Chapter I.

General Principles

I. Remedial Law and Rules of Court

LIBERTAD ALTAVAS CONLU, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents. [No. L-14027.
January 29, 1960]

1. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; RECORD ON APPEAL; EXTENSION OF PERIOD TO FILE.—An extension of time granted to
amend a record on appeal does not carry with it an extension of the reglementary period for the filing of the appeal bond (Salva vs.
Palacio, et al., 52 Off. Gaz., p. 3089). Similarly, in this case, the extension granted for the filing of the record on appeal does not
carry with it an extension for the filing of the notice of appeal and appeal bond.

2. RULES OF COURT; FORCE AND EFFECT OF.—Rules of courts, promulgated by authority of law, have the force and effect of
law; and rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely
indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business (Shioji vs. Harvey,
43 Phil., 33; Alvero vs. De la Rosa et al., 47 Off. Gaz., p. 316).

In the Matter to Declare in Contempt Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH, 497 SCRA 626, G.R. No. 150274
August 4, 2006

As a general rule, the retroactive application of procedural laws cannot be considered violative of any personal rights because no
vested right may attach to nor arise therefrom.—Well-settled is the rule that procedural laws are construed to be applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent. As a
general rule, the retroactive application of procedural laws cannot be considered violative of any personal rights because no vested
right may attach to nor arise therefrom. In the case at bar, the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are clearly
procedural and no vested right of the petitioner is violated as he is considered preventively suspended while his case is on appeal.
Moreover, in the event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason
of the suspension or removal. Besides, there is no such thing as a vested interest in an office, or even an absolute right to hold
office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have
any vested right in an office.

PCI LEASING AND FINANCE, INC., petitioner, vs. EMILY ROSE GO KO, doing business under the name and style of “KD
SURPLUS” and KIDDY LIM CHAO, respondents. G.R. No. 148641. March 31, 2005.*

Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Statutes regulating the procedure of courts are applicable to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage—procedural laws are retroactive in that sense.—The issue in this petition has been squarely resolved in
the case of Narzoles v. NLRC. It will suffice for this Court to repeat the ruling therein. Parenthetically, respondents candidly “admit
that they cannot take a contrary stand” in resolving the petition at in accordance with this Court’s ruling in Narzoles. There is no
question that the amendments brought about by Circular No. 39-98, which took effect on September 1, 1998, were already in force,
and therefore applicable when petitioners filed their petition. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts are applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense. No vested rights
attach to procedural laws. Consequently, the CA, in accordance with Circular No. 39-98, correctly deducted the 16 days (the
fifteenth day was a Sunday) it took for petitioners to file their motion for reconsideration from the 60 day reglementary period. As
petitioners only had the remaining period of 44 days from 19 October 1998, when it received a copy of the resolution denying
reconsideration, to file the petition for certiorari, or until 8 December 1998, the filing of the petition on 17 December 1998 was nine
(9) days too late.

AURORA B. GO, petitioner, vs. ELMER SUNBANUN,** GEORGIE S. TAN, DORIS SUNBANUN and RICHARD SUNBANUN,
respondents. G.R. No. 168240. February 9, 2011.*

Remedial Law; Certiorari; Pleadings and Practice; Verification; Certification of Non-forum Shopping; In filing a certiorari petition,
one aggrieved by a court’s judgment, order or resolution must verify his/her petition and must also attach a sworn certification of
non-forum shopping.—In filing a certiorari petition, one aggrieved by a court’s judgment, order or resolution must verify his/her
petition and must also attach a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. In dismissing Aurora’s petition, the CA cited as one of its
grounds the lack of signatures or authorizations of Sang and Yiu-Go Employment Agency in the verification and certification of non-
forum shopping. Such signatures, however, may be dispensed with as these parties are not involved in the petition. Although the
caption in Aurora’s petition before the CA erroneously included Sang and Yiu-Go Employment Agency as petitioners, its contents
reveal that it is solely Aurora who is the ‘person aggrieved,’ as she is the one who assailed before the CA the RTC’s Order that
denied her notice of appeal and, hence, she should be the one who should sign the petition. Notably, Aurora is the only one held
liable by the trial court for damages and thus is the one interested in filing an appeal and in elevating the case to the CA. Moreover,
only Aurora filed her answer before the RTC while Sang and Yiu-Go Employment Agency did not file any.
Same; Same; Same; The second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 65 requires the submission of a certified true copy of the
judgment, order or resolution subject of the petition as well as the submission of copies of all pleadings and documents relevant to
the petition; Court emphasizes that not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached, but only those which are
material and pertinent that they may provide the basis for a determination of a prima facie case for abuse of discretion.—The
second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 65 requires the submission of a certified true copy of thejudgment, order or resolution
subject of the petition as well as the submission of copies of all pleadings and documents relevant to the petition. “The initial
determination of what pleadings, documents or order are relevant and pertinent to the petition rests on the petitioner. [Should the
CA opine that additional documents must be submitted together with the petition, it may] (a) dismiss the petition under the last
paragraph of [Section 3,] Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; (b) order the petitioner to submit the required additional pleadings,
documents, or order within a specific period of time; or (c) order the petitioner to file an amended petition appending thereto the
required pleadings, documents or order within a fixed period.” We emphasize that not all pleadings and parts of case records are
required to be attached, but only those which are material and pertinent that they may provide the basis for a determination of a
prima facie case for abuse of discretion.

Same; Same; Same; Service of Pleadings; Whenever practicable, personal service and personal filing of pleadings are always the
preferred modes of service; Should one deviate from the general rule, it is mandatory for him/her to submit a written explanation
why the pleading was not personally filed/served.—Whenever practicable, personal service and personal filing of pleadings are
always the preferred modes of service. Under Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, should one deviate from the general rule, it
is mandatory for him/her to submit a written explanation why the pleading was not personally filed/served. Otherwise, the court has
the discretion to consider the paper as not filed. Petitioner should be aware that a court, in reasonably exercising discretionary
power to dismiss a petition that violated the rule on written explanation for resorting to modes other than personal service, also has
to take into account another factor, i.e., the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Appeals; Court emphasized that provisions with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for
perfecting appeals are strictly applied and are only relaxed in very exceptional circumstances on equitable considerations.—Indeed,
judicial notice may be taken that personal service is impracticable considering the distance between Cebu and Manila, and that
Musa v. Amor, 380 SCRA 347 (2002), supports Aurora’s argument that a written explanation why service was not done personally
might have been superfluous considering the evident distance between the appellate court and the place where the petition was
posted. It must be emphasized, however, that provisions with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals
are strictly applied and are only relaxed in very exceptional circumstances on equitable considerations.

Same; Appeals; Fresh Period Rule; “Fresh Period Rule” as held in Neypes v. Court of Appeals; A litigant is given another fresh
period of 15 days to perfect an appeal after receipt of the order of denial of his/her motion for reconsideration/new trial before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC).—Aurora had almost lost her statutory privilege to appeal, but in view of our ruling on Neypes v. Court
of Appeals, 469 SCRA 633 (2005), we shall grant Aurora’s petition. In Neypes we held that a litigant is given another fresh period of
15 days to perfect an appeal after receipt of the order of denial of his/her motion for reconsideration/new trial before the RTC.

Same; Same; Same; Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure.—“[P]rocedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure.” Neypes, which we
rendered in September 2005, has been applied retroactively to a number of cases wherein the original period to appeal had already
lapsed subsequent to the denial of the motion for reconsideration. Aurora’s situation is no exception, and thus she is entitled to
benefit from the amendment of the procedural rules.

JAIME TAN, JR., as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Jaime C. Tan, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS (Ninth Special Div.) and JOSE A. MAGDANGAL and ESTRELLA MAGDANGAL, respondents. G.R. No. 136368.
January 16, 2002.*

Remedial Law; Statutory Construction; Statute; Section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should not be given
retroactive effect in this case as it would result in great injustice to the petitioner.—We hold that Section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Procedure should not be given retroactive effect in this case as it would result in great injustice to the petitioner.
Undoubtedly, petitioner has the right to redeem the subject lot and this right is a substantive right. Petitioner followed the procedural
rule then existing as well as the decisions of this Court governing the reckoning date of the period of redemption when he
redeemed the subject lot. Unfortunately for petitioner, the rule was changed by the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure which if
applied retroactively would result in his losing the right to redeem the subject lot. It is difficult to reconcile the retroactive application
of this procedural rule with the rule of fairness. Petitioner cannot be penalized with the loss of the subject lot when he faithfully
followed the laws and the rule on the period of redemption when he made the redemption.

Same; Same; Same; The manner of exercising the right cannot be changed and the change applied retroactively if to do so will
defeat the right of redemption of the petitioner which is already vested.—Petitioner fought to recover this lot from 1988. To lose it
because of a change of procedure on the date of reckoning of the period of redemption is inequitous. The manner of exercising the
right cannot be changed and the change applied retroactively if to do so will defeat the right of redemption of the petitioner which is
already vested.

LUCIA BARRAMEDA VDA. DE BALLESTEROS, petitioner, vs. RURAL BANK OF CANAMAN, INC., represented by its
Liquidator, THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, respondent. G.R. No. 176260. November 24, 2010.*

Remedial Law; Courts; Jurisdiction; Doctrine on Adherence of Jurisdiction; Court recognizes the doctrine on adherence of
jurisdiction; Principle is not without exceptions.—The Court recognizes the doctrine on adherence of jurisdiction. Lucia, however,
must be reminded that such principle is not without exceptions. It is well to quote the ruling of the CA on this matter, thus: This
Court is not unmindful nor unaware of the doctrine on the adherence of jurisdiction. However, the rule on adherence of jurisdiction
is not absolute and has exceptions. One of the exceptions is that when the change in jurisdiction is curative in character.

Same; Same; Same; Same; After the Monetary Board has declared that a bank is insolvent and has ordered it to cease operations,
the Board becomes the trustee of its assets for the equal benefit of all the creditors, including depositors.—The cited Morfe case
held that “after the Monetary Board has declared that a bank is insolvent and has ordered it to cease operations, the Board
becomes the trustee of its assets for the equal benefit of all the creditors, including depositors. The assets of the insolvent banking
institution are held in trust for the equal benefit of all creditors, and after its insolvency, one cannot obtain an advantage or a
preference over another by an attachment, execution or otherwise.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Lucia’s complaint involving annulment of deed of mortgage and damages falls within the purview of a
disputed claim in contemplation of Section 30 of R.A. 7653 (The New Central Bank Act); the jurisdiction should be lodged with the
liquidation court.—Anent the second issue, Lucia faults the CA in directing the consolidation of Civil Case No. IR-3128 with Special
Proceedings No. M-5290. The CA committed no error. Lucia’s complaint involving annulment of deed of mortgage and damages
falls within the purview of a disputed claim in contemplation of Section 30 of R.A. 7653 (The New Central Bank Act). The jurisdiction
should be lodged with the liquidation court.

Same; Same; Same; Disputed Claims; “Disputed claims” refers to all claims, whether they be against the assets of the insolvent
bank, for specific performance, breach of contract, damages, or whatever.—“Disputed claims” refers to all claims, whether they be
against the assets of the insolvent bank, for specific performance, breach of contract, damages, or whatever. Lucia’s action being a
claim against RBCI can properly be consolidated with the liquidation proceedings before the RTC-Makati.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Liquidation; Liquidation proceeding has been explained in the case of In Re: Petition for Assistance in
the Liquidation of the Rural Bank of BOKOD (Benguet), Inc. v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 511 SCRA 123 (2006).—A liquidation
proceeding has been explained in the case of In Re: Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the Rural Bank of BOKOD
(Benguet), Inc. v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 511 SCRA 123 (2006), as follows: A liquidation proceeding is a single proceeding
which consists of a number of cases properly classified as “claims.” It is basically a two-phased proceeding. The first phase is
concerned with the approval and disapproval of claims. Upon the approval of the petition seeking the assistance of the proper court
in the liquidation of a closed entity, all money claims against the bank are required to be filed with the liquidation court. This phase
may end with the declaration by the liquidation court that the claim is not proper or without basis. On the other hand, it may also
end with the liquidation court allowing the claim. In the latter case, the claim shall be classified whether it is ordinary or preferred,
and thereafter included Liquidator. In either case, the order allowing or disallowing a particular claim is final order, and may be
appealed by the party aggrieved thereby. The second phase involves the approval by the Court of the distribution plan prepared by
the duly appointed liquidator. The distribution plan specifies in detail the total amount available for distribution to creditors whose
claim were earlier allowed. The Order finally disposes of the issue of how much property is available for disposal. Moreover, it
ushers in the final phase of the liquidation proceeding—payment of all allowed claims in accordance with the order of legal priority
and the approved distribution plan.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Regular courts do not have jurisdiction over actions filed by claimants against an insolvent bank,
unless there is a clear showing that the action taken by the BSP, through the Monetary Board, in the closure of financial institutions
was in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.—It is clear, therefore, that the liquidation court has jurisdiction over
all claims, including that of Lucia against the insolvent bank. As declared in Miranda v. Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation,
501 SCRA 288 (2006), regular courts do not have jurisdiction over actions filed by claimants against an insolvent bank, unless
there is a clear showing that the action taken by the BSP, through the Monetary Board, in the closure of financial institutions was in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. The same is not obtaining in this present case.

RICO ROMMEL ATIENZA, petitioner, vs. BOARD OF MEDICINE and EDITHA SIOSON, respondents. G.R. No. 177407.
February 9, 2011.*

Remedial Law; Evidence; It is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings before administrative
bodies such as the Board of Medicine (BOM).—It is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings
before administrative bodies such as the BOM. Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of
evidence, in connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have held
that: [I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly
irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if they
are thereafter found relevant or competent; on the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent,
can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring them.

Same; Same; Distinction between the admissibility of evidence and the probative weight to be accorded the same pieces of
evidence.—From the foregoing, we emphasize the distinction between the admissibility of evidence and the probative weight to be
accorded the same pieces of evidence. PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 402 (1998),
teaches: Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to be considered at all.
On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not it proves an issue.

Same; Same; The rules of evidence are merely the means for ascertaining the truth respecting a matter of fact.—Unquestionably,
the rules of evidence are merely the means for ascertaining the truth respecting a matter of fact. Thus, they likewise provide for
some facts which are established and need not be proved, such as those covered by judicial notice, both mandatory and
discretionary. Laws of nature involving the physical sciences, specifically biology, include the structural make-up and composition of
living things such as human beings. In this case, we may take judicial notice that Editha’s kidneys before, and at the time of, her
operation, as with most human beings, were in their proper anatomical locations.

PRUDENCIO BANTOLINO, NESTOR ROMERO, NILO ESPINA, EDDIE LADICA, ARMAN QUELING, ROLANDO NIETO,
RICARDO BARTOLOME, ELUVER GARCIA, EDUARDO GARCIA and NELSON MANALASTAS, petitioners, vs. COCA-COLA
BOTTLERS PHILS., INC., respondent. G.R. No. 153660. June 10, 2003.*

Labor Law; National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC); Labor Arbiter; Evidence; The argument that the affidavit is hearsay
because the affiants were not presented for cross-examination is not persuasive because the rules of evidence are not strictly
observed in proceedings before administrative bodies like the NLRC where decisions may be reached on the basis of position
papers only.—The issue confronting the Court is not without precedent in jurisprudence. The oft-cited case of Rabago v. NLRC
squarely grapples a similar challenge involving the propriety of the use of affidavits without the presentation of affiants for cross-
examination. In that case, we held that “the argument that the affidavit is hearsay because the affiants were not presented for
cross-examination is not persuasive because the rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before administrative
bodies like the NLRC where decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers only.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Under Art. 221 of the Labor Code, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law do not control
proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.—Southern Cotabato Dev. and Construction Co. v. NLRC succinctly states that
under Art. 221 of the Labor Code, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law do not control proceedings before the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC. Further, it notes that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are authorized to adopt reasonable means to ascertain
the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law and procedure, all in the interest of due
process. We find no compelling reason to deviate therefrom.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technicalities of law and procedure and the
rules obtaining in courts of law; Under the Rules of the Commission, the Labor Arbiter is given the discretion to determine the
necessity of a formal trial or hearing.—To reiterate, administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of
law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence may be
given only stringent application, i.e., by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect. The submission by respondent, citing
People v. Sorrel, that an affidavit not testified to in a trial, is mere hearsay evidence and has no real evidentiary value, cannot find
relevance in the present case considering that a criminal prosecution requires a quantum of evidence different from that of an
administrative proceeding. Under the Rules of the Commission, the Labor Arbiter is given the discretion to determine the necessity
of a formal trial or hearing. Hence, trial-type hearings are not even required as the cases may be decided based on verified position
papers, with supporting documents and their affidavits.

MAYON HOTEL & RESTAURANT, PACITA O. PO and/or JOSEFA PO LAM, petitioners, vs. ROLANDO ADANA, CHONA
BUMALAY, ROGER BURCE, EDUARDO ALAMARES, AMADO ALAMARES, EDGARDO TORREFRANCA, LOURDES
CAMIGLA, TEODORO LAURENARIA, WENEFREDO LOVERES, LUIS GUADES, AMADO MACANDOG, PATERNO LLARENA,
GREGORIO NICERIO, JOSE ATRACTIVO, MIGUEL TORREFRANCA, and SANTOS BROÑOLA, respondents. G.R. No.
157634. May 16, 2005.*

Labor Law; Appeals; Due Process; While it is within the NLRC’s competence, as an appellate agency reviewing decisions of Labor
Arbiters, to disagree with and set aside the latter’s findings, it stands to reason that it should state an acceptable cause therefore,
otherwise it would be a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, illogical, unreasonable exercise of quasi-judicial prerogative, subject to
invalidation by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.—There is no denying that it is within the NLRC’s competence, as an appellate
agency reviewing decisions of Labor Arbiters, to disagree with and set aside the latter’s findings. But it stands to reason that the
NLRC should state an acceptable cause therefore, otherwise it would be a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, illogical,
unreasonable exercise of quasi-judicial prerogative, subject to invalidation by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. And when the
factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are diametrically opposed and this disparity of findings is called into question,
there is, necessarily, a re-examination of the factual findings to ascertain which opinion should be sustained.

