1
EN BANC On March 2, 2009 the COMELEC transferred the Bulacan ballot boxes, including those involved in the
JOSELITO R. MENDOZA,
Petitioner,
- versus -
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROBERTO M. PAGDANGANAN,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 188308
Promulgated:
October 15, 2009
DECISION
BRION, J.:
The present case involves a clash between the power under the Philippine Constitution of the
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in the handling of a provincial election contest, and the
claimed due process rights of a party to the contest. The petitioner Joselito R. Mendoza (the petitioner)
essentially asserts in his petition for certiorari[1] that the COMELEC conducted proceedings in the
election contest for the gubernatorial position of the Province of Bulacan, between him and the
respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan (the respondent), without due regard to his fundamental due
process rights. The COMELEC, on the other hand, claims that its decision-making deliberations are
internal, confidential and do not require notice to and the participation of the contending parties.
THE ANTECEDENTS
The petitioner and the respondent vied for the position of Governor of the Province of Bulacan in the
May 14, 2007 elections. The petitioner was proclaimed winning candidate and assumed the office of
Governor.
The respondent seasonably filed an election protest with the COMELEC, which was raffled to the Second
Division and docketed as EPC No. 2007-44. Revision of ballots involving the protested and counter-
protested precincts in Angat, Bocaue, Calumpit, Doa Remedios Trinidad, Guiginto, Malolos, Meycauayan,
Norzagaray, Pandi, Paombong, Plaridel, Pulilan, San Rafael and San Jose del Monte soon followed. The
revision was conducted at the COMELECs office in Intramuros. After revision, the parties presented their
other evidence, leading to the parties formal offer of their respective evidence.
The COMELEC approved the parties formal offer of evidence and then required the parties to submit
their respective memoranda. The parties complied with the COMELECs order. The case was thereafter
submitted for resolution.
provincial election contest, to the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) in connection with the protest filed by
Aquilino Pimentel III against Juan Miguel Zubiri. In light of this development, the petitioner moved to
suspend further proceedings. .
The COMELECs Second Division denied the petitioners motion in its Order of April 29, 2009, ruling that
the COMELEC has plenary powers to find alternative methods to facilitate the resolution of the election
protest; thus, it concluded that it would continue the proceedings after proper coordination with the
SET. The petitioner moved to reconsider this Order, but the COMELECs Second Division denied the
motion in its Order of May 26, 2009. These inter-related Resolutions led to the COMELECs continued
action specifically, the appreciation of ballots on the provincial election contest at the SET offices.
Allegedly alarmed by information on COMELEC action on the provincial election contest within the SET
premises without notice to him and without his participation, the petitioners counsel wrote the SET
Secretary, Atty. Irene Guevarra, a letter dated June 10, 2009 to confirm the veracity of the reported
conduct of proceedings.[2] The SET Secretary responded on June 17, 2009 as follows:
x x x please be informed that the conduct of proceedings in COMELEC EPC No. 2007-44 (Pagdanganan vs.
Mendoza) within the Tribunal Premises was authorized by then Acting Chairman of the Tribunal, Justice
Antonio T. Carpio, upon formal request of the Office of Commissioner Lucenito N. Tagle.
Basis of such grant is Section 3, Comelec Resolution No. 2812 dated 17 October 1995, stating that (t)he
Tribunals, the Commission and the Courts shall coordinate and make arrangement with each other so as
not to delay or interrupt the revision of ballots being conducted. The synchronization of revision of
ballots shall be such that the expeditious disposition of the respective protest case shall be the primary
concern. While the said provision speaks only of revision, it has been the practice of the Tribunal to allow
the conduct of other proceedings in local election protest cases within its premises as may be requested.
THE PETITION
The SET Secretarys response triggered the filing of the present petition raising the following ISSUES
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE COMELEC VIOLATED DUE PROCESS BY CONDUCTING PROCEEDINGS
WITHOUT GIVING DUE NOTICE TO THE PETITIONER.
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO AN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN APPRECIATING BALLOTS WHICH ARE NOT IN ITS OFFICIAL CUSTODY AND
ARE OUTSIDE ITS OWN PREMISES, AUTHORITY AND CONTROL.
The petitioner argues that the election protest involves his election as Governor; thus, its subject matter
involves him and the people of the Province of Bulacan who elected him. On this basis, he claims
entitlement to notice and participation in all matters that involve or are related to the election protest.
He further asserts that he had the legitimate expectation that no further proceedings would be held or
conducted in the case after its submission for decision.

Citing the commentaries of Father Joaquin Bernas,[4] the petitioner argues that the proceedings before
the COMELEC in election protests are judicial in nature and character. Thus, the strictures of judicial due
process specifically, (a) opportunity to be heard and (b) that judgment be rendered only after lawful
hearing apply. Notices in judicial dispute, he claims, are not really just a matter of courtesy; they are
elementary fundamental element of due process, they are part and parcel of a right of a party to be
heard. He further cites Justice Isagani A. Cruz,[5] who wrote:
x x x Every litigant is entitled to his day in court. He has a right to be notified of every incident of the
proceeding and to be present at every stage thereof so that he may be heard by himself and counsel for
the protection of his interest.
The petitioner claims that without notice to him of the proceedings, the due process element of the right
to have judgment only after lawful hearing is absent. There is no way, he claims, that a judicial
proceeding held without notice to the parties could be described as a lawful hearing, especially a
proceeding which has as its subject matter the sovereign will of an entire province.
He was therefore denied his day in court, he claims, when the COMELEC conducted the examination and
appreciation of ballots. The proceedings should be stopped and declared null and void; its future results,
too, should be nullified, as nothing derived from the anomalous and unconstitutional clandestine and
unilateral proceedings should ever be part of any decision that the COMELEC may subsequently render.
The poisonous fruits (derived from the proceedings) should have no part and should not be admitted for
any purpose and/or in any judicial proceeding.
Other than his due process concern, the petitioner takes issue with the COMELECs appreciation of
ballots even when the ballots and other election materials were no longer in its official custody and were
outside its premises, authority and control. He asserts that an important element of due process is that
the judicial body should have jurisdiction over the property that is the subject matter of the proceedings.
In this case, the COMELEC has transferred possession, custody and jurisdiction over the ballots to the
SET, a tribunal separate and independent from the COMELEC and over which the COMELEC exercises no
authority or jurisdiction. For the COMELEC to still conduct proceedings on property, materials and
evidence no longer in its custody violates the principle of separation of powers.
The petitioner also points out that the COMELECs unilateral appreciation of the ballots in the SET
premises deviates from the Commissions usual and time honored practice and procedure of conducting
proceedings within its premises and while it has custody over the ballots. There is no precedent,
according to the petitioner, for this deviation, nor is there any compelling reason to make the present
case an exception. Citing Cabagnot v. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 124383, August 9, 1996) which
involves a transfer or change of venue of the revision of ballots, the petitioner alleges that this Court has
been very emphatic in denouncing the COMELEC for its departure from its own rules and usual practice;
while Cabagnot involves the issue of change of venue, the petitioner finds parallel applicability in the
present case which also involves a deviation from COMELEC rules and usual practice. The petitioner adds
that the act of the Second Division is effectively an arrogation of the authority to promulgate rules of
procedure a power that solely belongs to the COMELEC en banc.
After a preliminary finding of a genuine due process issue, we issued a Status Quo Order on July 14,
2009.
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THE RESPONDENTS COMMENTS
In his Comment to the Petition with Extremely Urgent Motion to Lift/Dissolve Status Quo Ante Order, the
private respondent asserts that the petition contains deliberate falsehoods and misleading allegations
that led the Court to grant the injunctive relief the petitioner had asked. He asserts that the proceeding
the petitioner stated in his petition was actually the COMELECs decision-making process, i.e., the
appreciation of ballots, which is a procedure internal to the Members of the Second Division of the
COMELEC and their staff members; no revision of ballots took place as revision had long been finished.
What was therefore undertaken within the SETs premises was unilateral COMELEC action that is
exclusive to the COMELEC and an internal matter that is confidential in nature. In this light, no due
process violation ever arose.
The private respondent also asserts that the petitioner cannot claim that he was not notified of and
denied participation in the revision proceedings, as the petitioner himself is fully aware that the revision
of the ballots was completed as early as July 28, 2008 and the petitioner was present and actively
participated in the entire proceedings, all the way to the filing of the required memoranda. Thus, the
petitioners right to due process was duly satisfied.
The private respondent implores us to commence contempt proceedings against the petitioner who, the
respondent claims, has not been forthright in his submissions and was not guided by the highest
standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in his conduct as a party and in his relations with the
opposing party, the other counsel and the Court.
Lastly, the private respondent posits that the present petition was filed out of time i.e., beyond the
reglementary period provided under Rule 64. All these reasons, the private respondent argues,
constitute sufficient basis for the lifting of the status quo order and the dismissal of the petition.
Public respondent COMELEC, for its part, claims that the petition is without basis in fact and in law and
ought to be dismissed outright. Given the possibility of simultaneous election contests involving national
and local officials, it has institutionalized an order of preference in the custody and revision of ballots in
contested ballot boxes. The established order of preference is not without exception, as the expeditious
disposition of protest cases is a primary concern. Additionally, the order of preference does not prevent
the COMELEC from proceeding with pending protest cases, particularly those already submitted for
decision. It claims that it has wide latitude to employ means to effectively perform its duty in
safeguarding the sanctity of the elections and the integrity of the ballot.
The COMELEC further argues that in the absence of a specific rule on whether it can conduct
appreciation of ballots outside its premises or official custody, the issue boils down to one of discretion
the authority of the COMELEC to control as it deems fit the processes or incidents of a pending election
protest. Under Section 4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the COMELEC may use all auxiliary writs,
processes and other means to carry into effect its powers or jurisdiction; if the procedure to be followed
in the exercise of such power or jurisdiction is not specifically provided for by law or the Rules of
Procedure, any suitable process or proceeding not prohibited by law or by its rules may be adopted.
The COMELEC lastly submits that while due process requires giving the parties an opportunity to
intervene in all stages of the proceedings, the COMELEC in the present case is not actually conducting

further proceedings requiring notice to the parties; there is no revision or correction of the ballots, as the
election protest had already been submitted for resolution. When the COMELEC coordinated with the
SET, it was simply for purposes of resolving the submitted provincial election contest before it; the
parties do not take part in this aspect of the case which necessarily requires utmost secrecy. On the
whole, the petitioner was afforded every opportunity to present his case. To now hold the election
protest hostage until the conclusion of the protest pending before the SET defeats the COMELECs
mandate of ensuring free, orderly and honest election.
THE COURTS RULING
We review the present petition on the basis of the combined application of Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules
of Court. While COMELEC jurisdiction over the Bulacan election contest is not disputed, the legality of
subsequent COMELEC action is assailed for having been undertaken with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Thus, our standard of review is grave abuse of discretion, a
term that defies exact definition, but generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility.[6] Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; the abuse must be grave to merit our
positive action.[7]
After due consideration, we find the petition devoid of merit.
The petition is anchored on the alleged conduct of proceedings in the election protest following the
completed revision of ballots at the SET premises without notice to and without the participation of the
petitioner. Significantly, the conduct of proceedings is confirmed by the SET Secretary in the letter we
quoted above.[8] As the issues raised show the petitioners focus is not really on the COMELEC Orders
denying the suspension of proceedings when the ballot boxes and other election materials pertinent to
the election contest were transferred to the SET; the focus is on what the COMELEC did after to the
issuance of the Resolutions. We read the petition in this context as these COMELEC Orders are now
unassailable as the period to challenge them has long passed.[9]
The substantive issue we are primarily called upon to resolve is whether there were proceedings within
the SET premises, entitling the petitioner to notice and participation, which were denied to him; in other
words, the issue is whether the petitioners right to due process has been violated. A finding of due
process violation, because of the inherent arbitrariness it carries, necessarily amounts to grave abuse of
discretion.
As a preliminary matter, we note that the petitioner has claimed that COMELEC exercises judicial power
in its action over provincial election contests and has argued its due process position from this view. We
take this opportunity to clarify that judicial power in our country is vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.[10] This exclusive grant of authority to the Judiciary is
reinforced under the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which further states
that Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable.. ., thus constitutionally locating the situs of the exercise
of judicial power in the courts.
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In contrast with the above definitions, Section 2, Article IX(C) of the Constitution lists the COMELECs
powers and functions, among others, as follows:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving
elective barangay officials by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and
barangay officials shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including
determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and
inspectors, and registration of voters.
Under these terms, the COMELEC under our governmental structure is a constitutional administrative
agency and its powers are essentially executive in nature (i.e., to enforce and administer election
laws),[11] quasi-judicial (to exercise original jurisdiction over election contests of regional, provincial and
city officials and appellate jurisdiction over election contests of other lower ranking officials), and quasi-
legislative (rulemaking on all questions affecting elections and the promulgation of its rules of
procedure).
Historically, the COMELEC has always been an administrative agency whose powers have been increased
from the 1935 Constitution to the present one, to reflect the countrys awareness of the need to provide
greater regulation and protection to our electoral processes to ensure their integrity. In the 1935
Constitution, the powers and functions of the COMELEC were defined as follows:
SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions which
may be conferred upon it by law. It shall decide, save those involving the right to vote, all administrative
questions affecting elections, including the determination of the number and location of polling places,
and the appointment of election inspectors and of other election officials. All law enforcement agencies
and instrumentalities of the Government, when so required by the Commission, shall act as its deputies
for the purpose of insuring free, orderly, and honest election. The decisions, orders, and rulings of the
Commission shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court. [emphasis supplied]
These evolved into the following powers and functions under the 1973 Constitution:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections.
(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all members of
the National Assembly and elective provincial and city officials.

(3) Decide, save those involving the right to vote, administrative questions affecting elections, including
the determination of the number and location of polling places, the appointment of election officials and
inspectors, and the registration of voters.
These powers have been enhanced in scope and details under the 1987 Constitution, but retained all the
while the character of an administrative agency.
The COMELECs adjudicative function is quasi-judicial since it is a constitutional body, other than a court,
vested with authority to decide election contests, and in the course of the exercise of its jurisdiction, to
hold hearings and exercise discretion of a judicial nature;[12] it receives evidence, ascertain the facts
from these submissions, determine the law and the legal rights of the parties, and on the basis of all
these decides on the merits of the case and renders judgment.[13] Despite the exercise of discretion that
is essentially judicial in character, particularly with respect to election contests, COMELEC is not a
tribunal within the judicial branch of government and is not a court exercising judicial power in the
constitutional sense;[14] hence, its adjudicative function, exercised as it is in the course of
administration and enforcement, is quasi-judicial.
As will be seen on close examination, the 1973 Constitution used the unique wording that the COMELEC
shall be the sole judge of all contests, thus giving the appearance that judicial power had been conferred.
This phraseology, however, was changed in the 1987 Constitution to give the COMELEC exclusive
jurisdiction over all contests, thus removing any vestige of exercising its adjudicatory power as a court
and correctly aligning it with what it is a quasi-judicial body.[15] Consistent with the characterization of
its adjudicatory power as quasi-judicial, the judicial review of COMELEC en banc decisions (together with
the review of Civil Service Commission decisions) is via the prerogative writ of certiorari, not through an
appeal, as the traditional mode of review of quasi-judicial decisions of administrative tribunals in the
exercise the Courts supervisory authority. This means that the Court will not supplant the decision of the
COMELEC as a quasi-judicial body except where a grave abuse of discretion or any other jurisdictional
error exists.
The appropriate due process standards that apply to the COMELEC, as an administrative or quasi-judicial
tribunal, are those outlined in the seminal case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations,[16] quoted
below:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. xxx
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending
to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be
"substantial. "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
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(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
These are now commonly referred to as cardinal primary rights in administrative proceedings.
The first of the enumerated rights pertain to the substantive rights of a party at hearing stage of the
proceedings. The essence of this aspect of due process, we have consistently held, is simply the
opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side
or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[17] A formal or trial-
type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential; in the case of COMELEC, Rule 17 of its Rules
of Procedure defines the requirements for a hearing and these serve as the standards in the
determination of the presence or denial of due process.
The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang Tibay requirements are reinforcements of
the right to a hearing and are the inviolable rights applicable at the deliberative stage, as the decision-
maker decides on the evidence presented during the hearing. These standards set forth the guiding
considerations in deliberating on the case and are the material and substantial components of decision-
making. Briefly, the tribunal must consider the totality of the evidence presented which must all be
found in the records of the case (i.e., those presented or submitted by the parties); the conclusion,
reached by the decision-maker himself and not by a subordinate, must be based on substantial
evidence.[18]
Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form and substance of the decision of a quasi-judicial body,
further complements the hearing and decision-making due process rights and is similar in substance to
the constitutional requirement that a decision of a court must state distinctly the facts and the law upon
which it is based.[19] As a component of the rule of fairness that underlies due process, this is the duty
to give reason to enable the affected person to understand how the rule of fairness has been
administered in his case, to expose the reason to public scrutiny and criticism, and to ensure that the
decision will be thought through by the decision-maker.
In the present case, the petitioner invokes both the due process component rights at the hearing and
deliberative stages and alleges that these component rights have all been violated. We discuss all these
allegations below.
The Right to Notice and to be Heard.
a. At the Hearing and Revision of Ballots.

Based on the pleadings filed, we see no factual and legal basis for the petitioner to complain of denial of
his hearing stage rights. In the first place, he does not dispute that he fully participated in the
proceedings of the election protest until the case was deemed submitted for resolution; he had
representation at the revision of the ballots, duly presented his evidence, and summed up his case
through a memorandum. These various phases of the proceedings constitute the hearing proper of the
election contest and the COMELEC has more than satisfied the opportunity to be heard that the Ang
Tibay hearing stage rights require. In these proceedings, the petitioner stood head-to-head with the
respondent in an adversarial contest where both sides were given their respective rights to speak, make
their presentations, and controvert each others submission, subject only to established COMELEC rules
of procedures. Under these undisputed facts, both parties had their day in court, so to speak, and
neither one can complain of any denial of notice or of the right to be heard.
b. At the Proceedings at the SET.
A critical question to be answered in passing upon due process questions at this stage of the election
contest is the nature of the so-called proceedings after the ballots and other materials pertinent to the
provincial election contest were transferred to the SET.
In the petition, the petitioner alleged that there were strange proceedings[20] which were unilateral,
clandestine and surreptitious within the premises of the SET, on documents, ballots and election
materials whose possession and custody have been transferred to the SET, and the petitioner was NEVER
OFFICIALLY NOTIFIED of the strange on-goings at the SET.[21] Attached to the petition was the letter of
the Secretary of the SET confirming the conduct of proceedings in the provincial election contest, and
citing as basis the authority of Acting SET Chairman, Justice Antonio T. Carpio, upon the formal request
of the Office of Commissioner Lucenito N. Tagle, and citing Section 3, COMELEC Resolution No. 2812
dated 17 October 1995 on the coordination envisioned among the COMELEC, the SET and the courts so
as not to delay or interrupt the revision of ballots being conducted. While the SET letter made the
reservation that While the said provision speaks only of revision, it has been the practice of the Tribunal
to allow the conduct of other proceedings in local election protest cases within its premises as may be
requested, no mention whatsoever was made of the kind of proceedings taking place.
It was at this point that this Court intervened, in response to the petitioners prayer for the issuance of
temporary injunctive relief, through the issuance of a Status Quo Order with a non-extendible directive
for the respondents to file their comments on the petition; for indeed, any further revision of ballots or
other adversarial proceedings after the case has been submitted for resolution, would not only be
strange and unusual but would indicate a gross violation of due process rights.
After consideration of the respondents Comments and the petitioners petition and Reply, we hold that
the contested proceedings at the SET (contested proceedings) are no longer part of the adversarial
aspects of the election contest that would require notice of hearing and the participation of the parties.
As the COMELEC stated in its Comment and without any contrary or disputing claim in the petitioners
Reply:[22]
However, contrary to the claim of petitioner, public respondent in the appreciation of the contested
ballots in EPC No. 2007-44 simultaneously with the SET in SET Case No. 001-07 is not conducting further
proceedings requiring notice to the parties. There is no revision or correction of the ballots because EPC
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No. 2007-04 was already submitted for resolution. Public respondent, in coordinating with the SET, is
simply resolving the submitted protest case before it. The parties necessarily take no part in said
deliberation, which require utmost secrecy. Needless to state, the actual decision-making process is
supposed to be conducted only by the designated members of the Second Division of the public
respondent in strict confidentiality.
In other words, what took place at the SET were the internal deliberations of the COMELEC, as a quasi-
judicial body, in the course of appreciating the evidence presented and deciding the provincial election
contest on the merits. These deliberations are no different from judicial deliberations which are
considered confidential and privileged.[23] We find it significant that the private respondents Comment
fully supported the COMELECs position and disavowed any participation in the contested proceeding the
petitioner complained about. The petitioner, on the other hand, has not shown that the private
respondent was ever present in any proceeding at the SET relating to the provincial election contest.
To conclude, the rights to notice and to be heard are not material considerations in the COMELECs
handling of the Bulacan provincial election contest after the transfer of the ballot boxes to the SET; no
proceedings at the instance of one party or of COMELEC has been conducted at the SET that would
require notice and hearing because of the possibility of prejudice to the other party. The COMELEC is
under no legal obligation to notify either party of the steps it is taking in the course of deliberating on
the merits of the provincial election contest. In the context of our standard of review for the petition, we
see no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the COMELEC
in its deliberation on the Bulacan election contest and the appreciation of ballots this deliberation
entailed.
Alleged Violations of
Deliberation Stage Rights.
On the basis of the above conclusion, we see no point in discussing any alleged violation of the
deliberative stage rights. First, no illegal proceeding ever took place that would bear the poisonous fruits
that the petitioner fears. Secondly, in the absence of the results of the COMELEC deliberations through
its decision on the election protest, no basis exists to apply the Ang Tibay deliberative stage rights; there
is nothing for us to test under the standards of the due process deliberative stages rights before the
COMELEC renders its decision. Expressed in terms of our standard of review, we have as yet no basis to
determine the existence of any grave abuse of discretion.
Conduct of COMELEC
Deliberations at the SET Premises
We turn to the issue of the propriety of the COMELECs consideration of the provincial election contest
(specifically its appreciation of the contested ballots) at the SET premises and while the same ballots are
also under consideration by the SET for another election contest legitimately within the SETs own
jurisdiction.

We state at the outset that the COMELEC did not lose jurisdiction over the provincial election contest, as
the petitioner seems to imply, because of the transmittal of the provincial ballot boxes and other
election materials to the SET. The Constitution conferred upon the COMELEC jurisdiction over election
protests involving provincial officials. The COMELEC in this case has lawfully acquired jurisdiction over
the subject matter, i.e., the provincial election contest, as well as over the parties. After its jurisdiction
attached, this jurisdiction cannot be ousted by subsequent events such as the temporary transfer of
evidence and material records of the proceedings to another tribunal exercising its own jurisdiction over
another election contest pursuant to the Constitution. This is the rule of adherence of jurisdiction.[24]
Thus, the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over provincial election contest exists side by side with the
jurisdiction of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, with each tribunal being supreme in their respective areas of
concern (the Senate election contests for the SET, and the regional, provincial and city election contests
for the COMELEC), and with neither one being higher than the other in terms of precedence so that the
jurisdiction of one must yield to the other.
But while no precedence in jurisdiction exists, the COMELEC, vowing to the reality that only a single
ballot exists in an election for national and local officials, saw it fit to lay down the rule on the order of
preference in the custody and revision of ballots and other documents contained in the ballot boxes. The
order, in terms of the adjudicatory tribunal and as provided in COMELEC Resolution No. 2812, runs:
1. Presidential Electoral Tribunal;
2. Senate Electoral Tribunal;
3. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;
4. Commission on Elections; and
5. Regional Trial Courts.
This order of preference dictated that the ballot boxes and other election materials in Bulacans
provincial election contest, had to be transferred to the SET when the latter needed these materials for
its revision of ballots. The transfer to the SET, however, did not mean that the Bulacan provincial election
contest at that time already submitted for decision had to be suspended as the COMELEC held in its
Orders of 29 April 2009 and 26 May 2009 in EPC No. 2007-44.[25] This is particularly true in Bulacans
case as no revision had to be undertaken, the revision having been already terminated.
With the COMELEC retaining its jurisdiction over the Bulacan provincial election contest, the legal effect
of the physical transfer of the ballots and other election materials to the SET for purposes of its own
revision becomes a non-issue, given the arrangement between the COMELEC and the SET, pursuant to
COMELEC Resolution No. 2812, to coordinate and make arrangements with each other so as not to delay
or interrupt the revision of ballots being conducted, all for the purpose of the expeditious disposition of
their respective protest cases. The SET itself honored this arrangement as shown by the letter of the SET
Secretary that the COMELEC could conduct proceedings within the Tribunal premises as authorized by
the Acting Chairman of the Tribunal, Justice Antonio T. Carpio.[26] This arrangement recognized the
COMELECs effective authority over the Bulacan ballots and other election materials, although these were
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temporarily located at the SET premises. This arrangement, too, together with the side by side and non-
conflicting existence of the COMELEC and SET jurisdictions, negate the validity of the petitioners
argument that the COMELEC transgressed the rule on separation of powers when it acted on the Bulacan
provincial election contest while the ballot boxes were at the SET premises. Rather than negate, this
arrangement reinforced the separate but co-existing nature of these tribunals respective jurisdictions.
As the petitioner argues and the COMELEC candidly admits, there is no specific rule which allows the
COMELEC to conduct an appreciation of ballots outside its premises and of those which are outside its
own custody.[27] But while this is true, there is likewise nothing to prohibit the COMELEC from
undertaking the appreciation of ballot side by side with the SETs own revision of ballots for the
senatorial votes, in light especially of the COMELECs general authority to adopt means to effect its
powers and jurisdiction under its Rules of Procedure. Section 4 of these Rules states:
Sec. 4. Means to Effect Jurisdiction. - All auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry
into effect its powers or jurisdiction may be employed by the Commission; and if the procedure to be
followed in the exercise of such power or jurisdiction is not specifically provided for by law or these
rules, any suitable process or proceeding may be adopted.
This rule is by no means unusual and unique to the COMELEC as the courts have the benefit of this same
type of rule under Section 6, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court. The courts own rule provides:
Means to Carry Jurisdiction into Effect. When by law jurisdiction is conferred o n a court or judicial
officer, all auxiliary writs, writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be
employed by such court or officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction
is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may
be adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules.
Incidentally, the COMELEC authority to promulgate the above rule enjoys constitutional moorings; in the
grant to the COMELEC of its jurisdiction, the Constitution provided it with the accompanying authority to
promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices,
provided that these rules shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.[28] The Constitution
additionally requires that the rules of procedure that the COMELEC will promulgate must expedite the
disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies.[29] This constitutional standard
is authority, no less, that the COMELEC can cite in defending its action. For ultimately, the appreciation
of the Bulacan ballots that the COMELEC undertook side by side with the SETs own revision of ballots,
constitutes an exercise of discretion made under the authority of the above-cited COMELEC rule of
procedure.
On the basis of the standards set by Section 4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, and of the
Constitution itself in the handling of election cases, we rule that the COMELEC action is a valid exercise of
discretion as it is a suitable and reasonable process within the exercise of its jurisdiction over provincial
election contests, aimed at expediting the disposition of this case, and with no adverse, prejudicial or
discriminatory effects on the parties to the contest that would render the rule unreasonable.
 7

Since the COMELEC action, taken by its Second Division, is authorized under the COMELEC Rules of legislative (rulemaking on all questions affecting elections and the promulgation of its rules of
Procedure, the Second Division cannot in any sense be said to be intruding into the COMELEC en banc procedure).
rule-making prerogative when the Second Division chose to undertake ballot appreciation within the SET
premises side by side with the SET revision of ballots. To be exact, the Second Division never laid down
any new rule; it merely acted pursuant to a rule that the COMELEC en banc itself had previously enacted.

In light of these conclusions, we need not discuss the other issues raised.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. We
accordingly LIFT the STATUS QUO ORDER we issued, effective immediately.

SO ORDERED.

Admin Law, Comelec, quasi-judicial power)

Facts:

Petitioner Mendoza asserts that the COMELEC, exercising judicial power, conducted proceedings in the
election contest within SET premises for the gubernatorial position of the Province of Bulacan, between
him and the respondent Pagdanganan, without due regard to his fundamental due process rights of
notice and participation.

The COMELEC, claims that its decision-making deliberations are internal, confidential and do not require
notice to and the participation of the contending parties.

Issue: Whether or not COMELEC has judicial power.

Held:

No. Judicial power in our country is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

The COMELECs adjudicative function is quasi-judicial since it is a constitutional body, other than a court,
vested with authority to decide election contests, and in the course of the exercise of its jurisdiction, to
hold hearings and exercise discretion of a judicial nature; it receives evidence, ascertain the facts from
these submissions, determine the law and the legal rights of the parties, and on the basis of all these
decides on the merits of the case and renders judgment. Despite the exercise of discretion that is
essentially judicial in character, particularly with respect to election contests, COMELEC is not a tribunal
within the judicial branch of government and is not a court exercising judicial power in the constitutional
sense; hence, its adjudicative function, exercised as it is in the course of administration and
enforcement, is quasi-judicial.

Under these terms, the COMELEC under our governmental structure is a constitutional administrative
agency and its powers are essentially executive in nature (i.e., to enforce and administer election laws),
quasi-judicial (to exercise original jurisdiction over election contests of regional, provincial and city
officials and appellate jurisdiction over election contests of other lower ranking officials), and quasi-

EN BANC
G.R. No. 194139 January 24, 2012
DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, Petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, AND CLAUDE P. BAUTISTA, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in an election protest may not directly assail the order in this Court through a special civil
action for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of the interlocutory order during the appeal of the
decision of the Division in due course.
For resolution is the petition for certiorari brought under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
order dated August 13, 2010 (denying the affirmative defenses raised by the petitioner),1 and the order
dated October 7, 2010 (denying his motion for reconsideration),2 both issued by the COMELEC First
Division in EPC No. 2010-42, an election protest entitled Claude P. Bautista, protestant v. Douglas R.
Cagas, protestee.3
Antecedents
The petitioner and respondent Claude P. Bautista (Bautista) contested the position of Governor of the
Province of Davao del Sur in the May 10, 2010 automated national and local elections. The fast
transmission of the results led to the completion by May 14, 2010 of the canvassing of votes cast for
Governor of Davao del Sur, and the petitioner was proclaimed the winner (with 163,440 votes), with
Bautista garnering 159,527 votes.4
Alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and violations of election laws, rules and
resolutions, Bautista filed an electoral protest on May 24, 2010 (EPC No. 2010-42).5 The protest was
raffled to the COMELEC First Division.
In his answer submitted on June 22, 2010,6 the petitioner averred as his special affirmative defenses that
Bautista did not make the requisite cash deposit on time; and that Bautista did not render a detailed
specification of the acts or omissions complained of.
On August 13, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued the first assailed order denying the special
affirmative defenses of the petitioner, 7 viz:
After careful examination of the records of the case, this Commission (First Division) makes the following
observation:
8
1. Protestant paid the cash deposit amounting to one hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) on
June 3, 2010 as evidenced by O.R. No. 1118105; and
2. Paragraph nos. 9 to 28 of the initiatory petition filed by the Protestant set forth the specific
details of the acts and omissions complained of against the Protestee.
It is therefore concluded that the payment by the Protestant on June 3, 2010 is a substantial compliance
with the requirement of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, taking into consideration Section 9(e), Rule 6 of
said Resolution. Furthermore, the Protestant has likewise essentially complied with Section 7(g), Rule 6
of the above-mentioned Resolution.
In view of the foregoing, this Commission (First Division) RESOLVES to DENY the Protestee’s special
affirmative defenses.
SO ORDERED.8
The petitioner moved to reconsider on the ground that the order did not discuss whether the protest
specified the alleged irregularities in the conduct of the elections, in violation of Section 2, paragraph
2,9 Rule 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804,10 requiring all decisions to clearly and distinctly express the
facts and the law on which they were based; and that it also contravened Section 7(g), 11 Rule 6 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 requiring a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of.
He prayed that the matter be certified to the COMELEC en banc pursuant to Section 1,12 Section 5,13 and
Section 6,14 all of Rule 20 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804.
The petitioner insisted that COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 had introduced the requirement for the
"detailed specification" to prevent "shotgun fishing expeditions by losing candidates;"15 that such
requirement contrasted with Rule 6, Section 1 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure,16 under which
the protest needed only to contain a "concise statement of the ultimate facts" constituting the cause or
causes of action; that Bautista’s protest did not meet the new requirement under COMELEC Resolution
No. 8804; and that in Peña v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,17 the Court upheld the
dismissal of a protest by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) for not specifically
alleging the electoral anomalies and irregularities in the May 8, 1995 elections.
In his opposition,18 Bautista countered that the assailed orders, being merely interlocutory, could not be
elevated to the COMELEC en banc pursuant to the ruling in Panlilio v. COMELEC;19 that the rules of the
COMELEC required the initiatory petition to specify the acts or omissions constituting the electoral
frauds, anomalies and election irregularities, and to contain the ultimate facts upon which the cause of
action was based; and that Peña v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal did not apply because,
firstly, Peña had totally different factual antecedents than this case, and, secondly, the omission of
material facts from Peña’s protest prevented the protestee (Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr.) from being apprised of
the issues that he must meet and made it eventually impossible for the HRET to determine which ballot
boxes had to be collected.
On October 7, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued its second assailed order,20 denying the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for failing to show that the first order was contrary to law, to wit:
The Protestee’s August 28, 2010 "Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer to Certify the Case to the
Commission En Banc" relative to the Order issued by the Commission (First Division) dated August 13,
2010 is hereby DENIED for failure to show that the assailed order is contrary to law

Without going into the merits of the protest, the allegations in the protestant’s petition have
substantially complied with the requirements of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 that will warrant the
opening of the ballot boxes in order to resolve not only the issues raised in the protest but also those
set forth in the Protestee’s answer. When substantial compliance with the rules is satisfied, allowing
the protest to proceed is the best way of removing any doubt or uncertainty as to the true will of the
electorate. All other issues laid down in the parties’ pleadings, including those in the Protestee’s
special and affirmative defenses and those expressed in the preliminary conference brief, will best be
threshed out in the final resolution of the instant case.
The prayer to elevate the instant Motion for Reconsideration to the Commission En Banc is DENIED
considering that the 13 August 2010 Order is merely interlocutory and it does not dispose of the
instant case with finality, in accordance with Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
SO ORDERED.
Not satisfied, the petitioner commenced this special civil action directly in this Court.
Issue
The petitioner submits that:—
THE RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN REFUSING TO DISMISS THE PROTEST FOR INSUFFICIENCY IN FORM AND
CONTENT.
The petitioner argues that Section 9,21 Rule 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 obliged the COMELEC
First Division to summarily dismiss the protest for being insufficient in form and content; and that the
insufficiency in substance arose from the failure of the protest to: (a) specifically state how the various
irregularities and anomalies had affected the results of the elections; (b) indicate in which of the
protested precincts were "pre-shaded bogus-ballots" used; (c) identify the precincts where the PCOS
machines had failed to accurately account for the votes in favor of Bautista; and (d) allege with
particularity how many additional votes Bautista stood to receive for each of the grounds he protested.
He concludes that the COMELEC First Division gravely abused its discretion in allowing the protest of
Bautista despite its insufficiency.
Moreover, the petitioner urges that the protest be considered as a mere fishing expedition to be
outrightly dismissed in light of the elections being held under an automated system. In support of his
urging, he cites Roque, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,22 where the Court took judicial notice of the
accuracy and reliability of the PCOS machines and CCS computers, such that allegations of massive errors
in the automated counting and canvassing had become insufficient as basis for the COMELEC to
entertain or to give due course to defective election protests.23 He submits that a protest like Bautista’s
cast doubt on the automated elections.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and Bautista both posit that the COMELEC
had the power and prerogative to determine the sufficiency of the allegations of an election protest; and
that certiorari did not lie because the COMELEC First Division acted within its discretion. Additionally, the
OSG maintains that the assailed orders, being interlocutory, are not the proper subjects of a petition
for certiorari.
9
As we see it, the decisive issue is whether the Court can take cognizance of the petition for certiorari.
Ruling
We dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
The governing provision is Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought
before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is
deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum
required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this
Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
This provision, although it confers on the Court the power to review any decision, order or ruling of the
COMELEC, limits such power to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not
extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has
no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of
the COMELEC. The following cogent observations made in Ambil v. Commission on Elections24 are
enlightening, viz:
To begin with, the power of the Supreme Court to review decisions of the Comelec is prescribed in the
Constitution, as follows:
"Section 7. Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter
brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or
matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the rules of the commission or by the commission itself. Unless otherwise
provided by this constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be brought
to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof." [emphasis supplied]
"We have interpreted this provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC
rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers." This decision must be a final
decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a division, certainly not an interlocutory order of
a division. The Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a
final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections.
The mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the Comelec en banc may be elevated to the Supreme
Court is by the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, now
expressly provided in Rule 64, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, requires that there be no appeal, or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A motion for reconsideration is a
plain and adequate remedy provided by law. Failure to abide by this procedural requirement constitutes
a ground for dismissal of the petition.

In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of the Comelec must be reviewed by the
Comelec en banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final en banc decision may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari. The pre-requisite filing of a motion for reconsideration is
mandatory.xxx25
There is no question, therefore, that the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition
for certiorariassailing the denial by the COMELEC First Division of the special affirmative defenses of the
petitioner. The proper remedy is for the petitioner to wait for the COMELEC First Division to first decide
the protest on its merits, and if the result should aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his special
affirmative defenses to the COMELEC en banc along with the other errors committed by the Division
upon the merits.
It is true that there may be an exception to the general rule, as the Court conceded in Kho v. Commission
on Elections.26 In that case, the protestant assailed the order of the COMELEC First Division admitting
an answer with counter-protest belatedly filed in an election protest by filing a petition
for certiorari directly in this Court on the ground that the order constituted grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the COMELEC First Division. The Court granted the petition and nullified the assailed order for
being issued without jurisdiction, and explained the exception thuswise:
As to the issue of whether or not the case should be referred to the COMELEC en banc, this Court finds
the respondent COMELEC First Division correct when it held in its order dated February 28, 1996 that
no final decision, resolution or order has yet been made which will necessitate the elevation of the
case and its records to the Commission en banc. No less than the Constitution requires that election
cases must be heard and decided first in division and any motion for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc. Apparently, the orders dated July 26, 1995, November 15, 1995 and
February 28, 1996 and the other orders relating to the admission of the answer with counter-protest are
issuances of a Commission in division and are all interlocutory orders because they merely rule upon an
incidental issue regarding the admission of Espinosa's answer with counter-protest and do not terminate
or finally dispose of the case as they leave something to be done before it is finally decided on the
merits. In such a situation, the rule is clear that the authority to resolve incidental matters of a case
pending in a division, like the questioned interlocutory orders, falls on the division itself, and not on the
Commission en banc. Section 5 (c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure explicitly provides for this,
Sec. 5. Quorum; Votes Required xxx
(c) Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be resolved by the
Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory orders of the division which shall be resolved by
the division which issued the order. (emphasis provided)
Furthermore, a look at Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure confirms that the subject
case does not fall on any of the instances over which the Commission en banc can take cognizance of. It
reads as follows:
Section 2. The Commission en banc. — The Commission shall sit en banc in cases hereinafter specifically
provided, or in pre-proclamation cases upon a vote of a majority of the members of a Commission, or in
all other cases where a division is not authorized to act, or where, upon a unanimous vote of all the
members of a Division, an interlocutory matter or issue relative to an action or proceeding before it is
decided to be referred to the Commission en banc.
10
In the instant case, it does not appear that the subject controversy is one of the cases specifically
provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure in which the Commission may sit en banc. Neither is
it shown that the present controversy a case where a division is not authorized to act nor a situation
wherein the members of the First Division unanimously voted to refer the subject case to the
Commission en banc. Clearly, the Commission en banc, under the circumstances shown above, can not
be the proper forum which the matter concerning the assailed interlocutory orders can be referred to.
In a situation such as this where the Commission in division committed grave abuse of discretion or
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing interlocutory orders relative to an action pending
before it and the controversy did not fall under any of the instances mentioned in Section 2, Rule 3 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the remedy of the aggrieved party is not to refer the controversy to
the Commission en banc as this is not permissible under its present rules but to elevate it to this
Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. (Bold emphasis supplied)
Under the exception, therefore, the Court may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari under Rule 64
to review an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC on the ground of the issuance
being made without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it does not appear to be specifically provided under the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure that the matter is one that the COMELEC en banc may sit and consider, or a
Division is not authorized to act, or the members of the Division unanimously vote to refer to the
COMELEC en banc. Of necessity, the aggrieved party can directly resort to the Court because the
COMELEC en banc is not the proper forum in which the matter concerning the assailed interlocutory
order can be reviewed.
However, the Kho v. Commission on Elections exception has no application herein, because the COMELEC
First Division had the competence to determine the lack of detailed specifications of the acts or
omissions complained of as required by Rule 6, Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, and whether
such lack called for the outright dismissal of the protest. For sure, the 1987 Constitution vested in the
COMELEC broad powers involving not only the enforcement and administration of all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of elections but also the resolution and determination of election
controversies.27 The breadth of such powers encompasses the authority to determine the sufficiency of
allegations contained in every election protest and to decide based on such allegations whether to admit
the protest and proceed with the hearing or to outrightly dismiss the protest in accordance with Section
9, Rule 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804.
The Court has upheld the COMELEC’s determination of the sufficiency of allegations contained in
election protests, conformably with its imperative duty to ascertain in an election protest, by all means
within its command, who was the candidate elected by the electorate.28 Indeed, in Panlilio v. Commission
on Elections,29 we brushed aside the contention that the election protest was insufficient in form and
substance and was a sham for having allegations couched in general terms, stating:
In Miguel v. COMELEC, the Court belittled the petitioner’s argument that the protestant had no cause of
action, as the allegations of fraud and irregularities, which were couched in general terms, were not
sufficient to order the opening of ballot boxes and counting of ballots. The Court states the rules in
election protests cognizable by the COMELEC and courts of general jurisdiction, as follows:
The rule in this jurisdiction is clear and jurisprudence is even clearer. In a string of categorical
pronouncements, we have consistently ruled that when there is an allegation in an election protest that
would require the perusal, examination or counting of ballots as evidence, it is the ministerial duty of the

trial court to order the opening of the ballot boxes and the examination and counting of ballots
deposited therein.
In a kindred case, Homer Saquilayan v. COMELEC, the Court considered the allegations in an election
protest, similar to those in this case, as sufficient in form and substance.
Again, in Dayo v. COMELEC, the Court declared that allegations of fraud and irregularities are sufficient
grounds for opening the ballot boxes and examining the questioned ballots. The pronouncement is in
accordance with Section 255 of the Omnibus Election Code, which reads:
Judicial counting of votes in election contest. – Where allegations in a protest or counter-protest so
warrant, or whenever in the opinion of the court in the interests of justice so require, it shall
immediately order the book of voters, ballot boxes and their keys, ballots and other documents used in
the election be brought before it and that the ballots be examined and the votes recounted.lawphi1
In this case, the COMELEC Second Division found that the allegations in the protest and counter-protest
warranted the opening of the contested ballot boxes and the examination of their contents to settle at
once the conflicting claims of petitioner and private respondent.
The petitioner adds that with the Court having noted the reliability and accuracy of the PCOS machines
and consolidation/canvassing system (CCS) computers in Roque, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections,30 Bautista’s election protest assailing the system and procedure of counting and canvassing of
votes cast in an automated system of elections should be immediately dismissed.
We are not persuaded.
Roque, Jr. v. Commission on Elections does not preclude the filing of an election protest to challenge the
outcome of an election undertaken in an automated system of elections. Instead, the Court only ruled
there that the system and procedure implemented by the COMELEC in evaluating the PCOS machines
and CCS computers met the minimum system requirements prescribed in Section 7 of Republic Act No.
8436.31 The Court did not guarantee the efficiency and integrity of the automated system of elections, as
can be gleaned from the following pronouncement thereat:
The Court, however, will not indulge in the presumption that nothing would go wrong, that a successful
automation election unmarred by fraud, violence, and like irregularities would be the order of the
moment on May 10, 2010. Neither will it guarantee, as it cannot guarantee, the effectiveness of the
voting machines and the integrity of the counting and consolidation software embedded in them. That
task belongs at the first instance to Comelec, as part of its mandate to ensure clean and peaceful
elections. This independent constitutional commission, it is true, possesses extraordinary powers and
enjoys a considerable latitude in the discharge of its functions. The road, however, towards successful
2010 automation elections would certainly be rough and bumpy. The Comelec is laboring under very
tight timelines. It would accordingly need the help of all advocates of orderly and honest elections, of all
men and women of goodwill, to smoothen the way and assist Comelec personnel address the fears
expressed about the integrity of the system. Like anyone else, the Court would like and wish automated
elections to succeed, credibly.32
In view of the foregoing, we have no need to discuss at length the other submissions of the petitioner.
11
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
DOUGLAS R. CAGAS v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CLAUDE P. BAUTISTA G.R. No. 194139, 24
January 2012, EN BANC (BERSAMIN, J.)
A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a COMELEC Division in an election protest may not
directly assail the order before the Supreme Court through a special civil action for certiorari. The
remedy is to seek the review of said interlocutory order during the appeal of the decision of the Division.
Petitioner Douglas R. Cagas was proclaimed the winner for the gubernatorial race for the province of
Davao del Sur. Respondent Claude P. Bautista, his rival, filed an electoral protest alleging fraud,
anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and violations of election laws, rules and resolutions. The protest
was raffled to the COMELEC First Division. In his affirmative defense, Cagas argued that Bautista did not
make the requisite cash deposit on time and that Bautista did not render a detailed specification of the
acts or omissions complained of. The COMELEC First Division denied the special affirmative defences.
Thus, Cagas prayed that the matter be certified to the COMELEC En Banc. Bautista countered that the
assailed orders, being merely interlocutory, could not be elevated to the COMELEC En Banc. The
COMELEC First Division issued an order denying Cagas’ motion for reconsideration, prompting him to file
a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order
issued by a Division of the COMELEC
HELD:
Petition DENIED. Although Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution confers on the Court the power
to review any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, it limits such power to a final decision or
resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of
the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order
or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC. There is no question, therefore, that the
Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for certiorari assailing the denial by the
COMELEC First Division of the special affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The proper remedy is for the
petitioner to wait for the COMELEC First Division to first decide the protest on its merits, and if the result
should aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his special affirmative defenses to the COMELEC En Banc
along with the other errors committed by the Division upon the merits. It is true that there may be an
exception to the general rule, which is when an interlocutory order of a Division of the COMELEC was
issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, as the Court conceded in Kho
v. Commission on Elections. However, the said UST Law Review, Vol. LVII No. 1, November 2012 case has
no application herein because the COMELEC First Division had the competence to determine the lack of
detailed specifications of the acts or omissions complained of as required by Rule 6, Section 7 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, and whether such lack called for the outright dismissal of the protest.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 203833 March 19, 2013
MAMERTO T. SEVILLA, JR. Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RENATO R. SO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
Before this Court is the petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order,1 filed by petitioner Mamerto T. Sevilla, Jr., to nullify the May
14, 2012 Resolution2 of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) Second Division and the October 6, 2012
Resolution3 of the Comelec en bancin SPR (BRGY-SK) No. 70-2011. These assailed Resolutions reversed
and set aside the May 4, 2011 Order of the Muntinlupa City Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 80
(MeTC), dismissing respondent Renato R. So’s election protest against Sevilla.
The Facts
Sevilla and So were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Sucat, Muntinlupa City
during the October 25, 2010 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. On October 26, 2010, the
Board of Election Tellers proclaimed Sevilla as the winner with a total of 7,354 votes or a winning margin
of 628 votes over So’s 6,726 total votes. On November 4, 2010, So filed an election protest with the
MeTC on the ground that Sevilla committed electoral fraud, anomalies and irregularities in all the
protested precincts. So pinpointed twenty percent (20%) of the total number of the protested precincts.
He also prayed for a manual revision of the ballots.4
Following the recount of the ballots in the pilot protested precincts, the MeTC issued an Order dated
May 4, 2011 dismissing the election protest. On May 9, 2011, So filed a motion for reconsideration from
the dismissal order instead of a notice of appeal; he also failed to pay the appeal fee within the
reglementary period. On May 17, 2011, the MeTC denied the motion for reconsideration on the ground
that it was a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section 1, Rule 6 of A.M. No. 07-04-15-SC.5
In response, So filed a petition for certiorari on May 31, 2011 with the Comelec, alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the MeTC Judge. So faults the MeTC for its non-observance of the rule that in
the appreciation of ballots, there should be a clear and distinct presentation of the specific details of
how and why a certain group of ballots should be considered as having been written by one or two
persons.6
The Comelec Second Division Ruling
In its May 14, 2012 Resolution, the Comelec Second Division granted So’s petition. The Comelec Second
Division held that certiorari can be granted despite the availability of appeals when the questioned order
amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority, as in the case before it. It also ruled that the
12
assailed Order was fraught with infirmities and irregularities in the appreciation of the ballots, and was
couched in general terms: "these are not written by one person observing the different strokes, slant,
spacing, size and indentation of handwriting and the variance in writing."7
The Comelec En Banc Ruling
The Comelec en banc, by a vote of 3-3,8 affirmed the Comelec Second Division’s ruling in its October 6,
2012 Resolution whose dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Respondent judge is directed to conduct another revision of the contested ballots in Election Protest
Case No. SP-6719 with dispatch.9
It ruled that where the dismissal was capricious, certiorari lies as the petition challenges not the
correctness but the validity of the order of dismissal. The Comelec en banc emphasized that procedural
technicalities should be disregarded for the immediate and final resolution of election cases inasmuch as
ballots should be read and appreciated with utmost liberality so that the will of the electorate in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. It found that the MeTC Judge
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when she did not comply with the
mandatory requirements of Section 2(d), Rule 14 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC on the form of the decision in
election protests involving pairs or groups of ballots written by two persons. It noted that based on the
general and repetitive phraseology of the Order, the MeTC Judge’s findings were "copy-pasted" into the
decision and ran counter to the mandate of the aforementioned rule. Also, the MeTC Judge failed to
mention in her appreciation of the ballots that she examined the Minutes of Voting and Counting to
ascertain whether there were illiterate voters or assisted voters in the protested precincts.10
Commissioner Lim’s Dissent 11
The dissent posited that So’s petition should be dismissed outright as it was mired in procedural errors.
First, So should have filed an appeal within five (5) days from receipt of the MeTC’s Order; a motion for
reconsideration was improper as the Order amounted to the final disposition of the protest. Second, So
should not have filed the motion for reconsideration even if he believed that the Order was interlocutory
since a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading. Also, he could have simply filed the petition
for certiorari without the necessity of filing the motion for reconsideration. Third, the petition for
certiorari cannot be a substitute for the lost appeal. The Comelec could not even treat the certiorari as
an appeal since the petition was filed 25 days after So received the assailed Order; thus, the Order
already attained finality. Finally, procedural rules should not be lightly shunned in favor of liberality
when, as in this case, So did not give a valid excuse for his errors.
The Petition
The Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it gave due course to the petition for certiorari
Sevilla argues that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it entertained So’s petition despite its
loss of jurisdiction to entertain the petition after the court a quo’s dismissal order became final and
executory due to So’s wrong choice of remedy. Instead of filing an appeal within five (5) days from
receipt of the Order and paying the required appeal fee, So filed a motion for reconsideration – a
prohibited pleading that did not stop the running of the prescriptive period to file an appeal. Sevilla also

emphasizes that So’s petition for certiorari should not have been given due course since it is not a
substitute for an appeal and may only be allowed if there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.12
The dismissal of the election protest was proper
Sevilla also contends that the dismissal was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion since the MeTC
Judge complied with the rules; she made clear, specific and detailed explanations pertaining to the
specific strokes, figures or letters showing that the ballots had been written by one person. Granting that
the decision was tainted with errors, certiorari would still not lie because a mere error of judgment is not
synonymous with grave abuse of discretion. Lastly, a liberal application of the rules cannot be made to a
petition which offers no explanation for the non-observance of the rules.13
On November 13, 2012,14 the Court resolved to require the Comelec and the respondent to comment on
the petition and to observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance of the assailed Comelec Second
Division’s Resolution of May 14, 2012 and the Comelec en banc’s Resolution of October 6, 2012.15
In his Comment, the respondent contends that the petition was filed prematurely. He emphasizes that
the October 6, 2012 Resolution of the Comelec en banc was not a majority decision considering that
three Commissioners voted for the denial of the motion for reconsideration and the three others voted
to grant the same. So notes that the assailed October 6, 2012 Resolution was deliberated upon only by
six (6) Commissioners because the 7th
Commissioner had not yet been appointed by the President at that time. Considering that the October 6,
2012 Resolution was not a majority decision by the Comelec en banc, So prays for the dismissal of the
petition so that it can be remanded to the Comelec for a rehearing by a full and complete Commission.16
The Court’s Ruling
We resolve to DISMISS the petition for having been prematurely filed with this Court, and remand the
case to the COMELEC for its appropriate action.
The October 6, 2012 Comelec en banc’s Resolution lacks legal effect as it is not a majority decision
required by the Constitution and by the Comelec Rules of Procedure
Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution requires that "each Commission shall decide by a majority vote
of all its members, any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission
for decision or resolution."17 Pursuant to this Constitutional mandate, the Comelec provided in Section
5(a), Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure the votes required for the pronouncement of a decision,
resolution, order or ruling when the Comelec sits en banc, viz.:
Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required. - (a) When sitting en banc, four (4) Members of the Commission
shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of transacting business. The concurrence of a majority of the
Members of the Commission shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order
or ruling. [italics supplied; emphasis ours]
13
We have previously ruled that a majority vote requires a vote of four members of the Comelec en banc.
In Marcoleta v. Commission on Elections,18 we declared "that Section 5(a) of Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules
of Procedure and Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution require that a majority vote of all the
members of the Comelec en banc, and not only those who participated and took part in the
deliberations, is necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or ruling."
In the present case, while the October 6, 2012 Resolution of the Comelec en banc appears to have
affirmed the Comelec Second Division’s Resolution and, in effect, denied Sevilla’s motion for
reconsideration, the equally divided voting between three Commissioners concurring and three
Commissioners dissenting is not the majority vote that the Constitution and the Comelec Rules of
Procedure require for a valid pronouncement of the assailed October 6, 2012 Resolution of the Comelec
en banc.
In essence, based on the 3-3 voting, the Comelec en banc did not sustain the Comelec Second Division’s
findings on the basis of the three concurring votes by Commissioners Tagle, Velasco and Yusoph;
conversely, it also did not overturn the Comelec Second Division on the basis of the three dissenting
votes by Chairman Brillantes, Commissioner Sarmiento and Commissioner Lim, as either side was short
of one (1) vote to obtain a majority decision. Recall that under Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution,
a majority vote of all the members of the Commission en banc is necessary to arrive at a ruling. In other
words, the vote of four (4) members must always be attained in order to decide, irrespective of the
number of Commissioners in attendance. Thus, for all intents and purposes, the assailed October 6, 2012
Resolution of the Comelec en banc had no legal effect whatsoever except to convey that the Comelec
failed to reach a decision and that further action is required.
The October 6, 2012 Comelec en banc’s Resolution must be reheard pursuant to the Comelec Rules of
Procedure
To break the legal stalemate in case the opinion is equally divided among the members of the Comelec
en banc, Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure mandates a rehearing where parties are
given the opportunity anew to strengthen their respective positions or arguments and convince the
members of the Comelec en banc of the merit of their case.19 Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure reads:
Section 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided. - When the Commission en banc is equally divided in
opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no
decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the
Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and in all
incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied. [emphasis ours; italics supplied]
In Juliano v. Commission on Elections,20 only three members of the Comelec en banc voted in favor of
granting Estrelita Juliano’s motion for reconsideration (from the Decision of the Comelec Second Division
dismissing her petition for annulment of proclamation of Muslimin Sema as the duly elected Mayor of
Cotabato City), three members dissented, and one member took no part. In ruling that the Comelec
acted with grave abuse of discretion when it failed to order a rehearing required by the Comelec Rules of
Procedure, the Court ruled:
Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure specifically states that if the opinion of the
Comelec En Banc is equally divided, the case shall be reheard. The Court notes, however, that the Order

of the Comelec En Banc dated February 10, 2005 clearly stated that what was conducted was a mere "re-
consultation."
A "re-consultation" is definitely not the same as a "rehearing."
A consultation is a "deliberation of persons on some subject;" hence, a re-consultation means a second
deliberation of persons on some subject.
Rehearing is defined as a "second consideration of cause for purpose of calling to court’s or
administrative board’s attention any error, omission, or oversight in first consideration. A retrial of issues
presumes notice to parties entitled thereto and opportunity for them to be heard." (italics supplied). But
as held in Samalio v. Court of Appeals,
A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential.1âwphi1 The requirements
are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy at hand.
Thus, a rehearing clearly presupposes the participation of the opposing parties for the purpose of
presenting additional evidence, if any, and further clarifying and amplifying their arguments; whereas, a
re-consultation involves a re-evaluation of the issues and arguments already on hand only by the
members of the tribunal, without the participation of the parties.
In Belac v. Comelec, when the voting of the Comelec En Banc on therein petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was equally divided, the Comelec En Banc first issued an order setting the case for
hearing and allowed the parties to submit their respective memoranda before voting anew on therein
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. This should have been the proper way for the Comelec En Banc
to act on herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration when the first voting was equally divided. Its
own Rules of Procedure calls for a rehearing where the parties would have the opportunity to strengthen
their respective positions or arguments and convince the members of the Comelec En Banc of the merit
of their case. Thus, when the Comelec En Banc failed to give petitioner the rehearing required by the
Comelec Rules of Procedure, said body acted with grave abuse of discretion.21 (italics supplied; emphases
ours)
To the same effect, in Marcoleta v. Commission on Elections,22
the Court ruled that the Comelec en banc
did not gravely abuse its discretion when it ordered a rehearing of its November 6, 2007 Resolution for
failing to muster the required majority voting. The Court held:
The Comelec, despite the obvious inclination of three commissioners to affirm the Resolution of the First
Division, cannot do away with a rehearing since its Rules clearly provide for such a proceeding for the
body to have a solicitous review of the controversy before it. A rehearing clearly presupposes the
participation of the opposing parties for the purpose of presenting additional evidence, if any, and
further clarifying and amplifying their arguments.
To reiterate, neither the assenters nor dissenters can claim a majority in the En Banc Resolution of
November 6, 2007. The Resolution served no more than a record of voters, lacking in legal effect despite
its pronouncement of reversal of the First Division Resolution. According, the Comelec did not commit
any grave abuse of discretion in ordering a rehearing.23 (italics supplied; citation omitted)
14
In the present case, it appears from the records that the Comelec en banc did not issue an Order for a
rehearing of the case in view of the filing in the interim of the present petition for certiorari by Sevilla. In
both the cases of Juliano and Marcoleta, cited above, we remanded the cases to the Comelec en banc for
the conduct of the required rehearing pursuant to the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Based on these
considerations, we thus find that a remand of this case is necessary for the Comelec en banc to comply
with the rehearing requirement of Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition and REMAND SPR (BR GY-SK) No. 70-2011 to the Comelec
en bane for the conduct of the required rehearing under the Comelec Rules of Procedure. The Comelec
en bane is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the rehearing with utmost dispatch. No costs. SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
Sevilla and So were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Sucat, Muntinlupa City
during the October 25, 2010 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, in which, Sevilla was
proclaimed as the winner. So filed an election protest with the MeTC on the ground that Sevilla
committed electoral fraud, anomalies and irregularities in all the protested precincts. The MeTC
dismissed the election protest.
So filed a motion for reconsideration from the dismissal order instead of a notice of appeal; he also failed
to pay the appeal fee within the reglementary period. But the MeTC denied the motion for
reconsideration on the ground that it was a prohibited pleading. In response, So filed a petition for
certiorari with the COMELEC, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MeTC Judge.
The COMELEC Second Division granted So’s petition and held that certiorari can be granted despite the
availability of appeals when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial
authority. It also ruled that the assailed Order was fraught with infirmities and irregularities in the
appreciation of the ballot.
The COMELEC en banc, by a vote of 3-3, affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s ruling.
ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it gave due course to the petition
despite its loss of jurisdiction after the dismissal order became final and executory due to So’s wrong
choice of remedy.
RULING:
The Court resolve to dismiss the petition for having been prematurely filed, and remand the case to the
COMELEC for its appropriate action. It ruled that COMELEC en banc’s Resolution lacks legal effect as it is
not a majority decision required by the Constitution and by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
The Court have previously ruled that a majority vote requires a vote of four members of the COMELEC en
banc. In Marcoleta v. Commission on Elections, it declared "that Section 5(a) of Rule 3 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure and Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution require that a majority vote of all the
members of the COMELEC en banc, and not only those who participated and took part in the
deliberations, is necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or ruling."
In the present case, while the Resolution of the COMELEC en banc appears to have affirmed the
COMELEC Second Division’s Resolution and, in effect, denied Sevilla’s motion for reconsideration, the
equally divided voting between three Commissioners concurring and three Commissioners dissenting is
not the majority vote that the Constitution and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure require for a valid
pronouncement of the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC en banc. Thus, the assailed Resolution of the
COMELEC en banc had no legal effect whatsoever except to convey that the COMELEC failed to reach a
decision and that further action is required. The COMELEC en banc’s Resolution must be reheard
pursuant to the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
 15

EN BANC favored by luck shall be proclaimed as the duly-elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Plaridel,
Palompon, Leyte.5
G.R. No. 186201 October 9, 2009
On May 13, 2008, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal6 with the trial court and she stated in her petition
that she also paid the appeal fee required under Section 9, Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure in Election
CARMELINDA C. BARRO, Petitioner,
Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials (A.M. No. 07-4-15-
vs.
SC).7 Thereafter, the records of the case were forwarded to the COMELEC.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION); HON. DELIA P. NOEL-BERTULFO, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court, Palompon, Leyte; and ELPEDIO P. CONTINEDAS,
JR.,Respondents. On November 25, 2008, the First Division of the COMELEC issued an Order dismissing petitioner’s appeal
for failure to pay the appeal fee, thus:
DECISION
Pursuant to Sections 3 and 4, Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provide for the payment
of appeal fee in the amount of ₱3,000.00 within the period to file the notice of appeal, and Section 9 (a),
PERALTA, J.:
Rule 22 of the same Rules, which provides that failure to pay the correct appeal fee is a ground for the
dismissal of the appeal, the Commission (First Division) RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES to DISMISS the
This is a petition for certiorari1 alleging that the First Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) instant appeal for Protestee-AppeIlant's failure to pay the appeal fee as prescribed by the Comelec Rules
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Orders of Procedure within the five (5)-day reglementary period.8
dated November 25, 2008 and January 9, 2009. The Order2 dated November 25, 2008 dismissed
petitioner’s appeal for failure to pay the appeal fee prescribed by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
On December 15, 2008, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration9 of the Order dated November 25,
within the reglementary period. The Order3 dated January 9, 2009 denied petitioner’s motion for
2008. On the same date, she also posted Postal Money Order Nos. A0820039317; B0810040373 and
reconsideration.
J1350301774 in the total sum of ₱3,200.00 payable to the Cash Division of the COMELEC to cover the
appeal fee.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the First Division of the COMELEC in its Order
Petitioner Carmelinda C. Barro and private respondent Elpedio P. Continedas, Jr. were candidates dated January 9, 2009, thus:
for Punong Barangay of Barangay Plaridel, Palompon, Leyte during the October 29, 2007
synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. Petitioner garnered 150 votes, while Protestee-Appellant's "Motion for Reconsideration" filed thru registered mail on 15 December 2008 and
respondent garnered 149 votes. The Barangay Board of Canvassers proclaimed petitioner as the duly
received on 23 December 2008, seeking reconsideration of the Commission's (First Division) Order dated
elected Punong Barangay, winning by a margin of only one vote.
25 November 2008, is hereby DENIED for failure of the movant to pay the necessary motion fees under
Sec. 7 (f), Rule 40 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure as amended by Comelec Resolution No. 02-0130.
On November 5, 2007, private respondent filed an election protest before the Municipal Trial Court of The Judicial Records Division-ECAD, this Commission, is hereby directed to return to the protestee-
Palompon, Leyte (trial court), impugning the result of the canvass in two precincts of the barangay. appellant the Postal Money Order Nos. A0820039317 in the amount of two thousand pesos (₱2,000.00);
B0810040373 in the amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) and J1350301774 in the amount of two
hundred pesos (₱200.00) representing his belated payment of appeal fee.10
After the revision of ballots, the trial court found that petitioner and respondent both garnered 151
votes.
On February 19, 2009, petitioner filed this petition raising the following issues:
4
In its Decision dated May 5, 2008, the trial court held:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE [FIRST DIVISION OF THE COMELEC] COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL.
In sum, the Protestant is credited with three (3) votes and the Protestee with two (2) votes of the
contested votes.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE [FIRST DIVISION OF THE COMELEC] COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
The three (3) credited votes added to the 148 votes of the protestant equals 151 votes. The two (2)
FILED BY PETITIONER.
credited votes added to the 149 votes of the protestee equals 151 votes. The protestant and the
protestee, therefore, received the same number of votes.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE [FIRST DIVISION OF THE COMELEC] COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ACTING ON THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
It appearing that the Protestant and the Protestee received the same number of votes for the position of
WITHOUT ELEVATING THE SAME TO THE COMELEC EN BANC.11
Barangay Chairman of Brgy. Plaridel, Palompon, Leyte, there shall be a drawing of lots and the party

The first issue is whether or not the First Division of the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
dismissing petitioner’s appeal.
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of
jurisdiction or an arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal hostility.12 The
grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law.13
The Court notes that in petitioner’s Notice of Appeal,14 she manifested payment of the appeal fees and
other lawful fees required for the appeal per Official Receipt Nos. 7719538 and 7719488. However, the
receipts were not attached to the record of the case. In her Petition, petitioner stated that when she
filed her Notice of Appeal on May 13, 2008, she also paid the appeal fee required under Section 9, Rule
14 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC.15 In her Reply,16petitioner also stated that she relied on the provision of
Sections 8 and 9, Rule 14 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC,17 which took effect on May 15, 2007, and that she
believed in good faith that the said new Rules of Procedure repealed the COMELEC Rules.
Based on petitioner’s pleadings and the fact that the trial court gave due course to petitioner’s appeal, it
may be presumed that petitioner paid the appeal fee of ₱1,000.00 to the trial court simultaneously with
the filing of the Notice of Appeal, despite absence of the receipt showing payment of the appeal fee of
₱1,000.00.
Petitioner contends in her Reply18 that the recent case of Jerry B. Aguilar v. Commission on Elections, et
al.,19applies to her case. The Court agrees with petitioner.
In Aguilar, petitioner Aguilar won as barangay chairman in the October 29, 2007 barangay elections. An
election protest was filed against him with the municipal trial court. The municipal trial court found that
Aguilar lost by a margin of one vote; hence, his proclamation was annulled. On April 21, 2008, Aguilar
filed a Notice of Appeal and paid the appeal fee of ₱1,000.00 to the municipal trial court in accordance
with A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC. The First Division of the COMELEC dismissed his appeal pursuant to Section 9
(a), Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure for non-payment of the appeal fee of ₱3,000.00 as
required in Sections 3 and 4, Rule 40 of the same Rules. His first and second motions for reconsideration
were denied by the First Division of the COMELEC. He filed a petition for certiorari with this Court, which
held:
With the promulgation of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, the previous rule that the appeal is perfected only upon
the full payment of the appeal fee, now pegged at ₱3,200.00, to the COMELEC Cash Division within the
period to appeal, as stated in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended, no longer applies.
It thus became necessary for the COMELEC to clarify the procedural rules on the payment of appeal fees.
For this purpose, the COMELEC issued on July 15, 2008, Resolution No. 8486, which the Court takes
judicial notice of.
x x x The appeal to the COMELEC of the trial court's decision in election contests involving municipal and
barangay officials is perfected upon the filing of the notice of appeal and the payment of the ₱1,000.00
appeal fee to the court that rendered the decision within the five-day reglementary period. The non-
payment or the insufficient payment of the additional appeal fee of ₱3,200.00 to the COMELEC Cash
Division, in accordance with Rule 40, Section 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended, does
not affect the perfection of the appeal and does not result in outright or ipso facto dismissal of the
appeal. Following, Rule 22, Section 9 (a) of the COMELEC Rules, the appeal may be dismissed. And
16
pursuant to Rule 40, Section 18 of the same rules, if the fees are not paid, the COMELEC may refuse to
take action thereon until they are paid and may dismiss the action or the proceeding. In such a situation,
the COMELEC is merely given the discretion to dismiss the appeal or not.
Accordingly, in the instant case, the COMELEC First Division, may dismiss petitioner's appeal, as it in fact
did, for petitioner's failure to pay the ₱3,200.00 appeal fee.
Be that as it may, the Court still finds that the COMELEC First Division gravely abused its discretion in
issuing the order dismissing petitioner's appeal. The Court notes that the notice of appeal and the
₱1,000.00 appeal fee were, respectively, filed and paid with the MTC of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte on
April 21, 2008. On that date, the petitioner's appeal was deemed perfected. COMELEC issued Resolution
No. 8486 clarifying the rule on the payment of appeal fees only on July 15, 2008, or almost three months
after the appeal was perfected. Yet, on July 31, 2008, or barely two weeks after the issuance of
Resolution No. 8486, the COMELEC First Division dismissed petitioner's appeal for non-payment to the
COMELEC Cash Division of the additional ₱3,200.00 appeal fee.
Considering that petitioner filed his appeal months before the clarificatory resolution on appeal fees,
petitioner's appeal should not be unjustly prejudiced by COMELEC Resolution No. 8486. Fairness and
prudence dictate that the COMELEC First Division should have first directed petitioner to pay the
additional appeal fee in accordance with the clarificatory resolution, and if the latter should refuse to
comply, then, and only then, dismiss the appeal. Instead, the COMELEC First Division hastily dismissed
the appeal on the strength of the recently promulgated clarificatory resolution — which had taken effect
only a few days earlier. This unseemly haste is an invitation to outrage.
In this case, the appeal to the COMELEC was perfected when petitioner filed her Notice of Appeal and
paid the appeal fee of ₱1,000.00 on May 13, 2008, which was two months before the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 8486,20 clarifying the rule on the payment of appeal fees. As stated in Aguilar, fairness
and prudence dictate that the First Division of the COMELEC should have first directed petitioner to pay
the additional appeal fee of ₱3,200.00 in accordance with the clarificatory resolution; and if petitioner
refused to comply, only then should the appeal be dismissed. The First Division of the COMELEC should
have been more cautious in dismissing petitioner’s appeal on the mere technicality of non-payment of
the additional appeal fee of ₱3,200.00 given the public interest involved in election cases.21
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that the First Division of the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the Order dated November 25, 2008, dismissing petitioner’s appeal. The case is
remanded to the First Division of the COMELEC for disposition of the appeal in accordance with this
decision, subject to the presentation by petitioner of the receipt evidencing payment of the appeal fee of
₱1,000.00 as required under Section 9, Rule 14 of A. M. No. 07-4-15-SC.
It must be stated, however, that for notices of appeal filed after the promulgation on July 27, 2009
of Divinagracia v. Commission on Elections,22 errors in the matter of non-payment or incomplete
payment of the two appeal fees in election cases are no longer excusable.
The second and third issues shall be discussed jointly.
Petitioner contends that the First Division of the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in acting on the motion for reconsideration without elevating
the same to the COMELEC en banc, and in denying the motion for reconsideration.
 17

The contention is meritorious.
It is settled that under Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution,23 what may be brought to this Court on
certiorari is the decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC en banc. However, this rule should not apply
when a division of the COMELEC arrogates unto itself and deprives the en banc of the authority to rule
on a motion for reconsideration, like in this case.24
Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution provides for the procedure for the resolution of election cases
by the COMELEC, thus:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies.
All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration
of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
The constitutional provision is reflected in Sections 5 and 6, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
as follows:
Sec. 5. How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed of. — Upon the filing of a motion to reconsider a
decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division, the Clerk of Court concerned shall, within twenty-four
(24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the Presiding Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2) days
thereafter certify the case to the Commission en banc.1avvph!1
Petitioner Carmelinda C. Barro and private respondent Elpedio P. Continedas, Jr. were candidates for
Punong Barangay of Barangay Plaridel, Palompon, Leyte during the October 29, 2007 synchronized
Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. Petitioner garnered 150 votes, while respondent
garnered 149 votes. the Barangay Board of Canvassers proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected Punong
Barangay, winning by a margin of only one vote.On November 5 2007, private respondent filed an
election protest before the Municipal Trial Court of Palompon, Leyte trial court, impugning the result of
the canvass in two precincts of the barangay.
After the revision of ballots, the trial court found that petitioner and respondent both garnered 151
votes. the trial court held that the Protestant and the Protestee received the same number of votes for
the position of Barangay Chairman of Brgy. Plaridel, Palompon, Leyte, there shall be a drawing of lots
and the party favored by luck shall be proclaimed as the duly/elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay
Plaridel, Palompon, Leyte.Petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the trial court and she stated in her
petition that she also paid the appeal fee required. Thereafter, the records of the case were forwarded
to the COMELEC.On December 15 2008, petitioner filed a Motion for reconsideration of the Order dated
November 25 2008. On thesame date, she also posted Postal money Order payable to the Cash division
of the COmELEC to cover the appeal fee. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the first
division of the COMELEC.

