Amado Picart vs Frank Smith, Jr.
Held:
In December 1912, Amado Picart was riding his horse
and while they were on a 75 meter long bridge, he saw
Frank Smith Jr.’s car approaching. Smith blew his horn
thrice while he was still at a distance away because
Picart and his horse were on Smith’s lane. But Picart
did not move his horse to the other lane, instead he
moved his horse closer to the railing. Smith continued
driving towards Picart without slowing down and when
he was already so near the horse he swerved to the
other lane. But the horse got scared so it turned its
body across the bridge; the horse struck the car and its
limb got broken. Picart suffered injuries which required
several days of medical attention while the horse
eventually died.
ISSUE: Whether or not Smith is negligent.
HELD: Yes. And so was Picart for planting himself on
the wrong side of the road. But Smith’s negligence
succeeded that of Picart. Smith saw at a distance when
he blew his horn that Picart and his horse did not move
to the other lane so he should have steered his car to
the other lane at that point instead of swerving at the
last minute. He therefore had the last clear chance to
avoid the unfortunate incident. When Smith’s car has
approached the horse at such proximity it left no
chance for Picart extricate himself and vigilance on his
part will not avert injury. Picart can therefore recover
damages from Smith but such should be proportioned
by reason of his contributory negligence
Picart v. Smith
Facts:
Plaintiff Amado Picart was riding on his pony on the
Carlatan Bridge in San Fernando, La Union when the
defendant, riding on his car, approached. Defendant blew
his horn to give warning. Plaintiff moved the horse to the
right instead of moving to the left, reasoning that he had no
sufficient time to move to the right direction. Defendant
continued to approach, and when he had gotten quite near,
he quickly turned to the left. The horse was frightened that
it turned his body across the bridge. His limb was broken
and the rider was thrown off and got injured. The horse
died. An action for damages was filed against the
defendant.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in the
manner above described was guilty of negligence such as
gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done
As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right
to assume that the horse and rider would pass over to the
proper side; but as he moved toward the center of the
bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not
be done; and he must in a moment have perceived that it
was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the
moving vehicle. In the nature of things this change of
situation occurred while the automobile was yet some
distance away; and from this moment it was not longer
within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down
by going to a place of greater safety. The control of the
situation had then passed entirely to the defendant.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence
in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent
person would have used in the same situation? If not, then
he is guilty of negligence. Conduct is said to be negligent
when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would
have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was
sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct
or guarding against its consequences.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free
from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in
planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we
have already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and
in such case the problem always is to discover which agent
is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that
the negligent acts of the two parties were not
contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant
succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable
interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the
person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending
harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of
the other party.
David Taylor vs Manila Electric
Railroad and Light Company
David Taylor was a 15 year old boy who spent time as
a cabin boy at sea; he was also able to learn some
principles of mechanical engineering and mechanical
drawing from his dad’s office (his dad was a
mechanical engineer); he was also employed as a
mechanical draftsman earning P2.50 a day – all said,
Taylor was mature well beyond his age.
One day in 1905, he and another boy entered into the
premises of Manila Electric power plant where they
found 20-30 blasting caps which they took home. In an
Taylor V. Manila Electric Railroad
effort to explode the said caps, Taylor experimented
until he succeeded in opening the caps and then he And Light Co.(1910)
lighted it using a match which resulted to the explosion
of the caps causing severe injuries to his companion
and to Taylor losing one eye. G.R. No. L-4977 March 22, 1910
Taylor sued Manila Electric alleging that because the
company left the caps exposed to children, they are FACTS:
liable for damages due to the company’s negligence.
 September 30, 1905 Sunday
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Electric is liable for
damages. afternoon: David Taylor, 15 years of age,
HELD: No. The SC reiterated the elements of quasi the son of a mechanical engineer, more
delict as follows:
mature than the average boy of his age, and
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
having considerable aptitude and training in
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant
personally, or some person for whose acts it must mechanics with a boy named Manuel
respond, was guilty. Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for
negligence and the damage.
the purpose of visiting Murphy, an
In the case at bar, it is true that Manila Electric has
been negligent in disposing off the caps which they employee of the defendant, who and
used for the power plant, and that said caps caused
promised to make them a cylinder for a
damages to Taylor. However, the causal connection
between the company’s negligence and the injuries miniature engine
sustained by Taylor is absent. It is in fact the direct acts
of Taylor which led to the explosion of the caps as he  After leaving the power house where they
even, in various experiments and in multiple attempts, had asked for Mr. Murphy, they walked
tried to explode the caps. It is from said acts that led to
the explosion and hence the injuries. across the open space in the neighborhood
Taylor at the time of the accident was well-grown youth of the place where the company dumped in
of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than
the cinders and ashes from its furnaces
the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a
cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a  they found some twenty or thirty brass
mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was
incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he fulminating caps scattered on the ground
was exceptionally well qualified to take care. The  These caps are approximately of the size
evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that he
well knew the explosive character of the cap with which and appearance of small pistol cartridges
he was amusing himself. The series of experiments
and each has attached to it 2 long thin wires
made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion
admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge by means of which it may be discharged by
the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts
to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final the use of electricity
success of his endeavors brought about by the  They are intended for use in the explosion
applications of a match to the contents of the cap, show
clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there of blasting charges of dynamite, and have
be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to
in themselves a considerable explosive
anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous.
power
“The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage
which comes to him through his own fault, and that he  the boys picked up all they could find, hung
cannot demand reparation therefor from another.”
them on stick, of which each took end, and
carried them home
 After crossing the footbridge, they met HELD: reversing the judgment of the court
Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and below
they went to Manuel's home
 The boys then made a series of experiments
with the caps
 trust the ends of the wires into an electric ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by
light socket - no result contracts, by quasi-contracts, and illicit acts and
 break the cap with a stone - failed omissions or by those in which any kind of fault
 opened one of the caps with a knife, and or negligence occurs.
finding that it was filled with a yellowish
substance they got matches
ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission
 David held the cap while Manuel applied a
causes damage to another when there is fault
lighted match to the contents
or negligence shall be obliged to repair the
 An explosion followed, causing more or less
damage so done.
serious injuries to all three
 Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting
a match to the contents of the cap, became ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the
frightened and started to run away, preceding article is demandable, not only for
received a slight cut in the neck personal acts and omissions, but also for those
 Manuel had his hand burned and wounded of the persons for whom they should be
 David was struck in the face by several responsible.
particles of the metal capsule, one of which
injured his right eye to such an extent as to
The father, and on his death or incapacity the
the necessitate its removal by the surgeons
mother, is liable for the damages caused by the
 Trial Court: held Manila Electric Railroad
minors who live with them.
And Light Company liable
ISSUE: xxx xxx xxx

Owners or directors of an establishment or

1. W/N the elemnents of quasi-delict to
enterprise are equally liable for damages caused
make Manila Electric Railroad And Light
by their employees in the service of the
Company liable - NO
branches in which the latter may be employed
2. W/N Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co.
or on account of their duties.
sufficiently proved that they employed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to avoid xxx xxx xxx