Same; Same; Same; Administrative Law; Factual findings of administrative bodies like the NLRC are affirmed only if they are
supported by substantial evidence that is manifest in the decision and on the records.—It is explicit in Castillo v. NLRC that factual
findings of administrative bodies like the NLRC are affirmed only if they are supported by substantial evidence that is manifest in
the decision and on the records. As stated in Castillo: [A]buse of discretion does not necessarily follow from a reversal by the NLRC
of a decision of a Labor Arbiter. Mere variance in evidentiary assessment between the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter does not
automatically call for a full review of the facts by this Court. The NLRC’s decision, so long as it is not bereft of substantial support
from the records, deserves respect from this Court. As a rule, the original and exclusive jurisdiction to review a decision or
resolution of respondent NLRC in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court does not include a correction of its
evaluation of the evidence but is confined to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Thus, the NLRC’s factual findings, if
supported by substantial evidence, are entitled to great respect and even finality, unless petitioner is able to show that it simply and
arbitrarily disregarded the evidence before it or had misappreciated the evidence to such an extent as to compel a contrary
conclusion if such evidence had been properly appreciated.

Same; Administrative Law; Evidence; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Article 221 of the Labor Code is clear—technical rules
are not binding, and the application of technical rules of procedure may be relaxed in labor cases to serve the demand of
substantial justice.—Petitioners’ reliance on the rules of evidence, i.e., the certificate of registration being the best proof of
ownership, is misplaced. Notwithstanding the certificate of registration, doubts were cast as to the true nature of petitioner Josefa
Po Lam’s involvement in the enterprise, and the Labor Arbiter had the authority to resolve this issue. It was therefore within his
jurisdiction to require the additional documents to ascertain who was the real owner of petitioner Mayon Hotel & Restaurant. Article
221 of the Labor Code is clear: technical rules are not binding, and the application of technical rules of procedure may be relaxed in
labor cases to serve the demand of substantial justice. The rule of evidence prevailing in court of law or equity shall not be
controlling in labor cases and it is the spirit and intention of the Labor Code that the Labor Arbiter shall use every and all reasonable
means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the
interest of due process. Labor laws mandate the speedy administration of justice, with least attention to technicalities but without
sacrificing the fundamental requisites of due process.

ONG CHIA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. G.R. No. 127240.
March 27, 2000.*

Naturalization; Evidence; Pleadings and Practice; Formal Offer of Evidence; Judgments; The rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule
132, §34) is clearly not applicable to a petition for naturalization; Decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule
on res judicata.—Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 of the Rules of Court which provides that—These rules shall not apply to land
registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for,
except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. (Emphasis added) Prescinding from the
above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) now being invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present
case involving a petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such
cases is when it is “practicable and convenient.” That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the
State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action considering that
decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata. Consequently, a final favorable judgment does
not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same documents.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to
afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility.—Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to
present and formally offer its documentary evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their
authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due process. We are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason
for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to
object to their admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents
submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the
Court of Appeals.

ROLANDO SASAN, SR., LEONILO DAYDAY, MODESTO AGUIRRE, ALEJANDRO ARDIMER, ELEUTERIO SACIL,
WILFREDO JUEGOS, PETRONILO CARCEDO and CESAR PACIENCIA, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION 4TH DIVISION, EQUITABLE-PCI BANK and HELPMATE, INC., respondents. G.R. No. 176240. October 17,
2008.*

Labor Law; Procedural Rules; The submission of additional evidence before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is
not prohibited by its New Rules of Procedure. After all, rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling in
labor cases.—Petitioners object to the acceptance and consideration by the NLRC of the evidence presented by HI for the first time
on appeal. This is not a novel procedural issue, however, and our jurisprudence is already replete with cases allowing the NLRC to
admit evidence, not presented before the Labor Arbiter, and submitted to the NLRC for the first time on appeal. Technical rules of
evidence are not binding in labor cases. Labor officials should use every reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case
speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process. The submission of
additional evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its New Rules of Procedure. After all, rules of evidence prevailing in courts
of law or equity are not controlling in labor cases. The NLRC and labor arbiters are directed to use every and all reasonable means
to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law and procedure all in the interest
of substantial justice. In keeping with this directive, it has been held that the NLRC may consider evidence, such as documents and
affidavits, submitted by the parties for the first time on appeal. The submission of additional evidence on appeal does not prejudice
the other party for the latter could submit counter-evidence.

Same; Same; Evidence; Technical rules of evidence do not apply if the decision to grant the petition proceeds from an examination
of its sufficiency as well as a careful look into the arguments contained in position papers and other documents.—The above
provision explicitly mandates that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other
than the original document itself. Notably, certified true copies of these documents, acceptable under the Rules of Court were
furnished to the petitioners. Even assuming that petitioners were given mere photocopies, again, we stress that proceedings before
the NLRC are not covered by the technical rules of evidence and procedure as observed in the regular courts. Technical rules of
evidence do not apply if the decision to grant the petition proceeds from an examination of its sufficiency as well as a careful look
into the arguments contained in position papers and other documents.

PRIMO C. MIRO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, petitioner, vs. MARILYN MENDOZA VDA. DE
EREDEROS, CATALINA ALINGASA and PORFERIO I. MENDOZA, respondents. G.R. Nos. 172532 & 172544-45. November
20, 2013.*

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Ombudsman; Findings of fact of the Office of the Ombudsman are generally accorded
with great weight and respect, if not finality by the courts, by reason of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling
under their jurisdiction.―It is well settled that findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by
substantial evidence. Their factual findings are generally accorded with great weight and respect, if not finality by the courts, by
reason of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction.

Same; Same; Same; Petition for Review on Certiorari; Factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by
certiorari.―Before proceeding to the merits of the case, this Court deems it necessary to emphasize that a petition for review under
Rule 45 is limited only to questions of law. Factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. This Court will not
review facts, as it is not our function to analyze or weigh all over again evidence already considered in the proceedings below.

Same; Same; Same; Same; “Question of Law” and “Question of Fact,” Distinguished.―There is a question of law when the doubt
or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts; a question of fact, on the other hand, exists when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. Unless the case falls under any of the recognized exceptions, we
are limited solely to the review of legal questions.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, jurisdiction is generally limited to the review of errors of law
committed by the appellate court.―The “errors” which we may review in a petition for review on certiorari are those of the CA, and
not directly those of the trial court or the quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, or officer which rendered the decision in the first instance. It
is imperative that we refrain from conducting further scrutiny of the findings of fact made by trial courts, lest we convert this Court
into a trier of facts. As held in Reman Recio v. Heirs of the Spouses Agueda and Maria Altamirano, etc., et al., our review is limited
only to the errors of law committed by the appellate court, to wit: Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, jurisdiction is generally
limited to the review of errors of law committed by the appellate court. The Supreme Court is not obliged to review all over again the
evidence which the parties adduced in the court a quo. Of course, the general rule admits of exceptions, such as where the factual
findings of the CA and the trial court are conflicting or contradictory.

Same; Evidence; Substantial Evidence; Words and Phrases; Substantial evidence is defined as such amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.―Substantial evidence is defined as such amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It is more than a mere scintilla of
evidence. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe, based on the evidence
submitted, that the respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of. It need not be overwhelming or preponderant, as is
required in an ordinary civil case, or evidence beyond reasonable doubt, as is required in criminal cases, but the evidence must be
enough for a reasonable mind to support a conclusion.

Same; Same; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; While administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, such as the Office of the
Ombudsman, are not bound by the technical rules of procedure, this rule cannot be taken as a license to disregard fundamental
evidentiary rules; the decision of the administrative agencies and the evidence it relies upon must, at the very least, be
substantial.―While administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, such as the Office of the Ombudsman, are not bound by the technical
rules of procedure, this rule cannot be taken as a license to disregard fundamental evidentiary rules; the decision of the
administrative agencies and the evidence it relies upon must, at the very least, be substantial.

II. Rule-making power of the Supreme Court

Chapter IV – Pleadings and Motions

I. Pleadings

PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES JOSE C. GO and ELVY T. GO, respondents. G.R. No.
175514. February 14, 2011.*

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Summary Judgments; Summary or accelerated judgment is a procedural technique aimed at
weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of litigation thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial;
Under the Rules, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact which call for the presentation of
evidence in a full-blown trial; Meaning of “Genuine Issue.”—Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended, except as
to the amount of damages, when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law, summary judgment may be allowed. Summary or accelerated judgment is a procedural technique aimed at
weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of litigation thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial.
Under the Rules, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact which call for the presentation of
evidence in a full-blown trial. Even if on their face the pleadings appear to raise issues, when the affidavits, depositions and
admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by the Rules must ensue as a matter of
law. The determinative factor, therefore, in a motion for summary judgment, is the presence or absence of a genuine issue as to
any material fact. A “genuine issue” is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham,
fictitious, contrived or false claim. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or genuine
issue or question as to the facts, and summary judgment is called for. The party who moves for summary judgment has the burden
of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is patently unsubstantial
so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only
when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested,
proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial.

Same; Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; To specifically deny a material allegation, a defendant must specify each material
allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit, and whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon
which he relies to support his denial.—To specifically deny a material allegation, a defendant must specify each material allegation
of fact the truth of which he does not admit, and whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he
relies to support his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true
and material and shall deny only the remainder. Where a defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth of a material averment made in the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a denial.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Modes of Specific Denial.—Rule 8, Section 10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure contemplates three (3)
modes of specific denial, namely: 1) by specifying each material allegation of the fact in the complaint, the truth of which the
defendant does not admit, and whenever practicable, setting forth the substance of the matters which he will rely upon to support
his denial; (2) by specifying so much of an averment in the complaint as is true and material and denying only the remainder; (3) by
stating that the defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment in the
complaint, which has the effect of a denial.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Purpose of Requiring the Defendant to Make a Specific Denial.—The purpose of requiring the
defendant to make a specific denial is to make him disclose the matters alleged in the complaint which he succinctly intends to
disprove at the trial, together with the matter which he relied upon to support the denial. The parties are compelled to lay their cards
on the table.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Allegations made in pleadings must be contextualized and interpreted in relation to the rest of the
statements in the pleading.—Again, in drafting pleadings, members of the bar are enjoined to be clear and concise in their
language, and to be organized and logical in their composition and structure in order to set forth their statements of fact and
arguments of law in the most readily comprehensible manner possible. Failing such standard, allegations made in pleadings are not
to be taken as stand-alone catchphrases in the interest of accuracy. They must be contextualized and interpreted in relation to the
rest of the statements in the pleading.

Same; Same; Same; Same; As held in Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 567 (1991), the Court
ruled that the defendant’s contention that it had no truth or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the deed of
exchange was an invalid or ineffectual denial pursuant to the Rules of Court, as it could have easily asserted whether or not it had
executed the deed of exchange attached to the petition.—In Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA
567 (1991), the Court ruled that the defendant’s contention that it had no truth or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of the deed of exchange was an invalid or ineffectual denial pursuant to the Rules of Court, as it could have easily asserted
whether or not it had executed the deed of exchange attached to the petition. Citing Capitol Motors Corporations v. Yabut, the
Court stated that: x x x The rule authorizing an answer to the effect that the defendant has no knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of an averment and giving such answer the effect of a denial, does not apply where the fact as to which
want of knowledge is asserted, is so plainly and necessarily within the defendant’s knowledge that his averment of ignorance must
be palpably untrue.

SPOUSES OCTAVIO and EPIFANIA LORBES, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RICARDO DELOS REYES and
JOSEFINA CRUZ, respondents. G.R. No. 139884. February 15, 2001.*

Actions; Judgments; Well-settled is the rule that courts should be liberal in setting aside orders of default for judgments of default
are frowned upon, unless in cases where it clearly appears that the reopening of the case is intended for delay.—Well-settled is the
rule that courts should be liberal in setting aside orders of default for judgments of default are frowned upon, unless in cases where
it clearly appears that the reopening of the case is intended for delay. The issuance of orders of default should be the exception
rather than the rule, to be allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal by the defendant to comply with the orders of the trial
court.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Reformation; Pleadings and Practice; The fact that the complaint filed before the trial court was
categorized to be one for reformation of instrument should not preclude the Court from passing upon the issue of whether the
transaction was in fact an equitable mortgage as the same has been squarely raised in the complaint and had been the subject of
arguments and evidence of the parties—it is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations therein that determine the nature of
the action, and the Court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof even if no such relief is prayed for.—Before
we fully set aside this issue, it will be recalled that the instant petition originated as a complaint for reformation filed before the RTC
of Antipolo, Rizal. The Court of Appeals found petitioners’ action for reformation unmeritorious because there was no showing that
the failure of the deed of sale to express the parties’ true intention was because of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct, or accident.
Indeed, under the facts of the present case, reformation may not be proper for failure to fully meet the requisites in Article 1359 of
the Civil Code, and because as the evidence eventually bore out the contested Deed of Absolute Sale was not intended to reflect
the true agreement between the parties but was merely to comply with the collateral requirements of Land Bank. However, the fact
that the complaint filed by petitioners before the trial court was categorized to be one for reformation of instrument should not
preclude the Court from passing upon the issue of whether the transaction was in fact an equitable mortgage as the same has been
squarely raised in the complaint and had been the subject of arguments and evidence of the parties. Thus we have held that it is
not the caption of the pleading but the allegations therein that determine the nature of the action, and the Court shall grant relief
warranted by the allegations and the proof even if no such relief is prayed for.

NORBERTO ALTRES vs. CAMILO G. EMPLEO G.R. No. 180986. December 10, 2008.*

Remedial Law; Pleadings and Practice; Verification; Certification of Non-Forum Shopping; Under justifiable circumstances, Courts
have already allowed the relaxation of the requirements of verification and certification so that the ends of justice may be better
served.—Under justifiable circumstances, we have already allowed the relaxation of the requirements of verification and
certification so that the ends of justice may be better served. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the
allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the
pleading is filed in good faith; while the purpose of the aforesaid certification is to prohibit and penalize the evils of forum shopping.

Same; Same; Same; Same; On the requirement of a certification of non-forum shopping, the well-settled rule is that all the
petitioners must sign the certification of non-forum shopping; The rule, however, admits of an exception and that is when the
petitioners show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification.—On the requirement of a certification of non-forum
shopping, the well-settled rule is that all the petitioners must sign the certification of non-forum shopping. The reason for this is that
the persons who have signed the certification cannot be presumed to have the personal knowledge of the other non-signing
petitioners with respect to the filing or non-filing of any action or claim the same as or similar to the current petition. The rule,
however, admits of an exception and that is when the petitioners show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the
certification. The petitioners must be able to convince the court that the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the
administration of justice.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Distinction between non-com-pliance with the requirement on or submission of defective verification,
and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum shopping.—1) A distinction must
be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective verification, and non-compliance with the
requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum shopping. 2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a
defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on
the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the
ends of justice may be served thereby. 3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge
to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition
have been made in good faith or are true and correct. 4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a
defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a
need to relax the Rule on the ground of “substantial compliance” or presence of “special circumstances or compelling reasons.” 5)
The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not
sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or
petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the
certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule. 6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must
be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable
to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.

Same; Civil Procedure; Distinction between a question of law and a question of fact.—The Court had repeatedly clarified the
distinction between a question of law and a question of fact. A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the
correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact, on the other hand,
exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole
evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevance of specific surrounding circumstances, as
well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation. When there is no dispute as to fact, the
question of whether the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct is a question of law.

II. Parts of a Pleading

PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES JOSE C. GO and ELVY T. GO, respondents. G.R. No.
175514. February 14, 2011.*

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Summary Judgments; Summary or accelerated judgment is a procedural technique aimed at
weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of litigation thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial;
Under the Rules, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact which call for the presentation of
evidence in a full-blown trial; Meaning of “Genuine Issue.”—Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended, except as
to the amount of damages, when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law, summary judgment may be allowed. Summary or accelerated judgment is a procedural technique aimed at
weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of litigation thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial.
Under the Rules, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact which call for the presentation of
evidence in a full-blown trial. Even if on their face the pleadings appear to raise issues, when the affidavits, depositions and
admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by the Rules must ensue as a matter of
law. The determinative factor, therefore, in a motion for summary judgment, is the presence or absence of a genuine issue as to
any material fact. A “genuine issue” is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham,
fictitious, contrived or false claim. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or genuine
issue or question as to the facts, and summary judgment is called for. The party who moves for summary judgment has the burden
of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is patently unsubstantial
so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only
when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested,
proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial.

Same; Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; To specifically deny a material allegation, a defendant must specify each material
allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit, and whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon
which he relies to support his denial.—To specifically deny a material allegation, a defendant must specify each material allegation
of fact the truth of which he does not admit, and whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he
relies to support his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true
and material and shall deny only the remainder. Where a defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth of a material averment made in the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a denial.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Modes of Specific Denial.—Rule 8, Section 10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure contemplates three (3)
modes of specific denial, namely: 1) by specifying each material allegation of the fact in the complaint, the truth of which the
defendant does not admit, and whenever practicable, setting forth the substance of the matters which he will rely upon to support
his denial; (2) by specifying so much of an averment in the complaint as is true and material and denying only the remainder; (3) by
stating that the defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment in the
complaint, which has the effect of a denial.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Purpose of Requiring the Defendant to Make a Specific Denial.—The purpose of requiring the
defendant to make a specific denial is to make him disclose the matters alleged in the complaint which he succinctly intends to
disprove at the trial, together with the matter which he relied upon to support the denial. The parties are compelled to lay their cards
on the table.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Allegations made in pleadings must be contextualized and interpreted in relation to the rest of the
statements in the pleading.—Again, in drafting pleadings, members of the bar are enjoined to be clear and concise in their
language, and to be organized and logical in their composition and structure in order to set forth their statements of fact and
arguments of law in the most readily comprehensible manner possible. Failing such standard, allegations made in pleadings are not
to be taken as stand-alone catchphrases in the interest of accuracy. They must be contextualized and interpreted in relation to the
rest of the statements in the pleading.

Same; Same; Same; Same; As held in Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 567 (1991), the Court
ruled that the defendant’s contention that it had no truth or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the deed of
exchange was an invalid or ineffectual denial pursuant to the Rules of Court, as it could have easily asserted whether or not it had
executed the deed of exchange attached to the petition.—In Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA
567 (1991), the Court ruled that the defendant’s contention that it had no truth or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of the deed of exchange was an invalid or ineffectual denial pursuant to the Rules of Court, as it could have easily asserted
whether or not it had executed the deed of exchange attached to the petition. Citing Capitol Motors Corporations v. Yabut, the
Court stated that: x x x The rule authorizing an answer to the effect that the defendant has no knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of an averment and giving such answer the effect of a denial, does not apply where the fact as to which
want of knowledge is asserted, is so plainly and necessarily within the defendant’s knowledge that his averment of ignorance must
be palpably untrue.