Sec. 6. Duty of Clerk of Court of Commission to Calendar Motion for Reconsideration. — The Clerk of
Court concerned shall calendar the motion for reconsideration for the resolution of the Commission en
banc within ten (10) days from the certification thereof.

In this case, the First Division of the COMELEC violated the cited provisions of the Constitution and the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure when it resolved petitioner's motion for reconsideration of its final Order
dated November 25, 2008, which dismissed petitioner’s appeal. By arrogating unto itself a power
constitutionally lodged in the Commission en banc, the First Division of the COMELEC exercised
judgment in excess of, or without, jurisdiction.25Hence, the Order issued by the First Division of the
COMELEC dated January 9, 2009, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, is null and void.

Petitioner stated in her Reply26 that on April 1, 2009, the First Division of the COMELEC issued an Order
declaring the Order dated November 25, 2008 as final and executory, and ordering the issuance of an
Entry of Judgment. On April 1, 2009, an Entry of Judgment was issued by the Electoral Contests
Adjudication Department.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated November 25, 2008 and January 9, 2009 by the
First Division of the COMELEC, and the Entry of Judgment issued on April 1, 2009 by the Electoral
Contests Adjudication Department are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the First
Division of the Commission on Elections for disposition in accordance with this Decision.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 221318, December 16, 2015
KABATAAN PARTY-LIST, REPRESENTED BY REPRESENTATIVE JAMES MARK TERRY L. RIDON AND
MARJOHARA S. TUCAY; SARAH JANE I. ELAGO, PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS OF
THE PHILIPPINES; VENCER MARI E. CRISOSTOMO, CHAIRPERSON OF THE ANAKBAYAN; MARC LINO J.
ABILA, NATIONAL PRESIDENT OF THE COLLEGE EDITORS GUILD OF THE PHILIPPINES; EINSTEIN Z.
RECEDES, DEPUTY SECRETARY- GENERAL OF ANAKBAYAN; CHARISSE BERNADINE I. BA�EZ,
CHAIRPERSON OF THE LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS; ARLENE CLARISSE Y. JULVE, MEMBER OF
ALYANSA NG MGA GRUPONG HALIGI NG AGHAM AT TEKNOLOHIYA PARA SA MAMAMAYAN
(AGHAM); AND SINING MARIA ROSA L. MARFORI, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ELECTIONS,
ON, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Rights beget responsibilities; progress begets change.
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition1 filed by herein petitioners Kabataan Party-
List, represented by Representative James Mark Terry L. Ridon and National President Marjohara S.
Tucay; Sarah Jane I. Elago, President of the National Union of Students of the Philippines; Veneer Mari E.
Crisostomo and Einstein Z. Recedes, Chairperson and Deputy Secretary-General of Anakbayan,
respectively; Marc Lino J. Abila, National President of the College Editors Guild of the Philippines;
Charisse Bernadine I. Ba�ez, Chairperson of the League of Filipino Students; Arlene Clarisse Y. Julve,
member of Alyansa ng mga Grupong Haligi ngAgham at Teknolohiya para sa Mamamayan (AGHAM);
and Sining Maria Rosa L. Marfori (petitioners) assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. (RA)
10367, entitled "An Act Providing for Mandatory Biometrics Voter Registration,"2 as well as respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution Nos. 9721,3 9863,4 and 10013,5 all related thereto.
The Facts
On February 15, 2013, President Benigno S. Aquino III signed into law RA 10367, which is a consolidation
of House Bill No. 3469 and Senate Bill No. 1030, passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate
on December 11, 2012 and December 12, 2012,6 respectively. Essentially, RA 10367 mandates the
COMELEC to implement a mandatory biometrics registration system for new voters7 in order to establish
a clean, complete, permanent, and updated list of voters through the adoption of biometric
technology.8RA 10367 was duly published on February 22, 2013,9 and took effect fifteen (15) days after.10
RA 10367 likewise directs that "[r]egistered voters whose biometrics have not been captured shall
submit themselves for validation."11 "Voters who fail to submit for validation on or before the last day
of filing of application for registration for purposes of the May 2016 [E]lections shall be deactivated x x
x."12 Nonetheless, voters may have their records reactivated after the May 2016 Elections, provided that
they comply with the procedure found in Section 2813 of RA 8189,14 also known as "The Voter's
Registration Act of 1996."15
On June 26, 2013, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 972116 which serves as the implementing rules
18
and regulations of RA 10367, thus, prescribing the procedure for validation,17 deactivation,18 and
reactivation of voters' registration records (VRRs).19 Among others, the said Resolution provides that: (a)
"[t]he registration records of voters without biometrics data who failed to submit for validation on or
before the last day of filing of applications for registration for the purpose of the May 9, 2016 National
and Local Elections shall be deactivated in the last [Election Registration Board (ERB)] hearing to be
conducted prior to said elections";20 (b) "[t]he following registered voters shall have their biometrics data
validated: [(1)] Those who do not have BIOMETRICS data appearing in the Voter['s] Registration System
(VRS); and [(2)] Those who have incomplete BIOMETRICS dataappearing in the VRS";21 (c) "[d]eactivated
voters shall not be allowed to vote";22 and (d) "[d]eactivation x x x shall comply with the requirements
on posting, ERB hearing and service of individual notices to the deactivated voters."23 Resolution No.
9721 further states that, as of the last day of registration and validation for the 2013 Elections on
October 31, 2012, a total of 9,018,256 registered voters were without biometrics data.24 Accordingly, all
Election Officers (EOs) were directed to "conduct [an] information campaign on the conduct of
validation."25cralawred
On July 1, 2013, the COMELEC, pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution, commenced the mandatory
biometric system of registration. To make biometric registration convenient and accessible to the voting
public, aside from the COMELEC offices in every local government unit, it likewise established satellite
registration offices in barangays and mails.26
On April 1, 2014, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 986327 which amended certain portions28 of
Resolution No. 985329 dated February 19, 2014, by stating that ERBs shall deactivate the VRRs of those
who "failed to submit for validation despite notice on or before October 31, 2015," and that the
"[d]eactivation for cases falling under this ground shall be made during the November 16, 2015 Board
hearing."30
A month later, or in May 2014, the COMELEC launched the NoBio-NoBoto public information
campaign which ran concurrently with the period of continuing registration.31
On November 3, 2015, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 1001332 which provides for the "procedures
in the deactivation of [VRRs] who do not have biometrics data in the [VRS] after the October 31, 2015
deadline of registration and validation."33 Among others, the said Resolution directed the EOs to: (a)
"[p]ost the lists of voters without biometrics data in the bulletin boards of the City/Municipal hall,
Office of the Election Officer and in the barangay hall along with the notice of ERB hearing;" and (b)
"[s]end individual notices to the affected voters included in the generated list of voters without
biometrics data."34 It also provides that "[a]ny opposition/objection to the deactivation of records shall
be filed not later than November 9, 2015 in accordance with the period prescribed in Section
4,35[Chapter I,] Resolution No. 9853."36 During the ERB hearing, which proceedings are summary in
nature,37 "the ERBs shall, based dn the list of voters without biometrics data, order the deactivation of
registration records on the ground of 'failure to validate.'"38 Thereafter, EOs were required to "[s]end
individual notices to the deactivated voters within five (5) days from the last day of ERB
hearing."39Moreover, Resolution No. 10013 clarified that the "[Registration records of voters
with incomplete biometrics data and those corrupted data (biometrics) in the database shall not be
deactivated and be allowed to vote in the May 9, 2016 Synchronized National, Local and [Autonomous
Region on Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)] Regional Elections."40
On November 25, 2015, herein petitioners filed the instant petition with application for temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPI) assailing the
constitutionality of the biometrics validation requirement imposed under RA 10367, as well as COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, all related thereto. They contend that: (a) biometrics validation
rises to the level of an additional, substantial qualification where there is penalty of deactivation;41 (b)
biometrics deactivation is not the disqualification by law contemplated by the 1987 Constitution;42 (c)

biometrics validation gravely violates the Constitution, considering that, applying the strict scrutiny test,
it is not poised with a compelling reason for state regulation and hence, an unreasonable deprivation of
the right to suffrage;43 (d) voters to be deactivated are not afforded due process;44 and (e) poor
experience with biometrics should serve as warning against exacting adherence to the system.45 Albeit
already subject of a prior petition46 filed before this Court, petitioners also raise herein the argument
that deactivation by November 16, 2015 would result in the premature termination of the registration
period contrary to Section 847 of RA 8189.48 Ultimately, petitioners pray that this Court declare RA 10367,
as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, unconstitutional and that the COMELEC be
commanded to desist from deactivating registered voters without biometric information, to reinstate
voters who are compliant with the requisites of RA 8189 but have already been delisted, and to extend
the system of continuing registration and capture of biometric information of voters until January 8,
2016.49
On December 1, 2015, the Court required the COMELEC to file its comment to the petition. Meanwhile,
it issued a TRO requiring the COMELEC to desist from deactivating the registration records of voters
without biometric information, pending resolution of the case at hand.50
On December 7, 2015, COMELEC Chairman Juan Andres D. Bautista, through a letter51 addressed to the
Court En Banc, urgently appealed for the immediate lifting of the above-mentioned TRO, stating that the
COMELEC is set to finalize the Project of Precincts (POP) on December 15, 2015, and that the TRO issued
in this case has the effect of including the 2.4 Million deactivated voters in the list of voters, which, in
turn, would require revisions to the POP and consequently, adversely affect the timelines of all other
interrelated preparatory activities to the prejudice of the successful implementation of the Automated
Election System (AES) for the 2016 Elections.52
On December 11, 2015, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its comment53 to
the instant petition. On even date, petitioners filed a manifestation54 asking the Court to continue the
TRO against the deactivation of voters without biometric information.55
With no further pleadings required of the parties, the case was submitted for resolution.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue in this case is whether or not RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863,
and 10013, all related thereto, are unconstitutional.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is bereft of merit.
I.
At the outset, the Court passes upon the procedural objections raised in this case. In particular, the
COMELEC claims that petitioners: (a) failed to implead the Congress, the Office of the President, and the
ERB which it purports are indispensable parties to the case;56 (b) did not have the legal standing to
institute the instant petition;57 and (c) erroneously availed of certiorari and prohibition as a mode of
questioning the constitutionality of RA 10367 and the assailed COMELEC Resolutions.58
The submissions do not hold.
Recognizing that the petition is hinged on an important constitutional issue pertaining to the right of
19
suffrage, the Court views the matter as one of transcendental public importance and of compelling
significance. Consequently, it deems it proper to brush aside the foregoing procedural barriers and
instead, resolve the case on its merits. As resonated in the case of Pabillo v. COMELEC,59 citing Capalla v.
COMELEC60 and Guingona, Jr. v. COMELEC:61
There can be no doubt that the coming 10 May 2010 [in this case, the May 2016] elections is a matter of
great public concern. On election day, the country's registered voters will come out to exercise the
sacred right of suffrage. Not only is it an exercise that ensures the preservation of our democracy, the
coming elections also embodies our people's last ounce of hope for a better future. It is the final
opportunity, patiently awaited by our people, for the peaceful transition of power to the next chosen
leaders of our country. If there is anything capable of directly affecting the lives of ordinary Filipinos so
as to come within the ambit of a public concern, it is the coming elections, [x x x.]
Thus, in view of the compelling significance and transcending public importance of the issues raised by
petitioners, the technicalities raised by respondents should not be allowed to stand in the way, if the
ends of justice would not be subserved by a rigid adherence to the rules of procedure.
Furthermore, the issue on whether or not the policy on biometrics validation, as provided under RA
10367 and fleshed out in the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, should be upheld is one that demands
immediate adjudication in view of the critical preparatory activities that are currently being undertaken
by the COMELEC with regard to the impending May 2016 Elections. Thus, it would best subserve the
ends of justice to settle this controversy not only in order to enlighten the citizenry, but also so as not to
stymy the operations of a co-constitutional body. As pronounced in Roque, Jr. v. COMELEC:62
[T]he bottom line is that the Court may except a particular case from the operations of its rules when the
demands of justice so require. Put a bit differently, rules of procedure are merely tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Accordingly, technicalities and procedural barriers should not be
allowed to stand in the way, if the ends of justice would not be subserved by a rigid adherence to the
rules of procedure.63ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
That being said, the Court now proceeds to resolve the substantive issues in this case.
II.
Essentially, the present petition is a constitutional challenge against the biometrics validation
requirement imposed under RA 10367, including COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013. As
non-compliance with the same results in the penalty of deactivation, petitioners posit that it has risen to
the level of an unconstitutional substantive requirement in the exercise of the right of suffrage.64 They
submit that the statutory requirement of biometric validation is no different from the unconstitutional
requirement of literacy and property because mere non-validation already absolutely curtails the
exercise of the right of suffrage through deactivation.65 Further, they advance the argument that
deactivation is not the disqualification by law contemplated as a valid limitation to the exercise of
suffrage under the 1987 Constitution.66
The contestation is untenable.
As early as the 1936 case of The People of the Philippine Islands v. Corral,67 it has been recognized that
"[t]he right to vote is not a natural right but is a right created by law. Suffrage is a privilege granted by
the State to such persons or classes as are most likely to exercise it for the public good. In the early
stages of the evolution of the representative system of government, the exercise of the right of suffrage
was limited to a small portion of the inhabitants. But with the spread of democratic ideas, the enjoyment
of the franchise in the modern states has come to embrace the mass of the audit classes of persons are
excluded from the franchise."68

Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution delineates the current parameters for the exercise of
suffrage:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law,
who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year
and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the
election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of
suffrage.
Dissecting the provision, one must meet the following qualifications in order to exercise the right of
suffrage: first, he must be a Filipino citizen; second, he must not be disqualified by law; and third, he
must have resided in the Philippines for at least one (1) year and in the place wherein he proposes to
vote for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the election.
The second item more prominently reflects the franchised nature of the right of suffrage. The State may
therefore regulate said right by imposing statutory disqualifications, with the restriction, however, that
the same do not amount to, as per the second sentence of the provision, a "literacy, property or other
substantive requirement." Based on its genesis, it may be gleaned that the limitation is geared towards
the elimination of irrelevant standards that are purely based on socio-economic considerations that have
no bearing on the right of a citizen to intelligently cast his vote and to further the public good.
To contextualize, the first Philippine Election Law, Act No. 1582, which took effect on January 15, 1907,
mandated that only men who were at least twenty-three (23) years old and "comprised within one of
the following three classes" were allowed to vote: (a) those who prior to the 13th of August, 1898, held
the office of municipal captain, governadorcillo, alcalde, lieutenant, cabeza de barangay, or member of
any ayuntamiento; (b) those who own real property to the value of P500.00, or who annually pay P30.00
or more of the established taxes; and (c) those, who speak, read, and write English or Spanish.
When the 1935 Constitution was adopted, the minimum voting age was lowered to twenty-one (21) and
the foregoing class qualification and property requirements were removed.69 However, the literacy
requirement was retained and only men who were able to read and write were given the right to
vote.70It also made women's right to vote dependent on a plebiscite held for such purpose.71
During the 1971 Constitutional Convention, the delegates decided to remove the literacy and property
requirements to broaden the political base and discontinue the exclusion of millions of citizens from the
political systems:72
Sponsorship Speech of Delegate Manglapus
DELEGATE MANGLAPUS: Mr. President, the draft proposal, the subject matter of Report No. 11 contains
amendments that are designed to improve Article V on suffrage and to broaden the electoral base of our
country. The three main points that are taken up in this draft which will be developed in the sponsorship
speeches that will follow might need explanatory remarks, x x x.
(2) The present requirement, reading and writing, is eliminated and instead a provision is introduced
which says, "No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise
of suffrage;"
The draft before us is in keeping with the trend towards the broadening of the electoral base already
begun with the lowering of the voting age to 18, and it is in keeping further with the Committee's
desire to discontinue the alienation and exclusion of millions of citizens from the political system and
from participation in the political life of the country. The requirement of literacy for voting is eliminated
for it is noted that there are very few countries left in the world where literacy remains a condition for
voting. There is no Southeast Asian country that imposes this requirement. The United States Supreme
Court only a few months ago declared unconstitutional any state law that would continue to impose this
20
requirement for voting.
It is to be noted that all those who testified before the Committee favoured the elimination of the
literacy requirement. It must be stressed that those witnesses represented all levels of society x x x.
Sponsorship Speech of Delegate Ordo�ez
x x x in the process, as we evolve, many and more of our people were left to the sidelines because they
could no longer participate in the process of government simply because their ability to read and write
had become inadequate. This, however, did not mean that they were no longer responsive to the
demands of the times, that they were unsensible to what was happening among them. And so in the
process as years went on, conscious efforts were made to liberate, to free these persons who were
formerly entitled in the course of election by means of whittling away the requirements for the exercise
of the right to vote. First of all, was the property requirement. There were times in the English
constitutional history that it was common to say as an answer to a question, "Who are entitled to vote?"
that the following cannot vote - - criminals, paupers, members of the House of Lords. They were landed
together at the same figurative category.
Eventually, with the wisdom of the times, property requirement was eliminated but the last remaining
vestige which bound the members of the community to ignorance, which was the persistence of this
requirement of literacy remained. And this is again preserved in our Constitution, in our Election Code,
which provides that those who cannot prepare their ballots themselves shall not be qualified to vote.
Unless you remove this literacy test, the cultural minorities, the underprivileged, the urban guerrillas
will forever be outcasts of our society, irresponsive of what is happening. And if this condition were to
continue, my friends, we cannot fully claim that we have representative democracy. Let us reverse the
cycle. Let us eliminate the social imbalance by granting to these persons who are very responsible the
right to participate in the choice of the persons who are to make their laws for them. (Emphases
supplied)
As clarified on interpellation, the phrase "other substantive requirement" carries the same tack as the
other standards alienating particular classes based on socio-economic considerations irrelevant to
suffrage, such as the payment of taxes. Moreover, as particularly noted and as will be later elaborated
on, the phrase did not contemplate any restriction on procedural requirements, such as that of
registration:
DELEGATE DE LOS REYES: On page 2, Line 3, the following appears:
"For other substantive requirement, no literacy[,] property, or other substantive requirement shall be
imposed on the exercise of suffrage."
just what is contemplated in the phrase, "substantive requirement?"
DELEGATE OCCE�A: I can answer that, but it belongs to the sphere of someone else in the Committee.
We use this term as distinguished from procedural requirements. For instance, the law cannot come in
and say that those who should be allowed to vote should have paid certain taxes. That would be a
substantial requirement in addition to what is provided for in the Constitution. But the law can step in as
far as certain procedural requirements are concerned like requiring registration, and also step in as far
as these classifications are concerned.73 (Emphases supplied)
As it finally turned out, the imposition of literacy, property, or other substantive requirement was
proscribed and the following provision on suffrage was adopted74 in the 1973 Constitution:
Section 1. Suffrage shall be exercised by citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who
are eighteen years of age or over, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and
in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the election. No literacy,
property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage. The Batasang

Pambansa shall provide a system for the purpose of securing the secrecy and sanctity of the vote.
(Emphasis supplied)
After deliberating on and eventually, striking down a proposal to exclude literacy requirements from the
limitation,75 the exact provision prohibiting the imposition of "literacy, property, or other substantive
requirement[s]" in the 1973 Constitution was fully adopted in the 1987 Constitution.
Along the contours of this limitation then, Congress, pursuant to Section 118 of Batas Pambansa Bilang
881, or the Omnibus Election Code, among others, imposed the following legal disqualifications:
Section 118. Disqualifications. - The following shall be disqualified from voting:
(a) Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less than one
year, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or granted amnesty: Provided,
however, That any person disqualified to vote under this paragraph shall automatically reacquire the
right to vote upon expiration of five years after service of sentence.
(b) Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by competent court or tribunal of having
committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government such as rebellion, sedition,
violation of the anti-subversion and firearms laws, or any crime against national security, unless restored
to his full civil and political rights in accordance with law: Provided, That he shall regain his right to vote
automatically upon expiration of five years after service of sentence.
(c) Insane or incompetent persons as declared by competent authority.
A "qualification" is loosely defined as "the possession of qualities, properties (such as fitness or capacity)
inherently or legally necessary to make one eligible for a position or office, or to perform a public duty or
function."76
Properly speaking, the concept of a "qualification", at least insofar as the discourse on suffrage is
concerned, should be distinguished from the concept of "registration", which is jurisprudentially
regarded as only the means by which a person's qualifications to vote is determined. In Yra v.
Aba�o,77 citing Meffert v. Brown,78 it was stated that "[t]he act of registering is only one step towards
voting, and it is not one of the elements that makes the citizen a qualified voter [and] one may be a
qualified voter without exercising the right to vote."79 In said case, this Court definitively characterized
registration as a form of regulation and not as a qualification for the right of suffrage:
Registration regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such
right.80 (Emphasis supplied)
As a form of regulation, compliance with the registration procedure is dutifully enjoined. Section 115 of
the Omnibus Election Code provides:
Section 115. Necessity of Registration. - In order that a qualified elector may vote in any election,
plebiscite or referendum, he must be registered in the permanent list of voters for the city or
municipality in which he resides. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, although one is deemed to be a "qualified elector," he must nonetheless still comply with the
registration procedure in order to vote.
As the deliberations on the 1973 Constitution made clear, registration is a mere procedural requirement
which does not fall under the limitation that "[n]o literacy, property, or other substantive requirement
shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage." This was echoed in AKBAYAN-Youth v.
COMELEC81(AKBAYAN-Youth), wherein the Court pronounced that the process of registration is
a procedural limitation on the right to vote. Albeit procedural, the right of a citizen to vote nevertheless
remains conditioned upon it:
Needless to say, the exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other rights, is subject to
existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other
repositories of law. Thus, as to the substantive aspect, Section 1, Article V of the Constitution provides:
21
As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon certain
procedural requirements he must undergo: among others, the process of registration. Specifically, a
citizen in order to be qualified to exercise his right to vote, in addition to the minimum requirements set
by the fundamental charter, is obliged by law to register, at present, under the provisions of Republic Act
No. 8189, otherwise known as the Voters Registration Act of 1996.82 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
RA 8189 primarily governs the process of registration. It defines "registration" as "the act of
accomplishing and filing of a sworn application for registration by a qualified voter before the election
officer of the city or municipality wherein he resides and including the same in the book of registered
voters upon approval by the [ERB]."83 As stated in Section 2 thereof, RA 8189 was passed in order "to
systematize the present method of registration in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and
updated list of voters."
To complement RA 8189 in light of the advances in modern technology, RA 10367, or the assailed
Biometrics Law, was signed into law in February 2013. It built on the policy considerations behind RA
8189 as it institutionalized biometrics validation as part of the registration process:
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. - It is the policy of the State to establish a clean, complete, permanent
and updated list of voters through the adoption of biometric technology.
"Biometrics refers to a quantitative analysis that provides a positive identification of an individual such as
voice, photograph, fingerprint, signature, iris, and/or such other identifiable features."84
Sections 3 and 10 of RA 10367 respectively require registered and new voters to submit themselves for
biometrics validation:
Section 3. Who Shall Submit for Validation. - Registered voters whose biometrics have not been captured
shall submit themselves for validation.
Section 10. Mandatory Biometrics Registration. - The Commission shall implement a mandatory
biometrics registration system for new voters.
Under Section 2 (d) of RA 10367, "validation" is defined as "the process of taking the biometrics of
registered voters whose biometrics have not yet been captured."
The consequence of non-compliance is "deactivation" which "refers to the removal of the registration
record of the registered voter from the corresponding precinct book of voters for failure to comply with
the validation process as required by [RA 10367]."85 Section 7 states:
Section 7. Deactivation. - Voters who fail to submit for validation on or before the last day of filing of
application for registration for purposes of the May 2016 elections shall be deactivated pursuant to this
Act. (Emphases supplied)
Notably, the penalty of deactivation, as well as the requirement of validation, neutrally applies to all
voters. Thus, petitioners' argument that the law creates artificial class of voters86 is more imagined than
real. There is no favor accorded to an "obedient group." If anything, non-compliance by the
"disobedient" only rightfully results into prescribed consequences. Surely, this is beyond the intended
mantle of the equal protection of the laws, which only works "against undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality."87
It should also be pointed out that deactivation is not novel to RA 10367. RA 8189 already provides for
certain grounds for deactivation, of which not only the disqualifications under the Constitution or the
Omnibus Election are listed.
Section 27. Deactivation of Registration. The board shall deactivate the registration and remove the
registration records of the following persons from the corresponding precinct book of voters and place
the same, properly marked and dated in indelible ink, in the inactive file after entering the cause or
causes of deactivation:

a) Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less than one
(1) year, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or amnesty: Provided, however,
That any person disqualified to vote under this paragraph shall automatically reacquire the right to vote
upon expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence as certified by the clerks of courts of the
Municipal/Municipal Circuit/Metropolitan/Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan;
b) Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by a competent court or tribunal of having
caused/committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government such as rebellion,
sedition, violation of the anti-subversion and firearms laws, or any crime against national security, unless
restored to his full civil and political rights in accordance with law; Provided, That he shall regain his right
to vote automatically upon expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence;
c) Any person declared by competent authority to be insane or incompetent unless such disqualification
has been subsequently removed by a declaration of a proper authority that such person is no longer
insane or incompetent;
d) Any person who did not vote in the two (2) successive preceding regular elections as shown by their
voting records. For this purpose, regular elections do not include the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
elections;
e) Any person whose registration has been ordered excluded by the Court; and
f) Any person who has lost his Filipino citizenship.
For this purpose, the clerks of court for the Municipal/Municipal ( Circuit/Metropolitan/Regional Trial
Courts and the Sandiganbayan shall furnish the Election Officer of the city or municipality concerned at
the end of each month a certified list of persons who are disqualified under paragraph (a) hereof, with
their addresses. The Commission may request a certified list of persons who have lost their Filipino
Citizenship or declared as insane or incompetent with their addresses from other government agencies.
The Election Officer shall post in the bulletin board of his office a certified list of those persons whose
registration were deactivated and the reasons therefor, and furnish copies thereof to the local heads of
political parties, the national central file, provincial file, and the voter concerned.
With these considerations in mind, petitioners' claim that biometrics validation imposed under RA
10367, and implemented under COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, must perforce fail. To
reiterate, this requirement is not a "qualification" to the exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere
aspect of the registration procedure, of which the State has the right to reasonably regulate. It was
institutionalized conformant to the limitations of the 1987 Constitution and is a mere complement to the
existing Voter's Registration Act of 1996. Petitioners would do well to be reminded of this Court's
pronouncement in AKBAYAN-Youth, wherein it was held that:
[T]he act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For registration is part
and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in the election process. Thus, contrary to
petitioners' argument, registration cannot and should not be denigrated to the lowly stature of a mere
statutory requirement. Proceeding from the significance of registration as a necessary requisite to the
right to vote, the State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws
to safeguard and regulate the act of voter's registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest,
orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election
activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner - one
which is not indifferent, and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent
circumstances of the times.88 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
22
Thus, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to the level of a literacy, property or other
substantive requirement as contemplated by the Framers of the Constitution - that is, one which
propagates a socio-economic standard which is bereft of any rational basis to a person's ability to
intelligently cast his vote and to further the public good - the same cannot be struck down as
unconstitutional, as in this case.
III.
For another, petitioners assert that biometrics validation gravely violates the Constitution, considering
that, applying the strict scrutiny test, it is not poised with a compelling reason for state regulation and
hence, an unreasonable deprivation of the right to suffrage.89 They cite the case of White Light Corp. v.
City of Manila90 (White Light), wherein the Court stated that the scope of the strict scrutiny test covers
the protection of the right of suffrage.91
Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the regulation passes the strict scrutiny test.
In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard for determining
the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental
freedoms. Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech,
gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal
protection.92 As pointed out by petitioners, the United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope of
strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage, judicial access, and interstate travel.93
Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial,
governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest,94 and
the burden befalls upon the State to prove the same.95
In this case, respondents have shown that the biometrics validation requirement under RA 10367
advances a compelling state interest. It was precisely designed to facilitate the conduct of orderly,
honest, and credible elections by containing - if not eliminating, the perennial problem of having flying
voters, as well as dead and multiple registrants. According to the sponsorship speech of Senator Aquilino
L. Pimentel III, the objective of the law was to cleanse the national voter registry so as to eliminate
electoral fraud and ensure that the results of the elections were truly reflective of the genuine will of the
people.96 The foregoing consideration is unquestionably a compelling state interest.
Also, it was shown that the regulation is the least restrictive means for achieving the above-said interest.
Section 697 of Resolution No. 9721 sets the procedure for biometrics validation, whereby the registered
voter is only required to: (a) personally appear before the Office of the Election Officer; (b) present a
competent evidence of identity; and (c) have his photo, signature, and fingerprints recorded. It is, in
effect, a manner of updating one's registration for those already registered under RA 8189, or a first-
time registration for new registrants. The re-registration process is amply justified by the fact that the
government is adopting a novel technology like biometrics in order to address the bane of electoral
fraud that has enduringly plagued the electoral exercises in this country. While registrants may be
inconvenienced by waiting in long lines or by not being accommodated on certain days due to heavy
volume of work, these are typical burdens of voting that are remedied by bureaucratic improvements to
be implemented by the COMELEC as an administrative institution. By and large, the COMELEC has not
turned a blind eye to these realities. It has tried to account for the exigencies by holding continuous
registration as early as May 6, 2014 until October 31, 2015, or for over a period of 18 months. To make
the validation process as convenient as possible, the COMELEC even went to the extent of setting up off-
site and satellite biometrics registration in shopping malls and conducted the same on
Sundays.98Moreover, it deserves mentioning that RA 10367 and Resolution No. 9721 did not mandate
registered voters to submit themselves to validation every time there is an election. In fact, it only

required the voter to undergo the validation process one (1) time, which shall remain effective in
succeeding elections, provided that he remains an active voter. To add, the failure to validate did not
preclude deactivated voters from exercising their right to vote in the succeeding elections. To rectify
such status, they could still apply for reactivation99 following the procedure laid down in Section 28100 of
RA 8189.
That being said, the assailed regulation on the right to suffrage was sufficiently justified as it was indeed
narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling state interest of establishing a clean, complete, permanent
and updated list of voters, and was demonstrably the least restrictive means in promoting that
interest.101
IV.
Petitioners further aver that RA 10367 and the COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013 violate
the tenets of procedural due process because of the short periods of time between hearings and notice,
and the summary nature of the deactivation proceedings.102
Petitioners are mistaken.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that the COMELEC, through Resolution No. 10013, had directed
EOs to: (a) "[p]ost the lists of voters without biometrics data in the bulletin boards of the City/Municipal
hall, Office of the Election Officer and in the barangay hall along with the notice of ERB hearing;" and (b)
[s]end individual notices to the affected voters included in the generated list of voters without
biometrics data.103 The same Resolution also accords concerned individuals the opportunity to file their
opposition/objection to the deactivation of VRRs not later than November 9, 2015 in accordance with
the period prescribed in Section 4,104 Chapter I, Resolution No. 9853. Meanwhile, Resolution Nos. 9721
and 9863 respectively state that "[d]eactivation x x x shall comply with the requirements on posting, ERB
hearing and service of individual notices to the deactivated voters,"105 and that the "Reactivation for
cases falling under this ground shall be made during the November 16, 2015 Board hearing."106 While the
proceedings are summary in nature, the urgency of finalizing the voters' list for the upcoming May 2016
Elections calls for swift and immediate action on the deactivation of VRRs of voters who fail to comply
with the mandate of RA 10367. After all, in the preparation for the May 2016 National and Local
Elections, time is of the essence. The summary nature of the proceedings does not depart from the fact
that petitioners were given the opportunity to be heard.
Relatedly, it deserves emphasis that the public has been sufficiently informed of the implementation of
RA 10367 and its deactivation feature. RA 10367 was duly published as early as February 22, 2013,107 and
took effect fifteen (15) days after.108 Accordingly, dating to the day of its publications, all are bound to
know the terms of its provisions, including the consequences of non-compliance. As implemented, the
process of biometrics validation commenced on July 1, 2013, or approximately two and a half (2 1/2)
years before the October 31, 2015 deadline. To add, the COMELEC conducted a massive public
information campaign, i.e., NoBio-NoBoto, from May 2014 until October 31, 2015, or a period of
eighteen (18) months, whereby voters were reminded to update and validate their registration records.
On top of that, the COMELEC exerted efforts to make the validation process more convenient for the
public as it enlisted the assistance of malls across Metro Manila to serve as satellite registration centers
and declared Sundays as working days for COMELEC offices within the National Capital Region and in
highly urbanized cities.109 Considering these steps, the Court finds that the public has been sufficiently
apprised of the implementation of RA 10367, and its penalty of deactivation in case of failure to comply.
Thus, there was no violation of procedural due process.
V.
23
Petitioners aver that the poor experience of other countries - i.e., Guatemala, Britain, Cote d'lvoire,
Uganda, and Kenya - in implementing biometrics registration should serve as warning in adhering to the
system. They highlighted the inherent difficulties in launching the same such as environmental and
geographical challenges, lack of training and skills, mechanical breakdown, and the need for re-
registration. They even adrnitted that while biometrics may address electoral fraud caused by multiple
registrants, it does not, however, solve other election-related problems such as vote-buying and source-
code manipulation.110
Aside from treading on mere speculation, the insinuations are improper. Clearly, petitioners' submissions
principally assail the wisdom of the legislature in adopting the biometrics registration system in curbing
electoral fraud. In this relation, it is significant to point out that questions relating to the wisdom,
morality, or practicability of statutes are policy matters that should not be addressed to the judiciary. As
elucidated in the case of Fari�as v. The Executive Secretary:111
[P]olicy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of
the political branches of the government. It is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of
legislative determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on
sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short,
the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are
matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious, conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring
them within the range of judicial cognizance.112 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In the exercise of its legislative power, Congress has a wide latitude of discretion to enact laws, such as
RA 10367, to combat electoral fraud which, in this case, was through the establishment of an updated
voter registry. In making such choices to achieve its desired result, Congress has necessarily sifted
through the policy's wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse.113 Whether
RA 10367 was wise or unwise, or was the best means in curtailing electoral fraud is a question that does
not present a justiciable issue cognizable by the courts. Indeed, the reason behind the legislature's
choice of adopting biometrics registration notwithstanding the experience of foreign countries, the
difficulties in its implementation, or its concomitant failure to address equally pressing election
problems, is essentially a policy question and, hence, beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny.
VI.
Finally, petitioners' proffer that Resolution No. 9863 which fixed the deadline for validation on October
31, 2015 violates Section 8 of RA 8189 which states:
Section 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. - The personal filing of application of registration
of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular office hours. No
registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days
before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election. (Emphasis added.)
The position is, once more, wrong.
Aside from committing forum shopping by raising this issue despite already being subject of a prior
petition filed before this Court, i.e., G.R. No. 220918,114 petitioners fail to consider that the 120- and 90-
day periods stated therein refer to the prohibitive period beyond which voter registration may no longer
be conducted. As already resolved in this Court's Resolution dated December 8, 2015 in G.R. No. 220918,
the subject provision does not mandate COMELEC to conduct voter registration up to such time; rather,
it only provides a period which may not be reduced, but may be extended depending on the
administrative necessities and other exigencies.115 Verily, as the constitutional body tasked to enforce
and implement election laws, the COMELEC has the power to promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to fulfil its mandate.116 Perforce, this power includes the determination of the periods to
accomplish certain pre-election acts,117 such as voter registration.
 24

At this conclusory juncture, this Court reiterates that voter registration does not begin and end with the ISSUES:
filing of applications which, in reality, is just the initial phase that must be followed by the approval of
applications by the ERB.118 Thereafter, the process of filing petitions for inclusion and exclusion follows. Whether or not the statutory requirement of biometrics validation is an unconstitutional requirement of
These steps are necessary for the generation of the1 final list of voters which, in turn, is a pre-requisite literacy and property.
for the preparation and completion of the Project of Precincts (POP) that is vital for the actual elections.
The POP contains the number of registered voters in each precinct and clustered precinct, the names of
Whether or not biometrics validation passes the strict scrutiny test.
the barangays, municipalities, cities, provinces, legislative districts, and regions included in the precincts,
and the names and locations of polling centers where each precinct and clustered precinct are
assigned.119 The POP is necessary to determine the total number of boards of election inspectors to be Whether or not Resolution No. 9863 which fixed the deadline for validation on October 31, 2015 violates
constituted, the allocation of forms and supplies to be procured for the election day, the number of vote Section 8 of RA 8189.
counting machines and other paraphernalia to be deployed, and the budget needed. More importantly,
the POP will be used as the basis for the fmalization of the Election Management System (EMS) which HELD:
generates the templates of the official ballots and determines the voting jurisdiction of legislative
districts, cities, municipalities, and provinces.120 The EMS determines the configuration of the canvassing FIRST ISSUE:
and consolidation system for each voting jurisdiction. Accordingly, as the constitutional body specifically
charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of No. The Court held that biometrics validation is not a “qualification” to the exercise of the right of
an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall,121 the COMELEC should be given sufficient
suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of which the State has the right to reasonably
leeway in accounting for the exigencies of the upcoming elections. In fine, its measures therefor should
be respected, unless it is clearly shown that the same are devoid of any reasonable justification. regulate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED due to lack of merit. The temporary restraining order issued by The Court reiterated their ruling in several cases that registration regulates the exercise of the right of
this Court on December 1, 2015 is consequently DISSOLVED. suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right. The process of registration is a procedural limitation on
the right to vote.
SO ORDERED.
Thus, although one is deemed to be a “qualified elector,” he must nonetheless still comply with the
TOPIC: Biometrics validation
registration procedure in order to vote.

FACTS:
Thus, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to the level of a literacy, property or other
substantive requirement as contemplated by the Framers of the Constitution -that is, one which
RA 10367 mandates the COMELEC to implement a mandatory biometrics registration system for new
propagates a socio-economic standard which is bereft of any rational basis to a person’s ability to
voters in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent, and updated list of voters through the
intelligently cast his vote and to further the public good -the same cannot be struck down as
adoption of biometric technology.
unconstitutional, as in this case.
RA 10367 likewise directs that “registered voters whose biometrics have not been captured shall submit
SECOND ISSUE:
themselves for validation.” “Voters who fail to submit for validation on or before the last day of filing of
application for registration for purposes of the May 2016 elections shall be deactivated.
Yes. In applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial,
governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest, and the
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9721 as amended by Resolutions No. 9863 and 10013. Among others,
burden befalls upon the State to prove the same.
the said Resolution provides that: “the registration records of voters without biometrics data who failed
to submit for validation on or before the last day of filing of applications for registration for the purpose
Presence of compelling state interest
of the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections shall be deactivated.
Respondents have shown that the biometrics validation requirement under RA 10367 advances a
Herein petitioners filed the instant petition with application for temporary restraining order (TRO)
compelling state interest. It was precisely designed to facilitate the conduct of orderly, honest, and
and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPI) assailing the constitutionality of the biometrics
credible elections by containing -if not eliminating, the perennial problem of having flying voters, as well
validation requirement imposed under RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and
as dead and multiple registrants. The foregoing consideration is unquestionably a compelling state
10013, all related thereto.
interest.

Biometrics validation is the least restrictive means for achieving the above-said interest
 25

Section 6 of Resolution No. 9721 sets the procedure for biometrics validation, whereby the registered
voter is only required to: (a) personally appear before the Office of the Election Officer; (b) present a
competent evidence of identity; and (c) have his photo, signature, and fingerprints recorded.

Moreover, RA 10367 and Resolution No. 9721 did not mandate registered voters to submit themselves
to validation every time there is an election. In fact, it only required the voter to undergo the validation
process one (1) time, which shall remain effective in succeeding elections, provided that he remains an
active voter.

Lastly, the failure to validate did not preclude deactivated voters from exercising their right to vote in the
succeeding elections. To rectify such status, they could still apply for reactivation.

THIRD ISSUE:

No. Section 8 of RA 8189 provides that:

System of Continuing Registration of Voters. – x x x No registration shall, however, be conducted during

the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before
a special election.

The Court held that the 120-and 90-day periods stated therein refer to the prohibitive period beyond
which voter registration may no longer be conducted. The subject provision does not mandate COMELEC
to conduct voter registration up to such time; rather, it only provides a period which may not be
reduced, but may be extended depending on the administrative necessities and other exigencies.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 190793 June 19, 2012
MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Rule 37, Section 1 of the Commission of Elections
(COMELEC) Rules of Procedure,1 in relation to Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Resolutions dated 26 October 2009 and 4 January 2010 issued by the COMELEC in SPP Case No. 09-073
(PP).2
On 2 July 2009, Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration with the
COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a regional political party based in the National
Capital Region (NCR) for participation in the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections.3 In the Petition,
MAGDALO was represented by its Chairperson, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, and its Secretary General,
Francisco Ashley L. Acedillo (Acedillo).4 The Petition was docketed as SPP No. 09-073 (PP) and raffled to
the Second Division of the COMELEC (COMELEC–Second Division).5
In its Order dated 24 August 2009, the COMELEC–Second Division directed MAGDALO to cause the
publication of the Petition for Registration and the said Order in three daily newspapers of general
circulation, and set the hearing thereof on 3 September 2009.6 In compliance therewith, MAGDALO
caused the publication of both documents in HATAW! No. 1 sa Balita, Saksi sa Balita and BOMBA BALITA
(Saksi sa Katotohanan).7
On 3 September 2009, a hearing was conducted in which MAGDALO (a) established its compliance with
the jurisdictional requirements; (b) presented Acedillo as its witness; and (c) marked its documentary
evidence in support of its Petition for Registration. The following day, MAGDALO filed its Formal Offer of
Evidence.8
On 26 October 2009, the COMELEC–Second Division issued its Resolution denying the Petition for
Registration filed by MAGDALO.9 The relevant portions of the assailed Resolution read:
Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago should be refused registration in accordance with Art. IX-C, Section 2(5) of
the Constitution. It is common knowledge that the party’s organizer and Chairman, Senator Antonio F.
Trillanes IV, and some members participated in the take-over of the Oakwood Premier Apartments in
Ayala Center, Makati City on July 27, 2003, wherein several innocent civilian personnel were held
hostage. This and the fact that they were in full battle gear at the time of the mutiny clearly show their
purpose in employing violence and using unlawful means to achieve their goals in the process defying
the laws of organized societies. x x x
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Petition is hereby DENIED.
26
SO ORDERED.10 (Emphasis supplied.)
On 3 November 2009, MAGDALO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was elevated to the
COMELEC En Banc for resolution.11
Meanwhile, on 27 November 2009, MAGDALO filed a Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-
List System of Representation in the 10 May 2010 Elections (Manifestation of Intent), in which it stated
that its membership includes "[f]ormer members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Anti-
Corruption Advocates, Reform-minded citizens."12 Thereafter, on 30 November 2009, it filed its Amended
Manifestation, which bore the following footnote: 13
With all due respect to the Honorable Commission, the MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO ("MAGDALO")
manifests that the instant MANIFESTATION is being filed ex abutanti (sic) cautelam (out of the
abundance of caution) only and subject to the outcome of the resolution of the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Magdalo in SPP No. 09-073 (PP) from the Resolution dated 26 October 2009 of
the Second Division of the Honorable Commission denying its Petition for Registration/Accreditation as a
Political Party based in the National Capital Region [NCR], which motion is still pending the (sic)
Honorable Commission En Banc. It is not in any way intended to preempt the ruling of the Honorable
Commission but merely to preserve the possibility of pursuing the Party’s participation in the Party-List
System of Representation in the eventuality that their Petition is approved.
Thereafter, MAGDALO filed a Manifestation and Motion for Early Resolution dated 23 December 2009, in
which it clarified its intention to participate in the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections as a party-
list group.14
In its assailed Resolution dated 4 January 2010, the COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by MAGDALO.15
In the instant Petition, MAGDALO argues that (a) the COMELEC Resolutions were not based on the
record or evidence presented; (b) the Resolutions preempted the decision of the trial court in Criminal
Case No. 03-2784, in which several members of the military are being tried for their involvement in the
siege of the Oakwood Premier Apartments (Oakwood); and (c) it has expressly renounced the use of
force, violence and other forms of unlawful means to achieve its goals. Thus, MAGDALO prays for this
Court to: (a) reverse and set aside the 26 October 2009 and 4 January 2010 COMELEC Resolutions; (b)
grant its Petition for Registration; and (c) direct the COMELEC to issue a Certificate of Registration.16 The
Petition likewise includes a prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and/or Injunctive Relief to direct the COMELEC to allow MAGDALO to
participate in the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections.17 However, this Court denied the issuance of
a TRO in its Resolution dated 2 February 2010.18
To support the grant of reliefs prayed for, MAGDALO puts forward the following arguments:
The findings of the assailed resolutions on the basis of which the Petition was denied are based on pure
speculation. The Resolutions speculated as to the alleged motives and/or intentions of the founders of
petitioner Magdalo, which claims are not based on evidence but on mere conjecture and pure baseless
presuppositions;

The assailed Resolutions effectively preempted the court trying the case. The subject Resolutions unfairly
jumped to the conclusion that the founders of the Magdalo "committed mutiny", "held innocent civilian
personnel as hostage", "employed violence" and "use[d] unlawful means" and "in the process defied the
laws of organized society" purportedly during the Oakwood incident when even the court trying their
case, [Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Makati City], Branch 148, has not yet decided
the case against them;
– and –
The Resolution violates the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of founders of the Magdalo
and their basic right of to [sic] due process of law.19
On the other hand, the COMELEC asserts that it had the power to ascertain the eligibility of MAGDALO
for registration and accreditation as a political party.20 It contends that this determination, as well as that
of assessing whether MAGDALO advocates the use of force, would entail the evaluation of evidence,
which cannot be reviewed by this Court in a petition for certiorari.21
However, MAGDALO maintains that although it concedes that the COMELEC has the authority to assess
whether parties applying for registration possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
under the applicable law, the latter nevertheless committed grave abuse of discretion in basing its
determination on pure conjectures instead of on the evidence on record.22
Preliminary to the examination of the substantive issues, it must be discussed whether this case has
been rendered moot and academic by the conduct of the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections.
Although the subject Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO was intended for the elections on even
date, it specifically asked for accreditation as a regional political party for purposes of subsequent
elections.23
Moreover, even assuming that the registration was only for the 10 May 2010 National and Local
Elections, this case nevertheless comes under the exceptions to the rules on mootness, as explained in
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo:24
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally,
courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in
resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave
violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved; third, when [the] constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.25 (Emphasis supplied.)
The second and fourth exceptions are clearly present in the case at bar. The instant action brings to the
fore matters of public concern, as it challenges the very notion of the use of violence or unlawful means
as a ground for disqualification from party registration. Moreover, considering the expressed intention of
MAGDALO to join subsequent elections, as well as the occurrence of supervening events pertinent to the
27
case at bar, it remains prudent to examine the issues raised and resolve the arising legal questions once
and for all.
Having established that this Court can exercise its power of judicial review, the issue for resolution is
whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the Petition for Registration filed by
MAGDALO on the ground that the latter seeks to achieve its goals through violent or unlawful means.
This Court rules in the negative, but without prejudice to MAGDALO’s filing anew of a Petition for
Registration.
The COMELEC has a constitutional and statutory mandate to ascertain the eligibility of parties and
organizations to participate in electoral contests. The relevant portions of the 1987 Constitution read:
ARTICLE VI – LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided
by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations.
ARTICLE IX – CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
C. The Commission on Elections
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition
to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens’
arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those
which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to
this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused
registration. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Echoing these constitutional provisions, Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (BP 881), otherwise known as the
Omnibus Election Code, states:
Sec. 60. Political party. – "Political party" or "party," when used in this Act, means an organized group of
persons pursuing the same ideology, political ideals or platforms of government and includes its
branches and divisions. To acquire juridical personality, qualify it for subsequent accreditation, and to
entitle it to the rights and privileges herein granted to political parties, a political party shall first be
duly registered with the Commission. Any registered political party that, singly or in coalition with
others, fails to obtain at least ten percent of the votes cast in the constituency in which it nominated and
supported a candidate or candidates in the election next following its registration shall, after notice and
hearing, be deemed to have forfeited such status as a registered political party in such constituency.

Sec. 61. Registration. – Any organized group of persons seeking registration as a national or regional
political party may file with the Commission a verified petition attaching thereto its constitution and by-
laws, platforms or program of government and such other relevant information as may be required by
the Commission. The Commission shall after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within ten days
from the date it is submitted for decision. No religious sect shall be registered as a political party and no
political party which seeks to achieve its goal through violence shall be entitled to
accreditation. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, Republic Act No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, reads in part:
Section 2. Declaration of policy. The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-
defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party
system in order to attain the broadcast possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in
the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature,
and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in
the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition
of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, to join electoral contests, a party or organization must undergo the two-step process of
registration and accreditation, as this Court explained in Liberal Party v. COMELEC:26
x x x Registration is the act that bestows juridical personality for purposes of our election laws;
accreditation, on the other hand, relates to the privileged participation that our election laws grant to
qualified registered parties.
x x x Accreditation can only be granted to a registered political party, organization or coalition; stated
otherwise, a registration must first take place before a request for accreditation can be made. Once
registration has been carried out, accreditation is the next natural step to follow.27 (Emphasis supplied.)
Considering the constitutional and statutory authority of the COMELEC to ascertain the eligibility of
parties or organizations seeking registration and accreditation, the pertinent question now is whether its
exercise of this discretion was so capricious or whimsical as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. In view of
the facts available to the COMELEC at the time it issued its assailed Resolutions, this Court rules that
respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
A. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in taking judicial notice of the Oakwood
incident.
28
MAGDALO contends that it was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to have denied the Petition
for Registration not on the basis of facts or evidence on record, but on mere speculation and
conjectures.28 This argument cannot be given any merit.
Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may be taken of matters that are of "public knowledge, or are
capable of unquestionable demonstration."29 Further, Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Revised Administrative Code, specifically empowers administrative agencies to admit and give probative
value to evidence commonly acceptable by reasonably prudent men, and to take notice of judicially
cognizable facts.30 Thus, in Saludo v. American Express,31 this Court explained as follows:
The concept of "facts of common knowledge" in the context of judicial notice has been explained as
those facts that are "so commonly known in the community as to make it unprofitable to require proof,
and so certainly known x x x as to make it indisputable among reasonable men."32
This Court has, in a string of cases, already taken judicial notice of the factual circumstances surrounding
the Oakwood standoff. 33 The incident involved over 300 heavily armed military officers and enlisted men
– led by the founding members of MAGDALO – who surreptitiously took over Oakwood in the wee hours
of 27 July 2003. They disarmed the security guards and planted explosive devices around the building
and within its vicinity. They aired their grievances against the administration of former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (former President Arroyo), withdrew their support from the government, and called
for her resignation, as well as that of her cabinet members and of the top officials of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). After the ensuing negotiations for
these military agents to lay down their weapons, defuse the explosives and return to the barracks, the
debacle came to a close at 11:00 p.m. on the same day.34 That the Oakwood incident was widely known
and extensively covered by the media made it a proper subject of judicial notice. Thus, the COMELEC did
not commit grave abuse of discretion when it treated these facts as public knowledge,35 and took
cognizance thereof without requiring the introduction and reception of evidence thereon.
B. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding that MAGDALO uses violence or
unlawful means to achieve its goals.
In the instant Petition, MAGDALO claims that it did not resort to violence when it took over Oakwood
because (a) no one, either civilian or military, was held hostage; (b) its members immediately evacuated
the guests and staff of the hotel; and (c) not a single shot was fired during the incident.36 These
arguments present a very narrow interpretation of the concepts of violence and unlawful means, and
downplays the threat of violence displayed by the soldiers during the takeover.
Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions that "seek
to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means" shall be denied registration. This
disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which provides that "no political party which seeks
to achieve its goal through violence shall be entitled to accreditation."
Violence is the unjust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the accompaniment of vehemence,
outrage or fury.37 It also denotes physical force unlawfully exercised; abuse of force; that force which is
employed against common right, against the laws, and against public liberty.38 On the other hand, an
unlawful act is one that is contrary to law and need not be a crime, considering that the latter must still
unite with evil intent for it to exist.39

In the present case, the Oakwood incident was one that was attended with violence. As publicly
announced by the leaders of MAGDALO during the siege, their objectives were to express their
dissatisfaction with the administration of former President Arroyo, and to divulge the alleged corruption
in the military and the supposed sale of arms to enemies of the state.40 Ultimately, they wanted the
President, her cabinet members, and the top officials of the AFP and the PNP to resign.41 To achieve
these goals, MAGDALO opted to seize a hotel occupied by civilians, march in the premises in full battle
gear with ammunitions, and plant explosives in the building. These brash methods by which MAGDALO
opted to ventilate the grievances of its members and withdraw its support from the government
constituted clear acts of violence.
The assertions of MAGDALO that no one was held hostage or that no shot was fired42 do not mask its use
of impelling force to take over and sustain the occupation of Oakwood. Neither does its express
renunciation of the use of force, violence and other unlawful means in its Petition for Registration and
Program of Government43 obscure the actual circumstances surrounding the encounter. The deliberate
brandishing of military power, which included the show of force, use of full battle gear, display of
ammunitions, and use of explosive devices, engendered an alarming security risk to the public. At the
very least, the totality of these brazen acts fomented a threat of violence that preyed on the
vulnerability of civilians. The COMELEC did not, therefore, commit grave abuse of discretion when it
treated the Oakwood standoff as a manifestation of the predilection of MAGDALO for resorting to
violence or threats thereof in order to achieve its objectives.
C. The finding that MAGDALO seeks to achieve its goals through violence or unlawful means did not
operate as a prejudgment of Criminal Case No. 03-2784.
MAGDALO contends that the finding of the COMELEC that the former pursues its goals through violence
or unlawful means was tantamount to an unwarranted verdict of guilt for several crimes, which in effect,
preempted the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 03-2784 and violated the right to presumption of
innocence.44 This argument cannot be sustained.
The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61 of BP 881 in the
COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups to participate in the elections
is purely administrative in character.45 In exercising this authority, the COMELEC only has to assess
whether the party or organization seeking registration or accreditation pursues its goals by employing
acts considered as violent or unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in nature. Although this process does
not entail any determination of administrative liability, as it is only limited to the evaluation of
qualifications for registration, the ruling of this Court in Quarto v. Marcelo46 is nonetheless analogously
applicable:
An administrative case is altogether different from a criminal case, such that the disposition in the
former does not necessarily result in the same disposition for the latter, although both may arise from
the same set of facts. The most that we can read from the finding of liability is that the respondents have
been found to be administratively guilty by substantial evidence – the quantum of proof required in an
administrative proceeding. The requirement of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure…that the
proposed witness should not appear to be the "most guilty" is obviously in line with the character and
purpose of a criminal proceeding, and the much stricter standards observed in these cases. They are
standards entirely different from those applicable in administrative proceedings.47(Emphasis supplied.)
Further, there is a well-established distinction between the quantum of proof required for administrative
proceedings and that for criminal actions, to wit:
29
As an administrative proceeding, the evidentiary bar against which the evidence at hand is measured is
not the highest quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt, requiring moral certainty to support
affirmative findings. Instead, the lowest standard of substantial evidence, that is, such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion, applies.48 (Emphasis omitted.)
In the case at bar, the challenged COMELEC Resolutions were issued pursuant to its administrative
power to evaluate the eligibility of groups to join the elections as political parties, for which the
evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence is applicable. In finding that MAGDALO resorts to violence
or unlawful acts to fulfil its organizational objectives, the COMELEC did not render an assessment as to
whether the members of petitioner committed crimes, as respondent was not required to make that
determination in the first place. Its evaluation was limited only to examining whether MAGDALO
possessed all the necessary qualifications and none of disqualifications for registration as a political
party. In arriving at its assailed ruling, the COMELEC only had to assess whether there was substantial
evidence adequate to support this conclusion.
On the other hand, Criminal Case No. 03-2784 is a criminal action charging members of MAGDALO with
coup d’état following the events that took place during the Oakwood siege. As it is a criminal case, proof
beyond reasonable doubt is necessary. Therefore, although the registration case before the COMELEC
and the criminal case before the trial court may find bases in the same factual circumstances, they
nevertheless involve entirely separate and distinct issues requiring different evidentiary thresholds. The
COMELEC correctly ruled thus:
It is at once apparent that that [sic] the proceedings in and the consequent findings of the Commission
(Second Division) in the subject resolution did not pre-empt the trial and decision of the court hearing
the cases of the Magdalo members. These are two different processes. The proceedings in the
Commission is [sic] a petition for registration of Magdalo as a political party and the Commission is
empowered to ascertain facts and circumstances relative to this case. It is not criminal in nature unlike
the court case of the Magdalo founders. Thus, the Second Division did not violate the right of the
Magdalo founders to be presumed innocent until proven guilty when it promulgated the questioned
resolution. There is likewise no violation of due process. Accreditation as a political party is not a right
but only a privilege given to groups who have qualified and met the requirements provided by law.49
It is unmistakable from the above reasons that the ruling of the COMELEC denying the Petition for
Registration filed by MAGDALO has not, as respondent could not have, preempted Criminal Case No. 03-
2784 or violated the right of petitioner’s members to a presumption of innocence.
Subsequent Grant of Amnesty to the Military Personnel involved in the Oakwood standoff
It must be clarified that the foregoing discussion finding the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the COMELEC is based on the facts available to it at the time it issued the assailed 26 October
2009 and 4 January 2010 Resolutions. It is crucial to make this qualification, as this Court recognizes the
occurrence of supervening events that could have altered the COMELEC’s evaluation of the Petition for
Registration filed by MAGDALO. The assessment of the COMELEC could have changed, had these
incidents taken place before the opportunity to deny the Petition arose. In the same manner that this
Court takes cognizance of the facts surrounding the Oakwood incident, it also takes judicial notice of the
grant of amnesty in favor of the soldiers who figured in this standoff.
This Court, in People v. Patriarca,50 explained the concept of amnesty, to wit:

Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political offenses,
or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have offended, by some
breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense
itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person released by
amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
In the case of People vs. Casido, the difference between pardon and amnesty is given:
"Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and
proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by
Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the courts
should take judicial notice. x x x"51 (Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution,52 President Benigno S. Aquino III issued on 24
November 2010 Proclamation No. 75,53 which reads in part:
GRANTING AMNESTY TO ACTIVE AND FORMER PERSONNEL OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE AND THEIR SUPPORTERS WHO MAY HAVE COMMITTED CRIMES
PUNISHABLE UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, THE ARTICLES OF WAR AND OTHER LAWS IN
CONNECTION WITH THE OAKWOOD MUTINY, THE MARINES STAND-OFF AND THE PENINSULA MANILA
HOTEL INCIDENT
WHEREAS, it is recognized that certain active and former personnel of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and their supporters have or may have committed
crimes punishable under the Revised Penal Code, the Articles of War and other laws in connection with,
in relation or incident to the July 27, 2003 Oakwood Mutiny, the February 2006 Marines Stand-Off and
the November 29, 2007 Manila Pen Incident;
WHEREAS, there is a clamor from certain sectors of society urging the President to extend amnesty to
said AFP personnel and their supporters;
WHEREAS, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution expressly vests the President the power to grant
amnesty;
WHEREAS, the grant of amnesty in favor of the said active and former personnel of the AFP and PNP and
their supporters will promote an atmosphere conducive to the attainment of a just, comprehensive and
enduring peace and is in line with the Government’s peace and reconciliation initiatives;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by Section 19, Article VII of the Philippine Constitution, do hereby DECLARE and PROCLAIM:
SECTION 1. Grant of Amnesty. – Amnesty is hereby granted to all active and former personnel of the AFP
and PNP as well as their supporters who have or may have committed crimes punishable under the
Revised Penal Code, the Articles of War or other laws in connection with, in relation or incident to the
July 27, 2003 Oakwood Mutiny, the February 2006 Marines Stand-Off and the November 29, 2007
Manila Peninsula Incident who shall apply therefor; Provided that amnesty shall not cover rape, acts of
torture, crimes against chastity and other crimes committed for personal ends.
30
SECTION 4. Effects. – (a) Amnesty pursuant to this proclamation shall extinguish any criminal liability for
acts committed in connection, incident or related to the July 27, 2003 Oakwood Mutiny, the February
2006 Marines Stand-Off and the November 29, 2007 Peninsula Manila Hotel Incident without prejudice
to the grantee’s civil liability for injuries or damages caused to private persons.
(b) Except as provided below, the grant of amnesty shall effect the restoration of civil and
political rights or entitlement of grantees that may have been suspended, lost or adversely
affected by virtue of any executive, administrative or criminal action or proceedings against
the grantee in connection with the subject incidents, including criminal conviction or (sic) any
form, if any.
(c) All enlisted personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines with the rank of up to
Technical Sergeant and personnel of the PNP with the rank of up to Senior Police Officer 3,
whose applications for amnesty would be approved shall be entitled to reintegration or
reinstatement, subject to existing laws and regulations. However, they shall not be entitled to
back pay during the time they have been discharged or suspended from service or unable to
perform their military or police duties.
(d) Commissioned and Non-commissioned officers of the AFP with the rank of Master
Sergeant and personnel of the PNP with the rank of at least Senior Police Officer 4 whose
application for amnesty will be approved shall not be entitled to remain in the service,
reintegration or reinstatement into the service nor back pay.
(e) All AFP and PNP personnel granted amnesty who are not reintegrated or reinstated shall
be entitled to retirement and separation benefits, if qualified under existing laws and
regulation, as of the time [of] separation, unless they have forfeited such retirement benefits
for reasons other than the acts covered by this Proclamation. Those reintegrated or
reinstated shall be entitled to their retirement and separation benefit[s] upon their actual
retirement. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thereafter, the House of Representatives and the Senate adopted Concurrent Resolution No. 4 on 13
and 14 December 2010, respectively.54 Relevant portions of the Resolution partly read:
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION CONCURRING WITH PROCLAMATION NO. 75 OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES DATED 24 NOVEMBER 2010 ENTITLED "GRANTING AMNESTY TO ACTIVE
AND FORMER PERSONNEL OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
AND THEIR SUPPORTERS WHO MAY HAVE COMMITTED CRIMES PUNISHABLE UNDER THE REVISED PENAL
CODE, THE ARTICLES OF WAR AND OTHER LAWS IN CONNECTION WITH THE OAKWOOD MUTINY, THE
MARINES STAND-OFF AND THE PENINSULA MANILA HOTEL INCIDENT
WHEREAS, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution provides that the President shall have the power to
grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of Congress;
WHEREAS, both Houses of Congress share the view of the President that in order to promote an
atmosphere conducive to the attainment of a just, comprehensive and enduing peace and in line with
the Government’s peace and reconciliation initiatives, there is a need to declare amnesty in favor of the
said active and former personnel of the AFP and PNP and their supporters;

WHEREAS, it is the sense of both House of Congress that it is imperative that an amnesty partaking the
nature proclaimed by His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, is necessary for the general
interest of the Philippines; xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
In light of the foregoing, to still sustain the finding, based on the participation of its members in the
Oakwood incident, that MAGDALO employs violence or other harmful means would be inconsistent with
the legal effects of amnesty. Likewise, it would not be in accord with the express intention of both the
Executive and the Legislative branches, in granting the said amnesty, to promote an atmosphere
conducive to attaining peace in line with the government’s peace and reconciliation initiatives.
Nevertheless, this Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions of the COMELEC as regards the use of
violence.1awp++i1Thus, should MAGDALO decide to file another Petition for Registration, its officers
must individually execute affidavits renouncing the use of violence or other harmful means to achieve
the objectives of their organization. Further, it must also be underscored that the membership of
MAGDALO cannot include military officers and/or enlisted personnel in active service, as this act would
run counter to the express provisions of the Constitution:
ARTICLE XVI – GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 5. (1) All members of the armed forces shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and defend
this Constitution.
(3) Professionalism in the armed forces and adequate remuneration and benefits of its members shall be
a prime concern of the State. The armed forces shall be insulated from partisan politics.
No member of the military shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity, except to
vote.1âwphi1
(4) No member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed or designated in
any capacity to a civilian position in the Government including government-owned or controlled
corporations or any of their subsidiaries. (Emphasis supplied.)
This Court finds that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the Petition for
Registration filed by MAGDALO. However, in view of the subsequent amnesty granted in favor of the
members of MAGDALO, the events that transpired during the Oakwood incident can no longer be
interpreted as acts of violence in the context of the disqualifications from party registration.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The 26 October 2009 and 4 January 2010 Resolutions of
the Commission on Elections are hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice to the filing anew of a Petition for
Registration by MAGDALO.
SO ORDERED.
Magdalo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012
TOPIC: Composition of Congress, Qualifications of Members, and Term of Office
31
DOCTRINE: The registration of political parties does not involve administrative liability as it is only
limited to the evaluation of qualifications for registration.
FACTS:
On 2 July 2009, Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration with the
COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a regional political party based in the NCR for
participation in the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections. In the Petition, MAGDALO was
represented by its Chairperson, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, and its Secretary General, Francisco
Ashley L. Acedillo (Acedillo).
On 26 October 2009, the COMELEC denied the Petition for Registration as it was not in accordance with
Art. IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution. It is common knowledge that the party’s organizer and
Chairman, and some members participated in the take-over of the Oakwood Premier Apartments in
Ayala Center, Makati City on July 27, 2003, wherein several innocent civilian personnel were held
hostage. This and the fact that they were in full battle gear at the time of the mutiny clearly show their
purpose in employing violence and using unlawful means to achieve their goals in the process defying
the laws of organized societies.
MAGDALO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc for
resolution. MAGDALO also filed a Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of
Representation in the 10 May 2010 Elections, in which it stated that its membership includes former
members of the AFP, Anti-Corruption Advocates, Reform-minded citizens. They filed an Amended
Manifestation, and in which they manifest that the instant MANIFESTATION is being filed ex abutanti
(sic) cautelam (out of the abundance of caution) only and subject to the outcome of the resolution of the
Motion for Reconsideration that is still pending. It is not in any way intended to preempt the ruling of the
Commission but merely to preserve the possibility of pursuing the Partys participation in the Party-List
System of Representation in the eventuality that their Petition is approved.
The COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration. In the instant Petition, MAGDALO argues
that the findings of the assailed resolutions on the basis of which the Petition was denied are based on
pure speculation. The assailed Resolutions effectively preempted the court trying the case. The subject
Resolutions unfairly jumped to the conclusion that the founders of the Magdalo committed mutiny, held
innocent civilian personnel as hostage, employed violence and used unlawful means and in the process
defied the laws of organized society purportedly during the Oakwood incident when even the court
trying their case, (RTC Makati) has not yet decided the case against them; and the Resolution violates the
constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of founders of the Magdalo and their basic right of to
due process of law.
On the other hand, the COMELEC asserts that it had the power to ascertain the eligibility of MAGDALO
for registration and accreditation as a political party. It contends that this determination, as well as that
of assessing whether MAGDALO advocates the use of force, would entail the evaluation of evidence,
which cannot be reviewed by this Court in a petition for certiorari.
However, MAGDALO maintains that although it concedes that the COMELEC has the authority to assess
whether parties applying for registration possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
under the applicable law, the latter nevertheless committed grave abuse of discretion in basing its
determination on pure conjectures instead of on the evidence on record.
ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the Petition for Registration filed by
MAGDALO on the ground that the latter seeks to achieve its goals through violent or unlawful means.

HELD: NO
This Court rules in the negative, but without prejudice to MAGDALOs filing anew of a Petition for
Registration. The COMELEC has a constitutional and statutory mandate to ascertain the eligibility of
parties and organizations to participate in electoral contests. The relevant portions of the 1987
Constitution read:
ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided
by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations.
ARTICLE IX CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
C. The Commission on Elections
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to
other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens arms
of the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which
seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this
Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.
x x x.
RA No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, reads in part:
Thus, to join electoral contests, a party or organization must undergo the two-step process of
registration and accreditation, as this Court explained in Liberal Party v. COMELEC:
x x x Registration is the act that bestows juridical personality for purposes of our election laws;
accreditation, on the other hand, relates to
the privileged participation that our election laws grant to qualified registered parties.
x x x Accreditation can only be granted to a registered political party, organization or coalition; stated
otherwise, a registration must first take place before a request for accreditation can be made. Once
registration has been carried out, accreditation is the next natural step to follow.
Considering the constitutional and statutory authority of the COMELEC to ascertain the eligibility of
parties or organizations seeking registration and accreditation, the pertinent question now is whether its
exercise of this discretion was so capricious or whimsical as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. In view of
the facts available to the COMELEC at the time it issued its assailed Resolutions, this Court rules that
respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
A. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in taking judicial notice of the Oakwood
incident.
MAGDALO contends that it was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to have denied the Petition
for Registration not on the basis of facts or evidence on record, but on mere speculation and
conjectures. This argument cannot be given any merit. Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may be
taken of matters that are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration. Further,
Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code, specifically empowers
administrative agencies to admit and give probative value to evidence commonly acceptable by
32
reasonably prudent men, and to take notice of judicially cognizable facts. Thus, in Saludo v. American
Express,this Court explained as follows:
The concept of facts of common knowledge in the context of judicial notice has been explained as those
facts that are so commonly known in the community as to make it unprofitable to require proof, and so
certainly known x x x as to make it indisputable among reasonable men.
The Oakwood incident was widely known and extensively covered by the media made it a proper subject
of judicial notice. Thus, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it treated these
facts as public knowledge, and took cognizance thereof without requiring the introduction and reception
of evidence thereon.
B. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding that MAGDALO uses violence or
unlawful means to achieve its goals.
In the instant Petition, MAGDALO claims that it did not resort to violence when it took over Oakwood
because (a) no one, either civilian or military, was held hostage; (b) its members immediately evacuated
the guests and staff of the hotel; and (c) not a single shot was fired during the incident.
Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions that seek
to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means shall be denied registration. This
disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which provides that no political party which seeks
to achieve its goal through violence shall be entitled to accreditation.
Violence is the unjust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the accompaniment of vehemence,
outrage or fury. It also denotes physical force unlawfully exercised; abuse of force; that force which is
employed against common right, against the laws, and against public liberty. The Oakwood incident was
one that was attended with violence. As publicly announced by the leaders of MAGDALO during the
siege, their objectives were to express their dissatisfaction with the administration of former President
Arroyo, and to divulge the alleged corruption in the military and the supposed sale of arms to enemies of
the state. Ultimately, they wanted the President, her cabinet members, and the top officials of the AFP
and the PNP to resign. To achieve these goals, MAGDALO opted to seize a hotel occupied by civilians,
march in the premises in full battle gear with ammunitions, and plant explosives in the building. These
brash methods by which MAGDALO opted to ventilate the grievances of its members and withdraw its
support from the government constituted clear acts of violence.
The assertions of MAGDALO that no one was held hostage or that no shot was fired do not mask its use
of impelling force to take over and sustain the occupation of Oakwood. Neither does its express
renunciation of the use of force, violence and other unlawful means in its Petition for Registration and
Program of Government obscure the actual circumstances surrounding the encounter. The deliberate
brandishing of military power, which included the show of force, use of full battle gear, display of
ammunitions, and use of explosive devices, engendered an alarming security risk to the public. At the
very least, the totality of these brazen acts fomented a threat of violence that preyed on the
vulnerability of civilians. The COMELEC did not, therefore, commit grave abuse of discretion when it
treated the Oakwood standoff as a manifestation of the predilection of MAGDALO for resorting to
violence or threats thereof in order to achieve its objectives.
C. The finding that MAGDALO seeks to achieve its goals through violence or unlawful means did not
operate as a prejudgment of Criminal Case No. 03-2784.
MAGDALO contends that the finding of the COMELEC that the former pursues its goals through violence
or unlawful means was tantamount to an unwarranted verdict of guilt for several crimes, which in effect,
preempted the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 03-2784 and violated the right to presumption of
innocence. This argument cannot be sustained.
 33

The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61 of BP 881 in the
COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups to participate in the elections
is purely administrative in character. In exercising this authority, the COMELEC only has to assess
whether the party or organization seeking registration or accreditation pursues its goals by employing
acts considered as violent or unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in nature. Although this process
does not entail any determination of administrative liability, as it is only limited to the evaluation of
qualifications for registration, the ruling of this Court in Quarto v. Marcelo is nonetheless analogously
applicable:
An administrative case is altogether different from a criminal case, such that the disposition in the
former does not necessarily result in the same disposition for the latter, although both may arise from
the same set of facts. The most that we can read from the finding of liability is that the respondents
have been found to be administratively guilty by substantial evidence the quantum of proof required
in an administrative proceeding. The requirement of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that the
proposed witness should not appear to be the most guilty is obviously in line with the character and
purpose of a criminal proceeding, and the much stricter standards observed in these cases. They are
standards entirely different from those applicable in administrative proceedings.
Further, there is a well-established distinction between the quantum of proof required for administrative
proceedings and that for criminal actions, to wit:
As an administrative proceeding, the evidentiary bar against which the evidence at hand is measured is
not the highest quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt, requiring moral certainty to support
affirmative findings. Instead, the lowest standard of substantial evidence, that is, such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion, applies.
The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in
resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave
violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved; third, when [the] constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.
The second and fourth exceptions are clearly present in the case at bar. The instant action brings to the
fore matters of public concern, as it challenges the very notion of the use of violence or unlawful means
as a ground for disqualification from party registration. Moreover, considering the expressed intention of
MAGDALO to join subsequent elections, as well as the occurrence of supervening events pertinent to the
case at bar, it remains prudent to examine the issues raised and resolve the arising legal questions once
and for all.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The 26 October 2009 and 4 January 2010 Resolutions of
the Commission on Elections are hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice to the filing anew of a Petition for
Registration by MAGDALO.