the damage - NO
The liability referred to in this article shall cease
when the persons mentioned therein prove that
they employed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to avoid the damage.
 accident he obtained employment as a
mechanical draftsman and continued in that
ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the
employment for 6 months at a salary of
damage caused —
P2.50 a day; and it appears that he was a
1 By the explosion of machines which may not boy of more than average intelligence, taller
have been cared for with due diligence, and for and more mature both mentally and
kindling of explosive substances which may not physically than most boys of 15
have been placed in a safe and proper place.  The series of experiments made by him in
his attempt to produce an explosion, as
described by Jessie who even ran away
 in order to establish his right to a recovery,  True, he may not have known and probably
must establish by competent evidence: did not know the precise nature of the
1. Damages to the plaintiff explosion which might be expected from the
2. Negligence by act or omission of which ignition of the contents of the cap, and of
defendant personally, or some person for course he did not anticipate the resultant
whose acts it must respond, was guilty. injuries which he incurred; but he well knew
3. The connection of cause and effect that a more or less dangerous explosion
between the negligence and the damage. might be expected from his act, and yet he
 while we hold that the entry upon the willfully, recklessly, and knowingly
property without express invitation or produced the explosion. It would be going
permission would not have relieved Manila far to say that "according to his maturity
Electric from responsibility for injuries and capacity" he exercised such and "care
incurred, without other fault on his part, if and caution" as might reasonably be
such injury were attributable to his required of him, or that defendant or
negligence, the negligence in leaving the anyone else should be held civilly
caps exposed on its premises was not the responsible for injuries incurred by him
proximate cause of the injury received under such circumstances.
 cutting open the detonating cap and putting  The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a
match to its contents was the proximate minor can be said to have the necessary
cause of the explosion and of the resultant capacity to understand and appreciate the
injuries inflicted nature and consequences of his own acts,
 Manila Electric is not civilly responsible for so as to make it negligence on his part to
the injuries thus incurred fail to exercise due care and precaution in
 2 years before the accident, David spent 4 the commission of such acts; and indeed it
months at sea, as a cabin boy on one of the would be impracticable and perhaps
interisland transports. Later he took up impossible so to do, for in the very nature
work in his father's office, learning of things the question of negligence
mechanical drawing and mechanical necessarily depends on the ability of the
engineering. About a month after his

minor to understand the character of his
own acts and their consequences
 he was sui juris in the sense that his age
and his experience qualified him to
understand and appreciate the necessity for
the exercise of that degree of caution which
would have avoided the injury which
resulted from his own deliberate act; and
that the injury incurred by him must be held
to have been the direct and immediate
result of his own willful and reckless act, so
that while it may be true that these injuries
would not have been incurred but for the
negligence act of the defendant in leaving
the caps exposed on its premises,
nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the
proximate and principal cause of the
accident which inflicted the injury
 rule of the Roman law was: Quod quis ex
culpa sua damnum sentit, non intelligitur
sentire
 just thing is that a man should suffer the
damage which comes to him through his
own fault, and that he can not demand
reparation therefor from another
 Negligence is not presumed, but must be
proven by him who alleges it.
Salud Villanueva Vda. De Bataclan vs
Mariano Medina
Pass-midnight in September 1952, Juan Bataclan rode
a bus owned by Mariano Medina from Cavite to Pasay.
While on its way, the driver of the bus was driving
fast and when he applied the brakes it cause the bus
to be overturned. The driver, the conductor, and some
passengers were able to free themselves from the bus
except Bataclan and 3 others. The passengers called
the help of the villagers and as it was dark, the villagers
brought torch with them. The driver and the conductor
failed to warn the would-be helpers of the fact that
gasoline has spilled from the overturned bus so a huge
fire ensued which engulfed the bus thereby killing the
4 passengers trapped inside. It was also found later in
trial that the tires of the bus were old.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proximate cause of the
death of Bataclan et al was their burning by reason of
the torches which ignited the gasoline.
HELD: No. The proximate cause was the overturning
of the bus which was caused by the negligence of the
driver because he was speeding and also he was
already advised by Medina to change the tires yet he
did not. Such negligence resulted to the overturning of
the bus. The torches carried by the would-be helpers
are not to be blamed. It is just but natural for the
villagers to respond to the call for help from the
passengers and since it is a rural area which did not
have flashlights, torches are the natural source of
lighting. Further, the smell of gas could have been all
over the place yet the driver and the conductor failed
to provide warning about said fact to the villagers.
WHAT IS “PROXIMATE CAUSE”?
Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.
And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause
is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person responsible for the
first event should, as an ordinary prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at
the moment of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom.
Fernando V. CA (1992)
FACTS:
 November 7, 1975: Bibiano Morta, market
master of the Agdao Public Market filed a
requisition request with the Chief of
Property of the City Treasurer's Office for
the re-emptying of the septic tank in Agdao
wherein Bascon won
 November 22, 1975: bidder Bertulano with
four other companions namely Joselito
 Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando  standard supposed to be supplied by the
and Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found dead inside imaginary conduct of the discreet pater
the septic tank. familias of the Roman law
 The bodies were removed by a fireman.  Conduct is said to be negligent when a
 The body of Joselito Garcia, was taken out prudent man in the position of the
by his uncle, Danilo Garcia and taken to the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an
Regional Hospital but he expired there. effect harmful to another was sufficiently
 The City Engineer's office investigated the probable warrant his foregoing the conduct
case and learned they entered the septic or guarding against its consequences
tank without clearance from it nor with the  The question as to what would constitute
knowledge and consent of the market the conduct of a prudent man in a given
master. situation must of course be always
 Since the septic tank was found to be determined in the light of human
almost empty, they were presumed to be experience and in view of the facts involved
the ones who did the re-emptying. in the particular case
 Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office  Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by
found them to have died from "asphyxia" - the ignoring of the suggestion born of this
diminution of oxygen supply in the body provision, is always necessary before
and intake of toxic gas negligence can be held to exist
 November 26, 1975: Bascon signed the  Distinction must be made between the
purchase order accident and the injury
 RTC: Dismissed the case  Where he contributes to the principal
 CA: Reversed - law intended to protect the occurrence, as one of its determining
plight of the poor and the needy, the factors, he can not recover
ignorant and the indigent  Where, in conjunction with the occurrence,
ISSUE: W/N Davao city is negligent and its he contributes only to his own injury, he
negligence is the proximate cause therefore can may recover the amount that the defendant
be liable for damages responsible for the event should pay for
such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable
equivalent for his own imprudence
HELD: NO. CA affirmed.  Toilets and septic tanks are not
 test by which to determine the existence of nuisances per se as defined in Article 694 of
negligence in a particular case: the New Civil Code which would necessitate
 Did the defendant in doing the alleged warning signs for the protection of the
negligent act use that reasonable care and public
caution which an ordinarily prudent person  While the construction of these public
would have used in the same situation? If facilities demands utmost compliance with
not, then he is guilty of negligence safety and sanitary requirements, the

