Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Armenia’s Future,
Relations with Turkey,
and the Karabagh
Conflict
Edited by Arman Grigoryan
Levon Ter-Petrossian Edited by
Armenian National Congress Arman Grigoryan
Armenia, Armenia Department of International Relations
Lehigh University
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania
USA
Arman Grigoryan
v
CONTENTS
vii
viii CONTENTS
Appendix 153
Bibliography 169
Index 171
CHAPTER 1
in the hands of Turks and their ethnic kin—the Azeris. Armenians, in fact, did
not even distinguish between Turks and Azeris, he further explains, and saw
the problem of Karabagh as part of a larger existential conflict with the
“Turks.” The genocide committed by Turks was seen by them as a warning
for what was in store for Karabagh Armenians. He also tells the readers about
the Armenian mythology of Christian martyrdom dating all the way back to a
sanctified fifth-century battle, which Armenians fought against Sassanid Iran as
they resisted the latter’s attempt to convert Armenians to Zoroastrianism. The
subsequent history of a subjugated Christian minority in various Islamic states
cemented the Armenian self-image of Christian martyrs. Kaufman insists that
the combination of hatreds, fears, and a sense of a righteous mission that this
narrative generated led to the bloodshed in Karabagh.5
Michael Croissant hits on all the same points and more—the importance
of the unique religious identity in the Armenian nationalist narrative, the
suffering as Christian subjects of Islamic empires, and especially at the hands
of Turks, the gaze toward Russia as a Christian savior, Armenian claims to
historic rights over Karabagh as the indigenous group in the region, the
Armenian contempt for Azeris, and, last, but not least, the overwhelming,
existential fear of Pan-Turkism combined with a desire to correct historic
wrongs ostensibly committed in the name of that doctrine.6 The conflict in
Karabagh was almost inevitable, given this narrative, or so argues Croissant.7
In an otherwise well-informed and intelligent book, which, in fact, is the
book of reference on the Karabagh conflict, Thomas de Waal writes along
similar lines:
A . . . more crucial factor in starting the [Karabagh] conflict was the ease with
which hatred of the other side could be disseminated among the population.
The Turkish historian Halil Berktay calls these mass expressions of fear and
prejudice “hate narratives.” They were the dark side of the “renaissance” of the
1960s. . . Armenian and Azerbaijani academics had been denigrating the claims
of rival scholars others’ republic for twenty years. In 1988, all that was needed
was injection of politics—of full-strength “alcohol”—into the mixture. In a war
of pamphlets, drawing on years of tendentious scholarship, sarcasm, and innu-
endo, and selective quotation incited ordinary people into hatred.8
This general outlook pervades the media coverage as well. For example,
it is difficult to find a reference to the Karabagh conflict in the New York
Times that fails to call it a conflict between “Christian Armenians and
4 1 FOREWORD: THE STRUGGLE TO CHANGE THE LOGIC OF. . .
that Armenia and Karabagh needed to settle the conflict with Azerbaijan as
urgently as ever. Even though such advocacy was politically costly,18 he kept
it as one of the central items of his agenda both as a candidate for the
presidency in 2008 and as the leader of the opposition afterward. That
advocacy culminated in a particularly important and lengthy speech on
December 17, 2016, which was delivered at a meeting of the ANC in
preparation for the parliamentary elections set for April 2, 2017 (Chap. 7,
document 3). Ter-Petrossian argued that peace and reconciliation with
Azerbaijan should become the centerpiece of the ANC’s electoral platform
and that not only the conflict should be settled though compromise but also
Armenian and Azerbaijani societies should undergo a deeper process of
reconciliation. In an important gesture to further that cause, Ter-Petrossian
expressed “equal sorrow” for the suffering the conflict had inflicted on both
peoples.
Ter-Petrossian has insisted throughout his career that peaceful and good-
neighborly relations with the neighbors have no alternative, given the
realities of power and resource constraints. Seeing him only as a realist
driven by pragmatic calculations of power is too limiting, however. It
obscures too much of what Armenian politics has been about since the
country became independent. Specifically, Ter-Petrossian and his sup-
porters have regarded peaceful and good-neighborly relations with the
neighbors not only as fundamental for Armenia’s security and economic
development but also essential if Armenia was to develop as a “normal
state.” Such a state would be tasked to protect its citizens from external
and internal predation, provide basic services and infrastructure, provide
welfare to its vulnerable citizens, and do not much else. It would have no
totalizing ideology or a mission. Its policies would reflect the preferences of
its citizens, whatever they are. “Normal,” in other words, meant “liberal.”
All of this may sound trivial to a Western reader, because liberalism as a
philosophy of governance is not seriously contested in any Western society.
Adherence to such a philosophy was not a trivial matter in Armenia. It was
and remains bitterly contested. The traditional narrative, which I described
earlier in the text, implied a very different kind of state from the one the
ANM aspired to build. The proponents of that narrative were also joined by
those who expressed explicit contempt for the idea of building a “normal
state,” calling instead for a state bound by “national ideology”—a kind of
state that would have a special mission, a kind of state that would not allow
its mission to be determined by the mundane and vulgar preferences of the
public, and certainly a kind of state that would be inspired by the aspiration
of correcting historical wrongs. Its chief proponent—Vazgen Manoukyan,
NOTES 9
NOTES
1. The conflict was over the status of a region called Nagorno Karabagh, which
had an Armenian majority (79 percent), but was part of Azerbaijan as an
autonomous district (oblast) during the Soviet period. In 1988, exercising a
right granted by the Soviet constitution, Karabagh Armenians demanded a
transfer of their region from Azerbaijani to Armenian jurisdiction, which
produced mass movements both in Armenia and Azerbaijan and a conflict
between them. The conflict escalated to war in 1991 as the Soviet Union
started crumbling. In 1994, a ceasefire was signed with Armenians in full
military control of Karabagh and seven adjacent Azerbaijani districts. Parties
have been negotiating a permanent political settlement ever since without
success. They came closest in 1997–1998 when Ter-Petrossian endorsed a
plan brokered by Russia, the USA, and France, but powerful members of his
government opposed the plan. Unable to overcome their resistance, Ter-
Petrossian resigned in February 1998.
2. It was called the Karabagh movement after it erupted in February 1988 and
before it was officially renamed the Armenian National Movement in 1989.
3. Ter-Petrossian had a distinguished academic career prior to getting involved
in politics. He was a senior researcher in one of the most important academic
institutions in Armenia—the Museum of Ancient Manuscripts —when he
10 1 FOREWORD: THE STRUGGLE TO CHANGE THE LOGIC OF. . .
After the doors were opened to political pluralism in the Soviet Union, the
ARF reestablished its presence in Armenia in 1990.
15. Armenian Cause was born as the Armenian Question after the Russian-
Turkish War of 1877–1878. Initially it described the politics of reforms in
the Armenian populated areas of the Ottoman Empire under the supervi-
sion, and sometimes the pressure, of European great powers. When the
problem vanished from the international agenda following the Treaty of
Lausanne in 1923, the Armenian Question acquired a new meaning in the
Armenian diaspora and was rebranded as the Armenian Cause. Establishing
sovereignty over historic Armenia, which includes the territories where
Armenians were exterminated during WWI, forms the basis of that ideology.
16. The process was launched by the Armenian president Serge Sargsyan, who
published an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal (“We Are Ready to Talk to
Turkey,” July 9, 2008) and invited his Turkish counterpart to Armenia to
watch a match between the Armenian and Turkish national teams together.
The invitation was not only to watch a soccer match, of course, but to
attempt to restart a dialogue about normalizing the relations between the
two countries. The process culminated in the signing of protocols regarding
the establishment of diplomatic relations in 2011, but the Turkish side
reverted to the position that the normalization of Turkish-Armenian rela-
tions could only happen after the resolution of the Karabagh conflict and
refused to ratify the protocols.
17. See de Waal, Black Garden, ch. 8; Melander, “The Nagorno Karabagh
Conflict Revisited,” pp. 69–70.
18. It was costly, because positions had continued to harden in both Armenia
and Karabagh, not the least because of the relentless nationalist propaganda
during the decade following Ter-Petrossian’s resignation, which had not
been challenged by anybody.
19. Gerard J. Libaridian, Armenia at the Crossroads: Democracy and Nationhood
in the Post-Soviet Era (Watertown, MA: Blue Crane Books, 1991), p. 46.
20. Vazgen Manoukyan, “We Are a Global Nation,” Hayastani Hanrapetutyun
[Republic of Armenia] [in Armenian], December 16, 1990.
CHAPTER 2
As an ideology, Pan-Turkism was born during the First World War and at
the present has lost its value as a political factor, since Turkic-speaking
peoples have opted for the path of national development. Calls to crusade
against Pan-Turanism and Pan-Islamism are bound to again make Armenia
a political tool and turn it into a target for both.2
The Karabagh Committee, leading the popular movement for over a
year, has rejected from the start the dangerous mentality of seeing Pan-
Turkism as a permanent threat and placing our hopes on an external
savior. The Committee has consistently worked to act according to the
principle that the Armenian people can achieve their national goals by
relying on themselves, and only themselves. This political path has
already produced obvious positive results by moving the Artsakh3 issue
from the denial to the solution stage. Because of its just constitutional
struggle, the Armenian people have made a number of allies within the
international community: in Moscow, in Leningrad, in the Baltic repub-
lics, and among democratic movements elsewhere. That is the result of
the appreciation for the substantial contribution of the national move-
ment in Armenia to the process of democratization of the Soviet Union,
but it is also the best guarantee for the just solution of the problem of
Artsakh, which we should cherish above all else. Conscious of this reality,
certain forces are trying to drive the problem of Artsakh into a deadlock
and to that end they are plotting a conspiracy against our people, and
some Armenian intellectuals are participating in it wittingly or
unwittingly.
Focusing on Pan-Turkism and raising the issue of the Armenian terri-
tories occupied by Turkey at this juncture serves only one purpose: to
portray Armenians as revanchists, to discredit the just cause of Artsakh,
and to deny the Armenian people the support of its allies.
For that reason, the Karabagh Committee condemns, in the harshest
terms, the periodic attempts to turn the Armenian question into a cheap
card in the game of international relations. We are convinced that the
only available path to achieve our national goals is to guarantee the
permanence of the democratization of the country and the unity of the
Armenian people according the principles articulated by the Armenian
National Movement. We are convinced that had the ANM been formally
recognized in time and a mechanism created for the dialogue between
the leaders of the republic and the representatives of the people, we
would have avoided the political recklessness, which this statement
champions.
2 HOW SHOULD WE THINK ABOUT OUR RELATIONS WITH OUR NEIGHBORS? 15
been taken in that direction. Indicative of those steps are Yeltsin’s letter to
me and my letter to Yeltsin. They establish a baseline for certain actions and
demonstrate understanding that the interests of our republics, of our peo-
ples should not be subordinated to those of the empire.
Excerpt from a speech delivered at the Armenian Supreme Soviet (22 October,
1990)6
. . . And finally, the fifth and the most important guarantee, which is essential
for the normal functioning of any state, is our relations with our immediate
neighbors—Iran and Turkey. These relations should be built on a pragmatic
understanding of what the Armenian people want and need. This issue has
become subject to political distortion, but rational actors understand the
imperative very well. And it is the authorities of Armenia that must design
and implement this policy. I am convinced that Armenian society, which has
reached a high level of political maturity, is capable of distinguishing mean-
ingful political goals from ideas that are the product of political distortion.
The people of Armenia should aim to make our republic into a self-
governing entity both politically and economically—one that can take
maximum advantage of the propitious circumstances and withstand the polit-
ical and economic challenges of our era. It is high time to draw serious lessons
from our bitter history, to abandon the identity of an emotional, romantic
nation, and to become a rational, realistic, and pragmatic one, which takes
every step on the basis of a well thought out and careful calculation.
Flexible diplomacy and the ability to maneuver should become the most
important political weapons we possess. We must monitor the relations of
our political partners and adversaries carefully and be able to take advantage
of the smallest disagreements among them. We must, therefore, altogether
reject pompous and unserious rhetoric, which unnecessarily antagonizes
our political partners and opponents, produces no political results, and
only causes disillusionment among our people.
Politics is a system, not a simple sum of random actions. Therefore, no
elected government that is implementing its own political program can
afford to appease peripheral pressures and veer off its main course.
A systematically developed political strategy can only be confronted with a
4 REJECTING FANTASIES AND NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH TURKEY 17
history. The Russian army evacuated Western Armenia during World War I
after a victorious campaign against Turkey. That happened in 1918.
We realize that we cannot, in such a short time, create a modern and
strong economy that would allow us to face all probably threats by our-
selves. For that reason alone, all the talk about “Armenian expansionism” is
pure idle speculation. The main guarantee of our security, as for any state, is
the normalization of relations with our neighbors. Consequently, we have
expressed our desire to establish mutually beneficial bilateral relations with
Turkey. The ambassador of that country visited Armenia. There are more
than a few complications we need to overcome, but what deserves emphasis
is the fact that the two peoples have begun the process of establishing
relations. We have already received verbal assurances that there will be
no political preconditions for establishing and developing economic and
cultural ties. Those ties, in fact, will create favorable conditions for the
resolution of political problems.
NOTES
1. This document was read in the Armenian Supreme Soviet on 24 June, 1989. An
earlier translation of it was published in Gerard J. Libaridian, ed., Armenia at the
Crossroads: Democracy and Nationhood in the Post-Soviet Era (Watertown, MA:
Blue Crane Books, 1991), pp. 155–156. It was issued in response to a speech in
the Armenian Supreme Soviet by Zory Balayan, who was a prominent intel-
lectual and activist, and who subscribed to the traditional Armenian nation-
alist narrative. In that speech, he reiterated some of the most important
postulates of that narrative: (1) Turkey and Azerbaijan are inspired by the
Pan-Turkist (or Pan-Turanist, which is a term used interchangeably with
Pan-Turkist) doctrine of political unification of Turkic-speaking peoples;
(2) the existence of Armenians in the Caucasus is an impediment on the
path of realization of that goal, hence that doctrine implies the extermination
of Armenians; (3) only Russian protection can stave off that threat; (4) Russia
and Armenia have a common interest in fighting Pan-Turkism, because the
idea of political unification of Turkic-speaking peoples threatens the stability
and integrity of the Soviet Union; (5) Moscow should support the Armenian
claims over Karabagh, because of that common interest; (6) Moscow should
similarly support Armenian claims over the territories of historic Armenia,
which are under Turkish control. See, Zory Balayan, “The Threat of Pan-
Turanism,” in Libaridian, ed., Armenia at the Crossroads, pp. 151–154.
2. Some proponents of the traditional nationalist narrative argued that Armenians
had been victimized not just by Turks, but by Muslims in general, as they had
NOTES 21
The strategy being worked out with regard to our relations with Iran and
Turkey is familiar to you in its basic contours. The current Armenian
administration has adopted the position that the guarantee of the survival
of any country rests in its ability to establish normal relations with its
neighbors. That is the cornerstone of our foreign policy. We cannot create
a security system that is based on reliance on powerful but distant actors like
Russia, Europe or the United States. We must strive to solve our problems
locally, with our immediate neighbors.