In the case at bar, the challenged COMELEC Resolutions were issued pursuant to its administrative
power to evaluate the eligibility of groups to join the elections as political parties, for which the
evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence is applicable. In finding that MAGDALO resorts to violence
or unlawful acts to fulfill its organizational objectives, the COMELEC did not render an assessment as to
whether the members of petitioner committed crimes, as respondent was not required to make that
determination in the first place. Its evaluation was limited only to examining whether MAGDALO
possessed all the necessary qualifications and none of disqualifications for registration as a political
party. In arriving at its assailed ruling, the COMELEC only had to assess whether there was substantial
evidence adequate to support this conclusion.

On the other hand, Criminal Case No. 03-2784 is a criminal action charging members of MAGDALO with
coup dtat following the events that took place during the Oakwood siege. As it is a criminal case, proof
beyond reasonable doubt is necessary. Therefore, although the registration case before the COMELEC
and the criminal case before the trial court may find bases in the same factual circumstances, they
nevertheless involve entirely separate and distinct issues requiring different evidentiary thresholds.

This Court finds that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the Petition for
Registration filed by MAGDALO. However, in view of the subsequent amnesty granted in favor of the
members of MAGDALO, the events that transpired during the Oakwood incident can no longer be
interpreted as acts of violence in the context of the disqualifications from party registration.

*Issue on Mootness
whether this case has been rendered moot and academic by the conduct of the 10 May 2010 National
and Local Elections. Although the subject Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO was intended for
the elections on even date, it specifically asked for accreditation as a regional political party for purposes
of subsequent elections.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 193237 October 9, 2012
DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and AGAPITO J. CARDINO, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
These are two special civil actions for certiorari1 questioning the resolutions of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) in SPA No. 09-076 (DC). In G.R. No. 193237, Dominador G. Jalosjos, Jr. (Jalosjos)
seeks to annul the 10 May 2010 Resolution2 of the COMELEC First Division and the 11 August 2010
Resolution3 of the COMELEC En Banc, which both ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy
on the ground of false material representation. In G.R. No. 193536, Agapito J. Cardino (Cardino)
challenges the 11 August 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, which applied the rule on succession
under the Local Government Code in filling the vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of Dapitan City,
Zamboanga del Norte created by the cancellation of Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy.
The Facts
Both Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte in the May
2010 elections. Jalosjos was running for his third term. Cardino filed on 6 December 2009 a petition
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to deny due course and to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of Jalosjos. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos made a false material representation in his
certificate of candidacy when he declared under oath that he was eligible for the Office of Mayor.
Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed his certificate of candidacy, Jalosjos had already been
convicted by final judgment for robbery and sentenced to prisión mayor by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 18 (RTC) of Cebu City, in Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-140-CEBU. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos has
not yet served his sentence. Jalosjos admitted his conviction but stated that he had already been granted
probation. Cardino countered that the RTC revoked Jalosjos’ probation in an Order dated 19 March 1987.
Jalosjos refuted Cardino and stated that the RTC issued an Order dated 5 February 2004 declaring that
Jalosjos had duly complied with the order of probation. Jalosjos further stated that during the 2004
elections the COMELEC denied a petition for disqualification filed against him on the same grounds.4
The COMELEC En Banc narrated the circumstances of Jalosjos’ criminal record as follows:
As backgrounder, Jalosjos and three (3) others were accused of the crime of robbery on January 22, 1969
in Cebu City. On April 30, 1970, Judge Francisco Ro. Cupin of the then Circuit Criminal Court of Cebu City
found him and his co-accused guilty of robbery and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of prision
correccional minimum to prision mayor maximum. Jalosjos appealed this decision to the Court of
Appeals but his appeal was dismissed on August 9, 1973. It was only after a lapse of several years or
more specifically on June 17, 1985 that Jalosjos filed a Petition for Probation before the RTC Branch 18 of
Cebu City which was granted by the court. But then, on motion filed by his Probation Officer, Jalosjos’
probation was revoked by the RTC Cebu City on March 19, 1987 and the corresponding warrant for his
34
arrest was issued. Surprisingly, on December 19, 2003, Parole and Probation Administrator Gregorio F.
Bacolod issued a Certification attesting that respondent Jalosjos, Jr., had already fulfilled the terms and
conditions of his probation. This Certification was the one used by respondent Jalosjos to secure the
dismissal of the disqualification case filed against him by Adasa in 2004, docketed as SPA No. 04-235.
This prompted Cardino to call the attention of the Commission on the decision of the Sandiganbayan
dated September 29, 2008 finding Gregorio F. Bacolod, former Administrator of the Parole and Probation
Administration, guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 for issuing a falsified Certification on
December 19, 2003 attesting to the fact that respondent Jalosjos had fully complied with the terms and
conditions of his probation. A portion of the decision of the Sandiganbayan is quoted hereunder:
The Court finds that the above acts of the accused gave probationer Dominador Jalosjos, Jr.,
unwarranted benefits and advantage because the subject certification, which was issued by the accused
without adequate or official support, was subsequently utilized by the said probationer as basis of the
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and to Lift Warrant of Arrest that he filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, which prompted the said court to issue the Order dated February 5, 2004 in Crim.
Case No. CCC-XIV-140-CEBU, declaring that said probationer has complied with the order of probation
and setting aside its Order of January 16, 2004 recalling the warrant or [sic] arrest; and that said
Certification was also used by the said probationer and became the basis for the Commission on
Elections to deny in its Resolution of August 2, 2004 the petition or [sic] private complainant James
Adasa for the disqualification of the probationer from running for re-election as Mayor of Dapitan City in
the National and Local Elections of 2004.5
The COMELEC’s Rulings
On 10 May 2010, the COMELEC First Division granted Cardino’s petition and cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate
of candidacy. The COMELEC First Division concluded that "Jalosjos has indeed committed material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy when he declared, under oath, that he is eligible for the
office he seeks to be elected to when in fact he is not by reason of a final judgment in a criminal case, the
sentence of which he has not yet served."6 The COMELEC First Division found that Jalosjos’ certificate of
compliance of probation was fraudulently issued; thus, Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence. The
penalty imposed on Jalosjos was the indeterminate sentence of one year, eight months and twenty days
of prisión correccional as minimum, to four years, two months and one day of prisión mayor as
maximum. The COMELEC First Division ruled that Jalosjos "is not eligible by reason of his disqualification
as provided for in Section 40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160."7
On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc denied Jalosjos’ motion for reconsideration. The pertinent
portions of the 11 August 2010 Resolution read:
With the proper revocation of Jalosjos’ earlier probation and a clear showing that he has not yet served
the terms of his sentence, there is simply no basis for Jalosjos to claim that his civil as well as political
rights have been violated. Having been convicted by final judgment,
Jalosjos is disqualified to run for an elective position or to hold public office. His proclamation as the
elected mayor in the May 10, 2010 election does not deprive the Commission of its authority to resolve
the present petition to its finality, and to oust him from the office he now wrongfully holds.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied for utter lack of merit.
Jalosjos is hereby OUSTED from office and ordered to CEASE and DESIST from occupying and discharging

the functions of the Office of the Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga. Let the provisions of the Local
Government Code on succession apply.
SO ORDERED.8
Jalosjos filed his petition on 25 August 2010, docketed as G.R. No. 193237, while Cardino filed his
petition on 17 September 2010, docketed as G.R. No. 193536.
On 22 February 2011, this Court issued a Resolution dismissing G.R. No. 193237.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The assailed
Resolution dated May 10, 2010 and Resolution dated August 11, 2010 of the Commission on Elections in
SPA Case No. 09-076 (DC) are hereby AFFIRMED.9
Cardino filed a Manifestation on 17 March 2011 praying that this Court take judicial notice of its
resolution in G.R. No. 193237. Jalosjos filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 on 22 March 2011. On 29
March 2011, this Court resolved11 to consolidate G.R. No. 193536 with G.R. No. 193237.Jalosjos then filed
a Manifestation on 1 June 2012 which stated that "he has resigned from the position of Mayor of the
City of Dapitan effective 30 April 2012, which resignation was accepted by the Provincial Governor of
Zamboanga del Norte, Atty. Rolando E. Yebes."12 Jalosjos’ resignation was made "in deference with the
provision of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to his candidacy as Provincial Governor of Zamboanga
del Sur in May 2013."13
These cases are not rendered moot by Jalosjos’ resignation. In resolving Jalosjos’ Motion for
Reconsideration in G.R. No. 193237 and Cardino’s Petition in G.R. No. 193536, we address not only
Jalosjos’ eligibility to run for public office and the consequences of the cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy, but also COMELEC’s constitutional duty to enforce and administer all laws relating to the
conduct of elections.
The Issues
In G.R. No. 193237, Jalosjos argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it (1) ruled that Jalosjos’ probation was revoked; (2) ruled that Jalosjos
was disqualified to run as candidate for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte; and (3) cancelled
Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy without making a finding that Jalosjos committed a deliberate
misrepresentation as to his qualifications, as Jalosjos relied in good faith upon a previous COMELEC
decision declaring him eligible for the same position from which he is now being ousted. Finally, the
Resolutions dated 10 May 2010 and 11 August 2010 were issued in violation of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.
In G.R. No. 193536, Cardino argues that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it added to the dispositive portion of its 11 August 2010 Resolution
that the provisions of the Local Government Code on succession should apply.
This Court’s Ruling
35
The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal conviction by final
judgment is a material fact involving eligibility which is a proper ground for a petition under Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code. Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was void from the start since he was not
eligible to run for any public office at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy. Jalosjos was never a
candidate at any time, and all votes for Jalosjos were stray votes. As a result of Jalosjos’ certificate of
candidacy being void ab initio, Cardino, as the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest
number of votes for the position of Mayor.
The dissenting opinions affirm with modification the 10 May 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division and the 11 August 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc. The dissenting opinions
erroneously limit the remedy against Jalosjos to disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code and apply the rule on succession under the Local Government Code.
A false statement in a certificate of candidacy that a candidate is eligible to run for public office is a false
material representation which is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the same Code. Sections 74
and 78 read:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. – The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person
filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if
for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized
city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status;
his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation;
that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the
obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion;
and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. – A verified petition seeking
to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false.
The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his certificate of candidacy "that he is eligible for
said office." A candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the public office.14 If a candidate is not
actually eligible because he is barred by final judgment in a criminal case from running for public office,
and he still states under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then
the candidate clearly makes a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section
78.
A sentence of prisión mayor by final judgment is a ground for disqualification under Section 40 of the
Local Government Code and under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. It is also a material fact
involving the eligibility of a candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, a
person can file a petition under Section 40 of the Local Government Code or under either Section 12 or
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The pertinent provisions read:
Section 40, Local Government Code:

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside
abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
Section 12, Omnibus Election Code:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. — Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any
offense for which he was sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given
plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration
by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of
a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes
disqualified.
Section 68, Omnibus Election Code:
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared
by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money
or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing
electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any
contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85,
86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of
or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code,
unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
36
Revised Penal Code:
Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. — x x x
Prisión mayor and temporary disqualification. — The duration of the penalties of prisión mayor and
temporary disqualification shall be from six years and one day to twelve years, except when the penalty
of disqualification is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, it shall be that of the principal
penalty.
Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. — The penalties of
perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held,
even if conferred by popular election.
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be
elected to such office.
3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of the
rights mentioned.
In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs 2
and 3 of this article shall last during the term of the sentence.
4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held.
Art. 31. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification. — The penalties of
perpetual or temporary special disqualification for public office, profession or calling shall produce the
following effects:
1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected.
2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either perpetually or during
the term of the sentence, according to the extent of such disqualification.
Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the
right of suffrage. — The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of
suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the
nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be elected to
such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of
his disqualification.
Art. 42. Prisión mayor — its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prisión mayor shall carry with it that of
temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of
suffrage which the offender shall suffer although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same
shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphasis supplied)

The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law,15 the accessory penalties
of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification. Under Article 30 of the
Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right
to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office." The duration of the
temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty. On the other hand,
under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code perpetual special disqualification means that "the offender
shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification," which is
perpetually. Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute
ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run
for elective public office, and commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of
candidacy that he is eligible to so run.
In Lacuna v. Abes,16 the Court, speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explained the import of the
accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification:
On the first defense of respondent-appellee Abes, it must be remembered that appellee’s conviction of a
crime penalized with prisión mayor which carried the accessory penalties of temporary absolute
disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage (Article 42, Revised Penal
Code); and Section 99 of the Revised Election Code disqualifies a person from voting if he had been
sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year or more of imprisonment.
The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the convict for public office and
for the right to vote, such disqualification to last only during the term of the sentence (Article 27,
paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised Penal Code) that, in the case of Abes, would have expired on 13
October 1961.
But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. This accessory penalty deprives the convict of the
right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually, as distinguished from temporary special
disqualification, which lasts during the term of the sentence. Article 32, Revised Penal Code, provides:
Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the
right of suffrage. — The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of
suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the
nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be elected to
such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of
disqualification.
The word "perpetually" and the phrase "during the term of the sentence" should be applied
distributively to their respective antecedents; thus, the word "perpetually" refers to the perpetual kind
of special disqualification, while the phrase "during the term of the sentence" refers to the temporary
special disqualification. The duration between the perpetual and the temporary (both special) are
necessarily different because the provision, instead of merging their durations into one period, states
that such duration is "according to the nature of said penalty" — which means according to whether the
penalty is the perpetual or the temporary special disqualification. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, Lacuna instructs that the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification "deprives the
convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually."
37
The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately once the judgment
of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of this accessory penalty does not depend on the duration of
the principal penalty, or on whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not. The last sentence of
Article 32 states that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of
his perpetual special disqualification." Once the judgment of conviction becomes final, it is immediately
executory. Any public office that the convict may be holding at the time of his conviction becomes vacant
upon finality of the judgment, and the convict becomes ineligible to run for any elective public office
perpetually. In the case of Jalosjos, he became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run for, any elective
public office from the time his judgment of conviction became final.
Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which means that the convict is not eligible to run
for public office, contrary to the statement that Section 74 requires him to state under oath. As used in
Section 74, the word "eligible" means having the right to run for elective public office, that is, having all
the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for public office. As this Court held in Fermin v.
Commission on Elections,17 the false material representation may refer to "qualifications or eligibility."
One who suffers from perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to run for public office. If a person
suffering from perpetual special disqualification files a certificate of candidacy stating under oath that
"he is eligible to run for (public) office," as expressly required under Section 74, then he clearly makes a
false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. As this Court explained in
Fermin:
Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the
lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false,
which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that
the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the
OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or
eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that
is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate.
Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding
under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with
the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition
for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate.18 (Emphasis supplied)
Conviction for robbery by final judgment with the penalty of prisión mayor, to which perpetual special
disqualification attaches by operation of law, is not a ground for a petition under Section 68 because
robbery is not one of the offenses enumerated in Section 68. Insofar as crimes are concerned, Section 68
refers only to election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code and not to crimes under the Revised
Penal Code. For ready reference, we quote again Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code:
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared
by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money
or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing
electoral functions;
(b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount
in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under
Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k,
v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected,
from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country
 38

shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his
status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis supplied)
There is absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68 that will justify including the crime of robbery
as one of the offenses enumerated in this Section. All the offenses enumerated in Section 68 refer to
offenses under the Omnibus Election Code. The dissenting opinion of Justice Reyes gravely errs when it
holds that Jalosjos’ conviction for the crime of robbery under the Revised Penal Code is a ground for "a
petition for disqualification under Section 68 of the OEC and not for cancellation of COC under Section 78
thereof." This Court has already ruled that offenses punished in laws other than in the Omnibus Election
Code cannot be a ground for a petition under Section 68. In Codilla, Sr. v. de Venecia,19 the Court
declared:
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in Section 68 of
the Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC
jurisdiction.They are criminal and not administrative in nature. (Emphasis supplied)
one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections – Cardino – who received the highest
number of votes.
Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-placer is
disqualified or declared ineligible22 should be limited to situations where the certificate of candidacy of
the first-placer was valid at the time of filing but subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation
of law that took place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing of the certificate of
candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person who filed such void
certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at any time. All votes for such non-
candidate are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a first-
placer in the elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the
day, of the election, prevailing jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes.23 If a
certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the elections, all votes for such
candidate should also be stray votes because the certificate of candidacy is void from the very beginning.
This is the more equitable and logical approach on the effect of the cancellation of a certificate of
candidacy that is void ab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of candidacy void ab initio can operate to defeat
one or more valid certificates of candidacy for the same position.

A candidate for mayor during the 2010 local elections certifies under oath four statements: (1) a
Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or under
statement that the candidate is a natural born or naturalized Filipino citizen; (2) a statement that the
Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of
candidate is not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country; (3) a statement that the
candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run for
candidate is eligible for the office he seeks election; and (4) a statement of the candidate’s allegiance to
public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is notice to the
the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.20
COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for public office. The law itself bars the
convict from running for public office, and the disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction.
We now ask: Did Jalosjos make a false statement of a material fact in his certificate of candidacy when The final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other
he stated under oath that he was eligible to run for mayor? The COMELEC and the dissenting opinions all government agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the law.
found that Jalosjos was not eligible to run for public office. The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos made a
false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. The dissenting opinion of
Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the disqualification,
Justice Reyes, however, concluded that the ineligibility of Jalosjos is a disqualification which is a ground
it is assumed that the portion of the final judgment on disqualification to run for elective public office is
for a petition under Section 68 and not under Section 78. The dissenting opinion of Justice Brion
addressed to the COMELEC because under the Constitution the COMELEC is duty bound to "enforce and
concluded that the ineligibility of Jalosjos is a disqualification that is not a ground under Section 78
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election."24 The disqualification of a
without, however, saying under what specific provision of law a petition against Jalosjos can be filed to
convict to run for public office under the Revised Penal Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a
cancel his certificate of candidacy.
competent court, is part of the enforcement and administration of "all laws" relating to the conduct of
elections.
What is indisputably clear is that the false material representation of Jalosjos is a ground for a petition
under Section 78. However, since the false material representation arises from a crime penalized by
To allow the COMELEC to wait for a person to file a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of one
prisión mayor, a petition under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of the Local
suffering from perpetual special disqualification will result in the anomaly that these cases so
Government Code can also be properly filed. The petitioner has a choice whether to anchor his petition
grotesquely exemplify. Despite a prior perpetual special disqualification, Jalosjos was elected and served
on Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or on Section 40 of the Local Government
twice as mayor. The COMELEC will be grossly remiss in its constitutional duty to "enforce and administer
Code. The law expressly provides multiple remedies and the choice of which remedy to adopt belongs to
all laws" relating to the conduct of elections if it does not motu proprio bar from running for public office
the petitioner.
those suffering from perpetual special disqualification by virtue of a final judgment.

The COMELEC properly cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy. A void certificate of candidacy on the
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 193237 is DENIED, and the Petition in G.R. No.
ground of ineligibility that existed at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy can never give
193536 is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated 10 May 2010 and 11 August 2010 of the COMELEC First
rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes.21 Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was cancelled
Division and the COMELEC En Bane, respectively, in SPA No. 09-076 (DC), are AFFIRMED with the
because he was ineligible from the start to run for Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is
MODIFICATION that Agapito J. Cardino ran unopposed in the May 2010 elections and thus received the
cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he
highest number of votes for Mayor. The COMELEC En Bane is DIRECTED to constitute a Special City Board
was never a valid candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio.
of Canvassers to proclaim Agapito J. Cardino as the duly elected Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del
Jalosjos’ ineligibility existed on the day he filed his certificate of candidacy, and the cancellation of his
Norte.
certificate of candidacy retroacted to the day he filed it. Thus, Cardino ran unopposed. There was only

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Secretaries of the Department of Justice and the Department
of Interior and Local Government so they can cause the arrest of, and enforce the jail sentence on,
Dominador G. Jalosjos, Jr. due to his conviction for the crime of robbery in a final judgment issued by the
Regional Trial Court (Branch 18) of Cebu City in Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-140-CEBU.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to Australia and acquired Australian
citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he returned to the Philippines and lived with his brother in
Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and was issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He then
renounced his Australian citizenship in September 2009.
He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for registration as voter in the Municipality
of Ipil. His application was opposed by the Barangay Captain of Veterans Village, Dan Erasmo, sr. but was
eventually granted by the ERB.
A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was then filed by Erasmo before the
MCTC. Said petition was denied. It was then appealed to the RTC who also affirmed the lower court's
decision.
On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay
Province. Erasmo filed a petition to deny or cancel said COC on the ground of failure to comply with R.A.
9225 and the one year residency requirement of the local government code.
COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency requirement of a gubernatorial
candidate and failed to show ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil.
COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his
domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
RULING:
The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a
resident of the province for at least one year before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the
requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to
reside in a particular place but must also have personal presence in such place coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention.
The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has laid down the following
guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that
domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.
39
It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos has met the
residency requirement for provincial governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.
Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be taken for granted that he
effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of
eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia became his
domicile by operation of law and by choice.
When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is
evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his
Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued
a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos
forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has
since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his
domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would
violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere.
The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely been
staying at his brother’s house. But this circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the
Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house in a community to establish
his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a
rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house where he
lives would make property a qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two
things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.
Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same village where he lived and a
fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed correspondences with political leaders,
including local and national party-mates, from where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a registered voter of
Ipil by final judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Sibugay.
While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative bodies like the COMELEC, this
does not prevent it from exercising its review powers to correct palpable misappreciation of evidence or
wrong or irrelevant considerations. The evidence Jalosjos presented is sufficient to establish Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in holding otherwise.
Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga Sibugay. The
Court will respect the decision of the people of that province and resolve all doubts regarding his
qualification in his favor to breathe life to their manifest will.
Court GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC.
 40

FACTS:

Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City on October 26, 1973. He migrated to Australia in 1981 when
he was eight years old and there acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he
decided to return to the Philippines and lived with his brother in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Four days
upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, hence, he was issued a
Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. On September 1, 2009
he renounced his Australian citizenship, executing a sworn renunciation of the same in compliance with
Republic Act (R.A.) 9225. From the time of his return, Jalosjos acquired a residential property in the same
village where he lived. He applied for registration as a voter in the Municipality of Ipil but respondent
Erasmo, the Barangay Captain, opposed the said act. Election Registration Board approved it and
included Jalosjos’ name in the COMELEC voters list. Erasmo filed before the MTC a petition for the
exclusion of Jalosjos’ name from the official voters list. MTC denied Erasmo’s petition. He appealed to
RTC but RTC ruled same as MTC’s. On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC)
for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province for the May 10, 2010 elections. Erasmo filed a petition to
deny due course or to cancel Jalosjos’ COC on the ground that Jalosjos made material misrepresentation
in the same since he failed to comply with (1) the requirements of R.A. 9225 and (2) the one-year
residency requirement of the Local Government Code. COMELEC ruled against Jalosjos, because it failed
to comply with the 1-year residency ruequirement. Jalosjos won the elections

ISSUE: w/n Jalosjos failed to comply with the 1-year residency requirement

HELD:

Yes. It is clear from the facts that Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place of his birth. His
domicile was changed from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight,
acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia became his domicile by
operation of law and by choice. But, when he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his
brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for
good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country.
In addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the
Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving
that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 136351 July 28, 1999
JOEL G. MIRANDA, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO M. ABAYA and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
EN BANC
MELO, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction questioning the resolution of the Comelec En Banc dated December 8,
1998 in SPA Case No. 98-288 which disposed:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered to:
1. AMEND and RECTIFY the dispositive portion of the Resolution of the Commission (First
Division) in SPA No. 98-019 promulgated on May 5, 1998, to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (First Division) GRANTS the
Petition. Respondent JOSE "PEMPE" MIRANDA's certificate of candidacy for the
position of mayor of Santiago City in the May 11, 1998 national and local elections
is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE AND/OR CANCELLED.
SO ORDERED.
2. ANNUL the election and proclamation of respondent JOEL G. MIRANDA as mayor of
Santiago City in the May 11, 1998 election and CANCEL the Certificate of Canvass and
Proclamation (C.E. form 25) issued therefor;
3. DIRECT THE City board of Canvassers of Santiago City to RECONVENE, PREPARE a new
certificate of canvass & proclamation and PROCLAIM the winning candidate among those
voted upon as the duly elected mayor of Santiago City in the May 11, 1998 election; and
4. DIRECT the Clerk of Court of the Commission to furnish copies of this Decision to the Office
of the President of the Philippines; the Department of Interior and Local Government; the
Department of Finance, and the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Santiago City.
SO ORDERED.
The aforementioned resolution dated December 8, 1998 reversed and set aside the earlier resolution of
the First Division of the Comelec dated May 16, 1998, dismissing private respondent's petition to declare
the substitution of Jose "Pempe" Miranda by petitioner as candidate for the City of Santiago's mayoralty
post void.
41
Briefly, the pertinent factual backdrop is summarized as follows:
On March 24, 1998, Jose "Pempe" Miranda, then incumbent mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, filed his
certificate of candidacy for the same mayoralty post for the synchronized May 11, 1998 elections.
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Antonio M. Abaya filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy (pp. 26-33, Rollo), which was docketed as SPA No. 98-019. The petition
was GRANTED by the Comelec in its resolution dated May 5, 1998 (pp. 36-43, Rollo). The Comelec further
ruled to DISQUALIFY Jose "Pempe" Miranda.
On May 6, 1998, way beyond the deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy, petitioner Joel G. Miranda
filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty post, supposedly as a substitute for his father, Jose
"Pempe" Miranda.
During the May 11, 1998 elections; petitioner and private respondent vied for the mayoralty seat, with
petitioner garnering 22,002 votes, 1,666 more votes than private respondent who got only 20,336 votes.
On May 13, 1998, private respondent filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void Substitution with Prayer
for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, which was docketed
as SPA No. 98-288. He prayed for the nullification of petitioner's certificate of candidacy for being
void ab initio because the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda, whom petitioner was
supposed to substitute, had already been cancelled and denied due course.
On May 16, 1998, Comelec's First Division dismissed SPA No. 98-288 motu proprio (pp. 57-61, Rollo).
Private respondent moved for reconsideration (pp. 62-72, Rollo). On December 8, 1998, the Comelec En
Banc rendered the assailed decision aforequoted, resolving to GRANT the motion for reconsideration,
thus nullifying the substitution by petitioner Joel G. Miranda of his father as candidate for the mayoralty
post of Santiago City.
On December 9, 1998, petitioner sought this Court's intercession via a petition for certiorari, with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. On December 11,
1998, the Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order and to require respondents to comment
on the petition. On December 14, 1998, private respondent filed his Comment (pp. 140-187 and 188-
234, Rollo) and on February 16, 1999, the Comelec, through its counsel, the Solicitor General, filed its
Comment (pp. 254-265, Rollo). The Court required petitioner to file a consolidated reply within 10 days
from notice, but petitioner twice asked for an extension of the period. Without granting the motions for
extension of time to file consolidated reply, the Court decided to resolve the controversy in favor of
petitioner.
Tersely, the issues in the present case may be summarized as follows:
1. Whether the annulment of petitioner's substitution and proclamation was issued without jurisdiction
and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction; and
2. Whether the order of the Comelec directing the proclamation of the private respondent was issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
 42

The Court finds neither lack of jurisdiction nor grave abuse of discretion attended the annulment of the persons whose certificates of candidacy have been denied due course and/or cancelled under the
substitution and proclamation of petitioner. provisions of Section 78 of the Code.

On the matter of jurisdiction, there is no question that the case at hand is within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Comelec. As early as in Herrera vs. Barretto (25 Phil, 245 [1913]), this Court had
occasion to apply the following principles:
Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause — the right to act in a case. Since it
is the power to hear and determine, it does not depend either upon the regularity of the
exercise of that power or upon the rightfulness of the decision made. Jurisdiction should
therefore be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a cause at
all, and not the decision rendered therein, is what makes up jurisdiction. Where there is
jurisdiction over the subject matter, as we have said before, the decision of all other
questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction.
More importantly, under the express provisions of Section 77 of the Code, not just any person, but only
"an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party" may be substituted. In Bautista
vs. Comelec (G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998) this Court explicitly ruled that "a cancelled certificate
does not give rise to a valid candidacy" (p.13).
A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a candidate in much the same
way as any person who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all can not, by any stretch of the
imagination, be a candidate at all.
The law clearly provides:

Sec. 73. Certificate of candidacy — No person shall be eligible for any elective public office
On the issue of soundness of the disposition in SPA No. 98-288, the Court finds that the Comelec's action
unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.
nullifying the substitution by and proclamation of petitioner for the mayoralty post of Santiago City,
Isabela is proper and legally sound.
By its express language, the foregoing provision of law is absolutely mandatory. It is but logical to say
that any person who attempts to run for an elective office but does not file a certificate of candidacy, is
Petitioner insists that the substitution at bar is allowed under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code
not a candidate at all. No amount of votes would catapult him into office. In Gador vs. Comelec (95 SCRA
which provides:
431 [1980]), the Court held that a certificate of candidacy filed beyond the period fixed by law is void,
and the person who filed it is not, in law, a candidate. Much in the same manner as a person who filed
Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal. — If after the last day for no certificate of candidacy at all and a person who filed it out of time, a person whose certificate of
the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited candidacy is cancelled or denied due course is no candidate at all. No amount of votes should entitle him
political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and to the elective office aspired for.
certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the
candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the
The evident purposes of the law in requiring the filing of certificates of candidacy and in fixing the time
political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in
limit therefor are: (a) to enable the voters to know, at least sixty days before the regular election, the
accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of the day of the election. If
candidates among whom they are to make the choice, and (b) to avoid confusion and inconvenience in
the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election
the tabulation of the votes cast. For if the law did not confine the choice or election by the voters to the
and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election
duly registered candidates, there might be as many persons voted for as there are voters, and votes
inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to
might be cast even for unknown or fictitious persons as a mark to identify the votes in favor of a
be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission.
candidate for another office in the same election. (Monsale vs. Nice, 83 Phil. 758 [1949]).

Petitioner capitalizes on the fact that the Comelec ruled to disqualify Jose "Pempe" Miranda in the May
It is at once evident that the importance of a valid certificate of candidacy rests at the very core of the
5, 1998 resolution and he heavily relies upon the above-quoted provision allowing substitution of a
electoral process. It cannot be taken lightly, lest there be anarchy and chaos. Verily, this explains why the
candidate who has been disqualified for any cause.
law provides for grounds for the cancellation and denial of due course to certificates of candidacy.

While there is no dispute as to whether or not a nominee of a registered or accredited political party
After having considered the importance of a certificate of candidacy, it can be readily understood why
may substitute for a candidate of the same party who had been disqualified for any cause, this does not
in Bautista we ruled that a person with a cancelled certificate is no candidate at all. Applying this
include those cases where the certificate of candidacy of the person to be substituted had been denied
principle to the case at bar and considering that Section 77 of the Code is clear and unequivocal that only
due course and cancelled under Section 78 of the Code.
an official candidate of a registered or accredited party may be substituted, there demonstrably cannot
be any possible substitution of a person whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled and denied
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. While the law enumerated the occasions where a candidate may be due course.
validly substituted, there is no mention of the case where a candidate is excluded not only by
disqualification but also by denial and cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. Under the foregoing
Also, under ejusdem generis rule, where a general word or phrase (such as "disqualification for any
rule, there can be no valid substitution for the latter case, much in the same way that a nuisance
cause" in this case) follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class (such as
candidate whose certificate of candidacy is denied due course and/or cancelled may not be substituted.
the words "dies" and "withdraws" in the instant case) or where the latter follow the former, the general
If the intent of the lawmakers were otherwise, they could have so easily and conveniently included those

word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to persons, things or cases akin to,
resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned (see: Vera vs. Cuevas, 90 SCRA
379 [1979]). A deceased candidate is required to have duly filed a valid certificate of candidacy,
otherwise his political party would not be allowed to field a substitute candidate in his stead under
Section 77 of the Code. In the case of withdrawal of candidacy, the withdrawing candidate is required to
have duly filed a valid certificate of candidacy in order to allow his political party to field a substitute
candidate in his stead. Most reasonable it is then, under the foregoing rule, to hold that a valid
certificate of candidacy is likewise an indispensable requisite in the case of a substitution of a disqualified
candidate under the provisions of Section 77 of the Code, just as it is in the two previous instances.
Furthermore, interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper freinda est, ut euiatur inconveniens et absurdum,
meaning, where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity shall in
all cases be adopted. To include those disqualified candidates whose certificate of candidacy had
likewise been denied due course and/or cancelled among those who may be substituted under Section
77 of the Omnibus Election Code, leads to the absurdity where a substitute is allowed to take the place
of somebody who had not been a candidate in the first place — a person who did not have a valid
certificate of candidacy prior to substitution. Nemo dat quod non habet. What right can a non-candidate
pass on to his substitute? Clearly, there is none because no one can give what he does not have.
Even on the most basic and fundamental principles, it is readily understood that the concept of a
substitute presupposes the existence of the person to be substituted, for how can a person take the
place of somebody who does not exist or who never was. The Court has no other choice but to rule that
in all the instances enumerated in Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, the existence of a valid
certificate of candidacy seasonably filed is a requisite sine qua non.
All told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy in the
first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed certificate of
candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. If a person was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted
under Section 77 of the Code. Besides, if we were to allow the so-called "substitute" to file a "new" and
"original" certificate of candidacy beyond the period for the filing thereof, it would be a crystalline case
of unequal protection of the law, an act abhorred by our Constitution.
From the foregoing discussion it is evident that the controversy at hand is not a simple case of hair-
splitting. A candidate may not be qualified to run for election but may have filed a valid certificate of
candidacy. Another candidate may likewise be not qualified and at the same time not have a valid
certificate of candidacy, for which reason, said certificate of candidacy is also cancelled and/or denied
due course. Or, a third candidate may be qualified but, his certificate of candidacy may be denied due
course and/or cancelled. This is possible because the grounds for disqualification (see: Omnibus Election
Code, Section 68 — Disqualifications) are totally separate and distinct from the grounds for cancellation
and/or denying due course to a certificate of candidacy (Ibid., Section 69 — nuisance candidates; and
Section 78 — material misrepresentation). Only the candidate who had a valid certificate of candidacy
may be substituted.
The question to settle next is whether or not aside from Joel "Pempe" Miranda being disqualified by the
Comelec in its May 5, 1998 resolution, his certificate of candidacy had likewise been denied due course
and cancelled.
The Court rules that it was.
43
Private respondent's petition in SPA No. 98-019 specifically prayed for the following:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of Candidacy filed by respondent for
the position of Mayor for the City of Santiago be not given due course and/or cancelled.
Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.
In resolving the petition filed by private respondent specifying a very particular relief, the Comelec ruled
favorably in the following manner:
SO ORDER
From a plain reading of the dispositive portion of the Comelec resolution of May 5, 1998 in SPA No. 98-
019, it is sufficiently clear that the prayer specifically and particularly sought in the petition was
GRANTED, there being no qualification on the matter whatsoever. The disqualification was simply ruled
over and above the granting of the specific prayer for denial of due course and cancellation of the
certificate of candidacy. It may be stressed at this instance that the legal consequences of this May 5,
1998 resolution are independent of the issue of whether or not the Comelec was correct in reviving SPA
No. 98-019 by consolidating it with SPA No. 98-288 in its December 8, 1998 resolution.
As regards the procedural matter in the present petition for certiorari, the following considerations are
also in point:
It may be relevantly stressed that the review powers of the Supreme Court over decisions of the
Constitutional Commissions, in general, and the Commission on Elections, in particular, were rather
particularly defined and "limited" by the 1987 Constitution, as they were also circumscribed in the 1973
Constitution, to a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 65. In Dario vs. Mison (176 SCRA 84
[1989]), the Court held:
. . . We affirm the teaching of Aratuc vs. Commission of Elections, 88 SCRA 251 [1979]) — as
regards recourse to this Court with respect to rulings of the Civil Service Commission — which
is that judgments of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court
through certiorari alone, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In Aratuc, we declared:
It is at once evident from these constitutional and statutory modifications that
there is a definite tendency to enhance and invigorate the role of the Commission
on Elections as the independent constitutional body charged with the safeguarding
of free, peaceful and honest elections. The framers of the new Constitution must
be presumed to have definite knowledge of what it means to make the decisions,
orders and rulings of the Commission "subject to review by the Supreme Court."
And since instead of maintaining that provision intact, it ordained that the
Commission's actuations be instead "brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari",
We cannot insist that there was no intent to change the nature of the remedy,
considering that the limited scope of certiorari, compared to a review, is well
known in remedial law.

. . . It should also be noted that under the new Constitution, as under the 1973
Charter, "any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari," which, as Aratuc tells us, "technically connotes
something less than saying that the same "shall be subject to review by the
Supreme Court," which in turn suggests an appeal by review by petition for review
under Rule 45. Therefore, our jurisdiction over cases emanating from the Civil
Service Commission is limited to complaints of lack or excess of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, complaints
that justify certiorari under Rule 65.
To emphasize this procedural point, then Commissioner, later to become a distinguished Member of this
Court, Mr. Justice Florenz Regalado responded to Commissioner Bernas' query during the deliberations
of the 1987 Constitution thusly:
FR. BERNAS. So, for purposes of the record, now, what is the intention of the Committee? What are the
grounds for certiorari?
MR. REGALADO. The Committee refers specifically to a technical term of review by certiorari would be
relying on the provision of Rule XLV [Should be LXV] of the Rules of Court that laid down the three
grounds.
(I RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, p. 539, as cited in Bernas, S.J, The 1987 Constitution
of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 Edition, p. 903.)
Thus, we have to be guided by jurisprudence relating to review by certiorari under Rule 65. Generally,
certiorari lies where a court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. "Without jurisdiction" refers to an absolute want of jurisdiction; "excess of jurisdiction" refers
to the case where the court has jurisdiction, but it transcended the same or acted without any statutory
authority; "grave abuse of discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the Comelec committed an error in the exercise of its
jurisdiction in the present case, such is not within the province of certiorari, as a remedial measure, to
correct. The only issue that may be taken cognizance of in the present case is whether or not the
Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed decision.
It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal may only be considered to have been done in grave
abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility (Intestate Estate of Carmen de Luna vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 170
SCRA 246 [1989]; Litton Mills vs. Galleon Traders, 163 SCRA 489 [1988]; Butuan Bay Export Co. vs. Court
of Appeals, 97 SCRA 297 [1980]). An error of judgment committed in the exercise of its legitimate
jurisdiction is not the same as "grave abuse of discretion". An abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself
to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari. The abuse must be grave and patent, and it must be shown
that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily and despotically (Soriano vs. Atienza, 171 SCRA 284 [1989]).
44
Petitioner posits that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it annulled the substitution
by and proclamation of petitioner, who under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, was allowed to
substitute for disqualified the candidate Jose "Pempe" Miranda. Petitioner also contends that it was an
act of grave abuse of discretion for the Comelec to direct the proclamation of private respondent as the
winning candidate in the May 11, 1998 election.
Petitioner further faults the Comelec for amending the dispositive portion of its resolution in SPA No. 98-
019, which was not elevated to it on review, the same having already attained finality by then.
While it may be conceded that the Comelec stepped overboard and acted in excess of its jurisdiction
when it motu proprio took cognizance of SPA No. 98-019, the decision in which was by then already final,
it does not necessarily follow that the Comelec also committed grave abuse of discretion in resolving to
grant private respondent's motion for reconsideration by nullifying the substitution of petitioner Joel G.
Miranda. Evidently, what is under review before us in this certiorari proceedings is SPA No. 98-288, and
not SPA No. 98-019.
The question to answer is: will the Comelec's act which may constitute an excess of jurisdiction in SPA
No. 98-019 be tantamount to an act of grave abuse of discretion in its judgment in the separate and
distinct case of SPA No. 98-288 as well? Clearly, non sequitur. SPA No. 98-288 should be judged on its
own accord, and not under the shadow of SPA No. 98-019.
Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion, in resolving SPA No. 98-288 in favor of private
respondent. As earlier pointed out, the result in the dispositive portion of the December 8, 1998
resolution pertaining to the issues involved in SPA No. 98-288 is correct insofar as it annulled the election
and proclamation of Joel G. Miranda. But even assuming for the sake of argument that it is not, still, this
supposed error does not constitute grave abuse of discretion which may be annulled and reversed in the
present petition for certiorari.
As earlier elucidated too, the crux of the Comelec's disposition in SPA No. 98-288 is the fact that former
candidate Jose "Pempe" Miranda's certificate of candidacy was denied due course and cancelled. There
is no dispute that the complaint or petition filed by private respondent in SPA No. 98-019 is one to deny
due course and to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda (Rollo, pp. 26-31). There
is likewise no question that the said petition was GRANTED without any qualification whatsoever. It is
rather clear, therefore, that whether or not the Comelec granted any further relief in SPA No. 98-019 by
disqualifying the candidate, the fact remains that the said petition was granted and that the certificate of
candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda was denied due course and cancelled. In fact, it was not even
necessary for the Comelec to reiterate this in its December 8, 1998 resolution. At best, the Comelec's
motu proprio act of resurrecting SPA No. 98-019 should be treated as a mere surplusage. The fact that
the certificate of candidacy of Joel "Pempe" Miranda was denied due course and cancelled did not
depend on the en banc resolution dated December 8, 1998 of the Comelec. It stems from the fact that
the May 5, 1998 resolution GRANTED private respondent's Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy.
Verily, there is clear basis to find that there indeed was a blatant misrepresentation in the instant case
and that it was a valid ground for the granting of the petition in SPA No. 98-019. Also, there appears to
be sound basis to rule that a certificate of candidacy which has been denied due course on account of

misrepresentation is, in every legal contemplation, no certificate at all. Ergo, there is nothing to
substitute. If this judgment, rendered in the Comelec's rightful exercise of its jurisdiction in SPA No. 98-
288 may, at all, be considered flawed, this blemish would only constitute an error of judgment and
definitely not grave abuse of discretion. And, of course, errors of judgment may not be corrected by
certiorari.
It may be noted that Commissioner Flores raised this supposed error in her dissenting opinion (pp. 93-
99, Rollo). However, her legal opinion failed to convince the majority of the collegiate body and was not
adopted by the Commission en banc. This Court in the present certiorari proceedings cannot substitute
its judgment for that of the Comelec without violating the Constitution and the Rules of Court on the
matter. The Comelec's decision is not subject to appeal to this Court. We may only strike out a Comelec
decision if it was rendered without jurisdiction, in excess thereof, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
The Court cannot accede to the reasoning that this Court should now acquiesce and submit to the
sovereign will of the electorate, as expressed by their votes. We should always be reminded that ours is
a government of laws not of men. If this Court should fold its arms and refuse to apply the law at every
"clamor" of the majority of the supposed constituency, where shall order and justice lie? Without the
least intention to degrade, where shall "people power" end, and where shall "law and justice" begin?
Would the apparent results of the canvassing of votes justify this Court in refusing to apply the law
instead? The answers to the foregoing are obvious. The Court cannot choose otherwise but to exercise
its sacred duty to uphold the Constitution and the laws of the Republic for and under which it exists.
Besides, only history will discern whether Jose "Pempe" Miranda's filing of a certificate of candidacy for a
4th term and the intended substitution by his son was a ploy to perpetrate the Mirandas in power by
way of a political dynasty disdained and abhorred by our Constitution which declared:
Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law.
(Article II, 1987 Constitution)
The invalidation of petitioner's supposed substitution of Jose "Pempe" Miranda brings about the
disqualification of petitioner in the mayoralty race. In this regard, what was said in Nolasco vs.
Commission on Elections (275 SCRA 763 [1997]) may be recalled:
Our case law is now settled that in a mayoralty election, the candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes, in this case Alarilla, cannot be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is
disqualified. Thus, we reiterated the rule in the fairly recent case of Reyes v. Comelec (254 SCRA 514
[1996]), viz.:
We likewise find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec in denying petitioner Julius O.
Garcia's petition to be proclaimed mayor in view of the disqualification of Renato U. Reyes.
That the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in
case the winning candidate is disqualified is now settled. The doctrinal instability caused by see-sawing
rulings has since been removed. In the latest ruling on the question, this Court said:
45
To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to
substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost
the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered
the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the
conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under the
circumstances.
Garcia's plea that the votes case for Reyes be invalidated is without merit. The votes cast for Reyes are
presumed to have been cast in the belief that Reyes was qualified and for that reason can be treated as
stray, void and meaningless. The subsequent finding that he is disqualified cannot retroact to the date of
the elections as to invalidate the votes cast for him.
Consequently, respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion insofar as it failed to follow the
above doctrine, a descendant of our ruling in Labo v. Comelec (176 SCRA 1[1989]).
Thus, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion insofar as it failed to follow the above-cited
settled ruling consistently applied by this Court since the case of Labo vs. Comelec (176 SCRA 1 [1989]),
Aquino vs. Comelec, 248 SCRA 400 [1995], Reyes vs. Comelec (254 SCRA 514 [1996]); and Nolasco vs.
Comelec (275 SCRA 763 [1997]).
Even as the Court cannot accede to the contention that, in view of the election results pointing to
petitioner as the electors' choice for the mayoralty post, we should now close our eyes to the pertinent
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on the matter, nevertheless, the Court duly notes that the said
election results point to the fact that private respondent was not then the choice of the people of
Santiago City, Isabela. This Court has no authority under any law to impose upon and compel the people
of Santiago City to accept private respondent as their mayor. The law on succession under section 44 of
Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, would then apply. Said provision
relevantly states:
Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor, —
(a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor
concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the
governor, vice governor, mayor, or vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member, or, in case of his
permanent disability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become governor, vice
governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled
automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein.
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher
vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns,
or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.
For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on
the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of
registered voters in each district in the immediately preceding local election.
 46

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby partly DENIED, insofar as the Comelec ruling to ANNUL the election
and proclamation of petitioner is being AFFIRMED. The petition is, however, hereby GRANTED so as to
MODIFY the resolution of the Comelec in SPA No. 98-288 by DELETING the portion directing the city
board of canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the winning candidate from among those voted upon
during the May 11, 1998 elections. The law on succession should be enforced. Accordingly, the
restraining order issued in this case is forthwith LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
JOEL G. MIRANDA, Petitioner, vs. ANTONIO M. ABAYA and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondents. MELO, J. :
FACTS:
HELD:
The Court finds neither lack of jurisdiction nor grave abuse of discretion attended the annulment of the
substitution and proclamation of petitioner. On the matter of jurisdiction, there is no question that the
case at hand is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Comelec. On the issue of soundness of the
disposition in SPA No. 8-288, the Court finds that the Comelecs action nullifying the substitution by and
proclamation of petitioner for the mayoralty post of Santiago City, Isabela is proper and legally sound. All
told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy in the first
place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed certificate of
candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. If a person was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted
under Section 77 of the Code. Besides, if we were to allow the so-called substitute to file a new and
original certificate of candidacy beyond the period for the filing thereof, it would be a crystalline case of
unequal protection of the law, an act abhorred by our Constitution.

On March 24, 1998, Jose Pempe Miranda, then incumbent mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, filed his The question to settle next is whether or not aside from Joel Pempe Miranda being disqualified by the
certificate of candidacy for the same mayoralty post for the synchronized May 11, 1998 elections. On Comelec in its May 5, 1998 resolution, his certificate of candidacy had likewise been denied due course
March 27, 1998, private respondent Antonio M. Abaya filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or and cancelled. The Court rules that it was. Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in resolving
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy (pp. 26-33, Rollo), which was docketed as SPA No. 98-019. The petition SPA No. 98-288 in favor of private respondent. As earlier pointed out, the result in the dispositive portion
was GRANTED by the Comelec in its resolution dated May 5, 1998 (pp. 36-43, Rollo). The Comelec further of the December 8, 1998 resolution pertaining to the issues involved in SPA No. 98-288 is correct insofar
ruled to DISQUALIFY Jose Pempe Miranda. as it annulled the election and proclamation of Joel G. Miranda. But even assuming for the sake of
argument that it is not, still, this supposed error does not constitute grave abuse of discretion which may
On May 6, 1998, way beyond the deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy, petitioner Joel G. Miranda be annulled and reversed in the present petition for certiorari.
filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty post, supposedly as a substitute for his father, Jose
Pempe During the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner and private respondent vied for the mayoralty seat,
with petitioner garnering 22,002 votes, 1,666 more votes than private respondent who got only 20, 336
votes. On May 13, 1998, private respondent filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void Substitution with
Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, which was
docketed as SPA No. 98-288.

He prayed for the nullification of petitioners certificate of candidacy for being void ab initio because the
certificate of candidacy of Jose Pempe Miranda, whom petitioner was supposed to substitute, had
already been cancelled and denied due course. On May 16, 1998, Comelecs First Division dismissed SPA
No. 98-288 motu proprio (pp. 57-61, Rollo). Private respondent moved for reconsideration (pp. 62-72,
Rollo). On December 8, 1998, the Comelec En Banc rendered the assailed decision aforequoted,
resolving to GRANT the motion for reconsideration, thus nullifying the substitution by petitioner Joel G.
Miranda of his father as candidate for the mayoralty post of Santiago City. On December 9, 1998,
petitioner sought this Courts intercession via a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the annulment of petitioners substitution and proclamation was issued without
jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction; and
2. Whether the order of the Comelec directing the proclamation of the private respondent was
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015
ROGELIO BATIN CABALLERO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JONATHAN ENRIQUE V.
NANUD, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to
set aside the Resolution1 dated November 6, 2013 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc
which affirmed in toto the Resolution2 dated May 3, 2013 of the COMELEC First Division canceling the
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Rogelio Batin Caballero.
Petitioner3 and private respondent Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr.4 were both candidates for the
mayoralty position of the Municipality of Uyugan, Province of Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections.
Private respondent filed a Petition5 to deny due course to or cancellation of petitioner's certificate of
candidacy alleging that the latter made a false representation when he declared in his COC that he was
eligible to run for Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes despite being a Canadian citizen and a non�resident
thereof.
During the December 10, 2012 conference, petitioner, through counsel, manifested that he was not
properly served with a copy of the petition and the petition was served by registered mail not in his
address in Barangay Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes. He, however, received a copy of the petition during the
conference. Petitioner did not file an Answer but filed a Memorandum controverting private
respondent's substantial allegations in his petition.
Petitioner argued that prior to the filing of his COC on October 3, 2012, he took an Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines before the Philippine Consul General in Toronto, Canada on September
13, 2012 and became a dual Filipino and Canadian citizen pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9225,
otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. Thereafter, he renounced
his Canadian citizenship and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation before a Notary Public in Batanes on
October 1, 2012 to conform with Section 5(2) of RA No. 9225.6 He claimed that he did not lose his
domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes despite becoming a Canadian citizen as he merely left Uyugan
temporarily to pursue a brighter future for him and his family; and that he went back to Uyugan during
his vacation while working in Nigeria, California, and finally in Canada.
On May 3, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution finding that petitioner made a material
misrepresentation in his COC when he declared that he is a resident of Barangay Imnajbu, Uyugan,
Batanes within one year prior to the election. The decretal portion of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES to GRANT the
instant Petition. The Certificate of Candidacy of respondent Caballero is hereby CANCELLED.
The COMELEC First Division did not discuss the procedural deficiency raised by petitioner as he was
already given a copy of the petition and also in consonance with the Commission's constitutional duty of
determining the qualifications of petitioner to run for elective office. It found that while petitioner
47
complied with the requirements of RA No. 9225 since he had taken his Oath of Allegiance to the
Philippines and had validly renounced his Canadian citizenship, he failed to comply with the other
requirements provided under RA No. 9225 for those seeking elective office, i.e., persons who renounced
their foreign citizenship must still comply with the one year residency requirement provided for under
Section 39 of the Local Government Code. Petitioner's naturalization as a Canadian citizen resulted in the
abandonment of his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes; thus, having abandoned his domicile of origin,
it is incumbent upon him to prove that he was able to reestablish his domicile in Uyugan for him to be
eligible to run for elective office in said locality which he failed to do.
Elections were subsequently held on May 13, 2013 and the election returns showed that petitioner won
over private respondent.8 Private respondent filed an Urgent Ex-parte Motion to Defer Proclamation.9
On May 14, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes.
On May 16, 2013, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc assailing the
May 3, 2013 Resolution issued by the COMELEC's First Division canceling his COC.
On May 17, 2013, private respondent filed a Petition to Annul Proclamation.10
On November 6, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued its assailed Resolution denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.
Petitioner filed with us the instant petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order.
In the meantime, private respondent filed a Motion for Execution11 of the May 3, 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division as affirmed by the En Banc and prayed for the cancellation of petitioner's COC,
the appropriate correction of the certificate of canvas to reflect that all votes in favor of petitioner are
stray votes, declaration of nullity of petitioner's proclamation and proclamation of private respondent as
the duly-elected Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections.
On December 12, 2013, COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. issued a Writ of Execution.12 Private
respondent took his Oath of Office13 on December 20, 2013.
In the instant petition for certiorari, petitioner raises the following assignment of errors, to wit:
THE COMELEC EN BANC GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE CLEAR IMPORT OF PROCEDURAL RULES
PROVIDED FOR UNDER COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 9523 PROMULGATED ON 25 SEPTEMBER 2012.
THE COMELEC EN BANC GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER ABANDONED HIS PHILIPPINE
DOMICILE WHEN HE WORKED IN SEVERAL FOREIGN COUNTRIES FOR "GREENER PASTURE."
EVEN ASSUMING THAT PETITIONER HAS ABANDONED HIS PHILIPPINE DOMICILE WHEN HE BECAME A
CANADIAN CITIZEN, HIS REACQUISITION OF HIS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP, TAKING OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO
THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT NINE (9) MONTHS PRIOR TO HIS ELECTION ON 13 MAY 2013, IS A
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW ON RESIDENCY.14chanrobleslaw
Petitioner contends that when private respondent filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel his
COC with the Office of the Municipal Election Officer of Uyugan, Batanes, a copy thereof was not
personally served on him; that private respondent later sent a copy of the petition to him by registered
mail without an attached affidavit stating the reason on why registered mail as a mode of service was
resorted to. Petitioner argues that private respondent violated Section 4, paragraphs (1)15 and (4),16 Rule

23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, thus, his petition
to deny due course or cancel petitioner's certificate of candidacy should have been denied outright.
We are not convinced.
While private respondent failed to comply with the above-mentioned requirements, the settled rule,
however, is that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal construction. Moreover, the
COMELEC may exercise its power to suspend its own rules as provided under Section 4, Rule 1 of their
Rules of Procedure.
Sec. 4. Suspension of the Rules. - In the interest of justice and in order to obtain speedy disposition of all
matters pending before the Commission, these rules or any portion thereof may be suspended by the
Commission.
Under this authority, the Commission is similarly enabled to cope with all situations without concerning
itself about procedural niceties that do not square with the need to do justice, in any case without
further loss of time, provided that the right of the parties to a full day in court is not substantially
impaired.17
In Hayudini v. COMELEC,18 we sustained the COMELEC's liberal treatment of respondent's petition to
deny due course or cancel petitioner's COC despite its failure to comply with Sections 2 and 4 of Rule 23
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by Resolution No. 9523, i.e., pertaining to the period to
file petition and to provide sufficient explanation as to why his petition was not served personally on
petitioner, respectively, and held that:
As a general rule, statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed in order that the
will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections.
Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to keep in office, for an indefinite period, one whose right to it is
uncertain and under suspicion. It is imperative that his claim be immediately cleared, not only for the
benefit of the winner but for the sake of public interest, which can only be achieved by brushing aside
technicalities of procedure that protract and delay the trial of an ordinary action. This principle was
reiterated in the cases of Tolentino v. Commission on Elections and De Castro v. Commission on
Elections, where the Court held that "in exercising its powers and jurisdiction, as defined by its mandate
to protect the integrity of elections, the COMELEC must not be straitjacketed by procedural rules in
resolving election disputes."
Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal construction. The
COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or even suspend its rules of procedure in the interest of
justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of all matters pending before it. This liberality is for the
purpose of promoting the effective and efficient implementation of its objectives - ensuring the holding
of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections, as well as achieving just, expeditious, and
inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the COMELEC.
Unlike an ordinary civil action, an election contest is imbued with public interest. It involves not only the
adjudication of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates, but also the paramount need of
dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the electorate. And the tribunal has the
corresponding duty to ascertain, by all means within its command, whom the people truly chose as their
rightful leader.
Here, we find that the issue raised, i.e., whether petitioner had been a resident of Uyugan, Batanes at
least one (1) year before the elections held on May 13, 2013 as he represented in his COC, pertains to his
qualification and eligibility to run for public office, therefore imbued with public interest, which justified
48
the COMELEC's suspension of its own rules. We adopt the COMELEC's s ratiocination in accepting the
petition, to wit:
This Commission recognizes the failure of petitioner to comply strictly with the procedure for filing a
petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy set forth in Section 4, Rule 23 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, which requires service of a
copy of the petition to respondent prior to its filing. But then, we should also consider the efforts
exerted by petitioner in serving a copy of his petition to respondent after being made aware that such
service is necessary. We should also take note of the impossibility for petitioner to personally serve a
copy of the petition to respondent since he was in Canada at the time of its filing as shown in
respondent's travel records.
The very purpose of prior service of the petition to respondent is to afford the latter an opportunity to
answer the allegations contained in the petition even prior to the service of summons by the
Commission to him. In this case, respondent was given a copy of the petition during the conference held
on 10 December 2012 and was ultimately accorded the occasion to rebut all the allegations against him.
He even filed a Memorandum containing his defenses to petitioner's allegations. For all intents and
purposes, therefore, respondent was never deprived of due process which is the very essence of this
Commission's Rules of Procedure.
Even the Supreme Court acknowledges the need for procedural rules to bow to substantive
considerations "through a liberal construction aimed at promoting their objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding, x x x
When a case is impressed with public interest, a relaxation of the application of the rules is in order,
Unquestionably, the instant case is impressed with public interest which warrants the relaxation of the
application of the [R]ules of [P]rocedure, consistent with the ruling of the Supreme Court in several
cases.
Petitioner next claims that he did not abandon his Philippine domicile. He argues that he was born and
baptized in Uyugan, Batanes; studied and had worked therein for a couple of years, and had paid his
community tax certificate; and, that he was a registered voter and had exercised his right of suffrage and
even built his house therein. He also contends that he usually comes back to Uyugan, Batanes during his
vacations from work abroad, thus, his domicile had not been lost. Petitioner avers that the requirement
of the law in fixing the residence qualification of a candidate running for public office is not strictly on
the period of residence in the place where he seeks to be elected but on the acquaintance by the
candidate on his constituents' vital needs for their common welfare; and that his nine months of actual
stay in Uyugan, Batanes prior to his election is a substantial compliance with the law. Petitioner insists
that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in canceling his COC.
We are not persuaded.
RA No. 9225, which is known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, declares that
natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country, can re-acquire or retain his Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of the law.21 The law does not provide for residency requirement for the reacquisition or
retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of
Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino.22
RA No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence.23 This is only logical and consistent with the

general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same
time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either in the Philippines or in
the foreign country of which he is also a citizen.24 However, when a natural-born Filipino with dual
citizenship seeks for an elective public office, residency in the Philippines becomes material. Section 5(2)
of FLA No. 9225 provides:
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship
under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Republic Act No. 7160, which is known as the Local Government Code of 1991, provides, among others,
for the qualifications of an elective local official. Section 39 thereof states:
SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered
voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sanggunian bayan, the district where he intends to be
elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and
able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
Clearly, the Local Government Code requires that the candidate must be a resident of the place where
he seeks to be elected at least one year immediately preceding the election day. Respondent filed the
petition for cancellation of petitioner's COC on the ground that the latter made material
misrepresentation when he declared therein that he is a resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one
year immediately preceeding the day of elections.
The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or
"habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal residence,25 that is, "the place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)."26 A domicile of origin is acquired by every
person at birth. It is usually the place where the child's parents reside and continues until the same is
abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). It consists not only in the intention to
reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention.27
Petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan, Batanes. Thus, it could be said
that he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes. However, he later worked in Canada and became a
Canadian citizen. In Coquilla v. COMELEC28 we ruled that naturalization in a foreign country may result in
an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This holds true in petitioner's case as permanent resident
status in Canada is required for the acquisition of Canadian citizenship.29 Hence, petitioner had
effectively abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and transferred his domicile of choice in Canada.
His frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation from work in Canada cannot be considered as
waiver of such abandonment.
The next question is what is the effect of petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No.
9225 on his residence or domicile?
In Japzon v. COMELEC,30 wherein respondent Ty reacquired his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225
49
and run for Mayor of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar and whose residency in the said place was put
in issue, we had the occasion to state, thus:
[Petitioner's] reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 had no automatic
impact or effect on his residence/domicile. He could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he did not
necessarily regain his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. Ty
merely had the option to again establish his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of choice. The length of his residence therein
shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact to the time
of his birth.31chanrobleslaw
Hence, petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not automatically make
him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still prove that after becoming a Philippine citizen
on September 13, 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his new domicile of choice which is
reckoned from the time he made it as such.
The COMELEC found that petitioner failed to present competent evidence to prove that he was able to
reestablish his residence in Uyugan within a period of one year immediately preceding the May 13, 2013
elections. It found that it was only after reacquiring his Filipino citizenship by virtue of RA No. 9225 on
September 13, 2012 that petitioner can rightfully claim that he re-established his domicile in Uyugan,
Batanes, if such was accompanied by physical presence thereat, coupled with an actual intent to
reestablish his domicile there. However, the period from September 13, 2012 to May 12, 2013 was even
less than the one year residency required by law.
Doctrinally entrenched is the rule that in a petition for certiorari, findings of fact of administrative
bodies, such as respondent COMELEC in the instant case, are final unless grave abuse of discretion has
marred such factual determinations/~ Clearly, where there is no proof of grave abuse of discretion,
arbitrariness, fraud or error of law in the questioned Resolutions, we may not review the factual findings
of COMELEC, nor substitute its own findings on the sufficiency of evidence.33
Records indeed showed that petitioner failed to prove that he had been a resident of Uyugan, Batanes
for at least one year immediately preceding the day of elections as required under Section 39 of the
Local Government Code.
Petitioner's argument that his nine (9) months of actual stay in Uyugan, Batanes, prior to the May 13,
2013 local elections is a substantial compliance with the law, is not persuasive. In Aquino v. Commission
on Elections,34 we held:
x x x A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a republican government those
laws are themselves ordained by the people. Through their representatives, they dictate the
qualifications necessary for service in government positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks one of the
essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of Representatives, not even the will of
a majority or plurality of the voters of the Second District of Makati City would substitute for a
requirement mandated by the fundamental law itself.35chanrobleslaw
Petitioner had made a material misrepresentation by stating in his COC that he is a resident of Uyugan,
Batanes for at least one (1) year immediately proceeding the day of the election, thus, a ground for a
petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Section 74, in relation to Section 78, of the OEC
governs the cancellation of, and grant or denial of due course to COCs, to wit:

SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person
filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if
for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized
city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status;
his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation;
that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the
obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion;
and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false.
The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election.
We have held that in order to justify the cancellation of COC under Section 78, it is essential that the
false representation mentioned therein pertains to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this
provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate - the right to run for the elective post for
which he filed the certificate of candidacy.36 We concluded that material representation contemplated
by Section 78 refers to qualifications for elective office, such as the requisite residency, age, citizenship
or any other legal qualification necessary to run for a local elective office as provided for in the Local
Government Code.37 Furthermore, aside from the requirement of materiality, the misrepresentation
must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render
a candidate ineligible.38 We, therefore, find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the COMELEC in
canceling petitioner's COC for material misrepresentation.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated May 3, 2013 of the
COMELEC First Division and the Resolution dated November 6, 2013 of the COMELEC En Banc and are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Facts:
Petitioner... and private respondent Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr. were both candidates for the
mayoralty position of the Municipality of Uyugan, Province of Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections.
Private respondent filed a Petition... cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy alleging that the
latter made a false representation when he declared in his COC that he was eligible to run for Mayor...
despite being a Canadian... citizen and a nonresident thereof.
Petitioner argued that prior to the filing of his COC... he took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines before the Philippine Consul General in Toronto, Canada on... and became a dual Filipino and
Canadian citizen pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9225. Thereafter, he renounced his Canadian
citizenship and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation before a Notary Public in Batanes on 2012.
On 2013 COMELEC... issued a Resolution finding that petitioner made a material misrepresentation in
his COC when he declared that he is a resident of Barangay Imnajbu... within one year prior to the
election.
50
It found that while petitioner complied with the requirements of RA No. 9225 since he had taken his
Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines and had validly renounced his Canadian citizenship, he failed to
comply with the other requirements provided under RA No. 9225 for those... seeking elective office, i.e.,
persons who renounced their foreign citizenship must still comply with the one year residency
requirement provided for under Section 39 of the Local Government Code.
Elections were subsequently held... and... petitioner won over private respondent... was proclaimed
Mayor... petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC... canceling his COC.
Private respondent filed a Petition to Annul Proclamation
COMELEC En Banc... denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner filed with us the instant petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order.
COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. issued a Writ of Execution.
Private respondent took his Oath of Office... claims that he did not abandon his Philippine domicile.
He was born and baptized in Uyugan,... he was a registered voter and had... exercised his right of
suffrage and even built his house therein.
Also contends that he usually comes back to Uyugan
Petitioner insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in canceling his COC.
Issues: Whether petitioner had been a resident of Uyugan, Batanes at least one (1) year before the
elections held on May 13, 2013 as he represented in his CO... what is the effect of petitioner's retention
of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 on his residence or domicile?
Ruling:
We are not persuaded.
RA No. 9225, which is known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, declares that
natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country, can re-acquire or... retain his Philippine citizenship under
the conditions of the law.
The law does not provide for residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of
Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino.
RA No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence.
Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign... citizenships, he
may establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a citizen.
However, when a natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship seeks for an elective public office, residency
in the Philippines... becomes material.
al Government Code requires that the candidate must be a resident of the place where he seeks to be
elected at least one year immediately preceding the election day.
Petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan, Batanes. Thus, it could be said
that he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes. However, he later worked in Canada and became a
Canadian citizen.
 51

naturalization in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This
holds true in petitioner's case as permanent resident status in Canada is required for the acquisition of
Canadian citizenship.

Hence, petitioner had effectively abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and transferred his domicile
of choice in Canada. His frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation from work in Canada
cannot be considered as waiver of such abandonment.

[Petitioner's] reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 had no automatic
impact or effect on his residence/domicile.

Hence, petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not automatically make
him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still prove that after becoming a Philippine citizen
on September 13, 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his... new domicile of choice which is
reckoned from the time he made it as such.
petitioner failed... to prove that he was able to reestablish his residence in Uyugan within a period of one
year immediately preceding the May 13, 2013 elections... the period from September 13, 2012 to May
12, 2013 was even less than the one year residency required by law.
We concluded that material representation contemplated by Section 78 refers to qualifications for
elective office, such as the requisite residency, age, citizenship or any... other legal qualification
necessary to run for a local elective office as provided for in the Local Government Code.
Furthermore, aside from the requirement of materiality, the misrepresentation must consist of a
deliberate attempt to mislead,... misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible.