MICHELLE LANA BROWN-ARANETA, for herself and representing her minor daughters, ARABELLA MARGARITA B.
ARANETA and AVANGELINA MYKAELA B. ARANETA, petitioners, vs. JUAN IGNACIO ARANETA, respondent. G.R. No.
190814. October 9, 2013.*

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; A circumstance of forum shopping occurs when, as a result or in anticipation of
an adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through means other than appeal or certiorari
by raising identical causes of action, subject matter and issues.―A circumstance of forum shopping occurs when, as a result or in
anticipation of an adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through means other than
appeal or certiorari by raising identical causes of action, subject matter and issues. Stated a bit differently, forum shopping is the
institution of two or more actions involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on
the supposition that one or the other court would come out with a favorable disposition. An indicium of the presence of, or the test
for determining whether a litigant violated the rule against, forum shopping is where the elements of litis pendentia are present or
where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other case.

Same; Same; Same; Dismissal of Actions; Litis pendentia, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil suit, refers to that situation
wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes
vexatious and unnecessary.―Litis pendentia, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil suit, refers to that situation wherein another
action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes vexatious and
unnecessary. For the bar of litis pendentia to be invoked, the concurring requisites must be present: (1) identity of parties, or at
least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts; and (3) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the
pending case, regardless of which party is successful would amount to res judicata in the other.

Same; Same; Same; Instances Where Forum Shopping Exists.―It has been held that there is forum shopping (1) whenever as a
result of an adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable decision (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another; or (2)
if, after he has filed a petition before the Supreme Court, a party files another before the CA since in such case said party
deliberately splits appeals “in the hope that even as one case in which a particular remedy is sought is dismissed, another case
(offering a similar remedy) would still be open”; or (3) where a party attempts to obtain a preliminary injunction in another court after
failing to obtain it from the original court.

Same; Same; Same; The evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by two competent tribunals
of two separate and contradictory decisions.―The evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by
two competent tribunals of two separate and contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous party litigants, taking advantage of a variety of
competent tribunals, may repeatedly try their luck in several different fora until a favorable result is reached. To avoid the resultant
confusion, the Court adheres to the rules against forum shopping, and a breach of these rules results in the dismissal of the case.

Same; Same; Same; That a party is the petitioner in one case and at the same time, the respondent in the other case does not,
without more, remove the said cases from the ambit of the rules on forum shopping.―That a party is the petitioner in one case and
at the same time, the respondent in the other case does not, without more, remove the said cases from the ambit of the rules on
forum shopping. So did the Court hold, for example in First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 259
(1996), that forum shopping exists even in cases like this where petitioners or plaintiffs in one case were impleaded as respondents
or defendants in another. Moreover, this Court has constantly held that the fact that the positions of the parties are reversed, i.e.,
the plaintiffs in the first case are the defendants in the second case or vice versa, does not negate the identity of parties for
purposes of determining whether the case is dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia.

Chapter V – Summons (Rule 14)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways, through the Hon.
Secretary, HERMOGENES EBDANE, petitioner, vs. ALBERTO A. DOMINGO, respondent. G.R. No. 175299 September 14,
2011

Civil Procedure; Summons; Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him; Jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant is acquired through coercive pro-cess.—Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of
the action brought against him. Service of such writ is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person.
Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired through coercive pro-cess, generally by the service of summons issued by
the court, or through the defendant’s voluntary appearance or submission to the court.

Same; Same; When a suit is directed against an unincorporated government agency, which, because it is unincorporated,
possesses no juridical personality of its own, the suit is against the agency’s principal, i.e., the State.—Jurisprudence further
instructs that when a suit is directed against an unincorporated government agency, which, because it is unincorporated,
possesses no juridical personality of its own, the suit is against the agency’s principal, i.e., the State.

Same; Same; The Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and its regional office are merely the agents of the former
(the Republic), which is the real party in interest in Civil Case No. 333-M-2002; The summons in this case should have been served
on the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).—In the instant case, the Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages filed by
Domingo specifically named as defendant the DPWH Region III. As correctly argued by the Republic, the DPWH and its regional
office are merely the agents of the former (the Republic), which is the real party in interest in Civil Case No. 333-M-2002. Thus, as
mandated by Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the summons in this case should have been served on the OSG.

Same; Parties; It is the duty of the plaintiff to implead all the necessary or indispensable parties for the complete determination of
the action.—On the other hand, Domingo opines that the DPWH Region III apparently neglected to inform the OSG of the
pendency of Civil Case No. 333-M-2002. Accordingly, Domingo asserted that he should not be faulted therefor. The Court
disagrees. Domingo ought to bear in mind that it is the duty of the plaintiff to implead all the necessary or indispensable parties for
the complete determination of the action. It was, thus, incumbent upon him to name and implead the proper defendant in this case,
i.e., the Republic, and cause the service of summons to be made upon the officer mandated by law, that is, the OSG. As Domingo
failed to discharge this burden, he cannot now be allowed to shift the blame on the DPWH Region III or hold in estoppel the OSG.

Same; Annulment of Judgment; A judgment of annulment shall set aside the questioned judgment or final order or resolution and
render the same null and void, without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper court.—In accordance with Section
7, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, a judgment of annulment shall set aside the questioned judgment or final order or resolution and
render the same null and void, without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper court.

TRIMICA, INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. POLARIS MARKETING CORPORATION and the HON. DELFIN B. FLORES in his
capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XI, and the PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL,
respondents. No. L-29887. October 28,1974.*

Jurisdiction; Summons; Jurisdiction over a corporation is not required by the mere appearance of its president in court in another
capacity.—We are of the opinion that the judgment against Trimica, Inc. was void for lack of jurisdiction and lack of due process
and that the judgment could be attacked directly although it had allegedly become executory. No jurisdiction was acquired over
Trimica, Inc. because it was never summoned. The appearance in court of its president, Capistrano, was in the capacity of counsel
for Fine Furnitures and not as representative or counsel of Trimica, Inc. Hence, such appearance cannot be construed as a
voluntary submission of Trimica, Inc. to the court's jurisdiction (Johnlo Trading Co. vs. Flores, 88 Phil. 741, 743).

Same; Same; No jurisdiction is acquired over a defendant who s not properly summoned. The lower court, in its order admitting the
amended complaint, should have ordered that the new defendant, Trimica, Inc., be summoned in order that jurisdiction could be
acquired over it and so that it could answer the amended complaint and have a chance to be heard. Where the defendant had not
been summoned, the court did not acquired jurisdiction over his person. The judgment against him is void. (Echevarria vs. Parsons
Hardware Co., 51 Phil. 980; Reyes vs. Paz and Judge of First Instance, 60 Phil. 440; Cañeda vs. Court of Appeals, 62 O.G. 1179,5
SCRA 1131).

ELLICE AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, represented by its Chairman of the Board of Directors and President, RAUL
E. GALA, petitioner, vs. RODEL T. YOUNG, DELFIN CHAN, JIM WEE and GUIA G. DOMINGO,** respondents. G.R. No.
174077. November 21, 2012.*

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Jurisdiction; Summons; Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid
service of summons or the defendant’s voluntary appearance in court; The purpose of summons is not only to acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant, but also to give notice to the defendant that an action has been commenced against it and to
afford it an opportunity to be heard on the claim made against it.―It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired
either upon a valid service of summons or the defendant’s voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily
submit to the court’s jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of summons, any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant is null and void. The purpose of summons is not only to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, but also to give notice to the defendant that an action has been commenced against it and to afford it an opportunity to
be heard on the claim made against it. The requirements of the rule on summons must be strictly followed, otherwise, the trial court
will not acquire jurisdiction over the defendant.

Same; Same; Summons; Service of Summons; Corporations; For service of summons upon a private domestic corporation to be
effective and valid, should be made on the persons enumerated in the rule. Conversely, service of summons on anyone other than
the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or director, is not valid.―Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the applicable rule on service of summons upon a private domestic corporation then, provides: Sec. 13. Service upon
private domestic corporation or partnership.―If the defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a
partnership duly registered, service may be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors.
[Underscoring supplied] Based on the above-quoted provision, for service of summons upon a private domestic corporation, to be
effective and valid, should be made on the persons enumerated in the rule. Conversely, service of summons on anyone other than
the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or director, is not valid. The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the
corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons be served on a
representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers served on him.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Courts; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant or respondent cannot be
acquired notwithstanding his knowledge of the pendency of a case against him unless he was validly served with
summons.―Granting arguendo that EAIC had actual knowledge of the existence of Civil Case No. 96-177 lodged against it, the
RTC still failed to validly acquire jurisdiction over EAIC. In Cesar v. Ricafort-Bautista, 506 SCRA 322 (2006), it was held that “x x x
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant or respondent cannot be acquired notwithstanding his knowledge of the
pendency of a case against him unless he was validly served with summons. Such is the important role a valid service of summons
plays in court actions.”

MA. IMELDA M. MANOTOC, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and AGAPITA TRAJANO on behalf of the
Estate of ARCHIMEDES TRAJANO, respondents. G.R. No. 130974. August 16, 2006.*

Courts; Jurisdictions; Summons; Substituted Service; While substituted service of summons is permitted, since it is extraordinary in
character and in derogation of the usual method of service, it must faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed requirements
and circumstances authorized by the rules.—Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or
the defendant’s voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the court’s jurisdiction or when
there is no valid service of summons, “any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null
and void.” In an action strictly in personam, personal service on the defendant is the preferred mode of service, that is, by handing
a copy of the summons to the defendant in person. If defendant, for excusable reasons, cannot be served with the summons within
a reasonable period, then substituted service can be resorted to. While substituted service of summons is permitted, “it is
extraordinary in character and in derogation of the usual method of service.” Hence, it must faithfully and strictly comply with the
prescribed requirements and circumstances authorized by the rules. Indeed, “compliance with the rules regarding the service of
summons is as much important as the issue of due process as of jurisdiction.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant
cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service; “Reasonable time” is defined as so much time as is necessary
under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that
should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any, to the other party; One month from the issuance of
summons can be considered “reasonable time” with regard to personal service on the defendant.—The party relying on substituted
service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service. Section 8,
Rule 14 provides that the plaintiff or the sheriff is given a “reasonable time” to serve the summons to the defendant in person, but
no specific time frame is mentioned. “Reasonable time” is defined as “so much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a
reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that should be done, having a regard
for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other party.” Under the Rules, the service of summons has no set period.
However, when the court, clerk of court, or the plaintiff asks the sheriff to make the return of the summons and the latter submits
the return of summons, then the validity of the summons lapses. The plaintiff may then ask for an alias summons if the service of
summons has failed. What then is a reasonable time for the sheriff to effect a personal service in order to demonstrate impossibility
of prompt service? To the plaintiff, “reasonable time” means no more than seven (7) days since an expeditious processing of a
complaint is what a plaintiff wants. To the sheriff, “reasonable time” means 15 to 30 days because at the end of the month, it is a
practice for the branch clerk of court to require the sheriff to submit a return of the summons assigned to the sheriff for service. The
Sheriff’s Return provides data to the Clerk of Court, which the clerk uses in the Monthly Report of Cases to be submitted to the
Office of the Court Administrator within the first ten (10) days of the succeeding month. Thus, one month from the issuance of
summons can be considered “reasonable time” with regard to personal service on the defendant.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Sheriffs; Sheriffs are enjoined to try their best efforts to accomplish personal service on defendant, and
since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and evade service of summons, the sheriff must be resourceful, persevering, canny,
and diligent in serving the process on the defendant; “Several attempts” means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two
different dates.—Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of summons with due care, utmost diligence, and
reasonable promptness and speed so as not to prejudice the expeditious dispensation of justice. Thus, they are enjoined to try their
best efforts to accomplish personal service on defendant. On the other hand, since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and
evade service of summons, the sheriff must be resourceful, perse-vering, canny, and diligent in serving the process on the
defendant. For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the
summons within a reasonable period [of one month] which eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service.
“Several attempts” means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why
such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding
the attempted personal service—the efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated
in detail in the Return.—The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the
attempted personal service. The efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in
detail in the Return. The date and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s
of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on
defendant must be specified in the Return to justify substituted service. The form on Sheriff’s Return of Summons on Substituted
Service prescribed in the Handbook for Sheriffs published by the Philippine Judicial Academy requires a narration of the efforts
made to find the defendant personally and the fact of failure. Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 5 dated November 9, 1989
requires that “impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the
failure of such efforts,” which should be made in the proof of service.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; A person of suitable age and discretion is one who has attained the age of full
legal capacity (18 years old) and is considered to have enough discernment to understand the importance of a summons;
“Discretion” is defined as the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible choice and for which an understanding of
what is lawful, right or wise may be presupposed; The person upon whom substituted service is made must have the “relation of
confidence” to the defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or at least be notified of the receipt of the summons.—If the
substituted service will be effected at defendant’s house or residence, it should be left with a person of “suitable age and discretion
then residing therein.” A person of suitable age and discretion is one who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old)
and is considered to have enough discernment to understand the importance of a summons. “Discre-tion” is defined as “the ability
to make decisions which represent a responsible choice and for which an understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may be
presupposed”. Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, such person must know how to read and understand English to comprehend the
import of the summons, and fully realize the need to deliver the summons and complaint to the defendant at the earliest possible
time for the person to take appropriate action. Thus, the person must have the “relation of confidence” to the defendant, ensuring
that the latter would receive or at least be notified of the receipt of the summons. The sheriff must therefore determine if the person
found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipient’s relationship with the defendant is, and
whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the
defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically described in
the Return of Summons.

Same; Same; Same; Same; If the substituted service will be done at de-fendant’s office or regular place of business, then it should
be served on a competent person in charge of the place.—If the substituted service will be done at defendant’s office or regular
place of business, then it should be served on a competent person in charge of the place. Thus, the person on whom the
substituted service will be made must be the one managing the office or business of defendant, such as the president or manager;
and such individual must have sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the summons, its importance,
and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons. Again, these details must be contained in the Return.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Given the fact that the substituted service of summons may be assailed by a Motion to Dismiss, it is
imperative that the pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding the service of summons be described with more particularity in
the Return or Certificate of Service.—A meticulous scrutiny of the aforementioned Return readily reveals the absence of material
data on the serious efforts to serve the Summons on petitioner Manotoc in person. There is no clear valid reason cited in the
Return why those efforts proved inadequate, to reach the conclusion that personal service has become impossible or unattainable
outside the generally couched phrases of “on many occasions several attempts were made to serve the summons x x x personally,”
“at reasonable hours during the day,” and “to no avail for the reason that the said defendant is usually out of her place and/or
residence or premises.” Wanting in detailed information, the Return deviates from the ruling—in Domagas v. Jensen, and other
related cases—that the pertinent facts and circumstances on the efforts exerted to serve the summons personally must be narrated
in the Return. It cannot be determined how many times, on what specific dates, and at what hours of the day the attempts were
made. Given the fact that the substituted service of summons may be assailed, as in the present case, by a Motion to Dismiss, it is
imperative that the pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding the service of summons be described with more particularity in
the Return or Certificate of Service.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Before resorting to substituted service, a plaintiff must demonstrate an effort in good faith to locate the
defendant through direct means.—Apart from the allegation of petitioner’s address in the Complaint, it has not been shown that
respondent Trajano or Sheriff Cañelas, who served such summons, exerted extraordinary efforts to locate petitioner. Certainly, the
second paragraph of the Complaint only states that respondents were “informed, and so [they] allege” about the address and
whereabouts of petitioner. Before resorting to substituted service, a plaintiff must demonstrate an effort in good faith to locate the
defendant through more direct means. More so, in the case in hand, when the alleged petitioner’s residence or house is doubtful or
has not been clearly ascertained, it would have been better for personal service to have been pursued persistently.

Same; Same; Same; Same; In view of the numerous claims of irregularities in substituted service which have spawned the filing of
a great number of unnecessary special civil actions of certiorari and appeals to higher courts, resulting in prolonged litigation and
wasteful legal expenses, the narration of the efforts made to find the defendant and the fact of failure written in broad and imprecise
words will not suffice—the facts and circumstances should be stated with more particularity and detail on the number of attempts
made at personal service, dates and times of the attempts, inquiries to locate defendant, names of occupants of the alleged
residence, and the reasons for failure should be included in the Return to satisfactorily show the efforts undertaken; To allow
sheriffs to describe the facts and circumstances in inexact terms would encourage routine performance of their precise duties
relating to substituted service—for it would be quite easy to shroud or conceal carelessness or laxity in such broad terms.—In the
case Umandap v. Sabio, Jr., 339 SCRA 243 (2000), it may be true that the Court held that a Sheriff’s Return, which states that
“despite efforts exerted to serve said process personally upon the defendant on several occasions the same proved futile,”
conforms to the requirements of valid substituted service. However, in view of the numerous claims of irregularities in substituted
service which have spawned the filing of a great number of unnecessary special civil actions of certiorari and ap-peals to higher
courts, resulting in prolonged litigation and wasteful legal expenses, the Court rules in the case at bar that the narration of the
efforts made to find the defendant and the fact of failure written in broad and imprecise words will not suffice. The facts and
circumstances should be stated with more particularity and detail on the number of attempts made at personal service, dates and
times of the attempts, inquiries to locate defendant, names of occupants of the alleged residence, and the reasons for failure should
be included in the Return to satisfactorily show the efforts undertaken. That such efforts were made to personally serve summons
on defendant, and those resulted in failure, would prove impossibility of prompt personal service. Moreover, to allow sheriffs to
describe the facts and circumstances in inexact terms would encourage routine performance of their precise duties relating to
substituted service—for it would be quite easy to shroud or conceal carelessness or laxity in such broad terms. Lastly, considering
that monies and properties worth millions may be lost by a defendant because of an irregular or void substituted service, it is but
only fair that the Sheriff’s Return should clearly and convincingly show the impracticability or hopelessness of personal service.