The relations with Iran present no complications. On the contrary, the
parties have common interests, in addition to not having any historical
disagreements, which helps facilitate the development of Armenian-Iranian
relations. I should express my satisfaction with the pace of development of
relations with Iran, which has accelerated recently, and we will soon enjoy
the benefits of that process.
There is no question that the process of establishing relations with
Turkey is more complicated, although, as mentioned earlier, we have
Europe)2 and during the last visit of the Turkish ambassador Volkan Vural.
This is also quite natural and easy for us to explain. I was compelled to be
very frank and to tell the ambassador the following: “You are trying to take
advantage of the existing situation. Seeing that the system guaranteeing the
security of post-Soviet republics is very shaky, you are trying to extract
certain statements from us.” I tried to explain to him that this was not a
realistic approach and that its ultimate consequence would be to torpedo
the process of normalizing Armenian-Turkish relations, and that this would
not be in the interests of either Turkey or Armenia. A proposal was made to
the ambassador to establish diplomatic relations on the basis of existing
international norms. Since both states are members of important interna-
tional organizations like the CSCE or the UN, they must build their
relations on the basis of the principles enshrined in the doctrines of these
organizations, putting aside the bilateral Armenian-Turkish agreements for
the time being. Clearly, those political issues deserve to be discussed, but
only in the second phase of our relationship, following the establishment of
diplomatic, economic, and commercial ties. We will discuss all the contro-
versial and thorny issues then, and I am sure the interests of both our states
will force us to find compromises and solutions acceptable to both parties.
Excerpt from a speech delivered at the 5th Congress of the Armenian National
Movement7
Mr. Chairman,
Honorable Guests,
Armenians are commemorating the 80th anniversary of their national
tragedy and bow their heads to the sacred memory of the 1.5 million
28 3 ARMENIAN-TURKISH RELATIONS AFTER INDEPENDENCE AND THE. . .
martyrs. In so doing, the Armenians assert yet again their unbreakable will
to live and their determination to take their rightful place among the
family of nations.
We see this International Conference, held in the capital of Armenia, first
as an expression of respect to the memory of the victims of the genocide;
and second, as a gesture of friendship toward our new and independent
statehood.
Deeply appreciative of your professionalism and competence, I would
not dare enter the depths of the complex issues related to the historical and
legal aspects of the Armenian genocide. I merely wish to register some well-
known facts that I consider central to the formation of contemporary
Armenian political consciousness. In view of the necessity to subject history
to rational analysis and thereby avoid the mistakes of the past, I believe it is
time to assess the facts with sound judgment and to set aside sentimental
approaches and conditioned responses.
We have laid out our position on this question many times before. One
could even say, everything has already been said. We do not have any
barriers. We are ready today to establish serious economic and commercial
ties with Turkey, to open the borders, to make our roads available as transit
for Turkish commerce. It seems like Turkey agrees with all of that, but it has
created a trap for itself, which it cannot escape, since it has made the
normalization of its relations with Armenia conditional on the normaliza-
tion of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, and particularly on the resolution of
the Karabagh conflict. We tried to persuade them to separate Armenian-
Turkish relations from Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, but we failed.
Maybe it was our fault; we did not do an adequate job of explaining. Be
that as it may, I really think that Turkey should be interested in building
friendly relations with Armenia if it wants to contribute to the resolution of
the Karabagh problem, which it has essentially made a precondition for the
establishment of relations. It is my firm conviction, in fact, that Turkey
would have had an easier time reaching this goal if it had established
relations with Armenia. Had it done so, it would have contributed to the
peaceful resolution of the Karabagh conflict.
NOTES
1. Republic of Armenia, 2 April, 1992; Ter-Petrossian, Selected Articles,
Speeches, and Interviews, pp. 273–290.
2. It was later renamed to Organization of Security and Cooperation in
Europe.
3. Republic of Armenia, 14 November, 1992; Ter-Petrossian, Selected Articles,
Speeches, and Interviews, pp. 316–318.
4. In the spring of 1992 the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia Raffi
Hovannisian delivered a speech in Istanbul, which diverged from the official
foreign policy line of the Republic of Armenia on Turkey. He was removed
from his post as a consequence of that speech.
5. The wheat was delivered successfully, and several months later the Turkish
railroad was used to transport 30,000 tons of wheat, which was an aid from
the European Union.
6. Margara is a bridge on the Arax River connecting the Armavir Province of
Armenia with the Turkish province of Agri.
7. Republic of Armenia, 28 June, 1993; Ter-Petrossian, Selected Articles,
Speeches, and Interviews, pp. 381–382.
8. Aram Manoukyan was the interim head of the government of Armenia in
1918.
9. Pood is a Russian unit of measuring weight equivalent to 16.38 kilograms.
10. Khalil Pasha was a general in the Ottoman Army, who had committed
numerous crimes against Armenians in 1915–1918.
11. Ter-Petrossian, Articles, Speeches, and Interviews, pp. 477–481.
12. This is the Turkish name for the Committee of Union and Progress, other-
wise known as the Young Turk party.
13. Taron was a province of historic Armenia.
14. Republic of Armenia, 27 September, 1997; Ter-Petrossian, Selected Articles,
Speeches, and Interviews, pp. 594–596.
NOTES 33
15. The proponents of this “ideology” never clearly defined what they meant by
it. Armenia was an independent state at the time, so it was not the standard
“nationalist ideology,” demanding liberation from an empire and statehood.
It was usually brandished as an implicit (and sometimes explicit) critique of
liberalism, democracy, and constitutionalism, insisting on the idea that
Armenians as a nation should have a special mission and that they all should
be unified around it. They never articulated with sufficient clarity what that
mission should be, what the process of determining that mission should be,
and what should be done to those who do not subscribe to it.
CHAPTER 4
(November 1, 1997)1
Armenian people are ready once again to shed blood for Artsakh, that we
don’t give a damn about world public opinion, that we will bring both
Azerbaijan and the international community to their knees, and that the
whole nation will turn into fedayees.3
Then what? No one tried to give answers to the following simple
questions:
– War must be off the table; the question of Karabagh, therefore, must
be resolved exclusively through peaceful negotiations.
– It is not possible to maintain the status quo for too long because
neither the international community nor Armenia’s economic
resources will permit it.
– The unresolved state of the conflict is not in the interest of Karabagh
or Armenia, because it is palpably hindering Armenia’s economic
development and, therefore, Karabagh’s; it is creating complications
in our relations with the international community and, especially, with
neighboring countries, which can have fatal consequences.
Compromise will satisfy every party to the conflict to a certain extent, but
at the same time, it will not fully satisfy any of them. President Aliyev will
present that compromise as Azerbaijan’s victory, while I will try to present it
as Armenia’s. The Azerbaijani opposition will charge that Aliyev has com-
mitted an act of treason and sold Karabagh. The opposition in Armenia will
consider that I have acted treacherously and sold Karabagh.
In such circumstances one cannot rule out the possibility of the Rabin-
Peres syndrome. One should also not ignore the Netanyahu syndrome:
despite having come to power with uncompromising positions, within a
short time, albeit unwillingly, he was compelled to continue the peace
process started by Rabin and Peres.
Second Myth: If Armenia were to adopt a tough position vis-a-vis Turkey and
confront it with the issues of genocide recognition, of revoking the Treaty of
Kars, and of territorial demands, then Turkey and Azerbaijan would make
more concessions on the question of Karabagh.
It is my deep conviction, which I can demonstrate through detailed
political analysis, that such a position would not bring any advantages to
the solution of the Karabagh problem. It would also result in new
42 4 THE KARABAGH CONFLICT AND THE FUTURE OF ARMENIAN STATEHOOD
Third Myth: Had Armenia made effective use of the diaspora’s lobbying
capabilities correctly, then diaspora communities would not have permitted
their governments to trample upon the rights of Nagorno Karabagh.
Before commenting on this myth, it is necessary to point out that of all
the diaspora Armenian communities, it is only the one in America that
has lobbying power; other countries do not have such lobbying tradi-
tions and, therefore, there are no organized Armenian lobbying groups
elsewhere.
I do not underestimate, of course, the lobbying work of the Armenian-
American community to produce serious humanitarian assistance to Arme-
nia and to shape US congressional opinions that are favorable to Nagorno
Karabagh. But one should not forget that lobbying has its limits: its influ-
ence ends where US national interests begin. That is the case not only for
the Armenian but also for all other lobbying groups. This includes the
Jewish lobby which, despite being considered the strongest of the ethnic
lobbies, is not omnipotent.
Third Riddle: We, the opposition, have no plan for the resolution of the
Karabagh conflict. But since the current leadership, lacking a national
ideology, is incapable of resolving that question, then give us the power and
we will resolve it, while incidentally also restoring Armenia’s industry,
increasing wages five- to ten-fold, and flooding the country with foreign
investments.
I do not know whether I should even comment on this riddle. At least
I cannot help but point out that in politics, “I swear to god” do not constitute
an argument, and the people have never turned power over to anyone only on
the basis of his good word, especially when that word, in addition to
containing a riddle, more suitably belongs to the realm of miracles.
(a) As noted earlier, once agreements are reached, but before the signing
of final treaties, the plan will be presented to the judgment of the
interested constituents;
(b) Any conflict resolution plan or treaty requires the signature of
Nagorno Karabagh;
(c) Following the signature, any plan or treaty must be ratified by the
respective parliaments of the parties to the conflict.
As we can see, both the public and the opposition will have the oppor-
tunity to review the resolution process and to influence its outcome. I would
be only too gratified if during public discussions and parliamentary debate
the opposition came forth with alternative proposals, which would give us
the possibility of arriving at the best decision, because on the question of
Karabagh, we cannot make mistakes.
Let us not delude ourselves and let us not cherish hollow illusions. On
the issue of Karabagh’s independence, we have no allies. No one will resolve
the conflict but us. We are the ones who must resolve it, and we will resolve
2 DEBATE WITH THE OPPONENTS INSIDE THE GOVERNMENT. . . 47
it to the extent that our capabilities allow us. The one thing we have on our
side is our rejection of recklessness.
It is not my intention to present a tragic picture or to sound the alarm,
because I have faith in the wisdom of our people.
Before turning to the statement itself, I don’t think it would be out of place
to summarize some views expressed here over the last two days in the
interest of fully clarifying the issue under consideration. I ask for your
forgiveness in advance if in some cases, the summaries are not word-for-
word reproductions of the views, but they are accurate in substance. Thus:
room for improvement here, and by working more effectively and speeding
up the reforms, we might achieve some positive shift. But this will not
substantially impact the economic development of Armenia, a phenomenon
which, in my opinion, is dependent upon more fundamental and deep-
seated factors.
These are the factors that I term the physical limits of the economic
development of Armenia: the deepening political isolation of Armenia
caused by the Karabagh conflict; the blockades; and the absence of foreign
investment. Unless these factors are removed, whatever government comes
to power in Armenia, whatever geniuses are at the helm of the government,
not only will they not succeed in ensuring the natural course of the country’s
economic development, but they will find it impossible to solve the present
social problems.
Salaries, pensions, and allowances will remain at the same pitiful levels,
earthquake zone reconstruction will drag on for years to come, and unem-
ployment will increase. The salary of state employees today is about $20 per
month. Even if we succeed in providing for a 30–40 percent annual increase
in this field, just imagine what salaries we will be paying in five years. Will
they be $40–50? Taking into consideration depreciation of the dram and
the inevitable inflation it is not hard to imagine that in five years this $40–50
will have the same value as $20 does today; in other words, there will be no
improvement of living standards, that is, of course, if God saves us from
their deterioration. If I am not mistaken, someone here has expressed the
view that our people will keep enduring for the sake of Karabagh, and that
there is no danger of social revolt in Armenia. I too believe that our people
will not endanger the existence of Karabagh for the sake of improving their
living conditions. But people’s social discontent will manifest itself in
another way—through the resumption of emigration.
I wonder what it is we are pinning our hopes on, when we boycott or, to
put it mildly, postpone the settlement of the Karabagh conflict. On the
conviction that the blockades don’t hinder Armenia’s economic develop-
ment, that foreign investment can be secured with the right marketing
campaign, that the budget can be tangibly increased through tighter disci-
pline on taxation, that the diaspora will be able to provide hundreds of
millions in assistance, that Russia and Iran will help us and will lead us out of
isolation, that we will succeed in what Israel has succeeded in, that we
should compromise only when we are compelled to? These assertions
seem so convincing that I think it is necessary to address them one by one.
2 DEBATE WITH THE OPPONENTS INSIDE THE GOVERNMENT. . . 51
situation, a fact that has been repeatedly expressed by experts from interna-
tional financial organizations. In addition, I have already noted that the
blockades cause a roughly 30 percent rise in the price of cargo transporta-
tion to and from Armenia which also inevitably influences the intentions of
foreign investors; how can businesses that are vulnerable to fluctuations of
one cent remain indifferent in the case of a 30 percent rise in cost? And
finally, we must be rational and realize that even irrespective of these
circumstances, Armenia as a three-and-a-half-a-million person market is
not in itself attractive to foreign investors. In the event of the settlement
of the conflicts, a 15-million strong market can take shape in the South
Caucasus, which, undoubtedly, would become a fertile field for foreign
investment. A factory would be built in Armenia, another one in Georgia,
a third in Azerbaijan, all of which could equally service this common market.
Besides, under these conditions, it would be possible to implement large-
scale regional projects that are much more attractive to foreign capital than
investments made in one specific country—not least because such projects,
which indirectly promote regional security and stability, are politically sig-
nificant as well as economically expedient.
Third, the existence of the conflict deprives Armenia of its most natural
and favorable economic partners—Azerbaijan, Turkey, and, to an extent,
Iran. Natural and favorable, first of all for the simple reason that they are
our immediate neighbors. It is no secret that in all normal states, immediate
neighbors account for at least a 50 percent of foreign economic relations. But
in the case of Armenia, this share is practically zero. I have had opportunities
to evaluate the potential and prospects of Armenian-Azerbaijani economic
cooperation; I will refrain from reiterating. I do not think anyone can deny
the tremendous potential of Armenian-Turkish economic relations; it might
perhaps play a secondary role in the process of Turkey’s economic develop-
ment, but for Armenia, it is undoubtedly of vital importance. According to
calculations made by our Union of Industrialists, in the event of reopening
communication routes between Armenia and Turkey, the commodity circu-
lation between the two countries might reach about $600 million within a
year. In other words, in the course of one year, the foreign trade turnover of
Armenia might grow by 50 percent (today it amounts to $1.125 billion). This
means major opportunities for the development of industry, additional jobs,
and prospects for solving social problems.