We, therefore, find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the COMELEC in canceling petitioner's
COC for material misrepresentation.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 203302 April 11, 2013
MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HOMER T. SAQUILAVAN, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Court hereby resolves the Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration tiled by petitioner
Emmanuel L. Maliksi against the Court's decision promulgated on March 12, 2013, dismissing his petition
for certiorari assailing the resolution dated September 14, 2012 of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) En Bane that sustained the declaration of respondent Homer T. Saquilayan as the duly
elected Mayor of Imus, Cavite.
For clarity, we briefly restate the factual antecedents.
During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Saquilayan the winner for the
position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the second highest number of
votes, brought an election protest in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite alleging that there
were irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts. Subsequently, the RTC held a
revision of the votes, and, based on the results of the revision, declared Maliksi as the duly elected
Mayor of Imus commanding Saquilayan to cease and desist from performing the functions of said office.
Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC. In the meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksi’s motion for execution
pending appeal, and Maliksi was then installed as Mayor.
In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the parties, decided to
recount the ballots through the use of the printouts of the ballot images from the CF cards. Thus, it
issued an order dated March 28, 2012 requiring Saquilayan to deposit the amount necessary to defray
the expenses for the decryption and printing of the ballot images. Later, it issued another order dated
April 17, 2012 for Saquilayan to augment his cash deposit.
On August 15, 2012, the First Division issued a resolution nullifying the RTC’s decision and declaring
Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor.1
Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that he had been denied his right to due process
because he had not been notified of the decryption proceedings. He argued that the resort to the
printouts of the ballot images, which were secondary evidence, had been unwarranted because there
was no proof that the integrity of the paper ballots had not been preserved.
On September 14, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc resolved to deny Maliksi’s motion for reconsideration.2
52
Maliksi then came to the Court via petition for certiorari, reiterating his objections to the decryption,
printing, and examination of the ballot images without prior notice to him, and to the use of the
printouts of the ballot images in the recount proceedings conducted by the First Division.1âwphi1
In the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013, the Court, by a vote of 8-7, dismissed Maliksi’s petition
for certiorari. The Court concluded that Maliksi had not been denied due process because: (a) he had
received notices of the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images by the First Division —
referring to the orders of the First Division directing Saquilayan to post and augment the cash deposits
for the decryption and printing of the ballot images; and (b) he had been able to raise his objections to
the decryption in his motion for reconsideration. The Court then pronounced that the First Division did
not abuse its discretion in deciding to use the ballot images instead of the paper ballots, explaining that
the printouts of the ballot images were not secondary images, but considered original documents with
the same evidentiary value as the official ballots under the Rule on Electronic Evidence; and that the First
Division’s finding that the ballots and the ballot boxes had been tampered had been fully established by
the large number of cases of double-shading discovered during the revision.
In his Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, Maliksi raises the following arguments, to wit:
I.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT EN BANC GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING
THE INSTANT PETITION DESPITE A CLEAR VIOLATION OF PETITIONER’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS OF LAW CONSIDERING THAT DECRYPTION, PRINTING AND EXAMINATION OF THE DIGITAL
IMAGES OF THE BALLOTS, WHICH IS THE BASIS FOR THE ASSAILED 14 SEPTEMBER 2012 RESOLUTION OF
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT, WHICH IN TURN AFFIRMED THE 15 AUGUST 2012 RESOLUTION OF THE
COMELEC FIRST DIVISION, WERE DONE INCONSPICUOUSLY UPON A MOTU PROPRIO DIRECTIVE OF THE
COMELEC FIRST DIVISION SANS ANY NOTICE TO THE PETITIONER, AND FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
II.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT EN BANC GRAVELY ERRED IN UPHOLDING
THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION’S RULING TO DISPENSE WITH THE PHYSICAL BALLOTS AND RESORT TO
THEIR DIGITAL IMAGES NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE BALLOTS ARE THE BEST AND MOST
CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF THE VOTERS’ WILL, AND THAT BALLOT IMAGES CAN BE RESORTED TO ONLY IF
THE OFFICIAL BALLOTS ARE LOST OR THEIR INTEGRITY WAS COMPROMISED AS DETERMINED BY THE
RECOUNT/REVISION COMMITTEE, CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE WANTING IN THIS CASE, AND IN FACT
THE INTEGRITY OF THE BALLOT BOXES AND ITS CONTENTS WAS PRESERVED AND THE ISSUE OF
TAMPERING WAS ONLY BELATEDLY RAISED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AFTER THE REVISION RESULTS
SHOWED THAT HE LOST.
III.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, IT IS THE HUMBLE SUBMISSION OF THE PETITIONER-MOVANT THAT THE 12
MARCH 2013 RESOLUTION ISSUED BY THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT EN BANC IS NULL AND VOID AB
INITIO AND THEREFORE OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT, FOR HAVING BEEN PROMULGATED DESPITE THE
ABSENCE OF HONORABLE SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ AT THE TIME OF THE
DELIBERATION AND VOTING ON THE 12 MARCH 2013 RESOLUTION IN THE INSTANT CASE.3

Maliksi insists: (a) that he had the right to be notified of every incident of the proceedings and to be
present at every stage thereof; (b) that he was deprived of such rights when he was not informed of the
decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images by the First Division; (c) that the March 28,
2012 and April 17, 2012 orders of the First Division did not sufficiently give him notice inasmuch as the
orders did not state the date, time, and venue of the decryption and printing of the ballot images; and
(d) that he was thus completely deprived of the opportunity to participate in the decryption proceedings.
Maliksi contends that the First Division’s motu proprio directive for the decryption, printing, and
examination of the ballot images was highly irregular. In this regard, he asserts: (a) that the decryption,
printing, and examination should have taken place during the revision before the trial court and after the
revision committee had determined that the integrity of the official ballots had not been preserved; (b)
that the trial court did not make such determination; (c) that, in fact, Saquilayan did not allege or present
any proof in the RTC to show that the ballots or the ballot boxes had been tampered, and had, in fact,
actively participated in the revision proceedings; (d) that the First Division should not have entertained
the allegation of ballot tampering belatedly raised on appeal; (e) that the First Division should have
limited itself to reviewing the evidence on record; and (f) that the First Division did not even explain how
it had arrived at the conclusion that the integrity of the ballots had not been preserved.
Maliksi submits that the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013 is null and void for having been
promulgated despite the absence from the deliberations and lack of signature of Justice Jose Portugal
Perez.
Ruling
The Court grants Maliksi’s Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, and reverses the decision
promulgated on March 12, 2013 on the ground that the First Division of the COMELEC denied to him the
right to due process by failing to give due notice on the decryption and printing of the ballot images.
Consequently, the Court annuls the recount proceedings conducted by the First Division with the use of
the printouts of the ballot images.
It bears stressing at the outset that the First Division should not have conducted the assailed recount
proceedings because it was then exercising appellate jurisdiction as to which no existing rule of
procedure allowed it to conduct a recount in the first instance. The recount proceedings authorized
under Section 6, Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as amended, are to be conducted by the
COMELEC Divisions only in the exercise of their exclusive original jurisdiction over all election protests
involving elective regional (the autonomous regions), provincial and city officials.4
As we see it, the First Division arbitrarily arrogated unto itself the conduct of the recount proceedings,
contrary to the regular procedure of remanding the protest to the RTC and directing the reconstitution
of the Revision Committee for the decryption and printing of the picture images and the revision of the
ballots on the basis thereof. Quite unexpectedly, the COMELEC En Banc upheld the First Division’s
unwarranted deviation from the standard procedures by invoking the COMELEC’s power to "take such
measures as the Presiding Commissioner may deem proper," and even citing the Court’s minute
resolution in Alliance of Barangay Concerns (ABC) Party-List v. Commission on Elections5 to the effect
that the "COMELEC has the power to adopt procedures that will ensure the speedy resolution of its
cases. The Court will not interfere with its exercise of this prerogative so long as the parties are amply
heard on their opposing claims."
53
Based on the pronouncement in Alliance of Barangay Concerns (ABC) v. Commission on Elections, the
power of the COMELEC to adopt procedures that will ensure the speedy resolution of its cases should
still be exercised only after giving to all the parties the opportunity to be heard on their opposing claims.
The parties’ right to be heard upon adversarial issues and matters is never to be waived or sacrificed, or
to be treated so lightly because of the possibility of the substantial prejudice to be thereby caused to the
parties, or to any of them. Thus, the COMELEC En Banc should not have upheld the First Division’s
deviation from the regular procedure in the guise of speedily resolving the election protest, in view of its
failure to provide the parties with notice of its proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, the most
basic requirements of due process.
I.
Due process requirements
The picture images of the ballots are electronic documents that are regarded as the equivalents of the
original official ballots themselves.6 In Vinzons-Chato v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,7 the
Court held that "the picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise
‘official ballots’ that faithfully capture in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by
Section 2(3) of R.A. No. 9369. As such, the printouts thereof are the functional equivalent of the paper
ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of revision of votes in an electoral
protest."
That the two documents—the official ballot and its picture image—are considered "original documents"
simply means that both of them are given equal probative weight. In short, when either is presented as
evidence, one is not considered as weightier than the other.
But this juridical reality does not authorize the courts, the COMELEC, and the Electoral Tribunals to
quickly and unilaterally resort to the printouts of the picture images of the ballots in the proceedings
had before them without notice to the parties. Despite the equal probative weight accorded to the
official ballots and the printouts of their picture images, the rules for the revision of ballots adopted
for their respective proceedings still consider the official ballots to be the primary or best evidence of
the voters’ will. In that regard, the picture images of the ballots are to be used only when it is first
shown that the official ballots are lost or their integrity has been compromised.
For instance, the aforesaid Section 6, Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 (In Re: Comelec Rules of
Procedure on Disputes In An Automated Election System in Connection with the May 10, 2010 Elections),
as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9164, itself requires that "the Recount Committee determines
that the integrity of the ballots has been violated or has not been preserved, or are wet and otherwise in
such a condition that (the ballots) cannot be recounted" before the printing of the image of the ballots
should be made, to wit:
(g) Only when the Recount Committee, through its chairman, determines that the integrity of the ballots
has been preserved or that no signs of tampering of the ballots are present, will the recount proceed. In
case there are signs that the ballots contained therein are tampered, compromised, wet or are otherwise
in such a condition that it could not be recounted, the Recount Committee shall follow paragraph (l) of
this rule.
(l) In the event the Recount Committee determines that the integrity of the ballots has been violated or
has not been preserved, or are wet and otherwise in such a condition that it cannot be recounted, the

Chairman of the Committee shall request from the Election Records and Statistics Department (ERSD),
the printing of the image of the ballots of the subject precinct stored in the CF card used in the May 10,
2010 elections in the presence of the parties. Printing of the ballot images shall proceed only upon prior
authentication and certification by a duly authorized personnel of the Election Records and Statistics
Department (ERSD) that the data or the images to be printed are genuine and not substitutes.
(Emphases supplied.)
Section 6, Rule 10 (Conduct of Revision) of the 2010 Rules of Procedure for Municipal Election Contests,
which governs the proceedings in the Regional Trial Courts exercising original jurisdiction over election
protests, provides:
(m) In the event that the revision committee determines that the integrity of the ballots and the ballot
box have not been preserved, as when proof of tampering or substitution exists, it shall proceed to
instruct the printing of the picture image of the ballots stored in the data storage device for the precinct.
The court shall provide a non-partisan technical person who shall conduct the necessary authentication
process to ensure that the data or image stored is genuine and not a substitute. Only after this
determination can the printed picture image be used for the recount. (Emphases supplied.)
A similar procedure is found in the 2010 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, to wit:
Rule 43. Conduct of the revision. – The revision of votes shall be done through the use of appropriate
PCOS machines or manually and visually, as the Tribunal may determine, and according to the following
procedures:
(q) In the event that the RC determines that the integrity of the ballots and the ballot box was not
preserved, as when there is proof of tampering or substitution, it shall proceed to instruct the printing of
the picture image of the ballots of the subject precinct stored in the data storage device for the same
precinct. The Tribunal may avail itself of the assistance of the COMELEC for the service of a non-partisan
technical person who shall conduct the necessary authentication process to ensure that the data or
images stored are genuine and not merely substitutes. It is only upon such determination that the
printed picture image can be used for the revision of votes. (Emphases supplied.)
Also, the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal’s Guidelines on the Revision of Ballots requires a
preliminary hearing to be held for the purpose of determining whether the integrity of the ballots and
ballot boxes used in the May 10, 2010 elections was not preserved, as when there is proof of tampering
or substitutions, to wit:
Section 10. Revision of Ballots
(d) When it has been shown, in a preliminary hearing set by the parties or by the Tribunal, that the
integrity of the ballots and ballot boxes used in the May 10, 2010 elections was not preserved, as when
there is proof of tampering or substitutions, the Tribunal shall direct the printing of the picture images of
the ballots of the subject precinct stored in the data storage device for the same precinct. The Tribunal
shall provide a non-partisan technical person who shall conduct the necessary authentication process to
ensure that the data or image stored is genuine and not a substitute. It is only upon such determination
that the printed picture image can be used for the revision. (As amended per Resolution of February 10,
2011; Emphases supplied.)
54
All the foregoing rules on revision of ballots stipulate that the printing of the picture images of the
ballots may be resorted to only after the proper Revision/Recount Committee has first determined that
the integrity of the ballots and the ballot boxes was not preserved.
The foregoing rules further require that the decryption of the images stored in the CF cards and the
printing of the decrypted images take place during the revision or recount proceedings. There is a good
reason for thus fixing where and by whom the decryption and the printing should be conducted. It is
during the revision or recount conducted by the Revision/Recount Committee when the parties are
allowed to be represented, with their representatives witnessing the proceedings and timely raising their
objections in the course of the proceedings. Moreover, whenever the Revision/Recount Committee
makes any determination that the ballots have been tampered and have become unreliable, the parties
are immediately made aware of such determination.
When, as in the present case, it was not the Revision/Recount Committee or the RTC exercising original
jurisdiction over the protest that made the finding that the ballots had been tampered, but the First
Division in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the parties should have been given a formal notice
thereof.
Maliksi was not immediately made aware of that crucial finding because the First Division did not even
issue any written resolution stating its reasons for ordering the printing of the picture images. The
parties were formally notified that the First Division had found that the ballots had been tampered only
when they received the resolution of August 15, 2012, whereby the First Division nullified the decision of
the RTC and declared Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor. Even so, the resolution of the First Division
to that effect was unusually mute about the factual bases for the finding of ballot box tampering, and did
not also particularize how and why the First Division was concluding that the integrity of the ballots had
been compromised. All that the First Division declared as justification was a simple generalization of the
same being apparent from the allegations of ballot and ballot box tampering and upon inspection of the
ballot boxes, viz:
The Commission (First Division) took into consideration the allegations of ballot and ballot box tampering
and upon inspecting the ballot boxes, it is apparent that the integrity of the ballots had been
compromised so, to be able to best determine the true will of the electorate, we decided to go over the
digital image of the appealed ballots.8(Emphasis supplied)
It was the COMELEC En Banc’s assailed resolution of September 14, 2012 that later on provided the
explanation to justify the First Division’s resort to the picture images of the ballots, by observing that the
"unprecedented number of double-votes" exclusively affecting the position of Mayor and the votes for
Saquilayan had led to the belief that the ballots had been tampered. However, that explanation by the
COMELEC En Banc did not cure the First Division’s lapse and did not erase the irregularity that had
already invalidated the First Division’s proceedings.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Antonio T. Carpio advances the view that the COMELEC’s finding of
ballot tampering was a mere surplusage because there was actually no need for such finding before the
ballots’ digital counterparts could be used. He cites Section 3, Rule 16 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804,
as amended by Resolution No. 9164, which states:
Section 3. Printing of Ballot Images. - In case the parties deem it necessary, they may file a motion to be
approved by the Division of the Commission requesting for the printing of ballot images in addition to
those mentioned in the second paragraph of item (e). Parties concerned shall provide the necessary

materials in the printing of images such as but not limited to copying papers, toners and printers. Parties
may also secure, upon prior approval by the Division of the Commission, a soft copy of the ballot images
contained in a secured/hashed disc on the condition that the ballot images be first printed, at the
expense of the requesting party, and that the printed copies be signed by the parties’ respective revisors
or representatives and by an ERSD IT-capable representative and deposited with the Commission.
The Over-all chairman shall coordinate with the Director IV, Election Records and Statistics Department
(ERSD), for the printing of images. Said director shall in turn designate a personnel who will be
responsible in the printing of ballot images.
Justice Carpio posits that when a party files a motion for the printing of the ballots that he or she deems
necessary, there is actually no need for a finding of tampering of the ballots or the ballot boxes before
the COMELEC Division may grant the motion. He states that a determination by the parties that the
printing is necessary under Section 3 is a ground separate from Section 6(e), which in turn pertinently
states that:
Section 6. Conduct of the Recount –
(e) Before the opening of the ballot box, the Recount Committee shall note its condition as well as that
of the locks or locking mechanism and record the condition in the recount report. From its observation,
the Recount Committee must also make a determination as to whether the integrity of the ballot box has
been preserved.
In the event that there are signs of tampering or if the ballot box appears to have been compromised,
the Recount Committee shall still proceed to open the ballot box and make a physical inventory of the
contents thereof. The committee shall, however, record its general observation of the ballots and other
documents found in the ballot box.
The application of Section 3 to this case is inappropriate, considering that the First Division did not in any
way suggest in its decision dated August 15, 2010 that it was resolving Saquilayan’s motion to print the
ballot images. Instead, the First Division made therein a finding of tampering, thus:
The COMELEC (First Division) took into consideration the allegations of ballot and ballot box tampering
and upon inspecting the ballot boxes, it is apparent that the integrity of the ballots had been
compromised so, to be able to best determine the true will of the electorate, we decided to go over the
digital images of the appealed ballots.
Even the COMELEC En Banc did not indicate in its decision dated September 14, 2012 that the First
Division merely resolved Saquilayan’s motion for the printing of the ballot images; instead, it reinforced
the First Division’s finding that there was tampering of the ballots. The non-mention of Saquilayan’s
motion was a clear indication of the COMELEC’s intention to act motu proprio; and also revealed its
interpretation of its very own rules, that there must be justifiable reason, i.e. tampering, before the
ballot images could be resorted to.
The application of Section 3 would only highlight the First Division’s denial of Maliksi’s right to due
process. For, if the First Division was really only acting on a motion to allow the printing of the ballot
images, there was a greater reason for the First Division to have given the parties notice of its ruling
thereon. But, as herein noted, the First Division did not issue such ruling.
55
To interpret Section 3 as granting to any one of the parties the right to move for the printing of the ballot
images should such party deem it necessary, and the COMELEC may grant such motion, is contrary to its
clear wording. Section 3 explicitly states: "in case the parties deem it necessary, they may file a motion."
The provision really envisions a situation in which both parties have agreed that the ballot images should
be printed. Should only one of the parties move for the printing of the ballot images, it is not Section 3
that applies but Section 6(e), which then requires a finding that the integrity of the ballots has been
compromised.
The disregard of Maliksi’s right to be informed of the decision to print the picture images of the ballots
and to conduct the recount proceedings during the appellate stage cannot be brushed aside by the
invocation of the fact that Maliksi was able to file, after all, a motion for reconsideration. To be exact, the
motion for reconsideration was actually directed against the entire resolution of the First Division, while
Maliksi’s claim of due process violation is directed only against the First Division’s recount proceedings
that resulted in the prejudicial result rendered against him. Notably, the First Division did not issue any
order directing the recount. Without the written order, Maliksi was deprived of the chance to seek any
reconsideration or even to assail the irregularly-held recount through a seasonable petition for certiorari
in this Court. In that context, he had no real opportunity to assail the conduct of the recount
proceedings.
The service of the First Division orders requiring Saquilayan to post and augment the cash deposits for
the printing of the picture images did not sufficiently give Maliksi notice of the First Division’s decision to
print the picture images. The said orders did not meet the requirements of due process because they did
not specifically inform Maliksi that the ballots had been found to be tampered. Nor did the orders offer
the factual bases for the finding of tampering. Hence, to leave for Maliksi to surmise on the factual bases
for finding the need to print the picture images still violated the principles of fair play, because the
responsibility and the obligation to lay down the factual bases and to inform Maliksi as the party to be
potentially prejudiced thereby firmly rested on the shoulders of the First Division.
Moreover, due process of law does not only require notice of the decryption, printing, and recount
proceedings to the parties, but also demands an opportunity to be present at such proceedings or to be
represented therein. Maliksi correctly contends that the orders of the First Division simply required
Saquilayan to post and augment his cash deposit. The orders did not state the time, date, and venue of
the decryption and recount proceedings. Clearly, the First Division had no intention of giving the parties
the opportunity to witness its proceedings.
Mendoza v. Commission on Elections9 instructs that notice to the parties and their participation are
required during the adversarial aspects of the proceedings. In that case, after the revision of the ballots
and after the election protest case was submitted for decision, the ballots and ballot boxes were
transferred to the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) in connection with a protest case pending in the SET.
Mendoza later learned that the COMELEC, with the permission of the SET, had meanwhile conducted
proceedings within the SET’s premises. Mendoza then claimed that his right to due process was violated
because he had not been given notice by the COMELEC that it would be conducting further proceedings
within the SET premises. The Court did not sustain his claim, however, and pointed out:
After consideration of the respondents’ Comments and the petitioner’s petition and Reply, we hold that
the contested proceedings at the SET ("contested proceedings") are no longer part of the adversarial
aspects of the election contest that would require notice of hearing and the participation of the parties.
As the COMELEC stated in its Comment and without any contrary or disputing claim in the petitioner’s
Reply:

"However, contrary to the claim of petitioner, public respondent in the appreciation of the contested
ballots in EPC No. 2007-44 simultaneously with the SET in SET Case No. 001-07 is not conducting "further
proceedings" requiring notice to the parties. There is no revision or correction of the ballots because EPC
No. 2007-04 was already submitted for resolution. Public respondent, in coordinating with the SET, is
simply resolving the submitted protest case before it. The parties necessarily take no part in said
deliberation, which require utmost secrecy. Needless to state, the actual decision-making process is
supposed to be conducted only by the designated members of the Second Division of the public
respondent in strict confidentiality."
In other words, what took place at the SET were the internal deliberations of the COMELEC, as a quasi-
judicial body, in the course of appreciating the evidence presented and deciding the provincial election
contest on the merits. These deliberations are no different from judicial deliberations which are
considered confidential and privileged. We find it significant that the private respondent’s Comment fully
supported the COMELEC’s position and disavowed any participation in the contested proceeding the
petitioner complained about. The petitioner, on the other hand, has not shown that the private
respondent was ever present in any proceeding at the SET relating to the provincial election
contest.1âwphi1
To conclude, the rights to notice and to be heard are not material considerations in the COMELEC’s
handling of the Bulacan provincial election contest after the transfer of the ballot boxes to the SET; no
proceedings at the instance of one party or of COMELEC has been conducted at the SET that would
require notice and hearing because of the possibility of prejudice to the other party. The COMELEC is
under no legal obligation to notify either party of the steps it is taking in the course of deliberating on
the merits of the provincial election contest. In the context of our standard of review for the petition, we
see no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the COMELEC
in its deliberation on the Bulacan election contest and the appreciation of ballots this deliberation
entailed.10 (Emphasis supplied.)
Here, the First Division denominated the proceedings it had conducted as an "appreciation of ballots"
like in Mendoza. But unlike in Mendoza, the proceedings conducted by the First Division were
adversarial, in that the proceedings included the decryption and printing of the picture images of the
ballots and the recount of the votes were to be based on the printouts of the picture images. The First
Division did not simply review the findings of the RTC and the Revision Committee, but actually
conducted its own recount proceedings using the printouts of the picture image of the ballots. As such,
the First Division was bound to notify the parties to enable them to participate in the proceedings.
Significantly, Section 6(l), Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No, 8804, as amended by COMELEC Resolution
No. 9164, requires the parties’ presence during the printing of the images of the ballots, thus:
(l) In the event the Recount Committee determines that the integrity of the ballots has been violated or
has not been preserved, or are wet and otherwise in such a condition that it cannot be recounted, the
Chairman of the Committee shall request from the Election Records and Statistics Department (ERSD),
the printing of the image of the ballots of the subject precinct stored in the CF card used in the May 10,
2010 elections in the presence of the parties. Printing of the ballot images shall proceed only upon prior
authentication and certification by a duly authorized personnel of the Election Records and Statistics
Department (ERSD) that the data or the images to be printed are genuine and not substitutes.
We should not ignore that the parties’ participation during the revision and recount proceedings would
not benefit only the parties, but was as vital and significant for the COMELEC as well, for only by their
56
participation would the COMELEC’s proceedings attain credibility as to the result. The parties’ presence
would have ensured that the requisite procedures have been followed, including the required
authentication and certification that the images to be printed are genuine. In this regard, the COMELEC
was less than candid, and was even cavalier in its conduct of the decryption and printing of the picture
images of the ballots and the recount proceedings. The COMELEC was merely content with listing the
guidelines that the First Division had followed in the appreciation of the ballots and the results of the
recount. In short, there was vagueness as to what rule had been followed in the decryption and printing
proceeding.
II.
Remand to the COMELEC
We are mindful of the urgent need to speedily resolve the election protest because the term of the
position involved is about to end. Thus, we overlook pro hac vice the lack of factual basis for the
COMELEC’s decision to use the digital images of the ballots and sustain its decision thereon. Although a
remand of the election protest to the RTC would have been the appropriate procedure, we direct the
COMELEC En Banc instead to conduct the decryption and printing of the digital images of the ballots and
to hold recount proceedings, with due notice to all the parties and opportunity for them to be present
and to participate during such proceedings. Nothing less serves the ideal objective safeguarded by the
Constitution.
In the absence of particular rules to govern its proceedings in accordance with this disposition, the
COMELEC is urged to follow and observe Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as amended by
COMELEC Resolution No. 9164.
The Court, by this resolution, does not intend to validate the victory of any of the parties in the 2010
Elections. That is not the concern of the Court as yet. The Court simply does not want to countenance a
denial of the fundamental right to due process, a cornerstone of our legal system.11 After all, it is the
Court’s primary duty to protect the basic rights of the people vis-à-vis government actions, thus:
It cannot be denied that most government actions are inspired with noble intentions, all geared towards
the betterment of the nation and its people. But then again, it is important to remember this ethical
principle: "The end does not justify the means." No matter how noble and worthy of admiration the
purpose of an act, but if the means to be employed in accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with
constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be allowed. The Court cannot just turn a blind eye and
simply let it pass. It will continue to uphold the Constitution and its enshrined principles.12
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of
petitioner Emmanuel Maliksi; REVERSES the Court's decision promulgated on March 12, 2013; and
DIRECTS the Commission on Elections En Bane to conduct proceedings for the decryption of the picture
images of the ballots involved in the protest after due authentication, and for the recount of ballots by
using the printouts of the ballot images, with notice to and in the presence of the parties or their
representatives in accordance with the procedure laid down by Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No.
8804, as amended by Resolution No. 9164.
No pronouncement on costs of suit. SO ORDERED.
 57

Facts:
During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Saquilayan the winner for the
position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the second highest number of
votes, brought an election protest in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite alleging that there
were irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts. Subsequently, the RTC held a
revision of the votes, and, based on the results of the revision, declared Maliksi as the duly elected
Mayor of Imus commanding Saquilayan to cease and desist from performing the functions of said office.
Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC. In the meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksi’s motion for execution
pending appeal, and Maliksi was then installed as Mayor. In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC First
Division, without giving notice to the parties, decided to recount the ballots through the use of the
printouts of the ballot images from the CF cards. Thus, it issued an order dated March 28, 2012 requiring
Saquilayan to deposit the amount necessary to defray the expenses for the decryption and printing of
the ballot images. Later, it issued another order dated April 17, 2012 for Saquilayan to augment his cash
deposit.
Issue: Whether or not the conduct of recount by the first division of the COMELEC is proper.
invocation of the fact that Maliksi was able to file, after all, a motion for reconsideration. To be exact, the
motion for reconsideration was actually directed against the entire resolution of the First Division, while
Maliksi’s claim of due process violation is directed only against the First Division’s recount proceedings
that resulted in the prejudicial result rendered against him. Notably, the First Division did not issue any
order directing the recount. Without the written order, Maliksi was deprived of the chance to seek any
reconsideration or even to assail the irregularly-held recount through a seasonable petition for certiorari
in this Court. In that context, he had no real opportunity to assail the conduct of the recount
proceedings.
The service of the First Division orders requiring Saquilayan to post and augment the cash deposits for
the printing of the picture images did not sufficiently give Maliksi notice of the First Division’s decision to
print the picture images. The said orders did not meet the requirements of due process because they did
not specifically inform Maliksi that the ballots had been found to be tampered. Nor did the orders offer
the factual bases for the finding of tampering. Hence, to leave for Maliksi to surmise on the factual bases
for finding the need to print the picture images still violated the principles of fair play, because the
responsibility and the obligation to lay down the factual bases and to inform Maliksi as the party to be
potentially prejudiced thereby firmly rested on the shoulders of the First Division.

Held:

No. It bears stressing at the outset that the First Division should not have conducted the assailed recount
proceedings because it was then exercising appellate jurisdiction as to which no existing rule of
procedure allowed it to conduct a recount in the first instance. The recount proceedings authorized
under Section 6, Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as amended, are to be conducted by the
COMELEC Divisions only in the exercise of their exclusive original jurisdiction over all election protests
involving elective regional (the autonomous regions), provincial and city officials.

Section 6, Rule 10 (Conduct of Revision) of the 2010 Rules of Procedure for Municipal Election Contests,
which governs the proceedings in the Regional Trial Courts exercising original jurisdiction over election
protests, provides:

(m) In the event that the revision committee determines that the integrity of the ballots and the ballot
box have not been preserved, as when proof of tampering or substitution exists, it shall proceed to
instruct the printing of the picture image of the ballots stored in the data storage device for the precinct.
The court shall provide a non-partisan technical person who shall conduct the necessary authentication
process to ensure that the data or image stored is genuine and not a substitute. Only after this
determination can the printed picture image be used for the recount.

The foregoing rules further require that the decryption of the images stored in the CF cards and the
printing of the decrypted images take place during the revision or recount proceedings. There is a good
reason for thus fixing where and by whom the decryption and the printing should be conducted. It is
during the revision or recount conducted by the Revision/Recount Committee when the parties are
allowed to be represented, with their representatives witnessing the proceedings and timely raising their
objections in the course of the proceedings. Moreover, whenever the Revision/Recount Committee
makes any determination that the ballots have been tampered and have become unreliable, the parties
are immediately made aware of such determination.

The disregard of Maliksi’s right to be informed of the decision to print the picture images of the ballots
and to conduct the recount proceedings during the appellate stage cannot be brushed aside by the
 58

EN BANC Nevertheless, the Law Department recommended the dismissal of petitioners’ complaint. Citing the
rulings of this Court in Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC2 and Salcedo II v. COMELEC,3 the Law Department
held that the misrepresentation in private respondent’s certificate of candidacy was not material to his
G.R. No. 172840 June 7, 2007
eligibility as a candidate and could not be a ground for his prosecution.

NELSON T. LLUZ and CATALINO C. ALDEOSA, petitioners,

However, upon motion of petitioners, the COMELEC En Banc by Resolution dated 5 October
vs.
2005 ordered the Law Department to file an information against private respondent for violation of
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CAESAR O. VICENCIO, respondents.
Section 262 in relation to Section 74 of B.P. 881. In reversing the resolution of the Law Department, the
COMELEC En Banc ruled that Romualdez-Marcosand Salcedo were disqualification cases not applicable
DECISION to the case of private respondent who is sought to be prosecuted for an election offense. As such, the
misrepresentation made by private respondent need not be material to his eligibility as a candidate in
CARPIO, J.: order to hold him liable under Section 262. The COMELEC En Banc further ruled that election offenses
are mala prohibita, in which case no proof of criminal intent is required and good faith, ignorance, or
lack of malice are not valid defenses.
The Case

On 18 October 2005, private respondent moved for reconsideration.

This petition for certiorari1 seeks to annul the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En
Bancdated 1 February 2006 and 25 May 2006 in E.O. Case No. 04-5. The 1 February 2006 resolution ruled
that no probable cause exists to charge private respondent Caesar O. Vicencio with violation of Section The Ruling of the COMELEC
262 in relation to Section 74 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (B.P. 881), otherwise known as the Omnibus
Election Code. The 25 May 2006 resolution denied petitioners Nelson T. Lluz and Catalino C. Aldeosa’s On 1 February 2006, the COMELEC En Banc reconsidered its earlier Resolution, explaining thus:
motion for reconsideration of the 1 February 2006 resolution.
After a careful evaluation x x x [w]e rule to grant the motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
Criminal intent is not absolutely disregarded in election offense cases. A good example is the provision of
Private respondent was a candidate for the post of punong barangay of Barangay 2, Poblacion, Catubig, Section 261(y)(17) of [B.P. 881], which requires malicious intent in order that a person may be charged
Samar in the 15 July 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. In his certificate for omitting, tampering, or transferring to another list the name of a registered voter from the official list
of candidacy, private respondent stated his profession or occupation as a certified public accountant of voters posted outside the polling place.
(CPA). Private respondent won in the elections.
In relation thereto, the fact that an offense is malum prohibitum does not exempt the same from the
Sometime after private respondent’s proclamation, petitioners charged him before the Law Department coverage of the general principles of criminal law. In this case, the provisions of Section 261 of [B.P. 881]
of the COMELEC (Law Department) with violation of Section 262 in relation to Section 74 of B.P. 881. must not be taken independent of the concepts and theories of criminal law.
Petitioners claimed they had proof that private respondent misrepresented himself as a CPA. Attached
to petitioners’ complaint was a Certification signed by Jose Ariola, Director II, Regulations Office of the
The offense allegedly committed by the respondent is for failure to disclose his true occupation as
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), stating that private respondent’s name does not appear in
required under Section 74 of [B.P. 881]. Apparently, respondent misrepresented himself as a CPA when
the book of the Board of Accountancy. The book contains the names of those duly authorized to practice
in fact he is not. The misrepresentation having been established, the next issue posited by the parties
accountancy in the Philippines.
is whether or not the misrepresentation should be material before it can be considered as an election
offense.
In his Answer, private respondent maintained that he was a CPA and alleged that he passed the CPA
Board Examinations in 1993 with a rating of 76%. Private respondent argued that he could not be held
We answer in the affirmative. Violation of Section 74 is a species of perjury, which is the act of knowingly
liable for an election offense because his alleged misrepresentation of profession was not material to his
making untruthful statements under oath. Settled is the rule that for perjury to be committed, it must be
eligibility as a candidate.
made with regard to a material matter.

On 21 September 2004, the Law Department through its Director Alioden D. Dalaig issued a subpoena
Clearly, the principle of materiality remains to be a crucial test in determining whether a person can be
requiring the Chief of the PRC’s Records Section to appear before it and settle the controversy on
charged with violating Section 74 of [B.P. 881] in relation to Section 262 thereof.
whether private respondent was indeed a CPA. On 6 October 2004, PRC Records Section Officer-in-
Charge Emma T. Francisco appeared before the Law Department and produced a Certification showing
that private respondent had taken the 3 October 1993 CPA Board Examinations and obtained a failing The case of [Salcedo] sheds light as to what matters are deemed material with respect to the certificate
mark of 40.71%. of candidacy, to wit: citizenship, residency and other qualifications that may be imposed. The nature of a

candidate’s occupation is definitely not a material matter. To be sure, we do not elect a candidate on the
basis of his occupation.4
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the COMELEC En Banc denied in the assailed
Resolution dated 25 May 2006. The COMELEC declared that while it "condemn[ed] in the strongest
possible terms" private respondent’s "morally appalling, devious, calculating, [and] deceitful" act, it
could not prosecute private respondent for an election offense, but possibly only for an administrative or
criminal offense.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioners argue that:
1. The assailed resolutions failed to consider that a violation of Section 262 in relation to
Section 74 of B.P. 881 is malum prohibitum;
2. The ruling in Salcedo is not applicable to petitioners’ complaint, that is, a fact
misrepresented in a certificate of candidacy need not be material in order to constitute a
violation of Section 262 in relation to Section 74 of B.P. 881; and
3. Assuming arguendo that materiality of a misrepresentation is required to constitute a
violation of Section 262 in relation to Section 74 of B.P. 881, the assailed resolutions should
have
held material private respondent’s misrepresentation because it increased his chances of winning in the
elections.
The Ruling of the Court
Petitioners come to us on a single question of law: is an alleged misrepresentation of profession or
occupation on a certificate of candidacy punishable as an election offense under Section 262 in relation
to Section 74 of B.P. 881?
We rule in the negative.
In urging the Court to order the COMELEC to file the necessary information against private respondent,
petitioners invoke Sections 262 and 74 of B.P. 881, which we reproduce below:
Section 262. Other election offenses.—Violation of the provisions, or pertinent portions, of the
following sections of this Code shall constitute election offenses: Sections 9, 18, 74, 75, 76, 80, 81, 82,
83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111,
112, 122, 123, 127, 128, 129, 132, 134, 135, 145, 148, 150, 152, 172, 173, 174, 178, 180, 182, 184, 185,
186, 189, 190, 191, 192, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212,
59
213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 223, 229, 230, 231, 233, 234, 235, 236, 239 and 240. (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy.—The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person
filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if
for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized
city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status;
his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or
occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that
the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
Unless a candidate has officially changed his name through a court approved proceeding, a candidate
shall use in a certificate of candidacy the name by which he has been baptized, or he has not been
baptized in any church or religion, the name registered in the office of the local civil registrar or any
other name allowed under the provisions of existing law or, in the case [of] a Muslim, his Hadji name
after performing the prescribed religious pilgrimage: Provided, That when there are two or more
candidates for an office with the same name and surname, each candidate, upon being made aware or
such fact, shall state his paternal and maternal surname, except the incumbent who may continue to use
the name and surname stated in his certificate of candidacy when he was elected. He may also include
one nickname or stage name by which he is generally or popularly known in the locality.
The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix his latest photograph, passport size; a
statement in duplicate containing his bio-data and program of government not exceeding one hundred
words, if he so desires. (Emphasis supplied)
The penal coverage of Section 262 is limited.
From a cursory reading of Sections 262 and 74 of B.P. 881, one may possibly conclude that an act or
omission in violation of any of the provisions of Section 74 ipso facto constitutes an election offense.
Indeed, petitioners point out that private respondent’s misrepresentation of profession having been
proved before the COMELEC, the latter is compelled to prosecute him for violation of Section 262.
Petitioners argue that such a violation being an election offense, it is malum prohibitum and immediately
gives rise to criminal liability upon proof of commission.
Petitioners’ stance assumes that Section 262 penalizes without qualification the violation of the sections
it enumerates. This assumption is uncalled for in view of the wording of Section 262.
The listing of sections in Section 262 is introduced by the clause: "Violation of the provisions, or
pertinent portions, of the following sections shall constitute election offenses: x x x." The phraseology of
this introductory clause alerts us that Section 262 itself possibly limits its coverage to only pertinent
portions of Section 74. That such a possibility exists must not be taken lightly for two reasons. First, were
the phrase not necessary, the law’s framers would have instead directly declared that violation of "the
provisions" or "any provision" of the enumerated sections — without any qualification — would
constitute an election offense. It is a settled principle in statutory construction that whenever possible, a
legal provision, phrase, or word must not be so construed as to be meaningless and a useless surplusage
in the sense of adding nothing to the law or having no effect on it.5 Second, equally well-settled is the
 60

rule that a statute imposing criminal liability should be construed narrowly in its coverage such that only resultant disqualification of the accused in case of conviction. The COMELEC should have opted for a
those offenses clearly included, beyond reasonable doubt, will be considered within the operation of the more direct and speedy process available under the law, considering the vital public interest involved
statute.6 A return to Section 74 is thus imperative. and the necessity of resolving the question at the earliest possible time for the benefit of the inhabitants
of Leyte.9
Section 74 enumerates all information which a person running for public office must supply the
COMELEC in a sworn certificate of candidacy. Section 74 specifies that a certificate of candidacy shall By "direct and speedy process," the Court referred to Section 78 of B.P. 881, which states:
contain, among others, a statement that the person is announcing his or her candidacy for the office and
is eligible for such office, the unit of government which the person seeks to represent, his or her political
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.— A verified petition
party, civil status, date of birth, residence, and profession or occupation. Section 74 further requires that
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively
the person make several declarations: "that he will support and defend the Constitution of the
on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance" to it, "that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and
is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing
decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities," "that he is not a permanent resident or
of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen
immigrant to a foreign country," "that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily," and
days before the election. (Emphasis supplied)
"that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge."

Thus, upon considering the facts and seeing that Larrazabal’s misrepresentation of her residence put her
Section 74 does not expressly mention which portion in its provisions is pertinent to Section 262, or
qualification as a candidate at issue,10 the Court found that the case fell squarely within the provisions of
which among its provisions when violated is punishable as an election offense. Nothing in Section 74
Section 78 and directed the COMELEC to determine the residence qualification of Larrazabal. Notably,
partakes unmistakably of a penal clause or a positive prohibition comparable to those found in other
the Court did not make a finding that Abella had no cause of action under Section 262, but only
sections7 also mentioned in Section 262 that use the words "shall not." The Court is then left to interpret
characterized the criminal case as involving a "roundabout investigation" seeking an end — Larrazabal’s
the meaning of Section 74 to determine which of its provisions are penalized under Section 262, and
disqualification — that could be achieved more speedily through an administrative proceeding under
particularly if disclosure of profession or occupation is among such provisions.
Section 78. The ruling in Abella recognized that Larrazabal’s act of misrepresenting her residence, a fact
required to be stated in her certificate of candidacy under Section 74 and which was also a qualification
Our rulings in Abella v. Larrazabal and Salcedo clarify the concept of misrepresentation under B.P. 881. for all elective local officials, gave rise to two causes of action against her under B.P. 881: one, a criminal
complaint under Section 262; and second, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy under Section 78.
The issue in this case is novel, yet the facts and provisions of law now before us call to mind the cases
of Abella v. Larrazabal8 and Salcedo, perhaps the closest this case has to a relevant precedent.
The case of Salcedo six years after Abella tested the limits of Section 78 on the specific question of what
constitutes a material misrepresentation. In Salcedo, petitioner Victorino Salcedo prayed for the
Abella dwelt on the issue of misrepresentation of residence in a certificate of candidacy. Petitioner
disqualification of private respondent Emelita Salcedo (Emelita) from the mayoralty race in Sara, Iloilo on
Abella had filed a case against private respondent Larrazabal before the COMELEC on the ground that
the basis of the use of her surname. Petitioner alleged that Emelita’s marriage to Neptali Salcedo
the latter falsely claimed to be a resident of Kananga, Leyte in her certificate of candidacy. In the course
(Neptali) was void and therefore Emelita’s use of Neptali’s surname constituted a material
of the hearing, Larrazabal moved for clarification of the nature of the proceedings, asking the COMELEC
misrepresentation. The COMELEC ruled in favor of Emelita, finding that she committed no
to determine under what law her qualifications were being challenged. The COMELEC, by process of
misrepresentation. On appeal by petitioner, the Court held:
elimination, determined that the proceeding was not (1) intended against a nuisance candidate under
Section 69 of B.P. 881, as Larrazabal was obviously a bona fide candidate; (2) a petition for quo warranto
under Section 253 which could be filed only after Larrazabal’s proclamation, as Larrazabal had not yet In case there is a material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy, the Comelec is authorized to
been proclaimed; (3) a petition to deny due course to Larrazabal’s certificate of candidacy under Section deny due course to or cancel such certificate upon the filing of a petition by any person pursuant to
78, as Abella’s petition did not contain such prayer and was not filed in the manner required by the Section 78 x x x.
COMELEC Rules of Procedure; or (4) a petition for disqualification under Section 68, as Larrazabal was
not being charged with the commission of any election offense mentioned under the section. The
As stated in the law, in order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under Section 78,
COMELEC concluded that "the subject of the petition, to wit, misrepresentation in the certificate of
it is essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertain[s] to a material matter for the
candidacy, was actually a violation of Section 74" and must be prosecuted as an election offense under
sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate — the right to
Section 262. The COMELEC dismissed the petition and referred the case to its Law Department for
run for the elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. Although the law does not
prosecution.
specify what would be considered as a "material representation," the Court has interpreted this phrase
in a line of decisions applying Section 78 of [B.P. 881].
We held that the dismissal was improper. There we reasoned that the issue of residence having been
squarely raised before the COMELEC —
Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of the
Code refer[s] to qualifications for elective office. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the
x x x it should not have been shunted aside to the Law Department for a roundabout investigation of consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a false representation in [the]
[Larrazabal’s] qualification through the filing of a criminal prosecution, if found to be warranted, with certificate of candidacy are grave — to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving,

or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. It could not have been the intention of the law to
deprive a person of such a basic and substantive political right to be voted for a public office upon just
any innocuous mistake.
Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must consist of a
"deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible." In other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one’s
qualifications for public office. x x x11(Emphasis supplied)
From these two cases several conclusions follow. First, a misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy
is material when it refers to a qualification for elective office and affects the candidate’s eligibility.
Second, when a candidate commits a material misrepresentation, he or she may be proceeded against
through a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78, or through
criminal prosecution under Section 262 for violation of Section 74. Third, a misrepresentation of a non-
material fact, or a non-material misrepresentation, is not a ground to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy under Section 78. In other words, for a candidate’s certificate of candidacy to be
denied due course or canceled by the COMELEC, the fact misrepresented must pertain to a qualification
for the office sought by the candidate.
Profession or occupation is not a qualification for elective office, and therefore not a material fact in a
certificate of candidacy.
No elective office, not even the office of the President of the Republic of the Philippines, requires a
certain profession or occupation as a qualification. For local elective offices including that of punong
barangay, Republic Act No. 7160 (R.A. 7160) or the Local Government Code of 1991 prescribes only
qualifications pertaining to citizenship, registration as a voter, residence, and language. Section 39 of
R.A. 7160 states:
Section 39. Qualifications. –
(a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at
least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or
any other local language or dialect.
Profession or occupation not being a qualification for elective office, misrepresentation of such does not
constitute a material misrepresentation. Certainly, in a situation where a candidate misrepresents his or
her profession or occupation in the certificate of candidacy, the candidate may not be disqualified from
running for office under Section 78 as his or her certificate of candidacy cannot be denied due course or
canceled on such ground.
In interpreting a law, the Court must avoid an unreasonable or unjust construction.
Were we to follow petitioners’ line of thought, for misrepresentation of a non-material fact, private
respondent could be prosecuted for an election offense and, if found guilty, penalized with
imprisonment and other accessory penalties. B.P. 881 prescribes a uniform penalty for all election
offenses under it to cover those defined in Sections 262 and 261, to wit:
61
Section 264. Penalties. –— Any person found guilty of any election offense under this Code shall be
punished with imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years and shall not be
subject to probation. In addition, the guilty party shall be sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold
public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage. If he is a foreigner, he shall be sentenced to
deportation which shall be enforced after the prison term has been served. Any political party found
guilty shall be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than ten thousand pesos, which shall be imposed upon
such party after criminal action has been instituted in which their corresponding officials have been
found guilty.
The position taken by petitioners merely highlights for us the absurdity of not applying here the reasons
given by the Court in Salcedo, a mere disqualification case. In the present case, private respondent not
only could be disqualified from holding public office and from voting but could also be deprived of his
liberty were the COMELEC to pursue a criminal case against him. If in Salcedo the Court could not
conceive the law to have intended that a person be deprived "of such a basic and substantive political
right to be voted for a public office upon just any innocuous mistake" on the certificate of candidacy,
weightier considerations here demand that materiality of the misrepresentation also be held an essential
element of any violation of Section 74. Otherwise, every detail or piece of information within the four
corners of the certificate of candidacy, even that which has no actual bearing upon the candidate’s
eligibility, could be used as basis for the candidate’s criminal prosecution.
Further compelling us to dismiss this petition is the consideration that any complaint against private
respondent for perjury under the Revised Penal Code would necessarily have to allege the element of
materiality. The pertinent section of the Revised Penal Code states:
Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation.— The penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any
person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not being included in the provision of the
next preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material matter before
a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires. (Emphasis
supplied)
The basis of the crime of perjury is the willful assertion of a falsehood under oath upon a material
matter. Although the term "material matter" under Article 183 takes on a fairly general meaning, that is,
it refers to the main fact which is the subject of inquiry,12 in terms of being an element in the execution
of a statement under oath it must be understood as referring to a fact which has an effect on the
outcome of the proceeding for which the statement is being executed.13 Thus, in the case of a certificate
of candidacy, a material matter is a fact relevant to the validity of the certificate and which could serve
as basis to grant or deny due course to the certificate in case it is assailed under Section 78. Of course,
such material matter would then refer only to the qualifications for elective office required to be stated
in the certificate of candidacy.
Perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code carries the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period and translates to imprisonment for four months and
one day up to two years and four months. The duration of this imprisonment is a far cry from that meted
by Section 264 of B.P. 881, which is a minimum of one year up to a maximum of six years. With the
gravity of the punishment provided by B.P. 881 for violation of election offenses, we glean the intention
of the law to limit culpability under Section 262 for violation of Section 74 only to a material
misrepresentation. We thus adhere to the more reasonable construction of the term "pertinent
portions" found in Section 262, in particular reference to Section 74, to mean only those portions of
Section 74 which prescribe qualification requirements of a candidate.
 62

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the En Banc Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections dated 1 February 2006 and 25 May 2006.

SO ORDERED.

FACTS:

Private respondent was a candidate for the post of punong barangay of Barangay 2, Poblacion, Catubig,
Samar in the 15 July 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. In his certificate
of candidacy, private respondent misrepresented himself as a certified public accountant (CPA) as his
profession or occupation. Private respondent won in the elections. Thus, he was charged for an election
offense before the COMELEC. In his Answer, private respondent argued that he could not be held liable
for an election offense because his alleged misrepresentation of profession was not material to his
eligibility as a candidate.

ISSUE: Is an alleged misrepresentation of profession or occupation on a certificate of candidacy

punishable as an election offense under Section 262 in relation to Section 74 of B.P. 881?

HELD:

No elective office, not even the office of the President of the Republic of the Philippines, requires a
certain profession or occupation as a qualification. For local elective offices including that of punong
barangay, Republic Act No. 7160 (R.A. 7160) or the Local Government Code of 1991 prescribes only
qualifications pertaining to citizenship, registration as a voter, residence, and language. Section 39 of
R.A. 7160 states: x x x x Profession or occupation not being a qualification for elective office,
misrepresentation of such does not constitute a material misrepresentation. Certainly, in a situation
where a candidate misrepresents his or her profession or occupation in the certificate of candidacy, the
candidate may not be disqualified from running for office under Section 78 as his or her certificate of
candidacy cannot be denied due course or canceled on such ground.
 63

EN BANC resolution, the COMELEC En Banc issued motu proprio Resolution No. 961314 on January 15, 2013,
resolving "to CANCEL and DENY due course the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Romeo G. Jalosjos as
Mayor of Zamboanga City in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections" due to his perpetual
G.R. No. 205033 June 18, 2013
absolute disqualification as well as his failure to comply with the voter registration requirement. As basis,
the COMELEC En Banc relied on the Court’s pronouncement in the consolidated cases of Dominador
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, Petitioner, Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC and Agapito Cardino v. COMELEC15 (Jalosjos, Jr. and Cardino).
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MARIA ISABELLE G. CLIMACO-SALAZAR, ROEL B. NATIVIDAD,
Hence, the instant petition.
ARTURO N. ONRUBIA, AHMAD NARZAD K. SAMPANG, JOSE L. LOBREGAT, ADELANTE ZAMBOANGA
PARTY, AND ELBERT C. ATILANO, Respondents.
Issues Before the Court
DECISION
Submitted for the Court’s determination are the following issues: (a) whether the COMELEC En Banc
acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued motu proprio Resolution No. 9613 and in so doing, violated
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
petitioner’s right to due process; and (b) whether petitioner’s perpetual absolute disqualification to run
for elective office had already been removed by Section 40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known
Assailed in this petition for certiorari1 file under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC).
Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) En Bane Resolution No. 96132 dated January 15, 2013, ordering the
denial of due course to and/or cancellation of petitioner Romeo G. Jalosjos' certificate of candidacy (CoC)
The Court’s Ruling
as a mayoralty candidate for Zamboanga City.

The petition is bereft of merit.

The Facts

At the outset, the Court observes that the controversy in this case had already been mooted by the
On November 16, 2001, the Court promulgated its Decision in G.R. Nos. 132875-76, entitled "People of
exclusion of petitioner in the May 2013 Elections. Nevertheless, in view of the doctrinal value of the
the Philippines v. Romeo G. Jalosjos," convicting petitioner by final judgment of two (2) counts of
issues raised herein, which may serve to guide both the bench and the bar in the future, the Court takes
statutory rape and six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness.4 Consequently, he was sentenced to suffer the
this opportunity to discuss on the same.
principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal5 for each count, respectively, which
carried the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification pursuant to Article 41 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC).6 On April 30, 2007, then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued an order A. Nature and validity of motu
commuting his prison term to sixteen (16) years, three (3) months and three (3) days (Order of proprio issuance of Resolution No.
Commutation). After serving the same, he was issued a Certificate of Discharge From Prison on March 9613.
18, 2009.7
Petitioner claims that the COMELEC En Banc usurped the COMELEC Divisions’ jurisdiction by cancelling
On April 26, 2012,8 petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City. However, because of his motu proprio petitioner’s CoC through Resolution No. 9613, contrary to Section 3, Article IX-C of the
previous conviction, his application was denied by the Acting City Election Officer of the Election 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) which reads:
Registration Board (ERB), prompting him to file a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters
(Petition for Inclusion) before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Zamboanga City, Branch 1
SEC. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
(MTCC).9 Pending resolution of the same, he filed a CoC10 on October 5, 2012, seeking to run as mayor
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies.
for Zamboanga City in the upcoming local elections scheduled on May 13, 2013 (May 2013 Elections). In
All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration
his CoC, petitioner stated, inter alia, that he is eligible for the said office and that he is a registered voter
of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
of Barangay Tetuan, Zamboanga City.

Concomitantly, he also claims that his right to procedural due process had been violated by the
On October 18, 2012,11 the MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion on account of his perpetual absolute
aforementioned issuance.
disqualification which in effect, deprived him of the right to vote in any election. Such denial was
affirmed by the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch 14 (RTC) in its October 31, 2012
Order12 which, pursuant to Section 13813 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, as amended, otherwise known The Court is not persuaded.
as the "Omnibus Election Code" (OEC), was immediately final and executory.
The above-cited constitutional provision requiring a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En
Meanwhile, five (5) petitions were lodged before the COMELEC’s First and Second Divisions (COMELEC Banc may take action is confined only to cases where the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial power. It
Divisions), praying for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of petitioner’s CoC. Pending
 64

finds no application, however, in matters concerning the COMELEC’s exercise of administrative Applying these principles to the case at bar, it is clear that the COMELEC En Banc did not exercise its
functions. The distinction between the two is well-defined. As illumined in Villarosa v. COMELEC:16 quasi-judicial functions when it issued Resolution No. 9613 as it did not assume jurisdiction over any
pending petition or resolve any election case before it or any of its divisions. Rather, it merely performed
its duty to enforce and administer election laws in cancelling petitioner’s CoC on the basis of his
The term ‘administrative’ connotes, or pertains, to ‘administration, especially management, as by
perpetual absolute disqualification, the fact of which had already been established by his final
managing or conducting, directing or superintending, the execution, application, or conduct of persons
conviction. In this regard, the COMELEC En Banc was exercising its administrative functions, dispensing
or things. It does not entail an opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a
with the need for a motion for reconsideration of a division ruling under Section 3, Article IX-C of the
decision or resolution thereon. While a ‘quasi-judicial function’ is a term which applies to the action,
Constitution, the same being required only in quasi-judicial proceedings.
discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their
official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Lest it be misunderstood, while the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of one’s CoC generally
necessitates the exercise of the COMELEC’s quasi-judicial functions commenced through a petition based
on either Sections 1220 or 7821 of the OEC, or Section 4022 of the LGC, when the grounds therefor are
Crucial therefore to the present disquisition is the determination of the nature of the power exercised by
rendered conclusive on account of final and executory judgments – as when a candidate’s
the COMELEC En Banc when it promulgated Resolution No. 9613.
disqualification to run for public office is based on a final conviction – such exercise falls within the
COMELEC’s administrative functions, as in this case.
The foregoing matter is not without established precedent. In Jalosjos, Jr. and Cardino, the Court held
that the COMELEC’s denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC in view of a candidate’s
In this light, there is also no violation of procedural due process since the COMELEC En Banc would be
disqualification to run for elective office based on a final conviction is subsumed under its mandate to
acting in a purely administrative manner. Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying
enforce and administer all laws relating to the conduct of elections. Accordingly, in such a situation, it is
policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs.23 As petitioner’s
the COMELEC’s duty to cancel motu proprio the candidate’s CoC, notwithstanding the absence of any
disqualification to run for public office had already been settled in a previous case and now stands
petition initiating a quasi-judicial proceeding for the resolution of the same. Thus, the Court stated:17
beyond dispute, it is incumbent upon the COMELEC En Banc to cancel his CoC as a matter of course, else
it be remiss in fulfilling its duty to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or under of an election.
Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run for
Equally compelling is the fact that the denial of petitioner’s Petition for Inclusion as a registered voter in
public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is notice to the
Zamboanga City had already attained finality by virtue of the RTC’s Order dated October 31, 2012. In this
COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for public office. The law itself bars the
accord, petitioner’s non-compliance with the voter registration requirement under Section 39(a) of the
convict from running for public office, and the disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction.
LGC24 is already beyond question and likewise provides a sufficient ground for the cancellation of his CoC
The final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other
altogether.
government agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the law.

B. Petitioner’s right to run for

Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the disqualification,
elective office.
it is assumed that the portion of the final judgment on disqualification to run for elective public office is
addressed to the COMELEC because under the Constitution the COMELEC is duty bound to "enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election." The disqualification of a It is petitioner’s submission that Article 30 of the RPC was partially amended by Section 40(a) of the LGC
convict to run for public office under the Revised Penal Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a and thus, claims that his perpetual absolute disqualification had already been removed.
competent court, is part of the enforcement and administration of "all laws" relating to the conduct of
elections.
The argument is untenable.

To allow the COMELEC to wait for a person to file a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of one
Well-established is the rule that every new statute should be construed in connection with those already
suffering from perpetual special disqualification will result in the anomaly that these cases so
existing in relation to the same subject matter and all should be made to harmonize and stand together,
grotesquely exemplify. Despite a prior perpetual special disqualification, Jalosjos was elected and served
if they can be done by any fair and reasonable interpretation.25
twice as mayor. The COMELEC will be grossly remiss in its constitutional duty to "enforce and administer
all laws" relating to the conduct of elections if it does not motu proprio bar from running for public office
those suffering from perpetual special disqualification by virtue of a final judgment. (Emphasis and On the one hand, Section 40(a) of the LGC, applicable as it is to local elective candidates, provides:
underscoring supplied)
SEC. 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
In Aratea v. COMELEC (Aratea),18 the Court similarly pronounced that the disqualification of a convict to position:
run for public office, as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relating to the conduct of elections.19

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And on the other hand, Article 30 of the RPC reads:
ART. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. - The penalties of
perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held,
even if conferred by popular election.
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular office or to be elected to
such office.
3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of the
rights mentioned.
In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs 2
and 3 of this Article shall last during the term of the sentence.
4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Keeping with the above-mentioned statutory construction principle, the Court observes that the conflict
between these provisions of law may be properly reconciled. In particular, while Section 40(a) of the LGC
allows a prior convict to run for local elective office after the lapse of two (2) years from the time he
serves his sentence, the said provision should not be deemed to cover cases wherein the law26 imposes a
penalty, either as principal or accessory,27 which has the effect of disqualifying the convict to run for
elective office. An example of this would be Article 41 of the RPC, which imposes the penalty of
perpetual28 absolute29 disqualification as an accessory to the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua
and reclusion temporal:
ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their accessory penalties. - The penalties of
reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during
the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the
offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been
expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In this relation, Article 30 of the RPC, as earlier cited, provides that the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification has the effect of depriving the convicted felon of the privilege to run for elective office.
To note, this penalty, as well as other penalties of similar import, is based on the presumptive rule that
one who is rendered infamous by conviction of a felony, or other base offense indicative of moral
turpitude, is unfit to hold public office,30 as the same partakes of a privilege which the State grants only
to such classes of persons which are most likely to exercise it for the common good.31
65
Pertinently, it is observed that the import of Article 41 in relation to Article 30 of the RPC is more direct
and specific in nature – insofar as it deprives the candidate to run for elective office due to his conviction
– as compared to Section 40(a) of the LGC which broadly speaks of offenses involving moral turpitude
and those punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment without any consideration of certain
disqualifying effects to one’s right to suffrage. Accordingly, Section 40(a) of the LGC should be
considered as a law of general application and therefore, must yield to the more definitive RPC
provisions in line with the principle of lex specialis derogat generali – general legislation must give way to
special legislation on the same subject, and generally is so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which
the special provisions are not applicable. In other words, where two statutes are of equal theoretical
application to a particular case, the one specially designed therefor should prevail.32
In the present case, petitioner was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and
reclusion temporal which, pursuant to Article 41 of the RPC, carried with it the accessory penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification and in turn, pursuant to Article 30 of the RPC, disqualified him to run
for elective office. As discussed, Section 40(a) of the LGC would not apply to cases wherein a penal
provision – such as Article 41 in this case – directly and specifically prohibits the convict from running for
elective office. Hence, despite the lapse of two (2) years from petitioner’s service of his commuted
prison term, he remains bound to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification
which consequently, disqualifies him to run as mayor for Zamboanga City.
Notably, Article 41 of the RPC expressly states that one who is previously convicted of a crime punishable
by reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal continues to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the said accessory
penalty shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.33 In this case, the same accessory penalty had
not been expressly remitted in the Order of Commutation or by any subsequent pardon and as such,
petitioner’s disqualification to run for elective office is deemed to subsist.
Further, it is well to note that the use of the word "perpetual" in the aforementioned accessory penalty
connotes a lifetime restriction and in this respect, does not depend on the length of the prison term
which is imposed as its principal penalty. Instructive on this point is the Court’s ruling in Lacuna v.
Abes,34 where the court explained the meaning of the term "perpetual" as applied to the penalty of
disqualification to run for public office:
The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the convict for public office and
for the right to vote, such disqualification to last only during the term of the sentence (Article 27,
paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised Penal Code) that, in the case of Abes, would have expired on 13
October 1961.
But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. This accessory penalty deprives the convict of the
right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually, as distinguished from temporary special
disqualification, which lasts during the term of the sentence. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, adopting the Lacuna ruling, the Court, in the more recent cases of Aratea,35 Jalosjos, Jr. and
Cardino,36held:
Clearly, Lacuna instructs that the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification "deprives the
convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually."

The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately once the judgment
of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of this accessory penalty does not depend on the duration of
the principal penalty, or on whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not. The last sentence of
Article 32 states that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of
his [perpetual special] disqualification." Once the judgment of conviction becomes final, it is immediately
executory. Any public office that the convict may be holding at the time of his conviction becomes vacant
upon finality of the judgment, and the convict becomes ineligible to run for any elective public office
perpetually. (Emphasis underscoring supplied)
All told, applying the established principles of statutory construction, and more significantly, considering
the higher interests of preserving the sanctity of our elections, the Court holds that Section 40(a) of the
LGC has not removed the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification which petitioner continues to
suffer.1âwphi1 Thereby, he remains disqualified to run for any elective office pursuant to Article 30 of
the RPC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Facts:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari[1] filed under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
the Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) En Banc Resolution No. 9613[2] dated January 15,... 2013,
ordering the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of petitioner Romeo G. Jalosjos' certificate of
candidacy (CoC) as a mayoralty candidate for Zamboanga City.
The Facts
On November 16, 2001, the Court promulgated its Decision in G.R. Nos. 132875-76, entitled "People of
the Philippines v. Romeo G. Jalosjos,"[3] convicting petitioner by final judgment of two (2) counts of
statutory rape and six (6) counts of acts of... lasciviousness.[4] Consequently, he was sentenced to suffer
the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal[5] for each count, respectively,
which carried the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute... disqualification pursuant to Article 41 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).
On April 30, 2007, then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued an order commuting his prison term to
sixteen (16) years, three (3) months and three (3) days (Order of
Commutation).
After serving the same, he was issued a Certificate of Discharge From Prison on March 18, 2009
On April 26, 2012,[8] petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City. However, because of his
previous conviction, his application was denied by the Acting City Election Officer of the Election
Registration Board (ERB), prompting him to file a
Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters (Petition for Inclusion) before the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities of Zamboanga City, Branch 1 (MTCC).
Pending resolution of the same, he filed a CoC[10] on October 5, 2012,... seeking to run as mayor for
Zamboanga City in the upcoming local elections scheduled on May 13, 2013 (May 2013 Elections).
n his CoC, petitioner stated, inter alia, that he is eligible for the said office and that he is a registered
voter of Barangay Tetuan,... Zamboanga City.
66
On October 18, 2012,[11] the MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion on account of his perpetual
absolute disqualification which in effect, deprived him of the right to vote in any election.
Such denial was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga
City, Branch 14 (RTC) in its October 31, 2012 Order[12] which, pursuant to Section 138[13] of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 881, as amended, otherwise known as the "Omnibus Election Code" (OEC), was
immediately final and executory.
Meanwhile, five (5) petitions were lodged before the COMELEC's First and Second Divisions (COMELEC
Divisions), praying for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of petitioner's CoC
Pending resolution, the COMELEC En Banc issued motu proprio Resolution
No. 9613[14] on January 15, 2013, resolving "to CANCEL and DENY due course the Certificate of
Candidacy filed by Romeo G. Jalosjos as Mayor of Zamboanga City in the May 13, 2013 National and
Local Elections" due to his perpetual... absolute disqualification as well as his failure to comply with the
voter registration requirement.
As basis, the COMELEC En Banc relied on the Court's pronouncement in the consolidated cases of
Dominador Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC and Agapito Cardino v.
COMELEC[15] (Jalosjos, Jr. and Cardino).
Issues:
Issues Before the Court
(a) whether the COMELEC En Banc acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued motu proprio Resolution
No. 9613 and in so doing, violated petitioner's right to due process
(b) whether petitioner's... perpetual absolute disqualification to run for elective office had already been
removed by Section 40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of
1991" (LGC).
Ruling:
The Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
At the outset, the Court observes that the controversy in this case had already been mooted by the
exclusion of petitioner in the May 2013 Elections.
Nevertheless, in view of the doctrinal value of the issues raised herein, which may serve to guide both
the bench and the bar in... the future, the Court takes this opportunity to discuss on the same.
A. Nature and validity of motu proprio... issuance of Resolution No. 9613.
Petitioner claims that the COMELEC En Banc usurped the COMELEC Divisions' jurisdiction by cancelling
motu proprio petitioner's CoC through Resolution No. 9613, contrary to Section 3, Article IX-C of the
1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution)
The Court is not persuaded
The above-cited constitutional provision requiring a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En
Banc may take action is confined only to cases where the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial power.
It finds no application, however, in matters concerning the

COMELEC's exercise of administrative functions.
The distinction between the two is well-defined.
[T]he term 'administrative' connotes, or pertains, to 'administration, especially management, as by
managing or conducting, directing or superintending, the execution, application, or conduct of persons
or things. It does not entail an... opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and
a decision or resolution thereon.
While a 'quasi-judicial function' is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public
administrative officers or bodies, who are required... to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise
discretion of a judicial nature.
Crucial therefore to the present disquisition is the determination of the nature of the power exercised by
the COMELEC En Banc when it promulgated Resolution No. 9613.
In Jalosjos, Jr. and Cardino, the Court held that the COMELEC's denial of due course to and/or
cancellation of a CoC in view of a candidate's disqualification to run for elective office based on a... final
conviction is subsumed under its mandate to enforce and administer all laws relating to the conduct of
elections.
Accordingly, in such a situation, it is the COMELEC's duty to cancel motu proprio the candidate's CoC,
notwithstanding the absence of any... petition initiating a quasi-judicial proceeding for the resolution of
the same.
Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or under
Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory... penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run
for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction.
The final judgment of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from
running for public office.
The law itself... bars the convict from running for public office, and the disqualification is part of the final
judgment of conviction.
The final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other
government agencies tasked to implement the final... judgment under the law.
Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the disqualification,
it is assumed that the portion of the final judgment on disqualification to run for elective public office is
addressed to the COMELEC because under the Constitution the COMELEC... is duty bound to "[e]nforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election."
The disqualification of a convict to run for public office under the Revised Penal Code, as affirmed by
final judgment of a competent court, is part of the... enforcement and administration of "all laws"
relating to the conduct of elections.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, it is clear that the COMELEC En Banc did not exercise its
quasi-judicial functions when it issued Resolution No. 9613 as it did not assume jurisdiction over any
pending petition or resolve any election case before it or... any of its divisions.
Rather, it merely performed its duty to enforce and administer election laws in cancelling petitioner's
CoC on the basis of his perpetual absolute disqualification, the fact of which had already been
established by his final conviction
67
In... this regard, the COMELEC En Banc was exercising its administrative functions, dispensing with the
need for a motion for reconsideration of a division ruling under Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution,
the same being required only in quasi-judicial... proceedings.
while the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of one's CoC generally necessitates the exercise of
the COMELEC's quasi-judicial functions commenced through a petition based on either Sections 12[20]
or 78[21] of the OEC, or Section 40[22] of the LGC, when the grounds therefor are rendered conclusive
on account of final and executory judgments as when a candidate's disqualification to run for public
office is based on a final conviction such... exercise falls within the COMELEC's administrative functions,
as in this case.
In this light, there is also no violation of procedural due process since the COMELEC En Banc would be
acting in a purely administrative manner.
As petitioner's disqualification to run for public office had already been settled in a previous case and
now stands beyond dispute, it is incumbent upon the COMELEC En Banc to cancel his CoC as a matter of
course, else it be remiss in... fulfilling its duty to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of an election.
Equally compelling is the fact that the denial of petitioner's Petition for Inclusion as a registered voter in
Zamboanga City had already attained finality by virtue of the RTC's Order dated October 31, 2012.
In this accord, petitioner's non-compliance with the voter... registration requirement under Section 39(a)
of the LGC[24] is already beyond question and likewise provides a sufficient ground for the cancellation
of his CoC altogether.
B. Petitioner's right to run... for elective office.
Well-established is the rule that every new statute should be construed in connection with those already
existing in relation to the same subject matter and all should be made to harmonize and stand together,
if they can be done by any fair and reasonable... interpretation.
SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence
ART. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. - The penalties of
perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects:
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular office or to be elected to
such office.
In particular, while Section 40(a) of the LGC allows a prior convict to run for local elective office after
the... lapse of two (2) years from the time he serves his sentence, the said provision should not be
deemed to cover cases wherein the law[26] imposes a penalty, either as principal or accessory,[27]...
which has the effect of disqualifying the convict to run for elective office.
In this relation, Article 30 of the RPC, as earlier cited, provides that the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification has the effect of depriving the convicted felon of the privilege to run for elective office.
To note, this penalty, as well as other penalties of similar... import, is based on the presumptive rule that
one who is rendered infamous by conviction of a felony, or other base offense indicative of moral
 68

turpitude, is unfit to hold public office,[30] as the same partakes of a privilege which the State... grants
only to such classes of persons which are most likely to exercise it for the common good.[31]
Accordingly, Section 40(a) of the LGC should be considered as a law of general application... and
therefore, must yield to the more definitive RPC provisions in line with the principle of lex specialis
derogat generali general legislation must give way to special legislation on the same subject, and
generally is so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which... the special provisions are not applicable.
In other words, where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one
specially designed therefor should prevail.[32]
In the present case, petitioner was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and
reclusion temporal which, pursuant to Article 41 of the RPC, carried with it the accessory penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification and in turn, pursuant... to Article 30 of the RPC, disqualified him to
run for elective office.
As discussed, Section 40(a) of the LGC would not apply to cases wherein a penal provision such as Article
41 in this case directly and specifically prohibits the convict from running for elective office.
COMELEC's exercise of administrative functions.
The distinction between the two is well-defined.
[T]he term 'administrative' connotes, or pertains, to 'administration, especially management, as by
managing or conducting, directing or superintending, the execution, application, or conduct of persons
or things. It does not entail an... opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and
a decision or resolution thereon.
While a 'quasi-judicial function' is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public
administrative officers or bodies, who are required... to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise
discretion of a judicial nature.
Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or under
Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory... penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run
for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction.

Hence, despite the lapse of two (2) years from petitioner's service of his commuted prison term, he
remains bound to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification which
consequently, disqualifies him to run as mayor for Zamboanga City
Notably, Article 41 of the RPC expressly states that one who is previously convicted of a crime punishable
by reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal continues to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification even though pardoned as to the... principal penalty, unless the said accessory
penalty shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
while the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of one's CoC generally necessitates the exercise of
the COMELEC's quasi-judicial functions commenced through a petition based on either Sections 12[20]
or 78[21] of the OEC, or Section 40[22] of the LGC, when the grounds therefor are rendered conclusive
on account of final and executory judgments as when a candidate's disqualification to run for public
office is based on a final conviction such... exercise falls within the COMELEC's administrative functions

In this case, the same accessory penalty had not been expressly remitted in the Order of Commutation
or by any subsequent pardon and as... such, petitioner's disqualification to run for elective office is
deemed to subsist.
Likewise, adopting the Lacuna ruling, the Court, in the more recent cases of Aratea,[35] Jalosjos, Jr. and
Cardino,[36] held:
Clearly, Lacuna instructs that the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification "deprives the
convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually."

Once the judgment of conviction becomes final, it is immediately executory. Any... public office that the
convict may be holding at the time of his conviction becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment, and
the convict becomes ineligible to run for any elective public office perpetually.

All told, applying the established principles of statutory construction, and more significantly, considering
the higher interests of preserving the sanctity of our elections, the Court holds that Section 40(a) of the
LGC has not removed the penalty of perpetual absolute... disqualification which petitioner continues to
suffer.