putting up of warning signs is not one of
those requirements
 accident such as toxic gas leakage from the
septic tank is unlikely to happen unless one
removes its covers
 Considering the nature of the task of
emptying a septic tank especially one which
has not been cleaned for years, an
ordinarily prudent person should
undoubtedly be aware of the attendant
risks. The victims are no exception; more so
with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in this kind
of service, who is presumed to know the
hazards of the job. His failure, therefore,
and that of his men to take precautionary
measures for their safety was the proximate
cause of the accident.
 proximate and immediate cause of the
death of the victims was due to their own
negligence. Consequently, the petitioners
cannot demand damages from the public
respondent.
Mercury Drug Corporation vs.
Sebastian Baking (Torts –
Proximate Cause)
Facts:
Respondent Sebastian Baking went to the clinic of
Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical check-up. Subsequently,
after several tests, Dr. Sy prescribed two medical
prescriptions – Diamicron for his blood Sugar and
Benalize tablets for his triglyceride.
Respondent then proceeded to petitioner Mercury
Drug Store (MDC) to buy the prescribed medicines.
However, the saleslady misread the prescription for
Diamicron for Dormicrum – a potent sleeping tablet.
Unaware of the mistake, Respondent took it for three
consecutive days. On the third day, he figured in a
vehicular accident. His car collided with another car
driven by one Josie Peralta. It turned out that
Respondent fell asleep while driving and has no idea
regarding the accident. Suspecting that the tablet he
took may have caused the accident, he returned to
Dr. Sy and the latter was shocked because of the
wrong medicine sold to his patient.
Respondent thereafter filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) complaint for damages against
petitioner.
The RTC ruled in favour of the plaintiff; decision of
which was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.
Hence this present petition.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was negligent, if so,
whether such negligence was the proximate cause of
respondent’s accident?
Ruling:
YES.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides that
“Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no re-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict”.
The Court also enumerated the three (3) elements of
Quasi-delict, to wit:
1. Damage suffered by the plaintiff;
2. Fault or negligence of the defendant
3. Connection of the cause and effect between the
fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damage incurred by the plaintiff
The Court stressed that there is no dispute that
respondent suffered damages. It is generally
recognized that the drugstore business is imbued with
public interest. The health and safety of the people
will be put into jeopardy if the drugstore employees
will not exercise the highest degree of care and
diligence.
That petitioner’s employee was grossly negligent. The
care required must be commensurate with the danger
involved, and the skill employed must correspondent
with the superior knowledge of the business which the
law demands.
Hence, the Court sustained that the proximate cause
of the accident was the petitioner’s employee’s
negligence. The vehicular accident could have not
occurred had the employee been careful to his job.
CAEDO et al vs. YU KHE THAI and
RAFAEL BERNARDO
G.R. No. L-20392 December 18,
1968
FACTS:
Plaintiff Caedo was driving his Mercury car at about
5:30 in the morning of March 24, 1958 along E. de los
Santos Ave., in the vicinity of San LorenzoVillage
bound for the airport. Several members of his family
were in the car. Coming from the opposite direction
was the Cadillac car of defendant Yu Khe Thai driven
by his driver Rafael Bernardo. The two cars were
traveling at a moderate speed with their headlights on.
Ahead of the Cadillac was a caretela.
Defendant’s driver did not notice it until he was about
eight (8) meters away. Instead of slowing down behind
the caretela defendant’s driver veered to the left with
the intention of passing by the caretela but in doing so
its rear bumper caught the ream of thecaretela’s left
wheel wrenching it off. Defendant’s car skidded
obliquely to the other end and collided with the on-
coming vehicle of the plaintiff. The plaintiff on his part,
slackened his speed and tried to avoid the collision by
veering to the right but the collisionoccurred just the
same injuring the plaintiff and members of his family.
Plaintiff brought an action for damages against both
the driver and owner of the Cadillac car. There was no
question that defendant’s driver was negligent and
liable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not defendant Yu Khe Thai, owner of the
car, who was in the car, was solidarily liable with
the driver under Art. 2184, of the Civil Code.
RULING:
The applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code.
Under the said provision, if the causative factor was the
driver’s negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was
present is likewise held liable if he could have
prevented the mishap by the exerciseof due diligence.
The basis of the master’s liability in civil law is not
respondent superior but rather the relationship of
paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the
negligence of the servant, if known to the master and
susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own
negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent
injury or damage.
Negligence on the part of the owner, if any, must be
sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of
the accident, that is, in his failure to detain
the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave
him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time
to act upon it. We do not see that such negligence may
be imputed. The car, as has been stated, was not
running at an unreasonable speed. The road was wide
and open, and devoid of traffic that early morning.
There was no reason for the car owner to be in any
special state of alert. He had reason to rely on the skill
and experience of his driver. He became aware of the
presence of the carretela when his car was only twelve
meters behind it, but then his failure to see it earlier did
not constitute negligence, for he was not himself at the
wheel. And even when he did see it at that distance, he
could not have anticipated his driver’s sudden decision
to pass the carretela on its left side in spite of the fact
that another car was approaching from the opposite
direction. The time element was such that there was no
reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the
risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. The
thought that entered his mind, he said, was that if he
sounded a sudden warning it might only make the
other man nervous and make the situation worse. It
was a thought that, wise or not, connotes no absence of
that due diligence required by law to prevent the
misfortune. Under the facts the owner of the car was
not liable.
KAPALARAN BUS LINE vs. CORONADO
(G.R. No. 85331; August 25, 1989)
Legal Issue:
Whether or not KAPALARAN BUS LINE
(KBL) is liable for damages from the collision.
Facts of the Case: T h e j e e p n e y d r i v e n b y
Lope Grajera was then coming from
P i l a , L a g u n a a n d traversing the an old
highway to wards Sta. Cruz collided with a
KBL bus driven by its regular driver Virgilio
Llamoso. As testified to by Atty. Conrado L.
Manicad who was driving a Mustang car coming
from the direction of Sta. Cruz and proceeding
towards the direction of Manila, he stopped at
the intersection to give way to the jeepney
driven by G r a j e r a . T h e s k e t c h m a r k e d
very clearly that the jeepney had
a l r e a d y t r a v e r s e d t h e intersection when it met
the KBL bus head-on. It is also obvious that the point
of impact was on the right lane of the highway which
is the lane properly belonging to the jeepney. Judging
from the testimony of Atty. Conrado L. Manicad and
the sketch (Exhibit 'E'), the s e q u e n c e o f e v e n t s
shows that the first vehicle to arrive at
t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n w a s t h e jeepney. Seeing that
the road was clear, the jeepney which had stopped at
the intersection began to move forward, and for his
part, Atty. Manicad stopped his car at the intersection turn towards Libertad Street when the collision
to give way to the jeepney. The KBL bus had no occurred. Villagracia sustained serious
more room within which to stop without slamming injuries and had to undergo four operations.
into the rear of the vehicle behind the car of
Atty. Manicad. The KBL driver chose to Villagracia instituted an action for damages against
gamble on proceeding on its way, unfortunately, the P&G Phils., Inc. and
jeepney driven by Grajera, which had the right-of-
Añonuevo before the RTC. He had also filed a criminal
way, was about to cross the center of the highway
and was directly on the path of the KBL bus. complaint against Añonuevo
The impact indicates that the KBL bus was before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong,
travelling at a fast rate of speed because, but the latter was subsequently
after the collision, it did not stop; it acquitted of the criminal charge. Añonuevo claims
travelled for another 50meters and stopped only that Villagracia violated traffic
when it hit an electric post. regulations when he failed to register his bicycle or
install safety gadgets. He posits that
Ruling of the Court:YES
. KBL is liable for the damages in the collision. Article 2185 of the Civil Code applies by analogy.
Reason behind the Ruling:
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it
The patent and gross negligence on the part
of the petitioner Kapalaran's driver raised the is presumed that a person
legal presumption that Kapalaran as driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the
employer was guilty of negligence either in time of the mishap he was
the selection or in the supervision of its bus violating any traffic regulation.
driver, where the employer is held liable for
damages; it has of course a right of recourse against 1. W/N Art. 2185 of the New Civil
its own negligent employee. The liability of the Code should apply to non-
employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is motorized vehicles, making
direct and immediate; it i s n o t c o n d i t i o n e d Villagracia presumptively negligent
upon prior recourse against the neglige --> N
n t e m p l o y e e a n d a p r i o r showing of the There is pertinent basis for segregating between
insolvency of such employee. So far as the motorized and non-motorized
record shows, petitioner Kapalaran was unable
vehicles. A motorized vehicle, unimpeded by the
to rebut the presumption of negligence on its own
part. The award of moral damages against petitioner limitations in physical exertion. is
Kapalaran is not only entirely in order; it is also quite capable of greater speeds and acceleration than non-
modest consideirng Dionisio Shinyo's death during motorized vehicles. At the same
the pendency of this petition, a death hastened by, time, motorized vehicles are more capable in
if not directly due to, the grievous injuries inflicting greater injury or damage in the
sustained by him in the violent collision. event of an accident or collision. This is due to a
combination of factors peculiar to the
JONAS AÑONUEVO, petitioner vs. motor vehicle, such as the greater speed, its relative
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JEROME greater bulk of mass, and greater
combustibility due to the use of fuel.
VILLAGRACIA, respondent
Tinga, J. 2. W/N Villagracia was negligent for
failure to comply with traffic
regulations --> N
FACTS The existence of negligence in a given case is not
Villagracia was traveling along Boni Ave. on his determined by the personal
bicycle, while Añonuevo, judgment of the actor in a given situation, but rather,
traversing the opposite lane was driving a Lancer car it is the law which determines what
owned by Procter and Gamble would be reckless or negligent. Añonuevo asserts that
Inc., the employer of Añonuevo’s brother. Añonuevo Villagracia was negligent as the
was in the course of making a left latter had transgressed traffic regulations. However,
Añonuevo was speeding as he the pedestrian overpass. Also, the complainants
made the left turn, and such negligent act was the presented no evidence to support their allegation of
proximate cause of the accident. the petitioner’s negligence.
Even assuming that Añonuevo had failed to see
CA reversed trial court’s decision.
Villagracia because the bicycle was not
equipped with headlights, such lapse on the cyclist’s Issue:
part would not have acquitted the
driver of his duty to slow down as he proceeded to Was there sufficient legal basis to award damages?
make the left turn.