It should also not be forgotten that besides being natural economic
partners—which is a value in itself—Turkey and Azerbaijan have also special
importance for Armenia as the shortest transit routes toward, in the first
2 DEBATE WITH THE OPPONENTS INSIDE THE GOVERNMENT. . . 53
case, Europe and the Arab states, and, in the second case, Iran, Russia, and
Central Asia.
Fourth, and finally, Armenia is being left out of regional organizations
and is being condemned to ever deepening isolation, which in my view is the
most unfortunate and dangerous problem. Currently, Armenia is a member
of only two regional organizations, the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). The CIS,
with all its importance in political and security matters, in fact plays no role
in Armenia’s economic development. And BSEC has not yet moved beyond
its status as a club for expressing good intentions. As for the Armenia–Iran–
Turkmenistan and Armenia–Iran–Greece trilateral cooperation projects,
they are still in the formation stage, but even in the event that they are fully
implemented they cannot have a substantial impact on our economic devel-
opment. I believe it is clear to all of us that from an economic standpoint,
much more practical and important are GUUAM,17 TRASECA,18 ECO,19
and the international oil consortiums, whose doors, unfortunately, are so far
closed to us.
By boycotting or even dragging out the conflict settlement, we will not
only be unable to escape our isolation, but we will also deepen it further and
further. I am not talking only about economic isolation, since it is clear that
economic isolation will also have undesirable political consequences. I do
not rule out that even in isolation, Armenia might be able to participate in
certain projects of regional organizations, but I have in mind not symbolic
participation but full-fledged membership, for only then can we anticipate
tangible results.
And now let us consider the other assertions made here.
The fact that it is necessary to fight against the shadow economy and
toughen tax enforcement is unlikely to meet with objection. But that it will
make it possible to significantly increase the budget seems highly question-
able. Through such measures, it is possible at best to achieve temporary
results, since it goes without saying that budget growth depends not as
much on administrative methods as on general trends in economic devel-
opment. And such trends, as I have said earlier, cannot exist in a situation of
continuing blockades, lack of investment, and political and economic isola-
tion. In addition, I believe that getting carried away regarding administra-
tive methods in this area may be extremely dangerous. Certain measures
taken by the government lately have already aroused my concern. Bearing in
mind certain inclinations on the part of the relevant bureaucracies—the
Taxation Administration, the Customs Inspection, the Ministry of Interior,
54 4 THE KARABAGH CONFLICT AND THE FUTURE OF ARMENIAN STATEHOOD
situation, that is, the status quo, for as long as possible. I have a painful
premonition about what a terrible danger to the existence of both Armenia
and Karabagh this represents. Today, like in Batumi and Alexandropol
before, we are in danger of missing, perhaps, the last opportunity for an
auspicious resolution of the Karabagh conflict and for the economic devel-
opment of Armenia. And we will all be held responsible before our people.
NOTES
1. Republic of Armenia, 1 November, 1997; Ter-Petrossian, Selected Articles,
Speeches, and Interviews, pp. 625–639.
2. In that press conference, Ter-Petrossian had signaled his intention to
endorse a plan of resolution for the Karabagh conflict negotiated with the
help of Russian, American, and French mediators.
3. That is a line from an Armenian revolutionary song. Fedayee means “martyr
for a cause” in Arabic. It is the word used to describe Armenian guerilla
fighters against the Ottoman Empire. For a while in the early 1990s it was
also used to refer to the Armenian volunteers fighting in Karabagh.
4. Shortly after the press conference Ter-Petrossian refers to in the beginning of
the article, his nationalist opponents mobilized to resist his policy on
Karabagh. As part of that resistance, they gathered in the Yerevan Cinema
House to voice their opposition to the policy.
5. Gandzasar is a village in Nagorno Karabagh.
6. The Armenian word “mahapart” can be translated as someone willing to die
for a cause. Ter-Petrossian here is referring to a call in the summer of 1992 to
form such a unit by Vazgen Sargsyan—Armenia’s Defense Minister—after
Azerbaijan had launched a massive offensive and succeeded in overrunning a
number of Armenian positions in Karabagh.
7. At the time of the speech Arkadi Ghukasyan was the president of Nagorno
Karabagh, Robert Kocharyan was the Prime Minister of Armenia, Alexander
Arzumanyan was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, and Vardan
Oskanian was the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. Gerard Libaridian,
who was referred to by his Armenian middle name Jirair in Armenia, had
recently retired after serving as Ter-Petrossian’s adviser for seven years and
his chief Karabagh negotiator.
8. This is a facetious reference to a line in an Armenian nationalist song around
the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
9. The Treaty of Sevres, which was signed between the victorious allies and the
Ottoman government on August 10, 1920, envisioned the creation of an
Armenian state in Eastern Anatolia that included most of the territory of
historic Armenia. By then, however, it was the Turkish nationalist movement
58 4 THE KARABAGH CONFLICT AND THE FUTURE OF ARMENIAN STATEHOOD
led by Kemal Ataturk that had become the center of gravity, rather than the
Ottoman government in Istanbul. There is evidence that the nationalists
were willing to negotiate a deal with the government of Armenia that would
imply Armenian control over some of the territories envisioned by Sevres,
but not all. The Armenian government ended up throwing its lot with
Sevres, although there was already serious doubt about the allies’ willingness
to force the implementation of that treaty. Armenians ended up losing not
just what was promised to them by Sevres and the Kemalists, but also half of
the territory of the Republic of Armenia.
10. The Treaty of Kars was signed in 1921 between the newly Sovietized
Armenia and the Turkish nationalist government of Kemal Ataturk. It
determined the current borders of Armenia.
11. Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Abulfaz Elchibey were the first postcommunist
leaders of Georgia and Azerbaijan, respectively. They both earned reputa-
tions of incompetent radicals.
12. Minsk Group was a group of member-states of the Organization of Coop-
eration and Security in Europe (OSCE) that took up the mission of acting as
mediators in the Karabagh conflict. Russia, the USA, and France became
“co-chairmen” of the Minsk Group and the main mediators.
13. Vazgen Manoukyan was one of the leaders of the ANM, but he broke away
in 1991 and became one of the fiercest critics of the ANM and
Ter-Petrossian. He was Ter-Petrossian’s main opponent in the 1996 presi-
dential elections. Ter-Petrossian is referring to Manoukyan’s electoral plat-
form for those elections.
14. These are two alternative methodologies of settlement. The “package”
methodology assumes simultaneous solution of all the disputed issues, espe-
cially the return of territories outside of Karabagh proper held by Armenian
forces and the determination of Karabagh’s status. The “step-by-step” or
“phased” method envisions the return of territories, granting of an interim
status to Karabagh, creation of guarantees against the resumption of hostil-
ities in the first phase, followed in the second phase by negotiations regard-
ing the determination of Karabagh’s final status.
15. Ter-Petrossian, Selected Articles, Speeches, and Interviews, pp. 647–660.
16. Nairit was one of the largest industrial enterprises in Armenia, which pro-
duced synthetic rubber among other things.
17. GUUAM stands for Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Mol-
dova. It was an organization created to facilitate economic and political
cooperation among these states. It is currently moribund.
18. TRACECA stands for Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia. It was an
international transport program aiming to strengthen the economic ties
between countries of these regions.
NOTES 59
19. ECO stands for Economic Cooperation Organization, which was created by
Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan in 1985. Central Asian states and Azerbaijan
joined the organization shortly after becoming independent.
20. This was a foundation created for attracting donations mainly from the
diaspora to fund some critical projects in Armenia and Karabagh.
21. Iran is home to a large Azeri minority, and there have been periodic man-
ifestations of Azeri irredentist aspirations toward Iran. These aspirations
gained some currency in the Azeri nationalist movement in the late 1980s
and early 1990s with Azerbaijan’s first postcommunist president, Abulfaz
Elchibey, also having been reputedly sympathetic to them.
22. Meghri is the southernmost province of Armenia and the one that borders
Iran. It is a reference to a road that connected Meghri to Iran.
23. The Treaty of Batumi was signed between the Ottoman Empire and the
newly independent Republic of Armenia on June 4, 1918. Armenia was
forced to accept a territorial settlement that left only 10,000 square kilome-
ters under its sovereign control. The Treaty of Alexandropol, which was
signed on December 2, 1920, by the ARF government but under Bolshevik
pressure, created a territorial settlement, which left 30,000 square kilometers
under Armenian control, which was much less than what Armenia could
reasonably aspire to a few months prior if its leaders had not thrown their lot
with Sevres.
CHAPTER 5
does not view 150,000 people as humans, but rather as a mere statistic, a
national minority at best—a notion normally applied to extra-territorial
minorities. But since, to the chagrin of the international community,
Nagorno Karabagh happens to be an ethno-territorial unit, international
conventions on the rights of national minorities do not cover
it. Therefore, there remains only one solution: the realization of the
right of the people of Nagorno Karabagh to self-determination. Other
solutions are not possible—not because Armenians and Azerbaijanis are
inherently incompatible, as Robert Kocharyan suggests, or because of
religious antagonism, as others insist, but because the political reality is
that Azerbaijan is incapable of providing for the security, freedom, and
welfare of the people of Nagorno Karabagh.
In my address last month, I noted with regret that thanks to the criminal
policies of Armenia’s current authorities, the resolution of the Nagorno
Karabagh conflict in the last ten years has reached the point of near hope-
lessness, since Azerbaijan has been steadily hardening its position and is no
longer considering any compromise. What are the grounds for such a
pessimistic assessment? Not so much that Armenia’s simultaneous repre-
sentation of Karabagh in negotiations has in fact pushed the latter out of the
settlement process, stripping it of the status of a full party to the conflict
under the OSCE resolutions; and not that the Karabagh issue was unwisely
removed from the realm of self-determination, only to be dealt with as a
disputed territory. Not so much because of all of that, but because of a far
more important and extremely painful reality.
For almost a decade, Armenia’s authorities, mocking the international
community, have feigned genuine interest in a swift resolution to the
Karabagh issue, while in reality pursuing a totally different objective—
doing everything possible to hinder and abort the process. The peace-
loving pronouncements of our statesmen, affirmations of support for com-
promise, and seemingly constructive initiatives are nothing but bluff,
designed to mislead the international community and hold on to the status
quo. They must have thought that the OSCE mediators were so naïve
that they would take the bait and no longer exert pressure. But even if the
mediators have managed to pretend that they trust the sincerity of the
Armenian side, this does not necessarily mean they are not onto this
primitive ploy. The reason they have not made any great effort so far to
push the parties toward an agreement in principle is simply that on the long
list of the superpowers’ priorities, the Karabagh conflict can be found
somewhere near the bottom. Yet Armenia’s authorities spare no effort in
1 THE CURRENT STATE OF THE PROCESS TO RESOLVE THE NAGORNO. . . 63
selling this as their greatest success, since they believe it aids their program
of preserving the status quo in Karabagh.
The desire to preserve the status quo stems from the premise that sooner
or later the international community will come to accept the fait accompli
and finally recognize the independence of Karabagh. In theory, that is a
valid line of reasoning, supported from a historical point of view by several
actual precedents. Yet, as I noted on one occasion a decade ago, the real
question is whether Armenia can afford to preserve the status quo for
another twenty or thirty years, and whether our resources will be enough
to help develop the economy, overcome the obstacles of the blockade and
isolation, and, finally, sustain our competitiveness vis-a-vis Azerbaijan.
The status quo rests neither on a map, nor on a ceasefire line, but rather
on a stable balance of forces. From that point of view, let us acknowledge
with regret that we are in a very distressing, if not desperate, position. Ten
years ago, Armenia and Azerbaijan possessed more or less comparable
human, economic, and military capabilities. Today, however, there is a
large gap between the countries on all three parameters, and this gap
appears to be growing. A comparison of macroeconomic indicators dem-
onstrates that Armenia trails Azerbaijan in all areas of economic growth, and
the distance is widening from year to year. Between 1997 and 2006,
Armenia’s GDP grew by a factor of 4, Azerbaijan’s by a factor of more
than 5; Armenia’s industrial output grew by a factor of 3, Azerbaijan’s by a
factor of 5.3; Armenia’s national budget grew by a factor of 3.8,
Azerbaijan’s by a factor of 5; Armenia’s exports quadrupled, Azerbaijan’s
increased by a factor of 8; Armenia’s trade balance in 2006 was a negative
$1.19 billion, Azerbaijan’s a positive $1.104 billion. Indicators for 2007 are
going to be even more disturbing.
I do not doubt that my esteemed opponents will declare tomorrow that
“by making these figures public, Ter-Petrossian has sown defeatism, pre-
paring the groundwork for the sellout of Karabagh to Azerbaijan.” But I
beseech them: Calm down, gentlemen. Quit the demagoguery. Stop mis-
leading the public with patriotic speeches. Stop hiding the truth. The people
are more intelligent, logical, and rational than many of you.
Let us realize once and for all that no president of Armenia, even in his
wildest dreams, can sell out Karabagh. First of all, the future of Karabagh
should be determined not by Armenia or Azerbaijan, but solely by the
people of Karabagh. Secondly, the July 8, 1992 Decision of the Supreme
Council of the Republic of Armenia prohibits the signing of any document
by Armenia that would “refer to Nagorno Karabagh as part of Azerbaijan.”
64 5 VIEWS ON THE KARABAGH CONFLICT AND THE ARMENIAN TURKISH. . .
What, then, is defeatism? Denying the public the knowledge it needs, and
numbing its senses to the point that it will wake up one day to find out that
Karabagh is gone? Or trying to unite the nation by telling it the truth and
alerting it to the imminent threat that must be prevented? Out of my great
respect for our people, I have never appealed to their emotion but only to
their reason. I have never kept the truth from them, no matter how bitter
that truth. I have never made false promises or engaged in demagoguery
and populism. And I am not about to give up these principles. Let it be
considered impolitic; let it affect my ratings. I am who I am, and that is who
I will remain. I was not any different in 1988; then, you understood and
placed your trust in me and my comrades on the Karabagh Committee, and
the result is an independent Armenia and a liberated Artsakh. I am con-
vinced that you will understand and trust me now as well.
With this lyrical digression, let us return to the Karabagh issue. The
informal document presented by the co-chairs, which Armenia has agreed
to “in principle,” is nothing other than the step-by-step proposal that was
rejected ten years ago. Armenia’s current authorities, after years of procras-
tination and diplomatic trickery, which have led to disastrous results, have
now quietly agreed to a plan that they themselves vigorously opposed as
defeatist, traitorous, et cetera. There can only be two explanations for this:
our authorities are either bluffing again, attempting to cause further delay in
the peace process, or—to give them the benefit of the doubt—they have
finally realized that there is no alternative to the step-by-step approach,
given the diametrically opposed positions of the parties on the status of
Karabagh.
The co-chairs’ document, for face-saving purposes, contains a vague
provision on some future referendum or plebiscite in Karabagh. Ninety-
nine percent of the document, we are told, has been agreed upon, and there
are only a few details that the parties still disagree on. These so-called details,
however, may be so essential as to defy consensus for quite a long time.