Thereby, he remains disqualified to run for any elective office pursuant to Article 30 of the RPC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

Principles:

Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution)

The above-cited constitutional provision requiring a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En
Banc may take action is confined only to cases where the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial power. It
finds no application, however, in matters concerning the

EN BANC
G.R. No. 202202 March 19, 2013
SILVERIO R. TAGOLINO, Petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND LUCY MARIE TORRES-GOMEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the March 22,
2012 Decision1 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) in HRET Case No. 10-031 (QW)
which declared the validity of private respondent Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez’s substitution as the Liberal
Party’s replacement candidate for the position of Leyte Representative (Fourth Legislative District) in lieu
of Richard Gomez.
The Facts
On November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez (Richard) filed his certificate of candidacy2 (CoC) with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeking congressional office as Representative for the Fourth
Legislative District of Leyte under the ticket of the Liberal Party. Subsequently, on December 6, 2009, one
of the opposing candidates, Buenaventura Juntilla (Juntilla), filed a Verified Petition,3 alleging that
Richard, who was actually a resident of College Street, East Greenhills, San Juan City, Metro Manila,
misrepresented in his CoC that he resided in 910 Carlota Hills, Can-adieng, Ormoc City. In this regard,
Juntilla asserted that Richard failed to meet the one (1) year residency requirement under Section 6,
Article VI4 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) and thus should be declared
disqualified/ineligible to run for the said office. In addition, Juntilla prayed that Richard’s CoC be denied
due course and/or cancelled.5
On February 17, 2010, the COMELEC First Division rendered a Resolution6 granting Juntilla’s petition
without any qualification. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVE, to GRANT the
Petition to Disqualify Candidate for Lack of Qualification filed by BUENAVENTURA O. JUNTILLA against
RICHARD I. GOMEZ. Accordingly, RICHARD I. GOMEZ is DISQUALIFIED as a candidate for the Office of
Congressman, Fourth District of Leyte, for lack of residency requirement.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, Richard moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the COMELEC En Banc
through a Resolution dated May 4, 2010.7 Thereafter, in a Manifestation of even date, Richard accepted
the said resolution with finality "in order to enable his substitute to facilitate the filing of the necessary
documents for substitution."8
69
On May 5, 2010, Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez (private respondent) filed her CoC9 together with a Certificate
of Nomination and Acceptance10 from the Liberal Party endorsing her as the party’s official substitute
candidate vice her husband, Richard, for the same congressional post. In response to various letter-
requests submitted to the COMELEC’s Law Department (Law Department), the COMELEC En Banc, in the
exercise of its administrative functions, issued Resolution No. 889011 on May 8, 2010, approving, among
others, the recommendation of the said department to allow the substitution of private respondent. The
recommendation reads:
STUDY AND OBSERVATION
On the same date, this Department received an Opposition from Mr. Buenaventura O. Juntilla, thru his
counsel, opposing the candidacy of Ms. Lucy Marie Torres Gomez, as a substitute candidate for Mr.
Richard I. Gomez.
The crux of the opposition stemmed from the issue that there should be no substitution because there is
no candidate to substitute for.
It must be stressed that the resolution of the First Division, this Commission, in SPA No. 09-059 speaks
for disqualification of candidate Richard I. Gomez and not of cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy:
‘Wherefore, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the
Petition to Disqualify Candidate for Lack of Qualification filed x x x against RICHARD I. GOMEZ.
Accordingly, RICHARD I. GOMEZ is DISQUALIFIED as a candidate for the Office of Congressman, Fourth
District of Leyte, for lack of residency requirement.’
The said resolution was affirmed by the Commission En Banc on May 04, 2010.
The disqualification of a candidate does not automatically cancel one’s certificate of candidacy,
especially when it is nominated by a political party. In effect, the political party is still allowed to
substitute the candidate whose candidacy was declared disqualified. After all, the right to substitute is a
privilege given to a political party to exercise and not dependent totally to a candidate.
Nonetheless, in case of doubt, the same must always be resolved to the qualification of a candidate to
run in the public office.
The substitution complied with the requirements provided under Section 12 in relation to Section 13 of
Comelec Resolution No. 8678 dated October 6, 2009.
In view of the foregoing, the Law Department RECOMMENDS the following:
2. TO ALLOW CANDIDATE LUCY MARIE TORRES GOMEZ AS A SUBSTITUTE CANDIDATE FOR RICHARD
GOMEZ: (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The following day, or on May 9, 2010, Juntilla filed an Extremely Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration12 (May 9, 2010 Motion) of the above-mentioned COMELEC En Banc resolution

Pending resolution of Juntilla’s May 9, 2010 Motion, the national and local elections were conducted as
scheduled on May 10, 2010. During the elections, Richards, whose name remained on the ballots,
garnered 101, 250 votes while his opponents, namely, Eufrocino Codilla, Jr. and herein petitioner Silverio
Tagolino, obtained 76,549 and 493 votes, respectively.13 In view of the aforementioned substitution,
Richard’s votes were credited in favor of private respondent and as a result, she was proclaimed the
duly-elected Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte.
On May 11, 2010, Juntilla filed an Extremely Urgent Motion to resolve the pending May 9, 2010 Motion
relative to Resolution No. 8890.14 The said motion, however, remained unacted.
On May 24, 2010, petitioner filed a Petition15 for quo warranto before the HRET in order to oust private
respondent from her congressional seat, claiming that: (1) she failed to comply with the one (1) year
residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution considering that the transfer of her
voter registration from San Rafael Bulacan16 to the Fourth District of Leyte was only applied for on July
23, 2009; (2) she did not validly substitute Richard as his CoC was void ab initio; and (3) private
respondent’s CoC was void due to her non-compliance with the prescribed notarial requirements i.e.,
she failed to present valid and competent proof of her identity before the notarizing officer.17
In her Verified Answer,18 private respondent denied petitioner’s allegations and claimed that she validly
substituted her husband in the electoral process. She also averred that she personally known to the
notary public who notarized her CoC, one Atty. Edgardo Cordeno, and thus, she was not required to have
presented any competent proof of identity during the notarization of the said document. Lastly, she
asserted that despite her marriage to Richard and exercise of profession in Metro Manila, she continued
to maintain her residency in Ormoc City which was the place where she was born and raised.
During the preliminary conference, and as shown in the Preliminary Conference Order dated September
2, 2010, the parties agreed on the following issues for resolution:
1. Whether or not the instant petition for quo warranto is meritorious;
2. Whether or not the substitution of respondent is valid;
3. Whether or not a petition for quo warranto can be used as a substitute for failure to file the
necessary petition for disqualification with the COMELEC;
4. Whether or not respondent’s COC was duly subscribed; and
5. Whether or not respondent is ineligible for the position of Representative of the Fourth
District of Leyte for lack of residency requirement.19
Ruling of the HRET
After due proceedings, the HRET issued the assailed March 22, 2012 Decision20 which dismissed the quo
warranto petition and declared that private respondent was a qualified candidate for the position of
Leyte Representative (Fourth Legislative District). It observed that the resolution denying Richard’s
candidacy i.e., the COMELEC First Division’s February 17, 2010 Resolution, spoke of disqualification and
not of CoC cancellation. Hence, it held that the substitution of private respondent in lieu of Richard was
legal and valid.21 Also, it upheld the validity of private respondent’s CoC due to petitioner’s failure to
controvert her claim that she was personally known to the notary public who notarized her
CoC.22 Finally, the HRET ruled that while it had been admitted that private respondent resides in Colgate
Street, San Juan City and lived in San Rafael, Bulacan, the fact was she continued to retain her domicile in
Ormoc City given that her absence therefrom was only temporary.
70
Hence, the instant petition.
Issues Before the Court
The crux of the present controversy is whatever or not the HRET gravely abused its discretion in finding
that Richard was validly substituted by private respondent as candidate for Leyte Representative (Fourth
Legislative District) in view of the former’s failure to meet the one (1) year residency requirement
provided under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution.
It is petitioner’s submission that the HRET gravely abused its discretion when it upheld the validity of
private respondent’s substitution despite contrary jurisprudence holding that substitution is
impermissible where the substituted candidate’s CoC was denied due course to and/or cancelled, as in
the case of Richard. On the other hand, respondents maintain that Richard’s CoC was not denied due
course to and/or cancelled by the COMELEC as he was only "disqualified" and therefore, was properly
substituted by private respondent.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
A. Distinction between a petition for disqualification and a petition to deny due course to/cancel a
certificate of candidacy
The Omnibus Election Code23 (OEC) provides for certain remedies to assail a candidate’s bid for public
office. Among these which obtain particular significance to this case are: (1) a petition for disqualification
under Section 68; and (2) a petition to deny due course to and/or cancel a certificate of candidacy under
Section 78. The distinctions between the two are well-perceived.
Primarily, a disqualification case under Section 68 of the OEC is hinged on either: (a) a candidate’s
possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country;24 or (b) his or her commission of certain
acts of disqualification. Anent the latter, the prohibited acts under Section 68 refer to election offenses
under the OEC, and not to violations of other penal laws.25 In particular, these are: (1) giving money or
other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing
electoral functions; (2) committing acts of terrorism to enhance one’s candidacy; (3) spending in one’s
election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by the OEC; (4) soliciting, receiving or making any
contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the OEC; and (5) violating Sections
80,26 83,27 85,28 8629 and 261, paragraphs d,30 e,31 k,32 v,33 and cc, sub-paragraph 634 of the OEC.
Accordingly, the same provision (Section 68) states that any candidate who, in an action or protest in
which he or she is a party, is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
COMELEC to have committed any of the foregoing acts shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate for public office, or disallowed from holding the same, if he or she had already been elected.35
It must be stressed that one who is disqualified under Section 68 is still technically considered to have
been a candidate, albeit proscribed to continue as such only because of supervening infractions which do
not, however, deny his or her statutory eligibility. In other words, while the candidate’s compliance with
the eligibility requirements as prescribed by law, such as age, residency, and citizenship, is not in
question, he or she is, however, ordered to discontinue such candidacy as a form of penal sanction
brought by the commission of the above-mentioned election offenses.
 71

On the other hand, a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC proceeding under Section 78 of political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
the OEC36 is premised on a person’s misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications required for disqualified. (Emphasis supplied)
the elective office aspired for. It is not enough that a person lacks the relevant qualification; he or she
must have also made a false representation of the same in the CoC.37 The nature of a Section 78 petition
Evidently, Section 77 requires that there be an "official candidate" before candidate substitution
was discussed in the case of Fermin v. COMELEC,38 where the Court illumined:
proceeds. Thus, whether the ground for substitution is death, withdrawal or disqualification of a
candidate, the said section unequivocally states that only an official candidate of a registered or
Let it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the accredited party may be substituted.43
lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false,
which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that
As defined under Section 79(a) of the OEC, the term "candidate" refers to any person aspiring for or
the candidates states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the
seeking an elective public office who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an
OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or
accredited political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties. Clearly, the law requires that one must
eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that
have validly filed a CoC in order to be considered a candidate. The requirement of having a CoC obtains
is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate.
even greater importance if one considers its nature. In particular, a CoC formalizes not only a person’s
Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding
public declaration to run for office but evidences as well his or her statutory eligibility to be elected for
under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with
the said post. In Sinaca v. Mula,44 the Court has illumined:
the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition
for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate. (Emphasis supplied)
A certificate of candidacy is in the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole world of the candidate’s
political creed or lack of political creed. It is a statement of a person seeking to run for a public office
Corollary thereto, it must be noted that the deliberateness of the misrepresentation, much less one’s
certifying that he announces his candidacy for the office mentioned and the be is eligible for the office,
intent to defraud, is of bare significance in a Section 78 petition as it is enough that the person’s
the name of the political party to which he belongs, if he belongs to any, and his post-office address for
declaration of a material qualification in the CoC be false. In this relation, jurisprudence holds that an
all election purposes being as well stated. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
express finding that the person committed any deliberate misrepresentation is of little consequence in
the determination of whether one’s CoC should be deemed cancelled or not.39 What remains material is
that the petition essentially seeks to deny due course to and/or cancel the CoC on the basis of one’s In this regard, the CoC is the document which formally accords upon a person the status of a candidate.
ineligibility and that the same be granted without any qualification.40 In other words, absent a valid CoC one is not considered a candidate under legal contemplation. As held
in Talaga:45
Pertinently, while a disqualified candidate under Section 68 is still considered to have been a candidate
for all intents and purposes, on the other hand, a person whose CoC had been denied due course to x x x a person’s declaration of his intention to run for public office and his affirmation that he possesses
and/or cancelled under Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all. The reason being is the eligibility for the position he seeks to assume, followed by the timely filing of such declaration,
that a cancelled CoC is considered void ab initio and thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and constitute a valid CoC that render the person making the declaration a valid or official candidate.
necessarily, to valid votes.41 In Talaga v. COMELEC42 (Talaga), the Court ruled that: (Emphasis supplied)

x x x x While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a
candidate, a person who certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a
candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.
The foregoing variance gains utmost importance to the present case considering its implications on
candidate substitution.
B. Valid CoC as a condition sine qua non for candidate substitution
Considering that Section 77 requires that there be a candidate in order for substitution to take place, as
well as the precept that a person without a valid CoC is not considered as a candidate at all, it necessarily
follows that if a person’s CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled, he or she cannot be
validly substituted in the electoral process. The existence of a valid CoC is therefore a condition sine qua
non for a disqualified candidate to be validly substituted.46
C. Divergent effects of disqualification and denial of due course to and/or cancellation of CoC cases vis-à-
vis candidate substitution

Proceeding, from the foregoing discourse, it is evident that there lies a clear-cut distinction between a
Section 77 of the OEC provides that if an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party
disqualification case under Section 68 and denial of due course to and/or cancellation of COC case under
dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, a person belonging to and certified by the same political
Section 78 vis-à-vis their respective effects on candidate substitution under Section 77.1âwphi1
party may file a CoC to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. It states that:

As explained in the case of Miranda v. Abaya47 (Miranda), a candidate who is disqualified under Section
Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. - If after the last day for
68 can be validly substituted pursuant to Section 77 because he remains a candidate until disqualified;
the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party
but a person whose CoC has been denied due course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be
dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same
substituted because he is not considered a candidate.48 Stated differently, since there would be no

candidate to speak of under a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC case, then there
would be no candidate to be substituted; the same does not obtain, however, in a disqualification case
since there remains to be a candidate to be substituted, although his or her candidacy is discontinued.
On this note, it is equally revelatory that Section 77 expressly enumerates the instances where
substitution is permissible, that is when an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party
"dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause." Noticeably, material misrepresentation cases are not
included in the said section and therefore, cannot be a valid basis to proceed with candidate
substitution.
D. Application to the case at bar
In this case, it is undisputed that Richard was disqualified to run in the May 10, 2010 elections due to his
failure to comply with the one year residency requirement.49 The confusion, however, stemmed from the
use of the word "disqualified" in the February 17, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, which
was adopted by the COMELEC En Banc in granting the substitution of private respondent, and even
further perpetuated by the HRET in denying the quo warranto petition. In short, a finding that Richard
was merely disqualified – and not that his CoC was denied due course to and/or cancelled – would mean
that he could have been validly substitute by private respondent, thereby legitimizing her candidacy.
Yet the fact that the COMELEC First Division’s February 17, 2010 Resolution did not explicitly decree the
denial of due course to and/or cancellation of Richard’s CoC should not have obviated the COMELEC En
Banc from declaring the invalidity of private respondent’s substitution. It should be stressed that the
clear and unequivocal basis for Richard’s "disqualification" is his failure to comply with the residency
requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution which is a ground for the denial of due course
to and/or cancellation a CoC under Section 78 of the OEC, misrepresentation contemplated under a
Section 78 petition refers to statements affecting one’s qualifications for elective office such as age,
residence and citizenship or non-possession of natural-born Filipino status.51 There is therefore no legal
basis to support a finding of disqualification within the ambit of election laws. Accordingly, given
Richard’s non-compliance with the one year residency requirement, it cannot be mistaken that the
COMELEC First Division’s unqualified grant of Juntilla’s "Verified Petition to Disqualify Candidate for Lack
of Qualification"52 – which prayed that the COMELEC declare Richard "DISQUALIFIED and INELIGIBLE
from seeking the office of Member of the House of Representatives" and "x x x that his Certificate of
Candidacy x x x be DENIED DUE COURSE and/or CANCELLED"53 – carried with it the denial of due course
to and/or cancellation of Richard’s CoC pursuant to Section 78.
Case law dictates that if a petition prays for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of CoC and
the same is granted by the COMELEC without any qualification, the cancellation of the candidate’s CoC in
in order. This is precisely the crux of the Miranda ruling wherein the Court, in upholding the COMELEC En
Banc’s nullification of the substitution in that case, decreed that the COMELEC Division’s unqualified
grant of the petition necessarily included the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of the
candidate’s CoC, notwithstanding the use of the term "disqualified" in the COMELEC Division’s
resolution, as the foregoing was prayed for in the said petition:
The question to settle next is whether or not aside from Joiel "Pempe" Miranda being disqualified by the
COMELEC in its May 5, 1998 resolution, his certificate of candidacy had likewise been denied due course
and cancelled.
The Court rules that it was.
72
Private respondent’s petition in SPA No. 98-019 specifically prayed for the following:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of Candidacy filed by respondent for the
position of Mayor for the City of Snatiago be not given due course and/or cancelled.
Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.
In resolving the petition filed by private respondent specifying a very particular relief, the COMELEC
ruled favorably in the following manner:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (FIRST DIVISION) GRANTS the Petition.
Respondent JOSE "Pempe" MIRANDA is hereby DISQUALIFIED from running for the position of mayor of
Santiago City, Isabela, in the May 11, 1998 national and local elections.
SO ORDERED.
From a plain reading of the dispositive portion of the COMELEC resolution of May 5, 1998 in SPA No. 98-
019, it is sufficiently clear that the prayer specifically and particularly sought in the petition was
GRANTED, there being no qualification on the matter whatsoever. The disqualification was simply ruled
over and above the granting of the specific prayer for denial of due course and cancellation of the
certificate of candidacy.
There is no dispute that the complaint or petition filed by private respondent in SPA No. 98-019 is one to
deny due course and to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda. There is likewise no
question that the said petition was GRANTED without any qualification whatsoever. It is rather clear,
therefore, that whether or not the COMELEC granted any further relief in SPA No. 98-019 by
disqualifying the candidate, the fact remains that the said petition was granted and that the certificate of
candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda was denied due course and cancelled. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The same rule was later discussed in the case of Talaga, viz:
3. Granting without any qualification or petition in SPA No. 09-029(DC) manifested COMELEC’s intention
to declare Ramon disqualified and to cancel his CoC
In Miranda v. Abaya, the specific relief that the petition prayed for was that the CoC "be not given due
course and/or cancelled". The COMELEC categorically granted "the petition" and then pronounced – in
apparent contradiction – that Joel Pempe Miranda was "disqualified." The Court held that the COMELEC,
by granting the petition without any qualification, disqualified Joel Pempe Miranda and at the same time
cancelled Jose Pempe Miranda’s CoC.
The crucial point of Miranda v. Abaya was that the COMELEC actually granted the particular relief of
cancelling or denying due course to the CoC prayed for in the petition by not subjecting that relief to any
qualification. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In view of the foregoing rulings, the COMELEC En Banc direly misconstrued the COMELEC First Division’s
February 17, 2010 Resolution when it adopted the Law Department’s finding that Richard was only
 73

"disqualified" and that his CoC was not denied due course to and/or cancelled, paving the way for the
approval of private respondent’s substitution. It overlooked the fact that the COMELEC First Division’s
ruling encompassed the cancellation of Richard’s CoC and in consequence, disallowed the substitution of
private respondent. It was therefore grave and serious error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc to
have approved private respondent’s substitution.
Consequently, in perpetuating the COMELEC En Banc’s error as above-discussed, the HRET committed a
grave abuse of discretion, warranting the grant of the instant petition.
Fundamental is the rule that grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently
violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.54 While it is well-recognized that the HRET
has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the House, the Court maintains jurisdiction over it to check
"whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction"
on the part of the latter.55 In other words, when the HRET utterly disregards the law and settled
precedents on the matter before it, it commits a grave abuse of discretion.
Records clearly show that: (1) Richard was held ineligible as a congressional candidate for the Fourth
District of Leyte due to his failure to comply with the one year residency requirement; (2) Juntilla’s
petition prayed for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of his CoC; and (3) the COMELEC First
Division granted the foregoing petition without any qualification. By these undisputed and essential facts
alone, the HRET should not have adopted the COMELEC En Banc’s erroneous finding that the COMELEC
First Division’s February 17, 2010 Resolution "speaks only of "disqualification and not of cancellation of
Richard’s CoC"36 and thereby, sanctioned the substitution of private respondent.
respondent’s own qualification to run for public office – which was inextricably linked to her husband’s
own qualifications due to her substitution – was the proper subject of quo warranto proceedings falling
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET and independent from any previous proceedings before the
COMELEC, lest the jurisdiction divide between the two be blurred.
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that the HRET’s independence is not without limitation. As earlier
mentioned, the Court retains certiorari jurisdiction over the HRET if only to check whether or not it has
gravely abused its discretion. In this regard, the Court does not endeavor to denigrate nor undermine the
HRET’s independence; rather, it merely fulfills its duty to ensure that the Constitution and the laws are
upheld through the exercise of its power of judicial review.
In fine, the Court observes that the HRET wantonly disregarded the law by deliberately adopting the
COMELEC En Banc’s flawed findings regarding private respondent’s eligibility to run for public office
which essentially stemmed from her substitution. In this light, it cannot be gainsaid that the HRET gravely
abused its discretion.
Owing to the lack of proper substitution in its case, private respondent was therefore not a bona fide
candidate for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Leyte when she ran for office,
which means that she could not have been elected. Considering this pronouncement, there exists no
cogent reason to further dwell on the other issues respecting private respondent’s own qualification to
office.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the March 22, 2012 Decision rendered by the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 10-031 (QW) is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Lest it be misunderstood, the HRET is not bound by previous COMELEC pronouncements relative to the
SO ORDERED.
qualifications of the Members of the House. Being the sole judge57 of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of its respective members, the HRET cannot be tied down by COMELEC
resolutions, else its constitutional mandate58 be circumvented and rendered nugatory. Instructive on this
point is the Court’s disquisition in Fernandez v. HRET,59 to wit:

Private respondent concludes from the above that petitioner had no legal basis to claim that the HRET,
when reference to the qualification/s of Members of the House of Representatives is concerned, is "co-
equal", to the COMELEC respecting the matter of eligibility and qualification of a member of the House
of Representatives. The truth is the other way around, because the COMELEC is subservient to the HRET
when the dispute or contest at issue refers to the eligibility and/or qualification of a Member of the
House of Representatives. A petition for quo warranto is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET as
sole judge, and cannot be considered forum shopping even if another body may have passed upon in
administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the issue of the Member’s qualification while the Member
was still a candidate. There is forum-shopping only where two cases involve the same parties and the
same cause of action. The two cases here are distinct and dissimilar in their nature and character.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Notably, the phrase "election, returns, and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as referring
to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee’s title. More particularly, the term "qualifications"
refers to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the pro-claimed winner, such
as his disloyalty or ineligibility, or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.60 As used in Section 74 of
the OEC, the word "eligible" means having the right to run for elective public office, that is, having all the
qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for the public office.61 In this relation, private
 74

EN BANC By that time, however, the official ballots had already been printed. Expectedly, on May 10, 2010, the
day of elections, the name "SANCHEZ, Edna P." was retained in the list of candidates for Mayor of Sto.
Tomas, and garnered the highest number of votes - 28,389 against Maligaya’s 22,577 votes.10
G.R. No. 199612 January 22, 2013

On May 11, 2010, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) printed the Certificate of Canvass of Votes
RENATO M. FEDERICO, Petitioner,
and Proclamation of Winning Candidates11 (COCVP) showing "SANCHEZ Edna P." as the winning
vs.
mayoralty candidate. The printed COCVP, reads:
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, COMELEC EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR and OSMUNDO M.
MALIGAYA,Respondents.
WE, THE UNDERSIGNED MEMBERS of the CITY/MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS do hereby certify
under oath that we have duly canvassed the votes cast in 81 precincts in the city/municipality for the
DECISION
Candidates therein for city/municipality offices in the elections held on May 10, 2010. Attached hereto
and forming part hereof is a Statement of Votes by Precinct (CEF No. 20-A-1) obtained by each candidate
MENDOZA, J.: for the offices of Mayor and Vice-Mayor.

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64, of the Rules of Court, assailing the That after such canvass, it appears that SANCHEZ, Edna P. obtained 28389 votes for the office of
December 21, 2011 Resolution1 of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) En Bane. in SPC No. 10-082, City/Municipality Mayor, the same being the highest number of votes legally cast for said office; and
entitled In Re: Petition to Annul the Proclamation of Respondent Renato M. Federico, Osmundo M. SILVA, Armenius O. obtained 25532 votes for the office of City/Municipality Vice Mayor, the same being
Maligaya v. Renato M. Federico and the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Santo Tomas, Batangas. the highest number of votes legally cast for said office.

The Facts
Edna Sanchez (Edna) and private respondent Osmundo M. Maligaya (Maligaya) were candidates for the
position of municipal mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, in the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local
Elections. Maligaya was the Liberal Party’s official mayoralty candidate.2
ON THE BASIS OF THE FOREGOING, we hereby proclaim the above candidates as the duly elected
City/Municipality Mayor and City/Municipality Vice Mayor.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have signed these presents in SANTO TOMAS, Province of Batangas this Tue
May 11, 14:09:55 PHT 2010.

On April 27, 2010, Armando Sanchez, husband of Edna and the gubernatorial candidate for the province [Emphases and underscoring supplied]
of Batangas, died. Two days later, or on April 29, 2010,3 Edna withdrew her Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) for the position of mayor. She then filed a new COC and the corresponding Certificate of
This action of MBOC prompted Maligaya to file his Petition to Annul Proclamation of Respondent Edna
Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) for the position of governor as substitute candidate for her
Sanchez,12docketed as SPC No. 10-022, on May 20, 2010. This petition was, however, later withdrawn, as
deceased husband.
agreed upon by the parties, and the case was dismissed by the Comelec First Division.13

On May 5, 2010, petitioner Renato M. Federico (Federico) filed with the Office of the Election Officer of
A second print-out14 of the COCVP was issued by the MBOC bearing the same time and date with the
Sto. Tomas, Batangas, his COC4 and CONA5 as official candidate of the Nationalista Party and as
same number of votes garnered by Edna being credited to Federico. The second print-out reads:
substitute candidate for mayor, in view of the withdrawal of Edna.

WE, THE UNDERSIGNED MEMBERS of the CITY/MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS do hereby certify
On May 7, 2010, the Comelec Law Department referred the Affidavit of Withdrawal, the COC and the
under oath that we have duly canvassed the votes cast in 81 precincts in the city/municipality for the
CONA of Edna, as substitute candidate for her late husband, and those of Federico, as substitute
Candidates therein for city/municipality offices in the elections held on May 10, 2010. Attached hereto
candidate for her, to the Comelec En Banc for its consideration.6
and forming part hereof is a Statement of Votes by Precinct (CEF No. 20-A-1) obtained by each candidate
for the offices of Mayor and Vice-Mayor.
On the same day, May 7, 2010, Maligaya filed his Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate
of Candidacy7 of Federico before the Comelec, docketed as SPA No. 10-137 (DC). Maligaya sought to
That after such canvass, it appears that FEDERICO, Renato M. obtained 28389 votes for the office of
have Federico declared ineligible to run as substitute candidate for Edna because the period to file the
City/Municipality Mayor, the same being the highest number of votes legally cast for said office; and
COC for substitute candidates had already lapsed after December 14, 2009, pursuant to Section 13 of
SILVA, Armenius O. obtained 25532 votes for the office of City/Municipality Vice Mayor, the same being
Comelec Resolution No. 8678.8
the highest number of votes legally cast for said office.

In Resolution No. 8889,9 dated May 8, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc gave due course to the COC of Edna
ON THE BASIS OF THE FOREGOING, we hereby proclaim the above candidates as the duly elected
as substitute gubernatorial candidate in the Batangas province and to that of Federico as substitute
City/Municipality Mayor and City/Municipality Vice Mayor.
mayoralty candidate in Sto. Tomas.
 75

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have signed these presents in SANTO TOMAS, Province of Batangas this Tue
May 11, 14:09:55 PHT 2010.
[Emphases and underscoring supplied]
On June 1, 2010, upon learning of the proclamation of Federico as the winning mayoralty candidate by
the MBOC, Maligaya filed his Petition to Annul Proclamation of Respondent Renato M. Federico15 as
mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, docketed as SPC No. 10-082. The petition was predicated on the alleged
illegal act of the MBOC in issuing a falsified and patently antedated second COCVP in the name of
Federico without reconvening, without due notice, and without annulling the first COCVP issued in favor
of Edna.
In his answer to the petition, Federico raised, among others, the defenses that the petition was an
erroneous remedy, having no basis under the rules; that it was not based on valid grounds; and that it
should not have been given due course as it was belatedly filed.16
On August 31, 2011, Federico filed a motion for reconsideration23 of the Comelec En Banc’s Order given
in the August 25, 2011 hearing, claiming that the case was barred by forum shopping and litis pendentia.
Pending his motion, he elevated the matter to the Supreme Court on September 9, 2011 by way of a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 198283. This petition was subsequently
dismissed by the Court on October 4, 2011 for being premature in view of the pendency of the partial
motion for reconsideration before the Comelec En Banc.24
On December 21, 2011, the Comelec En Banc issued the assailed Resolution granting Maligaya’s partial
motion for reconsideration. Thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Partial Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The
proclamation of respondent Federico is hereby ANNULLED. Accordingly:
1. The Executive Director is ordered to constitute a Special Municipal Board of Canvassers for
the municipality of Sto. Tomas, Batangas;

The members of the MBOC likewise filed an answer, claiming good faith when they proclaimed Federico 2. The Special Municipal Board of Canvassers is ordered to immediately notify the parties,
as winner considering that the substitutions of Edna and Federico were valid under Comelec Resolution reconvene and proclaim petitioner OSMUNDO M. MALIGAYA as the duly elected Mayor of
No. 8889.17 Sto. Tomas, Batangas; and

Meanwhile, Maligaya’s petition to deny due course and to cancel the COC of Federico was denied by the 3. The Law Department is directed to conduct an investigation on the members of the (Old)
Comelec Second Division in its Resolution,18 dated October 19, 2010. It gave due course to Federico’s Municipal Board of Canvassers of Sto. Tomas, Batangas for possible violation of Section 32
COC and CONA on the basis of the Comelec En Banc’s Resolution No. 8889 which upheld Federico’s pars. (c) and (f) Article VI of COMELEC Resolution No. 8809.
substitution.
Let the Executive Director implement this resolution.
In its Resolution,19 dated June 21, 2011, the Comelec First Division denied Maligaya’s petition to annul
the proclamation of Federico for having been filed out of time, as it was filed beyond the ten (10) day
SO ORDERED.25
period from the day of proclamation as provided for under Section 6, Rule 4 of Comelec Resolution
8804.20 Further, it held that Federico’s filing of candidacy for mayor, vice Edna, was valid.
The Comelec En Banc ruled that the petition for the annulment of Federico’s proclamation filed on June
21
1, 2011 was within the prescribed ten (10) day period. It explained that the period for the filing of the
Maligaya then filed his Verified Partial Motion for Reconsideration, dated June 27, 2011, insisting that
said petition should be reckoned from May 27, 2011, when Maligaya discovered the existence of the
his petition had not yet prescribed and that Federico’s substitution was null and void with his COC and
second COCVP and not on May 11, 2011, the proclamation date. The Comelec En Banc was of the view
CONA filed after December 14, 2009, the deadline provided for under Section 13 of Comelec Resolution
that the annulment of Federico’s proclamation was in order because of his invalid substitution of Edna,
No. 8678. He further claimed that the generation of a second print-out of the COCVP bearing the same
as his substitute COC was filed beyond the deadline and due to the illegality of the proceedings of the
time and date with the same number of votes garnered by Edna being credited to Federico was
MBOC in generating the second COCVP without authority from the Comelec and without notice to the
questionable for it was impossible for Federico to be proclaimed as the winning candidate because the
parties, in violation of Comelec Resolution No. 8804.
Canvassing and Consolidating System (CCS) had already printed a COCVP with the name of Edna, as the
winner.
Hence, Federico filed the present Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order, dated December 23, 2011, before this Court anchored on the
The said partial motion for reconsideration was elevated to the Comelec En Banc for proper disposition.
following

In his Comment22 on Maligaya’s partial motion for reconsideration, Federico pointed out that his
GROUNDS
substitution of Edna had already been upheld with finality and, thus, could no longer be questioned. He
prayed for the dismissal of the case.
(I)
In the hearing of August 25, 2011, the Comelec En Banc considered the case submitted for resolution.
The validity of Petitioner’s substitution as mayoralty candidate is already a settled fact.

A. Petitioner validly substituted Edna Sanchez pursuant to Section 77 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
B. The validity of Petitioner’s substitution was already decided with finality by the Comelec.
C. Resolution No. 8889 is valid. The Comelec, in issuing Resolution No. 8889, passed upon all
matters and issues laid before it in the case. Moreover, after Resolution No. 8889 was issued,
it was in force and had to be complied with.
(II)
The proclamation of Petitioner was regular and done in accordance with law.
A. The votes cast for "SANCHEZ, Edna P." were legally considered votes for Petitioner.
B. The petition to annul Petitioner’s proclamation was filed out of time.
(III)
Private Respondent cannot validly be proclaimed as elected mayor because he was the losing
candidate.26
In the meantime, on December 29, 2011, the Comelec En Banc issued Minute Resolution No. 11-1306
constituting the special MBOC pursuant to its December 21, 2011 Resolution.27
On January 16, 2012, the Comelec En Banc issued a Writ of Execution ordering Federico to vacate the
position as mayor and to cease and desist from performing the functions of the said office.28
On January 17, 2012, the Special MBOC issued a notice to convene on January 24, 2012 at the Comelec’s
Session Hall for the purpose of proclaiming Maligaya as the duly elected mayor.29
In its Resolution, dated January 17, 2012, the Court required the respondents in this case to comment on
Federico’s petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from notice, to which Maligaya and the Comelec
complied. In the same Resolution, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining the
Comelec from constituting and reconvening the Special MBOC and from proclaiming Maligaya as mayor
of Sto. Tomas, Batangas.30
Pending resolution of the case, on February 28, 2012, Vice-Mayor Armenius Silva (Intervenor Silva) of
Sto. Tomas, Batangas, filed his Motion for Leave to Intervene,31 praying essentially that as Federico failed
to qualify, he should be adjudged as his legal successor as mayor, under Section 44 of the Local
Government Code32 (LGC).
Both the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and Maligaya opposed the motion to intervene, both
arguing that he (Maligaya) was the only mayoralty candidate left to be voted for given the withdrawal of
Edna and Federico’s invalid substitution. Maligaya, then, was not a second placer but the sole and only
placer in the elections. Hence, the doctrine of the second-placer would not apply to him.
76
The Issues
From the pleadings of the parties, the principal issues presented for resolution are: (1) whether Federico
could validly substitute Edna who withdrew her candidacy for the mayoralty position; (2) whether
Maligaya’s Petition to Annul Proclamation of Federico as mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, docketed as
SPC No. 10-082, was filed on time; and (3) granting that Federico was disqualified, whether he should be
succeeded by Intervenor Silva under the LGC or replaced by Maligaya.
Essentially, the issue thrust upon the Court is whether the Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it
annulled Federico’s proclamation as the winning candidate on the ground that his substitution as
mayoralty candidate was void.
Federico insists that his substitution of Edna was valid and had long been final in view of Comelec
Resolution No. 8889. He likewise argues that his proclamation as mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, was
valid and regular and, hence, it must be upheld.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court agrees with the position taken by the OSG representing public respondent Comelec En Banc.
The electoral commission committed no grave abuse of discretion when it came out with its December
21, 2011 Resolution,33 in SPC No. 10-082, granting Maligaya’s partial motion for reconsideration. The
Court shall discuss the issues in seriatim.
Federico’s substitution of Edna Sanchez
as mayoralty candidate was not valid
In its assailed December 21, 2011 Resolution, the Comelec En Banc annulled Federico’s proclamation as
mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, on the ground that his substitution of Edna was invalid, the substitute
COC and CONA having been filed after the December 14, 2009 deadline provided for under Section 13 of
Comelec Resolution No. 8678.
Federico argues that Comelec Resolution No. 8678 cannot prevail over the provisions of Section 77 of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), prescribing the rules on substitution of an
official candidate of a registered political party who dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause after
the last day for the filing of his COC. The law provides:
Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. - If after the last day for
the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party
dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same
political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate
of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of
the day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before
the election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election
inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted
for by the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission. (Emphasis supplied)

Federico posits that he timely filed his COC as it was not later than midday of the day of the election. He
argues that the law makes no distinction between the different causes for substitution – death,
disqualification or withdrawal. Regardless of the cause of substitution, the deadline for the filing of a
substitute COC is "not later than mid-day of the election." Accordingly, he asserts that he validly
substituted Edna having filed his COC and CONA on May 5, 2010 or five (5) days before the elections and
having complied with all the procedural requirements for a valid substitution.
Federico’s argument is not well-taken.
The Comelec is empowered by law to prescribe such rules so as to make efficacious and successful the
conduct of the first national automated election.
On January 23, 2007, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9369, An Act Amending Republic Act No.
8436, Entitled ‘An Act Authorizing The Commission On Elections To Use An Automated Election System In
The May 11, 1998 National Or Local Elections And In Subsequent National And Local Electoral Exercises,’
To Encourage Transparency, Credibility, Fairness And Accuracy Of Elections, Amending For The Purpose
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, As Amended, Republic Act No. 7166 And Other Related Elections Laws,
Providing Funds Therefor And For Other Purposes. Section 13 of said law partially provides:
SEC. 13. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is hereby amended to read as follows:
SEC.15. Official Ballot. - The Commission shall prescribe the format of the electronic display and/or the
size and form of the official ballot, which shall contain the titles of the position to be filled and/or the
proposition to be voted upon in an initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Where practicable, electronic
displays must be constructed to present the names of all candidates for the same position in the same
page or screen, otherwise, the electronic displays must be constructed to present the entire ballot to the
voter, in a series of sequential pages, and to ensure that the voter sees all of the ballot options on all
pages before completing his or her vote and to allow the voter to review and change all ballot choices
prior to completing and casting his or her ballot.
Under each position to be filled, the names of candidates shall be arranged alphabetically by surname
and uniformly indicated using the same type size. The maiden or married name shall be listed in the
official ballot, as preferred by the female candidate. Under each proposition to be vote upon, the choices
should be uniformly indicated using the same font and size.
A fixed space where the chairman of the board of election inspector shall affix her/her signature to
authenticate the official ballot shall be provided.
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition
of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of
candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period
for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a
candidate shall effect only upon that start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any
person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the armed forces, and
officers, and employees in government-owned or-controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her
certification of candidacy. (Emphasis supplied)
77
Under said provision, "the Comelec, which has the constitutional mandate to enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,"34 has been empowered to set the dates for
certain pre-election proceedings. In the exercise of such constitutional and legislated power, especially
to safeguard and improve on the Automated Election System (AES), Comelec came out with Resolution
No. 8678.
As automated elections had been mandated by law, there was a need for the early printing of the
ballots. So that all candidates would be accommodated in the ballots, the early filing of COCs was
necessary. If there would be late filing and approval of COCs, the names of aspiring candidates would not
be included in the ballot, the only document to be read by the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS)
machines.
The Law, Rules and Regulations on Substitution
With regard to substitutions, Congress and the Comelec came out with laws and rules addressing
anticipated problems in such cases. Thus, under Section 12 of R.A. No. 9006, in order to obviate
confusion, the name of the substitute candidate should, as much as possible, bear the same surname as
that of the substituted candidate. Section 12 reads:
Section 12. Substitution of Candidates. – In case of valid substitutions after the official ballots have been
printed, the votes cast for the substituted candidates shall be considered as stray votes but shall not
invalidate the whole ballot. For this purpose, the official ballots shall provide spaces where the voters
may write the name of the substitute candidates if they are voting for the latter: Provided, however,
That if the substitute candidate of the same family name, this provision shall not apply. [Emphases
supplied]
Regarding the May 10, 2010 automated elections, the Comelec came out with Resolution No. 8678. On
substitution, Section 13 thereof provides:
SEC. 13. Substitution of Candidates, in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. - If after
the last day for the filing of certificate of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered political party
dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, he may be substituted by a candidate belonging to, and
nominated by, the same political party. No substitute shall be allowed for any independent candidate.
The substitute for a candidate who withdrew may file his certificate of candidacy as herein provided for
the office affected not later than December 14, 2009.
The substitute for a candidate who died or suffered permanent incapacity or disqualified by final
judgment, may file his certificate of candidacy up to mid-day of election day. If the death or permanent
disability should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, the substitute
candidate may file the certificate with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where
he is a candidate, or in the case of a candidate for President, Vice-President or Senator, with the Law
Department of the Commission on Elections in Manila.
No person who has withdrawn his candidacy for a position shall be eligible as substitute candidate for
any other position after the deadline for filing of certificates of candidacy. [Emphasis and underscoring
supplied]

As correctly pointed out by the OSG, it is clear from the foregoing that different deadlines were set to
govern the specific circumstances that would necessitate the substitution of a candidate due to death,
disqualification or withdrawal. In case of death or disqualification, the substitute had until midday of the
election day to file the COC. In case of withdrawal, which is the situation at bench, the substitute should
have filed a COC by December 14, 2009.
The reason for the distinction can easily be divined. Unlike death or disqualification, withdrawal is
voluntary. Generally, a candidate has sufficient time to ponder on his candidacy and to withdraw while
the printing has not yet started. If a candidate withdraws after the printing, the name of the substitute
candidate can no longer be accommodated in the ballot and a vote for the substitute will just be wasted.
When Batangas Governor Armando Sanchez died on April 27, 2010, Edna withdrew her candidacy as
mayor and substituted her late husband as gubernatorial candidate for the province on April 29, 2010.
The party actually had the option to substitute another candidate for Governor aside from Edna. By
fielding Edna as their substitute candidate for Governor, the party knew that she had to withdraw her
candidacy for Mayor. Considering that the deadline for substitution in case of withdrawal had already
lapsed, no person could substitute her as mayoralty candidate. The sudden death of then Governor
Armando Sanchez and the substitution by his widow in the gubernatorial race could not justify a belated
substitution in the mayoralty race.
Comelec Resolution No. 8889 not binding on Maligaya
Federico asserts that Resolution No. 8889, which gave due course to the COC of Edna, as gubernatorial
candidate; and his COC, as mayoralty candidate, was valid as the Comelec passed upon all matters and
issues laid before it in the case. According to him, the legal presumption was that official duty had been
regularly performed. The resolution was an operative fact by which the Comelec denied Maligaya’s
petition to deny due course to the COC of Federico, and on the basis of which the MBOC counted the
votes for Edna as votes cast for Federico.
As far as Maligaya is concerned, the resolution was void as it lacked legal basis as Federico’s substitution
was invalid, his COC having been filed only on May 5, 2010, or after December 14, 2009, the deadline
provided for under Section 13 of Comelec Resolution No. 8678. No reason was mentioned in the
resolution why his COC was given due course except that the withdrawal "merely caused a vacuum in
mayoralty contest."35 The resolution reads:
Mrs. Edna P. Sanchez is qualified to substitute for her deceased husband. And this substitution is not
contrary to law or our rules. She is stepping up from her candidacy as Mayor to Governor, and such
action merely caused a vacuum in mayoralty contest. The rule being cited by the Law Department that
the substitute for a candidate who withdrew may file his certificate of candidacy as herein provided for
the office affected not later than December 14, 2009, is far from germane considering that the vacancy
arose by reason of the death of Governor Sanchez.
To stress, the vacancy in the mayoralty race in Sto. Tomas, Batangas, was due to the withdrawal of Edna
as mayoralty candidate, not due to the death of Armando Sanchez.
Accordingly, the Court agrees with the OSG that Resolution No. 8889 was void as it was in contravention
of the guidelines set forth under Resolution No. 8678. With respect to Federico, it cannot be regarded as
a valid source of any right, like the right to be voted for public office. Indeed, a void judgment can never
be final and executory and may be assailed at any time.36
78
"Where a proclamation is null and void, the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed
candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the Comelec of the power to declare such nullity and
annul the proclamation."37
More importantly, Resolution No. 8889 was merely an administrative issuance, based on documents
forwarded to the Comelec. It was not a result of an adversarial proceeding, where the parties were
heard and allowed to adduce evidence. In issuing Resolution No. 8889, the Comelec did not bother to
notify the parties who would have been affected. It was, thus, not a decision in an actual case or
controversy which ripened into finality.
Unquestionably, parties who had no participation therein were not bound by the resolution. Federico
cannot invoke res judicata, one of the requirements of which is identity of parties. Stated differently, as
Maligaya was not a party in the said proceeding, Resolution No. 8889 was not binding on him.
The second COCVP in favor of Federico had no legal basis.
Without question, the votes garnered by Edna could not be credited to Federico as he was never a
legitimate candidate. As there was an invalid substitution, there could not be a valid proclamation. In
effect, the second COCVP in his name had no legal basis. Granting that those who voted for Edna had in
mind to vote for Federico, nonetheless, the fact that there was no compliance with the rules cannot be
ignored.
x x x. In a choice between provisions on material qualifications of elected officials, on the one hand, and
the will of the electorate in any given locality, on the other, we believe and so hold that we cannot
choose the electorate will. The balance must always tilt in favor of upholding and enforcing the law. To
rule otherwise is to slowly gnaw at the rule of law.38
It was alleged that the MBOC of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, raised the hands of Federico as the winner. As
correctly pointed out by Maligaya, however, this was impossible because the CCS printed the name of
Edna Sanchez as the winner on the first COCVP. Thereafter, the MBOC came out with a second COCVP,
this time, with the name of Federico on it with the same number of votes as that of Edna, and generated
on the very same date and the very same time as the first COCVP - a physical impossibility.
Maligaya’s Petition to Annul the Proclamation of Federico was filed on time
Maligaya became aware of the issuance of the second COCVP in favor of Federico only on May 27, 2010.
From that day, he had ten (10) days to question the dubious proceeding in the MBOC under Section 6 of
Resolution No. 8804. Considering that Maligaya filed his petition to annul Federico’s May 10, 2010
proclamation on June 1, 2010, it was indeed filed on time.
It has been argued that there is no evidence that Maligaya became aware of the issuance of the second
COCVP in favor of Federico only on May 27, 2010. In this regard, the Court believes that the actions
taken by Maligaya after the elections and the separate proclamations of Edna and Federico strongly
indicate that he was telling the truth. Indeed, there is no rhyme or reason why he should file a petition
questioning the proclamation of Edna if he had knowledge of the subsequent proclamation of Federico.
The Court adopts with approbation his reasoning on the matter. Thus:

5.35. Private respondent pursued and prosecuted this case with the knowledge that it was
Edna Sanchez who was proclaimed, until he came to know of the alleged proclamation of
respondent Federico on May 27, 2010. Consequently, he filed another petition on June 1,
2010, this time against Federico, to annul his proclamation. The June 1, 2010 petition was
filed within ten days from the knowledge of the alleged proclamation of Federico.
5.36. The filing of SPC NO. 10-022 demonstrates that private respondent Maligaya believed in
good faith that it was Edna Sanchez that was proclaimed and that he did not initially know
that there was a COCVP in the name of Federico. SPC No. 10-022 is also a proof that
petitioner did not dilly dally in protecting his rights. There simply is no reason and it runs
counter to human conduct for Maligaya to file a petition for annulment of proclamation of
Edna Sanchez if he knew all along that it was Federico who was proclaimed.
5.37. In the same manner, the filing of the present petition against Federico shows that the
proclamation of Federico was fraudulent or at least made surreptitiously. Had Maligaya
known of the proclamation of Federico, he should have outrightly filed the petition for
annulment of proclamation against Federico. But because it was made without any notice to
the herein private respondent, he only knew of it on May 27, 2010, thus, the petition on June
1, 2010. Private respondent did not certainly sleep on his rights as he filed the proper petition
within the prescribed period. He could not be penalized for belated filing when, as shown
above, the COCVP of Federico was surreptitiously accomplished. Thus, the Comelec En Banc
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the interest of herein private
respondent Maligaya.39 [Emphasis and underscoring in the original]
Accordingly, the Comelec did not abuse its discretion when it annulled the actions of the MBOC and the
proclamation of Federico. Such exercise is within its powers under the law to administer and enforce
election laws.
x x x, The statutory power of supervision and control by the COMELEC over the boards of canvassers
includes the power to revise or reverse the action of the boards, as well as to do what the boards should
have done. Such power includes the authority to initiate motu propio such steps or actions as may be
required pursuant to law, like reviewing the actions of the board; conducting an inquiry affecting the
genuineness of election returns beyond the election records of the polling places involved; annulling
canvass or proclamations based on incomplete returns or on incorrect or tampered returns; invalidating
a canvass or proclamation made in an unauthorized meeting of the board of canvassers either because it
lacked a quorum or because the board did not meet at all; requiring the board to convene.401âwphi1
There being no valid substitution, the candidate with the highest number of votes should be proclaimed
as the duly elected mayor.
As Federico's substitution was not valid, there was only one qualified candidate in the mayoralty race in
Sto. Tomas, Batangas Maligaya. Being the only candidate, he received the highest number of votes.
Accordingly, he should be proclaimed as the duly elected mayor in the May 10,2010 elections.41
Considering that Maligaya was the winner, the position of Intervenor Silva that he be considered the
legal successor of Federico, whom he claims failed to qualify, has no legal basis. There is simply no
vacancy. When there is no vacancy, the rule on succession under Section 4442 of the LGC cannot be
invoked.
79
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
The Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by Armenius Silva is DENIED.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court is ordered lifted.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 199612, JANUARY 22, 2013
DOCTRINE:
Under Sec. 15 of RA 9369 which governs the conduct of automated elections, the Comelec is empowered
by law to prescribe such rules so as to make efficacious and successful the conduct of the first national
automated election: “the Comelec, which has the constitutional mandate to enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,”
In resolving that the deadline for all substitutions must be made on or before Dec. 15, 2009 pursuant to
Comelec Resolution No. 8678, COMELEC did not abuse its discretion.
FACTS:
Edna Sanchez and private respondent Maligaya were candidates for the position of municipal mayor of
Sto. Tomas, Batangas, in the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections. Maligaya was the
Liberal Party’s official mayoralty candidate.
On April 27, 2010, Armando Sanchez, husband of Edna and the gubernatorial candidate for the province
of Batangas, died. On April 29, 2010, Edna withdrew her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position
of mayor. She then filed a new COC and the corresponding Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance
(CONA) for the position of governor as substitute candidate for her deceased husband.
Subsequently, petitioner Renato M. Federico (Federico) filed his COC and CONA as official candidate of
the Nationalista Party and as substitute candidate for mayor, in lieu of Edna.
Private Respondent sought to declare petitioner ineligible because his COC was allegedly filed after the
deadline had lapsed pursuant to Comelec Resolution No. 8678.
However, the COMELEC en banc resolved to give due course to the candidacy of Edna and Petitioner.
However, by the time of the elections, because the ballots had already been printed, the name of Edna
was still on the ballots for the position of Mayor of Sto. Tomas against Private Respondent. In fact, Edna
garnered the most votes for that election, beating Private Respodent for the position of mayor.
Eventually the board ofcanvassers credited the votes of Edna to Petitioner (who was the replacement of
Edna).
Private Respondent filed this petition to annul the proclamation of Petitioner Federico.
The COMELEC en banc eventually annulled the proclamation of Petitioner and proclaimed Private
Respondent Maligaya as mayor (Maligaya na sya). The COMELEC declared that Petitioner's substitution
of Edna was void because if was filed after the period for filing of COCs had lapsed.

Petitioner filed a petitin for certiorari with the Supreme Court. He claimed that Comelec Resolution No.
8678, which fixed a period for the filing of COCs and CONAs cannot prevail over the Omnibus Election
code, specifically Sec. 77 which provides that a party's replacement candidate of one who withdraws,
dies or is disqualified may be filed no later than mid-day of the elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it annulled Federico’s
proclamation as the winning candidate on the ground that his substitution as mayoralty candidate was
void.
HELD:
No, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion. The Comelec is empowered by law to prescribe
such rules so as to make efficacious and successful the conduct of the first national automated election.
RA 9369 which governs the conduct of automated elections specifically allows COMELEC to set deadlines
for the filing of certificates of candidacy etc.
Under Sec. 15, “the Comelec, which has the constitutional mandate to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,”
In resolving that the deadline for all substitutions must be made on or before Dec. 15, 2009 pursuant to
Comelec Resolution No. 8678, COMELEC did not abuse its discretion.
Thus, the substitution of Petitioner was made out of time and was thus void.
Wherefore, Maligaya pa rin si Maligaya.
Facts:
Edna Sanchez (Edna) and private respondent Osmundo M. Maligaya (Maligaya) were candidates for the
position of municipal mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas
Armando Sanchez, husband of Edna and the gubernatorial candidate for the province of Batangas, died.
Two days later,... Edna withdrew her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of mayor. She then
filed a new
COC... for the position of governor as substitute candidate for her deceased husband.
petitioner Renato M. Federico (Federico) filed... his COC... as official candidate of the Nationalista Party
and as substitute candidate for... mayor, in view of the withdrawal of Edna.
Maligaya filed his Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy... of Federico
before the Comelec
Maligaya sought to have Federico declared ineligible to run as substitute... candidate for Edna because
the period to file the COC for substitute candidates had already lapsed
COMELEC En Banc gave due course to the COC of Edna as substitute gubernatorial candidate in the
Batangas province and to that of Federico as substitute mayoralty candidate in Sto. Tomas.
By that time, however, the official ballots had already been printed.
on... the day of elections, the name "SANCHEZ, Edna P." was retained in the list of candidates for Mayor
of Sto. Tomas, and garnered the highest number of votes... against
Maligaya
80
Municipal Board of Canvassers... printed the Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of Winning
Candidates... showing "SANCHEZ Edna P." as the winning mayoralty candidate.
prompted Maligaya to file his Petition to Annul Proclamation of Respondent Edna Sanchez... upon
learning of the proclamation of Federico as the winning mayoralty candidate
Maligaya filed his Petition to Annul Proclamation of Respondent
Renato M. Federico
Meanwhile, Maligaya's petition to deny due course and to cancel the COC of Federico was denied by the
Comelec
It gave due course to Federico's COC... which upheld Federico's substitution.
Issues: Whether Federico could validly substitute Edna who withdrew her candidacy for the mayoralty
position... granting that Federico was disqualified, whether he should be succeeded by Intervenor Silva
under the LGC or replaced by Maligaya.
Ruling:
Federico's substitution of Edna Sanchez... as mayoralty candidate was not valid
Comelec En Banc annulled Federico's proclamation as mayor... on the ground that his substitution of
Edna was invalid, the substitute COC and CONA having been filed after the... deadline... provided for
under Section 13 of Comelec Resolution No. 8678.
"the Comelec, which has the constitutional mandate to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election,"... has been empowered to set the dates for certain pre-election
proceedings. In the... exercise of such constitutional and legislated power, especially to safeguard and
improve on the Automated Election System (AES), Comelec came out with Resolution No. 8678.
The substitute for a candidate who withdrew may file his certificate of candidacy as herein provided for
the office affected not later than December 14, 2009.
Considering that the deadline for substitution in case of withdrawal had already lapsed, no person could
substitute her as mayoralty... candidate.
The sudden death of then Governor Armando Sanchez and the substitution by his widow in the
gubernatorial race could not justify a belated substitution in the mayoralty race.
the resolution was void as it lacked legal basis as Federico's substitution was invalid, his COC having been
filed only on May 5, 2010, or after December 14, 2009, the deadline provided for under Section 13 of
Comelec Resolution No. 8678
Accordingly, the Court agrees with the OSG that Resolution No. 8889 was void as it was in contravention
of the guidelines set forth under Resolution No. 8678. With respect to Federico, it cannot be regarded as
a valid source of any right, like the right to be voted for public... office. Indeed, a void judgment can
never be final and executory and may be assailed at any time
"Where a proclamation is null and void, the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed
candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the Comelec of the power to declare such nullity and
annul the proclamation."
Without question, the votes garnered by Edna could not be credited to Federico as he was never a
legitimate candidate.

FACTS:
Edna Sanchez (Edna) and private respondent Osmundo M. Maligaya (Maligaya) were candidates for the
position of municipal mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, in the 2010 Elections.
On April 27, 2010, Armando Sanchez, husband of Edna and the gubernatorial candidate for the province
of Batangas, died. Edna withdrew her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of mayor. She then
filed a new COC and a Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) for the position of governor as
substitute candidate for her deceased husband.
On May 5, 2010, petitioner Renato M. Federico (Federico) filed with the Office of the Election Officer his
COC and CONA as official candidate of the Nationalista Party and as substitute candidate for mayor, in
view of the withdrawal of Edna.
Maligaya filed his Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Federico before
the Comelec. Maligaya sought to have Federico declared ineligible to run as substitute candidate for
Edna since the period to file the COC for substitute candidates had already lapsed after December 14,
2009.
The COMELEC En Banc gave due course to the COC of Edna as substitute gubernatorial candidate in the
Batangas province and to that of Federico as substitute mayoralty candidate.
But the official ballots had already been printed. On the day of elections, the name “SANCHEZ, Edna P.”
was retained in the list of candidates for Mayor of Sto. Tomas, and garnered the highest number of votes
- 28,389 against Maligaya’s 22,577 votes.
The Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) proclaimed Edna as the winning mayoralty candidate.
Maligaya filed his Petition to Annul Proclamation of Edna Sanchez. This petition was later withdrawn.
The MBOC credited the same number of votes garnered by Edna to Federico and proclaimed the latter as
the winning candidate. Maligaya filed his Petition to Annul Proclamation of Federico as mayor.
Meanwhile, Maligaya’s petition to deny due course and to cancel the COC of Federico was denied by the
Comelec Second Division. The Comelec First Division denied Maligaya’s petition to annul the
proclamation of Federico for having been filed out of time.
Maligaya elevated the matter to the Comelec En Banc. The Comelec En Banc issued the assailed
Resolution granting Maligaya’s partial motion for reconsideration. The Comelec En Banc was of the view
that the annulment of Federico’s proclamation was in order because of his invalid substitution of Edna,
as his substitute COC was filed beyond the deadline and due to the illegality of the proceedings of the
MBOC in generating the second COCVP without authority from the Comelec and without notice to the
parties.
Federico filed the present Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court.
81
Pending resolution of the case, Vice-Mayor Armenius Silva (Intervenor Silva) of Sto. Tomas, Batangas,
filed his Motion for Leave to Intervene, praying essentially that as Federico failed to qualify, he should be
adjudged as his legal successor as mayor, under the Local Government Code.
ISSUES:
Could Federico validly substitute Edna who withdrew her candidacy for the mayoralty position?
Granting that Federico was disqualified, should he be succeeded by Intervenor Silva under the LGC or be
replaced by Maligaya?
HELD:
The electoral commission committed no grave abuse of discretion. FIRST ISSUE: Federico’s substitution
of Edna Sanchez as mayoralty candidate was not valid. SECOND ISSUE: There being no valid substitution,
the candidate with the highest number of votes should be proclaimed as the duly elected mayor.
Regarding the May 10, 2010 automated elections, the Comelec came out with Resolution No. 8678. On
substitution, Section 13 thereof provides, “the substitute for a candidate who withdrew may file his
certificate of candidacy as herein provided for the office affected not later than December 14, 2009.”
In case of withdrawal, which is the situation at bench, the substitute should have filed a COC by
December 14, 2009.
When Batangas Gov. Armando Sanchez died on April 27, 2010, Edna withdrew her candidacy as mayor
and substituted her late husband as gubernatorial candidate for the province on April 29, 2010. The
party actually had the option to substitute another candidate for Governor aside from Edna. By fielding
Edna as their substitute candidate for Governor, the party knew that she had to withdraw her candidacy
for Mayor. Considering that the deadline for substitution in case of withdrawal had already lapsed, no
person could substitute her as mayoralty candidate. The sudden death of then Governor Sanchez and
the substitution by his widow in the gubernatorial race could not justify a belated substitution in the
mayoralty race.
As Federico's substitution was not valid, there was only one qualified candidate in the mayoralty race in
Sto. Tomas, Batangas - Maligaya. Being the only candidate, he received the highest number of votes.
Accordingly, he should be proclaimed as the duly elected mayor in the May 10, 2010 elections.
Considering that Maligaya was the winner, the position of Intervenor Silva that he be considered the
legal successor of Federico, whom he claims failed to qualify, has no legal basis. There is simply no
vacancy. When there is no vacancy, the rule on succession under Section 44 of the LGC cannot be
invoked.
DENIED

EN BANC. NUMBER 12 ON SYLLABUS.
G.R. No. 193314 June 25, 2013
SVETLANA P. JALOSJOS, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, EDWIN ELIM TUPAG and RODOLFO Y. ESTRELLADA. Respondents.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
This Resolution resolves the Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated 8 March 2013, filed by Edwin Elim
Tumpag and Rodolfo Y. Estrellada (private respondents) and the Motion for Reconsideration dated 27
March 2013, filed by Svetlana P. Jalosjos (petitioner) in connection with the Decision of the Court
promulgated on 26 February 2013.
Private respondents come before this Court on the sole issue of who between the vice-mayor and the
second placer shall assume office pursuant to the final determination of petitioner's ineligibility to run
for office and the lifting of the 07 September 20 1 0 Status Quo Order.
Petitioner, on the other hand, questions the Decision, by raising the following arguments:
1. This Court erred in concluding that there are inconsistencies in the Joint Affidavit of the
witnesses presented by petitioner.
2. Petitioner’s stay in Brgy. Punta Miray should be considered in determining the one-year
residency requirement in the same municipality.
3. Petitioner’s registration as a voter presupposes she has stayed in the municipality at least
six months prior to the registration.
4. Petitioner’s certificate of candidacy (COC) should not be cancelled, absent any finding of a
deliberate attempt to deceive the electorate.
5. COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction to decide on the question of the qualification of
petitioner after she was proclaimed as winner.
We deny the motion of petitioner and grant the partial motion for reconsideration of private
respondents.
The claim of actual and physical residence in Brgy. Tugas since 2008 is contradicted by the statements
that petitioner was staying in Mrs. Lourdes Yap’s house while her residential unit was being constructed;
and that by December 2009, the construction was still ongoing.
82
Petitioner questions the inconsistencies noted by the court in the affidavit of her witnesses who, while
claiming that they personally know her to have been an actual and physical resident of Brgy. Tugas since
2008, declared in the same affidavit that while her house was being constructed, she used to stay at the
residence of Mrs. Lourdes Yap (Mrs. Yap) in Brgy. Punta Miray.
The declaration of petitioner’s witnesses that they know petitioner to be "an actual and physical resident
of Brgy. Tugas since 2008" contradicts their statements that (1) they have "started the construction of
the residential house of the owner and other infrastructures of the resort since January 2009"; (2) "until
the present (meaning until December 2009 when they executed their affidavit), the construction and
development projects are still on-going"; and (3) "at times when Ms. Jalosjos is in Baliangao, she used to
stay in the house of Mrs. Lourdes Yap at Sitio Balas Diut, Brgy. Punta Miray, Baliangao, Misamis
Occidental, while her residential house was still being constructed."
Petitioner asserts that there are no inconsistencies in the statements of her witnesses, and that the
statements are in fact consistent with her claim that she had been residing in Baliangao, Misamis
Occidental for at least one year prior to the 10 May 2010 elections. She argues as follows:
x x x the fact that some of these witnesses knew that petitioner lived in the house of Mrs. Lourdes Yap in
a different barangay, particularly Brgy. Punta Miray, is not at all inconsistent or contradictory with
petitioner’s assertion and the witnesses’ statements that petitioner resides in Brgy. Tugas, because
petitioner obviously needed a place to stay while her residence in Brgy. Tugas was being constructed.
This does not negate the fact that petitioner was establishing her residence in Brgy. Tugas since the
latter part of 2008, or at the very latest during the first few months (sic) of January 2009.1
Her assertion that she "was establishing her residence in Brgy. Tugas since the latter part of 2008, or at
the very latest during the first few months [sic] of January 2009" shows that she herself cannot pinpoint
the particular date when she established her legal residence in Brgy. Tugas. This fact is contradictory to
the declaration of the witnesses that "we have personal knowledge that Ms. Svetlana P. Jalosjos has
been an actual and physical resident of Sunrise Tugas, Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, after she bought
the properties thereat from the Heirs of Agapita Yap, Jr. on 9 December 2008."
To be an actual and physical resident of a locality, one must have a dwelling place where one resides no
matter how modest and regardless of ownership. The mere purchase of a parcel of land does not make it
one’s residence. The fact that the residential structure where petitioner intends to reside was still under
construction on the lot she purchased means that she has not yet established actual and physical
residence in the barangay, contrary to the declaration of her witnesses that she has been an actual and
physical resident of Brgy. Tugas since 2008.
Petitioner wants this Court to believe that the ongoing construction referred to by her witnesses in their
joint affidavit does not refer to the residential structure, but to the other structures in the resort that
petitioner was then establishing. She does not assert, however, that her residential unit had already
been completed by that time. In fact, she has failed to present any proof as to when her claimed
residential unit was completed, or when she transferred to the unit.
It must be pointed out that the second statement in paragraph 1 of the Joint Affidavit states: "We have
started the construction of the residential house of the owner and the other infrastructures of the resort
since January, 2009." This was immediately followed by paragraph 2 which reads:

2. Until the present, the construction and development projects are still ongoing. To establish the fact of
the on-going construction work, we are attaching herewith as part hereof, pictures we have taken on
December 20 and 29, 2009 marked Annexes "1", "2", "3", "4", "5", and "6" hereof, respectively.2
Without any qualification as to what is being referred to by the construction and development projects
in paragraph 2, it follows that it refers to the "construction of the residential house of the owner and the
other infrastructures of the resort" found in the prior statement.
In the affidavit, there is no mention whatsoever of completion of the residential house as of 30
December 2009. Neither has any occupancy permit been presented by petitioner to definitely establish
the date she started occupying what she claims to be her residential unit in the resort.
Petitioner takes pains to present photographs of other structures in the resort, but fails to present any
photograph of a completed residential structure, which is more relevant in proving her claimed
residence in Brgy. Tugas. If the residential unit was already completed by December 2009, her witnesses
could have easily testified to that fact and presented photographs of the structure.
This absence of any photograph proving the alleged residence of petitioner in the resort bolsters the
court’s conclusion that at the time the witnesses signed their affidavits in December 2009, or six months
prior to the May 2010 elections, her residential unit had not yet been built.
A temporary stay in a stranger’s house cannot amount to residence.
Petitioner wants this Court to credit her stay in Mrs. Yap’s house as proof that she had been a resident of
the Municipality of Baliangao for more than one year prior to the 10 May 2010 elections. In her words:
7. More importantly, if this Honorable Court would consider the circumstance that petitioner was staying
in Brgy. Punta Miray as true so as to render the statements of her witnesses inconsistent, then such a
consideration should not have led this Honorable Court to the conclusion that petitioner was not a
resident of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental since Brgy. Punta Miray is located in the municipality of
Baliangao like Brgy. Tugas. In other words, the fact that petitioner was staying in a house in Brgy. Punta
Miray while her residence in Brgy. Tugas was being constructed during the early part of 2009 would STILL
LEAD to the conclusion that petitioner has been residing in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental for at least
one (1) year prior to the 10 May 2010 elections since Brgy. Punta Miray is a part of Baliangao.3 (Emphasis
in the original and underscoring omitted)
Petitioner relies on Mitra v. COMELEC4 and Sabili v. COMELEC5 in claiming that "the series of events
whereby petitioner first had her residence constructed ... after she purchased in 2008 the property
where her residence was eventually established, and while she lived in another barangay of the same
municipality, and then eventually moved in to her residence in Brgy. Tugas amounted to an ‘incremental
process’ of transferring residence."
Petitioner’s case must be differentiated from Mitra in that petitioner therein presented not only the
notarized lease contract over the property where he claimed to be residing, but also "a residence
certificate ... and an identification card of the House of Representatives showing Aborlan as his
residence."6
83
In Sabili, the Court declared that "the existence of a house and lot apparently owned by petitioner’s
common-law wife, with whom he has been living for over two decades, makes plausible petitioner’s
allegation of bodily presence and intent to reside in the area."7
Petitioner’s stay in the house of Mrs. Yap in Brgy. Punta Miray, on the other hand, was only a temporary
and intermittent stay that does not amount to residence. It was never the intention of petitioner to
reside in that barangay, as she only stayed there at times when she was in Baliangao while her house
was being constructed.8 Her temporary stay in Brgy. Punta Miray cannot be counted as residence in
Baliangao.
Petitioner failed to show by what right she stayed in Mrs. Yap’s house. Except for the declarations of her
witnesses that she stayed there while her residential unit in the resort was being built, she presented no
other evidence to show any basis of her right to stay in that particular house as a resident.
Approval of voter registration does not presuppose six-month residency in the place prior to registration.
It appears on record that petitioner, in filing her application for registration as a voter on 7 May 2009,
claimed "that she has been a resident of Brgy. Tugas, Baliangao, Misamis Occidental for six (6) months
prior to the filing of the said registration."9 For her claim to be true, she must have resided in Brgy. Tugas
on or before 8 November 2008. The records, however, show that she purchased property in Brgy. Tugas
only on December 2008. Thus, her claim that she had been a resident of Brgy. Tugas for at least six (6)
months prior to her application for registration as a voter on 7 May 2009 is an utter falsity.
The approval of the registration of petitioner as a voter does not and cannot carry with it an affirmation
of the falsehood and misrepresentation as to the period of her residence in Brgy. Tugas. At best, the
approval of her registration as a voter carries a presumption that the registrant will be able to meet the
six-month residency requirement for the elections in which the registrant intends to vote.10 It does not
prove that the registrant has resided in the locality for more than one year prior to the elections.
Representation that one is qualified to run for public office when proven false constitutes a deliberate
attempt to deceive the electorate.
Petitioner contends that the Court erred in upholding the cancellation of her COC despite the glaring
absence of any finding made by the respondent COMELEC in its assailed Resolution that petitioner
committed a false material representation in said COC.
The finding of the COMELEC that petitioner lacks the one year residency requirement to run for local
elective position in the municipality of Baliangao directly contradicts her sworn declaration that she is
eligible to run for public office. The fact that petitioner failed to prove that she has been a resident of the
locality for at least one year prior to the elections reveals the falsity of her assertion in her COC that she
is qualified to run for a local elective position. This false material representation justifies the cancellation
of her COC.
When the candidate’s claim of eligibility is proven false, as when the candidate failed to substantiate
meeting the required residency in the locality, the representation of eligibility in the COC constitutes a
"deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide the fact"11 of ineligibility.
 84

COMELEC is not ousted of jurisdiction to decide a petition for cancellation of the certificate of candidacy candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at any time. All votes for such non-candidate are stray
after the winner is proclaimed. votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a first-placer in the elections. If
a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the election,
prevailing jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes. If a certificate of
The COMELEC, in its Resolution dated 19 August 2010, citing Aquino v. COMELEC,12 has amply discussed
candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the elections, all votes for such candidate
this matter, thus:
should also be stray votes because the certificate of candidacy is void from the very beginning.17 x x x.
(Citations omitted)
Petitioner’s contention that "after the conduct of the election and (petitioner) has been established the
winner of the electoral exercise from the moment of election, the COMELEC is automatically divested of
There is another more compelling reason why the eligible candidate who garnered the highest number
authority to pass upon the question of qualification" finds no basis in law, because even after the
of votes must assume the office. The ineligible candidate who was proclaimed and who already assumed
elections the COMELEC is empowered by Section 6 (in relation to Section 7) of R.A. 6646 to continue to
office is a de facto officer by virtue of the ineligibility.
hear and decide questions relating to qualifications of candidates. Section 6 states:

The rule on succession in Section 44 of the Local Government Code18 cannot apply in instances when a
SECTION 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. – Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to
de facto officer is ousted from office and the de jure officer takes over. The ouster of a de facto officer
be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
cannot create a permanent vacancy as contemplated in the Local Government Code. There is no vacancy
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
to speak of as the de jure officer, the rightful winner in the elections, has the legal right to assume the
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
position.
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever
the evidence of guilt is strong. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated 08 March 2013 is
hereby GRANTED. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration dated 27 March 2013 is hereby DENIED with
FINALITY. AGNE V. YAP, SR. is hereby declared the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Baliangao,
Under the above-quoted provision, not only is a disqualification case against a candidate allowed to
Misamis Occidental in the 10 May 2010 elections. This resolution is immediately executory.
continue after the election (and does not oust the COMELEC of its jurisdiction), but his obtaining the
highest number of votes will not result in the suspension or termination of the proceedings against him
when the evidence of guilt is strong. While the phrase "when the evidence of guilt is strong" seems to SO ORDERED.
suggest that the provisions of Section 6 ought to be applicable only to disqualification cases under
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, Section 7 of R.A. 6646 allows the application of the provisions
of Section 6 to cases involving disqualification based on ineligibility under Section 78 of B.P. 881. Section
7 states:

SECTION 7. Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.1âwphi1 – The procedure
hereinabove provided shall apply to petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy
based on Sec. 78 of Batas Pambansa 881.13

The cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of an ineligible candidate who has assumed office renders
the officer a de facto officer.

This Court has ruled in Aratea v. COMELEC14 and Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC15 that the cancellation of the
COC based on an ineligibility that existed at the time of its filing means that the candidate was never a
valid candidate from the very beginning.16

On the question of who should assume the post vacated by the ineligible candidate, this Court amply
explained in Jalosjos, Jr. that:

Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-placer is
disqualified or declared ineligible should be limited to situations where the certificate of candidacy of the
first placer was valid at the time of filing but subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of
law that took place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person who filed such void certificate of
 85

EN BANC. NO. 7 IN SYLLABUS

rendered a decision, denying the petition.[5] On appeal,[6] the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the
MCTC decision. The RTC decision became final and executory.
ROMMEL APOLINARIO G.R. No. 191970
JALOSJOS,
Petitioner, On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Governor of Zamboanga
- versus -
Sibugay Province for the May 10, 2010 elections. Erasmo promptly filed a petition to deny due course or
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and DAN ERASMO, SR., to cancel Jalosjos COC[7] on the ground that the latter made material misrepresentation in the same since
Respondents. he failed to comply with (1) the requirements of R.A. 9225 and (2) the one-year residency requirement of
Promulgated: the Local Government Code.
April 24, 2012
DECISION
After hearing, the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled that, while Jalosjos had regained Philippine
ABAD, J.: citizenship by complying with the requirements of R.A. 9225, he failed to prove the residency
requirement for a gubernatorial candidate. He failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to

This case is about the proof required to establish the domicile of a reinstated Filipino citizen who seeks establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. On motion for reconsideration, the COMELEC En Banc

election as governor of a province. affirmed the Second Divisions decision, ruling that Jalosjos had been a mere guest or transient visitor in
his brothers house and, for this reason, he cannot claim Ipil as his domicile.

The Facts and the Case

Acting on Jalosjos prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, the Court resolved on May 7,

Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City on October 26, 1973. He migrated to Australia in 2010 to issue a status quo ante order, enjoining the COMELEC from enforcing its February 11, 2010

1981 when he was eight years old and there acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at decision pending further orders. Meanwhile, Jolosjos won the election and was proclaimed winner of the

age 35, he decided to return to the Philippines and lived with his brother, Romeo, Jr., in Barangay 2010 gubernatorial race in the Provinceof Zamboanga Sibugay.[8]

Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Four days upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine The Issue Presented

Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration.[1] On September 1, 2009 he renounced his Australian

citizenship, executing a sworn renunciation of the same[2] in compliance with Republic Act (R.A.) 9225.[3] The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona

From the time of his return, Jalosjos acquired a residential property in the same village where he lived fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

and a fishpond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He applied for registration as a voter in
the Municipality of Ipil but respondent Dan Erasmo, Sr., the Barangay Captain of Barangay Veterans The Courts Ruling

Village, opposed the same. Acting on the application, the Election Registration Board approved it and
included Jalosjos name in the Commission on Elections (COMELECs) voters list for Precinct 0051F The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a

of BarangayVeterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.[4] resident of the province for at least one year before the election.[9] For purposes of the election laws, the
requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile,[10] meaning that a person must not only intend to

Undaunted, Erasmo filed before the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Ipil-Tungawan-R.T. Lim in reside in a particular place but must also have personal presence in such place coupled with conduct

Ipil a petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos name from the official voters list. After hearing, the MCTC indicative of such intention.[11]

There is no hard and fast rule to determine a candidates compliance with residency requirement since
the question of residence is a question of intention.[12] Still, jurisprudence has laid down the following
guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that
domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.[13]
It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos has met the
residency requirement for provincial governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.
One. The COMELEC appears hasty in concluding that Jalosjos failed to prove that he successfully changed
his domicile to Zamboanga Sibugay. The COMELEC points out that, since he was unable to discharge the
burden of proving Zamboanga Sibugay to be his rightful domicile, it must be assumed that his domicile is
either Quezon City or Australia.
But it is clear from the facts that Quezon City was Jalosjos domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may
be taken for granted that he effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he
migrated there at the age of eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26
years. Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice.[14]
On the other hand, when he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his
brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for
good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that
country. In addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the
Bureau of Immigration.By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that
he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss
of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia)
would violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere.
Two. The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he
has merely been staying at his brothers house. But this circumstance alone cannot support such
conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house in a
community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live
there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. [15] To insist that the candidate
86
own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for public office. What matters is that
Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.
Jalosjos presented the affidavits of next-door neighbors, attesting to his physical presence at his
residence in Ipil. These adjoining neighbors are no doubt more credible since they have a better chance
of noting his presence or absence than his other neighbors, whose affidavits Erasmo presented, who just
sporadically passed by the subject residence. Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential
lot in the same village where he lived and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He
showed correspondences with political leaders, including local and national party-mates, from where he
lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a registered voter of Ipil by final judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga Sibugay.
Three. While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative bodies like the
COMELEC, this does not prevent it from exercising its review powers to correct palpable misappreciation
of evidence or wrong or irrelevant considerations.[16] The evidence Jalosjos presented is sufficient to
establish Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in holding
otherwise.
Four. Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga
Sibugay. The Court will respect the decision of the people of that province and resolve all doubts
regarding his qualification in his favor to breathe life to their manifest will.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC Second
Division dated February 11, 2010 and the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc dated May 4, 2010 that
disqualified petitioner Rommel Jalosjos from seeking election as Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.
SO ORDERED.
 87

EN BANC
G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
THE CASE
This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to review
the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The Resolution1 in SPA No. 10-1 09(DC) of
the COMELEC First Division dated 5 October 201 0 is being assailed for applying Section 44 of the Local
Government Code while the Resolution2 of the COMELEC En Banc dated 2 February 2011 is being
questioned for finding that respondent Rommel Arnado y Cagoco (respondent Arnado/Arnado) is solely
a Filipino citizen qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a U.S. passport.
FACTS
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a consequence of his subsequent
naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied
for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San
Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008.4 On the
same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.5
The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte, which contains, among others, the following statements:
I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.
I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.
I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith
and allegiance thereto. I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities.
I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.8
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to
disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections.9
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is
a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010
indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American."10To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US
citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record11 dated 03
December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and
departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009 and
returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in the Philippines on 24
November 2009.
Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010, certifying
that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer Database/Passenger
manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April 2010, with the following pertinent travel records:

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the
DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010
Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities of the Philippines and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of
the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.6
PASSPORT : 057782700
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states:
DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and perpetually renounce all allegiance
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which I am a citizen, and I divest myself of full
employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States of America.
PASSPORT : 05778270012
I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and
belief.7 On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order13 requiring the respondent to personally
file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.