3. W/N Villagracia is guilty of Ruling:

contributory negligence --> N Yes. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers
As between Añonuevo and Villagracia, the lower are liable for the damages caused by their employees
courts adjudged Añonuevo as acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. The
solely responsible for the accident. The petition does liability arises due to the presumed negligence of the
not demonstrate why this finding employers in supervising their employees unless they
should be reversed. It is hard to imagine that the prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
same result would not have occurred father of a family to prevent the damage. In this case,
even if Villagracia’s bicycle had been equipped with petitioner failed to prove that she exercised the
safety equipment. diligence of a good father of a family in supervising
Macasasa.

However, Soriano was guilty of contributory

FLORDELIZA MENDOZA vs. MUTYA
SORIANO and Minor
JULIE ANN SORIANO duly represented by
her natural mother
and guardian ad litem MUTYA SORIANO,
G.R. No. 164012,
June 8, 2007
Facts:
On July 14, 2007, Sonny Soriano, while crossing
Commonwealth Avenue, was hit by a speeding FX
driven by Lomer Macasasa. Macasasa fled the scene.
Soriano was brought by a school bus to
East Avenue Medical Center where he later died. On
August 20, 1997, respondents (Soriano’s wife and
daughter) filed a complaint for damages against
Macasasa and petitioner Mendoza, the registered
owner of the vehicle. In her answer, petitioner
maintained that she was not liable as owner of the
vehicle, because she had exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family over her employee, Macasasa.
Upon respondents’ motion, the complaint for
damages against Macasasa was dismissed.
After trial, trial court dismissed the complaint. It
found Soriano negligent for crossing Commonwealth
Avenue by using a gap in the island’s fencing rather
negligence for not using the pedestrian overpass
while crossing Commonwealth Avenue. Hence, the
reduction by 20% of the damages awarded, based on
Article 2179 of the Civil Code which reads: “When the
plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory,
the immediate and proximate cause of the injury
being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff
may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate
the damages to be awarded”.
Petition denied for lack of merit. Decision of CA
affirmed.
Spouses Africa et al vs Caltex Philippines,
Boquiren and the Court of Appeals
In March 1948, in Rizal Avenue, Manila, a tank
truck was hosing gasoline into the underground
storage of Caltex. Apparently, a fire broke out
from the gasoline station and the fire spread and
burned several houses including the house of
Spouses Bernabe and Soledad Africa. Allegedly,
someone (a passerby) threw a cigarette while
gasoline was being transferred which caused the
fire. But there was no evidence presented to
prove this theory and no other explanation can be
had as to the real reason for the fire. Apparently
also, Caltex and the branch owner (Mateo
Boquiren) failed to install a concrete firewall to
contain fire if in case one happens.
ISSUE: Whether or not Caltex and Boquiren are
liable to pay for damages.
HELD: Yes. This is pursuant to the application on
the principle of res ipsa loquitur (“the transaction
speaks for itself”) which states: “where the thing
which caused injury, without fault of the injured
person, is under the exclusive control of the
defendant and the injury is such as in the ordinary
course of things does not occur if he having such
control use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of the explanation, that
the injury arose from defendant’s want of care.”
The gasoline station, with all its appliances,
equipment and employees, was under the control
of Caltex and Boquiren. A fire occurred therein
and spread to and burned the neighboring
houses. The persons who knew or could have
known how the fire started were Boquiren, Caltex
and their employees, but they gave no
explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and
reasonable inference that the incident happened
because of want of care.
Note that ordinarily, he who charges negligence
shall prove it. However, res ipsa loquitur is the
exception because the burden of proof is shifted
to the party charged of negligence as the latter is
the one who had exclusive control of the thing
that caused the injury complained of.
Africa vs. Caltex, 16 SCRA 448
Facts: In the afternoon of March 18, 1948, a fire broke
out at the Caltex service station at the corner of
Antipolo St. and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while
gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the
underground storage, right at the opening of the
receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was
inserted. The fire spread to and burned several
houses. The owners, among them petitioner spouses
Africa and heirs of Ong, sued respondents Caltex Phil.,
Inc., the alleged owner of the station, and Mateo
Boquiren, the agent in charge of its operation, for
damages. The CFI and CA found that the petitioners
failed to prove negligence of the respondents, and
that there was due care in the premises and with
respect to the supervision of their employees.
Issue: Whether or not, without proof as to the cause
and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur should apply so as to presume negligence on
the part of the respondents.
Held: Yes. Res ipsa loquitur literally means “the thing
or transaction speaks for itself.” For the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur to apply, the following requisites
should be present: (a) the accident is of a kind which
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s
negligence; (b) it is caused by an instrumentality
within the exclusive control of the defendant or
defendants; and (c) the possibility of contributing
conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is
eliminated. In the case at bar, the gasoline station,
with all its appliances, equipment and employees,
was under the control of respondents. A fire occurred
therein and spread to and burned the neighboring
houses. The persons who knew or could have known
how the fire started were respondents and their
employees, but they gave no explanation thereof
whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that
the incident happened because of want of care. The
negligence of the employees was the proximate cause
of the fire, which in the ordinary course of things does
not happen. Therefore, the petitioners are entitled to
the award for damages.
F.F. CRUZ and CO., INC., petitioner, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, GREGORIO MABLE as
substituted by his wife LUZ ALMONTE MABLE
and children DOMING, LEONIDAS, LIGAYA,
ELENA, GREGORIO, JR., SALOME, ANTONIO,
and BERNARDO all surnamed MABLE,
respondents. (WENCESLAO)
DOCTRINE
Upon payment of the loss incurred by the
insured, the insurer is entitled to be
subrogated pro tanto to any right of action
which the insured may have against the third
person whose negligence or wrongful act
caused the loss. Under Art. 2207, the real
party in interest with regard to the indemnity
received by the insured is the insurer.
FACTS
 FF Cruz’s furniture manufacturing
shop in Caloocan was situated
adjacent to private respondent
Gregorio Mable’s residence. Mable
first approached Eric Cruz (plant
manager of petitioner) to request
that a firewall be construcred
between the shop and Mable
residence. This request was repeated
several times but Cruz fell on deaf
ears.
 Sept 6 1974—a fire broke out in FF
Cruz’s shop. Petitioner’s employees,
who slept in the shop premises tried to
put out the fire but their efforts proved
futile. The fire spread to Mable’s
house. Both the shop and the house
was razed to the ground. The cause
of the conflagration was never
discovered.
 Subsequently, Mable filed an action
for damages against Cruz. RCFI held
for the Mables ordering Cruz to pay
for damages.
 CA affirmed CFI decision. MR was
filed by Cruz but was denied. Hence,
this petition for review on certiorari
and eventually submitted for decision
on Jan 1981.
 Petitioner argues that the sum of
P35,000 which Mable recovered on
the insurance of their house must be
deducted from the award of
damages. Also, they argue that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur must
apply in the case,
ISSUE/S
W/N private respondents may still recover
from petitioner notwithstanding the
indemnity paid by their insurer?
HELD/RATIO
YES!
Art. 2207. If the plaintiff’s property has been
insured, and he has received indemnity from
the insurance company for the injury or loss
arising out of the wrong or breach of
contract complained of, the insurance
company is subrogated to the rights of the
insured against the wrongdoer or the person
who violated the contract. If the amount
paid by the insurance company does not
fully cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved
party shall be entitled to recover the
deficiency from the person causing the loss
or injury.
The law is clear and needs no interpretation.
On the other hand, the insurer may seek
reimbursement of the amount it indemnified
private respondents from petitioner. This is the
essence of the right to subrogation under Art.
2207. Upon payment of the loss incurred by
the insured, the insurer is entitled to be
subrogated to any right of action which the
insurer may have against the third person
whise negligence or wrongful act caused the
loss. (Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. v. Jamila
& Co.)
Under Art. 2207, the real party in interest with
regard to the indemnity received is the
insurer. Whether or not the insurer should
exercise the rights of the insured to which it
had been subrogated lies solely within the
former’s sound discretion. Since the insurer is
not a party to this case, its identity is not of
record, and no claim is made on its behalf,
the private respondent’s insurer has to claim
his right to reimbursement of the P35,000 paid
to the insured.
RULING: CA AFFIRMED. P35000 is reduced
rom the damages and the right of the insurer
to subrogation and thus seek reimbursement
from petitioner for P35000 is recognized.
NOTES:
Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur (found to be
applicable in this case)
 Concept: where the thing which caused
the injury complained of is shown to be under
the management of the defendant or his
servants and the accident is such as in the Respondent.
ordinary course of things does not happen if
those who have its management or control ISSUES OF THE CASE:
use the proper case, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of explanation by WHETHER RESPONDENT GPS, EITHER AS A
the defendant, that the accident arose from COMMON CARRIER OR A PRIVATE CARRIER, MAY BE
want of care. PRESUMED TO HAVE BEEN NEGLIGENT WHEN THE
GOODS IT UNDERTOOK TO TRANSPORT SAFELY
 Applicability: petitioner failed to construct WERE SUBSEQUENTLY DAMAGED WHILE IN ITS
a firewall between its shop and the residence PROTECTIVE CUSTODY AND POSSESSION.
of private respondents as required by the city
ordinance. Thus, the accident arose from - In culpa contractual, upon which the action of
want of care. petitioner rests as being the subrogee of Concepcion
Industries, Inc., the mere proof of the existence of
the contract and the failure of its compliance justify,
FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. G.P.S prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. Thus,
TRUCKING CORPORATION and LAMBERT FGU has a claim for the amount paid out.
M. EROLES - The law, recognizing the obligatory force of
contracts, will not permit a party to be set free from
liability for any kind of misperformance of the
FACTS OF THE CASE:
contractual undertaking or a contravention of the
G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS)
tenor thereof
undertook to deliver on 18 June 1994 thirty (30)
- GPS recognizes the existence of a contract of
units of Condura S.D. white refrigerators aboard one
carriage between it and petitioner’s assured, and
of its Isuzu truck, driven by Lambert Eroles. While
admits that the cargoes it has assumed to deliver
the truck was traversing the north diversion road
have been lost or damaged while in its custody. In
along McArthur highway in Barangay Anupol,
such a situation, a default on, or failure of
Bamban, Tarlac, it collided with an unidentified
compliance with, the obligation in this case, the
truck, causing it to fall into a deep canal, resulting in