Azerbaijan has pinned its hopes on its oil revenues and is in no haste,
whereas Armenia, for reasons unknown, fails to demonstrate the necessary
will to resolve the issue as well. Moreover, there are serious grounds to
believe that even if all disagreements are addressed, Kocharyan, true to
himself, will fail to sign the document, avoiding responsibility, and placing
this burden on the shoulders of the next President. To speak plainly, this is a
deadlock, and Kocharyan is to blame for it, together with Vartan Oskanian,
and in part, Arkadi Ghukasyan, who yielded Karabagh’s internationally
2 REASSESSING THE LEGACY OF THE GENOCIDE 65
Let me begin by saying that like many of the participants at this rally, I am
a descendant of genocide survivors. My grandfather fought in the heroic
Battle of Musa Dagh.5 My seven-year old father carried food and water to
the fighters. And my mother was born in those days in a cave. Had the
French Navy not happened to have been sailing by the shores of Musa
Dagh, I would not be alive now, and would not be speaking today from this
podium, much to the delight of Robert Kocharyan and Serge Sargsyan.
Three generations of my extended family fought against the Turks, in
one way or another. I already mentioned that my grandfather fought at the
heroic Battle of Musa Dagh. Earlier, in 1896, after the Zeitun uprising,6 he
had spent six months in Turkish prisons. My father headed the Armenian
movement against the plan to transfer the Sanjak of Alexandretta to Turkey
in 1939. And I was arrested in 1966 during a demonstration commemo-
rating the anniversary of the genocide, and was detained for about a week in
the Yerevan jail, at a time when Kocharyan and Sargsyan hadn’t even heard
the word “genocide.”
I am called “pro-Turkish” because during my presidency I, on numerous
occasions, insisted on the necessity of improving Armenian-Turkish rela-
tions, and because I am alleged to have never raised the question of the
recognition of the Armenian genocide. The first of these claims is accurate,
for I have indeed insisted on, and continue today to believe in, the impor-
tance of the expeditious normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations. The
second claim, however, does not correspond to reality, to put it mildly. The
Yerevan Genocide Museum was built during my presidency. It was I who
organized for the first time in Armenia an authoritative international con-
ference on genocide in 1995, attended by many world-renowned scholars. I
was the only acting head of the Armenian state, from the days of the First
Republic7 until now, to have offered a brief yet comprehensive political
assessment of the genocide.8
It is true, however, that all of this notwithstanding, I have not placed
genocide recognition at the foundation of Armenia’s foreign policy, con-
sidering it an ill-timed and dangerous undertaking. I will try to explain why
a little later. In contrast, the second president of Armenia immediately
turned that question into a cornerstone of the republic’s foreign policy,
and right from the beginning of his term took consistent steps in that
direction. What was the underlying rationale for that policy? To examine
it, I must once again refer to memory. In 1997, when I suggested that
Prime Minister Kocharyan head the State Council for Coordination of
Armenia-Diaspora Relations, he declined, reasoning that genocide
2 REASSESSING THE LEGACY OF THE GENOCIDE 67
order. When they urge Azerbaijan to refrain from militaristic rhetoric, they
think it will heed their call.
In the last ten years, Armenia’s foreign policy has come down to basically
a series of such empty, provincial, and pointless declarations. The authorities
aren’t bothered at all by the ridiculous position they are putting themselves
and our country in. The impression is that they confuse the State with a
Stepanakert Homeowners’ Association, or the Bourj Hammoud10 Com-
munity Hall. Getting caught in the embarrassing cross-fire of their own
statements, Kocharyan and Oskanian argue that they have been misunder-
stood, or their statements have been mistranslated. Other than inarticulate
bluster, who has, indeed, ever heard from them a balanced, logical analysis
or a programmatic speech on foreign policy? When did they ever present a
clear position on vital and urgent foreign policy issues, such as the resolution
of the Karabagh conflict, or the overcoming of Armenia’s political and
economic isolation, or the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations,
or, if you will, the pursuit of genocide recognition, the purpose of which
remains unclear not only to the people, but to themselves as well?
If the current authorities were honest, they would admit that in the last
ten years, our foreign policy has been one of total failure and shipwreck.
They urged the US Congress to maintain the Section 907 sanctions against
Azerbaijan, but Congress repealed them. They officially appealed to the
same body to recognize the Armenian genocide, and we saw what hap-
pened.11 They urged Turkey not to condition its relations with us on the
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, and to open the border, but nothing came
of it. Originally, they presented Turkey with the condition of recognizing
the genocide, but that condition was later withdrawn and it was agreed that
relations with that country should be normalized without preconditions.
They urged the international community to block the construction of the
Kars-Akhalkalak Railway, but that railway is now becoming a reality. They
opposed the withdrawal of the Russian base from Akhalkalak, but that base
is now gone. They have boasted about Armenia’s ability to develop for yet
another hundred years under blockade, but also continuously complain
about the blockade. They have asserted that Armenians and Azerbaijanis,
as nations, are inherently incompatible, but they also engage in round-the-
clock talk of reconciliation. They claim that the Karabagh issue has been
resolved as far as we are concerned, but for whatever reason, they don’t yet
quit the negotiations. They attempted to block the decision to hold the
OSCE summit in Istanbul, but in the end, they haplessly attended the
summit, and moreover, signed its famous charter, officially acknowledging
2 REASSESSING THE LEGACY OF THE GENOCIDE 69
Many nations and states, under differing circumstances and for different
reasons, have found themselves on the verge of national catastrophe.
Armenians and Jews were subjected to genocide. Germany and Japan, having
suffered devastating defeat, were utterly destroyed. Ottoman Turkey, Britain,
and Russia lost their all-powerful empires. Every nation believes in the unique-
ness of its own tragedy. As Tolstoy has it, the happy are all alike, but the
unhappy are unhappy each in their own way. However, almost all of these
nations and states, having suffered a national tragedy, have turned that tragedy
into a tool of healing and strength, rather than one of hopelessness and
inferiority. They have found the internal strength not only to heal their wounds
and rid themselves of historical complexes, but also to undergo revival and join
the community of the world’s most vibrant and flourishing nations. What
prevents us from following in these nations’ footsteps, instead of continuously
wailing, blaming the world, and begging for justice? We cannot become a
modern and viable nation until we overcome the mindset of the victim, set
ourselves free of the complexes of the past, and turn our eyes to the future. The
only way to overcome that mindset is to build and strengthen Armenia—a
country that today is in the hands of predators. History is a source of pride for
many nations, but the historical burden is an unnecessary shackle.
Following this speech, there will undoubtedly be those who, with the joy
of an inventor, will take my words out of context, or distort them to
attribute thoughts to me that have nothing to do with the truth. I am
responsible only for my own thoughts and my own words, and I have no
intention to respond to these kinds of tricks at all. Throughout their entire
history, the Armenian people have suffered mainly because of their rulers’
ignorance, short-sightedness, and recklessness. Good sense, however, has
never hurt us. I trust in your good sense, and have no doubt that you will
understand me correctly—even on this very sensitive subject from which,
according to the logic of the campaign, I stand to gain nothing.
relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan.” I would like to ask you to detail
this and to explain what you think the constructive steps should be beyond
the offer to normalize relations without any preconditions. As an adden-
dum to this question, I would also like to ask you to comment on the
undisguised joy expressed in the Turkish and Azerbaijan media at the
prospect of your return to power, which is expected to result in the speedy
resolution of the Karabagh conflict in favor of Azerbaijan. There was an
article reflecting that position in the newspaper “Zerkalo.”
I said a little while ago that the plan is not just this, it is not just these brief
statements. In my speeches, I have spoken extensively about the questions
you raise. As for the “constructive efforts toward normalization of relations
with Turkey and Azerbaijan,” first and foremost I have the resolution of the
Karabagh conflict in mind. Constructive efforts are the ones that are the
opposite of unconstructive. I think the process up to this point has not been
constructive, i.e. our authorities have done nothing to resolve the conflict,
regardless of whether the solution would be in our favor or Azerbaijan’s.
Our authorities have not taken a single step for ten years. They have done
things in the opposite direction, which is to avoid a solution, to sabotage
negotiations in order to maintain the status quo. My conceptual quarrel
with these authorities for ten years has been entirely about that. If they were
honest, our authorities would have told our people that they had no
intention of resolving the conflict, that people should tighten their belts
and be ready to live under a blockade for another ten, thirty, forty years, that
they should get used to deprivation. They should be honest and say all of
those things. They neither say that, nor do they take any steps toward
resolving the conflict. So “constructive,” in this process, means a change
in the philosophical approach to the resolution of the conflict. In other
words, it is necessary to shift from a philosophy of sabotaging the resolution
of the conflict to a philosophy of seeking a resolution. With regard to the
normalization of relations with Turkey, there are no great secrets that I can
see. These relations will be normalized only after the resolution of the
Karabagh conflict. Expecting anything before that is futile. The Turkish
border will remain closed as long as the Karabagh conflict remains
unresolved. I am not even talking about a full resolution. I am convinced
that Turkey will open the border if there is tangible progress in the resolu-
tion process in order to help move the process toward a final resolution. As
for what they think about my possible victory in Azerbaijan and Turkey, it is
their business. We are solving our problem, and I will be elected by our
4 THE CHANGED GEOPOLITICAL REALITY FOLLOWING THE RUSSO. . . 73
people, not by Turks or Azeris. I also disagree with you, because there have
been dozens of publications in Azerbaijan expressing a preference for Serge
Sargsyan becoming the president of Armenia, ten times more than publica-
tions expressing a preference for me. I have not even seen those, although
they probably exist, I am not disputing that. Imagine for a second a situation
where impressions about our politics were formed in places like Turkey,
Iran, Russia, and France on the basis of articles in our newspapers. How
well-founded would you think these impressions were? I am not saying our
media is bad, no, but there are so many voices in it, there are so many
unsubstantiated and sensational reports, nobody could make sense of
it. Therefore, I think drawing conclusions on the basis of such articles in
the media is not the best approach.
We have already said a great deal about the genocide and the normali-
zation of Armenian-Turkish relations. It is one of the items in our programs,
and its essence in the final analysis is reducible to the following formula:
because the issue of the genocide is subject to dispute in our relations with
Turkey, and because it is difficult to imagine that it will be settled in the
visible future, the only possible approach is to agree to disagree. This means
Armenia believes that what happened in 1915 was genocide, while Turkey
refuses to admit it. To put it differently, we agree that our positions are
different, and we build relations while having this disagreement. This
approach does not preclude reaching agreements on other issues in the
sphere of Armenian-Turkish relations. Unfortunately, however, it is not the
issue of the genocide, but the Karabagh conflict, that is the main obstacle on
the path of normalizing Armenian-Turkish relations, which I will explain
shortly. Now, what did Serge Sargsyan do to earn the world’s favor?
Without weighing the consequences carefully, and I do not know on
whose advice, he stated that Armenia is prepared to accept Turkey’s pro-
posal to form a commission of Armenian and Turkish historians, which
would be tasked to determine whether there was a genocide or not. This is a
manifestation of both ignorance and political immaturity, especially since
this question was not a surprise for him. It has been discussed on numerous
occasions. The proposal was first made three to four years ago. All possible
opinions have been expressed about it, but the common conclusion was that
Turkey’s sole purpose in making that proposal was to halt the process of the
international recognition of the genocide. Not to understand this, and to
accept a process that casts doubt on the genocide as historical fact, is simply
beyond the pale. Now Sargsyan may give a thousand explanations. Yes, in
his subsequent interviews he tries to camouflage the problem, claiming that
he has said no such thing or that it was not what he had in mind, but what
has been said has been said. It has been said and it cannot be taken back.
Turkey has been granted an opportunity to sense the weakness of Armenia’s
current authorities, which is manifested by the fact that they could agree to
the formation of such a commission. The harm has been done. Of course,
Armenians both in Armenia and in the diaspora will never allow Serge
Sargsyan or any other president to agree to the formation of that commis-
sion. Any current or future president must forget about it. That is not going
to happen. But as I said, the harm has already been done, otherwise he
would not have needed to make such a concession to Turkey in order to
ingratiate himself to the world. And the world welcomed it. We saw the kind
of reactions his eagerness generated.
4 THE CHANGED GEOPOLITICAL REALITY FOLLOWING THE RUSSO. . . 75
NOTES
1. Levon Ter-Petrossian, Return [in Armenian] (Yerevan, Armenia: Printinfo,
2009), pp. 36–41.
2. In the OSCE summit in Budapest in 1994, Nagorno Karabagh was officially
recognized a party to the conflict, which Ter-Petrossian considers the main
achievement of Armenian diplomacy. That recognition meant that (1) the
international community agreed with Armenia that the conflict was between
Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabagh, not between Armenia and Azerbaijan;
(2) that therefore it was not a territorial conflict, but a conflict about self-
determination; (3) and that Karabagh’s fate could not be decided without
taking the will of its people into account. It also created a legal and political
background, which could be favorable to Armenians in the negotiations over
Karabagh’s political status. After Kocharian came to power, he removed
Karabagh from the negotiations and insisted that he would negotiate on its
behalf.
3. Ter-Petrossian, Return, pp. 109–117.
4. Ter-Petrossian is referring to the fact that both Serge Sargsyan and Robert
Kocharyan were functionaries in the Karabagh communist youth organiza-
tion, which was subordinated to Baku.
5. This is a reference to the resistance of the Armenians in the town of Musa
Dagh and surrounding villages against the Ottoman army in August–Sep-
tember of 1915, which allowed them to survive and to escape to Egypt with
the help of the French navy. This event is the inspiration behind the famous
novel The Forty Days of Musa Dagh by the Austrian Jewish writer Franz
Werfel.
78 5 VIEWS ON THE KARABAGH CONFLICT AND THE ARMENIAN TURKISH. . .
I had promised to you during our rally on September 26 to reveal and explain
in detail the strategy of the Armenian National Congress without concealing
anything from you. Now it is the moment to fulfill that promise. Therefore, I
ask you to be patient and to listen carefully to every word of my speech.
I have already had the opportunity to draw your attention to the unprec-
edented geopolitical situation in which Armenia has found itself lately,
putting special emphasis on the fact that our country has never been as
vulnerable to external pressure in the 17 years of its independent existence
as it is today. It is in this dangerous situation that instead of thinking about
the interests of our state and the well-being of our people, Serge Sargsyan is
worried exclusively about clinging to power and having his legitimacy
recognized. What’s more, his recent steps demonstrate that in order to
attain his goals he is ready to revise Armenia’s foreign policy doctrine, and
instead of preserving the policy of maintaining a balance between Russia and
the West, gradually to lean toward the latter.
How can we explain Serge Sargsyan’s sharp turn toward the West? After
all, he was known up to recently as the most pro-Russian statesman in
Armenia. Let us not forget that he is the main architect of the “Property for
debt” deal, which ensured the transfer of Armenia’s entire energy system to
Russia. Let us also not forget his significant activities in the context of the
“Organization of the Collective Security Treaty,”2 as well the stubborn
rumors about his connections to both the Russian intelligence service and
the world of organized crime in that country.