After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present
evidence ex-parte.
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado garnered
the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer, submitting the following
documents as evidence:14
1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines dated 03
April 2009;
2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio Daligdig,
and Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long-time resident of
Kauswagan and that he has been conspicuously and continuously residing in his family’s
ancestral house in Kauswagan;
3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte dated 03
June 2010 stating that Arnado is a bona fide resident of his barangay and that Arnado went to
the United States in 1985 to work and returned to the Philippines in 2009;
4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government Operations Office of
Kauswagan stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of Kauswagan, from
January 1964 to June 1974 and from 15 February 1979 to 15 April 1986; and
5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that Arnado has
been a registered voter of Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on
misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification. Balua’s
contention that Arnado is a resident of the United States was dismissed upon the finding that "Balua
failed to present any evidence to support his contention,"16 whereas the First Division still could "not
conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year residency requirement under the Local Government
Code."17
In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with Arnado’s claim that
he is a Filipino citizen.18
We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No.
9225, Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April
2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.
Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no real intention to
renounce his US citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to run
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for office. We cannot turn a blind eye to the glaring inconsistency between Arnado’s unexplained use of
a US passport six times and his claim that he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his US
citizenship. As noted by the Supreme Court in the Yu case, "a passport is defined as an official document
of identity and nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn in foreign countries." Surely,
one who truly divested himself of US citizenship would not continue to avail of privileges reserved solely
for US nationals.19
The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC
First Division reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnado’s proclamation as the winning
candidate for Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby ANNULLED. Let the order of
succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991 take effect.20
The Motion for Reconsideration and
the Motion for Intervention
Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on the ground that "the
evidence is insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said Resolution is contrary to law."21 He
raised the following contentions:22
1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the evidence consisting of his
Oath of Allegiance and the Affidavit of Renunciation, which show that he has substantially
complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225;
2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his American citizenship is not
tantamount to a repudiation of his Filipino citizenship, as he did not perform any act to swear
allegiance to a country other than the Philippines;
3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the issuance of his Philippine
passport, and that he used his Philippine passport after he obtained it;
4. Balua’s petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was filed out of time, and
the First Division’s treatment of the petition as one for disqualification constitutes grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction;23
5. He is undoubtedly the people’s choice as indicated by his winning the elections;
6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC from jurisdiction over the
case; and
7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for quo warranto, which
should have been filed within ten days from his proclamation.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who
garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed
before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado’s
Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly
disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code is not
applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the
nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest
number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.
Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for Intervention and his Motion for
Reconsideration. Arnado opposed all motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that intervention is prohibited
after a decision has already been rendered, and that as a second-placer, Maquiling undoubtedly lost the
elections and thus does not stand to be prejudiced or benefitted by the final adjudication of the case.
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC
In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that under Section 6 of Republic Act
No. 6646, the Commission "shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest even
after the proclamation of the candidate whose qualifications for office is questioned."
As to Maquiling’s intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which allows
intervention in proceedings for disqualification even after elections if no final judgment has been
rendered, but went on further to say that Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be prejudiced by
the outcome of the case as it agrees with the dispositive portion of the Resolution of the First Division
allowing the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code to take effect.
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition as one for
disqualification, and ruled that the petition was filed well within the period prescribed by law,24 having
been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not later than 11 May 2010, the date of proclamation.
However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and granted
Arnado’s Motion for Reconsideration, on the following premises:
First:
By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced his Philippine
citizenship as though he never became a citizen of another country. It was at that time, April 3, 2009,
that the respondent became a pure Philippine Citizen again.
The use of a US passport … does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his
renunciation as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not operate
to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on renounced. The First Division’s reliance in the case of In Re:
Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The petitioner in the said
case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking his oath as a naturalized Filipino, applied for the renewal of
his Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the conduct of citizens who are not natural born,
who acquire their citizenship by choice, thus discarding their original citizenship. The Philippine State
expects strict conduct of allegiance to those who choose to be its citizens. In the present case,
respondent is not a naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen who chose greener pastures by working
89
abroad and then decided to repatriate to supposedly help in the progress of Kauswagan. He did not
apply for a US passport after his renunciation. Thus the mentioned case is not on all fours with the case
at bar.
The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US passport. Although he applied
for a Philippine passport, the passport was only issued on June 18, 2009. However, he was not notified of
the issuance of his Philippine passport so that he was actually able to get it about three (3) months later.
Yet as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in
his subsequent travels abroad. This fact is proven by the respondent’s submission of a certified true copy
of his passport showing that he used the same for his travels on the following dates: January 31, 2010,
April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010, January 12, 2010, March 31, 2010 and June 4, 2010. This then shows that
the use of the US passport was because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to
him for his use. As probably pressing needs might be undertaken, the respondent used whatever is
within his control during that time.25
In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that the use of foreign
passport is not one of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 through
which Philippine citizenship may be lost.
"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of citizenship is more appropriate in this
case. Under said principle, once a person becomes a citizen, either by birth or naturalization, it is
assumed that he desires to continue to be a citizen, and this assumption stands until he voluntarily
denationalizes or expatriates himself. Thus, in the instant case respondent after reacquiring his
Philippine citizenship should be presumed to have remained a Filipino despite his use of his American
passport in the absence of clear, unequivocal and competent proof of expatriation. Accordingly, all
doubts should be resolved in favor of retention of citizenship."26
On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented, thus:
Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance to the
United States. The latter’s continued use of his US passport and enjoyment of all the privileges of a US
citizen despite his previous renunciation of the afore-mentioned citizenship runs contrary to his
declaration that he chose to retain only his Philippine citizenship. Respondent’s submission with the twin
requirements was obviously only for the purpose of complying with the requirements for running for the
mayoralty post in connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections.
Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing requirements; once any of them is
lost during his incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. If a candidate is not a citizen at
the time he ran for office or if he lost his citizenship after his election to office, he is disqualified to serve
as such. Neither does the fact that respondent obtained the plurality of votes for the mayoralty post cure
the latter’s failure to comply with the qualification requirements regarding his citizenship.
Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law, his having received the highest
number of votes does not validate his election. It has been held that where a petition for disqualification
was filed before election against a candidate but was adversely resolved against him after election, his
having obtained the highest number of votes did not make his election valid. His ouster from office does
not violate the principle of vox populi suprema est lex because the application of the constitutional and
statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity. To apply it is to breath[e] life to the

sovereign will of the people who expressed it when they ratified the Constitution and when they elected
their representatives who enacted the law.27
THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for
public office despite his continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be proclaimed as the
winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc for
ruling that Arnado is a Filipino citizen despite his continued use of a US passport, Maquiling now seeks to
reverse the finding of the COMELEC En Banc that Arnado is qualified to run for public office.
Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to affirm the First Division’s
disqualification of Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the review of the applicability of Section 44 of the Local
Government Code, claiming that the COMELEC committed reversible error in ruling that "the succession
of the vice mayor in case the respondent is disqualified is in order."
There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be addressed seriatim as the
subsequent questions hinge on the result of the first.
The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.
The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship
amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made.
A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use of a foreign passport after
renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for public office.
The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is applicable
to this case.
OUR RULING
Intervention of a rival candidate in a disqualification case is proper when there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent Arnado filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the First Division Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. As the candidate who
garnered the second highest number of votes, Maquiling contends that he has an interest in the
disqualification case filed against Arnado, considering that in the event the latter is disqualified, the
votes cast for him should be considered stray and the second-placer should be proclaimed as the winner
in the elections.
90
It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one for cancellation of the
certificate of candidacy and / or disqualification, the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En Banc
correctly treated the petition as one for disqualification.
The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Mercado v. Manzano28
clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the Court said:
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against
private respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms
Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified
shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for
disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.29
Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the COMELEC En Banc has
already ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for the exemption to the second-placer
rule set forth in Sinsuat v. COMELEC30 are present and therefore would not be prejudiced by the
outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the matter before this Court.
Arnado’s claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and respondents therein
have not appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The elevation of the case
by the intervenor prevents it from attaining finality. It is only after this Court has ruled upon the issues
raised in this instant petition that the disqualification case originally filed by Balua against Arnado will
attain finality.
The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of
representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by
repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective
position.
Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:
 91

Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines
and the following conditions:
(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath of
Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing these twin
requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for public office.
Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when he
applied for repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA, and again
on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the time, however, he
likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a dual citizen.
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by executing an
Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public office.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the
effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.32
However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after
renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued possession
of a foreign citizenship.33
Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation when the Court declared:
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should
he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship
through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of
entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he
applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed
abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against anyone who, in
electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63
constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an act which repudiates
the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another
country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.
When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his
American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and perpetually
renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"37 and that he "divest(s)
himself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States of
America."38
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of
his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an
American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such
reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American
citizen by using his US passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for
public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.

Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign
Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive
citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his
act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth,
certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The pivotal question to determine is whether he was
who are not required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of
solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby rendering
candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship.39 Dual citizens by
him eligible to run for public office.
naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date public office.
he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of
renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen
represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both countries
enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by
that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United States of
the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code,40 he was not qualified to
America.
run for a local elective position.

The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time,
In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days, or from 3
only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign
April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date he first used his American passport after renouncing his
citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which
American citizenship.
granted the citizenship.

This Court has previously ruled that:
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time
of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the
required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. x x x.41
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not just at
the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath
of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnado’s act of consistently using
his US passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation."42 This does not mean, that he failed
to comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did.
It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which effectively
disqualified him from running for an elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code of 1991.
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any elective
public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced his foreign
citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.
Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the explanation that he was not notified of the
issuance of his Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of which he was only able to obtain his
Philippine passport three (3) months later.43
The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the Portuguese national who sought
naturalization as a Filipino citizen and later applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. That
Arnado did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation does not make his use of a US passport less
of an act that violated the Oath of Renunciation he took. It was still a positive act of representation as a
US citizen before the immigration officials of this country.
The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon as he was in possession of his
Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad."44 We
cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three months from June is September. If indeed, Arnado used his
Philippine passport as soon as he was in possession of it, he would not have used his US passport on 24
November 2009.
Besides, Arnado’s subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the fact that after he
renounced his foreign citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of candidacy, he used his US passport.
In the same way that the use of his foreign passport does not undo his Oath of Renunciation, his
subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not undo his earlier use of his US passport.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and
political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain
allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the
right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office are required to renounce their
92
foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided
allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, has
recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to
his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from becoming a
candidate in the May 2010 elections.
We now resolve the next issue.
Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes45 which is the jurisprudential spring of
the principle that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an election contest. This
doctrine must be re-examined and its soundness once again put to the test to address the ever-recurring
issue that a second-placer who loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be proclaimed as the winner in the
elections.
The Facts of the case are as follows:
On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of Cavite, to fill the office of
municipal president. The petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the respondent, Maximo Abad, were opposing
candidates for that office. Topacio received 430 votes, and Abad 281. Abad contested the election upon
the sole ground that Topacio was ineligible in that he was reelected the second time to the office of the
municipal president on June 4, 1912, without the four years required by Act No. 2045 having
intervened.46
Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of a statutory prohibition for seeking a
second re-election absent the four year interruption.
The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from
an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one
receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."47
This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court was comparing "the
effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the
elections x x x with that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office."
The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a comparison and contrast between the two
situations, thus:
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or
irregularities in the elections is quite different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold
such an office. In the former case the court, after an examination of the ballots may find that some other
person than the candidate declared to have received a plurality by the board of canvassers actually
received the greater number of votes, in which case the court issues its mandamus to the board of
canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may find that the manner of holding the election and
the returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality that it cannot be determined who received a plurality of
the legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no question as to the correctness of the returns or the manner
of casting and counting the ballots is before the deciding power, and generally the only result can be that

the election fails entirely. In the former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the
opposing parties are striving for supremacy. If it be found that the successful candidate (according to the
board of canvassers) obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that another candidate was the real
victor, the former must retire in favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a
contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other
candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast
ballots. In the one case the question is as to who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots; in the
other, the question is confined to the personal character and circumstances of a single
individual.48 (Emphasis supplied)
Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In the other case, there is not, strictly
speaking, a contest" in contrast to the earlier statement, "In the former, we have a contest in the strict
sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy."
The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that "the wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility
of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."
A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court of First Instance is
without jurisdiction to try a disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person who obtained the
highest number of votes in the election, its jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the
contestants has been duly elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared that no one
had been legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general election held in that town
on 4 June 1912" where "the only question raised was whether or not Topacio was eligible to be elected
and to hold the office of municipal president."
The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second placer cannot be
proclaimed in his stead. The Court therein ruled:
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the respondent judge exceeded his
jurisdiction in declaring in those proceedings that no one was elected municipal president of the
municipality of Imus at the last general election; and that said order and all subsequent proceedings
based thereon are null and void and of no effect; and, although this decision is rendered on respondents'
answer to the order to show cause, unless respondents raised some new and additional issues, let
judgment be entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So ordered.49
On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not even have a legal basis to stand
on. It was a mere pronouncement of the Court comparing one process with another and explaining the
effects thereof. As an independent statement, it is even illogical.
Let us examine the statement:
"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate
when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."
What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible candidate to another candidate?
93
When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the
legally cast ballots and ineligibility is thereafter established, what stops the Court from adjudging
another eligible candidate who received the next highest number of votes as the winner and bestowing
upon him that "wreath?"
An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express legal
mandate, he could not even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of material
time or any other intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to
election date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold himself out to the electorate as a
legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his
ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to his qualifications as a
candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public office. The number of ballots cast in his favor
cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for
public office.
The popular vote does not cure the ineligibility of a candidate.
The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that
certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those
qualifications must be met before one even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not qualified is
voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the electorate expressed
through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the candidate. To rule otherwise is to
trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates. We might as well write off our election laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole
determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in our republic.
This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC50 when we pronounced:
x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the
salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications
prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if
they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires
strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of
the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and
fidelity to any other state.51 (Emphasis supplied)
This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC52 where the Court ruled that
the ruling in Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without qualifications lest "Election victory x x x
becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements."53
We have ruled in the past that a candidate’s victory in the election may be considered a sufficient basis
to rule in favor of the candidate sought to be disqualified if the main issue involves defects in the
candidate’s certificate of candidacy. We said that while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy
are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as regards election laws, that
mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be construed as directory after the

elections, to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v.
COMELEC:
The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune our above ruling. We
say this with the realization that a blanket and unqualified reading and application of this ruling can be
fraught with dangerous significance for the rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For one, such
blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around the law that effectively negates election
requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic information to make an informed choice
about a candidate’s eligibility and fitness for office.
The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section 39 of the LGC which
specifies the basic qualifications of local government officials. Equally susceptive of being rendered
toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets out what should be stated in a COC. Section 78 may likewise
be emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC can
render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false COC data wins. To state the obvious,
candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they know that an election victory will cure any
defect that their COCs may have. Election victory then becomes a magic formula to bypass election
eligibility requirements. (Citations omitted)
What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid COC, concealing any
disqualification, and employing every strategy to delay any disqualification case filed against him so he
can submit himself to the electorate and win, if winning the election will guarantee a disregard of
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates?
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring that its
exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not
democracy or republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the
electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it precisely serves as an open
invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.1âwphi1
Maquiling is not a second-placer as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified
candidates.
With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the
highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a void COC
cannot produce any legal effect.
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the
winner of an election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still
respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole
and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates
form part of that voice and must also be respected.
94
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and disqualifications
of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are participants who turn out to be
ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any
of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC56 that when the voters are well aware within
the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said candidate,
then the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected. That rule
is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates who placed second
to ineligible ones.
The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite for the
disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the
candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not necessary
before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner.
The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no moment.
The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the
certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but also the proclamation.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be suspended under this rule because Arnado failed
to file his answer to the petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer on 15 June
2010, long after the elections and after he was already proclaimed as the winner.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not
involve the commission of election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate,
or if he has already been elected, from holding the office.
The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was both
a Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen
disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position." The prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under any of the
enumeration from participating as candidates in the election.
 95

With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered
void from the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado rendered
it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer to the
petition when the elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed the winner.
To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the disqualification
which Arnado possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of
Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches back to the filing of the
certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves
Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on
succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the COMELEC En Bane
dated 2 February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is
disqualified from running for any local elective position. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is hereby
DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May 2010 elections.
by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective
position which makes him dual citizen. Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity
that comes with attendant civil and political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise
demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who
acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or
appointment to public office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the
public trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
It is a continuing requirement that must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or
assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost,
his title may be seasonably challenged. Therefore, the Court held Arnandodisqualified for any local
elective position as provided by express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government
Code.Popular vote does not cure this ineligibility of the candidate. Otherwise, substantive requirements
set by the Constitution are nugatory.
Furthermore, there is no second-placer to speak of because as reiterated in the case of Jalosjos v.
COMELEC, when the ineligibility was held to be void ab initio, no legal effect is produced. Hence among
the qualified candidates for position, Maquiling who garnered the highest votes should bedeclared as
winner.

This Decision is immediately executory.

Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the Commission on Elections.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Facts:

Arnado wasa natural born Filipino citizen, but lost his citizenship upon naturalization as citizen of United
States of America.Sometime on 2008 and 2009, his repatriation was granted and he subsequently
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of foreign citizenship. On November 2009, Arnando filed for a
certificate of candidacy and won the said election. But prior from his declaration as winner, a pending
action for disqualification was filed by Balua, one of the contenders for the position. Balua alleged that
Arnando was not a citizen of the Philippines, with a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration
that Arnando’s nationality is USA-American and a certified true copy of computer-generated travel
record that he has been using his American passport even after renunciation of American citizenship. A
division of the COMELEC ruled against Arnando but this decision was reversed by the COMELEC en Banc
stating that continued use of foreign passport is not one of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Meanwhile, Maquiling
petition that should be declared winner as he gained the second highest number of votes.

Issue: Whether or not continued use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects
one’s qualifications to run for public office.

Held:

Yes. The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act
of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained

EN BANC
G.R. No. 210164 August 18, 2015
ROMMEL C. ARNADO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FLORANTE CAPITAN, Respondents,
CONCURRING OPINION
SERENO, CJ:
In Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration, 1 we emphasized the variable nature of a person's
citizenship, which cannot be determined with finality or become the basis of rules that can be applied to
any and all proceedings thereafter. We said:
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case,
whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the
occasion may demand. 2
In election contests, this pronouncement gains significance, as elective local officials are constitutionally
allowed to run and serve for three consecutive terms. 3 While citizenship is a continuing requirement
that must be possessed not only at the time of election or assumption of office, but also during the
entire tenure of the official,4 it is not a continuing disqualification to run for and hold public office.5
As such, each case involving the question of an elective official's citizenship must be treated anew in
accordance with the surrounding relevant facts and applicable laws.
In this regard, I agree with some of the statements of J Brion in his Dissenting Opinion. Indeed, the
Court's ruling in Maquiling v. COMELEc6 went only so far as to determine whether Rommel C. Arnado
(Amado) was qualified to run for public office in the 2010 elections. It did not operate as, nor was it
intended to be, a final determination of Amado's citizenship that would forever derail his career as a
public official.
In Maquiling, we reiterated that natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their citizenship by
reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country may qualify to run for public office upon
taking the Oath of Allegiance 7 and making a sworn renunciation of their foreign citizenship.8 Arnado
subjected his citizenship to attack when he continued to use his United States (US) passport to travel in
and out of the country despite previously renouncing his US citizenship. The Court ruled that his use of
his US passport nullified the effect of his previous renunciation of US citizenship. While he did not lose
his Philippine citizenship in the process, he reverted to his status as a dual citizen and remained as such
at the time that he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte in the 2010 elections. Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those with dual
citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective local position.
96
Considering that the Court had pinpointed the defect in Amado's oath of renunciation, the simple act of
taking the oath anew would have been enough compliance with the requirement of the law.
The Decision found that from the time Amado used his US passport to travel in and out of the country up
to the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy for the succeeding elections in 2013, there had been no
change in his circumstances. 9 He still had not made a sworn renunciation of his US citizenship. Thus, the
ruling in Maquiling still applies: that Arnado had dual citizenship when he filed for his candidacy on 1
October 2012.
It did not matter that Maquiling was promulgated months after Arnado had filed for candidacy. Since he
was not totally unaware that the use of his US passport might have adverse consequences on his
candidacy for the 2013 elections, the Decision concludes that he should have been prudent enough to
remedy whatever defect there might have been in his citizenship.10
Even J. Brion concedes that Amado could have been more circumspect in order to secure his
qualification to run for public office. 11 However, it is insisted that the members of this Court should
remove the present case from the shadow of Maquiling and arrive at its resolution based merely on the
attendant factual and legal considerations specific to it.12
It cannot be denied that by virtue of its being a decision of the Court that joins the country's body of laws
as jurisprudence, Maquiling serves as a "legal consideration" in the resolution of the present case.
Maquiling' s application cannot be helped, especially since the Decision therein hinged not only on
relevant laws, but largely on the facts then presented before the Court. Thus, while the legal conclusion
in Maquiling was not a final determination of Amado's citizenship - as it applied only for purposes of the
2010 elections - the facts on which its legal conclusion was founded cannot be totally ignored.
A person's citizenship may be "threshed out again and again"13 in every proceeding as long as it becomes
relevant and necessary. Except for some clearly unmeritorious cases, it is always a good idea to decide
on the merits, especially in election controversies in which the law is sometimes placed at odds with the
will of the people. At the same time, the Court puts a premium on economy, and where previous
declarations of one's citizenship become pertinent, those cases may be used as a take-off point if only to
emphasize the differences and similarities, as well as the measures that were taken in the interim.
One point of contention between the Decision and the Dissenting Opinion is the finding that Arnado
used his US passport for his travels in and out of the country on 12 January 2010 and 23 March 2010.
One point of contention between the Decision and the Dissenting Opinion is the finding that Arnado
used his US passport for his travels in and out of the country on 12 January 2010 and 23 March 2010.
Maquiling indeed made a finding that Arnado used his US passport for travel on those dates. In the Court
Resolution dated 2 July 2013, we said:
Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of administrative bodies will not be interfered with by the
courts in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of said agencies, or unless the
aforementioned findings are not supported by substantial evidence.1âwphi1 They are accorded not only
great respect but even finality, and are binding upon this Court, unless it is shown that the administrative
body had arbitrarily disregarded or misapprehended evidence before it to such an extent as to compel a
contrary conclusion had such evidence been properly appreciated.

Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that COMELEC First
Division found that Arnado used his U.S. Passport at least six times after he renounced his American
citizenship. This was debunked by the COMELEC En Banc, which found that Arnado only used his U.S.
passport four times, and which agreed with Amado's claim that he only used his U.S. passport on those
occasions because his Philippine passport was not yet issued. The COMELEC En Banc argued that Amado
was able to prove that he used his Philippine passport for his travels on the following dates: 12 January
2010, 31 January 2010, 31 March 2010, 16 April 2010, 20 May 2010, and 4 June 2010.
None of these dates coincide with the two other dates indicated in the certification issued by the Bureau
of Immigration showing that on 21 January 2010 and on 23 March 2010, Arnado arrived in the
Philippines using his U.S. Passport No. 057782700 which also indicated therein that his nationality is
USA-American. Adding these two travel dates to the travel record provided by the Bureau of Immigration
showing that Arnado also presented his U.S. passport four times (upon departure on 14 April 2009, upon
arrival on 25 June 2009, upon departure on 29 July 2009 and upon arrival on 24 November 2009), these
incidents sum up to six.
The COMELEC En Banc concluded that "the use of the US passport was because to his knowledge, his
Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his use." This conclusion, however, is not supported by
the facts. Arnado claims that his Philippine passport was issued on 18 June 2009. The records show that
he continued to use his U.S. passport even after he already received his Philippine passport. Arnado's
travel records show that he presented his U.S. passport on 24 November 2009, on 21 January 2010, and
on 23 March 2010. These facts were never refuted by Arnado.
Thus, the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc is based on a misapprehension of the facts that the use of the
U.S. passport was discontinued when Amado obtained his Philippine passport.14 (Emphases supplied)
It is important to clarify that the certification from the Bureau of Immigration indicated that Amado
arrived in the country using his US passport on 12 January 2010 and 23 March 2010.15 The Court gave full
credence to the certification, not only because it carried with it the presumption of regularity, but more
important, Arnado never bothered to refute the contents thereof.
On the basis of this finding, the Court rejected the claim that Amado's use of his US passport several
times were mere isolated acts that were done only because he was not yet issued his Philippine
passport.16
To my mind, this is the turning point of Maquiling that regrettably still applies in this case: that whatever
professions of faith and allegiance to the Republic that Amado claims when his citizenship is in question,
the fact remains that during the instances that he used his US passport despite having a Philippine
passport in his possession, those same professions became hollow. And, that up to the filing of Amado's
Certificate of Candidacy for the 2013 elections, he failed to remedy the fatal blow that such repeated use
of his US passport dealt on his electoral qualifications.
I therefore concur with the DISMISSAL of the PETITION.
G.R. No. 210164 – Political Law – Election Law – Republic Act No. 9225 – Qualifications of Local Elective
Candidates – Citizenship Requirements – Dual Allegiance
Remedial Law – Formal Offer of Evidence – Evidence not Offered
97
Rommel Arnado was a natural-born Filipino. Later, however, he became an American citizen.
On July 10, 2008, he re-acquired his Filipino citizenship by executing an oath of allegiance to the
Philippines.
On April 3, 2009, he executed an affidavit renouncing his American citizenship.
On November 30, 2009, he filed a certificate of candidacy (COC) for mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte for the May 10, 2010 elections.
A rival candidate (Linog Balua) then filed a disqualification case against Arnado on the ground that
Arnado used his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship in April 2009. It was argued that such act
of using a US passport constitutes dual allegiance and that is a ground for disqualification under the Local
Government Code. In short, it was argued that Arnado remained a US citizen.
In his defense, Arnado argued that he is qualified to run for public office because he complied with the
requirements of Republic Act No. 9225 which provides that a former Filipino citizen may run for elective
public office if (1) they meet the qualifications for the elective office they desire, and (2) make a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships – which must be done before the filing of the
COC.
Arnado explained that his use of his US passport after April 2009 was because of the fact that he did not
know yet that he had been issued already a Philippine passport; that when he received said Philippine
passport, he used it since then; that at any rate, Arnado, on November 30, 2009, again executed an
Affirmation of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance before a notary public.
Balua however presented proof that Arnado again used his US passport in January 2010 and in March
2010.
Eventually, the Commission on Elections disqualified Arnado, who won the 2010 elections, and declared
another rival candidate as the rightful mayor. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 195649).
Later, on October 1, 2012, Arnado filed his COC for mayor for the May 2013 elections. Another rival
candidate (Casan Maquiling) filed a petition to disqualify Arnado based on the ruling in G.R. No. 195649.
While the case was pending, Arnado won the 2013 elections as he even acquired 84% of the votes cast
for mayor in Kauswagan.
Later however, the COMELEC disqualified Arnado from running in the May 2013 Elections and his
declaration as Mayor of Kauswagan was voided. Arnado sued the COMELEC as he argued that the
COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion. He averred that he was able to comply with the
requirements of RA 9225; and that his disqualification only disenfranchised 84% of the Kauswagan
voters.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arguments raised by Arnado are tenable.
HELD:
No.
1. Firstly, the fact that he obtained a landslide victory does not override the requirements set by law. The
fact that he garnered 84% of the total votes cast in Kauswagan cannot override the constitutional and
statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications. Election victory cannot be used as a magic
formula to bypass election eligibility requirements; otherwise, certain provisions of laws pertaining to
elections will become toothless.
2. The COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it disqualified Arnado. Arnado failed to
comply with the requirements of RA 9225. Although he did swear allegiance to the Philippines and
renounced his US citizenship prior to filing his COC in November 2009, such acts were deemed recanted
or withdrawn when he again used his US passport.
 98

In fact, Arnado did not controvert the allegations that he used his US passport in January 2010 and
March 2010. As such, he remained a US citizen and is therefore disqualified to run for public office.
What Arnado could have done, for the purposes of running in the 2013 elections, was to renounce again
(for the third time) his US citizenship. But he never did that hence he was rightfully disqualified in the
2013 elections too.
Note also that assuming that Arnado never used his US passport in January 2010 and March 2010, he is
still disqualified.
Arnado averred that his use of his US passport prior to November 2009 was cured when he again made a
second renunciation of his US citizenship on November 30, 2009. However, the Affidavit of Renunciation
he offered in court during trial was a mere photocopy of the original. Under the Best Evidence Rule
(Section 3, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court), the original must be presented unless the same is lost. In
this case, the original was never alleged to have been lost. Further, the said Affidavit was being used
belatedly by Arnado. In fact, it was never formally offered. Under Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules of Court, “The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.”

EN BANC
G.R. No. 181613 November 25, 2009
ROSALINDA A. PENERA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR T. ANDANAR, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
We grant Rosalinda A. Penera’s (Penera) motion for reconsideration of this Court’s Decision of 11
September 2009 (Decision).
The assailed Decision dismissed Penera’s petition and affirmed the Resolution dated 30 July 2008 of the
COMELEC En Banc as well as the Resolution dated 24 July 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division. The
Decision disqualified Penera from running for the office of Mayor in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte and
declared that the Vice-Mayor should succeed Penera.
In support of her motion for reconsideration, Penera submits the following arguments:
1. Penera was not yet a candidate at the time of the incident under Section 11 of RA 8436 as
amended by Section 13 of RA 9369.
2. The petition for disqualification failed to submit convincing and substantial evidence
against Penera for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
3. Penera never admitted the allegations of the petition for disqualification and has
consistently disputed the charge of premature campaigning.
4. The admission that Penera participated in a motorcade is not the same as admitting she
engaged in premature election campaigning.
Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code defines a "candidate" as "any person aspiring for or seeking
an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy x x x." The second sentence, third
paragraph, Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by Section 13 of RA 9369, provides that "[a]ny person
who files his certificate of candidacy within [the period for filing] shall only be considered as a candidate
at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." The immediately
succeeding proviso in the same third paragraph states that "unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a
candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period." These two provisions
determine the resolution of this case.
The Decision states that "[w]hen the campaign period starts and [the person who filed his certificate of
candidacy] proceeds with his/her candidacy, his/her intent turning into actuality, we can already
consider his/her acts, after the filing of his/her COC and prior to the campaign period, as the promotion
99
of his/her election as a candidate, hence, constituting premature campaigning, for which he/she may be
disqualified."1
Under the Decision, a candidate may already be liable for premature campaigning after the filing of the
certificate of candidacy but even before the start of the campaign period. From the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, even long before the start of the campaign period, the Decision considers the
partisan political acts of a person so filing a certificate of candidacy "as the promotion of his/her election
as a candidate." Thus, such person can be disqualified for premature campaigning for acts done before
the start of the campaign period. In short, the Decision considers a person who files a certificate of
candidacy already a "candidate" even before the start of the campaign period. lawphil
The assailed Decision is contrary to the clear intent and letter of the law.
The Decision reverses Lanot v. COMELEC,2 which held that a person who files a certificate of candidacy
is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. In Lanot, this Court explained:
Thus, the essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a person
engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed to promote the
election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates; (3) the act is done outside the campaign
period.
The second element requires the existence of a "candidate." Under Section 79(a), a candidate is one who
"has filed a certificate of candidacy" to an elective public office. Unless one has filed his certificate of
candidacy, he is not a "candidate." The third element requires that the campaign period has not started
when the election campaign or partisan political activity is committed.
Assuming that all candidates to a public office file their certificates of candidacy on the last day, which
under Section 75 of the Omnibus Election Code is the day before the start of the campaign period, then
no one can be prosecuted for violation of Section 80 for acts done prior to such last day. Before such last
day, there is no "particular candidate or candidates" to campaign for or against. On the day immediately
after the last day of filing, the campaign period starts and Section 80 ceases to apply since Section 80
covers only acts done "outside" the campaign period.
Thus, if all candidates file their certificates of candidacy on the last day, Section 80 may only apply to acts
done on such last day, which is before the start of the campaign period and after at least one candidate
has filed his certificate of candidacy. This is perhaps the reason why those running for elective public
office usually file their certificates of candidacy on the last day or close to the last day.
There is no dispute that Eusebio’s acts of election campaigning or partisan political activities were
committed outside of the campaign period. The only question is whether Eusebio, who filed his
certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003, was a "candidate" when he committed those acts before
the start of the campaign period on 24 March 2004.
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 ("RA 8436") moved the deadline for the filing of certificates of
candidacy to 120 days before election day. Thus, the original deadline was moved from 23 March 2004
to 2 January 2004, or 81 days earlier. The crucial question is: did this change in the deadline for filing the
certificate of candidacy make one who filed his certificate of candidacy before 2 January 2004

immediately liable for violation of Section 80 if he engaged in election campaign or partisan political
activities prior to the start of the campaign period on 24 March 2004?
Section 11 of RA 8436 provides:
SECTION 11. Official Ballot. – The Commission shall prescribe the size and form of the official ballot which
shall contain the titles of the positions to be filled and/or the propositions to be voted upon in an
initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Under each position, the names of candidates shall be arranged
alphabetically by surname and uniformly printed using the same type size. A fixed space where the
chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors shall affix his/her signature to authenticate the official
ballot shall be provided.
Both sides of the ballots may be used when necessary.
For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for registration/
manifestation to participate in the election shall not be later than one hundred twenty (120) days before
the elections: Provided, That, any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other
than the one which he/she is holding in a permanent capacity, except for president and vice-president,
shall be deemed resigned only upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to the position for
which he/she is running: Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate
shall take effect upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That, for purposes of
the May 11, 1998 elections, the deadline for filing of the certificate of candidacy for the positions of
President, Vice-President, Senators and candidates under the party-list system as well as petitions for
registration and/or manifestation to participate in the party-list system shall be on February 9, 1998
while the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy for other positions shall be on March 27, 1998.
The official ballots shall be printed by the National Printing Office and/or the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
at the price comparable with that of private printers under proper security measures which the
Commission shall adopt. The Commission may contract the services of private printers upon certification
by the National Printing Office/Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet the printing requirements.
Accredited political parties and deputized citizens’ arms of the Commission may assign watchers in the
printing, storage and distribution of official ballots.
To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the Committee shall ensure that the serial
number on the ballot stub shall be printed in magnetic ink that shall be easily detectable by inexpensive
hardware and shall be impossible to reproduce on a photocopying machine, and that identification
marks, magnetic strips, bar codes and other technical and security markings, are provided on the ballot.
The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each city/municipality at the rate of one (1) ballot
for every registered voter with a provision of additional four (4) ballots per precinct.
Under Section 11 of RA 8436, the only purpose for the early filing of certificates of candidacy is to give
ample time for the printing of official ballots. This is clear from the following deliberations of the
Bicameral Conference Committee:
SENATOR GONZALES. Okay. Then, how about the campaign period, would it be the same[,] uniform for
local and national officials?
100
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Personally, I would agree to retaining it at the present periods.
SENATOR GONZALES. But the moment one files a certificate of candidacy, he’s already a candidate, and
there are many prohibited acts on the part of candidate.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Unless we. . . .
SENATOR GONZALES. And you cannot say that the campaign period has not yet began (sic).
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). If we don’t provide that the filing of the certificate will not bring
about one’s being a candidate.
SENATOR GONZALES. If that’s a fact, the law cannot change a fact.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). No, but if we can provide that the filing of the certificate of
candidacy will not result in that official vacating his position, we can also provide that insofar he is
concerned, election period or his being a candidate will not yet commence. Because here, the reason
why we are doing an early filing is to afford enough time to prepare this machine readable ballots.
So, with the manifestations from the Commission on Elections, Mr. Chairman, the House Panel will
withdraw its proposal and will agree to the 120-day period provided in the Senate version.
THE CHAIRMAN (SENATOR FERNAN). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SENATOR GONZALES. How about prohibition against campaigning or doing partisan acts which apply
immediately upon being a candidate?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Again, since the intention of this provision is just to afford the
Comelec enough time to print the ballots, this provision does not intend to change the campaign periods
as presently, or rather election periods as presently fixed by existing law.
THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (SEN. FERNAN). So, it should be subject to the other prohibition.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). That’s right.
THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (SEN. FERNAN). Okay.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). In other words, actually, there would be no conflict anymore
because we are talking about the 120-day period before election as the last day of filing a certificate of
candidacy, election period starts 120 days also. So that is election period already. But he will still not be
considered as a candidate.
Thus, because of the early deadline of 2 January 2004 for purposes of printing of official ballots, Eusebio
filed his certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003. Congress, however, never intended the filing of a
certificate of candidacy before 2 January 2004 to make the person filing to become immediately a
"candidate" for purposes other than the printing of ballots. This legislative intent prevents the
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immediate application of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code to those filing to meet the early
deadline. The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the "election periods as x x x fixed by existing
law" prior to RA 8436 and that one who files to meet the early deadline "will still not be considered as a
candidate."3 (Emphasis in the original)
x x x Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect upon
the start of the aforesaid campaign period, x x x.
In RA 9369, Congress inserted the word "only" so that the first proviso now reads —

Lanot was decided on the ground that one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the
x x x Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the
start of the campaign period. This ground was based on the deliberations of the legislators who
start of the aforesaid campaign period x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
explained the intent of the provisions of RA 8436, which laid the legal framework for an automated
election system. There was no express provision in the original RA 8436 stating that one who files a
certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. Thus, Congress not only reiterated but also strengthened its mandatory directive that election offenses
can be committed by a candidate "only" upon the start of the campaign period. This clearly means that
before the start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be so committed.
When Congress amended RA 8436, Congress decided to expressly incorporate the Lanot doctrine into
law, realizing that Lanot merely relied on the deliberations of Congress in holding that —
When the applicable provisions of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, are read together, these provisions
of law do not consider Penera a candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots, until the start
The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the "election periods as x x x fixed by existing law" prior
of the campaign period. There is absolutely no room for any other interpretation.
to RA 8436 and that one who files to meet the early deadline "will still not be considered as a
candidate."4 (Emphasis supplied)
We quote with approval the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Antonio T. Carpio:
Congress wanted to insure that no person filing a certificate of candidacy under the early deadline
required by the automated election system would be disqualified or penalized for any partisan political x x x The definition of a "candidate" in Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code should be read
act done before the start of the campaign period. Thus, in enacting RA 9369, Congress expressly wrote together with the amended Section 15 of RA 8436. A "‘candidate’ refers to any person aspiring for or
the Lanot doctrine into the second sentence, third paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436, seeking an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an
thus: accredited political party, aggroupment or coalition of parties." However, it is no longer enough to
merely file a certificate of candidacy for a person to be considered a candidate because "any person who
files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition
of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." Any person may thus file a
for registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of
certificate of candidacy on any day within the prescribed period for filing a certificate of candidacy yet
candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign
that person shall be considered a candidate, for purposes of determining one’s possible violations of
period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions
election laws, only during the campaign period. Indeed, there is no "election campaign" or "partisan
applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period:
political activity" designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to
Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active
public office simply because there is no "candidate" to speak of prior to the start of the campaign period.
members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled
Therefore, despite the filing of her certificate of candidacy, the law does not consider Penera a candidate
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at
at the time of the questioned motorcade which was conducted a day before the start of the campaign
the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy. (Boldfacing and underlining supplied)
period. x x x

Congress elevated the Lanot doctrine into a statute by specifically inserting it as the second sentence of
The campaign period for local officials began on 30 March 2007 and ended on 12 May 2007. Penera filed
the third paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436, which cannot be annulled by this Court
her certificate of candidacy on 29 March 2007. Penera was thus a candidate on 29 March 2009 only for
except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality. The Decision cannot reverse Lanot without repealing
purposes of printing the ballots. On 29 March 2007, the law still did not consider Penera a candidate for
this second sentence, because to reverse Lanot would mean repealing this second sentence.
purposes other than the printing of ballots. Acts committed by Penera prior to 30 March 2007, the date
when she became a "candidate," even if constituting election campaigning or partisan political activities,
The assailed Decision, however, in reversing Lanot does not claim that this second sentence or any are not punishable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Such acts are within the realm of a
portion of Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, is unconstitutional. In fact, the Decision citizen’s protected freedom of expression. Acts committed by Penera within the campaign period are not
considers the entire Section 15 good law. Thus, the Decision is self-contradictory — reversing Lanot but covered by Section 80 as Section 80 punishes only acts outside the campaign period.5
maintaining the constitutionality of the second sentence, which embodies the Lanot doctrine. In so
doing, the Decision is irreconcilably in conflict with the clear intent and letter of the second sentence,
The assailed Decision gives a specious reason in explaining away the first proviso in the third paragraph,
third paragraph, Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369.
the amended Section 15 of RA 8436 that election offenses applicable to candidates take effect only upon
the start of the campaign period. The Decision states that:
In enacting RA 9369, Congress even further clarified the first proviso in the third paragraph of Section 15
of RA 8436. The original provision in RA 8436 states —

x x x [T]he line in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, which provides that "any unlawful act
or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period," does
not mean that the acts constituting premature campaigning can only be committed, for which the
offender may be disqualified, during the campaign period. Contrary to the pronouncement in the
dissent, nowhere in said proviso was it stated that campaigning before the start of the campaign period
is lawful, such that the offender may freely carry out the same with impunity.
As previously established, a person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his/her becoming a candidate
(thus, prior to the start of the campaign period), can already commit the acts described under Section
79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as election campaign or partisan political activity, However, only
after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the campaign period, can said acts
be given effect as premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Only after
said person officially becomes a candidate, at the start of the campaign period, can his/her
disqualification be sought for acts constituting premature campaigning. Obviously, it is only at the start
of the campaign period, when the person officially becomes a candidate, that the undue and iniquitous
advantages of his/her prior acts, constituting premature campaigning, shall accrue to his/her benefit.
Compared to the other candidates who are only about to begin their election campaign, a candidate who
had previously engaged in premature campaigning already enjoys an unfair headstart in promoting
his/her candidacy.6(Emphasis supplied)
It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. This is
specially true to expression or speech, which Congress cannot outlaw except on very narrow grounds
involving clear, present and imminent danger to the State. The mere fact that the law does not declare
an act unlawful ipso facto means that the act is lawful. Thus, there is no need for Congress to declare in
Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, that political partisan activities before the start of the
campaign period are lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state that "any unlawful act or omission
applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period." The only
inescapable and logical result is that the same acts, if done before the start of the campaign period, are
lawful.
In layman’s language, this means that a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done
during the campaign period, not before. The law is clear as daylight — any election offense that may be
committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be committed before the start of the campaign
period. In ruling that Penera is liable for premature campaigning for partisan political acts before the
start of the campaigning, the assailed Decision ignores the clear and express provision of the law.
The Decision rationalizes that a candidate who commits premature campaigning can be disqualified or
prosecuted only after the start of the campaign period. This is not what the law says. What the law says
is "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
campaign period." The plain meaning of this provision is that the effective date when partisan political
acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the
campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.
The law does not state, as the assailed Decision asserts, that partisan political acts done by a candidate
before the campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the start of the campaign
period. Neither does the law state that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign
period are temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the start of the campaign period. This is
clearly not the language of the law. Besides, such a law as envisioned in the Decision, which defines a
criminal act and curtails freedom of expression and speech, would be void for vagueness.
102
Congress has laid down the law — a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon the start of the
campaign period. This Court has no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law that "any
person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a
candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." Neither can
this Court turn a blind eye to the express and clear language of the law that "any unlawful act or
omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period."
The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial measures, is not this Court but
the Legislature. This Court has no recourse but to apply a law that is as clear, concise and express as the
second sentence, and its immediately succeeding proviso, as written in the third paragraph of Section 15
of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT petitioner Rosalinda A. Penera’s Motion for Reconsideration. We SET ASIDE the
Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 181613 promulgated on 11 September 2009, as well as the Resolutions
dated 24 July 2007 and 30 January 2008 of the COMELEC Second Division and the COMELEC En Banc,
respectively, in SPA No. 07-224. Rosalinda A. Penera shall continue as Mayor of Sta. Monica, Surigao del
Norte.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
Penera and private respondent Edgar T. Andanar were mayoralty candidates in Sta. Monica during the
14 May 2007 elections. On 2 April 2007, Andanar filed before the Office of the Regional Election Director,
Caraga Region (Region XIII), a Petition for Disqualification against Penera, as well as the candidates for
Vice-Mayor and Sangguniang Bayan who belonged to her political party, for unlawfully engaging in
election campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the commencement of the campaign period.
Rosalinda A. Penera’s filed a motion for reconsideration of this Court’s Decision of 11 September
2009.The assailed Decision dismissed Penera’s petition and affirmed the Resolution dated 30 July 2008
of the COMELEC En Banc as well as the Resolution dated 24 July 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division.
The Decision disqualified Penera from running for the office of Mayor in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte
and declared that the Vice-Mayor should succeed Penera.
ISSUE: Is Penera guilty of premature campaigning? May premature campaigning be committed by a
person who is not a candidate?
RULING:
No to both. Under the assailed September 11, 2009 Decision, a candidate may already be liable for
premature campaigning after the filing of the certificate of candidacy but even before the start of the
campaign period. Thus, such person can be disqualified for premature campaigning for acts done before
the start of the campaign period. In short, the Decision considers a person who files a certificate of
candidacy already “candidate” even before the start of the campaign period.

Now the Court holds that the assailed Decision is contrary to the clear intent and letter of the law. In
Lanot v. COMELEC,it held that a person who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the
start of the campaign period. Lanot was decided on the ground that one who files a certificate of
candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period.
Congress elevated the Lanot doctrine into a statute by specifically inserting it as the second sentence of
the third paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436. In RA 9369, Congress inserted the word
“only” so that the first proviso now reads:
x x x Provided, that, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the
start of the aforesaid campaign period x x x.
Thus, Congress not only reiterated but also strengthened its mandatory directive that election offenses
can be committed by a candidate “only” upon the start of the campaign period. This clearly means that
before the start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be so committed.
In layman’s language, this means that a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done
during the campaign period, not before. The law is clear as daylight — any election offense that may be
committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be committed before the start of the campaign
period. In ruling that Penera is liable for premature campaigning for partisan political acts before the
start of the campaigning, the assailed Decision ignores the clear and express provision of the law.
The Supreme Court has strengthened the prohibition on premature campaigning and has disqualified the
Mayor of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte by reason thereof. In its Decision promulgated last September
11, 2009, the High Court dismissed the petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner Rosalinda A. Penera and
upheld the Resolution of the COMELEC’s Second Division and En Banc respectively, finding her guilty of
premature campaigning for violating Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code during the 2007 elections.
Penera and private respondent Edgar T. Andanar were mayoralty candidates in Sta. Monica during
the 14 May 2007 elections. On 2 April 2007, Andanar filed before the Office of the Regional Election
Director (ORED), Caraga Region (Region XIII), a Petition for Disqualification against Penera, as well as the
candidates for Vice-Mayor and Sangguniang Bayan who belonged to her political party, for unlawfully
engaging in election campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the commencement of the
campaign period. Andanar claimed that on 29 March 2007 – a day before the start of the authorized
campaign period on 30 March 2007 – Penera and her partymates went around the
different barangays in Sta. Monica, announcing their candidacies and requesting the people to vote for
them on the day of the elections.
Penera alone filed an Answer denying the charges but admitted that a motorcade did take place and that
it was simply in accordance with the usual practice in nearby cities and provinces, where the filing of
certificates of candidacy (COCs) was preceded by a motorcade, which dispersed soon after the
completion of such filing. The COMELEC disqualified Penera but absolved the other candidates from
Penera’s party from violation of section 80 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
In denying Penera’s petition, the Supreme Court, through Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario,
found that Penera and her witnesses admitted that the vehicles, consisting of two jeepneys and ten
103
motorcycles, were festooned with multi-colored balloons; the motorcade went around
three barangays in Sta. Monica; and Penera and her partymates waved their hands and threw sweet
candies to the crowd. Thus, for violating Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, proscribing election
campaign or partisan political activity outside the campaign period, Penera was disqualified from holding
the office of Mayor of Sta. Monica.
As to the questions of law involved in the case, the Court tackled the legal issue that Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, provides a new definition of the term
“candidate,” as a result of which, premature campaigning may no longer be committed and that because
of the said provision, the prohibited act of premature campaigning in Section 80 of the Omnibus Election
Code, is practically impossible to commit at any time.
In this regard, the Court disagreed, declaring that “there is no absolute and irreconcilable
incompatibility between Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, and Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which defines the prohibited act of premature campaigning. It is possible to
harmonize and reconcile these two provisions and, thus, give effect to both.”
The Court held, further, that:
“True, that pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, even after the filing of the COC
but before the start of the campaign period, a person is not yet officially considered a candidate.
Nevertheless, a person,upon the filing of his/her COC, already explicitly declares his/her intention to run
as a candidate in the coming elections. The commission by such a person of any of the acts enumerated
under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code (i.e., holding rallies or parades, making speeches, etc.)
can, thus, be logically and reasonably construed as for the purpose of promoting his/her intended
candidacy.
When the campaign period starts and said person proceeds with his/her candidacy, his/her intent
turning into actuality, we can already consider his/her acts, after the filing of his/her COC and prior to
the campaign period, as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate, hence, constituting premature
campaigning, for which he/she may be disqualified. Also, conversely, if said person, for any reason,
withdraws his/her COC before the campaign period, then there is no point to view his/her acts prior to
said period as acts for the promotion of his/her election as a candidate. In the latter case, there can be
no premature campaigning as there is no candidate, whose disqualification may be sought, to begin
with.
Third, in connection with the preceding discussion, the line in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as
amended, which provides that “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take
effect only upon the start of the campaign period,” does not mean that the acts constituting premature
campaigning can only be committed, for which the offender may be disqualified, during the campaign
period. Contrary to the pronouncement in the dissent, nowhere in the said proviso was it stated that
campaigning before the start of the campaign period is lawful, such that the offender may freely carry
out the same with impunity.
As previously established, a person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his/her becoming a candidate
(thus, prior to the start of the campaign period), can already commit the acts described under Section
79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as election campaign or partisan political activity. However, only
after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the campaign period, can said acts
be given effect as premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Only after
said person officially becomes a candidate, at the start of the campaign period, can
 104

his/her disqualification be sought for acts constituting premature campaigning. Obviously, it is only at
the start of the campaign period, when the person officially becomes a candidate, that the undue and
iniquitous advantages of his/her prior acts, constituting premature campaigning, shall accrue to his/her
benefit. Compared to the other candidates who are only about to begin their election campaign, a
candidate who had previously engaged in premature campaigning already enjoys an unfair headstart in
promoting his/her candidacy.

As can be gleaned from the foregoing disquisition, harmony in the provisions of Sections 80 and 79 of
the Omnibus Election Code, as well as Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, is not only very
possible, but in fact desirable, necessary and consistent with the legislative intent and policy of the law. “

Given this Decision, however, it is not yet clear what action the COMELEC will take with regard to the
numerous infomercials made by possible candidates in the May 2010 elections. Moreover, there is a
possibility that the Court may reconsider its Decision because of the close 8-7 vote among the Justices.
 105

EN BANC
The election protest is based on three hundred (300) ballots more or less with only "MARTINEZ" or "C.
CELESTINO A. MARTINEZ III, G.R. No. 189034 MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative which the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) did not
Petitioner,
count for Martinez on the ground that there was another congressional candidate (Edilito C. Martinez)
- versus – who had the same surname. Martinez further alleged that he lost several thousand votes as a result of
incorrect appreciation of ballots not counted in his favor while clearly marked ballots, groups of ballots
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND Promulgated: which appeared to have been prepared by one (1) person, individual ballots which appeared to have
BENHUR L. SALIMBANGON, been prepared by two (2) or more persons, and fake and unofficial ballots were read and counted in
Respondents. January 12, 2010
favor of Salimbangon. He also claimed that the votes reflected in the election returns were unlawfully
DECISION increased in favor of Salimbangon while votes in his favor were unlawfully decreased.[4]
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Salimbangon filed his Answer with Counter-Protest stating that the Minutes of Voting (MOV) inside the
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeks to nullify the Decision[1] dated May 28, 2009 of the House ballot boxes in all the protested precincts contain no recorded objections regarding straying of votes
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 07-035 dismissing the election protest and claimed by Martinez, and that it was very seldom, if at all, that there were ballots with only "MARTINEZ"
declaring private respondent as the duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of or "C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative. He counter-protested 954 precincts on grounds
Cebu, and the Resolution[2] dated July 30, 2009 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof. of coercion/intimidation and duress; massive vote-buying; "lansadera";
The Facts misreading/miscounting/misappreciation of votes; and other electoral anomalies and irregularities.

In the May 14, 2007 elections, petitioner Martinez and private respondent Salimbangon were among the
During the revision, ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for
candidates for Representative in the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu Province. On March 29, 2007,
Representative were not counted and temporarily classified as stray. These comprise majority of the
Edilito C. Martinez, a resident of Barangay Tambongon, Daan-Bantayan, Cebu, filed his certificate of
9,831 stray ballots claimed by Martinez.[5]
candidacy for the same position.

HRET Ruling
On April 3, 2007, Martinez filed a petition to declare Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate.[3] However,
the Commission on Elections Second Division issued its Resolution declaring Edilito C. Martinez a
In its Decision dated May 28, 2009, the HRET resolved each of the claims and objections respectively
nuisance candidate only on June 12, 2007 or almost one (1) month after the elections.
raised by protestant and protestee applying the rules for appreciation of ballots. The Tribunal recognized
as most crucial the issue of whether or not ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" written on
On July 9, 2007, Salimbangon was proclaimed winner in the congressional elections for the Fourth
the line for Representative should be counted in favor of Martinez. Thus, the election protest "will rise or
Legislative District of Cebu on the basis of official results showing that he garnered sixty-seven thousand
fall on how the Tribunal [appreciates said] ballots."[6]
two hundred seventy-seven (67,277) votes as against Martinez who garnered sixty-seven thousand one
hundred seventy-three (67,173) votes, or a difference of one hundred four (104) votes.
Ruling on the issue, the HRET sustained the BEI in considering the ballots as stray in accordance with Sec.
211 (1) of the Omnibus Election Code which provides:
Martinez filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam on July 18, 2007 and on July 26, 2007, the HRET granted
his motion to convert the same into a Regular Protest of all one thousand one hundred twenty-nine "Where only the first name of a candidate or only his surname is written, the vote
for such candidate is valid, if there is no other candidate with the same first
(1,129) precincts of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu. name or surname for the same office."[7] [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]
 106

Since the name of Edilito C. Martinez was still included in the official list of candidates on election day Unclaimed ballots admitted*** 8 11

(May 14, 2007), the HRET held that five thousand four hundred one (5,401) ballots with "MARTINEZ" or Restored Ballots 2
"C. MARTINEZ" only written on the line for Representative were properly denied on the ground that Total Votes in the Contested Precincts After Appreciation of
Evidence
there was no way of determining the real intention of the voter. These ballots were included in the
66,655 67,108
7,544 ballots denied as votes for Martinez in 961 precincts.[8]
PLURALITY OF PROTESTEE'S VOTES
453
Commiserating with Martinez on the delayed resolution of SPA Case No. 07-133 (PES), the HRET stated:
* Taken from Revision Reports
** Namely Precinct Nos. 51A, Daan-Bantayan, 40A, 56A, 79A, all of Bantayan,
"We sympathize to (sic) the protestant that he is the victim of the inaction of the
15C, 19D, 66B/67A, 88A, 105A, all of Bogo, 40A/41A, 70A/71A, all of
Comelec in failing to decide the petition to disqualify Edilito C. Martinez as
Medellin, 30A, Sta. Fe.
nuisance candidate on or before the May 14, 2007 elections. After all, it appears
*** During appreciation of ballots in 961 precincts.
that the latter did not even lift a finger to oppose the petition for his declaration
as nuisance candidate and that per its decision rendered only twenty-nine (29)
days after the May 14, 2007 elections, Edilito C. Martinez was indeed a nuisance
On the basis of the foregoing, the HRET dismissed the election protest, affirmed the proclamation of
candidate.
Salimbangon and declared him to be the duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of
"As it is, the delay committed by the Comelec in deciding the petition to disqualify Cebu, having won by a plurality margin of 453 votes.
Edilito C. Martinez as nuisance candidate on or before May 14, 2007 election did
not only cause injustice to herein protestant but worst, had resulted to (sic) the
disenfranchisement of five thousand four hundred one (5,401) electorates whose Martinez moved for reconsideration of the Decision, but the HRET denied it by Resolution dated July 30,
votes could have changed the number of votes garnered by the parties herein if
not changed altogether the outcome of the election itself."[9] 2009.[11]

The final overall results of recount and appreciation of ballots, election documents and other evidence in The Petition
[10]
the entire 1,129 precincts as determined by the HRET are as follows :
Petitioner alleges that the HRET gravely abused its discretion when it failed to credit the "MARTINEZ" or
Overall Fourth District of Cebu Votes "C. MARTINEZ" votes in his favor despite the finality of the COMELEC resolution declaring Edilito C.
PROTESTANT PROTESTEE
Martinez a nuisance candidate. Petitioner argues that the Decision disenfranchised 5,401 voters when it
1] Votes per physical count* in 961 precincts where there was ruled that said votes cannot be counted as votes for him since "there is no way of determining the real
ballot appreciation
57,758 57,132 intention of the voter", in utter disregard of the mandate of Art. VIII, Sec. 14 of the Constitution. He

2] Votes in 12 precincts** without ballots found during revision maintains that there is no clear and good reason to justify the rejection of those 5,401 ballots, and points
(based on election returns) out that at the time private respondent was proclaimed by the Board of Canvassers, only 104 votes
998 660
separated private respondent from him (private respondent was credited with 67,277 votes as against
3] Votes per election returns in 156 precincts in which several
spurious ballots were placed after elections, counting and/or 67,173 votes of petitioner, while nuisance candidate Edilito C. Martinez got a measly 363 votes.)[12]
canvassing of votes
9,937 7,815
Petitioner further alleges that the HRET invalidated ballots for him without stating the legal and factual
68,693 65,607
bases therefor, and on grounds other than the objections raised by private respondent. He contends that
the HRET erred in concluding that the ruling in Bautista v. Commission on Elections[13] cannot be applied
Less: Objected ballots rejected*** 4,333 860
in view of circumstances which supposedly distinguish the present case from Bautista. Finally, petitioner
Add: Claimed ballots admitted*** 2,287 2,348
cites the dissenting opinion of the Honorable Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura who

disagreed with the majority ruling and posited that the final declaration by COMELEC that Edilito C.
Martinez was a nuisance candidate and the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy should be deemed
effective as of the day of the election.[14]
In his Comment, private respondent assails the apparent desire of petitioner for this Court to review the
physical appreciation of ballots conducted by the HRET when he assigned as issues the alleged erroneous
invalidation by the HRET of petitioner's ballots which were ruled as written by two (2) persons, and when
he even appreciated ballots that were declared by the HRET as marked ballots. Private respondent
details the mostly post-election anomalies and irregularities, particularly in Bogo City, perpetrated by the
petitioner as found by the HRET such as tampering of election returns and statement of votes and vote
padding/tampering.
As to the "MARTINEZ" and "C. MARTINEZ" ballots, private respondent asserts that the HRET correctly
refused to credit petitioner with these votes, stressing that there were admittedly three (3) candidates
for the position of Representative for the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu as of May 14, 2007. Not a
single voter in the district knew of any nuisance congressional candidate on election day. Private
respondent argues that it would be illogical and most unfair to count the said ballots in favor of
petitioner as it is erroneous to base the voter's intent on the supervening circumstance which was
inexistent on the date the ballot was accomplished and cast. The HRET likewise did not err in holding
that the Bautista ruling is inapplicable, there being no announced declaration yet of one (1) of the
candidates as nuisance candidate when the voters cast their ballots on election day.
The Issues
What then is the legal effect of declaring a nuisance candidate as such in a final judgment after the
elections? Should ballots containing only the similar surname of two (2) candidates be considered as
stray votes or counted in favor of the bona fide candidate?
Our Ruling
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
"Section 69. Nuisance candidates. -- The Commission may motu proprio or upon a
verified petition of an interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy if it is shown that said certificate has been filed to put the
107
election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters
by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other
circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona
fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been
filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate."
Republic Act No. 6646, otherwise known as The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987" provides in Section 5
thereof:
"SEC. 5. Procedure in Cases of Nuisance Candidates. --
(a) A verified petition to declare a duly registered candidate as a nuisance
candidate under Section 69 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be filed personally or
through duly authorized representative with the Commission by any registered
candidate for the same office within five (5) days from the last day for the filing of
certificates of candidacy. Filing by mail shall not be allowed.
"(b) Within three (3) days from the filing of the petition, the Commission shall
issue summons to the respondent candidate together with a copy of the petition
and its enclosures, if any.
"(c) The respondent shall be given three (3) days from receipt of the summons
within which to file his verified answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition,
serving copy thereof upon the petitioner. Grounds for a motion to dismiss may be
raised as affirmative defenses.
"(d) The Commission may designate any of its officials who are lawyers to hear the
case and receive evidence. The proceeding shall be summary in nature. In lieu of
oral testimonies, the parties may be required to submit position papers together
with affidavits or counter-affidavits and other documentary evidence. The hearing
officer shall immediately submit to the Commission his findings, reports, and
recommendations within five (5) days from the completion of such submission of
evidence. The Commission shall render its decision within five (5) days from receipt
thereof.
"(e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall, after five (5) days from
receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, be final and executory unless stayed by
the Supreme Court.
"(f) The Commission shall within twenty-four hours, through the fastest available
means, disseminate its decision or the decision of the Supreme Court to the city or
municipal election registrars, boards of election inspectors and the general public
in the political subdivision concerned." [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]
By their very nature, proceedings in cases of nuisance candidates require prompt disposition. The
declaration of a duly registered candidate as nuisance candidate results in the cancellation of his
certificate of candidacy. The law mandates the Commission and the courts to give priority to cases of
disqualification to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the

election in which the disqualification is sought.[15] In many instances, however, proceedings against
nuisance candidates remained pending and undecided until election day and even after canvassing of
votes had been completed.
Here, petitioner sought to declare Edilito C. Martinez as a nuisance candidate immediately after the
latter filed his certificate of candidacy as an independent candidate and long before the May 14, 2007
elections. Petitioner averred that Edilito C. Martinez who was a driver of a motorcycle for hire, locally
known as "habal-habal", did not own any real property in his municipality, had not filed his income tax
return for the past years, and being an independent candidate did not have any political machinery to
propel his candidacy nor did he have political supporters to help him in his campaign. Petitioner claimed
that Edilito C. Martinez after the filing of his certificate of candidacy, was never heard of again and
neither did he start an electoral campaign. Given such lack of bona fide intention of Edilito C. Martinez
to run for the office for which he filed a certificate of candidacy, petitioner contended that his candidacy
would just cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of their surnames, considering that
petitioner was undeniably the frontrunner in the congressional district in the Fourth Legislative District
of Cebu as his mother, Rep. Clavel A. Martinez, was the incumbent Representative of the district.[16]
The COMELEC's Second Division granted the petition and declared Edilito C. Martinez as a nuisance
candidate. It noted that the failure of said candidate to answer and deny the accusations against him
clearly disclosed the fact that he had no bona fide intention to run for public office. Thus, it concluded
that his only purpose for filing his certificate of candidacy was to put the election process into mockery
and cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of his surname with that of petitioner.[17]
No motion for reconsideration was filed by Edilito C. Martinez and neither did he appeal before this
Court the resolution declaring him a nuisance candidate. Said decision had thus become final and
executory after five (5) days from its promulgation in accordance with the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.[18] But having come too late, the decision was an empty victory for petitioner who lost to
private respondent by a slim margin of 104 votes. In his election protest, petitioner sought to have
ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative counted in his
favor. The HRET, however, considered such ballots numbering 5,401 as stray and rejected petitioner's
argument that the ruling in Bautista v. Comelec (supra) is applicable in this case.
Bautista involves a mayoralty candidate (Cipriano "Efren" Bautista) during the May 11, 1998 elections
who filed a petition to declare as nuisance candidate Edwin "Efren" Bautista, who filed a certificate of
candidacy for the same position at the last minute. The COMELEC granted the petition, declared Edwin
108
Bautista a nuisance candidate and ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. Consequently,
Edwin Bautista's name was not included in the official list of candidates for the position of mayor of
Navotas City and copies of the list were distributed to the boards of election inspectors (BEI). On May 8,
1998, Edwin filed a motion for reconsideration and as a result, the Election Officer of Navotas issued a
directive to the BEI to include the name of Edwin Bautista in the certified list of candidates, only to recall
said order in the afternoon. In view of the conflicting directives, counsel for petitioner requested the
COMELEC that instructions be given to the BEI to tally separately the votes for "EFREN BAUTISTA",
"EFREN", "E. BAUTISTA" and "BAUTISTA."
On May 13, 1998, the COMELEC denied Edwin Bautista's motion for reconsideration. When the canvass
of the election returns was commenced, the Municipal Board of Canvassers refused to canvass as part of
the valid votes of petitioner the separate tallies of ballots on which were written "EFREN BAUTISTA,"
"EFREN," "E. BAUTISTA" and "BAUTISTA." Petitioner then filed with the COMELEC a petition to declare
illegal the proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers. Meanwhile Edwin Bautista filed a petition
for certiorari with this Court assailing the actions of COMELEC declaring him a nuisance candidate and
ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. The Court dismissed said petition finding no
grave abuse of discretion committed by the COMELEC and subsequently also denied with finality the
motion for reconsideration filed by Edwin Bautista.
As to the petition to declare as illegal the proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers for its
refusal to include the stray votes in the separate tally sheet, the COMELEC dismissed the same, citing
Sec. 211 (4)[19] of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner Bautista elevated the case to the Supreme Court
which ruled in his favor, thus:
"At the outset and initially setting aside all the ramifications of the substantive
issue of the instant petition, the primordial concern of the Court is to verify
whether or not on the day of the election, there was only one 'Efren Bautista' as a
validly registered candidate as far as the electorate was concerned.
"Edwin Bautista moved for reconsideration on May 8, 1998. Unfortunately, said
motion was not resolved as of election day. Technically, the April 30, 1998 decision
was not yet final as of May 11, 1998, and this technicality created serious
problems on election day.
"An analysis of the foregoing incidents shows that the separate tallies were made
to remedy any prejudice that may be caused by the inclusion of a potential
nuisance candidate in the Navotas mayoralty race. Such inclusion was brought
about by technicality, specifically Edwin Bautista's filing of a motion for
reconsideration, which prevented the April 30, 1998 resolution disqualifying him
from becoming final at that time.