delivery of the goods in its custody to the place of
damage to the cargoes.
destination - gives rise to a presumption of lack of
FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU), an insurer of the
care and corresponding liability on the part of the
shipment, paid to Concepcion Industries, Inc., the
contractual obligor the burden being on him to
value of the covered cargoes: P204, 450.00. FGU, in
establish otherwise. GPS has failed to do so.
turn, being the subrogee of the rights and interests
of the insured sought reimbursement of the amount,
HELD:
from GPS. Since GPS failed to heed the claim, FGU
The decision of the lower courts insofar as Lambert
filed a complaint for damages and breach of contract
M. Eroles is concerned is affirmed but assailed
of carriage against GPS and its driver with the
decision with regard to GPS trucking is reversed. It, is
Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, of Makati City. In its
hereby ordered to pay FGU Insurance Corporation
answer, respondents asserted that GPS was the
the value of the damaged and lost cargoes in the
exclusive hauler only of Concepcion Industries, Inc.,
amount of P204, 450.00
since 1988, and it was not so engaged in business as
a common carrier. Respondents further claimed that
Obligations and Contracts Terms:
the cause of damage was purely accidental. GPS,
instead of submitting its evidence, filed with leave of
• expectation interest- the interest in having the
court a motion to dismiss the complaint by way of
benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a
demurrer to evidence on the ground that petitioner
position as he would have been in had the contract
had failed to prove that it was a common carrier.
been performed
The RTC and CA both ruled in favor of the
• reliance interest- the interest in being reimbursed
for loss caused by reliance on the contract by being
put in as good a position as he would have been in
had the contract not been made
• Restitution interest- which is his interest in having
restored to him any benefit that he has conferred on
the other party.
• Subrogee- the person or entity that assumes the
legal right to attempt to collect a claim of another
(subrogor) in return for paying the other's expenses
or debts which the other claims against a third party.
A subrogee is usually the insurance company which
has insured the party whose expenses were paid.
Layugan vs. IAC; Torts- vicarious liability
of owner of a truck
Facts:
Pedro T. Layugan filed an action for damages against
Godofredo Isidro, alleging that while at Baretbet,
Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, the Plaintiff and a
companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck
which was parked along the right side of the National
Highway; that defendant's truck, driven recklessly by
Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff, that as a result,
plaintiff was injured and hospitalized where he
incurred and will incur more expenses as he
recuperates from said injuries; Plaintiff's right leg was
amputated and that because of said injuries he would
be deprived of a lifetime income.
To free themselves from liability, defendants Isidro
[owner] and Serrano [driver] averred that he knows his
responsibilities as a driver and further contends that it
was the negligence of plaintiff that was the proximate
cause of the accident. They alleged that plaintiff
parked his truck in a manner which occupied a part of
the highway and he did not even put a warning sign.
Subsequently, a third-party complaint was filed by the
defendant against his insurer, the Travellers Multi
Indemnity Corporation; that the third-party plaintiff
[Isidro], without admitting his liability to the plaintiff,
claimed that the third-party defendant [Travellers] is
liable to the former for contribution, indemnity and
subrogation by virtue of their insurance contract which
covers the insurer's liability for damages arising from
death, bodily injuries and damage to property. The
Insurance company argued that it is only liable for the
amount agreed in the policy and the complaint was
premature since no claim was made to it.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Petitioners. The CA
reversed the decision, stating that it is the petitioners
who were negligent since they did not exercise
caution by putting warning signs that their truck is
park on the shoulder of the highway.
Issue:
Whether or not Isidro is liable as employer of Serrano.
Ruling:
Yes!
The SC held that the CA erroneously appreciated the
evidence. It was proven that the petitioner placed a
warning sign within 3 to 4 meters from their truck in
the form of a lighted kerosene lamp. The existence of
this warning sings was corroborated by Serrano,
respondent's driver, and further stated that when he
saw a parked truck, he kept on stepping on the brake
pedal but it did not function. Thus despite this
warning signs, the truck recklessly driven by Serrano
and owned by Respondent Isidro bumped the truck of
petitioner.
The private respondent is sued under Art. 2176 in
relation to Art. 2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code.
In the latter, when an injury is caused by the
negligence of a servant or employee there instantly
arises a presumption of law that there was negligence
on the part of the master or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision
over him after selection, or both. Such presumption
is juris tantum and not juris et de jure and
consequently, may be rebutted. If follows necessarily
that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the
court that in the selection and in the supervision he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a
family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved
from liability. In disclaiming liability for the incident,
the private respondent stresses that the negligence of
his employee has already been adequately overcome
by his driver's statement that he knew his
responsibilities as a driver and that the truck owner
used to instruct him to be careful in driving.
We do not agree with the private respondent in his
submission. In the first place, it is clear that the driver
did not know his responsibilities because he
apparently did not check his vehicle before he took it
on the road. If he did he could have discovered earlier
that the brake fluid pipe on the right was cut, and could
have repaired it and thus the accident could have been
avoided. Moveover, to our mind, the fact that the
private respondent used to intruct his driver to be
careful in his driving, that the driver was licensed, and
the fact that he had no record of any accident, as found
by the respondent court, are not sufficient to destroy
 The two-storey residence of the Sarangayas
the finding of negligence of the Regional Trial Court
given the facts established at the trial. The private was behind the second and third doors of
respondent or his mechanic, who must be competent, the building
should have conducted a thorough inspection of his
vehicle before allowing his driver to drive it.  On the left side of the commercial building
stood the office of the Matsushita Electric
In the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case,
we hold that Isidro failed to prove that the diligence of Philippine Corporation (Matsushita)
a good father of a family in the supervision of his  1988: Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc.
employees which would exculpate him from solidary
through its branch manager Bienvenido
liability with his driver to the petitioner. But even if
we concede that the diligence of a good father of a Pascual, entered into a contract of lease of
family was observed by Isidro in the supervision of his the first door beside the Matsushita office
driver, there is not an iota of evidence on record of the
observance by Isidro of the same quantum of diligence  It was converted into a two door so he had
in the supervision of his mechanic, if any, who would a garage where he parked a company
be directly in charge in maintaining the road
worthiness of his (Isidro's) truck. But that is not all. car 1981 model 4-door Ford Cortina which
There is paucity of proof that Isidro exercised the he used to supervise different towns
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
 July 7, 1988: Pascual went to San
of his driver, Daniel Serrano, as well as in the selection
of his mechanic, if any, in order to insure the safe Fernando, Pampanga leaving the car
operation of his truck and thus prevent damage to
 3 days later: When he returned and warmed
others. Accordingly, the responsibility of Isidro as
employer treated in Article 2180, paragraph 5, of the up the car, it made an odd sound. On the
Civil Code has not ceased. second try, there was again an odd sound
and a small flames came out of its engine
so he was startled, stopped the car, went
Perla Compania De Seguros, Inc., Et out and pushed it out of the garage
 Soon, fire spewed out of its rear
Al. V. Sps. Gaudencio And Primitiva
compartment and burned the whole garage
Sarangaya (2005) where he was trapped so he suffered burns
in the face, legs and arms
G.R. No. 147746 October 25, 2005
 The spouses were busy atching TV when
Lessons Applicable: Res Ipsa Loquitur
they heard 2 loud explosions, smelt of
(Torts and Damages)
gasoline and fire burned all their belongings
 city fire marshall investigated and
concluded that the fire was accidental
FACTS:
 Spouses filed a complaint against Pascual
 1986: Spouses Gaudencio Sarangaya III
for gross negligence and Perla for
and Primitiva Sarangaya erected Super A
lacking the required diligence in the
Building, a semi-concrete, semi-narra, one-
selection and supervision of its employee.
storey commercial building fronting the
 RTC: Pascual and Perla liable jointly and
provincial road of Santiago, Isabela
solidarily
 It has three doors which were leased out
 Pascual was held liable under the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur
 CA: affirmed but modified the amount of
damages
ISSUE:
1. W/N the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
applicable - YES
2. W/N Perla lacked the required diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employee. - NO
HELD: DENIED
1. YES.
 Res ipsa loquitur
 Latin phrase which literally means “the
thing or the transaction speaks for itself.
 It relates to the fact of an injury that sets
out an inference to the cause thereof or
establishes the plaintiff’s prima facie case
 The doctrine rests on inference and not on
presumption
 facts of the occurrence warrant the
supposition of negligence and they furnish
circumstantial evidence of negligence when
direct evidence is lacking
 based on the theory that the defendant
either knows the cause of the accident or
has the best opportunity of ascertaining it
and the plaintiff, having no knowledge
thereof, is compelled to allege negligence in
general terms
 plaintiff relies on proof of the happening of
the accident alone to establish negligence
 provides a means by which a plaintiff can
pin liability on a defendant who, if innocent,
should be able to explain the care he
exercised to prevent the incident
complained of
 defendant’s responsibility to show that
there was no negligence on his part
 Requisites of Res Ipsa Loquitur
 1) the accident is of a kind which does not
ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent
 “Ordinary” refers to the usual course of
events
 Flames spewing out of a car engine, when it
is switched on, is obviously not a normal
event. Neither does an explosion usually
occur when a car engine is revved.
 Pascual, as the caretaker of the car, failed
to submit any proof that he had it
periodically checked - negligence
 2) the cause of the injury was under the
exclusive control of the person in charge
and
 3) the injury suffered must not have been
due to any voluntary action or contribution
on the part of the person injured.
 When there is caso fortuito:
 (a) the cause of the unforeseen and
unexpected occurrence was independent
of the human will
 human agency must be entirely excluded as
the proximate cause or contributory cause
of the injury or loss -Not because car not
maintained
 (b) it was impossible to foresee the event
which constituted the caso fortuito or, if it
could be foreseen, it was impossible to
avoid - NOT under the control of pascual
 (c) the occurrence must be such as to
render it impossible to perform an
obligation in a normal manner - Spouses
had no access nor obligation for the
maintenance
 (d) the person tasked to perform the
obligation must not have participated in any