So what has forced Serge Sargsyan to reject this Russian orientation and
tilt toward the West? The reasons, obviously, have nothing to do with
Armenia’s strategic or state interests, but rather the simple benefit of solving
his legitimacy problem.
Russia never questioned Serge Sargsyan’s legitimacy. President Vladimir
Putin was among the first to congratulate him even before the official results
of the elections had been announced. Sargsyan, on his part, violated certain
diplomatic norms and expressed his gratitude to Russia in such an exagger-
ated form that it created a difficult situation for that country’s diplomatic
service.
Serge Sargsyan does have a legitimacy problem in the West. The US
president George W. Bush has still not congratulated him. The Parliamen-
tary Assembly of the European Council, meanwhile, continues to threaten
sanctions against Armenia, which would seriously undermine Serge
Sargsyan’s legitimacy.
What this means is that Sargsyan has no expectations from Russia on this
issue, and his only hope is to get the West’s endorsement, for which he is
ready to make any concession. And since given the absence of mineral
resources, transit routes, and an attractive market, Armenia does not have
much to offer the West except for its state interests, he has decided to
sacrifice those interests. This claim is supported not only by the conciliatory
position he has assumed on the Nagorno Karabagh conflict and on the issue
of normalizing Armenian-Turkish relations, but also—and this is even more
important—by his intention to make Armenia’s foreign policy
“orientationalist.”
Throughout the entire period of independence, Armenia has adhered to
the principle of maintaining a balance between the West and Russia. Despite
having adopted the Western values of democracy, liberalism, and a market
economy, Armenia never allowed itself to come under the West’s unilateral
influence. At the same time, having a close economic and military relation-
ship with Russia, Armenia nonetheless did not become the latter’s political
satellite. In other words, Armenia has tried to be neither pro-Russian, nor
1 WHY THE WEST HAS TURNED A BLIND EYE ON SERGE SARGSYAN’S. . . 81
pro-Western, but rather pursue a policy based solely on its own best
interests.
During my presidency this position was called the policy of “balancing.”
Under Kocharyan it was called the policy of “complementarity.” But the
difference here is mainly in terminology.
Serge Sargsyan is thus sharply changing this established order of things,
and, to protect his personal interests, he is trying to seduce the West. I
consider it a waste of time to assess the advantages or disadvantages of
Western or Russian orientations, because I consider any orientation dan-
gerous. What has convinced me of this is, first and foremost, the example of
conventional Armenian political thinking, which has had catastrophic con-
sequences for Armenia in the past. In the final analysis, both the genocide
that our people were subjected to and the territorial losses the first Arme-
nian republic incurred were the consequences of a flawed “orientationalist”
approach. What also convinces me in this is today’s reality. Before our own
eyes, we saw that Georgia’s adoption of a Western orientation led that
country into a national disaster, which it could have avoided had it pursued
a more balanced relationship with Russia. Apart from the empty demon-
strations of solidarity and the bluster of anti-Russian rhetoric, the West was
unable to do anything to help its junior ally.
The politics of orientation is not just an abstraction or a theoretical
construct for us. It has very specific and practical implications. By turning
his back to Russia and embracing the West, as represented by the United
States and its ally Turkey, Serge Sargsyan is entrusting to them the unilateral
solution to the most crucial problem of Armenia’s foreign policy, the
Karabagh conflict. We can conclude this based on the West’s obvious effort
to exclude Russia from the Karabagh conflict resolution process. It is most
clearly manifested in the transparent statements of Western diplomats, as
well as the fact of trilateral negotiations on Karabagh between Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Turkey, especially in the context of conversations regarding
the inclusion of Turkey’s representative as a cochairman in the Minsk
Group. By the way, Serge Sargsyan is so dependent on the West now that
he would hardly be able to resist the demand to replace Russia with Turkey
in the Minsk Group cochairmanship if such a demand were pressed
upon him.
As a result, there is a threat to the very existence of the Minsk Group,
which for the last sixteen years has been the only international mechanism
for resolving the Karabagh conflict. Despite its many flaws, the Minsk
Group has been the most practical, even ideal format for us, because both
82 6 THE POLITICS AND GEOPOLITICS OF THE PROCESS OF. . .
the US and Russia were represented and also partly due to the competition
that existed between them. It is no coincidence that Azerbaijan has spared
no effort in trying to discredit the Minsk Group as a forum for settling the
Karabagh conflict and to replace it with other international mechanisms.
Unfortunately, there is a real danger that the integrity of this format will
be violated and that Russia will be excluded from it, because Russia, being
preoccupied with the aftermath of the conflict with Georgia, will hardly be
able to oppose the West’s increased involvement in Karabagh. It goes
without saying that in case of a resolution to the Karabagh conflict that
has been unilaterally sponsored by the West, Russia will be excluded also
from the international peacekeeping force that will be deployed in
Karabagh. And that means, if not complete eradication of Russia’s influence
in the South Caucasus, then its substantial weakening, which entails serious
and unpredictable geopolitical consequences, such as suspension of both
Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s participation in the CIS, removal of the Russian
base and the Russian frontier troops from Armenia, and so on.
The change in the Minsk Group format thus implies a unilateral Western
solution to the Karabagh problem, with active Turkish participation to
boot; this can never be beneficial for Armenia. By the way, realism on this
issue requires us to say, also, that a unilateral Russian solution would not be
in Armenia’s interests either, since Russia has stated on numerous occasions
that it sees such a solution only within the confines of Azerbaijan’s territorial
integrity. This, however, is an abstract observation, since there is no threat
of a unilateral Russian solution to the problem, mainly because Azerbaijan
would never agree to that.
Whereas, by contrast, an exclusively Western—more specifically Ameri-
can and Turkish—solution is an entirely real prospect, as I have tried to
demonstrate.
Does Serge Sargsyan realize the dangers of jumping into the West’s
embrace and granting it a monopoly on resolving the Karabagh conflict
and that such a step could lead to a national catastrophe? There is no doubt
that he does not. He is trying to play the same game with the West that
Robert Kocharyan played for the last ten years. The essence of that game,
which I explained in detail in my speech on October 26, 2007, was to
pretend that Armenia was genuinely interested in resolving the Karabagh
conflict, but in reality to try to sabotage that process and maintain the
status quo.
And even though the OSCE mediators have, for their part, pretended to
believe the sincerity of the Armenian side, this does not mean that they have
1 WHY THE WEST HAS TURNED A BLIND EYE ON SERGE SARGSYAN’S. . . 83
The logic driving the West’s policy toward Russia relies on the following
reasoning: “Very well, you solved the problems in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia; now we are going to solve the problem in Nagorno-Karabagh.”
What is frustrating about this situation is that just as the West could do
nothing to prevent Russia from solving the problems in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, Russia in all likelihood will be unable to prevent the West from
solving the Karabagh problem. The deepening of the international financial
crisis and the threat of that crisis becoming uncontrollable may be the only
thing that could get in the way of the West’s plan for resolving the Karabagh
conflict.
Confronting Russia, however, is only one of the many motives condi-
tioning the West’s behavior, and certainly not the main one. The main
factor is Serge Sargsyan’s weakness and the unprecedented opportunity to
exploit it. The presence of such levers as the absence of legitimacy, the
degree to which he is corrupt, and the vulnerabilities that exist in his moral
character, are like a treasure the West has discovered. Which other leader of
Armenia would agree to jump into the West’s embrace so unreservedly, to
deepen the cooperation with NATO, to turn its back on Russia, to contrib-
ute to Russia’s exclusion from the Minsk group, to endorse the creation of
the forgotten proposal of a commission of Armenian and Turkish historians,
which would raise doubts about the factual truth of the genocide and
84 6 THE POLITICS AND GEOPOLITICS OF THE PROCESS OF. . .
Since Serge Sargsyan has taken the bait on this issue, they are not going to
let him off the hook.
Of course, we can discuss which of the points listed above are beneficial
for Azerbaijan and Turkey and which ones for Armenia, but this is a useless
endeavor, because the provisions can only be appreciated in their entirety
and interconnectedness. It is more essential to figure out which points are
especially likely to complicate the negotiations. Points 3, 4, and 9, which
respectively deal with the return of Azerbaijani refugees to Karabagh proper,
the definition of the legal status of the Lachin corridor, and the holding of a
referendum in Nagorno Karabagh are going to be the hardest to resolve.
But taking into consideration the latest geopolitical developments, I do not
think these difficulties will be insurmountable for the mediators.
What we need to understand is that if up to recently the co-chairmen of
the Minsk Group have followed the principle of achieving an agreement
among the parties, now the West has the opportunity to impose its preferred
solution, i.e. to implement the Dayton option. It is sad that the same
Dayton logic implies that Nagorno Karabagh will not participate in the
resolution process, and its interests in the upcoming fateful negotiations will
be represented by Armenia, as the interests of the Bosnian Serbs were
represented by Yugoslavia. Soon we are probably going to become the
witnesses of Armenia and Azerbaijan participating in a Dayton-type confer-
ence initiated by the United States and Turkey, where Russia and France, as
co-chairing countries of the Minsk Group, will participate, but as observers
at best. In this regard, I do not think the Parliamentary Assembly of the
European Council’s timing for adopting a final resolution on Armenia—
January, 2009—was chosen by coincidence. That is how much time has
been given to Serge Sargsyan to fulfill the promises he has made regarding
the resolution of the Karabagh conflict; otherwise the threatened sanctions
will finally be imposed.
Of course, Serge Sargsyan alone should not be saddled with the respon-
sibility for the current situation. In the final analysis, this is the consequence
of the Kocharyan administration’s deplorable policy on the resolution of the
Karabagh conflict and the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations.
Responsibility should be shared also by the all coalition governments that
came, one after the other, the criminalized National Assembly, the official
press, the intelligentsia that fed at the government’s trough, and the polit-
ical parties that are in the regime’s pocket. Today we are eating the bitter
fruits of that policy and of the criminal behavior of the kleptocratic system
created under Kocharyan.
2 INTERVIEW TO “NEWSWEEK TÜRKIYE” CORRESPONDENT SEMIN GÜMÜŞEL 87
(December 1, 2008)3
As for the evolving principle of resolving the Karabagh conflict and normal-
izing Armenian-Turkish relations within one package, I should say that in
terms of practical policy and methodology, it is perhaps a realistic approach.
After all, it is pretty obvious that as long as the Karabagh conflict has not
been resolved, Armenian-Turkish relations will not be normalized and the
Armenian-Turkish border will not be opened. But the realization of that
methodological principle will depend on the constructiveness of the Turkish
stance in the negotiations to solve the Karabagh conflict, expressed primar-
ily in the form of influencing Azerbaijan and nudging it toward a compro-
mise. The Turkish side apparently also wants to include the establishment of
a joint commission of historians on the issue of the genocide as part of the
overall framework of normalization. This forgotten idea, which became part
of the political agenda as a result of Serge Sargsyan’s ill-considered state-
ment, can create serious and unnecessary obstacles both for the settlement
of the Karabagh conflict and the normalization of Armenian-Turkish rela-
tions, since it is beyond doubt that Turkey, on the one hand, will not
abandon its fixation to establish such a commission, and, on the other
hand, Serge Sargsyan, no matter how badly he wants it, will not be able to
respond positively to that intention because of the pressure of public
opinion.
92 6 THE POLITICS AND GEOPOLITICS OF THE PROCESS OF. . .
saying surrender Karabagh and we will open the border. No head of state
has ever found himself in such a pitiful situation.
Sargsyan’s frustration and anger are perfectly understandable human
emotions. After risking his reputation and even earning the label of a traitor
both in Armenia and especially in the diaspora, he did not improve his
legitimacy or solidify his shaking rule. He was even unable to satisfy his
expectation of solving the difficult economic problems facing the country
through the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border, which, if
implemented, could have at least partially justified his ill-fated policy toward
Turkey. Frustration and anger are, of course, human emotions, but they are
not psychological states fitting a head of state, because such emotions can
cause disastrous consequences for the country and its people, an example of
which we witnessed in August of last year in neighboring Georgia.9 The
head of state must always keep his composure, not give in to the pressures of
the moment, and have the ability to avoid hasty and miscalculated decisions.
Frustration, anger, and other similar emotional reactions not only do not
contribute to the correction of the committed errors, but also become the
reason for new ones.
These steps do not necessarily mean that the West has decided to punish
Serge Sargsyan. He is an extremely valuable and appreciated partner for the
West. It is no coincidence that Sargsyan himself recently stated that
the more he is denounced in Armenia the more he is praised in Europe.
The aforementioned steps, therefore, are directed not against Serge
Sargsyan but against Armenia and its people. And as for Sargsyan’s frustra-
tion and hurt feelings, the West has just the thing to soothe them, which is
to ignore the fact of his illegitimacy and to tolerate the violence he is
committing in his own country.
In any case, even if the West’s and Turkey’s reactions are not a serious
problem for Serge Sargsyan personally, they are a serious problem for our
country. Thus, both the Armenian authorities and the Armenian public
should be concerned and should seek appropriate solutions.
The more he delays choosing between these two paths, the more he will
contribute to the intensification of external pressures on Armenia and to the
deterioration of the country’s already dreadful situation. Stubbornness and
procrastination will only force Serge Sargsyan to make new concessions
under external pressure, as he has done during the past year of his rule,
and these will come at the expense of our national interests.
Now, you tell me: is there a link between foreign policy and domestic
politics? Is it not obvious from what was said above that every single instance
of falsified elections, political persecution, limits imposed on democracy,
6 SARGSYAN PLAYED TURKEY’S GAME 99
Today, the main question discussed in our country is whether, within the
framework of soccer diplomacy, Serge Sargsyan will or will not visit Turkey,
as if there is nothing more important to talk about or as if his decision to go
or not to go could change anything. Levon Zurabyan and Ashot Sargsyan,11
speaking on behalf of the Armenian National Congress, have already given
comprehensive answers to this question, which I feel it necessary to repeat,
with some amendments, to the wider circles of people gathered at today’s
public rally. The issue of Serge Sargsyan’s going or not going to Turkey has
now become meaningless, since he has already made each and every possible
mistake in the field of Armenian-Turkish relations, especially by calling into
question the very fact of the genocide and by making it a bargaining chip.
Thus, his going or not going will not make any difference as things are now
beyond repair.
As you know, recently Serge Sargsyan stated categorically that not until
the border has been opened will he pay a visit to Turkey. This apparent
ultimatum exposes two realities. First, Turkey promised Serge Sargsyan it
would open its border in exchange for the signing of the so called
“roadmap” on April 22, 2009. And, second, Sargsyan feels insulted and
cheated by the Turks for not keeping their promise. However, this state-
ment cannot be considered a true ultimatum, as in the same text, Sargsyan
reckoned it necessary to add that he would still go to Turkey provided there
were positive signs that the border were “about to be” opened. Having
made this amendment, he admits—by omission or by commission—that he
has already made the decision to go, because the notion of “about to be” is
so vague that it can have any number of interpretations.