"Ideally, the matter should have been finally resolved prior to election day. Its
pendency on election day exposed petitioner to the evils brought about by the
inclusion of a then potential, later shown in reality to be nuisance candidate. We
have ruled that a nuisance candidate is one whose certificate of candidacy is
presented and filed to cause confusion among the electorate by the similarity of
the names of the registered candidate or by other names which demonstrate that
the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the
certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of
the true will of the electorate (Fernandez vs. Fernandez, 36 SCRA 1 [1970]).
"It must be emphasized that the instant case involves a ground for disqualification
which clearly affects the voters' will and causes confusion that frustrates the same.
This is precisely what election laws are trying to protect. They give effect to, rather
than frustrate, the will of the voter. Thus, extreme caution should be observed
before any ballot is invalidated. Further, in the appreciation of ballots, doubts are
resolved in favor of their validity. (Silverio vs. Castro, 19 SCRA 521 [1967]).
"As discussed in the COMELEC's April 30, 1998 decision, in accordance with Section
69, Edwin Bautista was found to be a nuisance candidate. First and foremost, he
was running under the name of Edwin 'Efren' Bautista, when it had been
established that he was really known as 'Boboy' or 'Boboy Tarugo.' Second, the
following circumstances saliently demonstrate that he had no bona fide intention
of running for the office for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: He is said to
be engaged in a 'buy and sell' business, but he has no license therefor. He
declared that he had a monthly income of P10,000.00 but with expenses
totalling P9,000.00. He does not own any real property. He did not file his income
tax return for the years 1995 and 1996 and when asked why, he said he did not
have any net income and that he was only earning enough to defray household
expenses. He even violated COMELEC rules since he failed to submit the names of
individuals who paid for his campaign materials as well as the printing press he
dealt with. He did not have a political line-up and had no funds to support his
campaign expenses. He merely depended on friends whose names he did not
submit to the COMELEC. And as straightforwardly found by the COMELEC, he 'has
not demonstrated any accomplishment/achievement in his twenty-six (26) years
of existence as a person that would surely attract the electorate to choose him as
their representative in government.'
"In contrast, it was shown that petitioner had previously held under his name
Cipriano and appellation, 'Efren' Bautista, various elective positions, namely:
Barangay Captain of Navotas in 1962, Municipal Councilor of Navotas in 1970, and
Vice-Mayor of Navotas in 1980. He is a duly registered Naval Architect and Marine
Engineer, and a member of various civic organizations such as the Rotary Club of
Navotas and the Philippine Jaycees.
"It seems obvious to us that the votes separately tallied are not really stray
votes. Then COMELEC Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo himself, now a respected
member of the Court, in his May 14, 1998 Memorandum, allowed the segregation
of the votes for "Bautista," "Efren," and "Efren Bautista," and "E. Bautista" into a
separate improvised tally, for the purpose of later counting the votes. In fine, the
COMELEC itself validated the separate tallies since they were meant to be used in
the canvassing later on to the actual number of votes cast. These separate tallies
109
actually made the will of the electorate determinable despite the apparent
confusion caused by a potential nuisance candidate. What remained unsaid by
the COMELEC Chairman was the fact that as early as May 13, 1998, the COMELEC
had already spoken and stated its final position on the issue of whether or not
Edwin Bautista is a nuisance candidate. It had already denied Edwin's motion for
reconsideration in its May 13, 1998 Order x x x
"This important detail only shows that as of May 14, 1998, when Chairman Pardo
issued the aforestated Memorandum, Edwin Bautista had already been finally
declared as a nuisance candidate by the COMELEC. And when Edwin Bautista
elevated the matter to this Court, we upheld such declaration. How then can we
consider valid the votes for Edwin Bautista whom we finally ruled as disqualified
from the 1998 Navotas mayoralty race? That is like saying one thing and doing
another. These are two incompatible acts the contrariety and inconsistency of
which are all too obvious."[20] [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]
Petitioner now invokes this Court's pronouncement in Bautista to the effect that votes indicating only
the surname of two (2) candidates should not be considered as stray but counted in favor of the bona
fide candidate after the other candidate with a similar surname was declared a nuisance candidate. In
refusing to apply the ruling in Bautista, the HRET said that the factual circumstances in said case are
different, thus:
"Protestant strongly asserts that the 'MARTINEZ' or 'C. MARTINEZ' only votes be
counted in his favor invoking the ruling in the case of Bautista vs. Comelec, G.R.
No. 133840, November 13, 1998 (298 SCRA 480) where the Supreme Court held
that the final and conclusive ruling on the declaration of a nuisance candidate
retroacts on the day of the election.
"We disagree.
"While the Bautista vs. Comelec case also involves a candidate declared as
nuisance by the Comelec, the case herein is not on all fours with it. x x x
"It is clear from the foregoing facts of the Bautista case that the nuisance
candidate, Edwin Bautista, was declared as such on April 30, 1998, eleven (11)
days before the May 11, 1998 elections. Although the decision was not yet final
on Election Day because of a Motion for Reconsideration that Edwin Bautista had
filed on May 8, 1998, nevertheless, his name was not included in the list of
candidates for the position of Mayor for Navotas. This is not the situation in the
present case for Edilito C. Martinez was not yet declared disqualified during the
May 14, 2007 elections. There were, therefore, two (2) congressional candidates
on the day of the election with "MARTINEZ" as surname, Celestino A. Martinez
and Edilito C. Martinez.
"More importantly, in the Bautista case, while the Comelec's decision declaring
Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate had not yet attained finality on election day,
May 11, 1998, the voters of Navotas were informed of such disqualification by
virtue of newspaper releases and other forms of notification. The voters in said
case had constructive as well as actual knowledge of the action of the Comelec
delisting Edwin Bautista as a candidate for mayor. This is not so in the present
case for Edilito C. Martinez was not yet disqualified as nuisance candidate
during the May 14, 2007 elections. There were no newspaper releases and other

forms of notification to the voters of the Fourth District of Cebu on or before
May 14, 2007 elections that Edilito C. Martinez was disqualified as a nuisance
candidate."[21] [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]
It is clear that Bautista is anchored on the factual determination that the COMELEC resolution declaring
Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate was already final since his motion for reconsideration was already
denied by the Commission when canvassing of the votes started. Hence, the segregated and separately
tallied votes containing only the similar first names/nicknames and surnames of the two (2) candidates
were considered as not really stray votes. We held that the separate tallies validated by the COMELEC
actually made the will of the electorate determinable despite the apparent confusion caused by a
nuisance candidate.
In the case at bar, there was no segregation or separate tally of votes for petitioner. Unlike
in Bautista, there was simply no opportunity for petitioner to request the segregation and separate tally
of expected ballots containing only the surname "MARTINEZ" as the resolution granting his petition was
promulgated only a month later. The HRET, while not closing its eyes to the prejudice caused to
petitioner by COMELEC's inaction and delay, as well as the disenfranchisement of the 5,401 voters,
refused to credit him with those votes on the ground that there was no way of determining the real
intention of the voter.
We disagree.
The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed by the board
of canvassers is the lawful choice of the people. What is sought is the correction of the canvass of votes,
which was the basis of proclamation of the winning candidate. Election contests, therefore, involve the
adjudication not only of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates, but also of paramount public
interest considering the need to dispel uncertainty over the real choice of the electorate.[22]
In controversies pertaining to nuisance candidates as in the case at bar, the law contemplates the
likelihood of confusion which the similarity of surnames of two (2) candidates may generate. A nuisance
candidate is thus defined as one who, based on the attendant circumstances, has no bona fide intention
to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed, his sole purpose being the
reduction of the votes of a strong candidate, upon the expectation that ballots with only the surname of
such candidate will be considered stray and not counted for either of them.
110
In elections for national positions such as President, Vice-President and Senator, the sheer logistical
challenge posed by nuisance candidates gives compelling reason for the Commission to exercise its
authority to eliminate nuisance candidates who obviously have no financial capacity or serious intention
to mount a nationwide campaign. Thus we explained in Pamatong v. Commission on Elections[23]:
"The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the
disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run
for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its
electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State
takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably,
the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical
confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in
preparation for the election. These practical difficulties should, of course, never
exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At the same
time, remedial actions should be available to alleviate these logistical hardships,
whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a
textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our democratic
institutions. As the United States Supreme Court held:
[T]here is surely an important state interest in requiring some
preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support
before printing the name of a political organization and its
candidates on the ballot -- the interest, if no other, in
avoiding confusion, deception and even frustration of the
democratic [process].
"There is a need to limit the number of candidates especially in
the case of candidates for national positions because the
election process becomes a mockery even if those who cannot
clearly wage a national campaign are allowed to run. Their
names would have to be printed in the Certified List of
Candidates, Voters Information Sheet and the Official Ballots.
These would entail additional costs to the government. x x x
"The preparation of ballots is but one aspect that would be affected by allowance
of "nuisance candidates" to run in the elections. Our election laws provide various
entitlements for candidates for public office, such as watchers in every polling
place, watchers in the board of canvassers, or even the receipt of electoral
contributions. Moreover, there are election rules and regulations the formulations
of which are dependent on the number of candidates in a given election.
"Given these considerations, the ignominious nature of a nuisance candidacy
becomes even more galling. The organization of an election with bona
fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no
serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the
electoral process. x x x
Given the realities of elections in our country and particularly contests involving local positions, what
emerges as the paramount concern in barring nuisance candidates from participating in the electoral

exercise is the avoidance of confusion and frustration of the democratic process by preventing a faithful
determination of the true will of the electorate, more than the practical considerations mentioned
in Pamatong. A report published by the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism in connection with
the May 11, 1998 elections indicated that the tactic of fielding nuisance candidates with the same
surnames as leading contenders had become one (1) "dirty trick" practiced in at least 18 parts of the
country. The success of this clever scheme by political rivals or operators has been attributed to the last-
minute disqualification of nuisance candidates by the Commission, notably its "slow-moving" decision-
making.[25]
As illustrated in Bautista, the pendency of proceedings against a nuisance candidate on election day
inevitably exposes the bona fide candidate to the confusion over the similarity of names that affects the
voter's will and frustrates the same. It may be that the factual scenario in Bautista is not exactly the
same as in this case, mainly because the Comelec resolution declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance
candidate was issued before and not after the elections, with the electorate having been informed
thereof through newspaper releases and other forms of notification on the day of election. Undeniably,
however, the adverse effect on the voter's will was similarly present in this case, if not worse,
considering the substantial number of ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" written on the
line for Representative - over five thousand - which have been declared as stray votes, the invalidated
ballots being more than sufficient to overcome private respondent's lead of only 453 votes after the
recount.
Bautista upheld the basic rule that the primordial objective of election laws is to give effect to, rather
than frustrate, the will of the voter. The inclusion of nuisance candidates turns the electoral exercise into
an uneven playing field where the bona fide candidate is faced with the prospect of having a significant
number of votes cast for him invalidated as stray votes by the mere presence of another candidate with
a similar surname. Any delay on the part of the COMELEC increases the probability of votes lost in this
manner. While political campaigners try to minimize stray votes by advising the electorate to write the
full name of their candidate on the ballot, still, election woes brought by nuisance candidates persist.
The Court will not speculate on whether the new automated voting system to be implemented in the
May 2010 elections will lessen the possibility of confusion over the names of candidates. What needs to
be stressed at this point is the apparent failure of the HRET to give weight to relevant circumstances that
make the will of the electorate determinable, following the precedent in Bautista. These can be gleaned
from the findings of the Commission on the personal circumstances of Edilito C. Martinez clearly
indicating lack of serious intent to run for the position for which he filed his certificate of candidacy,
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foremost of which is his sudden absence after such filing. In contrast to petitioner who is a well-known
politician, a former municipal mayor for three (3) terms and a strong contender for the position of
Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu (then occupied by his mother), it seems too
obvious that Edilito C. Martinez was far from the voters' consciousness as he did not even campaign nor
formally launch his candidacy. The HRET likewise failed to mention the total number of votes actually
cast for Edilito C. Martinez, which can support petitioner's contention that the "MARTINEZ" and "C.
MARTINEZ" votes could not have been intended as votes for Edilito C. Martinez.
Petitioner should not be prejudiced by COMELEC's inefficiency and lethargy. Nor should the absence of
objection over straying of votes during the actual counting bar petitioner from raising the issue in his
election protest. The evidence clearly shows that Edilito C. Martinez, who did not even bother to file an
answer and simply disappeared after filing his certificate of candidacy, was an unknown in politics within
the district, a "habal-habal" driver who had neither the financial resources nor political support to
sustain his candidacy. The similarity of his surname with that of petitioner was meant to cause confusion
among the voters and spoil petitioner's chances of winning the congressional race for the Fourth
Legislative District of Cebu. As it turned out, there were thousands of ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or
"C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative, votes considered stray by the BEI and not counted
in favor of petitioner, and which the HRET affirmed to be invalid votes. Had the Commission timely
resolved the petition to declare Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate, all such ballots with
"MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" would have been counted in favor of petitioner and not considered stray,
pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 4116,[26] issued in relation to the finality of resolutions or decisions
in disqualification cases, which provides:
This pertains to the finality of decisions or resolutions of the Commission en banc or
division, particularly on Special Actions (Disqualification Cases).
Special Action cases refer to the following:
(a) Petition to deny due course to a certificate of candidacy;
(b) Petition to declare a candidate as a nuisance candidate;
(c) Petition to disqualify a candidate; and
(d) Petition to postpone or suspend an election.
Considering the foregoing and in order to guide field officials on the finality of
decisions or resolutions on special action cases (disqualification cases) the
Commission, RESOLVES, as it is hereby RESOLVED, as follows:
(1) the decision or resolution of the En Banc of the Commission on disqualification
cases shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation
unless restrained by the Supreme Court;

(4) the decision or resolution of the En Banc on nuisance candidates, particularly
whether the nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate
shall be immediately executory;
(5) the decision or resolution of a DIVISION on nuisance candidate, particularly
where the nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate
shall be immediately executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a motion for
reconsideration is seasonably filed. In which case, the votes cast shall not be
considered stray but shall be counted and tallied for the bona fide candidate.
All resolutions, orders and rules inconsistent herewith are hereby modified or
repealed. [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]
We held in several cases that the judgments of the Electoral Tribunals are beyond judicial interference,
unless rendered without or in excess of their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.[27] The power
of judicial review may be invoked in exceptional cases upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a clear denial of due process of law, or upon
a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of direction
that there has to be a remedy for such abuse.[28] Grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of
power because of passion or personal hostility. The grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.[29] Respondent HRET
gravely abused its discretion in affirming the proclamation of respondent Salimbangon as the duly
elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu despite the final outcome of revision
showing 5,401 ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. "MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative,
votes which should have been properly counted in favor of petitioner and not nullified as stray votes,
after considering all relevant circumstances clearly establishing that such votes could not have been
intended for "Edilito C. Martinez" who was declared a nuisance candidate in a final judgment.
Ensconced in our jurisprudence is the well-founded rule that laws and statutes governing election
contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the
electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. An election
protest is imbued with public interest so much so that the need to dispel uncertainties which becloud
the real choice of the people is imperative. [30] The prohibition against nuisance candidates is aimed
precisely at preventing uncertainty and confusion in ascertaining the true will of the electorate. Thus, in
certain situations as in the case at bar, final judgments declaring a nuisance candidate should effectively
cancel the certificate of candidacy filed by such candidate as of election day. Otherwise, potential
nuisance candidates will continue to put the electoral process into mockery by filing certificates of
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candidacy at the last minute and delaying resolution of any petition to declare them as nuisance
candidates until elections are held and the votes counted and canvassed.
We therefore hold that ballots indicating only the similar surname of two (2) candidates for the same
position may, in appropriate cases, be counted in favor of the bona fide candidate and not considered
stray, even if the other candidate was declared a nuisance candidate by final judgment after the
elections. Accordingly, the 5,401 votes for "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" should be credited to
petitioner giving him a total of 72,056 votes as against 67,108 total votes of private respondent.
Petitioner thus garnered more votes than private respondent with a winning margin of 4,948 votes.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 28, 2009 and Resolution dated July 30,
2009 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 07-035 are ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner Celestino A. Martinez III is hereby declared the duly elected Representative of the
Fourth Legislative District of Cebu in the May 14, 2007 elections. This decision is immediately executory.
Let a copy of the decision be served personally upon the parties and their counsels.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
CELESTINO A. MARTINEZ III vs. HRET and BENHUR SALIMBANGON
G.R. No. 189034, January 11, 2010
Villarama, Jr., J.:
Facts:
In the May 14, 2007 elections, petitioner Martinez and private respondent Salimbangon were among the
candidates for Representative in the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu Province. On March 29, 2007,
Edilito C. Martinez, a resident of Barangay Tambongon, Daan-Bantayan, Cebu, filed his certificate of
candidacy for the same position.
On April 3, 2007, Martinez filed a petition to declare Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate. However,
the Commission on Elections Second Division issued its Resolution declaring Edilito C. Martinez a
nuisance candidate only on June 12, 2007 or almost one (1) month after the elections.

On July 9, 2007, Salimbangon was proclaimed winner in the congressional elections for the Fourth
Legislative District of Cebu on the basis of official results showing that he garnered sixty-seven thousand
two hundred seventy-seven (67,277) votes as against Martinez who garnered sixty-seven thousand one
hundred seventy-three (67,173) votes, or a difference of one hundred four (104) votes.
Martinez filed an election protest before the HRET based on the 300 ballots more or less with only
“MARTINEZ” or “C. MARTINEZ” written on the line for Representative which the Board of Election
Inspectors did not count for Martinez on the ground that there was another congressional candidate
(Edilito C. Martinez) who had the same surname. In its decision dated May 28, 2009, the HRET sustained
the BEI in considering the ballots as stray in accordance with Sec. 211 (1) of the Omnibus Election Code.
Since the name of Edilito C. Martinez was still included in the official list of candidates on election day
(May 14, 2007), the HRET held that five thousand four hundred one (5,401) ballots with "MARTINEZ" or
"C. MARTINEZ" only written on the line for Representative were properly denied on the ground that
there was no way of determining the real intention of the voter. The HRET dismissed the election
protest, affirmed the proclamation of Salimbangon and declared him to be the duly elected
Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu, having won by a plurality margin of 453 votes.
Martinez moved for reconsideration of the Decision, but the HRET denied it by Resolution dated July 30,
2009. Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks to nullify the decision of HRET
dismissing the election protest declaring private respondent as the duly elected Representative of the
Fourth Legislative District of Cebu, and the Resolution dated July 30, 2009 denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration thereof.
Issue:
1. What is the legal effect of declaring a nuisance candidate as such in a final judgment after the
elections?
2. Should ballots containing only the similar surname of two (2) candidates be considered as stray votes
or counted in favor of the bona fide candidate?
Held:
The court finds the petition meritorious.
1. Ensconced in our jurisprudence is the well-founded rule that laws and statutes governing
election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that
the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical
infirmities. An election protest is imbued with public interest so much so that the need to
dispel uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is imperative. The prohibition
against nuisance candidates is aimed precisely at preventing uncertainty and confusion in
ascertaining the true will of the electorate. Thus, in certain situations as in the case at bar,
final judgments declaring a nuisance candidate should effectively cancel the certificate of
candidacy filed by such candidate as of election day. Otherwise, potential nuisance candidates
will continue to put the electoral process into mockery by filing certificates of candidacy at
the last minute and delaying resolution of any petition to declare them as nuisance
candidates until elections are held and the votes counted and canvassed.
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2. Ballots indicating only the similar surname of two (2) candidates for the same position may, in
appropriate cases, be counted in favor of the bona fide candidate and not considered stray,
even if the other candidate was declared a nuisance candidate by final judgment after the
elections.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Petitioner filed an election protest to HRET against private
respondent, the latter being declared as the representative – elect of Cebu after the May 2007 elections.
One Edelito C. Martinez, who had the same last name as that of petitioner was declared nuisance
candidate long after the May 2007 elections was over. His name, therefore was not removed from the
ballots and that ballots bearing the name “C. Martinez” or “Martinez” considered stray by BEI. The HRET
refused to credit the 5,401 voters to petitioner on the ground that there was no way of determining the
real intention of the voter.
ISSUE: Whether nor not ballots containing similar surname of two candidates be considered as stray
votes or counted in favor of the bona fide candidate.
RULING:
The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed by the board of
canvassers is the lawful choice of the people. What is sought is the correction of the canvass of votes,
which was the basis of proclamation of the winning candidate.
In controversies pertaining to nuisance candidates as in the case at bar, the law contemplates the
likelihood of confusion which the similarity of surnames of 2 candidates may generate. A nuisance
candidate is defined as one, who based on the attendant circumstance, has no bona fide intention to run
for office for which the COC has been filed, his sole purpose being the reduction of votes of a strong
candidate, upon the expectation that ballots with only the surname of such candidate will be considered
stray and not counted for either of them.
We therefore hold that ballots indicating only the similar surname of 2 candidates for the same position
may, in appropriate cases, be counted in favor of the bona fide candidate and not considered stray even
if the other candidate was declared a nuisance candidate by final judgment after elections… petitioner
thus garnered more votes than respondent.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 192221 November 13, 2012
CASIMIRA S. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOHN LLOYD M. PACETE, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
With the adoption of automated election system in our country, one of the emerging concerns is the
application of the law on nuisance candidates under a new voting system wherein voters indicate their
choice of candidates by shading the oval corresponding to the name of their chosen candidate printed
on the ballots, instead of writing the candidate's name on the appropriate space provided in the ballots
as in previous manual elections. If the name of a nuisance candidate whose certificate of candidacy had
been cancelled by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) was still included or printed in the official
ballots on election day,should the votes cast for such nuisance candidate be considered stray or counted
in favor of the bona fide candidate?
The Case
In this petition for certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief/s under Rule 65 in conjunction with Section
2, Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, filed on May 31, 2010, Casimira S. Dela Cruz
(petitioner) assails COMELEC Resolution No. 88441 considering as stray the votes cast in favor of certain
candidates who were either disqualified or whose COCs had been cancelled/denied due course but
whose names still appeared in the official ballots or certified lists of candidates for the May 10, 2010
elections.
Petitioner prays for the following reliefs:
1. Upon the filing of the instant Petition, a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction be issued enjoining the taking of oath and assumption into office of
Private Respondent John Lloyd Pacete as Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Bugasong;
2. After the Petition is submitted for resolution, a decision be rendered granting the instant
Petition and:
(a) declaring as null and void the portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 8844
considering as stray the votes cast in favor of the disqualified nuisance candidate
Aurelio N. Dela Cruz;
(b) ordering that the votes cast in favor of Aurelio N. Dela Cruz be counted and
tallied in favor of Petitioner Casimira S. Dela Cruz pursuant to COMELEC Resolution
No. 4116; and
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(c) requiring the Regional Trial Court of the Province of Antique where the
Petitioner’s Election Protest is pending to proclaim as Vice-Mayor of the
Municipality of Bugasong the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes
after the votes in favor of nuisance candidate Aurelio N. Dela Cruz is counted and
tallied to the votes garnered by Petitioner Casimira S. Dela Cruz.
3. Permanently enjoining the taking of oath and assumption into office of Private Respondent
if Petitioner is proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Bugasong, Province of
Antique.
Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for.2
Factual Antecedents
In the 2001, 2004 and 2007 elections, petitioner ran for and was elected member of the Sangguniang
Bayan(SB) of Bugasong, Antique. On November 28, 2009, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy3 for
the position of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Bugasong, Province of Antique under the ticket of the
National People’s Coalition (NPC). Subsequently, Aurelio N. Dela Cruz (Aurelio) also filed a certificate of
candidacy4 for the same position.
On December 6, 2009, petitioner filed a petition5 to declare Aurelio a nuisance candidate on the ground
that he filed his certificate of candidacy for the vice-mayoralty position to put the election process in
mockery and to cause confusion among voters due to the similarity of his surname with petitioner’s
surname. Petitioner emphasized that she is considered a very strong candidate for the said position
having been elected as member of the SB for three consecutive terms under the ticket of the NPC and
obtained the fifth (2001), fourth (2004) and third (2007) highest number of votes. In contrast, Aurelio is
an unknown in the political scene with no prior political experience as an elective official and no political
party membership. Being a retiree and having no known business, Aurelio has no sufficient source of
income but since the 2007 elections petitioner’s opponents have been prodding him to run for the same
position as petitioner in order to sow confusion and thwart the will of the voters of Bugasong. Petitioner
further cited Aurelio’s miserable showing in the previous local elections when he ran and garnered only
126 and 6 votes forthe positionsof SB member (May 2007) and barangay captain of Barangay Maray,
Bugasong (November 2007), respectively. Citing Bautista v. COMELEC,6 petitioner asserted that these
circumstances clearly demonstrate Aurelio’s lack of a bona fide intention and capability to run for the
position of Vice-Mayor, thus preventing a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.
On January 29, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution7 declaring Aurelio as a nuisance
candidate and cancelling his certificate of candidacy for the vice-mayoralty position in Bugasong.
Despite the declaration of Aurelio as a nuisance candidate, however, his name was not deleted in the
Certified List of Candidates8 and Official Sample Ballot9 issued by the COMELEC. The names of the
candidates for Vice-Mayor, including Aurelio and respondent John Lloyd M. Pacete, appeared on the
Official Sample Ballot as follows:
VICE-MAYOR
Vote for not more than 1
O 1. DELA CRUZ, Aurelio N. O 2. DELA CRUZ, Casimira O 3. PACETE, John Lloyd M.
"REL" (IND.) S. "MIRAY" (NPC) "BINGBING" (NP)

Consequently, petitioner filed on March 23, 2010, an Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion10 praying, among
other things, that COMELEC issue an order directing the deletion of Aurelio’s name from the Official List
of Candidates for the position of Vice-Mayor, the Official Ballots, and other election paraphernalia to be
used in Bugasong for the May 2010 elections. She also prayed that in the event Aurelio’s name can no
longer be deleted in time for the May 10, 2010 elections, the COMELEC issue an order directing that all
votes cast in favor of Aurelio be credited in her favor, in accordance with COMELEC Resolution No. 4116
dated May 7, 2001.
On May 1, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No. 884411 listing the names of disqualified
candidates, including Aurelio, and disposing as follows:
NOW THEREFORE, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, as follows:
1. to delete the names of the foregoing candidates from the certified list of candidates; and
2. to consider stray the votes of said candidates, if voted upon.12 (Emphasis supplied)
On May 10, 2010, the first automated national and local elections proceeded as scheduled. Aurelio’s
name remained in the official ballots.
During the canvassing of the votes by the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) of Bugasong on May
13, 2010, petitioner insisted that the votes cast in favor of Aurelio be counted in her favor. However, the
MBOC refused, citing Resolution No. 8844. The Statement of Votes by Precinct for Vice-Mayor of
Antique-Bugasong13 showed the following results of the voting:
TOTAL RANK
DELA CRUZ, AURELIO N. 532 3 clause and due process of law without any basis.
DELA CRUZ, CASIMIRA S. 6389 2 On the claim of equal protection violation, COMELEC contends that there is a substantial distinction
PACETE, JOHN LLOYD M. 6428 1 Resolution No. 8844. While the votes for the nuisance candidate were not considered stray but counted
Consequently, on May 13, 2010, private respondent John Lloyd M. Pacete was proclaimed Vice-Mayor of
Bugasong by the MBOC of Bugasong.14
On May 21, 2010, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of the Province of Antique an election
protest praying for (1) the tallying in her favor of the 532 votes cast for Aurelio; (2) the annulment of
respondent Pacete’s proclamation as Vice-Mayor of Bugasong; and (3) her proclamation as winning
candidate for the position of Vice-Mayor of Bugasong.
Petitioner’s Arguments
Considering that private respondent won by a margin of only thirty-nine (39) votes over petitioner’s
6,389 votes, petitioner contends that she would have clearly won the elections for Vice-Mayor of
Bugasong had the MBOC properly tallied or added the votes cast for Aurelio to her votes. Thus,
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petitioner insists she would have garnered a total of 6,921 votes as against the 6,428 votes of private
respondent. By issuing a directive to consider the votes cast for Aurelio as stray votes instead of counting
the same in favor of petitioner in accordance with COMELEC Resolution No. 4116, the COMELEC’s First
Division gravely abused its discretion.
Petitioner argues that Resolution No. 8844 violates her constitutional right to equal protection of the
laws because there is no substantial difference between the previous manual elections and the
automated elections conducted in 2010 to justify non-observance of Resolution No. 4116 issued in
2001,particularly on the matter of votes cast for a candidate who was declared a nuisance candidate in a
final judgment where such nuisance candidate has the same name with that of the bona fide candidate.
Moreover, in contrast to the assailed resolution, COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 properly recognized the
substantial distinctions between and among (a) disqualified candidates, (b) nuisance candidates whose
names are similar to those of the bona fide candidates, (c) nuisance candidates who do not have similar
names with those of the bona fide candidates, and (d) candidates who had voluntarily withdrawn their
certificates of candidacy. As a result of the failure of the COMELEC’s First Division to make these
important distinctions when it issued Resolution No. 8844 that applies to disqualified candidates,
nuisance candidates and all other candidates whose certificates of candidacy had been cancelled or
denied course, petitioner’s right to due process was clearly violated, and only made possible the very evil
that is sought to be corrected by the former rule not to consider the votes cast for the nuisance
candidate as stray but count them in favor of the bona fide candidate.
Respondents’ Arguments
COMELEC maintains that there is a presumption of validity with respect to its exercise of supervisory or
regulatory authority in the conduct of elections. Also, the time-honored rule is that a statute is presumed
to be constitutional and that the party assailing it must discharge the burden of clearly and convincingly
proving its invalidity. Thus, to strike down a law as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and
unequivocal showing that what the law prohibits, the statute permits. In this case, petitioner miserably
failed to prove a clear breach of the Constitution; she merely invokes a violation of the equal protection
between a manual election where Resolution No. 4116 applies, and an automated election governed by
in favor of the bona fide candidate, this is no longer the rule for automated elections. COMELEC cites the
following factors which changed the previous rule: (1) the official ballots in automated elections now
contain the full names of the official candidates so that when a voter shaded an oval, it was presumed
that he carefully read the name adjacent to it and voted for that candidate, regardless of whether said
candidate was later declared disqualified or nuisance; (2) since the names of the candidates are clearly
printed on the ballots, unlike in manual elections when these were only listed in a separate sheet of
paper attached to the ballot secrecy folder, the voter’s intention is clearly to vote for the candidate
corresponding to the shaded oval; (3) the rules on appreciation of ballots under Section 211, Article XVIII
of the Omnibus Election Code apply only to elections where the names of candidates are handwritten in
the ballots; and (4) with the use of the automated election system where the counting of votes is
delegated to the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines, pre-proclamation controversies, including
complaints regarding the appreciation of ballots and allegations of misreading the names of the
candidates written, were flaws which the automation rectified. Aside from being germane to the
purpose of our election laws, Resolution No. 8844 is not limited to existing conditions as it is applicable
to all persons of the same class even in succeeding elections, and covered all disqualified and nuisance
candidates without distinction.

Lastly, COMELEC asserts there is no violation of the right to due process. For public office is not a
property right and no one has a vested right to any public office.
On his part, private respondent Pacete asserts that petitioner cannot validly claim the votes cast for
Aurelio in view of the rule provided in Section 211 (24) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, which cannot be
supplanted by Resolution No. 4116. He also cites an annotation on election law,15 invoking this Court’s
ruling in Kare v. COMELEC16 that the aforesaid provision when read together with Section 72, are
understood to mean that "any vote cast in favor of a candidate, whose disqualification has already been
declared final regardless of the ground therefor, shall be considered stray."
Private respondent also points out the fact that on May 4, 2010, COMELEC caused the publication of
Resolution No. 8844 in two newspapers of general circulation in the country. There was thus an earnest
effort on the part of COMELEC to disseminate the information, especially to the voters in Bugasong,
Antique, that the name of Aurelio was printed on the official ballots as one of the candidates for Vice-
Mayor. Said voters were amply forewarned about the status of Aurelio’s candidacy and the
consequences that will obtain should he still be voted for. Additionally, the petitioner and Aurelio bear
different first names, female and male, respectively; petitioner and her political party engaged in a
massive voter education during the campaign period, emphasizing to her supporters that she was given
the corresponding number ("2") in the official ballots, and the voters should be very circumspect in filling
up their ballots because in case of error in filling up the same, they will not be given replacement ballots.
As to the Judicial Affidavits of those who voted for petitioner attesting to the fact of mistakenly shading
the oval beside the name of Aurelio in the ballots, which was attached to the petition, petitioner in effect
would want this Court to sit in judgment as trier of facts.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
The only question that may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Section 2, Rule 64 of the Revised
Rules of Court is whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.17 For a petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice
and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion. There is also grave abuse of discretion when there is a
contravention of the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.18
COMELEC being a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country, its
factual findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered on matters falling within its competence
shall not be interfered with by this Court in the absence of grave abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional
infirmity or error of law.19 In this case, Resolution No. 8844 issued by COMELEC clearly contravened
existing law and jurisprudence on the legal effect of declaration of a candidate as a nuisance candidate,
especially in the case of nuisance candidates who have the same surnames as those of bona fide
candidates.
Private respondent argues that no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed on COMELEC when it issued
Resolution No. 8844 which is simply consistent with the rule laid down in Section 211 (24), Article XVIII
and Section 72, Article IX of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC). Said provisions state:
SEC. 72. Effects of Disqualification cases and priority. -- The Commission and the courts shall give priority
to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final decision shall be
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rendered not later than seven days before the election in which the disqualification is sought.Any
candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not declared by
final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number
of votes in such election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his
proclamation and assumption of office.
SEC. 211. Rules for the appreciation of ballots. – In the reading and appreciation of ballots, every ballot
shall be presumed to be valid unless there is clear and good reason to justify its rejection. The board of
election inspectors shall observe the following rules, bearing in mind that the object of the election is to
obtain the expression of the voter’s will:
24. Any vote cast in favor of a candidate who has been disqualified by final judgment shall be considered
as stray and shall not be counted but it shall not invalidate the ballot.
Private respondent cites the case of Kare v. COMELEC20 where this Court, construing the above
provisions, stated:
According to the Comelec, Section 211 (24) of the OEC is a clear legislative policy that is contrary to the
rule that the second placer cannot be declared winner.
We disagree.
The provision that served as the basis of Comelec’s Decision to declare the second placer as winner in
the mayoral race should be read in relation with other provisions of the OEC. Section 72 thereof, as
amended by RA 6646, provides as follows:
When read together,these provisions are understood to mean that any vote cast in favor of a candidate,
whose disqualification has already been declared final regardless of the ground therefor, shall be
considered stray. The Comelec misconstrued this provision by limiting it only to disqualification by
conviction in a final judgment.
Obviously, the disqualification of a candidate is not only by conviction in a final judgment; the law lists
other grounds for disqualification. It escapes us why the Comelec insists that Section 211(24) of the OEC
is strictly for those convicted by a final judgment. Such an interpretation is clearly inconsistent with the
other provisions of the election code.21 (Emphasis supplied; italics not ours)
Private respondent thus suggests that regardless of the ground for disqualification, the votes cast for the
disqualified candidate should result in considering the votes cast for him as stray as explicitly mandated
by Section 211(24) in relation to Section 72 of the OEC.
We disagree.
It bears to stress that Sections 211 (24) and 72 applies to all disqualification cases and not to petitions to
cancel or deny due course to a certificate of candidacy such as Sections 69 (nuisance candidates) and 78
(material representation shown to be false). Notably, such facts indicating that a certificate of candidacy
has been filed "to put the election process in mockery or disrepute, or to cause confusion among the

voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates, or other circumstances or acts which
clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the
certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the
electorate" are not among those grounds enumerated in Section 68 (giving money or material
consideration to influence or corrupt voters or public officials performing electoral functions, election
campaign overspending and soliciting, receiving or making prohibited contributions) of the OEC or
Section 4022 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
In Fermin v. COMELEC,23 this Court distinguished a petition for disqualification under Section 68 and a
petition to cancel or deny due course to a certificate of candidacy (COC) under Section 78. Said
proceedings are governed by different rules and have distinct outcomes.
At this point, we must stress that a "Section 78" petition ought not to be interchanged or confused with
a "Section 68" petition. They are different remedies, based on different grounds, and resulting in
different eventualities. Private respondent’s insistence, therefore, that the petition it filed before the
COMELEC in SPA No. 07-372 is in the nature of a disqualification case under Section 68, as it is in fact
captioned a "Petition for Disqualification," does not persuade the Court.
To emphasize, a petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of
the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC
can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The
petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely
prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course
under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC. Thus, in Miranda v.
Abaya, this Court made the distinction that a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can validly
be substituted under Section 77 of the OEC because he/she remains a candidate until disqualified; but a
person whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted
because he/she is never considered a candidate.24 (Additional emphasis supplied)
Clearly, a petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC under Section 69 as in Section 78 cannot be
treated in the same manner as a petition to disqualify under Section 68 as what COMELEC did when it
applied the rule provided in Section 72 that the votes cast for a disqualified candidate be considered
stray, to those registered candidates whose COC’s had been cancelled or denied due course. Strictly
speaking, a cancelled certificate cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Said
votes cannot be counted in favor of the candidate whose COC was cancelled as he/she is not treated as a
candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a COC. But should these votes cast for the candidate whose COC
was cancelled or denied due course be considered stray?
COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 issued in relation to the finality of resolutions or decisions in special
action cases, provides:
This pertains to the finality of decisions or resolutions of the commission en banc or division, particularly
on special actions (disqualification cases).
special action cases refer to the following:
(a) petition to deny due course to a certificate of candidacy;
117
(b) petition to declare a candidate as a nuisance candidate;
(c) petition to disqualify a candidate; and
(d) petition to postpone or suspend an election.
Considering the foregoing and in order to guide field officials on the finality of decisions or resolutions on
special action cases (disqualification cases) the Commission, RESOLVES, as it is hereby RESOLVED, as
follows:
(1) the decision or resolution of the En Banc of the Commission on disqualification cases shall become
final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court;
(4) the decision or resolution of the En Banc on nuisance candidates, particularly whether the nuisance
candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall be immediately executory;
(5) the decision or resolution of a DIVISION on nuisance candidate, particularly where the nuisance
candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall be immediately executory after the lapse
of five (5) days unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed. In which case, the votes cast shall
not be considered stray but shall be counted and tallied for the bona fide candidate.
All resolutions, orders and rules inconsistent herewith are hereby modified or repealed. (Emphasis
supplied)25
The foregoing rule regarding the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such under a final
judgment was applied by this Court in Bautista v. COMELEC26 where the name of the nuisance candidate
Edwin Bautista (having the same surname with the bona fide candidate) still appeared on the ballots on
election day because while the COMELEC rendered its decision to cancel Edwin Bautista’s COC on April
30, 1998, it denied his motion for reconsideration only on May 13, 1998 or three days after the election.
We said that the votes for candidates for mayor separately tallied on orders of the COMELEC Chairman
was for the purpose of later counting the votes and hence are not really stray votes. These separate
tallies actually made the will of the electorate determinable despite the apparent confusion caused by a
potential nuisance candidate.
But since the COMELEC decision declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate was not yet final on
electionday, this Court also considered those factual circumstances showing that the votes mistakenly
deemed as "stray votes" refer to only the legitimate candidate (petitioner Efren Bautista) and could not
have been intended for Edwin Bautista. We further noted that the voters had constructive as well as
actual knowledge of the action of the COMELEC delisting Edwin Bautista as a candidate for mayor.
A stray vote is invalidated because there is no way of determining the real intention of the voter. This is,
however, not the situation in the case at bar. Significantly, it has also been established that by virtue of
newspaper releases and other forms of notification, the voters were informed of the COMELEC’s
decision to declare Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate.27
In the more recent case of Martinez III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,28 this Court
likewise applied the rule in COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 not to consider the votes cast for a nuisance

candidate stray but to count them in favor of the bona fide candidate notwithstanding that the decision
to declare him as such was issued only after the elections.
As illustrated in Bautista, the pendency of proceedings against a nuisance candidate on election day
inevitably exposes the bona fide candidate to the confusion over the similarity of names that affects the
voter’s will and frustrates the same. It may be that the factual scenario in Bautista is not exactly the
same as in this case, mainly because the Comelec resolution declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance
candidate was issued before and not after the elections, with the electorate having been informed
thereof through newspaper releases and other forms of notification on the day of election. Undeniably,
however, the adverse effect on the voter’s will was similarly present in this case, if not worse,
considering the substantial number of ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or
"C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative - over five thousand - which have been declared as
stray votes, the invalidated ballots being more than sufficient to overcome private respondent’s lead of
only 453 votes after the recount.29
Here, Aurelio was declared a nuisance candidate long before the May 10, 2010 elections. On the basis of
Resolution No. 4116, the votes cast for him should not have been considered stray but counted in favor
of petitioner. COMELEC’s changing of the rule on votes cast for nuisance candidates resulted in the
invalidation of significant number of votes and the loss of petitioner to private respondent by a slim
margin. We observed in Martinez:
Bautista upheld the basic rule that the primordial objective of election laws is to give effect to, rather
than frustrate, the will of the voter. The inclusion of nuisance candidates turns the electoral exercise into
an uneven playing field where the bona fide candidate is faced with the prospect of having a significant
number of votes cast for him invalidated as stray votes by the mere presence of another candidate with
a similar surname. Any delay on the part of the COMELEC increases the probability of votes lost in this
manner. While political campaigners try to minimize stray votes by advising the electorate to write the
full name of their candidate on the ballot, still, election woes brought by nuisance candidates persist.
The Court will not speculate on whether the new automated voting system to be implemented in the
May 2010 elections will lessen the possibility of confusion over the names of candidates. What needs to
be stressed at this point is the apparent failure of the HRET to give weight to relevant circumstances that
make the will of the electorate determinable, following the precedent in Bautista. x x x30
COMELEC justified the issuance of Resolution No. 8844 to amend the former rule in Resolution No. 4116
by enumerating those changes brought about by the new automated election system to the form of
official ballots, manner of voting and counting of votes. It said that the substantial distinctions between
manual and automated elections validly altered the rules on considering the votes cast for the
disqualified or nuisance candidates. As to the rulings in Bautista and Martinez III, COMELEC opines that
these find no application in the case at bar because the rules on appreciation of ballotsapply only to
elections where the names of candidates are handwritten in the ballots.
The Court is not persuaded.
In Martinez III, we took judicial notice of the reality that, especially in local elections, political rivals or
operators benefited from the usually belated decisions by COMELEC on petitions to cancel or deny due
course to COCs of potential nuisance candidates. In such instances, political campaigners try to minimize
118
stray votes by advising the electorate to write the full name of their candidate on the ballot, but still,
election woes brought by nuisance candidates persist.31
As far as COMELEC is concerned, the confusion caused by similarity of surnames of candidates for the
same position and putting the electoral process in mockery or disrepute, had already been rectified by
the new voting system where the voter simply shades the oval corresponding to the name of their
chosen candidate. However, as shown in this case, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8844 on May 1, 2010,
nine days before the elections, with sufficient time to delete the names of disqualified candidates not
just from the Certified List of Candidates but also from the Official Ballot. Indeed, what use will it serve if
COMELEC orders the names of disqualified candidates to be deleted from list of official candidates if the
official ballots still carry their names?
We hold that the rule in Resolution No. 4116 considering the votes cast for a nuisance candidate
declared as such in a final judgment, particularly where such nuisance candidate has the same surname
as that of the legitimate candidate, notstray but counted in favor of the latter, remains a good law. As
earlier discussed, a petition to cancel or deny a COC under Section 69 of the OEC should be distinguished
from a petition to disqualify under Section 68. Hence, the legal effect of such cancellation of a COC of a
nuisance candidate cannot be equated with a candidate disqualified on grounds provided in the OEC and
Local Government Code.
Moreover, private respondent admits that the voters were properly informed of the cancellation of COC
of Aurelio because COMELEC published the same before election day. As we pronounced in Bautista, the
voters’ constructive knowledge of such cancelled candidacy made their will more determinable, as it is
then more logical to conclude that the votes cast for Aurelio could have been intended only for the
legitimate candidate, petitioner. The possibility of confusion in names of candidates if the names of
nuisance candidates remained on the ballots on election day, cannot be discounted or eliminated, even
under the automated voting system especially considering that voters who mistakenly shaded the oval
beside the name of the nuisance candidate instead of the bona fide candidate they intended to vote for
could no longer ask for replacement ballots to correct the same.1âwphi1
Finally, upholding the former rule in Resolution No. 4116 is more consistent with the rule well-ensconced
in our jurisprudence that laws and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of ballots
must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may
not be defeated by technical infirmities.32 Indeed, as our electoral experience had demonstrated, such
infirmities and delays in the delisting of nuisance candidates from both the Certified List of Candidates
and Official Ballots only made possible the very evil sought to be prevented by the exclusion of nuisance
candidates during elections.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and the writ prayed for, accordingly GRANTED.
COMELEC Resolution No. 8844 dated May 1, 2010 insofar as it orders that the votes cast for candidates
listed therein, who were declared nuisance candidates and whose certificates of candidacy have been
either cancelled or set aside, be considered stray, is hereby declared NULL and VOID. Consequently, the
532 votes cast for Aurelio N. Del a Cruz during the elections of May 10, 2010 should have been counted
in favor of Casimira S. Dela Cruz and not considered stray votes, making her total garnered votes 6,921 as
against the 6,428 votes of private respondent John Lloyd M. Pacete who was the declared winner.
Petitioner Casimira S. Dela Cruz is hereby DECLARED the duly elected Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of
Bugasong, Province of Antique in the May 10, 2010 elections.
 119

This Decision is immediately executory. Ruling:

Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the Commission on Elections. The petition is meritorious.

No pronouncement as to costs. It bears to stress that Sections 211 (24) and 72 applies to all disqualification cases and not to petitions to
cancel or deny due course to a certificate of candidacy such as Sections 69 (nuisance candidates) and 78
SO ORDERED. (material representation shown to be false). Notably, such facts indicating that a certificate of candidacy
has been filed "to put the election process in mockery or disrepute, or to cause confusion among the
voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates, or other circumstances or acts which
DELA CRUZ vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the
G.R. No. 192221, November 13, 2012
certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the
electorate" are not among those grounds enumerated in Section 68 (giving money or material
Issue:
consideration to influence or corrupt voters or public officials performing electoral functions, election
With the adoption of automated election system in our country, one of the emerging concerns is the
campaign overspending and soliciting, receiving or making prohibited contributions) of the OEC or
application of the law on nuisance candidates under a new voting system wherein voters indicate their
Section 40 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
choice of candidates by shading the oval corresponding to the name of their chosen candidate printed
on the ballots, instead of writing the candidate's name on the appropriate space provided in the ballots
In Fermin vs. COMELEC, this Court distinguished a petition for disqualification under Section 68 and a
as in previous manual elections. If the name of a nuisance candidate whose certificate of candidacy had
petition to cancel or deny due course to a certificate of candidacy (COC) under Section 78. Said
been cancelled by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) was still included or printed in the official
proceedings are governed by different rules and have distinct outcomes.
ballots on election day, should the votes cast for such nuisance candidate be considered stray or
counted in favor of the bona fide candidate?
At this point, we must stress that a "Section 78" petition ought not to be interchanged or confused with
a "Section 68" petition. They are different remedies, based on different grounds, and resulting in
Facts:
different eventualities. x xx
In this petition for certiorari, Casimira S. Dela Cruz assails COMELEC Resolution No. 8844 considering as
stray the votes cast in favor of certain candidates who were either disqualified or whose COCs had been
To emphasize, a petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of
cancelled/denied due course but whose names still appeared in the official ballots or certified lists of
the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC
candidates for the May 10, 2010 elections.
can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The
petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely
During the canvassing of the votes by the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) of Bugasong on May
prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course
13, 2010, Casimira insisted that the votes cast in favor of Aurelio be counted in her favor. However, the
under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC. Thus, in Miranda vs.
MBOC refused, citing Resolution No. 8844. The Statement of Votes by Precinct for Vice-Mayor of
Abaya, this Court made the distinction that a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can validly
Antique-Bugasong showed the following results of the voting:
be substituted under Section 77 of the OEC because he/she remains a candidate until disqualified; but
TOTAL RANK a person whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted
because he/she is never considered a candidate. (Additional emphasis supplied)
DELA CRUZ, AURELIO N. 532 3
Strictly speaking, a cancelled certificate cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid
DELA CRUZ, CASIMIRA S. 6389 2
votes. Said votes cannot be counted in favor of the candidate whose COC was cancelled as he/she is not
PACETE, JOHN LLOYD M. 6428 1 treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a COC. But should these votes cast for the candidate
whose COC was cancelled or denied due course be considered stray?

Consequently, John Lloyd M. Pacete was proclaimed Vice-Mayor of Bugasong by the MBOC of Bugasong.
Considering that Pacete won by a margin of only thirty-nine (39) votes, Casimira contends that she would
have clearly won the elections for Vice-Mayor of Bugasong had the MBOC properly tallied or added the
votes cast for Aurelio to her votes.
The foregoing rule regarding the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such under a final
judgment was applied by this Court in Bautista vs. COMELEC where the name of the nuisance candidate
Edwin Bautista (having the same surname with the bona fide candidate) still appeared on the ballots on
election day because while the COMELEC rendered its decision to cancel Edwin Bautista’s COC on April
30, 1998, it denied his motion for reconsideration only on May 13, 1998 or three days after the election.

We said that the votes for candidates for mayor separately tallied on orders of the COMELEC Chairman
was for the purpose of later counting the votes and hence are not really stray votes. These separate
tallies actually made the will of the electorate determinable despite the apparent confusion caused by
a potential nuisance candidate.
But since the COMELEC decision declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate was not yet final on
electionday, this Court also considered those factual circumstances showing that the votes mistakenly
deemed as "stray votes" refer to only the legitimate candidate (petitioner Efren Bautista) and could not
have been intended for Edwin Bautista. We further noted that the voters had constructive as well as
actual knowledge of the action of the COMELEC delisting Edwin Bautista as a candidate for mayor.
A stray vote is invalidated because there is no way of determining the real intention of the voter. This
is, however, not the situation in the case at bar. Significantly, it has also been established that by virtue
of newspaper releases and other forms of notification, the voters were informed of the COMELEC’s
decision to declare Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate.
In the more recent case of Martinez III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, this Court likewise
applied the rule in COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 not to consider the votes cast for a nuisance candidate
stray but to count them in favor of the bona fide candidate notwithstanding that the decision to declare
him as such was issued only after the elections.
As illustrated in Bautista, the pendency of proceedings against a nuisance candidate on election day
inevitably exposes the bona fide candidate to the confusion over the similarity of names that affects the
voter’s will and frustrates the same. It may be that the factual scenario in Bautista is not exactly the
same as in this case, mainly because the Comelec resolution declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance
candidate was issued before and not after the elections, with the electorate having been informed
thereof through newspaper releases and other forms of notification on the day of election. Undeniably,
however, the adverse effect on the voter’s will was similarly present in this case, if not worse,
considering the substantial number of ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or"C. MARTINEZ" written on the
line for Representative - over five thousand - which have been declared as stray votes, the invalidated
ballots being more than sufficient to overcome private respondent’s lead of only 453 votes after the
recount.
Here, Aurelio was declared a nuisance candidate long before the May 10, 2010 elections. On the basis of
Resolution No. 4116, the votes cast for him should not have been considered stray but counted in favor
of petitioner. COMELEC’s changing of the rule on votes cast for nuisance candidates resulted in the
invalidation of significant number of votes and the loss of petitioner to private respondent by a slim
margin. We observed in Martinez:
Bautista upheld the basic rule that the primordial objective of election laws is to give effect to, rather
than frustrate, the will of the voter. The inclusion of nuisance candidates turns the electoral exercise
into an uneven playing field where the bona fide candidate is faced with the prospect of having a
significant number of votes cast for him invalidated as stray votes by the mere presence of another
candidate with a similar surname. Any delay on the part of the COMELEC increases the probability of
votes lost in this manner. While political campaigners try to minimize stray votes by advising the
120
electorate to write the full name of their candidate on the ballot, still, election woes brought by nuisance
candidates persist.
The Court will not speculate on whether the new automated voting system to be implemented in the
May 2010 elections will lessen the possibility of confusion over the names of candidates. What needs
to be stressed at this point is the apparent failure of the HRET to give weight to relevant circumstances
that make the will of the electorate determinable, following the precedent in Bautista. x xx
COMELEC justified the issuance of Resolution No. 8844 to amend the former rule in Resolution No. 4116
by enumerating those changes brought about by the new automated election system to the form of
official ballots, manner of voting and counting of votes. It said that the substantial distinctions between
manual and automated elections validly altered the rules on considering the votes cast for the
disqualified or nuisance candidates. As to the rulings in Bautista and Martinez III, COMELEC opines that
these find no application in the case at bar because the rules on appreciation of ballotsapply only to
elections where the names of candidates are handwritten in the ballots.
The Court is not persuaded.
In Martinez III, we took judicial notice of the reality that, especially in local elections, political rivals or
operators benefited from the usually belated decisions by COMELEC on petitions to cancel or deny due
course to COCs of potential nuisance candidates. In such instances, political campaigners try to
minimize stray votes by advising the electorate to write the full name of their candidate on the ballot,
but still, election woes brought by nuisance candidates persist.
As far as COMELEC is concerned, the confusion caused by similarity of surnames of candidates for the
same position and putting the electoral process in mockery or disrepute, had already been rectified by
the new voting system where the voter simply shades the oval corresponding to the name of their
chosen candidate. However, as shown in this case, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8844 on May 1, 2010,
nine days before the elections, with sufficient time to delete the names of disqualified candidates not
just from the Certified List of Candidates but also from the Official Ballot. Indeed, what use will it serve if
COMELEC orders the names of disqualified candidates to be deleted from list of official candidates if the
official ballots still carry their names?
We hold that the rule in Resolution No. 4116 considering the votes cast for a nuisance candidate
declared as such in a final judgment, particularly where such nuisance candidate has the same
surname as that of the legitimate candidate, notstray but counted in favor of the latter, remains a
good law.
Moreover, private respondent admits that the voters were properly informed of the cancellation of COC
of Aurelio because COMELEC published the same before election day. As we pronounced in Bautista, the
voters’ constructive knowledge of such cancelled candidacy made their will more determinable, as it is
then more logical to conclude that the votes cast for Aurelio could have been intended only for the
legitimate candidate. The possibility of confusion in names of candidates if the names of nuisance
candidates remained on the ballots on election day, cannot be discounted or eliminated, even under the
automated voting system especially considering that voters who mistakenly shaded the oval beside the
 121

name of the nuisance candidate instead of the bona fide candidate they intended to vote for could no
longer ask for replacement ballots to correct the same.

Finally, upholding the former rule in Resolution No. 4116 is more consistent with the rule well-ensconced
in our jurisprudence that laws and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of ballots
must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may
not be defeated by technical infirmities. Indeed, as our electoral experience had demonstrated, such
infirmities and delays in the delisting of nuisance candidates from both the Certified List of Candidates
and Official Ballots only made possible the very evil sought to be prevented by the exclusion of nuisance
candidates during elections.
 122

EN BANC Bayron of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, is pending before this Commission, and has been reviewed by
the [ODEDO] and submitted to the en bane through a Memorandum dated 24 March 2014, to wit:
G.R. No. 212584 November 25, 2014
After review of the reports/findings of EO Gapulao, the ODEDO recommends to the Commission the
issuance of a Resolution certifying to the SUFFICIENCY of the petition for recall of Mayor Lucilo R. Baron
ALROBEN J. GOH, Petitioner,
[sic] of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan.
vs.
HON. LUCILO R. BAYRON and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
WHEREAS, Section 75 of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 proyides for the source of funding for
the conduct of recall elections, to wit:
DECISION

Section 75. Expenses Incident to Recall Elections. -All expenses incidental to recall elections shall be
CARPIO, J.:
borne by the COMELEC. For this purpose, there shall be included in the annual General Appropriations
Act a contingency fund at the disposal of the COMELEC for the conduct of recall elections.
The Case
WHEREAS, Section 31 of COMELEC Resolution No. 7505 decrees that all expenses incident to recall
This case is a Petition for Certiorari1 with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction elections shall be borne by the Commission, pursuant to Section 75 of the LGC. WHEREAS, a
filed by Alroben J. Goh (Goh) assailing Resolution Nos. 9864 and 9882 issued by the Commission on Memorandum from the Finance Services Department dated 24 March 2014 raised an issue as to the
Elections (COMELEC). funding of the entire process of recall;

Resolution No. 9864,2 promulgated on 1 April 2014, affirmed the recommendation of the Office of the
Deputy Executive Director (ODEDO). The ODEDO found the petition seeking the recall (recall petition) of
Mayor Lucilo R. Bayron (Mayor Bayron), the incumbent mayor of Puerto Princesa City, sufficient in form
and substance. However, Resolution No. 9864 suspended all proceedings under the recall petition
because the Financial Services Department (FSD) of the COMELEC raised an issue as to the funding of the
entire process of recall. The COMELEC Chairman and all COMELEC Commissioners3 signed Resolution No.
9864 without any separate opinion.
Resolution No. 9882,4 promulgated on 27 May 2014, suspended any proceeding relative to recall as the
recall process, as stated in said Resolution, does not have an appropriation in the General Appropriations
Act of 2014 (2014 GAA)5 and the 2014 GAA does not provide the COMELEC with legal authority to
commit public funds for the recall process. Unfike Resolution No. 9864, five COMELEC Commissioners
signed Resolution No. 9882 with a comment or a separate opinion.6
The Facts
NOW THEREFORE, the Commission on Elections, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution,
the Local Government Code, as amended, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Act No. 9244, and other
elections laws, RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to AFFIRM the recommendation of the ODEDO as to
the SUFFICIENCY of the Recall Petition filed against Mayor Lucilo R. Bayron of Puerto Princesa City,
Palawan.
RESOLVED FURTHER, considering that the FSD has raised an issue as to the funding of any and all recall
elections, any proceeding in furtherance thereof, including the verification process, is hereby
SUSPENDED until the funding issue shall have been resolved.
SO ORDERED.8
On 28 April 2014, Mayor Bayron filed with the COMELEC an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for
Clarification9 which prayed for the dismissal of the recall petition for lack of merit.

On 19 May 2014, Goh filed a Comment/Opposition (To the 27 April 2014 Omnibus Motion for
On 17 March 2014, Goh filed before the COMELEC a recall petition, docketed as SPA EM No. 14-004
Reconsideration and for Clarification) with Motion to Lift Suspension10 which prayed for the COMELEC's
(RCL),7against Mayor Bayron due to loss of trust and confidence brought about by "gross violation of
denial of Mayor Bayron's 27 April 2014 Omnibus Motion, as well as to direct COMELEC's authorized
pertinent provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, gross violation of pertinent provisions of
representative to immediately carry out the publication of the recall petition against Mayor Bayron, the
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials, Incompetence, and other related gross
verification process, and the recall election of Mayor Bayron. On 27 May 2014, COMELEC promulgated
inexcusable negligence/dereliction of duty, intellectual dishonesty and emotional immaturity as Mayor
Resolution No. 9882, as follows:
of Puerto Princesa City."

This refers to the petition for recall against Mayor Lucilo Bayron of the City of Puerto Princesa, Province
On 1 April 2014, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9864. Resolution No. 9864 found the recall
of Palawan. In Resolution No. 9864, while the Commission en bane affirmed the recommendation of the
petition sufficient in form and substance, but. suspended the funding of any and all recall elections until
Office of the Deputy Executive Director for Operations (ODEDO) as to the sufficiency of the Recall
the resolution of the funding issue. We reproduce the text of Resolution No. 9864 below:
Petition, it suspended further proceedings on recall until the funding issue raised by the Finance Services
Department shall have been resolved.
WHEREAS, the Commission is mandated to enforce all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; WHEREAS, a petition for the recall of Mayor Lucilo
 123

The power of recall for loss of confidence is exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit "SECTION 32. Use of Appropriated Funds. - All moneys appropriated for functions, activities, projects and
to which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs [Footnote 1 -Sec. 69 of the Local programs shall be available solely for the specific purposes for which these are appropriated. "
Government Code]. The exercise of this power is subject to the following limitations provided for by law:
(a) any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for
In prior years, including election years such as 2007, 2010 and 2013, the Commission had a line item for
loss of confidence; and (b) [n]o recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's
the "Conduct and Supervision of Elections and other Political Exercises" under the Program category of
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular election [Footnote 2 - Section 74 of
its budget. However, the said line item was never utilized for the actual conduct of any elections or other
the Local Government Code]. Because of the cost implications involved, the achievability of pursuing a
political exercises including recall elections. Again, the said line item has been consistently spent for the
recall proceeding to its conclusion will depend on the availability of funds at the disposal of the
basic continuing staff support and administrative operations of the Commission. This is because on top
Commission on Elections (the Commission).
of the line item for the "Conduct and Supervision of Elections and other Polftical Exercises" under the
Program category, separate line items were provided by Congress for the conduct of the "National and
The conduct of recall is one of several constitutional mandates of the Commission. Unfortunately, it Local Elections," "SK and Barangay Elections" as well as "Overseas Absentee Voting" under the Locally
cannot now proceed with the conduct of recall elections as it does not have an appropriation or legal Funded Projects (Project) category of the Commission's 2007, 2010 and 2013 budget, to wit:
authority to commit public funds for the purpose.

Year/GAA Item Budget Amount Item Budget Amount

I. All expenses incident to Recall elections shall he for the account of the Commission. Under Program under Projects

It is important to note that the Local Government Code (LGC) specifically provides for the expenses in the 2007 Conduct and Supervision of ₱957,294,000 National and Local ₱5,128,969,000
conduct of recall elections, to wit: Elections and Other Political Elections
Exercises
SK and Barangay ₱2,130,969,000
"SECTION 75. Expenses Incident to Recall Elections. -All expenses incident to recall elections shall be Elections
borne by the COMELEC. for this purpose, there shall be included in the annual General Appropriations
Act a contingency fund at the disposal of the COMELEC for the conduct ofrecall election." Overseas Absentee ₱238,421,000
Voting
Hence, the Commission is mandated to shoulder ALL expenses relative to the conduct of recall elections. 2010 Conduct and Supervision of ₱1, Automated National and ₱5,216,536,000
Expenses in recall elections, unlike the other exercises mandated by the (C]onstitution to be Elections and Other Political 101,072.000 Local Elections
administered by the Commission, is specifically treated in a special law -the LGC. Section 75 of the LGC Exercises
likewise requires the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA) to include a contingency fund at the SK and Barangay ₱3,241,535,000
disposal of the Commission for the conduct of recall elections. This leads us to the crucial question: does Elections
the 2014 GAA [Footnote 3 - Republic Act No. 10633] include such contingency fund m the Commission's
appropriations? Overseas Absentee ₱188,086,000
Voting

II. The Commission does not have an appropriation or line item budget to serve as a contingency fund for 2013 Conduct and Supervision of ₱1,452,752,000 Synchronized National, ₱4,585,314,000
the conduct of recall elections under the 2014 CAA. Elections and Other Political Local and ARMM
Exercises Elections
A careful review of the Commission's budget under the 2014 GAA reveals that it does not have any SK and Barangay ₱1,175,098,000
appropriation or line item budget (line item) to serve as a contingency fund for the conduct of recall Elections
elections. While the Commission has a line item for the "Conduct and supervision of elections, referenda,
recall votes and plebiscites" under the Program cate~ory of its 2014 budget in the amount of Overseas Absentee ₱105,036,000
Phpl.401.501.000.00, the said amount cannot be considered as "an appropriation made by law" as Voting
required by the Constitution [Footnote 4 -Art. VI, Section 29 (1)] nor a contingent fund provided under
the LGC considering that the said line item is legally intended to finance the basic continuing staff
support and administrative operations of the Commission such as salaries of officials and employees as Thus, all expenses relative to the actual conduct of elections were charged against the specific line items
well as essential office maintenance and other operating expenses. As such, it cannot be used for the for "National and Local Elections," "SK and Barangay Elections" and "Overseas Absentee Voting" under
actual conduct of recall elections. the Locally Funded Projects category and not against the separate line item for the "Conduct and
Supervision of Elections and other Political Exercises" under the Program category.
Under the Revised Administrative Code, an appropriation may be used only for the specific purpose for
which they are appropriated, to wit: This brings us to the relevance of classifying an agency's budget into two major catego.ries - Programs
and Projects. Their definitions are found in the 2014 Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing
(BESF) submitted by the President to Congress as required by the Constitution [Footnote 5 -Article VII,

Sec. 22]. In the Glossary of Terms attached to the 2014 BESF, a "Program" [Footnote 6 - Page 1015] is
defined as "a homogenous group of activities necessary for the performance of a major purpose for
which a government agency is established, for the basic maintenance of the agency s administrative
operations or for the provisions of staff support to agency s administrative operations or for the
provisions of staff support to the agency '.s· line functions." On the other hand, "Projects" are defined as
"[s}pecial agency undertakings which are to be carried out within a definite time frame and which are
intended to result [in] some pre-determined measures of goods and services."
Moreover, in the Organizational Perfom1ance Indicator Framework (OPIF) Reference Guide issued by the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) itself, a "Program" is defined as "an integrated group of
activities that contribute to a particular continuing objective of a department/agency." [Footnote 7 -
Page 36]
Hence, a budget under the category of "Program" is intended to finance the regular day-to-day activities
of the Commission for the continuing basic maintenance of its administrative operations. Those activities
are regularly undertaken by the Commission regardless of whether or not an election or any political
exercises are being administered by the Commission. With respect to budget under the category of
"Project", it is intended to fund the special undertakings or activities of the Commission which are not
carried out on a regular day-today basis such as the actual administration of elections and other political
exercises including recall elections. Hence, it is illegal to proceed with any activity falling within the
definition of "Project" by using the budget intended to finance the activities within the scope of
"Program." The only instance when the Constitution allows the budget intended for "Program" to be
used for "Project" is when there is a valid augmentation.
Clearly, thus, the Commission's appropriations in the 2014 GAA does [sic] not include any line item for a
contingency fund for the specific purpose of conducting recall elections. In fact, the same has been true
for all appropriations of the Commission since 2005.
Allocating funds for the purpose of conducting recall elections would not only be illegal under the
Supreme Court ruling in Brillantes, Jr. v. Commission on Elections [Footnote 8 - G.R. No. 163193, 15 June
2004], it would likewise, and more importantly, run afoul [of] the prohibition under Article VI, Section 29
(1) of the 1987 Constitution that "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law." The same prohibition is reiterated in the Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines [Footnote 9 - Presidential Decree No. 1445].
III. Augmentation is Not Possible.
III. a.) There is no Line Item for Recall Elections in the 2014 GAA.
Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the Constitution empowers the Chairman of the Commission, along with
other heads of the Constitutional Departments and Commissions, to augment any item in the general
appropriations law, to wit:
"No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President
of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and
the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations."
124
Clearly, there are three (3) requisites for the valid exercise of the power to augment, namely:
1. There must be a law authorizing the Chairman to augment;
2. There must be a deficient existing line item in the general appropriations law to be
augmented; and
3. There must be savings on the part of the Commission.
While there is a law authorizing the Chairman to augment a deficient appropriation (Sec. 67, General
Provisions of the 2014 GAA), there is no existing line item in the Commission's budget for the actual
conduct of a recall elections [sic]. Thus, augmentation is not possible in this case. III. b.) Recall Elections is
not one of the Specific Purposes and Priorities for Augmentation under the 2014 GAA.
Granting arguendo that the line item for the "Conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall
votes and plebiscites" under the Program category of the Commission's 2014 budget is also a line item
for the conduct of recall elections, still, augmentation cannot be made within the bounds of the law.
Under Sec. 69 of the General Provisions of the 2014 GAA, there are priorities in the use of savings, and
[the conduct of] recall elections is not one of them, to wit:
"Sec. 69. Priority in the Use of Savings. Tn the use of savings, priority shall he given to the augmentation
of the amounts set aside for the payment of compensation, year-end bonus and cash gifi, retirement
gratuity, terminal leave benefits, old age pension of veterans and other personnel benefits authorized by
law. and those expenditure items authorized in agency special provisions and in other sections of the
General Provisions in this Act."
Most importantly, under the 2014 GAA's Special Provisions for the Commission, the Chairman's power to
augment is limited to specific purposes only, which purposes do not include recall elections, to wit:
"2. Use of Savings. The COMELEC, through its Chairperson, is authorized to use savings from its
appropriations to cover actual deficiencies incurred for the current year and for the following purposes:
(i) printing and/ or publication of decisions, resolutions, and training information materials: (ii) repair,
maintenance and improvement (?l central and regional offices, facilities and equipment; (iii) purchase of
equipment, books, journals and periodicals; (iv) necessary expenses for the employment of temporary,
contractual and casual employees; and (v) payment of extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses,
representation and transportation allowances, and other authorized benefits of its officials and
employees, subject to pertinent budgeting, accounting and auditing rules and regulations. "
Notably, the latter restriction aforequoted under the 2014 GAA is new and absent from General
Appropriations Acts of previous years. Hence, in the past, the Chairman could augment ANY deficient
items in the Commission's budget. But with the present legislative restrictions, augmentation is limited
to certain purposes which, unfortunately, do not include recall elections. IV. Personal and Criminal
liabilities for
Violation of the GAA and the Revised Penal Code.

Not only will the use of the Commission's current funds for the conduct of recall elections be
unconstitutional, it would likewise open the responsible officials to possible personal and criminal
liabilities.
Section 17 of the General Provisions of the 2014 GAA provides for the use of the current year's
appropriation and spells out the liability that will 'be faced by any official or employee who will
authorize, allow or permit, as well as those who are negligent in the performance of their duties and
functions which resulted in the incurrence of obligations or commitments by the government in violation
of the provision of law, to wit:
"Sec. 17. Use of the Current Years Appropriations. All departments, bureaus and offices of the National
Government, including Constitutional Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy and sues shall ensure that
appropriations in this Act shall be disbursed only for the purposes authorized herein and incurred during
the current year. x x x.
Officials and employees who will authorize, allow or permit, as well as those who are negligent in the
performance of their duties and functions which resulted in the incurrence of obligations or
commitments by the government in violation of this provision shall be personally liable to the
government for the full amount obligated or committed, and subject to disciplinary actions in
accordance with Section 43, Chapter 5 and Section 80, Chapter 7, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, and to
appropriate criminal action under existing laws. "
It should be emphasized that mere utilization of a public fund to any public use other than for which
such fund was appropriated by law is considered as a criminal act under Article 220 of the Revised Penal
Code even if no damage has resulted to the public, to wit:
"Article 220. Illegal use of public funds or property. - Any public officer who shall apply any public fund or
property under his administration to any public use other than for which such fund or property were
appropriated by law or ordinance shall suffer the penalty of prision correcciona/ in its minimum period
or a fine ranging from one-half to the total of the sum misapplied, if by reason of such misapplication,
any damages or embarassment shall have resulted to the public service. In either case, the offender shall
also suffer the penalty of temporary special disqualification.
If no damage or embarrassment to the public service has resulted, the penally shall be a fine from 5 to
50 per cent of the sum misapplied."
V. The Conduct of Recall Elections may adversely affect the Commission’s preparation's [sic] for [the}
2016 National and Local Elections.
It should be noted that the instant petition is not the only move for the conduct of recall elections. In
fact, another petition is pending for the conduct of recall in the Province of Bulacan. Thus, should the
Commission allow the present petition to push through, it is equivalent to opening the floodgates for
numerous other recall petitions which will result in multiple counts of violation of the existing
appropriation laws. Furthermore, the conduct of several recall elections may adversely affect the
ongoing preparations for the conduct of the May 9, 2016 National, Local and ARMM Elections, which the
Commission has commenced as far back as December of 2013.
125
VI. The only Solution is the Enaclment of a Law that will Appropriate Funds for the Conduct of Recall
Elections.
One solution to the Commission's predicament on recall is the inclusion in the 2015 GAA of a
contingency fund that may be used by the Commiss.ion for the conduct of recall elections pursuant to
Section 75 of the LGC. Hence, in the Commission's budget proposal for 2015, the Commission included a
budget in the amount of Php321,570,000.00 for possible recall elections in 2015 considering that recall
elections can still be conducted up to May of 2015.
An alternative solution is for persons interested in pursuing recall elections to adopt actions that may
lead to the passage by Congress of a supplemental (special) appropriations law for the FY 2014 for the
conduct of recall elections. The same may be suppo1ted by the Commission by certifying that such
funds, which are presently lacking, are necessary to defray expenses for the holding of recall elections,
pursuant l.o Section 11, Art. IX(C) of the Constitution.
Relative to this matter, it is unwise to request additional funding from the DBM. Again, Section 29(1),
Article VI of the Constitution is clear that the expenditure of public funds must be pursuant to an
appropriation made by law. Since only Congress can enact laws [Footnote 10 - Section l, Article VI,
Philippine Constitution], the DBM has no power to set aside funds, more so allot to the Commission said
funds, for an item of expenditure that is not provided in the Commission's appropriations in the 2014
GAA.
It is likewise unwise for the Commission to request the partial use of the One Billion Peso
(PH₱1,000,000,000.00) Contingent Fund under the 2014 GAA [Footnote 11 - Page 853]. True, Special
Provision No. 1 does say that the contingent fund may be used for "new and/or urgent projects and
activities that need to be implemented during the year." However, it also says that such fund "shall be
administered by the office of the President." Given the circumstances, not a few may interpret the
Commission's request to use such fund from the Office of the President as an affront to the
independence of this Commission. This may in turn lead some quarters to view any recall process funded
by the said Contingent Fund as tainted and biased. Going through with this proposal would do more
harm than good.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, not to
continue with any proceedings relative to recall as it does not have a line item budget or legal authority
to commit public funds for the purpose. Hence, until a law is passed by Congress appropriating funds for
recall elections - either by approving the Commission's budget proposal for FY 2015 or through a
supplemental (special) appropriations for FY 2014 - any proceeding relative t9 the instant petition for
recall should be suspended further.
RESOLVED, further, that this Resolution shall be applied consistently to all other petitions for recall now
pending or to be pursued by interested parties subsequent hereto.
SO ORDERED.11
Resolution No. 9882 was signed, without comment or separate opinion, by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes,
Jr. and Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph. Commissioner Lucenito N. Tagle voted in favor of the resolution
and filed a comment.12 Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim concurred in the resolution, with the
comment that "malversation should be under Article 217 not 220 [of the Revised Penal

Code]."13 Commissioners Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca,14 AI A. Parreno,15 and Luie Tito F. Guia16 wrote
separate options.
Commissioner Tagle stated that "in order for the Commission to effectively undertake actions relative to
recall petitions, First, the budget proposal to Congress for the FY 201 5 should contain a specific line item
appropriated for the funding of the conduct of recall elections; or Second, if feasible, we can request a
supplemental budget from Congress for the FY 2014 to specifically answer for the funding of recall
proceedings."17
Commissioner Padaca called for a holistic look of the GAA. She submitted that "the allocation for the
Commission in the GAA is primarily geared toward our Constitutional mandate, that is, the enforcement
and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiat.ive,
referendum, and recall xx x."18Therefore, the interpretation of the provisions of the GAA should be read
with the intent to pursue COMELEC's mandate. Commissioner Padaca further pointed out that the
COMELEC was "able to conduct special elections in the first district of !locos Sur in 2011, Zam bales in
2012, and a plebiscite for the creation of Davao Occidental in 2013, all of which lack a specific line item in
the applicable GAA. The lack of a specific appropriation or line item in the GAA did not deter [COMELEC]
from conducting and supervising an electoral exercise that was legally called upon by the
people."19 However, Commissioner Padaca recognized the limitations set by Section 2 of the 2014
GAA20 on the COMELEC's use of its savings.
In his separate opinion, Commissioner Parreno agreed with the factual findings of the FSD of the
COMELEC and the Office of the Chairman that the budget for the conduct of recall elections was not in
the 2014 GAA. He quoted from the 24 March 2014 Memorandum to the FSD which stated that the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) did not include a provision for expenses for recall
elections for Fiscal Years 2013 and 2014. The memorandum stated that: Please be informed that for the
FY 2013 and 2014, there is no provision made by the DBM for any expenses for the recall elections. A
provision was made only in the previous years in the total amount of ₱1,000,000.00. What was provided
for in our FY 2014 budget was the regular expenses for the election activities - regular salaries of field
employees and the corresponding expenses for the regular activities of our office.21
The Office of the Chairman, on the other hand, submits the COMELEC's annual budget for the COMELEC
En Bane's approval and directs and supervises the operations and internal administrations of the
COMELEC.
Commissioner Guia states that the majority opinion suggests that recall elections can only be funded
through a supplemental budget law. He opines that the majority adopts a strict interpretation of the
budget law when it states that there is no 1ine item for the conduct of recall elections in the 2014 GAA.
Commissioner Guia proposes a liberal approach: that the 2014 GAA should be construed as merely
failing to provide sufficient funds for the actual conduct of recall elections, and not as preventing
COMELEC from exercising its constitutional mandate of conducting recall elections. Commissioner Guia's
liberal approach to interpreting the budget law makes the remedy of funding recall elections by way of
augmenting an existing line item from savings a theoretical possibility. Commissioner Guia, however,
recognizes that the GAA's Sec. 69 of the General Provisions and Sec. 2 of the Special Provisions for the
COMELEC22 limit the items that can be funded from the COMELEC's savings. He suggests that curative
legislation be made to enable COMELEC to perform its constitutional mandate.
Goh filed the present Petition on 6 June 2014.
126
The Issues
In his Grounds for filing the Petition, Goh stated:
26. Petitioner respectfully moves for (a) the PARTIAL ANNULMENT and REVERSAL of Resolution No.
9864, insofar as the same directed the suspension of further action on the instant Recall Petition, and (b)
the ANNULMENT AND REVERSAL of Resolution No. 9882, on the ground that in their issuance, the
respondent Commission committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it failed to rule that:
I. THE 2014 GAA PROVIDES FOR AN APPROPRIATION OR LINE ITEM BUDGET TO SERVE AS A
CONTINGENCY FUND FOR THE CONDUCT OF RECALL ELECTIONS.
II. THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION MAY LAWFULLY AUGMENT ANY SUPPOSED
INSUFFICIENCY IN FUNDING FOR THE CONDUCT OF RECALL ELECTIONS BY UTILIZING ITS
SAVINGS.
III. THE PROPER, ORDERLY AND LAWFUL EXERCISE OF THE PROCESS OF RECALL IS WITHIN THE
EXCLUSIVE POWER AND AUTHORITY OF THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION. IV. THE FACTUAL
BACKDROP OF THIS CASE DOES NOT WARRANT NOR JUSTIFY THE DEFERMENT OF ALL
PROCEEDINGS ON RECALL PETITJONS.
27. Petitioner respectfully submits that an examination of the merits of this case, as well as the
applicable laws and entrenched legal precepts on the legal issues presented, will clearly establish an
undeniable basis for the reversal of the questioned Resolution Nos. 9864 and 9882.
28. Indeed, notwithstanding its finding that the Recall Petition filed by Petitioner Goh is sufficient in form
and substance, Respondent Commission nevertheless suspended the holding of a recall election
supposedly through Jack of funding. Petitioner respectfully submits that the same is a grave abdication
and wanton betrayal of the Constitutional mandate of the Respondent Commission and a grievous
violation of the sovereign power of the people. What the Resolution Nos. 9864 and 9882 have given with
one hand (the affirmation of the sufficiency of the Recall Petition), they have taken away with the other
(the funding issue, later claimed the issue of lack funding).23
In his comment, Mayor Bayron provided the following grounds for the dismissal of the petition:
I. THE 2014 GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT DOES NOT CARRY ANY SPECIFIC PARTICULAR
ITEM FOR THE CONDUCT OF RECALL ELECTIONS IN THE ClTY OF PUERTO PRINCESA, PROVINCE
OF PALAWAN OR ELSEWHERE;
A. The "power of the purse" belongs to the Congress and not with the Commission
on Elections; B. Fiscal autc.momy of the Commission on Elections operates within
the parameters of the Constitution; C. There is no particular item for the Conduct
of Recall Elections in which to apply the provision on budget augmentation; [and]
D: ft is the Commission, in line with the present budget, that has the authority to
determine the presence and possibility of augmentation.
 127

II. PROGRAM AND PROJECT HAVE BEEN CLEARLY DIFFERENTIATED BY THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS;
III. THE 2014 GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT PRESENTS A SPECIAL PROVISION WHICH WAS
ABSENT IN THE PREVIOUS GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT THEREBY FURTHER LIMITING THE
COMELEC'S EXERCISE OF AUGMENTATION;
IV. BUDGET CAN STILL BE ALLOCATED BY CONGRESS THROUGH THE ENACTMENT AND
PASSAGE OF A 2014 SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGET OR THROUGH THE 2015 GENERAL
APPROPRIATIONS ACT;
V. GOVERNMENT FUNDS SHOULD NOT BE SPENT TO SUPPORT ILLEGAL AND PREMATURE
INSTITUTION OF RECALL; [and]
The 1987 Constitution expressly provides the COMELEC with the power to "[e]nforce and administer alE
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall."26 The 1987 Constitution not only guaranteed the COMELEC's fiscal autonomy,27 but also granted
its head, as authorized by law, to augment items in its appropriations from its savings.28 The 2014 GAA
provides such authorization to the COMELEC Chairman.29
The COMELEC’s budget in the 2014 CAA
Goh asserts that the 2014 GAA provided COMELEC with an appropriation for the conduct of recall
elections in the total amount of Ph₱2,735,321,000. As evidence, Goh reproduced the COMELEC's budget
allocation in the 2014 GAA:
PS MODE CO TOTAL

VI. POLITICS IS A PRACTICAL MATTER, AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS MUST BE DEALT WITH PROGRAMS 1,937,544,000 450,937,000 2,388,481,000
REALISTICALLY.24
General 454,457,000 276,749,000 731,206,000
Administration
The COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that;
& Support

I. RESPONDENT COMELEC EN BANC DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN Operations 1,483,087,000 174,184,000 1,657,275,000
SUSPENDING PROCEEDINGS RELATIVE TO THE RECALL PETITION FILED AGAINST RESPONDENT
MAYOR LUCTLO R. BAYRON OF PUERTO PRINCESA CITY.