course of conduct that aggravated the
accident
2. YES.
 Perla did not include any rule or regulation
that Pascual should have observed in
performing his functions
 There was no guidelines for the
maintenance and upkeep of company
property like the vehicle that caught fire
 Did not require periodic reports on or
inventories of its properties
 Article 2180 of the Civil Code states that
employers shall be liable for the damage
caused by their employees. The liability is
imposed on all those who by their industry,
profession or other enterprise have other
persons in their service or supervision
 Nowhere does it state that the liability is
limited to employers in the transportation
business.
Paulan vs Sarabia
GR No. L-10542
July 31, 1958
Facts:
On July 25, 1951, a truck owned and operated by
Zacarias Sarabia and driven by Emilio Celeste fell into
a creek after it collided with another truck of the Mary
Lim Line. As a result of the collision, Gaudencio Basco
who was one of the passengers of Sarabia’s Truck
died. On April 19, 1955, Basco’s widow and heirs filed
a complaint against Zacarias Sarabia and Emilio
Celeste for compensation and damages. On July 11,
1955 Sarabia filed a third-party complaint against
driver of the truck of Mary Lim Line and a certain
Quintin Lim. The third-party complaint was amended
on December 20, 1955 replacing Quintin Lim with the
name of Maria M. Lim. Maria Lim filed a motion to
dismiss contending among others that the action has
already prescribed. Sarabia argued that the
computation of the presriptive period should be
counted from April 19, 1955 the date when the main
action was filed against them.
Issue:
Whether or not the action already prescribed
Held:
Yes. The action which appellants(Sarabia) desire to
press against appellee (Lim) is really one based on
quasi-delict which prescribes in four years, and this
period having already expired when the action was
taken, it is obvious that the action has prescribed.
Thus, in the third-party complaint against the appelle
it is alleged that the collision “was the exclusive, direct
and immediate result of the felonious, negligent,
careless, reckless and imprudent driving of the TPU
truck of Mary Lim Line No. 108 by Juan Cadungon xxx
without any regard for traffic laws, and regulations
and vehicle laws as to speed, blowing of horn, right of
way and other rules”, which truck is owned and
operated by appellee. And Article 1146 of the New
Civil Code provides that an action based “upon a quasi-
delict”prescribes in four years.
The law ordinarily provides that the period during
which an action may be brought shall be computed
from the time the right of action accrues (Articles 1144
& 1149, New Civil Code), but nothing is provided in this
respect with regard to an action based on a quasi-
delict, Article 1146 (New Civil Code) simply provides
that the action shall be instituted within four years.
There being no provision as to when shall the period
of four years commence to run, the provision of Article
1150 shall apply, which reads: “The time for
prescription for all kinds of actions, when there is no
special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be
counted from the day they may be brought.”
Evidently, the day therein referred to is that of the
collision, for an action based on a quasi-delict can be
brought now independently of the criminal action and
even regardless of the outcome of the latter (Article
31, New Civil Code). There can therefore be no dispute
that the action of appellants against the appellee
should have been brought within the period of four
years counted from July 25, 1951.
Hidalgo Enterprises Inc. v.
Guillermo Balandan, Anselma
Anila and CA
GR No. L-3422. June 13, 1952, J. Bengzon
Topic: Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance
Facts: Hidalgo Enterprises was the owner of an
ice-plant factory in San Pablo, Laguna. In the
factory, there were two tanks full of water, both 9-
ft deep, for cooling purposes of its engine. There
was no fence or top cover; the edges of the tanks
were barely a foot high from the surface of the
ground. The factory itself was surrounded with a
fence. However, the wide gate entrance was
continually open, and anyone could easily enter
the factory. There was no guard assigned on the
gate.
Around noon on April 16, 1948, Mario
Balandan, a boy barely 3 years old, was playing
with other boys his age when he entered the
factory premises through the gate. Mario
Balandan then took a bath in one of the tanks of
water and, later on, sank to the bottom of the
tank. He died of “asphyxia secondary to
drowning.” The CFI and CA ruled that Hidalgo
Enterprises maintained an attractive nuisance
and neglected to adopt the necessary precautions
to avoid accident to person entering its premises.
Issue: Whether or not a water tank is an
attractive nuisance.
Held: No. Hidalgo Enterprises Inc.’s water tanks
are not classified as attractive nuisance. Other
issues such as whether it exercised reasonable
precautions, and if the parents were guilty of
contributory negligence are immaterial.
Appealed decision reversed. Hidalgo Enterprises
is absolved from liability.
Ratio:
One who maintains on his premises
dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a
character likely to attract children in play, and
who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent
children from playing therewith or resorting
thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is
injured thereby, even if the child is technically a
trespasser in the premises. This is the doctrine of
attractive nuisance. The principal reason for the
doctrine is that the condition or appliance in
question although its danger is apparent to those
of age, is so enticing or alluring to children of
tender years as to induce them to approach, get
on or use it, and this' attractiveness is an implied
invitation to such children.
The majority of American jurisprudence
posits that the doctrine of attractive nuisance is
generally not applicable to bodies of water,
whether artificial or natural. The exception to this
is if there is some unusual condition or artificial
feature other than mere water and its location.
Furthermore, in Anderson v. Reith-Riley Const.
Co., the Indiana Appellate Court explained why
bodies of water are not considered as attractive
nuisance. It ruled that children have been
instructed early on to exercise caution around
bodies of water and are presumed to know the
danger.
Dissent of J. Pablo: Children are naturally
curious and do not have perfect knowledge of
things. They are amazed by the natural attraction
of the waters and shall explore where their
curiosity leads them unless there is something
that prevents them. As such, petitioners should
have placed fences around the ponds as an
ordinary precaution. (Note: translated and
paraphrased from Spanish text)
Margarita Afialda vs Basilio Hisole et al
Loreto Afialda was a caretaker of the carabaos
owned by Basilio Hisole. In March 1947, without
any fault from Afialda or any force majeure, one
of the carabaos gored him thereby causing his
death. Afialda’s sister, Margarita Afialda, sued
Hisole arguing that under the Civil Code, “The
possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the
same, is liable for any damages it may cause,
even if such animal should escape from him or
stray away. This liability shall cease only in case,
the damage should arise fromforce majeure or
from the fault of the person who may have
suffered it.”
ISSUE: Whether or not Hisole is liable in the case
at bar as owner of the carabao which killed
Afialda.
HELD: No. The law uses the term “possessor
and user of the animal”. Afialda was the caretaker
of the animal and he was tasked and paid to tend
for the carabaos. He, at the time of the goring, is
the possessor and the user of the carabao and
therefore he is the one who had custody and
control of the animal and was in a position to
prevent the animal from causing damage. It
would have been different had Afialda been a
stranger. Obviously, it was the caretaker’s
business to try to prevent the animal from causing
injury or damage to anyone, including himself.
And being injured by the animal under those
circumstances was one of the risks of the
occupation which he had voluntarily assumed
and for which he must take the consequences.
This action could have been more appropriately
raised in court under the provisions of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act as the risk involve
was one of occupational hazards.
THE ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC
COMPANY vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, 1st Division, LILIAN JUAN
LUIS, JANE JUAN YABES, VIRGINIA
JUAN CID, GLORIA JUAN CARAG, and
PURISIMA JUAN, respondents.
[G.R. No. L-53401; November 6,
1989] Obligations and Contracts|Fortuitous
Events|
FACTS:
A strong typhoon engulfed the province of Ilocos
Norte, bringing heavy rains and flooding in its wake.
The deceased Isabel Lao Juan, fondly called Nana
Belen, ventured out of the house towards the direction
of the Five Sisters Emporium, a commercial
establishment. While wading in waist-deep flood,
Nana Belen, in an unfortunate accident, had suffered
and died in a circulatory shock electrocution. An
action for damages was instituted by the heirs of the
deceased. Petitioner, on the other hand, contended that
the deceased could have died either by drowning or by
electrocution due to negligence attributable only to
herself and not to the electric company. That the
deceased installed an electrical wire enclosing the iron
gate and fence to deter the area from burglars.
ISSUES:
Whether petitioner may be held liable for the
deceased’s death.
HELD:
While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered
Acts of God for which no person may be held
responsible, however, it was through the intervention
of petitioner’s negligence that death took place.
Under the circumstances, petitioner was negligent in
seeing to it that no harm is done to the general
public “… considering that electricity is an agency,
subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of
electric companies must be commensurate with or
proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising
this high degree of diligence and care extends to every
place where persons have a right to be“. “The
negligence of petitioner having been shown, it may not
now absolve itself from liability by arguing that the
victim’s death was solely due to a fortuitous event.”
When an act of God combines or concurs with the
negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the
defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted
but for his own negligent conduct or omission
Hence, the heirs of Nana Belen, may not be barred
from recovering damages caused by petitioner’s
negligence.
Calalas v Court of Appeals & Eliza Sunga
(Torts – Proximate Cause)
Facts:
Private Respondent Eliza Saunga took a passenger
jeepney owned and operated by Petitioner Vicente
Calalas. As the jeepney was already full, she was just
given an “extension seat”, a wooden stool, at the rear
end of the vehicle.
On the way, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger presumption of negligence at once arose on Calalas’
off. Since Sunga was seated at the rear end, she gave part, which makes him liable.
way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing
so, an Isuzu Elf Truck driven by Igclerio Verena and
owned by Francisco Salva, bumped to the left rear
end of the jeepney. This incident cause injury to
Sunga.