Jurisdictions; Summons; Substituted Service; There are two requirements under the Rules regarding leaving summons with a
“person of suitable age and discretion” residing in defendant’s house or residence, namely, (1) recipient must be a person of
suitable age and discretion, and, (2) recipient must reside in the house or residence of defendant; To protect a defendant’s right to
due process by being accorded proper notice of a case against her, the substituted service of summons must be shown to clearly
comply with the rules.—Granting that such a general description be considered adequate, there is still a serious nonconformity from
the requirement that the summons must be left with a “person of suitable age and discretion” residing in defen-dant’s house or
residence. Thus, there are two (2) requirements under the Rules: (1) recipient must be a person of suitable age and discretion; and
(2) recipient must reside in the house or residence of defendant. Both requirements were not met. In this case, the Sheriff’s Return
lacks information as to residence, age, and discretion of Mr. Macky de la Cruz, aside from the sher-iff’s general assertion that de la
Cruz is the “resident caretaker” of petitioner as pointed out by a certain Ms. Lyn Jacinto, alleged receptionist and telephone
operator of Alexandra Homes. It is doubtful if Mr. de la Cruz is residing with petitioner Manotoc in the condominium unit considering
that a married woman of her stature in society would unlikely hire a male caretaker to reside in her dwelling. With the petitioner’s
allegation that Macky de la Cruz is not her employee, servant, or representative, it is necessary to have additional information in the
Return of Summons. Besides, Mr. Macky de la Cruz’s refusal to sign the Receipt for the summons is a strong indication that he did
not have the necessary “relation of confidence” with petitioner. To protect petitioner’s right to due process by being accorded proper
notice of a case against her, the substituted service of summons must be shown to clearly comply with the rules. It has been stated
and restated that substituted service of summons must faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and in the
circumstances authorized by the rules.
Same; Same; Same; Sheriffs; For the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty by a sheriff, the Sheriff’s Return
must show that serious efforts or attempts were exerted to personally serve the summons and that said efforts failed; The
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by the sheriff is not applicable where it is patent that the sheriff’s
return is defective.—The court a quo heavily relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. It reasons
out that “[t]he certificate of service by the proper officer is prima facie evidence of the facts set out herein, and to overcome the
presumption arising from said certificate, the evidence must be clear and convincing.” The Court acknowledges that this ruling is
still a valid doctrine. However, for the presumption to apply, the Sheriff’s Return must show that serious efforts or attempts were
exerted to personally serve the summons and that said efforts failed. These facts must be specifically narrated in the Return. To
reiterate, it must clearly show that the substituted service must be made on a person of suitable age and discretion living in the
dwelling or residence of defendant. Otherwise, the Return is flawed and the presumption cannot be availed of. As previously
explained, the Return of Sheriff Cañelas did not comply with the stringent requirements of Rule 14, Section 8 on substituted
service. In the case of Venturanza v. Court of Appeals, 156 SCRA 305 (1987), it was held that “x x x the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official functions by the sheriff is not applicable in this case where it is patent that the sher-iff’s return is
defective (emphasis supplied).” While the Sheriff’s Return in the Venturanza case had no statement on the effort or attempt to
personally serve the summons, the Return of Sheriff Cañelas in the case at bar merely described the efforts or attempts in general
terms lacking in details as required by the ruling in the case of Domagas v. Jensen and other cases. It is as if Cañelas’ Return did
not mention any effort to accomplish personal service. Thus, the substituted service is void.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Even assuming that the indicated address is defendant’s actual residence, such fact would not make
an irregular and void substituted service valid and effective.—On the issue whether petitioner Manotoc is a resident of Alexandra
Homes, Unit E-2104, at No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig City, our findings that the substituted service is void has rendered the matter
moot and academic. Even assuming that Alexandra Homes Room 104 is her actual residence, such fact would not make an
irregular and void substituted service valid and effective.

J. ARTIE VERGEL DE DIOS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND EDUARDO LOPINGCO, respondents. G.R. No.
80491. August 12, 1992.*

Remedial Law; Amendment; Summons; It is only when new causes of action are alleged in an amended complaint filed before the
defendant has appeared in Court that another summons must be served on the defendant with the amended complaint.—The rule
is that it is only when new causes of action are alleged in an amended complaint filed before the defendant has appeared in court
that another summons must be served on the defendant with the amended complaint.

Same; Same; Same; To determine whether a different cause of action is introduced by amendments to the complaint, the court
must ascertain if the defendant shall be required to answer for a liability or legal obligation wholly different from that which was
stated in the original complaint.—In determining whether a different cause of action is introduced by amendments to the complaint,
the court must ascertain if the defendant shall be required to answer for a liability or legal obligation wholly different from that which
was stated in the original complaint. An amendment will not be considered as stating a new cause of action if the facts alleged in
the amended complaint show substantially the same wrong with respect to the same transaction, or if what are alleged refer to the
same matter but are more fully and differently stated, or where averments which were implied are made in express terms, and the
subject of the controversy or the liability sought to be enforced remains the same.

Same; Same; Same; In the case at bar, the amended complaint merely supplemented an incomplete allegation regarding the
subject property.—A reading of the amended complaint in the case at bar shows that it merely supplemented an incomplete
allegation regarding the subject property. The purpose of the amendment was merely to include the additional information that the
subject property “was and is still under litigation and the contract was entered into without the knowledge and approval of the
litigants or of competent judicial authority.”

Same; Same; Same; Trial Court was correct in holding that when private respondent sent by registered mail a copy of the amended
complaint directly to the petitioner, he was acting in accordance with Sec. 2 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, allowing direct service
on a party if not represented by counsel.—The trial court was correct in holding that when the private respondent sent by registered
mail a copy of the amended complaint directly to the petitioner, he was acting in accordance with Sec. 2 of Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court, allowing direct service on a party if not represented by counsel. At the time the amended complaint was filed, the defendant
was not yet represented by counsel, which entered its appearance only after the private respondent had filed his amended
complaint.

Spouses PATRICK JOSE and RAFAELA JOSE, petitioners, vs. Spouses HELEN BOYON and ROMEO BOYON,
respondents. G.R. No. 147369. October 23, 2003.*
Remedial Law; Actions; Summons; Jurisdictions; Generally, trial courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by the
service of summons.—In general, trial courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by the service of summons.
Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, such service may be done by personal or substituted
service, following the procedures laid out in Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Substituted Service; Personal service of summons is preferred to substituted service; Only if the
former cannot be made promptly can the process server resort to the latter; Circumstances which must be indicated in the proof of
summons; Failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements of substituted service renders the service
of summons ineffective.—As can be gleaned from the above-quoted Sections, personal service of summons is preferred to
substituted service. Only if the former cannot be made promptly can the process server resort to the latter. Moreover, the proof of
service of summons must (a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts
exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is
residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of business, of the defendant. It is likewise required that
the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in the officer’s return. The failure to comply
faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements of substituted service renders the service of summons ineffective.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A general statement that such efforts were made will not suffice for purposes of complying with
the rules of substituted service of summons.—The Return of Summons shows that no effort was actually exerted and no positive
step taken by either the process server or petitioners to locate and serve the summons personally on respondents. At best, the
Return merely states the alleged whereabouts of respondents without indicating that such information was verified from a person
who had knowledge thereof. Certainly, without specifying the details of the attendant circumstances or of the efforts exerted to
serve the summons, a general statement that such efforts were made will not suffice for purposes of complying with the rules of
substituted service of summons.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Extraterritorial Service; Extraterritorial service of summons or summons by publication applies only
when the action is in rem or quasi in rem.—It must be noted that extraterritorial service of summons or summons by publication
applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in rem. The first is an action against the thing itself instead of against the
defendant’s person; in the latter, an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose is to subject that individual’s interest in a
piece of property to the obligation or loan burdening it.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An action for specific performance is an action in personam.—In the instant case, what was
filed before the trial court was an action for specific performance directed against respondents. While the suit incidentally involved a
piece of land, the ownership or possession thereof was not put in issue, since they did not assert any interest or right over it.
Moreover, this Court has consistently declared that an action for specific performance is an action in personam.

SIXTO N. CHU, petitioner, vs. MACH ASIA TRADING CORPORATION, respondent. G.R. No. 184333. April 1, 2013.*

Remedial Law; Summons; Service of Summons; Substituted Service of Summons; As a rule, summons should be personally
served on the defendant. It is only when summons cannot be served personally within a reasonable period of time that substituted
service may be resorted to.―Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand,
jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of summons upon them or through their
voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority. As a rule, summons should be personally served on the
defendant. It is only when summons cannot be served personally within a reasonable period of time that substituted service may be
resorted to. Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 7. Substituted service.—If, for justifiable causes, the defendant
cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of
the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving
the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

Same; Same; Same; Same; In case of substituted service, there should be a report indicating that the person who received the
summons in the defendant’s behalf was one with whom the defendant had a relation of confidence, ensuring that the latter would
actually receive the summons.―It is to be noted that in case of substituted service, there should be a report indicating that the
person who received the summons in the defendant’s behalf was one with whom the defendant had a relation of confidence,
ensuring that the latter would actually receive the summons. Also, impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by
stating that efforts have been made to find the defendant personally and that such efforts have failed. This is necessary because
substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character, hence, may be used
only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. The statutory requirements of substituted service must be
followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized by statute is considered ineffective.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It was not shown that the security guard who received the summons in behalf of the petitioner was
authorized and possessed a relation of confidence that petitioner would definitely receive the summons.―Clearly, it was not shown
that the security guard who received the summons in behalf of the petitioner was authorized and possessed a relation of
confidence that petitioner would definitely receive the summons. This is not the kind of service contemplated by law. Thus, service
on the security guard could not be considered as substantial compliance with the requirements of substituted service.

Same; Same; Same; Same; As a rule, if defendants have not been validly summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over their
person, and a judgment rendered against them is null and void.―The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of
due process. As a rule, if defendants have not been validly summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over their person, and a
judgment rendered against them is null and void. Since the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, the
judgment rendered by the court could not be considered binding upon him for being null and void.

Chapter VI. Proceedings after Service of Summons and Dismissal of Action

A. Motion for Bill of Particulars

CESAR E. A. VIRATA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents. G.R. No. 114331. May 27, 1997.*

Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Bill of Particulars; As long as the complaint contains these three elements—(1) a right in favor of
the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant
to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of
damages—a cause of action exists even though the allegations therein are vague.—The rule is that a complaint must contain the
ultimate facts constituting plaintiff’s cause of action. A cause of action has the following elements, to wit: (1) a right in favor of the
plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of
damages. As long as the complaint contains these three elements, a cause of action exists even though the allegations therein are
vague, and dismissal of the action is not the proper remedy when the pleading is ambiguous because the defendant may ask for
more particulars.

Same; Same; Same; The remedy available to a party who seeks clarification of any issue or matter vaguely or obscurely pleaded
by the other party is to file a motion either for a more definite statement or for a bill of particulars.—As such, Section 1, Rule 12 of
the Rules of Court, provides, inter alia, that a party may move for more definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter
which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to prepare his responsive pleading or to
prepare for trial. Such motion shall point out the defects com pl a in ed of and the details desired. Under this Rule, the remedy
available to a party who seeks clarification of any issue or matter vaguely or obscurely pleaded by the other party, is to file a
motion, either for a more definite statement or for a bill of particulars. An order directing the submis sion of such s tatement or bill,
further, is proper where it enables the party movant intelligently to prepare a responsive pleading, or adequately to prepare for trial.

Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Bill of Particulars,” Explained.—A bill of particulars is a complementary procedural
document consisting of an amplification or more particularized outline of a pleading, and being in the nature of a more specific
allegation of the facts recited in the pleading. It is the office of the bill of particulars to inform the opposite party and the court of the
precise nature and character of the cause of action or defense which the pleader has attempted to set forth and thereby to guide
his adversary in his preparations for trial, and reasonably to protect him against surprise at the trial. It gives information of the
specific proposition for which the pleader contends, in respect to any material and issuable fact in the case, and it becomes a part
of the pleading which it supplements. It has been held that a bill of particulars must inform the opposite party of the nature of the
pleader’s cause of action or defens e, and it must furnish the required items of the claim with reasonable fullness and precision.
Generally, it will be held sufficient if it fairly and substantially gives the opposite party the information to which he is entitled, as
required by the terms of the application and of the order thereof. It should be definite and specific and not contain general
allegations and conclusions. It should be reasonably certain and as specific as the circumstances will allow.

LEONARDO GALEON, petitioner, vs. MARCIAL GALEON,ZOSI-MA GALEON-CANDA,MATEO GALEON, and COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON,BRANCH II, LUCENA CITY, respondents. No. L-30380. February 28, 1973.

Remedial law; Civil procedure; Motion to dismiss; Test of sufficiency of statement of cause of action is whether, admitting the
veracity of the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment.—–In a motion to dismiss a complaint for lack of cause of
action, the question submitted to the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations of facts made in the complaint to
constitute a cause of action and not whether these allegations of fact are true, for said motion must hypothetically admit the truth of
the facts alleged in the complaint. The test of the sufficiency of the facts, is whether or not, accepting the veracity of the facts
alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.

Same; Same; Same; Trial court may not inquire into the truth of averments in the complaint for purposes of disposing of a motion to
dismiss.—–The uniform ruling of this Court is that the trial court may not inquire into the truth of the allegations, and find them to be
false before a hearing is had on the merits of the case. If the court finds the allegations to be sufficient but doubts their veracity, it is
incumbent upon said court to deny the motion to dismiss and require the defendant to answer. The veracity of the assertions could
be ascertained at the trial on the merits.

Same; Same; Same; An averment in the complaint that the plaintiff is the son of one Demetrio Galeon,” who during his lifetime, has
acknowledged and recognized him as such illegitimate child,” substantially complies with the rule on sufficiency of the statement of
the cause of action.—–As early as Reyes vs. Zuzuarregui (102 Phil. 346), Justice J.B.L. Reyes advocated that illegitimate children
other than natural, should be acknowledged in the same manner as natural children. This aspect of his concurring opinion became
the majority opinion in Paulino vs. Paulino (3 SCRA 730). Since acknowledgment is essential and is the basis of the right of a
spurious child to inherit in the estate of his deceased putative parent under articles 287, 887, and 895 of the New Civil Code, it is
necessary as a basis for his claim in the estate to allege such. It is therefore evident that the questioned averment in petitioner’s
complaint substantially complies with the aforementioned requirement. For the case at bar is not an action to compel recognition of
petitioner as the illegitimate (spurious) child of the deceased. Rather it is an action by one who alleges as a matter of fact that he is
an acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child of said deceased, for the partition of his estate. As to whether or not petitioner
was actually acknowledged by the deceased as his illegitimate child, is a question of fact, which will depend upon the evidence to
be presented at the trial. The dismissal of the case was therefore premature. It amounted to a denial of petitioner’s day in court.

Same; Same; Same; An action cannot be dismissed on the ground that complaint is vague or indefinite.—It is true that the
allegation in question is rather vague, as it does not state the manner or form in which such voluntary recognition of petitioner was
made, whether in a record of birth, a will, statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. But this Court, speaking
thru Chief Justice Moran, in Co Tiamco vs. Diaz (75 Phil. 672), explained that under “the new Rules of Court, an action cannot be
dismissed upon the ground that the complaint is vague, ambiguous, or indefinite, because the defendant, in such case, may ask for
more particulars or he may compel the plaintiff to disclose more relevant facts under the different methods of discovery provided by
the Rules.

FILIPINAS FABRICATORS & SALES INC., FELIPE V. PESTANO, and BENITO UNCHUAN, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
CELSO L. MAGSINO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL AND ATLAS COPCO (PHILIPPINES), INC.,
respondents. No. L-47574. January 29, 1988.*

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Bill of particulars; A filed motion for bill of particulars which is sufficient in form and substance
renders the running of the reglementary period to answer, suspended; Failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of
motions in the motion for bill of particulars is fatal to the motion.—We agree with the petitioners’ premise that a filed motion for bill
of particulars renders the running of the reglementary period to answer, suspended. This statement is, of course, accurate only if
the filed motion is sufficient in form and substance, meaning, it complies with the general requirements of motions under Sections 4
and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court, which explicitly require a motion to be accompanied by a notice of hearing, to be
served by the movant on the adverse parties concerned at least three (3) days before the hearing, and to state therein the exact
time and place of hearing. Section 6 of the same Rule further commands that “no motion shall be acted upon by the court, without
proof of service of the notice thereof except when the court is satisfied that the rights of the adverse party or parties are not
affected.” These requirements under Rule 15, as we have often held, are mandatory, and the failure of the movant to comply with
them renders his motion fatal. (New Japan Motors, Inc. v. Perucho, 74 SCRA 14, 19 [1974], See also Omico Mining Industrial
Corporation v. Vallejos, 63 SCRA 285 [1975]; and Sacdalan v. Bautista, 56 SCRA 175 [1974]).

Same; Same; Same; Where the motion for bill of particulars did not contain the notice of hearing and proof of service required by
the Rules, the motion is nothing but a mere scrap of paper; A defective motion does not interrupt the running of the period within
which to file answer.—The petitioners’ motion for bill of particulars filed on May 12, 1977, did not contain the notice of hearing and
proof of service required by the Rules. This kind of motion, as we have already held in several cases (Firme v. Reyes, 92 SCRA
713, 715 [1979], citing therein several cases), is nothing but “a mere scrap of paper.” It presents no question which merits the
attention and consideration of the court. In fact, it is not even considered a motion. A defective motion of this kind does not interrupt
the running of the period within which to file answer.

Same; Same; Same; Fact that the court had taken cognizance of the defective motion did not cure the defect nor alter the nature of
the defective motion.—Significantly, the fact that the court had taken cognizance of the defective motion first, by requiring the
parties to set it for hearing and second, when it denied the same for lack of merit in its omnibus motion, did not cure the defect nor
alter the nature of the defective motion. In Andrada v. Court of Appeals (60 SCRA 379, 382), we held: “[T]he subsequent action of
the court thereon does not cure the flaw, for a motion with a notice fatally defective is a ‘useless piece of paper.’”

Same; Same; Same; Default; Order of default, valid where the petitioners failed to file their answer to the complaint within the
reglementary period.—Even on the assumption that the respondent court’s omnibus order was irregular for denying the petitioners’
defective motion and at the same time declaring them in default, still, we find the default order valid. The petitioners, who admit in
paragraph 6 of their petition that a copy of the omnibus order denying the motion for bill of particulars was received on August 30,
1977, again failed to file their answer within five (5) days from receipt thereof.

MARIA MATIAS DE BAUTISTA, assisted by her husband LORENZO BAUTISTA, plaintiff and appellant, vs. JOSE
TEODORO, JR. defendant and appellee. [No. L-8894. May 31, 1957]

PLEADING AND PRACTICE; COMPLAINT; DISMISSAL; PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH ORDER OF COURT.—
Where the plaintiff is ordered either to amend the complaint or to file a bill of particulars within ten days from receipt of notice and
an extension of two weeks granted by the Court and plaintiff still fails to comply with said order, the action may be dismissed upon
motion of the defendant or upon the Court's own motion pursuant to Section 3, Rule 30 and Section 3, Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court.