PROJECTS 500,000 120,816,000 225,524,000 346,840,000

A. The 2014 GAA does not provide for an appropriation or line item to serve as
contingency fund for the conduct of Recall Elections. Localty-funded 500,000 120,816,000 225,524,000 346,,840,000
Projects
B. Any activity falling within the definition of a "Project," such as Recall Elections,
cannot validly proceed by using the budget intended to finance the activities
within the scope of "Programs." C. Respondent COMELEC may not lawfully utilize
its savings to augment any insufficiency in the funding for recall elections. TOTAL NEW 1,938,044,000 571,753,000 225,524,000 2,735,321,00030
APPRO.

II. THE RECALL ELECTIONS BEING SOUGHT BY PETITIONER MAY PROCEED ONLY IF A LAW IS
ENACTED APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR. Goh further pointed out that the COMELEC has Ph₱1,483,087,000 appropriated under Operations, and
that the PhP 1,401,501,000 for current operating expenditure is allocated per region as follows:
III. PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY
INJUNCTION.25
National Capital Region 74,356,000
The Court's Ruling Region I - Ilocos 97,350,000

We grant the petition. We hold that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Region II - Cagayan Valley 69,302,000
Resolution Nos. 9864 and 9882.1âwphi1 The 2014 GAA provides the line item appropriation to allow the
COMELEC to perform its constitutional mandate of conducting recall elections. There is no need for Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) 63,120,000
supplemental legislation to authorize the COMELEC to conduct recall elections for 2014.
Region III - Central Luzon 1 I 2,896,000

The COMELEC's Fiscal Autonomy Region IV-A - CALABARZON 183,390,000

 128

The amount of PhP 1,401,501,000, on the other hand, is the total amount allotted for "Personnel
Region V – Bicol 92,944,000
Services" (Ph₱1,360,975,000) and "Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses" (Ph₱40,526,000) for
Regional Allocation.35
Region VI - Western Visayas 23,252,000

Region VII - Central Visayas 108,093,000 The COMELEC reiterated pertinent portions of Resolution No. 9882,36 thus:

Region VIII - Eastern Visayas 106,144,000

Region IX - Zamboanga Peninsula
Region X- Northern Mindanao
Region XI - Davao
Region XII - SOCCSKSARGEN
x x x While x x x the Commission has a line item for the "Conduct and supervision of elections, referenda,
56,636,000 recall votes and plebiscites" under the Program category of its 2014 budget in the amount of Php
1,401,501,000.00, the said amount cannot be considered as "an appropriation made by law" as required
76,864,000 by the Constitution [Footnote 17 -Art. VI, Section 29 (I)] nor a contingent fund provided under the LGC
considering that the said line item is legally intended to finance the basic continuing staff support and
51,639,000 administrative operations of the Commission such as salaries of officials and employees as well as
essential office maintenance and other operating expenses. As such, it carmot be used for the actual
44,982,000 conduct of recall elections.

Region XIII - CARAGA 59,481,000 In prior years, including election years such as 2007, 2010 and 2013, the Commission had a line item for
the "Conduct and Supervision of Elections and other Political Exercises" under the Program category of
Autonomous Region in Muslim 81,052,00031
its budget. However, the said line item was never utilized for the actual conduct of any elections or other
Mindanao (ARMM)
political exercises including recall elections. Again, the said line item has been consistently spent for the
basic continuing staff support and administrative operations of the Commission. This is because the top
of the line item for the "Conduct and Supervision of Elections and other Political Exercises" under the
Goh further states that COMELEC's personnel themselves admitted to the existence of a contingency
Program category, separate line items were provided by Congress for the conduct of the "National and
fund for the lawful conduct of recall elections. Atty. Maria Lea R. Alarkon, Acting Director III of the
Local Elections," "SK and Barangay Elections" as well as "Overseas Absentee Voting" under the Locally
COMELEC's FSD, during the 3 September 2013 budget hearing before the Senate's Subcommittee A of
Funded Projects (Project) category of the Commission's 2007, 2010 and 2013 budget, to wit:
the Committee on Finance, stated:

Your Honors, for the specifics of our MFO [Major Final Output] budget, x x x conduct and supervision of
elections, referenda, recall and plebiscites, 1,527,815,000; x x x.32 (Emphasis supplied)
Item Budget
Item Budget
Goh also cited an online news article which quoted COMELEC spokesperson James Jimenez saying that Year/GAA Under Amount Amount
under Projects
"lack of budget (should) not (be) an issue. xx x We always have a 'standby' budget for recall, plebiscite, Program
etc." and adding that the successful holding of any recall elections, referendum or plebiscite is the
fundamental mandate of the COMELEC.33 2007 Conduct and Supervision of ₱957,294,000 National and ₱5,128,969,000
Elections and Local Elections
Other Political
Finally, Goh presented a letter dated 28 May 2014 from Rep. Isidro T. Ungab, Chairman of the House of
Exercises SK and Barangay ₱2,130,969,000
Representatives' Committee on Appropriations, addressed to Hon. Douglas S. Hagedorn, Representative
Elections
of the Third District of Palawan. The letter stated that "[t]he FY 2014 budget of the COMELEC as
authorized in the FY 2014 General Appropriations Act amounts to ₱2,735,321,000, of which Overseas ₱238,421,000
₱1,401,501,000 is appropriated for the conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and Absentee Voting
plebiscites."34
2010 Conduct and Supervision of ₱1,101,072.000 Automated ₱5,216,536,000
The COMELEC, through the Solicitor General, classifies Goh's assertions as misleading. To illustrate the Elections and National and
lack of appropriation or line item for a contingency fund for the conduct of recall elections in the 2014 Other Political Local Elections
GAA, the COMELEC countered: Exercises
SK and Barangay ₱3,241,535,000
Elections
The amount of PhP 1,483,087,000 referred to by [Goh] allegedly for the conduct and supervision of
election, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites, actually refers to operating expenditures for "Personnel Overseas ₱188,086,000
Services," under the program "Regulation of Elections." Absentee Voting
 129

2013 Conduct and Supervision of ₱1,452,752,000 Synchronized ₱4,585,314,000 Region IX 48,318,000

Elections and National, Local
Other Political and ARMM Elections Region X 57,308,000
Exercises Region XI - Davao 45,150,000
SK and Barangay ₱1,175,098,000
Elections Region XII 48,407,000

Overseas ₱105,036,000
Absentee Voting
Despite Resolution No. 9882's statement about the alleged failure of the 2014 GAA to provide for a line
item appropriation for the conduct of recall elections, we hold that the 2014 GAA actually expressly
provides for a line item appropriation for the conduct and supervision of recall elections. This is found in
the Programs category of its 2014 budget, which the COMELEC admits in its Resolution No. 9882 is a
"line item for the 'Conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites.'" In
addition, one of the specific constitutional functions of the COMELEC is to conduct recall elections. When
the COMELEC receives a budgetary appropriation for its "Current Operating Expenditures," such
appropriation includes expenditures to carry out its constitutional functions, including the conduct of
recall elections. Thus, in Socrates v. COMELEC37 (Socrates), recall elections were conducted even without
a specific appropriation for recall elections in the 2002 GAA.
In Socrates, the COMELEC conducted recall elections for mayor of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan on 24
September 2002. At the time, the COMELEC found no reason to raise any concern as to the funding of
the 24 September 2002 recall elections. The COMELEC's budget in the 2002 GAA provided for the
following:
Under these factual circumstances, we find it difficult to justify the COMELEC's reasons why it is unable
to conduct recall elections in 2014 when the COMELEC was able to conduct recall elections in 2002
despite lack of the specific words "Conduct and supervision of x x x recall votes x x x" in the 2002 GAA. In
the 2002 GAA, the phrase "Conduct and supervision of elections and other political exercises" was
sufficient to fund the conduct of recall elections. In the 2014 GAA, there is a specific line item
appropriation for the "Conduct and supervision of x x x recall votes x x x."
More importantly, the COMELEC admits in its Resolution No. 9882 that the COMELEC has "a line item for
the 'Conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites.'" This admission of the
COMELEC is a correct interpretation of this specific budgetary appropriation. To be valid, an
appropriation must indicate a specific amount and a specific purpose. However, the purpose may be
specific even if it is broken down into different related sub-categories of the same nature. For example,
the purpose can be to '"conduct elections," which even if not expressly spelled out covers regular,
special, or recall elections. The purpose of the appropriation is still specific - to fund elections, which
naturally and logically include, even if not expressly stated, not only regular but also special or recall
elections.
The COMELEC’s Savings

New Appropriations, by Program / Project. XXX

Nowhere in the COMELEC's comment, however, does it dispute the existence of savings. In the transcript
of the hearing for the COMELEC's 2014 budget, the COMELEC estimated to have PhPl0.7 billion savings
In the 2002 GAA, the COMELEC had Ph₱910,854,000 appropriated under Operations, and that the around the end of 2013. However, since the DBM did not include a line budget for certain items,.
Ph₱788,659,000 for current operating expenditure was allocated per region as follows: Chairman Brillantes estimated that the PhP 10.7 billion savings will be reduced to about Ph₱2 billion
after the COMELEC augments expenses for the purchase of its land, warehouse, building, and the
overseas absentee voting. This estimate was made under the assumption that the 2014 GAA will provide
National Capital Region 41,708,000 a line item budget for the COMELEC's land, warehouse, building, and the overseas absentee voting.
Region I 57,269,000
In his opening remarks before the Senate Committee on Finance, Chairman Brillantes underscored the
Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) 34,975,000 need for a line item budget for certain items that the COMELEC can subsequently augment based on its
savings. Chairman Brillantes was aware that an item without a line budget cannot be funded by savings.
Region II 40,813,000

Region III 63,799,000 MR. BRILLANTES. 2014 is a non-election year, your Honor. Therefore, the budget that the Commission on
Elections would be asking will not really be too much. We, in fact, asked for five billion, which is much,
Region IV 103 ,689 ,000 much lower than all of our previous budgets but this has been cut by the DBM to only 2.8.
Region V 54,911,000
Now, 2.8 is already acceptable to the Commission on Elections. There are only some slight requests that
Region VI 68,236,000 we are going to ask. Since the 2.8 reduction actually cut off our projects, like we intend to set up our own
building and purchase land. All that we are asking is that in previous years we have been given a line
Region VII 62,421,000
budget for one million at least which we can augment based on our savings. All that we ask is that we be
Region VIII 61,655,000 given another line item for land, building and warehouse. Even at one million each or two million each
and we will take care of the augmentation as we have enough savings which we have tried to

accumulate during the past years which we can set up our own land, building and warehouse. So we
would request that we realign, not necessarily getting from other agencies, the amount of three million
or six million as the case may be, but get it from the same budget that we have so that we will not touch
the budget of other agencies. We have special budget for JSSP, and this is at 226 million. We can reduce
this to 220 million and put the six million to two million each for land, building and warehouse so we can
cover it.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. [FRANCIS G.] ESCUDERO). Noted.
Noted, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
MR. BRILLANTES. Yes, Your Honor. In addition to this let me just point out, Your Honor, that this year, we
are holding the barangay elections this corning October 28. While we did, in fact, ask for a budget last
year for the 2013 elections for barangay, we were only given by Congress as well as the President 1.1
billion. What we intend [for] our budget for the October 28 barangay elections is based on our
computations, 3 .4 billion. So on the basis of that, we are going to have to set aside from our own savings
2.3 billion to cover for the entire barangay elections. So we are setting aside 2.3 billion from our own
savings so that we can cover the 3.4 billion that we expect to actuaJly spend for the October 2013
barangay elections, meaning that the I. I plus 2.3 would be the 3.4. Therefore, that would cut off into our
savings but we are willing to sacrifice for this.
With this, Your Honor, we are ready to present our budget which is not really much. It is only 2.8 billion.
Now, we are also - we would like also to mention by way of an addition [sic] final statement, Your Honor.
We were given zero budget for the COAV (Committee on Overseas Absentee Voting], the overseas
voting, zero budget. We can understand that there has been some, well, reservations in Congress as well
as the President because of the poor performance in the COAV. However, there is a new law now which
requires the establishment of an office for the overseas voting. And this new Jaw provides that the
coverage is supposed to allocate a certain amount for the appropriation for this new office for COAV.
However, this law was passed after DBM had already submitted its budget to Congress and therefore it is
not allocated. It is not provided for under the submitted budget.
Now, we have some - we can provide for some amounts again for COAV but we would need at least
another line item for this no matter how big. We were asking for about 60 million which is reaJly not
much. We can take it out from our own savings but we have to have a line item also for this and then we
would ask that Congress provide - as provided for by the new law that new amounts be given to us, even
another 60 million, so we can cover our preparations for the the overseas voting for the 2016. x x x.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ESCUDERO). x x x. Second, Mr. Chairman, you were mentioning a while ago the
savings of the COMELEC. May we know how much exactly is the savings of the COMELEC? Kasi kaya n'yo
palang punuan yung kulang ng barangay election. Kaya n'yo palang magpagawa ng building.
MR. BRILLANTES. Tama ho iyon. Kaya ho namin kaya lang masasaktan ho yung bibilhin naman naming
lupa at saka building. Kasi ho 2.3 ang iaabono namin sa barangay. That is why if you will notice, as soon
as we finished the May elections, May 2013 elections, I immediately announced that we were praying na
kung pwede i-postpone na natin yung barangay saka SK.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ESCUDERO). I heard that but how?
130
MR. BRILLANTES. Pero sinabi ng Presidente tuloy, so tuloy tayo kako. Because we only have l. J billion
budget and we need about three billion plus, so we know it will cut on our savings. Yung savings ho
namin pag titgnan ho, mahaba hong kwento yung savings namin. Pag makikita ninyo yung notes ninyo,
nag-uurnpisa sa 10. 7 billion, parang napakalaki. Pero hindi ho totoo iyon. Ten point seven billion,
marami hong natatanggal diyan. Natanggalan kami ng 2.3 sa barangay, rnararni pa ho kaming utang na
hindi binabayaran, sa Smartmatic meron pa –
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ESCUDERO). Wala pa ho tayo duon. Sa ngayon Jang ho, magkano ho yung savings
ng COMELEC?
MR. BRILLANTES. Ngayon ho siguro mga 2B.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ESCUDERO). Binawas n'yo na yung 2.4 sa barangay.
MR. BRILLANTES. Tanggal ng lahat po yung barangay, yung mga utang na dapat naming bayaran,
obligasyon. At saka iyon ni-reserve namin, in-obligate na namin para sa lupa at saka sa building ...
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ESCUDERO). Sa building.
MR. BRILLANTES .... which is about three.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ESCUDERO). Now, two more points, Mr. Chairman. On the use of savings within
the NEP as provided for, nakalagay ho di to yung reuse of savings ninyo for repair, for printing, for
purchase of equipme'nt. Ang sinasabi niyo po, ang kailangan may prov'ision. Are you asking for a
provision in the special provisions to allow you to use savings for your building or do you want an item or
is it the same?
MR. BRTLLANTES. We need a line item for it, Your Honor, because we had some debates with then - of
the Senate President, who was then the Committee Finance chairman during previous proceedings ...
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ESCUDERO). Na?
MR. BRILLANTES .... na meron - bumibili na ho kami ng lupa, nakapag-down payment na nga kami ng 200
million, pero wala pala kaming line budget for purchase of land.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ESCUDERO). But was there a use of savings provisions similar to what we have in
the proposed 2014 budget in 2013?
MR. BRILLANTES. Meron ho kami, yeah, we have the savings.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ESCUDERO). May use of savings provision din? ·
MR. BRILLANTES. Yes, we can use to augment but there has to be a line budget. We cannot augment if it
is zero. Yun ang naging argument nun. So we ask for the Committee on Finance then for a one million
kuwan, kami na ang bahalang mag-augment. Binigyan naman kami for 2013 for the land at saka
warehouse. Binigyan kami tigwa-one million, so we can augment. But we did not have time to work on it
 131

ngayong 2013 because of the elections at saka meron pa hong barangay. So we might have to make -
apply this in 2014 ...
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ESCUDERO). For that matter –
MR. BRILLANTES .... If we don't have any line item now, we might have a problem in 2014. THE
CHAIRMAN (SEN. ESCUDERO). For that matter, pwede rin naman piso po yun, 'di ba? Pareho Jang
naman. It's the same.
MR. BRILLANTES. Pwede rin ho. Pero sinasabi nga namin –
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ESCUDERO). All you need is an item, right?
MR. BRILLANTES. Sina-suggest ko nga ho kanina sa opening statement ko, meron kami dun sa ISSP na
226 million ...
The COMELEC s Alleged Lack of Authority
to Augment the "Project" "Recall Elections" from Savings
Despite the Ph₱2 billion to Ph₱10.7 billion savings ex1stmg in the COMELEC's coffers, the COMELEC
asserts that it cannot legally fund the exercise of recall elections. The power to augment from savings lies
dormant until authorized by law.39 Flexibility in the use of public funds operates only upon legislative fiat.
x x x However, to afford the heads of the different branches of the government and those of the
constitutional commissions considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources, the
constitution allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of
augmenting an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the government branch or
constitutional body concerned. The leeway granted was thus limited. The purpose and conditions for
which funds may be transferred were specified, i.e. transfer may be allowed for the purpose of
augmenting an item and such transfer may be made only if there are savings from another item in the
appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body.40

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ESCUDERO). Yun na lang din ang pagkunan. The COMELEC cited the following provisions in the 2014 GAA to justify its lack of authority to augment
expenses for the conduct of recall elections from its existing savings:
MR. BRILLANTES. . .. yung six million na lang ang tanggalin, gawin na lang 220, kasya na yun dun sa ISSP
namin, bigyan na lang kami ng tigto-two million dun sa six, hindi kami kukuha sa ibang agencies, sa amin Special Provisions for the COMELEC
din.
2. Use of Savings. The COMELEC, through ils Chairperson, is hereby authorized to use savings from its
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ESCUDERO). Within the agency din? appropriations to cover actual deficiencies incurred for the current year and for the following purposes:
(i) printing and/or publication of decisions, resolutions, and training information materials; (ii) repair,
MR. BRILLANTES. Yes, para hindi ho tayo magkaproblema. maintenance and improvement of central and regional offices, facililies and equipment; (iii) purchase of
equipment, books, journals and periodicals; (iv) necessary expenses for the employment of temporary,
contractual and casual employees; and (v) payment of extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses,
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ESCUDERO). That's for two items, right? representation and transportation allowances, and other authorized benefits of its officials and
employees, subject to pertinent budgeting, accounting and auditing rules and regulations.
MR. BRILLANTES. Yes.
General Provisions in the 2014 GAA
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ESCUDERO). Two or three items?
Sec. 67. Use pf Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House
MR. BRILLANTES. Actually, four ho yun, tatlo sa – of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions
enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to use savings in their respective
appropriations to augment actual deficiencies incurred for the current year in any item of their
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ESCUDERO). Land, building – respectiv:e appropriations.

MR. BRILLANTES. Land, building and warehouse, tapos yung Sec. 68. Meaning of Savings and Augmentation. Savings refer to portions or balances of any programmed
appropriation in this Act free from any obligation or encumbrance which are (i) still available after the
overseas kasarna pa ho. completion or final discontinuance or abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which the
appropriation is authorized; (ii) from appropriation balances arising from unpaid compensation and
related costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of absence without pay; and (iii) from
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ESCUDERO). Pang-apat yung OAV?
appropriation balances realized from the implementation of measures resulting in improved systems and
efficiencies and thus enabled agencies to meet and deliver the required or planned targets, programs
MR. BRILLA TES. Pang-apat ho yun.38 and services approved in this Act at a lesser cost.

Augmentation· implies the existence in this Act of a program, activity, or project with an appropriation,
which upon implementation or subsequent evaluation of needed resources, is determined to be
deficient. In no case shall a non-existent program.,activity, or project be funded by augmentation from
savings or by the use of appropriations otherwise authorized in this Act.
Sec. 69. Priority in the Use of Savings. In the use of savings, priority shall be given to the augmentation of
the amounts set aside for the payment of compensation, year-end bonus and cash gift, retirement
gratuity, terminal leave benefits, old-age pension of veterans and other personnel benefits authorized by
law, and those expenditure items authorized in agency special provisions and in other sections of the
General Provisions in this Act. (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
Commissioner Guia, in his Separate Opinion, stressed the disconnection between the COMELEC's
mandate and the lack of a line budget item for the conduct of recall elections.
At this point Jet it be stated that there is a provision in the GAA limiting the items that can be funded
from realignment of savings. See Section 69 of the General Provisions and Section 2 of the Special
Provision for COMELEC in the 2014 GAA. Providing for the conduct of recall votes is not one of them. This
limitation effectively establishes a clash between the COMELEC's constitutional mandate as an
independent constitutinnal body to administer recall elections and the power of Congress to appropriate
public funds.
This clash can simply be avoided by a curative legislation that would enable COMELEC to perform its
constitutional mandate while at the same time recognizing the power of Congress to allocate public
funds. Unless there are other lawful means by which the conduct of recall elections can be funded,
COMELEC's hands are tied by the way the GAA is worded. The ball is now in the hands of Congress.41
Resolution No. 9882 proposed alternative sources for funding recall elections:
One solution to the Commission's predicament on recall is the inclusion in the 2015 GAA of a
contingency fund that may be used by the Commission for the conduct of recall elections pursuant to
Section 75 of the LGC. Hence, in the Commission's budget proposal for 2015, the Commission included a
budget in the amount of Php321,570,000.00 for possible recall elections in 2015 considering that recall
elections can still be conducted up to May of 2015.
An alternative solution is for persons interested in pursuing recall elections to adopt actions that may
lead to the passage by Congress of a supplemental (special) appropriations law for the FY 2014 for the
conduct of recall elections. The same may be supported by the Commission by certifying that such funds,
which are presently lacking, are necessary to defray expenses for the holding of recall elections, pursuant
to Section 11, Art. IX(C) of the Constitution.42
There is no clash between the COMELEC and Congress. We reiterate that the 2014 GAA provides a line
item appropriation for the COMELEC's conduct of recall elections. Since the COMELEC now admits that it
does not have sufficient funds from its current line item appropriation for the "Conduct and supervision
of x x x recall votes xx x" to conduct an actual recall election, then there is therefore an actual deficiency
in its operating funds for the current year. This is a situation that allows for the exercise of the COMELEC
Chairman's power to augment actual deficiencies in the item for the "Conduct and supervision of x x x
recall votes x x x" in its budget appropriation.1âwphi1
132
The COMELEC, in Resolution No. 9882, admitted the existence of a line item appropriation for the
"Conduct and supervision of x x x recall votes x x x":
A careful review of the Commission's budget under the 2014 GAA reveals that it does not have any
appropriation or line item budget (line item) to serve as a contingency fund for the conduct of recall
elections. While the Commission has a line item for the "Conduct and supervision of elections, referenda,
recall votes and plebiscites" under the Program category of its 2014 budget in the amount of
Phpl,401,501,000.00, the said amount cannot be considered as "an appropriation made by law" as
required by the Constitution lFootnote 4 - Arl. VI, Section 29 (I)] nor a contingent fund provided under
the LGC considering that the said line item is legally intended to finance the basic continuing staff
support and administrative operations of the Commission such as salaries of officials and ·employees as
well as essential office maintenance and other operating expenses. As such, it cannot be used for the
actual conduct of recall elections. (Emphasis supplied)
However, contrary to the COMELEC's assertion, the appropriations for personnel ser-Vices and
maintenance and other operating expenses falling under "Conduct and supervision of elections,
referenda, recall votes and plebiscites" constitute a line item which can be augmented from the
COMELEC's savings to fund the conduct of recall elections in 2014. The conduct of recall elections
requires only operating expenses, not capital outlays. The COMELEC's existing personnel in Puerto
Princesa are the same personnel who will evaluate the sufficiency of the recall petitions. and conduct the
recall elections.43
Moreover, the line item appropnation for the "Conduct and supervision of x x x recall votes x x x" in the
2014 GAA is sufficient to fund recall elections. There is no constitutional requirement that the
budgetary.appropriation must be loaded in "contingent funds." The Congress has plenary power to lodge
such appropriation in current operating expenditures. Going back to the circumstances of the 2002 recall
elections in Puerto Princesa, the 2002 GAA provided for the following:
1. Special Audit. The appropnat1ons herein authorized for the Commission for registration,
plebiscite, referendum and election purposes shall be used exclusively for the purpose for
which these are intended. Special Audit shall be undertaken by the Commission on Audit
(COA) on all expenses for printing jobs, materials and paraphernalia to be used for
registration, plebiscite, referendum and election purposes. Copies of the COA report shall be
furnished the Legislature within one month after such audit.
2. Augmentation of the Appropriations for Barangay Elections. The appropriations authorized
herein for the holding of barangay elections may be augmented by COMELEC savings not
exceeding Three Hundred Million Pesos (₱300,000,000.00) if upon implementation or
subsequent evaluation, the needed resources for the holding of said election is determined to
be deficient.
3. Appropriations for Programs and Specific Activities. The amounts herein appropriated for
the programs of the agency shall be used specifically for the following activities in the
indicated amounts and conditions: x x x.
General Provisions in the 2002 GAA
Sec. 51. Modification of Expenditure Components. Unless specifically authorized in this Act, no change or
modification shall be made in the expenditure items authori:t.ed in this Act and other appropriations

laws unless in cases of augmentations from savings in appropriations as authorized under Section 25(5),
Article Vl of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
53. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional
Commissions under Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman, and the Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights are hereby authorized to augment any item in this Act for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. Sec. 54. Meaning of Savings and
Augmentation. Savings refer to portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act free
from any obligation or encumbrance still available after the completion or final discontinuance or
abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized, or arising from
unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of absence without
pay.
Augmentation implies the existence in this Act of an item, project, activity, or purpose with an
appropriation which upon implementation or subsequent evaluation of needed resources is determined
to be deficient. In no case, therefore, shall a non-existent item, project, activity, purpose or object of
expenditure be funded by augmentation from savings or by the use of appropriations otherwise
authorized in this Act.
Sec. 55. Priority in the Use of Savings. Jn the use of savings, priority shall be given to the augmentation of
the amounts set aside for compensation, year-end bonus and cash gift, retirement gratuity, terminal
leave benefit, old-age pension of veterans and other personnel benefits authorized by law, and those
expenditure items authorized in agency Special Provisions and in Section 16 and in other Sections of the
General Provisions of this Act. (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
We thus find unnecessary the COMELEC's protests regarding the difference between "Projects" and
"Programs" for their failure to allocate funds for any recall process in 2014.
x x x The constitutional test for validity is not how itemized the appropriation is down to the project level
but whether the purpose of the appropriation is specific enough to al low the President to exercise his
lineitem veto power. Section 23, Chapter 4, Book VI of the Administrative Code provides a stricter
requirement by mandating that there must be a corresponding appropriation for each program and for
each project. A project is a component of a program which may have several projects. A program is
equivalent to the specific purpose of an appropriation. An item of appropriation for school-building is a
program, while the specific schools to be built, being the identifiable outputs of the program, are the
projects. The Constitution only requires a corresponding appropriation for a specific purpose or program,
not for the sub-set of projects or activitics.44 (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that there is an existing line item appropriation for the conduct of recall elections in the
2014 GAA, we see no reason why the COMELEC is unable to perform its constitutional mandate to
"enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of x x x recall."45 Should the
funds appropriated in the 2014 GAA be deemed insufficient, then the COMELEC Chairman may exercise
his authority to augment such line item appropriation from the COMELEC's existing savings, as this
augmentation is expressly authorized ]n the 2014 GAA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
133
We PARTIALLY REVERSE and SET ASIDE Resolution No. 9864 insofar as it directed the suspension of any
and all proceedings in the recall petition. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE Resolution No. 9882, and DIRECT
the Commission on Elections to immediately carry out the recall elections of Mayor Lucilo R. Bayron of
Puerto Princesa City, Palawan in accordance with the provisions of the Local Government Code and
COMELEC Resolution No. 7505.
This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
CASE 2014-0058: ALROBEN J. GOH, PETITIONER, VERSUS HON. LUCILO R. BAYRON AND COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENTS (G.R. NO. 212584, 25 NOVEMBER 2014, CARPIO, J.) SUBJECT/S:
COMELEC BUDGET; RECALL ELECTION (BRIEF TITLE:: GOH VS. HON. BAYRON AND COMELEC).
DISPOSITIVE:
“WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
We PARTIALLY REVERSE and SET ASIDE Resolution No. 9864 insofar as it directed the suspension of any
and all proceedings in the recall petition. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE Resolution No. 9882, and DIRECT
the Commission on Elections to immediately carry out the recall elections of Mayor Lucilo R. Bayron of
Puerto Princesa City, Palawan in accordance with the provisions of the Local Government Code and
COMELEC Resolution No. 7505.
This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.”
SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:
COMELEC SAYS THERE IS NO BUDGET IN THE 2014 GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT FOR THE CONDUCT
OF RECALL ELECTION AND THEREFORE THEY CANNOT CONDUCT RECALL ELECTIONS. IS THIS CORRECT?
NO. THE 2014 GAA PROVIDES THE LINE ITEM APPROPRIATION TO ALLOW COMELEC TO CONDUCT
RECALL ELECTIONS.
“We grant the petition. We hold that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
Resolution Nos. 9864 and 9882. The 2014 GAA provides the line item appropriation to allow the
COMELEC to perform its constitutional mandate of conducting recall elections. There is no need for
supplemental legislation to authorize the COMELEC to conduct recall elections for 2014.”
TO BE VALID AN APPROPRIATION MUST INDICATE A SPECIFIC AMOUNT AND A SPECIFIC PURPOSE. DOES
THE PURPOSE ‘TO CONDUCT ELECTIONS’ COVER RECALL ELECTIONS”?
YES. THE PURPOSE MAY BE BROKEN DOWN INTO DIFFERENT RELATED SUB-CATEGORIES. THEREFORE
THE PURPOSE “TO CONDUCT ELECTIONS” COVERS, EVEN IF NOT EXPRESSLY SPELLED OUT, REGULAR,
SPECIAL AND RECALL ELECTIONS.
 134

“Under these· factual circumstances, we find it difficult to justify the COMELEC ‘s reasons why it is unable
to conduct recall elections in 2014 when the COMELEC was able to conduct recall elections in 2002
despite lack of the specific words “Conduct and supervision of x x x recall votes x x x” in the 2002 GAA. In
the 2002 GAA, the phrase “Conduct and supervision of elections and other political exercises” was
sufficient to fund the conduct of recall elections. In the 2014 GAA, there is a specific line item
appropriation for the “Conduct and supervision of x x x recall votes x x x.”

More importantly, the COMELEC admits in its Resolution No. 9882 that the COMELEC has “a line item for
the ‘Conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites.”‘ This admission of the
COMELEC is a correct interpretation of this specific budgetary appropriation.· To be valid, an
appropriation must indicate a specific amount and a specific purpose. However, the purpose may be
specific even if it is broken down into different related sub-categories of the same nature. For example,
the purpose can be to “conduct elections,” which even if not expressly spelled out covers regular,
special, or recall elections. The purpose of the appropriation is still specific -to fund elections, which
naturally and logically include, even if not expressly stated, not only regular but also special or recall
elections.

CAN COMELEC TAP ITS SAVINGS TO FUND THE CONDUCT OF RECALL ELECTIONS?

YES. IT CAN AUGMENT FROM SAVINGS ITS APPROPRIATIONS FOR PERSONNEL SERVICES, MAINTENANCE
AND OTHER OPERATING EXPENSES. RECALL ELECTIONS ONLY NEED OPERATING EXEPENSES BECAUSE
THE EXISTING PERSONNEL ARE THE SAME PERSONNEL WHO WILL EVALUATE THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE
RECALL PETITIONS.

However, contrary to the COMELEC’s assertion, the appropriations for personnel services and
maintenance and other operating expenses falling under “Conduct and supervision of elections,
referenda, recall votes and plebiscites” constitute a line item which can be augmented from the
COMELEC’s savings to fund the conduct of recall elections in 2014. The conduct of recall elections
requires only operating expenses, not capital outlays. The COMELEC’s existing personnel in Puerto
Princesa are the same personnel who will evaluate the sufficiency of the recall petitions. and conduct the
recall elections.43

EN BANC
G.R. No. 177508 August 7, 2009
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT) PARTY-LIST,
represented by SALVADOR B. BRITANICO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for prohibition1 with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction2 filed by petitioner Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party List (petitioner) assailing the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 9369 (RA 9369)3 and enjoining respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from
implementing the statute.
RA 9369 is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2231 and House Bill No. 5352 passed by the Senate on 7
December 2006 and the House of Representatives on 19 December 2006. On 23 January 2007, less than
four months before the 14 May 2007 local elections, the President signed RA 9369. Two newspapers of
general circulation, Malaya and Business Mirror, published RA 9369 on 26 January 2007. RA 9369 thus
took effect on 10 February 2007.
On 7 May 2007, petitioner, a duly accredited multi-sectoral organization, filed this petition for
prohibition alleging that RA 9369 violated Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.4 Petitioner also
assails the constitutionality of Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 of RA 9369. According to petitioner, these
provisions are of questionable application and doubtful validity for failing to comply with the provisions
of the Constitution.
The COMELEC and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed their respective Comments. At the
outset, both maintain that RA 9369 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality, save for the prayer of
the COMELEC to declare Section 43 as unconstitutional.
The Assailed Provisions of RA 9369
Petitioner assails the following provisions of RA 9369:
1. Section 34 which provides:
SEC. 34. Sec. 26 of Republic Act No. 7166 is hereby amended to read as follows:
135
"SEC. 26. Official Watchers. - Every registered political party or coalition of political parties, and every
candidate shall each be entitled to one watcher in every polling place and canvassing center: Provided
That, candidates for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlunsod, or Sangguniang Bayan
belonging to the same slate or ticket shall collectively be entitled to only one watcher.
"The dominant majority party and dominant minority party, which the Commission shall determine in
accordance with law, shall each be entitled to one official watcher who shall be paid a fixed per diem of
four hundred pesos (400.00).
"There shall also recognized six principal watchers, representing the six accredited major political parties
excluding the dominant majority and minority parties, who shall be designated by the Commission upon
nomination of the said parties. These political parties shall be determined by the Commission upon
notice and hearing on the basis of the following circumstances:
"(a) The established record of the said parties, coalition of groups that now composed them,
taking into account, among other things, their showing in past election;
"(b) The number of incumbent elective officials belonging to them ninety (90) days before the
date of election;
"(c) Their identifiable political organizations and strengths as evidenced by their
organized/chapters;
"(d) The ability to fill a complete slate of candidates from the municipal level to the position
of President; and
"(e) Other analogous circumstances that may determine their relative organizations and
strengths."
2. Section 37 which provides:
SEC. 37. Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 30. Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for the Election of President and Vice President:
The Commission en banc as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of senators: Determination
of Authenticity and Due Execution of Certificates of Canvass. – Congress and the Commission en banc
shall determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificate of canvass for president and vice
president and senators, respectively, as accomplished and transmitted to it by the local boards of
canvassers, on a showing that: (1) each certificate of canvass was executed, signed and thumbmarked by
the chairman and members of the board of canvassers and transmitted or caused to be transmitted to
Congress by them; (2) each certificate of canvass contains the names of all of the candidates for
president and vice president or senator, as the case may be, and their corresponding votes in words and
their corresponding votes in words and in figures; (3) there exits no discrepancy in other authentic copies
of the certificates of canvass or any of its supporting documents such as statement of votes by
city/municipality/by precinct or discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words and figures in the
certificate; and (4) there exist no discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words and figures in the
certificates of canvass against the aggregate number of votes appearing in the election returns of

precincts covered by the certificate of canvass: Provided, That certified print copies of election returns or
certificates of canvass may be used for the purpose of verifying the existence of the discrepancy.
"When the certificate of canvass, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province, city of
district, appears to be incomplete, the Senate President or the Chairman of the Commission, as the case
may be, shall require the board of canvassers concerned to transmit by personal delivery, the election
returns form polling places that were not included in the certificate of canvass and supporting
statements. Said election returns shall be submitted by personal delivery within two (2) days from
receipt of notice.
"When it appears that any certificate of canvass or supporting statement of votes by city/municipality or
by precinct bears erasures or alteration which may cast doubt as to the veracity of the number of votes
stated herein and may affect the result of the election, upon requested of the presidential, vice
presidential or senatorial candidate concerned or his party, Congress or the Commission en banc, as the
case may be shall, for the sole purpose of verifying the actual number of votes cast for president, vice
president or senator, count the votes as they appear in the copies of the election returns submitted to it.
"In case of any discrepancy, incompleteness, erasure or alteration as mentioned above, the procedure
on pre-proclamation controversies shall be adopted and applied as provided in Section 17,18,19 and 20.
"Any person who present in evidence a simulated copy of an election return, certificate of canvass or
statement of votes, or a printed copy of an election return, certificate of canvass or statement of votes
bearing a simulated certification or a simulated image, shall be guilty of an election offense shall be
penalized in accordance with Batas Pambansa Blg. 881."
3. Section 38 which provides:
SEC. 38. Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases in Elections for President, Vice President, Senator, and Member of the
House of Representatives. - For purposes of the elections for president, vice president, senator, and
member of the House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters
relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or the
certificates of canvass, as the case may be, except as provided for in Section 30 hereof. However, this
does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu proprio or upon written
complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election
returns before it.
"Questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers may be initiated in the
board or directly with the Commission in accordance with Section 19 hereof.
"Any objection on the election returns before the city or municipal board of canvassers, or on the
municipal certificates of canvass before the provincial board of canvassers or district board of canvassers
in Metro Manila Area, shall be specifically noticed in the minutes of the respective proceedings."
4. Section 43 which provides:
136
SEC. 43. Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 265. Prosecution. – The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the
power, concurrent with the other prosecuting arms of the government, to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same."
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
1. Whether RA 9369 violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution;
Whether Sections 37 and 38 violate Section 17, Article VI5 and Paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII6 of the
Constitution;
Whether Section 43 violates Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution;7 and
Whether Section 34 violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution.8
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has no merit.
is settled that every statute is presumed to be constitutional.9 The presumption is that the legislature
intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law. Those who petition the Court to declare a law
unconstitutional must show that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely
a doubtful, speculative or argumentative one; otherwise, the petition must fail.10
In this case, petitioner failed to justify why RA 9369 and the assailed provisions should be declared
unconstitutional.
RA 9369 does not violate Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution
Petitioner alleges that the title of RA 9369 is misleading because it speaks of poll automation but
contains substantial provisions dealing with the manual canvassing of election returns. Petitioner also
alleges that Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 are neither embraced in the title nor germane to the subject
matter of RA 9369.
Both the COMELEC and the OSG maintain that the title of RA 9369 is broad enough to encompass topics
which deal not only with the automation process but with everything related to its purpose encouraging
a transparent, credible, fair, and accurate elections.
The constitutional requirement that "every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof" has always been given a practical rather than a technical
construction.11 The requirement is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough to include subjects
related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve.12 The title of a law does not have to

be an index of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other
and may be inferred from the title.13 Moreover, a title which declares a statute to be an act to amend a
specified code is sufficient and the precise nature of the amendatory act need not be further stated.14
RA 9369 is an amendatory act entitled "An Act Amending Republic Act No. 8436, Entitled ‘An Act
Authorizing the Commission on Elections to Use an Automated Election System in the May 11, 1998
National or Local Elections and in Subsequent National and Local Electoral Exercises, to Encourage
Transparency, Credibility, Fairness and Accuracy of Elections, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881, as Amended, Republic Act No. 7166 and Other Related Election Laws, Providing Funds Therefor
and For Other Purposes.’" Clearly, the subject matter of RA 9369 covers the amendments to RA 8436,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (BP 881),15 Republic Act No. 7166 (RA 7166),16 and other related election laws
to achieve its purpose of promoting transparency, credibility, fairness, and accuracy in the elections. The
provisions of RA 9369 assailed by petitioner deal with amendments to specific provisions of RA 7166 and
BP 881, specifically: (1) Sections 34, 37 and 38 amend Sections 26, 30 and 15 of RA 7166, respectively;
and (2) Section 43 of RA 9369 amends Section 265 of BP 881. Therefore, the assailed provisions are
germane to the subject matter of RA 9369 which is to amend RA 7166 and BP 881, among others.
Sections 37 and 38 do not violate Section 17, Article VI and Paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution
Petitioner argues that Sections 37 and 38 violate the Constitution by impairing the powers of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). According to petitioner,
under the amended provisions, Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of
President and Vice President (Congress), and the COMELEC en banc as the National Board of Canvassers
(COMELEC en banc), for the election of Senators may now entertain pre-proclamation cases in the
election of the President, Vice President, and Senators. Petitioner concludes that in entertaining pre-
proclamation cases, Congress and the COMELEC en banc undermine the independence and encroach
upon the jurisdiction of the PET and the SET.
The COMELEC maintains that the amendments introduced by Section 37 pertain only to the adoption
and application of the procedures on pre-proclamation controversies in case of any discrepancy,
incompleteness, erasure or alteration in the certificates of canvass. The COMELEC adds that Section 37
does not provide that Congress and the COMELEC en banc may now entertain pre-proclamation cases
for national elective posts.1avvphi1
OSG argues that the Constitution does not prohibit pre-proclamation cases involving national elective
posts. According to the OSG,
only Section 15 of RA 716617 expressly disallows pre-proclamation cases involving national elective posts
but this provision was subsequently amended by Section 38 of RA 9369.
In Pimentel III v. COMELEC,18 we already discussed the implications of the amendments introduced by
Sections 37 and 38 to Sections 15 and 3019 of RA 7166, respectively and we declared:
Indeed, this Court recognizes that by virtue of the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 9369 to
Sections 15 and 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, pre-proclamation cases involving the authenticity and due
execution of certificates of canvass are now allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, and
Senators. The intention of Congress to treat a case falling under Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9369, as a pre-proclamation case is apparent in the fourth paragraph of
137
the said provision which adopts and applies to such a case the same procedure provided under Sections
17, 18, 19 and 20 of Republic Act No. 7166 on pre-proclamation controversies.
In sum, in [the] elections for President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, the general rule is still that pre-proclamation cases on matters relating to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or certificates of canvass
are still prohibited. As with other general rules, there are recognized exceptions to the prohibition,
namely: (1) correction of manifest errors; (2) questions affecting the composition or proceeding of the
board of canvassers; and (3) determination of the authenticity and due execution of certificates of
canvass as provided in Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369.20
In the present case, Congress and the COMELEC en banc do not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the
PET and the SET. There is no conflict of jurisdiction since the powers of Congress and the COMELEC en
banc, on one hand, and the PET and the SET, on the other, are exercised on different occasions and for
different purposes. The PET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the President or Vice President. The SET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of members of the Senate. The jurisdiction of the PET and the SET
can only be invoked once the winning presidential, vice presidential or senatorial candidates have been
proclaimed. On the other hand, under Section 37, Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall determine
only the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass. Congress and the COMELEC en
banc shall exercise this power before the proclamation of the winning presidential, vice presidential,
and senatorial candidates.
Section 43 does not violate Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution
Both petitioner and the COMELEC argue that the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the "exclusive
power" to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of election laws. Petitioner and the COMELEC
allege that Section 43 is unconstitutional because it gives the other prosecuting arms of the government
concurrent power with the COMELEC to investigate and prosecute election offenses.21
We do not agree with petitioner and the COMELEC that the Constitution gave the COMELEC the
"exclusive power" to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of election laws.
Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to "investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting
election frauds, offenses, and malpractices." This was an important innovation introduced by the
Constitution because this provision was not in the 193522 or 197323 Constitutions.24 The phrase "[w]here
appropriate" leaves to the legislature the power to determine the kind of election offenses that the
COMELEC shall prosecute exclusively or concurrently with other prosecuting arms of the government.
The grant of the "exclusive power" to the COMELEC can be found in Section 265 of BP 881, which
provides:
Sec. 265. Prosecution. - The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the
exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code,
and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the
government: Provided, however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint
within four months from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or
with the Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted. (Emphasis supplied)

This was also an innovation introduced by BP 881. The history of election laws shows that prior to BP
881, no such "exclusive power" was ever bestowed on the COMELEC.25
We also note that while Section 265 of BP 881 vests in the COMELEC the "exclusive power" to conduct
preliminary investigations and prosecute election offenses, it likewise authorizes the COMELEC to avail
itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government. In the 1993 COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, the authority of the COMELEC was subsequently qualified and explained.26 The 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:
Rule 34 - Prosecution of Election Offenses
Sec. 1. Authority of the Commission to Prosecute Election Offenses. - The Commission shall have the
exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the
election laws and to prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided by law. (Emphasis
supplied)
It is clear that the grant of the "exclusive power" to investigate and prosecute election offenses to the
COMELEC was not by virtue of the Constitution but by BP 881, a legislative enactment. If the intention of
the framers of the Constitution were to give the COMELEC the "exclusive power" to investigate and
prosecute election offenses, the framers would have expressly so stated in the Constitution. They did
not.
In People v. Basilla,27 we acknowledged that without the assistance of provincial and city fiscals and their
assistants and staff members, and of the state prosecutors of the Department of Justice, the prompt and
fair investigation and prosecution of election offenses committed before or in the course of nationwide
elections would simply not be possible.28 In COMELEC v. Español,29 we also stated that enfeebled by lack
of funds and the magnitude of its workload, the COMELEC did not have a sufficient number of legal
officers to conduct such investigation and to prosecute such cases.30 The prompt investigation,
prosecution, and disposition of election offenses constitute an indispensable part of the task of securing
free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.31 Thus, given the plenary power of the legislature
to amend or repeal laws, if Congress passes a law amending Section 265 of BP 881, such law does not
violate the Constitution.
Section 34 does not violate Section 10, Article III of the Constitution
assails the constitutionality of the provision which fixes the per diem of poll watchers of the dominant
majority and dominant minority parties at ₱on election day. Petitioner argues that this violates the
freedom of the parties to contract and their right to fix the terms and conditions of the contract they see
as fair, equitable and just. Petitioner adds that this is a purely private contract using private funds which
cannot be regulated by law.
The OSG argues that petitioner erroneously invoked the non-impairment clause because this only applies
to previously perfected contracts. In this case, there is no perfected contact and, therefore, no obligation
will be impaired.
Both the COMELEC and the OSG argue that the law is a proper exercise of police power and it will prevail
over a contract. According to the COMELEC, poll watching is not just an ordinary contract but is an
agreement with the solemn duty to ensure the sanctity of votes. The role of poll watchers is vested with
138
public interest which can be regulated by Congress in the exercise of its police power. The OSG further
argues that the assurance that the poll watchers will receive fair and equitable compensation promotes
the general welfare. The OSG also states that this was a reasonable regulation considering that the
dominant majority and minority parties will secure a copy of the election returns and are given the right
to assign poll watchers inside the polling precincts.
There is no violation of the non-impairment clause. First, the non- impairment clause is limited in
application to laws that derogate from prior acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner
changing the intention of the parties.32 There is impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms of a
contract between the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws
remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties.33
As observed by the OSG, there is no existing contract yet and, therefore, no enforceable right or
demandable obligation will be impaired. RA 9369 was enacted more than three months prior to the 14
May 2007 elections. Hence, when the dominant majority and minority parties hired their respective poll
watchers for the 14 May 2007 elections, they were deemed to have incorporated in their contracts all
the provisions of RA 9369.
Second, it is settled that police power is superior to the non-impairment clause.34 The constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in
the interest of public health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the community.
Section 8 of COMELEC Resolution No. 140535 specifies the rights and duties of poll watchers:
The watchers shall have the right to stay in the space reserved for them inside the polling place. They
shall have the right to witness and inform themselves of the proceedings of the board; to take notes of
what they may see or hear, to take photographs of the proceedings and incidents, if any, during the
counting of votes, as well as the election returns, tally board and ballot boxes; to file a protest against
any irregularity or violation of law which they believe may have been committed by the board or by any
of its members or by any person; to obtain from the board a certificate as to the filing of such protest
and/or of the resolution thereon; to read the ballots after they shall have been read by the chairman, as
well as the election returns after they shall have been completed and signed by the members of the
board without touching them, but they shall not speak to any member of the board, or to any voter, or
among themselves, in such a manner as would disturb the proceedings of the board; and to be
furnished, upon request, with a certificate of votes for the candidates, duly signed and thumbmarked by
the chairman and all the members of the board of election inspectors.
Additionally, the poll watchers of the dominant majority and minority parties in a precinct shall, if
available, affix their signatures and thumbmarks on the election returns for that precinct.36 The
dominant majority and minority parties shall also be given a copy of the certificates of canvass37 and
election returns38 through their respective poll watchers. Clearly, poll watchers play an important role in
the elections.
Moreover, while the contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms, and conditions
as they may deem convenient, such stipulations should not be contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy.39
In Beltran v. Secretary of Health,40 we said:
 139

Furthermore, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the HELD:
police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State,
but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-being of the No. It is settled that every statute is presumed to be constitutional. The presumption isthat the
community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law. Those who petitionthe Court to declare a law
necessity.41 (Emphasis supplied)
unconstitutional must show that there is a clear anunequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a
doubtful, speculative or argumentative one. Otherwise, the petition must fail.
Therefore, assuming there were existing contracts, Section 34 would still be constitutional because the
law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to promote the general welfare of the Section 37 and 38 do not violateSection 17, Article VI. The COMELEC maintained that the amendments
people. We agree with the COMELEC that the role of poll watchers is invested with public interest. In
introducedby Section 37 pertained only to the adoption and application of the procedures on thepre-
fact, even petitioner concedes that poll watchers not only guard the votes of their respective candidates
or political parties but also ensure that all the votes are properly counted. Ultimately, poll watchers aid proclamation controversies. It did not provide Congress and the COMELEC "enbanc" may entertain pre-
in fair and honest elections. Poll watchers help ensure that the elections are transparent, credible, fair, proclamation cases for national elective posts.
and accurate. The regulation of the per diem of the poll watchers of the dominant majority and minority
parties promotes the general welfare of the community and is a valid exercise of police power.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

BANAT v. COMELEC

G.R. 177508 | August 7, 2009

FACTS:

Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) partylist petitioned in Court
for the constitutionality of RA 9369, enjoining respondentCommission on Elections (COMELEC) from
implementing the statute. RA 9369 is aconsolidation of Senate Bill No. 2231 and House Bill No.
5352.Petitioner also assailed the constutionality of Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 of the saidRepublic Act
and alleged that they were of questionable application and their validitywas doubtful.Petitioner raised
the issue whether RA 9369, RA 7166 as amended, being aconsolidation of Senate Bill No. 2231 and
House Bill No. 5352, violated Section 26(1)of Article VI of the Constitution which states that "Every bill
passed by the Congressshall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
BANATalso questioned the validity of Sections 37 and 38, whether or not it violated Section17 or Article
VI of the Constitution which specifies that the Senate and the House of Representatives should each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all election, returns, and qualification contests
relating to its Members.

Petitioner alleged that the title of RA 9369 is misleading because it speaks of pollautomation but
contains substantial provisions dealing with the manual canvassing of election returns. Petitioner also
alleged that Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 are neitherembraced in the title nor pertaining to the subject
matter of RA 9369.

ISSUE: Do Sections 37 and 38 of RA 7166 not violate Section 17, Article VI?

EN BANC
G.R. No. 199082 July 23, 2013
JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, Petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in her capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Justice; HON. SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., in his capacity as Chairperson of
the Commission on Elections; and the JOINT DOJ-COMELEC PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE
and FACT-FINDING TEAM, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PERALTA, J.:
For resolution are the separate motions for reconsideration filed by movants Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
(GMA)1 in G.R. No. 199118 and Jose Miguel T. Arroyo (Mike Arroyo )2 in G.R. No. 199082 praying that the
Court take a second look at our September 18, 2012 Decision3 dismissing their petitions and
supplemental petitions against respondents Commission on Elections (Comelec), the Department of
Justice (DOJ), Senator Aquilino M. Pimentel III (Senator Pimentel), Joint DOJ-Comelec Preliminary
Investigation Committee (Joint Committee) and DOJ-Comelec Fact-Finding Team (Fact-Finding Team), et
al.
For a better perspective, we briefly state the relevant factual and procedural antecedents as found by
the Court in the assailed decision, to wit:
On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting
a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team (referred to as Joint Panel) on the 2004 and 2007 National
Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases. The Joint Committee was mandated to conduct the
necessary preliminary investigation on the basis of the evidence gathered and the charges
recommended by the Fact-Finding Team. The Fact-Finding Team, on the other hand, was created for the
purpose of gathering real, documentary, and testimonial evidence which can be utilized in the
preliminary investigation to be conducted by the Joint Committee. Pursuant to Section 74 of the Joint
Order, on August 23, 2011, the Joint Committee promulgated its Rules of Procedure.
In its Initial Report5 dated October 20, 2011, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the
results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato, and
Maguindanao was indeed perpetrated.6 The Fact-Finding Team recommended, among others, that
petitioner Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. (Abalos) be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral
sabotage for conspiring to manipulate the election results in North and South Cotabato; that GMA and
Abalos be subjected to another preliminary investigation for manipulating the election results in
Maguindanao;7 and, that Mike Arroyo be subjected to further investigation.8 The case was docketed as
DOJ-Comelec Case No. 001-2011.
Meanwhile, on October 17, 2011, Senator Pimentel filed a ComplaintAffidavit9 for Electoral Sabotage
against petitioners and twelve others, and several John Does and Jane Does. The case was docketed as
DOJ-Comelec Case No. 002-2011.
140
On October 24, 2011, the Joint Committee issued two subpoenas against petitioners in DOJ-Comelec
Case Nos. 001-2011 and 002-2011.10 On November 3, 2011, petitioners, through counsel, appeared
before the Joint Committee11 and respondents therein were ordered to submit their Counter-Affidavits
by November 14, 2011.12
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the Court separate Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
assailing the creation of the Joint Panel.13 The petitions were eventually consolidated.
On November 14, 2011, Mike Arroyo filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings14 before the Joint Committee,
in view of the pendency of his petition before the Court. On the same day, GMA filed before the Joint
Committee an Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam15 to require Senator Pimentel to furnish her with
documents referred to in his complaint-affidavit and for the production of election documents as basis
for the charge of electoral sabotage. GMA prayed that she be allowed to file her counter-affidavit within
ten (10) days from receipt of the requested documents.16Petitioner Abalos, for his part, filed a Motion to
Suspend Proceedings (Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam),17 in view of the pendency of his petition brought
before the Court.
In an Order18 dated November 15, 2011, the Joint Committee denied the aforesaid motions of
petitioners. GMA, subsequently, filed a motion for reconsideration.19
On November 16, 2011, the Joint Committee promulgated a Joint Resolution which was later indorsed to
the Comelec.20 On November 18, 2011, the Comelec en banc issued a Resolution21 approving and
adopting the Joint Resolution subject to modifications. The Comelec resolved, among others, that an
information for electoral sabotage be filed against GMA and Abalos, while the charges against Mike
Arroyo be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
On even date, pursuant to the above Resolution, the Comelec’s Law Department filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Pasay City, an Information against petitioner GMA, Governor Andal Ampatuan, Sr., and
Atty. Lintang H. Bedol, for violation of Section 42(b)(3) of Republic Act (RA) No. 9369, amending Section
27 (b) of RA 6646, docketed as Criminal Case No. RPSY-11-04432-CR.22 The case was raffled to Branch
112 and the corresponding Warrant of Arrest was issued which was served on GMA on the same day.23
On November 18, 2011, GMA filed with the RTC an Urgent Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam24 with leave to
allow the Joint Committee to resolve the motion for reconsideration filed by GMA, to defer issuance of a
warrant of arrest and a hold departure order, and to proceed to judicial determination of probable
cause. She, likewise, filed with the Comelec a Motion to Vacate Ad Cautelam25 praying that its Resolution
be vacated for being null and void. The RTC, nonetheless, issued a Warrant for her arrest which was duly
served. GMA was later arraigned and she entered a plea of "not guilty." She was, for some time, on
hospital arrest but was able to obtain temporary liberty when her motion for bail was granted. At
present, she is again on hospital arrest by virtue of a warrant issued in another criminal case.
On September 18, 2012, the Court rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions and supplemental petitions are DISMISSED. Comelec
Resolution No. 9266 dated August 2, 2011, Joint Order No. 001-2011 dated August 15, 2011, and the
Fact- Finding Team’s Initial Report dated October 20, 2011, are declared VALID. However, the Rules of
Procedure on the Conduct of Preliminary Investigation on the Alleged Election Fraud in the 2004 and
2007 National Elections is declared INEFFECTIVE for lack of publication.

In view of the constitutionality of the Joint Panel and the proceedings having been conducted in
accordance with Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure, the conduct of the preliminary investigation is hereby declared VALID.
Let the proceedings in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 112, where the criminal cases for
electoral sabotage against petitioners GMA and Abalos are pending, proceed with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.26
Hence, these motions for reconsideration.
Issues
Mike Arroyo reiterates his arguments on the independence of the Comelec as basis in nullifying the
subject joint DOJ-Comelec resolutions. Echoing Justice Arturo Brion in his Dissenting and Concurring
Opinion,27 Mike Arroyo insists that the creation of the Joint Panel undermines the decisional
independence of the Comelec.28
Mike Arroyo also maintains that the DOJ should conduct preliminary investigation only when deputized
by the Comelec but not exercise concurrent jurisdiction.29 Finally, as has been repeatedly pointed out in
his earlier pleadings before the Court, Mike Arroyo claims that the proceedings involving the electoral
sabotage case were rushed because of pressures from the executive branch of the government.30
For her part, GMA claims that in availing of the procedural remedies available, she merely exercised her
earnest efforts to defend herself and should not have been deemed by the Court as acts which
purportedly tend to demonstrate that she either waived or forfeited her right to submit her counter-
affidavit and countervailing evidence.31 Citing several cases decided by the Court, she likewise faults the
Court in not upholding her right to ask for additional time within which to submit her counter-affidavit
and countervailing evidence.32 GMA highlights that the subject Comelec Resolution creating the Joint
Panel is different from the previous Comelec resolutions requesting the DOJ Secretary to assign
prosecutors to assist the Comelec, as the latter emphasize the role of the DOJ as deputized agency in the
conduct of preliminary investigation. She maintains that it is the Comelec and not the Joint Committee
that has the primary, if not exclusive, authority to conduct preliminary investigation of election cases.33
In their Consolidated Comment,34 respondents defend the creation of the Joint Committee and argue
that it does not undermine the independence of the Comelec as a constitutional body because it is still
the Comelec that ultimately determines probable cause.35 As to the conduct of the preliminary
investigation, respondents maintain that no rights were violated as GMA was afforded the opportunity
to defend herself, submit her counter-affidavit and other countervailing evidence.36 They, thus, consider
GMA’s claim of availing of the remedial measures as "delaying tactics" employed to thwart the
investigation of charges against her by the Joint Committee.37
The Court’s Ruling
Clearly from the above discussion, movants raise issues that have been thoroughly explained by the
Court in the assailed decision. The issues were all addressed and the explanation was exhaustive, thus,
we find no reason to disturb the Court’s conclusions.
141
At any rate, if only to address the motions of the movants herein and to put an end to the questions
attached to the creation of the Joint Panel and, consequently, to the performance of their assigned tasks,
we hereby reiterate our findings and conclusions made in the assailed decision.
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with the issue of whether the Comelec has the
exclusive power to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of election laws. In Barangay Association
for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party-List v. Commission on Elections,38 the
constitutionality of Section 4339 of RA 936940 had already been raised by petitioners therein and
addressed by the Court. While recognizing the Comelec’s exclusive power to investigate and prosecute
cases under Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 or the Omnibus Election Code, the Court pointed out that the
framers of the 1987 Constitution did not have such intention. This exclusivity is thus a legislative
enactment that can very well be amended by Section 43 of RA 9369. Therefore, under the present law,
the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the government, such as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent
jurisdiction in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses.
Indeed, as aptly pointed out by GMA, there is a discrepancy between Comelec Resolution No.
346741 dated January 12, 2001 and Joint Order No. 001-2011, dated August 15, 2011, creating and
constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral
fraud and manipulation cases. However, GMA seemed to miss the date when these two resolutions were
promulgated by the Comelec. It is noteworthy that Comelec Resolution No. 3467 was issued when
Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code was still effective, while Joint Order No. 001-2011 as well as
Comelec Resolution Nos. 873342 and 905743 mentioned in the assailed decision but missed out by GMA in
her motion, were issued during the effectivity of Section 43 of RA 9369, giving the Comelec and other
prosecuting arms of the government the concurrent jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election
offenses. This amendment paved the way for the discrepancy. In Comelec Resolution No. 3467, the
Comelec maintained the continuing deputation of prosecutors and the Comelec Law Department was
tasked to supervise the investigatory and prosecutory functions of the task force pursuant to the
mandate of the Omnibus Election Code. However, with the amendment, the Comelec likewise changed
the tenor of the later resolutions to reflect the new mandate of the Comelec and other prosecuting arms
of the government now exercising concurrent jurisdiction. Thus, the Comelec Law Department and the
Office of the Chief State Prosecutor of the DOJ were tasked to jointly supervise the investigatory and
prosecutory functions of the Comelec-DOJ Task Force. Considering, therefore, that the later resolutions,
including Joint Order No. 001-2011, were issued pursuant to Section 43 of RA 9369 amending Section
265 of BP 881 which was declared "constitutional" in Banat, there is no reason for us to declare
otherwise. To maintain the previous role of other prosecuting arms of the government as mere deputies
despite the amendment would mean challenging Section 43 of RA 9369 anew which has already been
settled in Banat.
To be sure, the creation of a Joint Committee is not repugnant to the concept of "concurrent
jurisdiction" authorized by the amendatory law. As we explained in our September 18, 2012 Decision:
x x x The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject
matter. Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, there is no prohibition on simultaneous exercise of
power between two coordinate bodies. What is prohibited is the situation where one files a complaint
against a respondent initially with one office (such as the Comelec) for preliminary investigation which
was immediately acted upon by said office and the re-filing of substantially the same complaint with
another office (such as the DOJ). The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the second office over the
cases filed will not be allowed. Indeed, it is a settled rule that the body or agency that first takes
cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.

None of these problems would likely arise in the present case. The Comelec and the DOJ themselves
agreed that they would exercise their concurrent jurisdiction jointly. Although the preliminary
investigation was conducted on the basis of two complaints – the initial report of the Fact-Finding Team
and the complaint of Senator Pimentel – both complaints were filed with the Joint Committee.
Consequently, the complaints were filed with and the preliminary investigation was conducted by only
one investigative body. Thus, we find no reason to disallow the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction jointly
by those given such authority. This is especially true in this case given the magnitude of the crimes
allegedly committed by petitioners. The joint preliminary investigation also serves to maximize the
resources and manpower of both the Comelec and the DOJ for the prompt disposition of the cases.44
Notwithstanding the grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the Comelec and the DOJ nevertheless included a
provision in the assailed Joint Order whereby the resolutions of the Joint Committee finding probable
cause for election offenses shall still be approved by the Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules
of Procedure.45 With more reason, therefore, that we cannot consider the creation of the Joint
Committee as an abdication of the Comelec’s independence enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.
Finally, we focus on the validity of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Joint Committee.
The procedure in conducting the preliminary investigation is governed by Rule 112 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure and Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Under both Rules,46 the
respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting documents
relied upon for his defense, within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena, with the complaint and
supporting affidavits and documents.47 Also in both Rules, respondent is given the right to examine
evidence, but such right of examination is limited only to the documents or evidence submitted by
complainants which she may not have been furnished and to copy them at her expense.48
As to the alleged denial of GMA’s right to examine documents, we maintain that no right was violated in
view of the limitation of such right as set forth above. We reiterate our explanation in the assailed
decision, to wit:
While it is true that Senator Pimentel referred to certain election documents which served as bases in
the allegations of significant findings specific to the protested municipalities involved, there were no
annexes or attachments to the complaint filed. As stated in the Joint Committee’s Order dated
November 15, 2011 denying GMA’s Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam, Senator Pimentel was ordered to
furnish petitioners with all the supporting evidence. However, Senator Pimentel manifested that he was
adopting all the affidavits attached to the Fact-Finding Team’s Initial Report. Therefore, when GMA was
furnished with the documents attached to the Initial Report, she was already granted the right to
examine as guaranteed by the Comelec Rules of Procedure and the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Those
were the only documents submitted by the complainants to the Committee. If there are other
documents that were referred to in Senator Pimentel’s complaint but were not submitted to the Joint
Committee, the latter considered those documents unnecessary at that point (without foreclosing the
relevance of other evidence that may later be presented during the trial) as the evidence submitted
before it were considered adequate to find probable cause against her. x x x491âwphi1
Neither was GMA’s right violated when her motion for extension of time within which to submit her
counter-affidavit and countervailing evidence was consequently denied. The Rules use the term "shall" in
requiring the respondent to submit counter-affidavit and other countervailing evidence within ten (10)
days from receipt of the subpoena. It is settled that the use of the word "shall" which is a word of
command, underscores the mandatory character of the rule.50 As in any other rule, though, liberality in
142
the application may be allowed provided that the party is able to present a compelling justification for
the non-observance of the mandatory rules. In the 2008 Revised Manual for Prosecutors, investigating
prosecutors allow or grant motions or requests for extension of time to submit counter-affidavits when
the interest of justice demands that respondent be given reasonable time or sufficient opportunity to
engage the services of counsel; examine voluminous records submitted in support of the complaint or
undertake research on novel, complicated or technical questions or issues of law and facts of the case.51
In this case, GMA claimed that she could not submit her counteraffidavit within the prescribed period
because she needed to examine documents mentioned in Senator Pimentel’s complaint-affidavit. It
appeared, however, that said documents were not submitted to the Joint Committee and the only
supporting documents available were those attached to the Initial Report of the Fact-Finding Team.
Admittedly, GMA was furnished those documents. Thus, at the time she asked for the extension of time
within which to file her counter-affidavit, she very well knew that the documents she was asking were
not in the record of the case. Obviously, she was not furnished those documents because they were not
submitted to the Joint Committee. Logically, she has no right to examine said documents. We cannot,
therefore, fault the Joint Committee in consequently denying her motion for extension to file counter-
affidavit as there was no compelling justification for the non-observance of the period she was earlier
required to follow.
And as we held in the assailed decision:
There might have been overzealousness on the part of the Joint Committee in terminating the
investigation, endorsing the Joint Resolution to the Comelec for approval, and in filing the information in
court.
However, speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasijudicial officer cannot per se be
instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of functions. The orderly administration of justice
remains the paramount consideration with particular regard to the peculiar circumstances of each case.
To be sure, petitioners were given the opportunity to present countervailing evidence. Instead of
complying with the Joint Committee’s directive, several motions were filed but were denied by the Joint
Committee. Consequently, petitioners’ right to submit counter-affidavit and countervailing evidence was
forfeited. Taking into account the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases and following the
procedures set forth in the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the Comelec Rules of Procedure, the Joint
Committee finally reached its conclusion and referred the case to the Comelec. The latter, in turn,
performed its task and filed the information in court. Indeed, petitioners were given the opportunity to
be heard. They even actively participated in the proceedings and in fact filed several motions before the
Joint Committee. Consistent with the constitutional mandate of speedy disposition of cases, unnecessary
delays should be avoided.52
Finally, in our assailed decision, we already took judicial notice that not only did GMA enter a plea of
"not guilty," she also filed a Motion for Bail and after due hearing, it was granted. Apparently, she
benefited from the RTC Order giving her temporary liberty. In filing the motion before the RTC and
actively participating therein, she has chosen to seek judicial remedy before the RTC where the electoral
sabotage case is pending instead of the executive remedy of going back to the Joint Committee for the
submission of her counter-affidavit and countervailing evidence. Besides, as thoroughly discussed in the
assailed decision, the irregularity or even the absence of preliminary investigation does not impair the
validity of the information filed against her.
 143

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motions for Reconsideration are DENIED for lack of merit. SO where one files a complaint against a respondent initially with one office (such as the Comelec) for
ORDERED. preliminary investigation which was immediately acted upon by said office and the re-filing of
substantially the same complaint with another office (such as the DOJ). The subsequent assumption of
jurisdiction by the second office over the cases filed will not be allowed. Indeed, it is a settled rule that
NATURE:
the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion
of the others.
These are separate motions for reconsideration filed by movants Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in G.R. No.
199118 and Jose Miguel T. Arroyo in G.R. No. 199082 praying that the Court take a second look at our
FALLO: petition is denied
September 18, 2012 Decision3 dismissing their petitions and supplemental petitions against respondents
Commission on Elections (Comelec), the Department of Justice (DOJ), Senator Aquilino M. Pimentel III
(Senator Pimentel), Joint DOJ-Comelec Preliminary Investigation Committee (Joint Committee) and DOJ-
Comelec Fact-Finding Team (Fact-Finding Team), et al.

FACTS:

On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued a Joint Order creating and constituting a Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and
manipulation cases
In its Initial Report of the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14,
2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato, and Maguindanao was indeed
perpetrated. It recommended that Petitioner Benjamin S. Abalos, GMA, and Mike Arroyo be subjected to
preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage and manipulating the election results.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the Court separate Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
assailing the creation of the Joint Panel.
On September 18, 2012, the Court rendered the assailed Decision. It ruled that:

1. Fact- Finding Team’s Initial Report dated October 20, 2011, are declared VALID. However, the Rules of
Procedure on the Conduct of Preliminary Investigation on the Alleged Election Fraud in the 2004 and
2007 National Elections is declared INEFFECTIVE for lack of publication.

2. The Joint Panel and the proceedings having been conducted in accordance with Rule 112 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure and Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, the conduct of the preliminary
investigation is hereby declared VALID.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the creation of the Joint Panel undermines the decisional independence of the Comelec.
2. Whether or not the DOJ should conduct preliminary investigation only when deputized by the Comelec
but not exercise concurrent jurisdiction

HELD:

1. The grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the Comelec and the DOJ nevertheless included a provision in the
assailed Joint Order whereby the resolutions of the Joint Committee finding probable cause for election
offenses shall still be approved by the Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules of
Procedure.45 With more reason, therefore, that we the the court cannot consider the creation of the
Joint Committee as an abdication of the Comelec’s independence enshrined in the 1987 Constitution

2. The creation of a Joint Committee is not repugnant to the concept of "concurrent jurisdiction" authorized
by the amendatory law The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the
same subject matter. Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, there is no prohibition on
simultaneous exercise of power between two coordinate bodies. What is prohibited is the situation