She filed a compliant for damages against Calalas on

the ground of breach of contract of carriage. On the
other hand, Calalas filed a third-party complaint
against Salva, the owner of the truck.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Salva guilty and

absolved Calalas from liability holding that it was the
truck owner who is responsible for the accident based
on quasi-delict.

However, on appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the

appellate court reversed the RTC’s decision, on the
ground that Sunga’s cause of action was based on a
breach of contract of carriage and not on quasi-delict.

Hence, this appeal from Calalas.

ISSUE: Whether or not the negligence of the truck

driver as the proximate cause of the accident which
negates petitioner’s liability?

RULING:

No.

First, the issue in this case is the liability under

contract of carriage.

In this case, the petitioner failed to transport his

passenger safely to his destination as a common
carrier in violation of Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the New
Civil Code.

Moreso, there is no basis that the ruling of the RTC

binds Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate cause
of the collision was the truck driver, because the
doctrine of proximate cause applies only to cases of
quasi-delict.

The doctrine of proximate cause is a device for

imputing liability to a person where there is no
relation between him and another party. But in the
case at bar, there is a pre-existing relation between
petitioner and respondent in their contract of
carriage. Hence, upon happening of the accident, the
018 Kapalaran Bus Line v. Coronado AUTHOR: Jimi R. Arranchado
G.R. No. 85331 August 25, 1989
TOPIC: Diligence Required of Common Carriers
PONENTE: FELICIANO, J.

FACTS:

1. The jeepney driven by Lope Grajera was then coming from Pila, Laguna and traversing the old highway towards Sta.
Cruz collided with a KBL bus driven by its regular driver Virgilio Llamoso.

2. As testified to by Atty. Conrado L. Manicad who was driving a Mustang car coming from the direction of Sta. Cruz and
proceeding towards the direction of Manila, he stopped at the intersection to give way to the jeepney driven by Grajera.