MODESTA CALIMLIM AND LAMBERTO MAGALI IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF DOMINGO
MAGALI, petitioners, vs. HON. PEDRO A. RAMIREZ IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF PANGASINAN, BRANCH I, and FRANCISCO RAMOS, respondents. No. L-34362. November 19, 1982.*

Judgment; There is no res judicata or bar by prior judgment where a CFI acting as a court of limited jurisdiction as a land
registration court resolved a highly controversial matter—ownership of titled property and cancellation of torrens title previously
issued — beyond its judicial competence to pass upon.—It may hardly be questioned that the issues raised by the petitioners in
their petition to cancel TCT No. 68568 refer to the ownership or title over the property covered thereby. The said petition presented
before the respondent Court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction as a cadastral court, the question of who should be considered
the true and lawful owner of the parcel of land embraced in said title. The petitioners alleged therein that they are the true owners of
the property, and that TCT No. 68568 which they sought to cancel was issued as a result of the errors which were not of their own
making. In short, the petition raised a highly controversial matter which is beyond the judicial competence of a cadastral court to
pass upon or to adjudicate.

Same; Land Registration; Jurisdiction; The ruling in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, that a party is estopped from questioning
the jurisdiction of the land registration court in which it filed a petition for cancellation of title, is to be considered as a mere
exception rather than the general rule. Unfortunately, the ruling in Sibonghanoy case had become to be regarded as the general
rule.—A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction
of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties.
The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified
by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted,
however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The
exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure front the accepted concept of non-waivability of
objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed
ruling In Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle
that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.

Same; Same; Laches; Petitioners herein cannot be faulted with laches as they immediately filed a petition in court after learning
that their title had been cancelled.—The petitioners in the instant case may not be faulted with laches. When they learned that the
title to the property owned by them had erroneously and illegally been cancelled and registered in the name of another entity or
person who had no right to the same, they filed a petition to cancel the latter’s title. It is unfortunate that in pursuing said remedy,
their counsel had to invoke the authority of the respondent Court as a cadastral court, instead of its capacity as a court of general
jurisdiction. Their petition to cancel the title in the name of Independent Mercantile Corporation was dismissed upon a finding by the
respondent Court that the same was “without merit.” No explanation was given for such dismissal nor why the petition lacked merit.
There was no hearing, and the petition was resolved solely on the basis of memoranda filed by the parties which do not appear of
record. It is even a possibility that such dismissal was in view of the realization of the respondent Court that, sitting as a cadastral
court, it lacked the authority to entertain the petition involving as it does a highly controversial issue. Upon such petition being
dismissed, the petitioners instituted Civil Case No. SCC-180 on January 1, 1971, or only two and one-half years after the dismissal
of their petition in LRC Record No. 39492. Hence, we see no unreasonable delay in the assertion by the petitioners of their right to
claim the property which rightfully belongs to them. They can hardly be presumed to have abandoned or waived such right by
inaction within an unreasonable length of time or inexcusable negligence. In short, their filing of Civil Case No. SCC-180 which in
itself is an implied non-acceptance of the validity of the proceedings had in LRC Record No. 39492 may not be deemed barred by
estoppel by laches.

Same; Estoppel; Estoppel, when it can be invoked.—It is neither fair nor legal to bind a party by the result of a suit or proceeding
which was taken cognizance of in a court which lacks jurisdiction over the same irrespective of the attendant circumstances. The
equitable defense of estoppel requires knowledge or consciousness of the facts upon which it is based. The same thing is true with
estoppel by conduct which may be asserted only when it is shown, among others, that the representation must have been made
with knowledge of the facts and that the party to whom it was made is ignorant of the truth of the matter. (De Castro vs. Gineta, 27
SCRA 623.) The filing of an action or suit in a court that does not possess jurisdiction to entertain the same may not be presumed
to be deliberate and intended to secure a ruling which could later be annulled if not favorable to the party who filed such suit or
proceeding. Instituting such an action is not a one-sided affair.

Jurisdiction; Estoppel; Waiver; Filing of petition or complaint in court does not result in waiver on lack of court’s jurisdiction as the
determination of the correct jurisdiction of a court is not a simple matter and court itself which takes cognizance over a case it has
no jurisdiction over should be faulted for the resultant situation.—The determination of the correct jurisdiction of a court is not a
simple matter. It can raise highly debatable issues of such importance that the highest tribunal of the land is given the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction to entertain the same. The point simply is that when a party commits error in filing his suit or proceeding in a
court that lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same, such act may not at once be deemed sufficient basis of estoppel. It
could have been the result of an honest mistake, or of divergent interpretations of doubtful legal provisions. If any fault is to be
imputed to a party taking such course of action, part of the blame should be placed on the court which shall entertain the suit,
thereby lulling the parties into believing that they pursued their remedies in the correct forum. Under the rules, it is the duty of the
court to dismiss an action “whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter.” (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of
Court.) Should the court render a judgment without jurisdiction, such judgment may be impeached or annulled for lack of jurisdiction
(Sec. 30, Rule 132, Ibid), within ten (10) years from the finality of the same. (Art. 1144, par. 3, Civil Code.)

Spouses ADORACION C. PANGILINAN and GEORGE B. PANGILINAN represented in this suit by their Attorney-in-fact,
ARCADIO S. MALLARI, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE R. CANLAS and LUIS R. CANLAS and RURAL BANK
OF STA. RITA, INC., respondents. G.R. No. 83588. September 29, 1997.*

Same; Same; Same; Appeals; Pleadings and Practice; It is settled that an issue which was neither averred in the complaint nor
raised during the trial in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.—It must be noted that upon a careful
examination of the records of this case, it appears that the contention of the petitioners that their failure to pay the balance of 15%
of the total contract price of the lot was due to the inability of the private respondent to improve the subdivision and install facilities
which was raised only for the first time on appeal. They did not raise this issue before the lower courts. It is settled that an issue
which was neither averred in the complaint nor raised during the trial in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Issues of fact and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the trial court need not be and ordinarily will not be
considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

MA. CONCEPCION L. REGALADO, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO S. GO, respondent. G.R. No. 167988. February 6, 2007.*

Attorneys; Contempt; Contempt of Court signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court’s orders, but such conduct
tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into dispute or in some manner to impede the due
administration of justice.—Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to
bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses
during litigation. It is defined as disobedience to the Court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It signifies not
only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court’s orders, but such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court and the
administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice.

Contempt; Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the
same, and includes disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or answer as a
witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so.—Direct contempt is committed in the presence of
or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, and includes disrespect toward the court, offensive
personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully
required to do so.
Same; Indirect contempt proceedings may be initiated only in two ways: 1) motu proprio by the court; or 2) through a verified
petition and upon compliance with the requirements for initiatory pleadings.—The provisions of the Rules are unequivocal. Indirect
contempt proceedings may be initiated only in two ways: (1) motu proprio by the court; or (2) through a verified petition and upon
compliance with the requirements for initiatory pleadings. Procedural requirements as outlined must be complied with.

Same; It bears to stress that the power to punish for contempt is not limitless. It must be used sparingly with caution, restraint,
judiciousness, deliberation, and due regard to the provisions of the law and the constitutional rights of the individual.—It bears to
stress that the power to punish for contempt is not limitless. It must be used sparingly with caution, restraint, judiciousness,
deliberation, and due regard to the provisions of the law and the constitutional rights of the individual.

Same; Pleadings and Practice; Even if the contempt proceedings stemmed from the main case over which the court already
acquired jurisdiction, the Rules direct that the petition for contempt be treated independently of the principal action.—Even if the
contempt proceedings stemmed from the main case over which the court already acquired jurisdiction, the Rules direct that the
petition for contempt be treated independently of the principal action. Consequently, the necessary prerequisites for the filing of
initiatory pleadings, such as the filing of a verified petition, attachment of a certification on non-forum shopping, and the payment of
the necessary docket fees, must be faithfully observed.

Estoppel; Laches; Words and Phrases; Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.—Laches is defined as the “failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
it.”

Same; Same; Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is
analogous to that in the cited case.—The ruling in People v. Regalario, 220 SCRA 368 (1993), that was based on the landmark
doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 22 Phil. 29 (1968), on the matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is the exception rather
than the rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is
analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should have been clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must
have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert
it.

Contempt; Pleadings and Practice; In case where the indirect contempt charge is not initiated by the courts, the filing of a verified
petition which fulfills the requirements on initiatory pleadings is a prerequisite.—The provisions of the Rules are worded in very
clear and categorical language. In case where the indirect contempt charge is not initiated by the courts, the filing of a verified
petition which fulfills the requirements on initiatory pleadings is a prerequisite. Beyond question now is the mandatory requirement
of a verified petition in initiating an indirect contempt proceeding. Truly, prior to the amendment of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, mere motion without complying with the requirements for initiatory pleadings was tolerated by the courts. At the onset of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, such practice can no longer be countenanced.

SPOUSES MARIANO P. MARASIGAN and JOSEFINA LEAL, petitioners, vs. CHEVRON PHILS., INC., ACCRA
INVESTMENTS, CORP., and ANGARA ABELLO CONCEPCION REGALA & CRUZ, respondents. G.R. No. 184015. February
8, 2012.*

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; Litis Pendentia; The essence of forum shopping is the filing by a party against
whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, seeking another and possibly favorable opinion in another suit other
than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari.—The essence of forum shopping is the filing by a party against whom an
adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, seeking another and possibly favorable opinion in another suit other than by
appeal or special civil action for certiorari. It is the act of filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. Forum shopping exists where the
elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration. Litis pendentia is a Latin term, which literally means “a pending suit” and is variously referred to in some decisions as
lis pendens and auter action pendant. As a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, it refers to the situation where two actions are
pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious. It is
based on the policy against multiplicity of suits. Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) identity of
parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs
prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two
cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to
res judicata in the other case.
Same; Same; Same; The test to determine identity of causes of action is to ascertain whether the same evidence necessary to
sustain the second cause of action is sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first, even if the forms or the nature of the two (2)
actions are different from each other.—Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts,
likewise subsists here. It cannot be denied that the complaint filed in the RTC-Makati was for a Sum of Money while that filed in the
RTC-Gumaca was for Declaration of Nullity and/or Annulment of Foreclosure with Damages. Although both cases differ in form or
nature, the same facts would be alleged and the same evidence would be presented considering that the resolution of both cases
would be based on the validity and enforceability of the same credit lines, real estate mortgages and foreclosure proceedings.
Indeed, the true test in determining the identity of causes of action lies not in the form or nature of the actions but rather in the
evidence that would be presented. The test to determine identity of causes of action is to ascertain whether the same evidence
necessary to sustain the second cause of action is sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first, even if the forms or the nature of
the two (2) actions are different from each other. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two (2) actions are
considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action; otherwise, it is not. This
method has been considered the most accurate test as to whether a former judgment is a bar in subsequent proceedings between
the same parties. It has even been designated as infallible.

ERMELINDA C. MANALOTO, AURORA J. CIFRA, FLORDELIZA J. ARCILLA, LOURDES J. CATALAN, ETHELINDA J. HOLT,
BIENVENIDO R. JONGCO, ARTEMIO R. JONGCO, JR. and JOEL JONGCO, petitioners, vs. ISMAEL VELOSO III,
respondent. G.R. No. 171365. October 6, 2010.*

Appeals; Fresh Period Rule; Pleadings and Practice; Words and Phrases; Jurisprudence has settled the “fresh period rule,”
according to which, an ordinary appeal from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to the Court of Appeals, under Section 3 of Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court, shall be taken within fifteen (15) days either from receipt of the original judgment of the trial court or from receipt
of the final order of the trial court dismissing or denying the motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.—Jurisprudence has
settled the “fresh period rule,” according to which, an ordinary appeal from the RTC to the Court of Appeals, under Section 3 of
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, shall be taken within fifteen (15) days either from receipt of the original judgment of the trial court or
from receipt of the final order of the trial court dismissing or denying the motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In
Sumiran v. Damaso, 596 SCRA 450 (2009), we presented a survey of the cases applying the fresh period rule: As early as 2005,
the Court categorically declared in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, 469 SCRA 633 (2005), that by virtue of the power of the Supreme
Court to amend, repeal and create new procedural rules in all courts, the Court is allowing a fresh period of 15 days within which to
file a notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing or denying a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. This would standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the
15-day appeal period should be counted.

Same; Same; Same; The fresh period rule has retroactive application to cases pending and undetermined upon its effectivity—
procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no
vested rights in the rules of procedure.—Also in Sumiran, we recognized the retroactive application of the fresh period rule to cases
pending and undetermined upon its effectivity: The retroactivity of the Neypes rule in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed
prior to the date of promulgation of Neypes on September 14, 2005, was clearly explained by the Court in Fil-Estate Properties, Inc.
v. Homena-Valencia, stating thus: The determinative issue is whether the “fresh period” rule announced in Neypes could
retroactively apply in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005 when Neypes was promulgated.
That question may be answered with the guidance of the general rule that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure. Amendments
to procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character as they do not create new or remove vested rights, but only operate in
furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing.

Actions; Motions to Dismiss; When the ground for dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action, such fact can be
determined only from the facts alleged in the complaint and from no other, and the court cannot consider other matters aliunde.—
According to Rule 2, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another. When the ground for dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action, such fact can be determined only from the
facts alleged in the complaint and from no other, and the court cannot consider other matters aliunde. The test, therefore, is
whether, assuming the allegations of fact in the complaint to be true, a valid judgment could be rendered in accordance with the
prayer stated therein.

Same; Same; Elements.—A cause of action (for damages) exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the
plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of
damages. We find that all three elements exist in the case at bar. Respondent may not have specifically identified each element,
but it may be sufficiently determined from the allegations in his complaint.
Same; A finding that the complaint sufficiently states a cause of action does not necessarily mean that the complaint is
meritorious—it shall only result in the reinstatement of the complaint and the hearing of the case for presentation of evidence by the
parties.—We cannot subscribe to respondent’s argument that there is no more need for the presentation of evidence by the parties
since petitioners, in moving for the dismissal of respondent’s complaint for damages, hypothetically admitted respondent’s
allegations. The hypothetical admission of respondent’s allegations in the complaint only goes so far as determining whether said
complaint should be dismissed on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. A finding that the complaint sufficiently states a
cause of action does not necessarily mean that the complaint is meritorious; it shall only result in the reinstatement of the complaint
and the hearing of the case for presentation of evidence by the parties.

DOLORES ADORA MACASLANG, petitioner, vs. RENATO AND MELBA ZAMORA, respondents. G.R. No. 156375. May 30,
2011.*

Civil Procedure; Appeals; The Regional Trial Court, in exercising appellate jurisdiction, is not limited to the errors assigned in the
appeal memorandum, but could decide on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the trial court and such
memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court (RTC).—As such, the RTC, in
exercising appellate jurisdiction, was not limited to the errors assigned in the petitioner’s appeal memorandum, but could decide on
the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the trial court and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by
the parties or required by the RTC. The difference between the procedures for deciding on review is traceable to Section 22 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

Same; Cause of Action; In resolving whether the complaint states a cause of action or not, only the facts alleged in the complaint
are considered.—In resolving whether the complaint states a cause of action or not, only the facts alleged in the complaint are
considered. The test is whether the court can render a valid judgment on the complaint based on the facts alleged and the prayer
asked for. Only ultimate facts, not legal conclusions or evidentiary facts, are considered for purposes of applying the test.

Same; Same; Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are really different from each other.—Failure to state a
cause of action and lack of cause of action are really different from each other. On the one hand, failure to state a cause of action
refers to the insufficiency of the pleading, and is a ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, lack
of cause action refers to a situation where the evidence does not prove the cause of action alleged in the pleading.

SEVERINO S. CAPIRAL, petitioner, vs. SIMEONA CAPIRAL ROBLES and VICENTE CAPIRAL, respondents. G.R. No.
173628. November 16, 2011.*

Civil Procedure; Motions to Dismiss; Section 2, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court allows not only a hearing on the motion to dismiss,
but also for the parties to submit their evidence on the questions of fact involved which may be litigated extensively at the hearing
or hearings on the motion.—In Rimbunan Hijau Group of Companies v. Oriental Wood Processing Corporation, 470 SCRA 650
(2005), this Court had occasion to rule that the issues raised in a motion to dismiss have to be determined in accordance with the
evidence and facts presented, not on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations and that the courts could not afford to dismiss a
litigant’s complaint on the basis of half-baked conclusions with no evidence to show for it. In emphasizing the need for a formal
hearing, this Court held that the demand for a clear factual finding to justify the grant or denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be
dispensed with. To this end, Section 2, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court allows not only a hearing on the motion to dismiss, but also for
the parties to submit their evidence on the questions of fact involved, which may be litigated extensively at the hearing or hearings
on the motion. During the said hearings, the parties are allowed to submit their respective evidence, and even rebut the opposing
parties’ evidence. The hearings should provide the parties the forum for full presentation of their sides. Moreover, from the trial
court’s perspective, the extent of such hearings would depend on its satisfaction that the ground in filing the motion to dismiss has
been established or disestablished.

SPOUSES ERNESTO and VICENTA TOPACIO, as represented by their attorney-in-fact MARILOU TOPACIO-NARCISO,
petitioners, vs. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS and MORTGAGE BANK, respondent. G.R. No. 157644. November 17, 2010.*

Remedial Law; Actions; Judgments; Res Judicata; Under the rule of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a
court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all later suits and on all points and matters
determined in the previous suit; The rationale for the rule is that “public policy requires that controversies must be settled with
finality at a given point in time.”—Under the rule of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all later suits and on all points and matters determined in the
previous suit. The term literally means a “matter adjudged, judicially acted upon, or settled by judgment.” The principle bars a
subsequent suit involving the same parties, subject matter, and cause of action. The rationale for the rule is that “public policy
requires that controversies must be settled with finality at a given point in time.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The doctrine of res judicata embraces two (2) concepts: bar by prior judgment and conclusiveness of
judgment; Requisites before res judicata applies in the concept of bar by prior judgment.—The doctrine of res judicata embraces
two (2) concepts: the first is “bar by prior judgment” under paragraph (b) of Rule 39, Section 47 of the Rules of Court, and the
second is “conclusiveness of judgment” under paragraph (c) thereof. Res judicata applies in the concept of “bar by prior judgment”
if the following requisites concur: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the merits;
(3) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must
be, between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of subject matter and of causes of action.

Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; As a rule, judgments are sufficiently served when they are delivered personally, or through
registered mail to the counsel of record, or by leaving them in his office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof.—As a
rule, judgments are sufficiently served when they are delivered personally, or through registered mail to the counsel of record, or by
leaving them in his office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof. After service, a judgment or order which is not
appealed nor made subject of a motion for reconsideration within the prescribed 15-day period attains finality.