But this is not the essential thing. The essential thing is why Serge
Sargsyan feels insulted by the Turks. Let’s ask him directly: is it because
you were duped? Then why would you let it happen? Is it not clear that, if
not in human relations but in politics, no matter how unfair it may be from a
moral standpoint, it is the cheated and not the cheaters who are to blame?
Therefore, if you were cheated, you should be angry first and foremost with
yourself. Or, if Turkey really broke its promises, have the courage to speak
about it openly and make necessary corrections in your policy. But these are
just rhetorical questions and appeals, because against all odds Serge
Sargsyan will have to go to Turkey, whether he wants to or not,12 as, first
of all, he will not be given any alternative and, second, he cannot abort this
soccer diplomacy, because he was the one who initiated it. However, if by
any chance he decides not to go, which is hardly possible, he would do even
greater damage to our country and find himself in an even more humiliating
7 THE RIGHT AND WRONG CRITICISMS OF SERGE SARGSYAN’S POLICY. . . 101
genocide and the Armenian people’s historic rights, and the need for
compensation of the material losses incurred by Western Armenians.
By doing so, these factions created the impression that the ANC is being
passive and unprincipled in its criticism of the Armenian-Turkish protocols
and that it is only they who are seriously fighting against Serge Sargsyan’s
“anti-national” policy. In reality, though, they undermined the argument
about the unacceptability of the creation of a historians’ commission, which
is the most dangerous point of the protocols, and at the same time provided
a great service to Serge Sargsyan by putting forward such irrational demands
that they unwittingly boosted his international credit. Despite the personal
humiliation, he was subjected to in the rallies in Armenia and especially in
the diaspora, Sargsyan has immeasurably strengthened his international
position thanks to that nationalistic hysteria, presenting himself to the
world as a realistic and decisive statesman, worthy of the twenty-first century
and prepared to make courageous and nonpopulist choices in the name of
his principles. It is not a coincidence at all, therefore, that immediately after
the signing of the protocols he was recognized as “the European of the
week,” from whence to the Nobel Prize it is only one step, and everybody
knows what that step is.
The extreme nationalists, particularly the ARF, are putting themselves in
an uncomfortable position from another perspective as well, which is that on
the one hand they defend the principle of establishing relations without
preconditions and complain against the preconditions put forward by Tur-
key, and on the other hand they insist on preconditions of their own. In
order for this charge not to seem groundless, I think it is appropriate to
quote a lengthy passage from a document called “Roadmap for the Activ-
ities of ARF’s Organization in Armenia” (10.23.2009), where we literally
read the following: “Prerequisites for establishing normal relations between
Armenia and Turkey can be established only after Turkey recognizes the
Armenian genocide and shows readiness to pay reparations, and after halt-
ing the joint Turkish-Azerbaijani anti-Armenian policy. Launching a pro-
cess of normalizing bilateral relations without preconditions is an extremely
serious and momentous step and it should be the only concession by
Armenia at this historic juncture. . . . The foreign policy of Armenia should
aim to resist the anti-Armenian policies of the Turkish-Azerbaijani tag-team
and be guided by the following principles: to assess as illegitimate and
insulting to our national dignity the preconditions put forward by Turkey;
to thwart the attempts to link Turkish-Armenian relations to the process of
Karabagh negotiations, which otherwise would result in the splitting of the
7 THE RIGHT AND WRONG CRITICISMS OF SERGE SARGSYAN’S POLICY. . . 105
Such a condition by itself would not have been a problem, had it not
enabled Turkey to link the ratification question with the demand to first
settle the Nagorno-Karabagh issue. The fact that this concern is not
groundless is confirmed by the style and the atmosphere of the debates
recently started in the Turkish parliament on the ratification of the pro-
tocols, as well as by the countless statements made with regard to this issue
by high-ranking Turkish officials. With all this proof to the contrary, it is
ludicrous to continue claiming that the settlement of Armenian-Turkish
relations is not linked to resolving the Karabagh conflict resolution. More-
over, these stubborn claims, which are incessantly voiced both by Armenian
and Western diplomats, testify to the opposite, that is, to the fact that the
Armenian-Turkish problem and the Karabagh conflict will be resolved in
one package. I predicted that as far back as in my October 17, 2008, public
speech, having added that “an attempt will be made to include in the
package the establishment of an Armenian-Turkish historians’ commission
with the aim to study the genocide”—which became a reality.
To further clarify the position of the Congress on the issues discussed
earlier, I deem it necessary to once again stress the following basic points:
As you see, the situation is extremely delicate and sensitive, and requires
great prudence both from the authorities and the opposition, who face
difficult issues and challenges as well. On the one hand, it is important
that internal standoffs do not harm the processes of normalization of
Armenian-Turkish relations and the Karabagh conflict resolution; on the
other hand, it is necessary to make sure that these processes are secured
against dangerous and undesirable outcomes for the Armenian people. The
ANC has always been and will always be guided by this prudent mind-set,
avoiding reckless actions and political maximalism, and taking into account,
first and foremost, the nation’s best interests. Unfortunately, one cannot say
the same about the authorities, who stubbornly refuse to use the most
valuable resource for withstanding external challenges, which is the
strengthening and consolidating of Armenia’s position by solving domestic
issues and establishing national solidarity.
The following puzzle does not make any sense to me. Since there is no
doubt that to gain legitimacy from the outside world Serge Sargsyan makes
unnecessary concessions with regard to the normalization of Armenian-
Turkish relations and the Karabagh conflict resolution, what is it that pre-
vents him from requesting legitimacy from his own people, instead of being
so humiliated and obliged to make such concessions? In the seventeenth
century, there lived a priest in Turkey named Eliazar of Ayntap, whose
vanity and hunger for power knew no limits, and who, by giving bribes
and through schemes managed to be declared the Catholicos18 of Turkish
Armenians, thus gravely jeopardizing the unity of the Armenian Church and
people. The Echmiadzin19 brotherhood of that time summoned a meeting
and addressed him with the following offer: “Brother, if you wish to become
a Catholicos, come and be the Catholicos of All Armenians, only don’t
divide the church and bring such a disaster upon our nation.” Eliazar
112 6 THE POLITICS AND GEOPOLITICS OF THE PROCESS OF. . .
accepted the offer and comfortably ruled in Holy Echmiadzin for ten years
(1681–1691). So the imminent and disastrous threat to the Armenian
Church was averted. In the entire history of the Armenian people, I don’t
know of another example of such truly national thinking that would match
the wisdom and open-mindedness of the decision made by that brother-
hood of Echmiadzin. Why would Serge Sargsyan think that Armenians are
unable to show once again such wisdom and open-mindedness for the sake
of the nation?
On January 23, the French Senate voted on a law criminalizing the denial of
the Armenian genocide. For understandable reasons, that news was greeted
with great enthusiasm among various segments of Armenian society, espe-
cially in the diaspora. Serge Sargsyan and Eduard Nalbandyan, meanwhile,
expressed their gratitude to the leaders of France and chalked it up as a
major victory for Armenian diplomacy. Only god knows what the contri-
bution of Armenian diplomacy was to that decision, since it is clear that
French politicians initiated the move independently, with the aim of
improving their appeal for French Armenian voters in an election season
and also perhaps with the larger goal of impeding Turkey’s accession to the
European Union. In other words, the Armenian question has become
subject to foreign manipulation irrespective of our wishes yet again with
all the predictable consequences. Two days ago, it also became clear that the
jubilation had been premature, because the French Constitutional Council
judged the Senate’s decision unconstitutional, which you can comment on
better than I. I think, therefore, that instead of getting excited and cele-
brating a “victory,” it was necessary to ask whether the Senate’s “historic”
decision was going to have a positive or negative effect on the normalization
of Armenian-Turkish relations, because nobody can deny the vital impor-
tance of that issue for Armenia’s security and economic development. Let us
hope then that the “victory” that was won a month ago does not turn out to
be like the “victories” of Armenian diplomacy at the peace conferences of
Berlin in 1878 and Paris in 1920, which resulted, respectively, in the
destruction of Western Armenia and the loss of exactly half of the territory
9 ABOUT THE ARMENIAN-TURKISH RELATIONS AND THE PROBLEM OF. . . 113
Robert Kocharyan’s demand, made from the UN’s podium in 1998, that
the world recognize the Armenian genocide, was the biggest mistake by
Armenian authorities in the process of normalizing Armenian-Turkish rela-
tions. Our intelligentsia was fainting it was so happy and excited. There were
celebrations, people sang Robert Kocharyan’s praises—he was such a tough
guy, he was not afraid to say whatever needed to be said from the UN’s
podium. But what were they going to do to him regardless of what he said
from the UN’s podium? Were they going to hang him, kill him, arrest him?
The UN’s podium is the place that requires the least courage; it is there that
the ultimate coward can play a hero. The leaders of all countries say
whatever comes to their minds from that podium. Iran gets criticized so
much, then Ahmedinejad goes to the UN and issues a challenge to the
whole world; the president of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, makes a mockery
of that podium by ridiculing the US president. Khrushchev struck at the UN
podium with his shoe. Now Robert Kocharyan has gone and done this
thing. Who is he, Andranik, Njdeh, David of Sassoun?22 And what did he
get for his adolescent behavior? I consider it an immature, unserious act, a
means of scoring easy points.
If Robert Kocharyan wanted to raise the issue of recognition of the
Armenian genocide in the UN, he should have done it based on the pro-
tocols of the UN. Armenia should have prepared a meticulous file, appealed
to the UN according to the official protocol, and the UN could not have
refused to take up the issue. Robert Kocharyan did not demand that the UN
take up the issue of the Armenian genocide and condemn it. The UN is an
organization that has to satisfy the appeals for deliberation of its member
states. It would have accepted the appeal for deliberation; and if, then it
issued a resolution, good. If not, it would have at least had a discussion of
the issue. Kocharyan did not do that, instead putting on a ridiculous show,
which then turned out to be a disaster for the Armenian people.
As soon as Robert Kocharyan demanded to recognize the genocide on
behalf of the state, Turkey made a countermove. Before 1998, Turkey had
never demanded that we create a historians’ commission tasked with deter-
mining whether the genocide happened. It did not make such a demand
and it could not have made such a demand, because we had not made that
issue a part of our foreign policy agenda. As soon as Robert Kocharyan
turned it into the cornerstone of our foreign policy, Turkey made a shrewd
move, saying: “Very well, you say it was a genocide? No problem. Let’s
create a commission of Armenian and Turkish historians and examine
whether it happened.” Robert Kocharyan gave what he thought was a clever
9 ABOUT THE ARMENIAN-TURKISH RELATIONS AND THE PROBLEM OF. . . 115
answer, saying “You know what, let’s first normalize our relations, open the
borders, and then, instead of such a commission, we can create a big
governmental one that will take up all the issues together.” In other
words, he gave consent to the creation of that commission, but as part of
the governmental, state commission, rather than a separate one. And that is
exactly what was affirmed in the protocols signed in Switzerland: to create a
subcommittee as part of the intergovernmental commission, which would
examine whether the genocide happened. What is more, they praised this as
a great agreement, which, and I remember it verbatim, “reflects the interests
of Armenia and Karabagh,” and which does not diverge from our national
interests.
With respect to Karabagh, our authorities, or more accurately Robert
Kocharyan, committed one fateful error, which we are never going to be
able to correct. It was not Serge’s error; at the time, he was the minister of
defense. He is responsible for it only to the extent that he was part of that
government, but the decision was the president’s to make. And Robert
Kocharyan bequeathed that error to Serge Sargsyan. The error was the
decision to deprive Karabagh of the status of being a party to the conflict,
to throw Karabagh out of the format of negotiations. What did Robert
Kocharyan say? I was Karabagh’s president, and now I am Armenia’s,
therefore I can represent both Karabagh and Armenia, and there is no
need for Karabagh to participate in the negotiations. This was such a gift
to Azerbaijan and the international community that they were shocked. He
was so naïve, he could not even sell that gift, he gave it away for free, he gave
it cheaply, for a penny, just to look like a guy who is broad-minded and who
wants to solve the problem.
In the 1990s, Azerbaijan’s struggle against us, against our diplomacy was
to do everything in their power to prevent Karabagh’s participation in the
negotiations. In 1992, when Raffi Hovannisyan was the foreign minister
and when the Minsk Group was formed, we succeeded in pushing through
the following formula in the Minsk Group: the participants in the negoti-
ations are Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the “elected authorities” of Nagorno
Karabagh. With that—the expression “elected authorities”—the founda-
tion for the status of Karabagh was laid. And after a long struggle, or more
accurately, after the victorious conclusion of the war in 1994, the interna-
tional community was forced to recognize Karabagh a party to the conflict
fully equal in its status to Armenia and Azerbaijan. It meant that any plan of
resolution presented by the Minsk Group or the international community
116 6 THE POLITICS AND GEOPOLITICS OF THE PROCESS OF. . .
1. It is stated in the very first paragraph of the declaration that “the State
Commission on the Coordination of Events Dedicated to the 100th
11 THOUGHTS ON THE PUBLICATION OF THE “PAN-ARMENIAN. . . 119
First, I would like to apologize for addressing you not through confidential
channels, but with an open letter. There are two reasons for doing so:
a. Considering our deep political disagreements, such a step on my part, the
content of which I will reveal below, would not have escaped the risk of
setting off all kinds of rumors and speculation;
b. My letter is motivated by a problem as important for the state and the
nation as the raising of the issue of the Armenian genocide internationally
on its centennial, which, in my view, should be above any political
calculations.
I am sorry that this idea of mine, which I proposed with only the
nation’s interests in mind, is now unworkable because of the political
score-settling and the brutality unleashed against Gagik Tsarukyan, the
Prosperous Armenia party, and the opposition in general. 28 I should also
13 WHY IS EVERYBODY SILENT? 125
add that I am not concerned at all about the howls from both left and
right that the publication of this letter is going to provoke, because it
could not be delayed given how close we are to the centennial of the
genocide.
Dear Participants,
The next topic of my speech, which I consider one of the most important
topics of the day, is the concern generated by the “Pan-Armenian Declara-
tion on the Centennial of the Genocide.” I have reflected on that topic
twice last month (see Fourth Estate, 02.11.2015, and Ilur.am, 02.11.2015,
02.17.2015), and I have even had a public debate with Serge Sargsyan (see
president.am, 02.20.2015, and Ilur.am, 02.21.2015). I will refrain from
delving into details, since you can get them in the aforementioned publica-
tions, and will instead focus on the most dangerous point in the declara-
tion—the latest sharp turn in Armenia’s foreign policy.
As you know, Armenia’s authorities in the 1990s, distancing themselves
from the traditional ideology of what then was a stateless nation, adopted a
realistic policy that was in harmony with the foundational principles of
international law and was derived solely from the interests of the state.
And it is no accident that all of Armenia’s foreign policy successes coincide
with that period. It should be mentioned that this is not only my opinion.