3. The sketch marked very clearly that the jeepney had already traversed the intersection when it met the KBL bus head-on.
It is also obvious that the point of impact was on the right lane of the highway which is the lane properly belonging to the
jeepney.

4. Judging from the testimony of Atty. Conrado L. Manicad and the sketch (Exhibit 'E'), the sequence of events shows that
the first vehicle to arrive at the intersection was the jeepney.

5. Seeing that the road was clear, the jeepney which had stopped at the intersection began to move forward, and for his part,
Atty. Manicad stopped his car at the intersection to give way to the jeepney.

6. The KBL bus had no more room within which to stop without slamming into the rear of the vehicle behind the car of
Atty. Manicad. The KBL driver chose to gamble on proceeding on its way, unfortunately, the jeepney driven by Grajera,
which had the right-of-way, was about to cross the center of the highway and was directly on the path of the KBL bus.

7. The impact indicates that the KBL bus was travelling at a fast rate of speed because, after the collision, it did not stop; it
travelled for another 50meters and stopped only when it hit an electric post.

8. On 14 September 1982, Kapalaran, apparently believing that the best defense was offense, filed a complaint for damage
to property and physical injuries through reckless imprudence against respondents Angel Coronado and Lope Grajera in the
Regional Trial Court. Respondents answered with their own claims (counter-claims) for damages. A third-party complaint
and/or a complaint for intervention was also filed in the same case against Kapalaran by jeepney passenger Dionisio Shinyo.

9. The petitioner contended that the jeepney should have stopped before entering the "Y-intersection" because of the
possibility that another vehicle behind the cars which had stopped might not similarly stop and might swerve to the left to
proceed to the highway en route to Manila, is more ingenious than substantial.

9. The trial court rendered a judgment in favor of private respondents.

10. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified the award of damages by setting aside the
grant of exemplary damages as well as the award of attorney's fee and litigation expenses made to Dionisio Shinyo.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Kapalaran's driver exercised the diligence required of common carriers.
HELD: NO.

RATIO:
1. Kapalaran's driver had become aware that some vehicles ahead of the bus and travelling in the same direction had already
stopped at the intersection obviously to give way either to pedestrians or to another vehicle about to enter the intersection.

2. The bus driver, who was driving at a speed too high to be safe and proper at or near an intersection on the highway, and
in any case too high to be able to slow down and stop behind the cars which had preceded it and which had stopped at the
intersection, chose to swerve to the left lane and overtake such preceding vehicles, entered the intersection and directly
smashed into the jeepney within the intersection.

3. Immediately before the collision, the bus driver was actually violating the following traffic rules and regulations, among
others, in the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, Republic Act No. 4136, as amended:

Sec. 35. Restriction as to speed. — (a) Any person driving a motor vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a careful and
prudent speed, not greater nor less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard for the traffic, the width of the highway,
and or any other condition then and there existing; and no person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway at such a
speed as to endanger the life, limb and property of any person, nor at a speed greater than will permit him to bring the vehicle
to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 41. Restrictions on overtaking and passing. 1 (a) The driver of a vehicle shall not drive to the left side of the center line
of a highway in overtaking or passing another vehicle, proceeding in the same direction, unless such left side is clearly
visible, and is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to permit such overtaking or passing to be made in
safety.

xxx xxx xxx

(c) The driver of a vehicle shall not overtake or pass any other vehicle proceeding in the same direction, at any railway
grade crossing, or at any intersection of highways, unless such intersection or crossing is controlled by traffic signal, or
unless permitted to do so by a watchman or a peace officer, except on a highway having two or more lanes for movement of
traffic in one direction where the driver of a vehicle may overtake or pass another vehicle on the right. Nothing in this section
shall be construed to prohibit a driver overtaking or passing, upon the right, another vehicle which is making or about to
make a left turn.

xxx xxx xxx

4. Thus, a legal presumption arose that the bus driver was negligent 3 a presumption Kapalaran was unable to overthrow.

5. The jeepney driver, seeing the cars closest to the intersection on the opposite side of the highway come to a stop to give
way to him, had the right to assume that other vehicles further away and behind the stopped cars would similarly come to a
stop and not seek illegally to overtake the stopped vehicles and come careening into the intersection at an unsafe speed.

6. Petitioner's bus was still relatively far away from the intersection when the jeepney entered the same; the bus collided
head on into the jeepney because the bus had been going at an excessively high velocity immediately before and at the time
of overtaking the stopped cars, and so caught the jeepney within the intersection. It was also the responsibility of the bus
driver to see to it, when it overtook the two (2) cars ahead which had stopped at the intersection, that the left lane of the road
within the intersection and beyond was clear. The point of impact was on the left side of the intersection (the light lane so
far as concerns the jeepney coming from the opposite side), which was precisely the lane or side on which the jeepney had
a right to be.

7. Kapalaran argues that there was no justification for holding it, the employer, liable for damages, considering that such
liability was premised upon the bus driver's negligence and that petitioner "as mere employer" was not guilty of such
negligence or imprudence. This contention in thoroughly unpersuasive. The patent and gross negligence on the part of the
petitioner Kapalaran's driver raised the legal presumption that Kapalaran as employer was guilty of negligence either in the
selection or in the supervision of its bus driver.

8. Where the employer is held liable for damages, it has of course a right of recourse against its own negligent employee. If
petitioner Kapalaran was interested in maintaining its right of recourse against or reimbursement from its own driver, it
should have appealed from that portion of the trial court's decision which had failed to hold the bus driver is not "merely
subsidiary," and is not limited to cases where the employee "cannot pay his liability" nor are private respondents compelled
first to proceed against the bus driver.

9. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior
recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. So far as the record shows,
petitioner Kapalaran was unable to rebut the presumption of negligence on its own part. The award of moral damages against
petitioner Kapalaran is not only entirely in order; it is also quite modest considering Dionisio Shinyo's death during the
pendency of this petition, a death hastened by, if not directly due to, the grievous injuries sustained by him in the violent
collision.

10. The law requires petitioner as common carrier to exercise extraordinary diligence in carrying and transporting their
passenger safely "as far as human care and foresight can proved, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with
due regard for all circumstances."

11. In requiring the highest possible degree of diligence from common carriers and creating a presumption of negligence
against them, the law compels them to curb the recklessness of their drivers. While the immediate beneficiaries of the
standard of extraordinary diligence are, of course, the passengers and owners of cargo carried by a common carrier, they are
not only persons that the law seeks to benefit. For if common carriers carefully observed the statutory standard of
extraordinary diligence in respect of their own passengers, they cannot help but simultaneously benefit pedestrians and the
owners and passengers of other vehicles who are equally entitled to the safe and convenient use of our roads and highways.

12. The law seeks to stop and prevent the slaughter and maiming of people (whether passengers or not) and the destruction
of property (whether freight or not) on our highways by buses, the very size and power of which seem often to inflame the
minds of their drivers. Article 2231 of the Civil Code explicitly authorizes the imposition of exemplary damages in cases of
quasi-delicts "if the defendant acted with gross negligence."
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: In requiring the highest possible degree of diligence from common carriers and creating a
presumption of negligence against them, the law compels them to curb the recklessness of their drivers. While the immediate
beneficiaries of the standard of extraordinary diligence are, of course, the passengers and owners of cargo carried by a
common carrier, they are not only persons that the law seeks to benefit. For if common carriers carefully observed the
statutory standard of extraordinary diligence in respect of their own passengers, they cannot help but simultaneously benefit
pedestrians and the owners and passengers of other vehicles who are equally entitled to the safe and convenient use of our
roads and highways.

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S): WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on certiorari is DENIED for lack
of merit and the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, except (1) that the award of exemplary damages
to Dionisio Shinyo shall be restored and increased from P10,000.00 to P25,000.00, and (2) that the grant of attorney's fees
and litigation expenses in the sum of P15,000.00 to Dionisio Shinyo shall similarly be restored. Costs against petitioner.