Actions; Foreclosure of Mortgage; Writs of Possession; Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court finds application only to civil
actions and not to special proceedings.—The petitioners finally submit that the writ of possession, issued by the RTC on February
16, 1984, may no longer be enforced by a mere motion, but by a separate action, considering that more than five years had
elapsed from its issuance, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, x x x In rejecting a similar argument, the Court held
in Paderes v. Court of Appeals, 463 SCRA 504 (2005), that Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court finds application only to civil
actions and not to special proceedings.

Same; Same; Same; Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is not applicable to an ex parte petition for the issuance of the writ of
possession as it is not in the nature of a civil action.—In the present case, Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is not applicable
to an ex parte petition for the issuance of the writ of possession as it is not in the nature of a civil action governed by the Rules of
Civil Procedure but a judicial proceeding governed separately by Section 7 of Act No. 3135 which regulates the methods of
effecting an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage.

Same; Same; Same; The duty of the trial court to grant a writ of possession is ministerial; the writ issues as a matter of course upon
the filing of the proper motion and the approval of the corresponding bond.—The above-cited provision lays down the procedure
that commences from the filing of a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession, to the issuance of the writ of possession by the
Court, and finally to the execution of the order by the sheriff of the province in which the property is located. Based on the text of
the law, we have also consistently ruled that the duty of the trial court to grant a writ of possession is ministerial; the writ issues as a
matter of course upon the filing of the proper motion and the approval of the corresponding bond. In fact, the issuance and the
immediate implementation of the writ are declared ministerial and mandatory under the law.

Same; Same; Same; The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is summary and ministerial
in nature as such proceeding is merely an incident in the transfer of title.—In Philippine National Bank v. Adil, 118 SCRA 110
(1982), we emphatically ruled that “once the writ of possession has been issued, the trial court has no alternative but to enforce the
writ without delay.” The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is summary and ministerial in
nature as such proceeding is merely an incident in the transfer of title. The trial court does not exercise discretion in the issuance
thereof; it must grant the issuance of the writ upon compliance with the requirements set forth by law, and the provincial sheriff is
likewise mandated to implement the writ immediately.

VIRGINIA MARAHAY, petitioner, vs. HON. MENELEO C. MELICOR, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance, Branch VI,
Carigara, Leyte; ALIWANAG B. VALLERAMOS, LIGAYA BRAZIL Y PEREZ, FRUTO BRAZIL, MATIBAY BRAZIL Y PALADIN
and DALISAY BRAZIL Y AYASO, respondents. G.R. No. 44980. February 6, 1990.*

Civil Procedure; Certiorari; Final Orders; An order of dismissal whether right or wrong is a final order, hence a proper subject of
appeal, not certiorari.—Before resolving said issue, it would be judicious to first clear the air of any misconception as to the
procedural propriety of giving due course to this petition. An order of dismissal, whether right or wrong, is a final order. If it is
erroneous, ordinarily the remedy of the aggrieved party is appeal, hence the same cannot be assailed by certiorari.

Same; Dismissal of Actions; It is the plaintiff’s absence, not that of his counsel, that will warrant dismissal on ground of non-suit;
When plaintiff is present in court, the action cannot be dismissed for failure to prosecute unless he is not ready or is unwilling to
proceed with the scheduled trial.—It is, therefore, the absence of the plaintiff, and not the absence of the lawyer, which may warrant
the dismissal of the case on the ground of non-suit. In the case at bar, only the counsel for plaintiff was absent, plaintiff herself
being in attendance in court. While the aforequoted provision also provides sanctions for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable
length of time, despite the presence of the interested parties, it cannot be said that such neglect or failing obtains in the present
case. There is failure to prosecute when the plaintiff, being present, is not ready or is unwilling to proceed with the scheduled trial.
In the instant case, petitioner did not in the least manifest unwillingness to proceed with the hearing. Upon the call for appearances,
petitioner responded that her counsel was in Manila and that he had not yet returned. Unschooled as she is in the vagaries of
procedural law, petitioner indeed could not have responded otherwise nor done any better.

Same; Same; Judgments of non-suit are generally disfavored.—The counter-argument that petitioner had already moved for
postponements in the past should take into account the fact that the circumstances thereof were not of her making nor intended to
be dilatory and that no substantial prejudice has been caused private respondents. Besides, judgments of non-suit are generally
disfavored in the same manner that default judgments are discouraged. Thus, in Padua vs. Ericta, etc., et al., we had the occasion
to rule that: “Courts should not brook undue delays in the ventilation and determination of causes. It should be their constant effort
to ensure that litigations are prosecuted and resolved with dispatch. Postponements of trials and hearings should not be allowed
except on meritorious grounds; and the grant or refusal thereof rests entirely in the sound discretion of the Judge. It goes without
saying, however, that discretion must be reasonably and wisely exercised, in the light of the attendant circumstances. Some
reasonable deferment of the proceedings may be allowed or tolerated to the end that cases may be adjudged only after full and
free presentation of evidence by all the parties, especially where the deferment would cause no substantial prejudice to any party.
The desideratum of a speedy disposition of cases should not, if at all possible, result in the precipitate loss of a party’s right to
present evidence and either in the plaintiff’s being non-suited or of the defendant’s being pronounced liable under an ex-parte
judgment.” Indeed, after the issues had been duly joined, a plaintiff is entitled to present his case. Seldom does departure from
orderly procedure bring satisfactory results. While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur, the real test for the
exercise of such power is whether, under the circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed
with reasonable promptitude. In the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to
observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to dispense
with rather than wield their authority to dismiss.

Chapter VII – Pre-Trial and Modes of Discovery

SILVESTRE TIU, petitioner, vs. DANIEL MIDDLETON and REMEDIOS P. MIDDLETON, respondents. G.R. No. 134998. July
19, 1999.*

Actions; Pre-Trials; Pleadings and Practice; Although pre-trial was discretionary under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was made
mandatory under the 1964 Rules and the subsequent amendments in 1997.—Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the
speedy disposition of cases. Although it was discretionary under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was made mandatory under the 1964
Rules and the subsequent amendments in 1997. Hailed as “the most important procedural innovation in Anglo-Saxon justice in the
nineteenth century,” pre-trial seeks to achieve the following: “(a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to
alternative modes of dispute resolution; (b) The simplification of the issues; (c) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the
pleadings; (d) The possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents to avoid unnecessary proof; (e) The
limitation of the number of witnesses; (f) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner; (g) The propriety of
rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of dismissing the action should a valid ground therefor be found to
exist; (h) The advisability or necessity of suspending the proceedings; and (i) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt
disposition of the action.”

Same; Same; Same; Pre-Trial Briefs; Requisite Contents of a Pre-Trial Brief.—In light of these objectives, the parties are also
required to submit a pre-trial brief, which must contain the following: “(a) A statement of their willingness to enter into amicable
settlement or alternative modes of dispute resolution, indicating the desired terms thereof; (b) A summary of admitted facts and
proposed stipulation of facts; (c) The issues to be tried or resolved; (d) The documents or exhibits to be presented, stating the
purpose thereof; (e) A manifestation of their having availed or their intention to avail themselves of discovery procedures or referral
to commissioners; and (f) The number and names of the witnesses, and the substance of their respective testimonies.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Pre-trial and its governing rules are not technicalities which the parties may ignore or trifle with.—The
Court emphasizes that pre-trial and its governing rules are not technicalities which the parties may ignore or trifle with. As earlier
stated, pre-trial is essential in the simplification and the speedy disposition of disputes. Thus, the Court has observed: “Everyone
knows that a pre-trial in civil actions is mandatory, and has been so since January 1, 1964. Yet to this day its place in the scheme
of things is not fully appreciated, and it receives but perfunctory treatment in many courts. Some courts consider it a mere
technicality, serving no useful purpose save perhaps, occasionally to furnish ground for non-suiting the plaintiff, or declaring a
defendant in default, or, wistfully, to bring about a compromise. The pre-trial device is not thus put to full use. Hence it has failed in
the main to accomplish the chief objective for it: the simplification, abbreviation and expedition of the trial, if not indeed its
dispensation. This is a great pity, because the objective is attainable, and with not much difficulty, if the device were more
intelligently and extensively handled.”
Same; Same; Same; Same.—In light of the objectives of a pretrial and the role of the trial court therein, it is evident that judges
have the discretion to exclude witnesses and other pieces of evidence not listed in the pre-trial brief, provided the parties are given
prior notice to this effect.

Same; Same; Same; Where a party did not challenge before the trial a Pre-Trial Order allowing the presentation of unnamed
witnesses, nor invoke the power of the trial court to compel the other party to submit the names of his witnesses and summaries of
their testimonies, he is deemed to have acquiesced to such Pre-Trial Order; Modifying a pre-trial order during the trial or, worse,
when the defendant is about to present witnesses will indubitably result in manifest injustice.—The provision in the Pre-trial Order
allowing petitioner to present six witnesses “shall control the subsequent course of action.” The court a quo proceeded with the trial
without modifying the Order. In the same vein, respondents did not challenge it before the trial. Neither did they invoke the power of
the trial court to compel the petitioner to submit the names of his witnesses and summaries of their testimonies. By their silence,
respondents acquiesced to the Pre-trial Order allowing the presentation of petitioner’s unnamed witnesses. Modifying a pre-trial
order during the trial or, worse, when the defendant is about to present witnesses will indubitably result in manifest injustice. This
could not have been the intention of the Rules.

LICOMCEN, INC., petitioner, vs. ENGR. SALVADOR ABAINZA, doing business under the name and style “ADS
INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT,” respondent. G.R. No. 199781. February 18, 2013.*

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; Evidence; Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, with the following exceptions: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) litis
pendentia; (3) res judicata; and (4) prescription of the action.—Under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, with the following exceptions: (1) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) litis pendentia; (3) res judicata; and (4) prescription of the action. Clearly, petitioner cannot
change its defense after the termination of the period of testimony and after the exhibits of both parties have already been admitted
by the court. The non-inclusion of this belated defense in the pre-trial order barred its consideration during the trial. To rule
otherwise would put the adverse party at a disadvantage since he could no longer offer evidence to rebut the new theory. Indeed,
parties are bound by the delimitation of issues during the pre-trial.

Same; Same; Pre-Trial; Although a pre-trial order is not meant to catalogue each issue that the parties may take up during the trial,
issues not included in the pre-trial order may be considered only if they are impliedly included in the issues raised or inferable from
the issues raised by necessary implication.—As held in Villanueva v. Court of Appeals: Pre-trial is primarily intended to insure that
the parties properly raise all issues necessary to dispose of a case. The parties must disclose during pre-trial all issues they intend
to raise during the trial, except those involving privileged or impeaching matters. Although a pre-trial order is not meant to catalogue
each issue that the parties may take up during the trial, issues not included in the pre-trial order may be considered only if they are
impliedly included in the issues raised or inferable from the issues raised by necessary implication. The basis of the rule is simple.
Petitioners are bound by the delimitation of the issues during the pre-trial because they themselves agreed to the same.

FILOIL MARKETING CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARINE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE

PHILIPPINES, defendant-appellant. No. L-29636. September 30, 1982.*

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Summons; Service of summons to a corporation upon counsel as the corporation's agent, valid.—It
is admitted that in this case the summons and copy of the complaint were served upon Atty. Paulino Al. Aquino, an Assistant
Attorney in the Syquia Law Offices and who, in three or four instances, had already appeared in court in connection with the
Motions to Dismiss on the ground of improper service of summons. Section 13, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides
that service of summons upon a domestic corporation may be made on its agent. In the case at bar, where defendant-corporation's
counsel received the summons, he was acting for and in behalf of the defendant in connection with the Motions to Dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction on the person of the defendant due to improper service of summons. Perforce, he was the defendant's
agent and under the aforecited rule, service upon him is sufficient.

ISAGANI M. JUNGCO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and G. A. MACHINERIES, INC., respondents. G.R. No.
78051. November 8, 1989.*

Pre-trial; Default; Appearance of parties at the scheduled pretrial, mandatory.—Mainly, petitioner argues that the trial court gravely
abused its discretion in considering him as in default. We do not think so. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 20 of the Rules of Court, the
appearance of the parties at the scheduled pre-trial conference is mandatory. And to ensure the enforcement of such mandate,
Section 2 of the same Rule gives to the trial court the discretion to declare a party who fails to appear at said conference as in
default or non-suited.

Same; Same; Distinction between a party in default and as in default.—To pursue his argument that the lower court gravely abused
its discretion in declaring him in default, petitioner cites the case of Continental Leaf Tobacco (Phil.) Inc. v. IAC (140 SCRA 269)
and adds that he has a meritorious defense as he goes on to narrate the latter. Before disposing of this contention, a distinction first
must be made between a party in default (Sec. 1, Rule 18) and one declared as in default (Sec. 2, Rule 20). In the former case, one
is declared in default due to his failure to file his answer to the complaint within the period required by the Rules. On the other hand,
the latter contemplates a scenario wherein the defendant in a suit had already filed his answer (therefore had set up both his
negative and affirmative defenses) but failed to comply with the mandate of the Rules in not appearing at the scheduled pre-trial
hearing.
Same; Same; Same; Proper remedy in case a party is declared as in default for failure to appear during pre-trial.—Taking into
account the above distinction, reliance on the Continental Leaf Tobacco case (supra) is not in place since the said case involves a
defendant declared in default for failure to file an answer. In the case at bar, petitioner was declared as in default by the trial court
for failure to appear at the scheduled pre-trial hearing despite due notice thereof. Consequently, petitioner may not insist that the
trial court set aside its Order of default in view of his meritorious defense since such defense, as it appears in his answer (see p.
64, Rollo), is already within the knowledge of said court prior to the issuance of the disputed Order. In fact, present jurisprudence
show that a “Motion to Set Aside Order of Default” is not the proper remedy of a party who had been so declared as in default, a
Motion for Reconsideration being the relevant remedy (Lucero v. Dacayo, 22 SCRA 1004) without need for a recital of defendant’s
“meritorious defenses” simply because the said defenses of the defendant are already laid down in the answer (Regalado,
Remedial Law Compendium, 1986 ed., p. 167).

PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION (now TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES), petitioner, vs. AMALGAMATED MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, FELIMON R. CUEVAS, AND JOSE A. SADDUL, JR., respondents. G.R. No. 177729. September 28, 2011.*

Pre-Trial; A pre-trial order is not intended to be a detailed catalogue of each and every issue that is to be taken during the trial, for it
is unavoidable that there are issues that are impliedly included among those listed or that may be inferable from those listed by
necessary implication which are as much integral parts of the pre-trial order as those expressly listed.—It is true that the issues to
be tried between the parties in a case shall be limited to those defined in the pre-trial order, as Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court explicitly provides: Section 7. Record of pre-trial.—The proceedings in the pre-trial shall be recorded. Upon the termination
thereof, the court shall issue an order which shall recite in detail the matters taken up in the conference, the action taken thereon,
the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements or admissions made by the parties as to any of the matters
considered. Should the action proceed to trial, the order shall explicitly define and limit the issues to be tried. The contents of the
order shall control the subsequent course of the action, unless modified before trial to prevent manifest injustice. (5a, R20)
However, a pre-trial order is not intended to be a detailed catalogue of each and every issue that is to be taken during the trial, for it
is unavoidable that there are issues that are impliedly included among those listed or that may be inferable from those listed by
necessary implication which are as much integral parts of the pre-trial order as those expressly listed.

Obligations and Contracts; In a solidary obligation, each debtor was liable for the entire obligation.—The deed of undertaking
specifically stated that the grant of the extension of the guaranty period did not extinguish or diminish the obligation of Cuevas and
Saddul under the guaranty. Hence, whether or not the guaranty period was extended, and whether or not they were notified of the
extension, Cuevas and Saddul remained liable under the guaranty. The stipulation, which was not illegal or immoral, necessarily
bound Cuevas and Saddul. It is worth noting, too, that a solidary obligation existed among AMDC, Cuevas and Saddul because
they had assented to be jointly and severally liable to the petitioner for whatever damages or liabilities that it might incur by virtue of
the guaranty. In a solidary obligation, each debtor was liable for the entire obligation.

Same; The obligor incurs in delay from the time the obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands the fulfillment of the obligation.—In
the deed of undertaking, Cuevas and Saddul bound themselves to reimburse or to pay to the petitioner their obligation under the
guaranty upon the latter’s demand. The Civil Code provides that the obligor incurs in delay from the time the obligee judicially or
extrajudicially demands the fulfillment of the obligation.

Same; Foreclosure of Mortgage; Deficiency Claims; Prescription; The 10-year period to recover a deficiency claim starts to run
upon the foreclosure of the property mortgaged.—In Quirino Gonzales Logging Concessionaire v. Court of Appeals, 402 SCRA 181
(2003), we have ruled that the 10-year period to recover a deficiency claim starts to run upon the foreclosure of the property
mortgaged, viz.: With respect to the first to the fifth causes of action, as can be gleaned from the complaint, the Bank seeks the
recovery of the deficient amount of the obligation after the foreclosure of the mortgage. Such suit is in the nature of a mortgage
action because its purpose is precisely to enforce the mortgage contract. A mortgage action prescribes after ten years from the
time the right of action accrued. The law gives the mortgagee the right to claim for the deficiency resulting from the price obtained in
the sale of the property at public auction and the outstanding obligation at the time of the foreclosure proceedings. In the present
case, the Bank, as mortgagee, had the right to claim payment of the deficiency after it had foreclosed the mortgage in 1965. In
other words, the prescriptive period started to run against the Bank in 1965. As it filed the complaint only on January 27, 1977,
more than ten years had already elapsed, hence, the action on its first to fifth causes had by then prescribed. No other conclusion
can be reached even if the suit is considered as one upon a written contract or upon an obligation to pay the deficiency which is
created by law, the prescriptive period of both being also ten years (citing Article 1144 of the Civil Code).

Same; Interest Rates; In contracts, the law empowers the courts to reduce interest rates and penalty charges that are iniquitous,
unconscionable and exorbitant.—In contracts, the law empowers the courts to reduce interest rates and penalty charges that are
iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant. Whether an interest rate or penalty charge is reasonable or excessive is addressed to
the sound discretion of the courts. In determining what is iniquitous and unconscionable, courts must consider the circumstances of
the case.
ESCOLASTICA MONTESCLAROS SON, and HEIRS OF ANASTACIO SON, petitioners, vs. CARMELINO SON, TEOFISTA
SON, PRIMITIVO SON, CIPRIANA SON, ANATALIA SON, LAREANO SON, GERARDA SON and THE HONORABLE
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents. G.R. No. 73077. December 29, 1995.*

Evidence; Witnesses; The matter of giving credence to evidence presented is best addressed by the trial judge.—It is a time-
honored principle that the matter of giving credence to evidence presented is best addressed by the trial judge who is in a better
position than the appellate courts to appreciate the weight and evidentiary value of the testimonies of witnesses who have
appeared before him.

Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Pre-Trial; A party is deemed to have waived the delimitations in a pre-trial order if he failed to
object to the introduction of evidence on an issue outside of the pre-trial order, as well as in cross-examining the witness in regard
to said evidence.—Petitioners contend that the agreement to limit the issue to the validity of the alleged Deed of Absolute Sale
dated 5 November 1957, embodied in the pre-trial order, no longer controlled considering that private respondents failed to object
when petitioners introduced the 1951 Deed of Sale with Right of Repurchase as evidence and, instead, even actively cross-
examined Anastacio Son on his testimony regarding said deed. Private respondents’ lapse, petitioners assert, amounted to a
waiver.

Same; Same; Same; Pre-trial is primarily intended to make certain that all issues necessary to the disposition of a case are
properly raised, and the determination of issues at a pre-trial conference bars the consideration of other questions on appeal.—A
pre-trial hearing is meant to serve as a device to clarify and narrow down the basic issues between the parties, to ascertain the
facts relative to those issues and to enable the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before civil
trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark. Pre-trial is primarily intended to make certain that all issues
necessary to the disposition of a case are properly raised. Thus, to obviate the element of surprise, parties are expected to disclose
at a pre-trial conference all issues of law and fact which they intend to raise at the trial, except such as may involve privileged or
impeaching matters. The determination of issues at a pre trial conference bars the consideration of other questions on appeal.

Same; Same; Same; Failure to object to the introduction of evidence on an issue not contained in the pre-trial order amounts to an
implied consent conferring jurisdiction on the court to try the said issue.—However, as previously intimated, the rules are not
applied with rigidity To prevent manifest injustice, some exceptions are admitted. The rules itself, specifically Section 5 of Rule 10
on Amended and Supplemental Pleadings, permits the amendment of pleadings to cause them to conform to the evidence. In
Velasco v. Apostol, 173 SCRA 228 (1989), we made the following qualification . . . . A pre-trial order is not meant to be a detailed
catalogue of each and every issue that is to be or may be taken up during the trial. Issues that are impliedly included therein or may
be inferable therefrom by necessary implication are as much integral parts of the pre trial order as those that are expressly
stipulated. In fact, it would be absurd and inexplicable for the respondent company to knowingly disregard or deliberately abandon
the issue of non-payment of the premium on the policy considering that it is the very core of its defense. Correspondingly, We
cannot but perceive here an undesirable resort to technicalities to evade an issue determinative of a defense duly averred.
Furthermore, as private respondent correctly points out, evidence to prove such late payment was introduced without any objection
by the adverse party. This lack of objection amounts to an implied consent conferring jurisdiction on the court to try said issue.
(italics ours)

Contracts; Filipino Family; Close family ties is a common Filipino trait.—We do not find peculiar Anastacio Son’s explanation that he
simply acceded to his brother’s plea to reduce the area of the disputed lot and the P350.00 given by Anastacio to Pedro to pay for
the latter’s food expenses be just considered as additional payment, close family ties being a common Filipino trait.

FAUSTINO T. CHINGKOE and GLORIA CHINGKOE, petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, respondent. G.R. No. 183608. July 31, 2013.*

Remedial Law; Appeals; Certiorari; The Rules precludes recourse to the special civil action of certiorari if appeal by way of a
Petition for Review is available, as the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.—
Respondent’s Petition for Certiorari filed before the CA was not the proper remedy against the assailed Order of the RTC. Pursuant
to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a special civil action for certiorari could only be availed of when a tribunal “acts in a capricious,
whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of [its] judgment as to be said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction” or
when it acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and if there is no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is settled that the
Rules precludes recourse to the special civil action of certiorari if appeal by way of a Petition for Review is available, as the
remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.

Same; Same; Same; A petition for certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if one’s own negligence or
error in one’s choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse.—A petition for certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an
appeal, especially if one’s own negligence or error in one’s choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. When an appeal is
available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the basis is grave abuse of discretion. The RTC Order subject of the petition was a final
judgment which disposed of the case on the merits; hence, an ordinary appeal was the proper remedy.
Same; Civil Procedure; Dismissal of Actions; Pre-Trial; The rule is clear enough that an order of dismissal based on failure to
appear at pre-trial is with prejudice, unless the order itself states otherwise.—The rule is clear enough that an order of dismissal
based on failure to appear at pre-trial is with prejudice, unless the order itself states otherwise. The questioned Order of the trial
court did not specify that the dismissal is without prejudice. There should be no cause for confusion, and the trial court is not
required to explicitly state that the dismissal is with prejudice. The respondent is not then left without a remedy, since the Rules
itself construes the dismissal to be with prejudice. It should be considered as adjudication on the merits of the case, where the
proper remedy is an appeal under Rule 41. Regrettably, the respondent chose the wrong mode of judicial review. In not dismissing
the petition for certiorari outright, and in not ruling that such remedy is the wrong mode of judicial review, the CA committed grave
and reversible error.

ALFREDO P. ROSETE, OSCAR P. MAPALO and CHITO P. ROSETE, petitioners, vs. JULIANO LIM and LILIA LIM,
respondents. G.R. No. 136051. June 8, 2006.*

Criminal Procedure; Rights of the Accused; Self-Incrimination; The right against self-incrimination is accorded to every person who
gives evidence, whether voluntary or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal or administrative proceeding.—The right
against self-incrimination is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntary or under compulsion of subpoena, in
any civil, criminal or administrative proceeding. The right is not to be compelled to be a witness against himself. It secures to a
witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to
which has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can be claimed only when the specific question,
incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right
to disregard a subpoena, decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness
receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular
question is addressed to which may incriminate himself for some offense that he may refuse to answer on the strength of the
constitutional guaranty.

Same; Same; Same; Under the Rules of Court, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled among others, to the
following.—An accused “occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness.” Under the Rules of Court, in all criminal
prosecutions the defendant is entitled among others—1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself, and 2) to testify as
witness in his own behalf; but if he offers himself as a witness he may be cross-examined as any other witness; however, his
neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him.

Same; Same; Same; As long as the suit is criminal in nature, the party thereto can altogether decline to take the witness stand—it
is not the character of the suit involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls.—It is clear, therefore, that only an accused
in a criminal case can refuse to take the witness stand. The right to refuse to take the stand does not generally apply to parties in
administrative cases or proceedings. The parties thereto can only refuse to answer if incriminating questions are propounded. This
Court applied the exception—a party who is not an accused in a criminal case is allowed not to take the witness stand—in
administrative cases/ proceedings that partook of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. It is
likewise the opinion of the Court that said exception applies to parties in civil actions which are criminal in nature. As long as the
suit is criminal in nature, the party thereto can altogether decline to take the witness stand. It is not the character of the suit involved
but the nature of the proceedings that controls.

Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Issues; Issues are joined when all the parties have pleaded their respective theories and the terms
of the dispute are plain before the court.—Issues are joined when all the parties have pleaded their respective theories and the
terms of the dispute are plain before the court. In the present case, the issues have, indeed, been joined when petitioners, as well
as the other defendants, filed their answers. The respective claims and defenses of the parties have been defined and the issues to
be decided by the trial court have been laid down.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 112710. May 30, 2001.*

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Depositions; A deposition may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever
necessary or convenient.—First of all, a “deposition,” in its technical and appropriate sense, is the written testimony of a witness
given in the course of a judicial proceeding, in advance of the trial or hearing upon oral examination or in response to written
interrogatories and where an opportunity is given for cross-examination. A deposition may be taken at any time after the institution
of any action, whenever necessary or convenient.

Same; Same; Same; Depositions pending action may be conducted by oral examination or written interrogatories, and may be
taken at the instance of any party, with or without leave of court; Leave of court not necessary to take a deposition after an answer
to the complaint has been served.—Depositions pending action may be conducted by oral examination or written interrogatories,
and may be taken at the instance of any party, with or without leave of court. Leave of court is not necessary to take a deposition
after an answer to the complaint has been served, It is only when an answer has not yet been filed (but jurisdiction has been
obtained over any defendant or over property subject of the action) that prior leave of court is required. The reason for this is that
before filing of the answer, the issues are not yet joined and the disputed facts are not clear.
Same; Same; Same; Generally a plaintiff may not be permitted to take depositions before answer is served.—The general rule is
that a plaintiff may not be permitted to take depositions before answer is served. Plaintiff must await joinder of issues because if the
discovery is to deal with matters relevant to the case, it is difficult to know exactly what is relevant until some progress has been
made toward developing the issues. Ordinarily, the issues are made up before the need for discovery arises, hence, prior to the
time of delineation of the issues, the matter is in the control of the court.

Same; Same; Same; There are instances when a deposition is allowed to be taken before service of answer once jurisdiction has
been acquired over the person or thing; A general examination by deposition before answer however is premature and ordinarily
not allowed, neither is mere avoidance of delay a sufficient reason.—There are instances, however, when a deposition is allowed to
be taken before service of answer once jurisdiction has been acquired over the person or thing. Leave of court may be granted only
in “exceptional” or “unusual” cases, and the decision is entirely within the discretion of the court. It should be granted only under
“special circumstances” where conditions point to the necessity of presenting a strong case for allowance of the motion. There must
be some “necessity” or “good reason” for taking the testimony immediately or that it would be prejudicial to the party seeking the
order to be compelled to await joinder of issue. If the witness is aged or infirm, or about to leave the court’s jurisdiction, or is only
temporarily in the jurisdiction, leave may be granted. A general examination by deposition before answer however is premature and
ordinarily not allowed, neither is mere avoidance of delay a sufficient reason.

JOWEL SALES, petitioner, vs. CYRIL A. SABINO, respondent. G.R. No. 133154. December 9, 2005.*

Remedial Law; Evidence; Depositions; A deposition is not to be used when the deponent is at hand; Five (5) Exceptions for the
Admissibility of a Deposition are Listed in Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court.—While depositions may be used as evidence in
court proceedings, they are generally not meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness.
Stated a bit differently, a deposition is not to be used when the deponent is at hand. Indeed, any deposition offered during a trial to
prove the facts therein set out, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent in open court, may be opposed and excluded on
the ground of hearsay. However, depositions may be used without the deponent being called to the witness stand by the
proponent, provided the existence of certain conditions is first satisfactorily established. Five (5) exceptions for the admissibility of a
deposition are listed in Section 4, Rule 23, supra, of the Rules of Court. Among these is when the witness is out of the Philippines.

Same; Same; Same; As a rule, the inadmissibility of testimony taken by deposition is anchored on the ground that such testimony
is hearsay, i.e., the party against whom it is offered has no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the time his testimony is
offered; The act of cross-examining the deponent during the taking of the deposition cannot, without more, be considered a waiver
of the right to object to its admissibility as evidence in the trial proper.—As a rule, the inadmissibility of testimony taken by
deposition is anchored on the ground that such testimony is hearsay, i.e., the party against whom it is offered has no opportunity to
cross-examine the deponent at the time his testimony is offered. But as jurisprudence teaches, it matters not that opportunity for
cross-examination was afforded during the taking of the deposition; for normally, the opportunity for cross-examination must be
accorded a party at the time the testimonial evidence is actually presented against him during the trial or hearing. In fine, the act of
cross-examining the deponent during the taking of the deposition cannot, without more, be considered a waiver of the right to object
to its admissibility as evidence in the trial proper. In participating, therefore, in the taking of the deposition, but objecting to its
admissibility in court as evidence, petitioner did not assume inconsistent positions. He is not, thus, estopped from challenging the
admissibility of the deposition just because he participated in the taking thereof.

Same; Same; Same; Section 29, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court in gist provides that while errors and irregularities in depositions as
to notice, qualifications of the officer conducting the deposition and manner of taking the deposition are deemed waived if not
objected to before or during the taking of the deposition, objections to the competency of a witness or the competency, relevancy or
materiality of testimony may be made for the first time at the trial and need not be made at the time of the taking of the deposition,
unless they could be obviated at that point.—Lest it be overlooked, Section 29, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, no less, lends
support to the conclusion just made. In gist, it provides that, while errors and irregularities in depositions as to notice, qualifications
of the officer conducting the deposition, and manner of taking the deposition are deemed waived if not objected to before or during
the taking of the deposition, objections to the competency of a witness or the competency, relevancy, or materiality of testimony
may be made for the first time at the trial and need not be made at the time of the taking of the deposition, unless they could be
obviated at that point.

Same; Same; Same; Certiorari; Certiorari will not lie against an order admitting or rejecting a deposition in evidence, the remedy
being an appeal from the final judgment.—While perhaps a bit anti-climactic to state at this point, certiorari will not lie against an
order admitting or rejecting a deposition in evidence, the remedy being an appeal from the final judgment. For this singular reason
alone, the appellate court could have had already dismissed herein petitioner’s invocation of its certiorari jurisdiction.

CARIDAD CRUZ VDA. DE SY-QUIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE PEDRO REYNALDO SYQUIA,
respondents No. L-62283. November 25, 1983.*

Same; Same; Remedial Law; Evidence; Depositions; Deposition of doctor who took blood tests on alleged claimants to the
disputed property, inadmissible evidence when doctor could have testified in court; Intermediate Appellate Court, which is now
empowered to receive evidence, is authorized to receive testimony of doctor.—We agree with the Court of Appeals that Doctor
Cue’s deposition is inadmissible under section 4, Rule 24 of the Rules of Court. But he should testify before the Appellate Court
which is now authorized to receive evidence by section 9 of the Judiciary Reorganization Law, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

DASMARIÑAS GARMENTS, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. RUBEN T. REYES, Judge, Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 50,
and AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES, LTD., respondents. G.R. No. 108229. August 24, 1993.*

Remedial Law; Depositions; Depositions are intended as a means to compel disclosure of facts resting in the knowledge of a party
or other person which are relevant in some suit or proceeding in court.—Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are
intended as a means to compel disclosure of facts resting in the knowledge of a party or other person which are relevant in some
suit or proceeding in court. Depositions, and the other modes of discovery (interrogatories to parties; requests for admission by
adverse party; production or inspection of documents or things; physical and mental examination of persons) are meant to enable a
party to learn all the material and relevant facts, not only known to him and his witnesses but also those known to the adverse party
and the latter’s own witnesses. In fine, the object of discovery is to make it possible for all the parties to a case to learn all the
material and relevant facts, from whoever may have knowledge thereof, to the end that their pleadings or motions may not suffer
from inadequacy of factual foundation, and all the relevant facts may be clearly and completely laid before the Court, without
omission or suppression.

Same; Same; Depositions are not generally meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness.—
Depositions are principally made available by law to the parties as a means of informing themselves of all the relevant facts; they
are not therefore generally meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. The deponent must
as a rule be presented for oral examination in open court at the trial or hearing. This is a requirement of the rules of evidence.

Same; Same; Same; Any deposition offered to prove the facts therein set out during a trial or hearing in lieu of the actual oral
testimony of the deponent in open court may be opposed and excluded on the ground that it is hearsay.—Indeed, any deposition
offered to prove the facts therein set out during a trial or hearing, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent in open court,
may be opposed and excluded on the ground that it is hearsay; the party against whom it is offered has no opportunity to cross-
examine the deponent at the time that his testimony is offered. It matters not that that opportunity for cross-examination was
afforded during the taking of the deposition; for normally, the opportunity for cross-examination must be accorded a party at the
time that the testimonial evidence is actually presented against him during the trial or hearing.

Same; Same; Same; Depositions may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand by the proponent
under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes.—However, depositions may be used without the deponent being actually
called to the witness stand by the proponent, under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes. These exceptional situations
are governed by Section 4, Rule 24 of the Rules of Court.

Same; Same; Depositions of any person may be taken wherever he may be, in the Philippines or abroad.—It is apparent then that
the deposition of any person may be taken wherever he may be, in the Philippines or abroad. If the party or witness is in the
Philippines, his deposition “shall be taken before any judge, municipal or notary public” (Sec. 10, Rule 24, Rules of Court). If in a
foreign state or country, the deposition “shall be taken: (a) on notice before a secretary or embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, or (b) before such person or officer as may be appointed
by commission or under letters rogatory”.

Same; Same; Same; Leave of court not necessary where the deposition is to be taken before a secretary or embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines and the defendant’s answer has already
been served.—Leave of court is not necessary where the deposition is to be taken before “a secretary or embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines,” and the defendant’s answer has already
been served (Sec. 1, Rule 24). After answer, whether the deposition-taking is to be accomplished within the Philippines or outside,
the law does not authorize or contemplate any intervention by the court in the process, all that is required being that “reasonable
notice” be given “in writing to every other party to the action ** (stating) the time and place for taking the deposition and the name
and address of each person to be examined, if known, and if the name is not known, a general description sufficient to identify him
or the particular class or group to which he belongs. **” (Sec. 15, Rule 24). The court intervenes in the process only if a party
moves (1) to “enlarge or shorten the time” stated in the notice (id.), or (2) “upon notice and for good cause shown,” to prevent the
deposition-taking, or impose conditions therefor, e.g., that “certain matters shall not be inquired into” or that the taking be “held with
no one present except the parties to the action and their officers or counsel,” etc. (Sec. 16, Rule 24), or (3) to terminate the process
on motion and upon a showing that “it is being conducted in bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or
oppress the deponent or party”.

Same; Same; Commission and Letters rogatory defined.—A commission may be defined as “(a)n instrument issued by a court of
justice, or other competent tribunal, to authorize a person to take depositions, or do any other act by authority of such court or
tribunal” (Feria, J., Civil Procedure, 1969 ed., p. 415, citing Cyclopedic Law Dictionary, p. 200). Letters rogatory, on the other hand,
may be defined as “(a)n instrument sent in the name and by the authority of a judge or court to another, requesting the latter to
cause to be examined, upon interrogatories filed in a cause pending before the former, a witness who is within the jurisdiction of the
judge or court to whom such letters are addressed.”

Same; Same; Same; The commission is to be coursed through the Department of Foreign Affairs conformably with Circular No.
4.—It further appears that the commission is to be coursed through the Department of Foreign Affairs conformably with Circular No.
4 issued by Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee on April 6, 1987, pursuant to the suggestion of the Department of Foreign Affairs—
directing “ALL JUDGES OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS
IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS” “to course all requests for the taking of
deposition of witnesses residing abroad through the Department of Foreign Affairs” to enable it and “the Philippine Foreign Service
establishments to act on the matter in a judicious and expeditious manner;” this, “in the interest of justice,” and to avoid delay in the
deposition-taking.