This obvious fact has been acknowledged by none other than Vazgen
Sargsyan, Robert Kocharyan, the Chairman of the National Assembly of
the Republic of Nagorno Karabagh Arthur Tovmasyan, and others (The
Republic of Armenia, 09.19.1996).
After 1998 the international recognition of the Armenian genocide was
made the bedrock of Armenia’s foreign policy, which resulted in our
country being forced to agree to the creation of the commission of Arme-
nian and Turkish historians. At the same time, the Kocharyan regime
committed an even bigger blunder by removing Nagorno Karabagh from
the negotiating process as a legally recognized party to the conflict and
turning the problem of Karabagh Armenians’ right to self-determination
into a territorial dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
126 6 THE POLITICS AND GEOPOLITICS OF THE PROCESS OF. . .
target of hatred for both Armenian and Turkish nationalists until he was
murdered by a Turkish criminal and only then was lionized and eulogized
by his Armenian detractors.
Unlike most people, I have developed immunity to criticism over the
decades, so I have no fear of being criticized and labeled yet again. My
“critics” have already pinned all the possible labels to my name—cosmo-
politan, defeatist, agent of a Judeo-Masonic conspiracy, traitor,
pro-Turkish, Turkophile, even Turk, etc. And I have earned all these labels
for the following deadly sins:
NOTES
1. Ter-Petrossian, Return, pp. 287–303.
2. This is the Russian-dominated collective security organization, which in
addition to Russia, includes Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmeni-
stan, Kirgizistan, and Tajikistan.
3. Ter-Petrossian, Return, pp. 309–314.
4. Ter-Petrossian, Return, p. 319.
5. In an article published in The Wall Street Journal on July 9, 2008, Serge
Sargsyan invited the Turkish President Abdullah Gul to visit Yerevan in
September to attend a match for the World Cup qualifying stage between
the Turkish and Armenian national teams. Of course, it was not just an
invitation to watch soccer together. The main agenda was to restart the
conversation about establishing diplomatic relations between the two coun-
tries. But since the soccer match had provided a convenient excuse for the
invitation, the process launched by it was unofficially dubbed “soccer diplo-
macy.” See Serge Sargsyan, “We Are Ready to Talk to Turkey,” The Wall
Street Journal, July 9, 2008.
6. Ter-Petrossian, Return, pp. 357–361.
7. This prediction was on target as Serge Sargsyan faced intense protests in the
diaspora with several organizations boycotting the events where he spoke
during visits to several countries with large Armenian communities.
8. Armenian Times, May 16, 2009.
9. The reference is to the impulsive action of President Saakashvili, which
resulted in Georgia’s loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
10. Armenian Times, September 19, 2009.
11. Levon Zourabyan was a member of the National Assembly of Armenia and is
the Deputy Chairman of the Armenian National Congress. Ashot Sargsyan is
a former member of the National Assembly and member of the governing
board of the Armenian National Congress. Sargsyan is also a historian.
12. This prediction was also on target as Sargsyan did later visit Turkey.
13. Indeed, Turkey never ratified the protocols and the border has remained
closed.
14. Armenian Times, November 12, 2009.
15. Vardan Oskanian served as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia in
1998–2008.
16. Edward Nalbandyan became Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia in 2008.
He remains in that post as of this writing.
17. “Madrid principles” are the foundational principles for the resolution of the
Karabagh conflict put forward by the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group
(USA, Russia, and France) in 2007. They form the basis of the negotiations
to resolve the conflict. The most important principles in this document are
NOTES 129
– make Armenia less attractive for foreign companies that would other-
wise want to invest in the country;
– force Armenia to allocate a large portion of its meager resources to
military spending;
– contribute to emigration from Armenia and Nagorno Karabagh,
which has already taken on the proportions of a demographic catas-
trophe; and
– complicate Armenia’s relations with almost all countries, even
friendly ones.
10. Armenia also does not present a demand of Turkey to recognize the
Armenian genocide and to face its own history, considering these a
matter of internal affairs for the latter as well. This does not refer, of
course, to the reparation to descendants of the victims of the geno-
cide for legally documented financial losses suffered by their ances-
tors and to the restitution of lost family and communal (church)
properties.
11. Addressing the governments of Europe, the Republic of Armenia
requests that the recognition of the Armenian genocide not be
considered a precondition during the ongoing negotiations related
to Turkey’s membership in the European Union. With respect to
Turkey’s integration into the European Union, Armenia considers it
as a prospect that would improve regional security and open up
alternative avenues for cooperation with the outside world, which
would contribute to Armenia’s development.
12. Armenia is ready to establish diplomatic relations with Turkey and to
develop multidimensional economic, cultural, and political cooper-
ation between the two countries on the basis of the Protocols signed
in Zurich on October 10, 2009, having reservations only with
regard to the appropriateness of creating a commission of Armenian
and Turkish historians that would examine the factuality of the
genocide. Such a reservation is based on two concerns. First, there
is as yet no precedent in international practice where a political
conflict is resolved by a commission of historians; and, second, a
commission of Armenian and Turkish historians may be turned into
a theater of sharp disputes and the stoking of passions which, instead
of creating an atmosphere of trust between the two peoples, would
inevitably present further complications for their cooperation.
13. Considering in a particular sense the interconnection between
Armenian-Turkish relations and the resolution of the Karabagh
problem, Armenia is ready to resolve that conflict as well, on the
basis of the Madrid principles and through peaceful negotiations,
with the condition that until such time that a timetable for the
resolution of the conflict is implemented, there is a clarification of
the conditions, deadlines, and legal consequences of the planned
referendum aiming at the determination of the future status of
Mountainous Karabagh as well as of the issues related to the place-
ment of international peacekeeping forces in the area for the purpose
of providing security for the Karabagh population.
3 PEACE, RECONCILIATION, AND GOOD-NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS 137
One would think that the still lingering consequences of the economic
crisis of 2008, the increasing scale of emigration, our foreign debt which has
assumed menacing proportions and the resulting threat of a default, and
especially the April War, would have a sobering effect on our authorities and
would force them to radically revise their disastrous policy over Karabagh
and to adopt a completely different strategy to deal with the challenges we
face. Judging from the regime’s reaction, however, it looks like we are going
to be disappointed in this case as well, because instead of proposing rational
measures, it has put forward a new nonsensical ideology, which will lead us
into a new deadlock. I am referring to the idea of forming a “nation-army,”
which unfortunately has even been included in the program of the govern-
ment. Putting aside the moral aspect of the issue, which has to do with the
introduction of a new tax as a first step of giving life to the concept, I will
concentrate only on its political content.
To that end, we first need to find out what hides inside this concept. If we
ignore the Amazons, history knows three successful cases of a “nation-
army,” the first two in medieval Mongolia and Switzerland, and the third
in modern Israel, bearing in mind, of course, that the word “nation” cannot
be used literally in the medieval context. In order to get a basic picture of the
phenomenon, I think it is necessary to give a brief account of each of these
cases.
In the early years of the thirteenth century, Genghis Khan unified by
force the dozens of different Mongol tribes, which had been fighting
amongst each other for centuries, and replaced the old system of inter-
tribe relations with a well-organized system of an army. All the men were
subject to conscription to fight in units made up of 10, 100, 1000, and
10,000 (tumen) men. This simultaneously awakened a sense of “national”
unity among the Mongols and created an awesome military force that
allowed a people as small as the Mongols to create the largest land empire
in the world stretching from the Pacific Ocean to Poland and Anatolia and
to rule over a combined population 200 times as large as them. That massive
empire, however, survived only for five–six decades, splintering into four
parts following the death of the Great Khan Kubilai (1294), because the
military energy of the Mongols was spent, because they were unable to form
a unifying ideology for the empire, and because the Mongols were small in
number.
As I already pointed out, the next successful example of forming a
“nation-army” is the Swiss case, which, however, is different from the
Mongol case in its motives and aims. If in the Mongol case it was designed
3 PEACE, RECONCILIATION, AND GOOD-NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS 139
as an instrument for their expansionist goals, in the Swiss case it was dictated
by the imperative of defending themselves in a hostile environment. For
500 years (1291–1815), the feudal lords of the alpine valleys, which had a
mixed population of German, French, and Italian origin, had to rely exclu-
sively on themselves and to see the creation of a combat capable army their
ultimate priority in order to repel the constant attacks from their powerful
neighbors—France, Germany, and Austria. And even though Switzerland
has not been subject to external dangers, given its status of a neutral state in
the last 200 years, and even though it has avoided involvement in all wars on
the European continent in that period, including World War I and World
War II, the army, where every healthy male between the ages of 18 and
50 serves either on active duty or in reserve, is still cherished by the Swiss
society because of tradition. This is why some consider Switzerland the most
militarized state in the world because of the size of its army relative to its
population and because it can increase the size of the army tenfold in a
couple of days thanks to its very well-prepared reserve.
Since the Armenian proponents of the “nation-army” concepts consider
the Israeli example the object of emulation, it is necessary to discuss it in
more detail. In essence, Israel’s motives for creating a “nation-army” are not
different from those of Switzerland as it was also dictated by similar
demands of national security and ensuring the continued existence of the
state in a hostile environment. Palestine was divided into two equal parts—
14,000 square kilometers each—on the basis of a UN resolution adopted on
November 29, 1947. Israel recognized that resolution, and on the day of
the expiration of the British Mandate—14 May, 1948—it declared inde-
pendence. Palestinian Arabs and Arab countries refused to recognize the
resolution and on the very next day declared war on Israel, but were forced
to agree to a cease-fire after suffering a crushing defeat. Thus, having been
denied the prospect of peaceful coexistence, Israel was forced to rely exclu-
sively on its own military power and to improve its army in order to ensure
its continued existence, which then allowed it to score victories in the
subsequent wars. The atmosphere in the Arab-Israeli conflict improved
radically after the signing of the Camp David accords in 1978–1979 and
after the ratification of the peace treaties Israel signed with Egypt and
Jordan. In 1993, Israel was recognized by the Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation (PLO), which laid the foundation for the process of Israeli-Palestin-
ian reconciliation, which has not been concluded yet. It should be added
that in addition to its core mission of guaranteeing the state’s continued
existence and security, the process of building the Israeli army has indirectly
140 7 PEACE WITH NEIGHBORS HAS NO GOOD ALTERNATIVES
period between 1994 and 2008, the Armenian economy is going through a
period of horrible decline, and what is even worse, there is no prospect of
improvement. As they say, there is no light at the end of the tunnel. It is not
to say that no wealth is being created in Armenia. Wealth is being created,
but it is being plundered by high-ranking officials and being spent on the
development of their businesses, on mansions, on lion hunts in Africa, and
what is left over is parked in foreign bank accounts. Just to give you an idea
of the size of the plunder, I can assure you that it would be sufficient for
having a Karabagh with 300,000 inhabitants and an army equipped with
supermodern weapons. If the state of the Armenian economy was not
catastrophic, the authorities would have never passed the scandalous law
of begging the people to pay 1000 drams11 per month for the care of
wounded soldiers and the families of soldiers killed in action, which, as a
first step toward the “nation-army” concept did nothing but discredit it and
which made us look ridiculous in the eyes of the world. No one should pin
substantial hopes on the Diaspora for material assistance either. First, why
should the Diaspora help Armenia if the country’s wealth is being plundered
by its rulers? Second, while being grateful to the major benefactors and the
ordinary Armenians of the Diaspora for their humanitarian assistance during
the period of independence, we should not forget that that assistance has
never exceeded 2–3 percent of our annual budget. You have to agree that
that is an insignificant contribution for such a costly endeavor as building a
“nation-army.” Even if Armenia’s entire budget was dedicated to that
program, it would have been insufficient.
Let us now answer the following question: what is the imperative dictat-
ing the creation of a “nation-army” and what are the motives behind the
idea? As we saw, in the case of the Mongols, the motive was conquest, while
in the case of Switzerland and Israel, it was ensuring the security of those
peoples and the continued survival of their states. To speak of plans of
conquest is ridiculous, if we ignore the delusional nonsense about capturing
Baku, Western Armenia, and creating an Armenia from sea to sea. As far as
ensuring the security of our people and the survival of our state is
concerned, the Swiss example is irrelevant, because the medieval period is
long behind us, and the relations between states are regulated on the basis of
totally different principles of international law. Armenia’s problems then
seem to be comparable to Israel’s. They are, but with some serious caveats.
I pointed out already that the root of the protracted Arab-Israeli con-
frontation was the reality created by the Arab states’ refusal to abide by the
UN resolution of November 29, 1947, about the partition of Palestine and
142 7 PEACE WITH NEIGHBORS HAS NO GOOD ALTERNATIVES
the war they launched against Israel the day after the adoption of the
resolution. Israel, therefore, had no choice but to rely on its own resources
and to embark on the creation of the “nation-army.” In other words, Israel
was forced to do so from the very beginning, rather than coming to the idea
as a matter of a choice. By the way, Israel’s concerns have not been fully
ameliorated after the peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, because 21 Arab
and Islamic states still do not recognize Israel contrary to the spirit of the
UN Charter.
Let us now see whether Armenia is compelled to follow Israel’s footsteps
even if resources are available. Unlike Israel, Armenia is recognized by all
the member-states of the UN, with the exception of Pakistan. Armenia does
not have diplomatic relations only with two of its four neighbors—Turkey
and Azerbaijan. The relations with the other two neighbors—Iran and
Georgia—have been warm and friendly from the very beginning, and
these relations are not only unlikely to be disrupted, but they show all the
signs of becoming deeper and more effective, given the mutual interests and
the geopolitical reality. Since its independence, Israel has fought six large-
scale wars with four of its neighbors—Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon
(1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982, and 2006)—not counting its massive
strike against the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981. In contrast, Armenia has
been in a military confrontation only with one of its neighbors—Azerbaijan.
In this regard, it is worth remembering that Armenia’s current situation is
different not only from Israel’s but also from the situation of the first
Armenian republic, which during the two and a half years of its existence
fought wars with three of its four neighbors—Azerbaijan, Georgia, and
Turkey.
The elimination of disputes with Turkey and Azerbaijan and the estab-
lishment of good-neighborly relations with them depends on the resolution
of only one problem—the Karabagh conflict—which I will address in more
detail shortly. It is also not unimportant that despite the unconditional
support Turkey has granted Azerbaijan on that issue, it has not committed
any hostile act against Armenia, other than the blockade, and it has not been
able to prevent the territorial expansion of Karabagh. Moreover, and this
may sound paradoxical, by encouraging Azerbaijan to become more intran-
sigent with its verbal support, Turkey has in a way contributed to the
successes of the Karabagh army. Had it adopted a neutral stance in the
conflict, instead of siding with Azerbaijan and nudging it toward intransi-
gence, the latter would not have lost the other five regions following the loss
3 PEACE, RECONCILIATION, AND GOOD-NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS 143
replaced with a better sounding and more attractive brand. More specifi-
cally, not having drawn any lessons from the bitter experience of the past
18 years, the regime has decided to continue with the failed policy of
permanent confrontation with Turkey and Azerbaijan, which has already
visited many social, demographic, and psychological disasters on Armenia
and Karabagh in that short period. This program means enduring these
disasters for another 18 years until nothing will be left of Armenia and
Karabagh and the problem will be solved by becoming irrelevant.