Same; Same; Depositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action whenever necessary or convenient.—
Dasmariñas also contends that the “taking of deposition is a mode of pretrial discovery to be availed of before the action comes to
trial.” Not so. Depositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient. There is
no rule that limits deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition against the taking of depositions after
pre-trial. Indeed, the law authorizes the taking of depositions of witnesses before or after an appeal is taken from the judgment of a
Regional Trial Court “to perpetuate their testimony for use in the event of further proceedings in the said court” (Rule 134, Rules of
Court), and even during the process of execution of a final and executory judgment.

Same; Same; Same; Even if the depositions were to be taken on oral examination in Taipei, the adverse party is still accorded full
right to cross-examine the deponents by the law, either by proceeding to Taipei and there conducting the cross-examination orally
or opting to conduct said cross-examination merely by serving cross-interrogatories.—The ostensible reason given by the Trial
Court for the condition—that the depositions be taken “only upon written interrogatories”—is “so as to give defendant (Dasmariñas)
the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses by serving cross-interrogatories.” The statement implies that opportunity to cross-
examine will not be accorded the defendant if the depositions were to be taken upon oral examination, which, of course, is not true.
For even if the depositions were to be taken on oral examination in Taipei, the adverse party is still accorded full right to cross-
examine the deponents by the law, either by proceeding to Taipei and there conducting the cross-examination orally, or opting to
conduct said cross-examination merely by serving cross-interrogatories.

HYATT INDUSTRIAL MANUFACTURING CORP., and YU HE CHING, petitioners, vs. LEY CONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT CORP., and PRINCETON DEVELOPMENT CORP., respondents. G.R. No. 147143. March 10, 2006.*

Civil Procedure; Modes of Discovery; Depositions; Deposition is allowed as a departure from the accepted and usual judicial
proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge, consistent with the
principle of promoting just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding, provided it is taken in accordance
with the provisions of the Rules of Court.—A deposition should be allowed, absent any showing that taking it would prejudice any
party. It is accorded a broad and liberal treatment and the liberty of a party to make discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters
inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of law. It is
allowed as a departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their
demeanor could be observed by the trial judge, consistent with the principle of promoting just, speedy and inexpensive disposition
of every action and proceeding; and provided it is taken in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, i.e., with leave of
court if summons have been served, and without such leave if an answer has been submitted; and provided further that a
circumstance for its admissibility exists (Section 4, Rule 23, Rules of Court). The rules on discovery should not be unduly restricted,
otherwise, the advantage of a liberal discovery procedure in ascertaining the truth and expediting the disposal of litigation would be
defeated.

Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court approved A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC on July 13, 2004 which provided for the guidelines to be
observed by trial court judges and clerks of court in the conduct of pre-trial and use of deposition-discovery measures.—The
importance of discovery procedures is well recognized by the Court. It approved A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC on July 13, 2004 which
provided for the guidelines to be observed by trial court judges and clerks of court in the conduct of pre-trial and use of deposition-
discovery measures. Under A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, trial courts are directed to issue orders requiring parties to avail of interrogatories
to parties under Rule 45 and request for admission of adverse party under Rule 26 or at their discretion make use of depositions
under Rule 23 or other measures under Rule 27 and 28 within 5 days from the filing of the answer. The parties are likewise
required to submit, at least 3 days before the pre-trial, pre-trial briefs, containing among others a manifestation of the parties of their
having availed or their intention to avail themselves of discovery procedures or referral to commissioners.

Same; Same; Same; The right to take statements and the right to use them in court have been kept entirely distinct.—The
argument that the taking of depositions would cause unnecessary duplicity as the intended deponents shall also be called as
witnesses during trial, is also without merit. The case of Fortune Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 335 (1994), which already
settled the matter, explained that: x x x The right to take statements and the right to use them in court have been kept entirely
distinct. The utmost freedom is allowed in taking depositions; restrictions are imposed upon their use. As a result, there is accorded
the widest possible opportunity for knowledge by both parties of all the facts before the trial. Such of this testimony as may be
appropriate for use as a substitute for viva voce examination may be introduced at the trial; the remainder of the testimony, having
served its purpose in revealing the facts to the parties before trial, drops out of the judicial picture.

Same; Same; Same; Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to supplement the pleadings.—
Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to supplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing
the real matters of dispute between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation for trial.

Isabela Sugar Co., Inc. and Enrique J. C. Montilla, petitioners, vs. Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg, Ellias Jereos, and heirs of
Jose Ytilo, namely, Alicia Yulo de Laurel, Herminia Yulo de Villa Conchita Yulo de Jalandoni, and Maria Fe Vda. de Yulo,
respond-ents. [No. L-5924. October 28, 1953]

1.Pleading and Practice, Depositions; Incriminating Question in Depositions.—When the deposition of a witness is being taken
under the provisions of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, the party objecting to a question claimed to be immaterial or ir-relevant may
object thereto, but such party cannot prevent the witness from answering the question (section 17, Rule 18) be- cause the
relevancy or materiality will only be decided upon the trial when the deposition is introduced as evidence (section 29, Rule 18) . An
exception to this general rule obtains when the questions propounded are annoying, embarrassing, or oppres. sive to the deponent
(section 18, Rule 18), in which case the matter may be submitted to the trial judge for a ruling, or when the constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination is invoked by the deponent or by counsel on his behalf, to enforce the constitutional privilege defined in
section 79, Rule 123, in which latter case also the staying hand of the trial judge may also be demanded.

2. Id. ; Id.; Id.;—"Many links frequently compose that chain of testimony which is necessary to convict any individual of a crime. It
appears to the court to be the true sense of the rule that no witness is compellable to furnish any one of them against himself. It is
certainly not only a possible but a probable case that a witness, by disclosing a single fact, may complete the testimony against
himself, and to every effectual purpose accuse himself as entirely as he would be stating every circumstance which would be
required for his conviction. That fact of itself might be unavailing; but all other facts without it would be insufficient. While that
remains concealed within his booms, he is safe; but draw it from thence, and he is exposed to a prosecution. The rule which
declares that no man is compellable to accuse himself would most obviously be infringed by compelling a witness to disclose a fact
of this description. * * * It would seem, then, that the court ought never to compel a witness to give an answer which discloses
a fact that would form a necessary and essential part of a crime which is punishable by the laws." (Marshall in Aaron Burr's Trial,
Rotertsons Rep. I, 208, 244, quoted in VIII Wigmore, p. 355.)

3. Id.; Id; Id; Waiver.—Where the witness, in answer to pre. vious incriminating questions, said, "I do not remember," that is clearly
a refusal to answer, and the privilege is not deemed waived thereby.

ANGELES CASON, substituted by ANTONIO C. GARRETERO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VICENTE SAN PEDRO, and CARMEN
FAVILA, defendants-appellants. No. L-18928. December 28, 1963.

Pleadings and Practice; Written interrogatories; Effect of failure to answer; Judgment by Default.—Section 5, Rule 24, of the Rules
of Court, expressly authorizes the Court to render a default judgment against a party who fails to serve answers to written
interrogatories submitted under Rule 20 after proper service of such interrogatories, upon motion of the serving party.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Party in default loses standing in court.—At the time the appellants in the case at bar filed their motion
to declare appellee in default for failure to answer the former’s counterclaim, said appellants were already declared in default by the
trial court for failure to answer the latter’s written interrogatories. Held: Having been declared in default, said appellants have lost
their standing in court, and the trial court was justified in refusing or failing to act on their aforementioned motion to declare appellee
in default.

METRO MANILA SHOPPING MECCA CORP., SHOEMART, INC., SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., STAR APPLIANCES CENTER,
SUPER VALUE, INC., ACE HARDWARE PHILIPPINES, INC., HEALTH AND BEAUTY, INC., JOLLIMART PHILS. CORP., and
SURPLUS MARKETING CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. MS. LIBERTY M. TOLEDO, in her official capacity as the City
Treasurer of Manila, and THE CITY OF MANILA, respondents. G.R. No. 190818. June 5, 2013.*

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Modes of Discovery; Request for Admission; Once a party serves a request for admission
regarding the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact, the party to whom such request is served is given a period of fifteen
(15) days within which to file a sworn statement answering the same.—Once a party serves a request for admission regarding the
truth of any material and relevant matter of fact, the party to whom such request is served is given a period of fifteen (15) days
within which to file a sworn statement answering the same. Should the latter fail to file and serve such answer, each of the matters
of which admission is requested shall be deemed admitted. The exception to this rule is when the party to whom such request for
admission is served had already controverted the matters subject of such request in an earlier pleading. Otherwise stated, if the
matters in a request for admission have already been admitted or denied in previous pleadings by the requested party, the latter
cannot be compelled to admit or deny them anew. In turn, the requesting party cannot reasonably expect a response to the request
and thereafter, assume or even demand the application of the implied admission rule in Section 2, Rule 26.

VICENTE UY CHAO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. DE LA RAMA STEAMSHIP CO., INC., defendant-appellee. No. L-14495.
September 29, 1962.
Pleading and Practice; Requests for admission of facts and genuineness of documents; When they must be made.—Requests for
admission of facts and genuineness, of documents must be made after the pleadings are closed. The reason for this requirement is
that the questions of fact involved in a case are inquired into only when it reaches the state of proof. Where this stage, as to any
particular relevant fact, is accelerated by a motion to dismiss which cannot be fairly resolved without evidence thereon being
received, the purpose of the rule comes into play. In so far as that fact is concerned the issue is already joined and the pleadings
may be deemed to be closed within the meaning of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court.

Same; Dismissal of Complaint; Indubitability of Ground of Motion to Dismiss.—The fact that in dismissing the complaint the court
did not make a definite finding as to whether or not appellee was a war sufferer and had filed a war damage claim, leaving the
question unresolved, shows that the ground of the motion to dismiss does not appear to be indubitable, for which reason the court
would have been justified in allowing an amendment of the complaint so as to include therein the necessary allegation on that
question of fact, or in deferring the determination of the motion until the trial.

EAGLERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, MARCELO N. NAVAL and CRISPIN I. OBEN, petitioners, vs. CAMERON
GRANVILLE 3 ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC., respondent. G.R. No. 204700. April 10, 2013.*

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Modes of Discovery; Production and Inspection of Documents; The provision on production and
inspection of documents is one of the modes of discovery sanctioned by the Rules of Court in order to enable not only the parties,
but also the court to discover all the relevant and material facts in connection with the case pending before it.—Section 1, Rule 27
of the 1997 Rules of Court, states: Section 1. Motion for production or inspection; order.—Upon motion of any party showing good
cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or
photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs,
objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and
which are in his possession, custody or control; xxx The provision on production and inspection of documents is one of the modes
of discovery sanctioned by the Rules of Court in order to enable not only the parties, but also the court to discover all the relevant
and material facts in connection with the case pending before it.

Same; Evidence; Documentary Evidence; Under Section 17, Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Court, when part of a writing or record
is given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and when a detached writing or
record is given in evidence, any other writing or record necessary to its understanding may also be given in evidence.—Under
Section 17, Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Court, when part of a writing or record is given in evidence by one party, the whole of the
same subject may be inquired into by the other, and when a detached writing or record is given in evidence, any other writing or
record necessary to its understanding may also be given in evidence. Since the Deed of Assignment was produced in court by
respondent and marked as one of its documentary exhibits, the LSPA which was made a part thereof by explicit reference and
which is necessary for its understanding may also be inevitably inquired into by petitioners.

Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Discretionary acts will be reviewed where the lower court or tribunal has acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, where an interlocutory order does not conform to the essential requirements of law and may reasonably
cause material injury throughout subsequent proceedings for which the remedy of appeal will be inadequate, or where there is a
clear or serious abuse of discretion.—Discretionary acts will be reviewed where the lower court or tribunal has acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, where an interlocutory order does not conform to the essential requirements of law and may reasonably
cause material injury throughout subsequent proceedings for which the remedy of appeal will be inadequate, or where there is a
clear or serious abuse of discretion. The exercise of discretion pertaining to discovery will be set aside where there is abuse, or the
trial court’s disposition of matters of discovery was improvident and affected adversely the substantial rights of a party. After all, the
discretion conferred upon trial courts is a sound discretion which should be exercised with due regard to the rights of the parties
and the demands of equity and justice.

Same; Civil Procedure; Modes of Discovery; The rules on discovery are accorded broad and liberal interpretation precisely to
enable the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts, including those known only to their adversaries,
in order that trials may not be carried on in the dark.—In light of the general philosophy of full discovery of relevant facts, the
unreceptive and negative attitude by the respondent is abominable. The rules on discovery are accorded broad and liberal
interpretation precisely to enable the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts, including those known
only to their adversaries, in order that trials may not be carried on in the dark. Undoubtedly, the trial court had effectively placed
petitioners at a great disadvantage inasmuch as respondent effectively suppressed relevant documents related to the transaction
involved in the case a quo. Furthermore, the remedies of discovery encouraged and provided for under the Rules of Court to be
able to compel the production of relevant documents had been put to naught by the arbitrary act of the trial court.

Same; Same; Courts; Courts, as arbiters and guardians of truth and justice, must not countenance any technical ploy to the
detriment of an expeditious settlement of the case or to a fair, full and complete determination on its merits.—It must be
remembered that “litigation is essentially an abiding quest for truth undertaken not by the judge alone, but jointly with the parties.
Litigants, therefore, must welcome every opportunity to achieve this goal; they must act in good faith to reveal documents, papers
and other pieces of evidence material to the controversy.” Courts, as arbiters and guardians of truth and justice, must not
countenance any technical ploy to the detriment of an expeditious settlement of the case or to a fair, full and complete
determination on its merits.

JOSIELENE LARA CHAN, petitioner, vs. JOHNNY T. CHAN, respondent. G.R. No. 179786. July 24, 2013.*

Remedial Law; Evidence; Physician-Patient Privileged Communication Rule; The physician-patient privileged communication rule
essentially means that a physician who gets information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined
without the patient’s consent as to any facts which would blacken the latter’s reputation.―The physician-patient privileged
communication rule essentially means that a physician who gets information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a
civil case be examined without the patient’s consent as to any facts which would blacken the latter’s reputation. This rule is
intended to encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and give him access to his
body, enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide the appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician
could be compelled in the future to come to court and narrate all that had transpired between him and the patient might prompt the
latter to clam up, thus putting his own health at great risk.

Same; Same; Objection to Evidence; Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must be made after the offer of such
evidence for admission in court.―The case presents a procedural issue, given that the time to object to the admission of evidence,
such as the hospital records, would be at the time they are offered. The offer could be made part of the physician’s testimony or as
independent evidence that he had made entries in those records that concern the patient’s health problems. Section 36, Rule 132,
states that objections to evidence must be made after the offer of such evidence for admission in court. Thus: SEC. 36.
Objection.—Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made. Objection to a question
propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become
reasonably apparent. An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer unless a
different period is allowed by the court. In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified. Since the offer of evidence is
made at the trial, Josielene’s request for subpoena duces tecum is premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin before making
a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records. It is when those records are produced
for examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence, but more so to their disclosure.
Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence quoted above is about non-disclosure of privileged matters.

Same; Same; Physician-Patient Privileged Communication Rule; To allow the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital
records ― the results of tests that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he gave
him ― would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patient’s consent.―The right to compel the production
of documents has a limitation: the documents to be disclosed are “not privileged.” Josielene of course claims that the hospital
records subject of this case are not privileged since it is the “testimonial” evidence of the physician that may be regarded as
privileged. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the physician “cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be
examined” regarding their professional conversation. The privilege, says Josielene, does not cover the hospital records, but only
the examination of the physician at the trial. To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records —
the results of tests that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him —
would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patient’s consent. Physician memorializes all these
information in the patient’s records. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged
matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter’s prior consent.

SPS. EXPEDITO ZEPEDA AND ALICE D. ZEPEDA, petitioners, vs. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, respondent. G.R. No.
172175. October 9, 2006.*

Remedial Law; Actions; Cause of Action; A cause of action is a formal statement of the operative facts that give rise to a remedial
right; Question of whether the complaint states a cause of action is determined by its averments regarding the acts committed by
the defendant; Essential elements of a cause of action.—A cause of action is a formal statement of the operative facts that give rise
to a remedial right. The question of whether the complaint states a cause of action is determined by its averments regarding the
acts committed by the defendant. Thus it “must contain a concise statement of the ultimate or essential facts constituting the
plaintiff’s cause of action.” Failure to make a sufficient allegation of a cause of action in the complaint “warrants its dismissal.” As
defined in Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of
another. Its essential elements are as follows: 1. A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises
or is created; 2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and 3. Act or omission on
the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the
plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.

Same; Same; Same; In determining whether an initiatory pleading states a cause of action, the test is as follows: admitting the truth
of the facts alleged, can the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer?; Only the material allegations in the
complaint are to be taken into account, extraneous facts and circumstances or other matters aliunde are not considered; Court may
consider in addition to the complaint the appended annexes or documents, other pleadings of the plaintiff, or admissions in the
records.—It is, thus, only upon the occurrence of the last element that a cause of action arises, giving the plaintiff the right to
maintain an action in court for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. In determining whether an initiatory pleading states
a cause of action, “the test is as follows: admitting the truth of the facts alleged, can the court render a valid judgment in
accordance with the prayer?” To be taken into account are only the material allegations in the complaint; extraneous facts and
circumstances or other matters aliunde are not considered. The court may consider in addition to the complaint the appended
annexes or documents, other pleadings of the plaintiff, or admissions in the records.

Same; Same; Same; Courts finds the allegations in the complaint sufficient to establish a cause of action for nullifying the
foreclosure of the mortgaged property.—We find the allegations in the complaint sufficient to establish a cause of action for
nullifying the foreclosure of the mortgaged property. The fact that petitioners admitted that they failed to redeem the property and
that the title was consolidated in respondent bank’s name did not preclude them from seeking to nullify the extrajudicial foreclosure.
Precisely, petitioners seek to nullify the proceedings based on circumstances obtaining prior to and during the foreclosure which
render it void.

Same; Same; Interrogatories; Consequences enumerated in Section 3(c) of Rule 29 would only apply where the party upon whom
the written interrogatories is served, refuses to answer a particular question in the set of written interrogatories and despite an order
compelling him to answer the particular question, still refuses to obey the order.—As we have explained in Arellano v. Court of First
Instance of Sorsogon, 65 SCRA 46 (1975), the consequences enumerated in Section 3(c) of Rule 29 would only apply where the
party upon whom the written interrogatories is served, refuses to answer a particular question in the set of written interrogatories
and despite an order compelling him to answer the particular question, still refuses to obey the order. In the instant case, petitioners
refused to answer the whole set of written interrogatories, not just a particular question. Clearly then, respondent bank should have
filed a motion based on Section 5 and not Section 3(c) of Rule 29.