It has been said many times that the main guarantee for Armenia’s
security, economic development, and the improvement of its demographic
situation is the resolution of the Nagorno Karabagh conflict and the nor-
malization of Armenian-Turkish relations. It turns out, however, that even
the past 18 years were not enough for grasping this elementary truth. In
reality, there is only one problem—the resolution of the Nagorno Karabagh
conflict. After that the Armenian-Turkish relations will be normalized
automatically. And no method other than the phased solution for that
conflict exists. The proposal for a compromise solution that is on the
negotiating table today is in essence the same proposal that was on the
table in 1997—in exchange for ceding certain territories Karabagh receives
an internationally recognized transitional status, leaving the determination
of the final status to the future and guaranteed by the deployment of
peacekeeping forces on the line of contact between Armenian and
Azerbaijani armed forces.
The modern world does not recognize the right of the conqueror and
the law of the jungle, and no method other than compromises exists for
resolving conflicts. The example of Israel, so admired by our hardliners who
still think in the “Bank Ottoman” terms and keep shouting “not an inch of
land,” proves that as well. In order to conclude the peace deal at Camp
David, Israel returned the approximately 60,000 square kilometers of ter-
ritory of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt and granted autonomy to Arab
Palestine in exchange for recognition of its statehood by the PLO, being
also prepared to recognize Palestine’s full independence after the resolution
of certain problems. These were difficult and painful compromises for which
Anwar Sadat and Yitzhak Rabin even paid with their lives. So, if there is a
lesson to learn from Israel, it is not the “nation-army” lesson but the lesson
of its Peace Now movement. Only superpowers are “allowed” to violate the
rule about compromise solutions to conflicts. Saddam Hussein, who did not
understand this, destroyed both himself and his own country by conquering
Kuwait.
3 PEACE, RECONCILIATION, AND GOOD-NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS 145
and which is fully consistent with the vital interests of the people of Armenia
and Karabagh. Of course, that program can be implemented only if the
Congress wins the elections or secures a sizeable presence in the parliament.
But since the elections are still far in the future, and even after that
Armenia will remain a presidential republic till April 2018, we must take
into account the fact that Serge Sarsgyan’s administration and the parties
that form its base will have the responsibility for resolving the Karabagh
conflict. The other political forces, including the Armenian National Con-
gress, have no levers of influence over that process other than expressing
their opinions. That certainly does not mean that they should not assume
moral responsibility, even if they cannot assume legal responsibility, and that
therefore they should step aside. On an issue as important for the entire
nation as the resolution of the Karabagh conflict, political forces, civic
organizations, and the intellectuals who support peace and reconciliation
must lend their support to the authorities regardless of their attitude toward
them. We have always been guided by this principle whenever there has
been an external danger or a danger of domestic instability as evidenced by
our stance during the events of October 27,17 the April War,18 or the crisis
brought about by the actions of the Mavericks of Sassoon.19
The other political forces are either the proponents of no compromise
and “not an inch of land” positions, or they keep silent out of fear that they
will be called traitors. Even though most of the people screaming “not an
inch of land” have had no connection to the acquisition of those lands and
even though many of them are warming their hands on the blood of soldiers
and freedom fighters as Varuzhan Avetisyan20 has correctly observed, we
should not consider their existence out of the ordinary. Such extremist
forces exist even in developed democracies, including in Israel, which has
been amply discussed in this speech. What is out of the ordinary is the
behavior of the representatives of the Republican Party and the parties of the
coalition. No member of that party and no member of the government has
made public statements on the prospects for a compromise solution beyond
vague and general words. In essence, they have abandoned their president
in the task of countering opponents and preparing the public for peace.
That should indeed have been their task, not the task of the Armenian
National Congress. It is high time to realize that in order to succeed in
resolving the Karabagh conflict, Serge Sargsyan must emerge as a leader
who enjoys the support of the majority of the public, political forces, and
civic organizations, not as a weak leader with serious problems in his own
country. He should be encouraged to make the decisive move toward the
3 PEACE, RECONCILIATION, AND GOOD-NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS 147
First, the readiness to stand by the authorities when there are external
threats and when there is a need to insure domestic stability is a
principled stance, and in no way means cooperation with the regime.
We have been their toughest, most principled, and consistent critics,
and we shall not stop, ruling out any possibility of entering a coalition
with the Republican Party, which has brought countless disasters
upon the Armenian people. We are completely different, or rather
we are complete opposites in terms of our ideological, political, and
moral principles, therefore our relations can never be outside of the
government-opposition format.
Second, the leadership of Azerbaijan will be deeply mistaken if it
interprets the conciliatory spirit of this speech and the Armenian
people’s desire for peace as a sign of weakness and if it decides to
harden its position. I think the April War should have proven to them
that in times of danger, the Armenian people are capable of uniting
and striking back at any aggression in the most forceful fashion.
Whenever it happens, Azerbaijan will suffer a bitter defeat and lose
several more regions if it initiates a war. And what will happen after
that only God knows. Despite his belligerent rhetoric, I consider
148 7 PEACE WITH NEIGHBORS HAS NO GOOD ALTERNATIVES
(a) You cede the part to be able to keep the other part
(b) You cede nothing, you lose everything
(c) Those who keep the part are declared traitors, while those who lose
everything are lionized as patriots.
Why are we then creating this headache for ourselves? Because there is no
other force in Armenia that is willing to stare truth in the eye. If we go silent,
the light of reason will be extinguished completely. Therefore, regardless of
the labels we are going to earn, I propose that the Armenian National
Congress stands in these elections with “Peace, Reconciliation, and Good-
neighborly Relations” as its slogan. It cannot fail to be appreciated by the
majority of our people, because there is no other path toward the salvation,
security, and development of Armenia and Karabagh. Authoritative political
scientists and economists, including a fellow Armenian—Daron Acemyan24
—are already classifying Armenia as a failed state along with Afghanistan,
Somalia, Libya, Yemen, South Sudan, Iraq, and other similar states. The
“Peace, Reconciliation, and Good-neighborly Relations” platform creates
an opportunity to leave that unfortunate company in a short period of time.
As regards the tactics of the Armenian National Congress, I think it would be
desirable to participate in the parliamentary elections in an alliance formed
around that political slogan or platform. Our doors must be open to political
parties that want to form such an alliance.
Concluding my speech, I would like to clarify the position of the Arme-
nian National Congress on the issue of the resolution of the Karabagh
conflict, even if it is going to involve some reiteration of what already has
been said. That position rests on the following objective starting points:
NOTES 149
(a) Armenia and Karabagh are less secure and are deprived of a chance of
developing and prospering without a resolution to that conflict. The
past 18 years were a sufficient proof of that.
(b) There is no other solution that what is on the negotiating table
today. If we lose the opportunity, the next solution will be worse
than what is available today.
(c) The parties should not perceive themselves as winners or losers
following the resolution, otherwise there will be a permanent danger
of resumption of the conflict.
(d) The Armenian National Congress, as was already pointed out, has no
levers of influencing the process of resolution other than expressing
an opinion.
(e) The responsibility for resolving the conflict rests with the current
administration and the political forces forming its base. Do they want
to pay attention to what we are saying? Good. If they don’t, may
God be with them.
(f) If our government succeeds in getting a better, more victorious
solution, we will only welcome it and we will apologize to them.
(g) We equally mourn the losses and suffering the conflict inflicted on
the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis and we sincerely believe in the
peaceful coexistence and the establishment of good-neighborly rela-
tions between the two peoples
Perhaps my speech turned out to be too depressing, but my goal was not to
demoralize people. To the contrary, it was motivated by the desire to show a
hopeful and dignified way out of the current situations to our people, whose
only source of joy and pride today is Henrikh Mkhitaryan.25
NOTES
1. Fourth Estate, March 20, 2015; Ilur.am, March 20, 2015.
2. (See forum.hyeclub.com 11.09.2008.)
3. Armenian revolutionary parties pursued a strategy of attracting European
great powers’ attention after they emerged in the late nineteenth century by
engaging in demonstrative and provocative behavior. Gum Gapu refers to
the kidnapping of the patriarch from the main church of the patriarchate by
members of the Social Democratic Hnchak Party, which was located in a
square under that name, and forcing him to deliver a petition to the Sultan.
150 7 PEACE WITH NEIGHBORS HAS NO GOOD ALTERNATIVES
They were arrested on their way to the Sultan’s palace. Repressions against
Armenians followed.
4. In 1896 members of the ARF took over the main office of the Ottoman
Bank and issued a set of demands. They were evacuated thanks to the
mediation of several European ambassadors, but the Ottoman government
responded with a massacre, which killed 6000 Armenians.
5. In 1920, Armenian paramilitaries attacked the barracks of an Azerbaijani
army unit in Shushi. The Azerbaijani unit repulsed the attack and went on
the offensive against the Armenian districts of the city, killing more than 500
and expelling 25,000 Armenians.
6. In the summer of 1920 the Armenian government launched an offensive to
capture the coal mines near the town of Olti on the Armenian-Turkish
border, which led to a war ending in Armenia’s defeat in November 1920.
Armenia lost 30,000 square kilometers, which was half of the country’s
territory, as a result.
7. In February 1921, the ARF, which had been ousted from power by the
Bolsheviks three months earlier, launched an armed insurrection, which led
to a civil war.
8. Ilur.am, 24 March, 2015.
9. Three more states—Austria (2015), Luxemburg (2015), and Germany
(2016)—have recognized the Armenian genocide since the publication of
the article.
10. Ilur.am, 17 December, 2016.
11. That is the equivalent of slightly more than $2.
12. Kelbajar is one of the two Azerbaijani districts that separated Karabagh from
Armenia, Lachin being the other. Lachin was captured by Armenian forces in
May, 1992. Kelbajar was captured in early 1993 in what became a prelude of
a larger military operation resulting in the capture of five more Azerbaijani
districts outside of Nagorno Karabagh.
13. This is the catchy refrain of Armenian revisionism, claiming territories that
stretch from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.
14. This is a somewhat more reserved version of Armenian revisionism, claiming
territories between the Kura and Arax rivers.
15. This is a reference to a claim by former Prime Minister Tigran Sargsyan that
the second largest city of Armenia, which still has not recovered from the
consequences of the 1988 earthquake, should be turned into some kind of a
technology center.
16. This is a reference to another statement by the same Tigran Sargsyan about
turning the town of Dilijan into a banking center.
17. On October 27, 1999, terrorists killed eight members of the Armenian
parliament and government during a session of the National Assembly,
including the prime minister and the chairman of the National Assembly.
NOTES 151
Whereas, on October 16, 1991, the Republic of Armenia held its first
multiparty presidential election selecting Levon Ter-Petrossian, a former
political prisoner, as its first president; and
Whereas these elections have been recognized as being free and fair:
Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That
the Congress:
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, historians may well say that the
collapse of communism in the Soviet bloc began not in the heart of Russia
or Central Europe, but in Armenia. In February 1988, the Armenian people
engaged in a courageous protest against the corrupt Communist regime
that had been imposed on them by the Kremlin. This revolt against Com-
munist rule in the USSR served as a model and inspiration for the uprisings
that took place in Central Europe later in the year.
Having inspired the people of Central Europe, the people of Armenia
were emboldened in turn by the collapse of the Berlin Wall. In August,
1990, Armenia’s democratically elected parliament passed a declaration of
its intent to become independent; in September 1991, the Republic voted
overwhelmingly to become independent; and on October 16, Levon
Ter-Petrossian was elected President with 83 percent of the vote. Observers
from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe praised these
elections.
President Ter-Petrossian deserves not only our admiration, but our
support. He has adopted a path of moderation and cooperation with the
Soviet authorities. Under his leadership, Armenia has been the only
APPENDIX 155
Republic to follow the complex procedure for secession that was set forth by
President Gorbachev. Armenia has also decided recently to join the newly
established Soviet economic community. As Ter-Petrossian stated before
the Armenian parliament, Armenia will pursue “complete political indepen-
dence,” in addition to “the maximum participation in all constructive
processes” going on in the former Soviet Union. President Ter-Petrossian
has also played a constructive role in the negotiations over the status of
Nagorno-Karabagh.
At the same time, President Ter-Petrossian recognizes that the Soviet
Union cannot be put back together again. If individual republics want full
sovereignty, as Armenia does, neither the Soviet central authorities nor the
international community should stand in its way.
Mr. President, given our belief in democracy and self-government, the
manifest desire of the Armenian people to be independent, and the respon-
sible policies of President Ter-Petrossian, I am introducing a resolution
today, with Senator Pressler and Senator Simon, which expresses the sense
of the Senate that the U.S. government should extend formal diplomatic
recognition to the Republic of Armenia and support its application to join
international organizations, including the United Nations and the Confer-
ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
The Armenian people deserve such recognition. Their march toward
independence demonstrates that they are as dedicated to freedom as any
of the peoples of the former Soviet Union. This dedication and sense of
purpose has existed for centuries. It survived their long and lonely period of
suffering as involuntary members of the Czarist, Ottoman, and Communist
empires, including the horrors and genocide that were visited upon them
during World War I. We owe this courageous people our support, admira-
tion, and diplomatic recognition.
(February 9, 1993)4
(September 8, 2008)6
Ter-Petrosyan once pointed at the Alican border gate and told me: “Look,
if this gate is opened, people will see and know each other; they will
commingle with each other. We will end up buying many things we need
from you. This will help the resolution of the problems of the past.”
However, we have a strange reticence. We are a country with too many
red lines and taboos. We are told that “Armenia is hostile to us” and that “it
has territorial claims on Turkey.” It is time to distinguish between rhetoric
and the realities of life.
N.D. What are the realities of life?
V.V. People may say, demand, and dream certain things rhetorically. They may
dream about a very large Armenia. There is no limit to dreaming. However,
the realities are evident. Can Armenia take any land from Turkey? Which
sensible person can contemplate that? The number of soldiers in our armed
forces is as big as the entire population of Armenia. We must have more
confidence in ourselves.
N.D. The man in the street may harbor fears or may be made to harbor
fears, but how do you explain the phobias and red lines of military and
civilian bureaucrats who know the realities?
V.V. This is Turkey. The Foreign Ministry is cautious, as expected. Acting with
extreme caution is a rule of that profession, but no problem can be solved
without taking any risks. This also partly reflects a desire to avoid the risk of
being criticized by the Turkish public. The entire problem is this: There is a
certain circumstance and you can either become the slave of that
circumstance or find ways of changing it. We became a slave of the
circumstances.
N.D. Turkey became a slave of the Armenian question.
V.V. Yes. We should have sought another equation to solve this issue, but the
risk was not taken out of fears of making mistakes and facing criticism at
home. As a result, we reduced ourselves to the point of doing nothing.
N.D. As diplomatic relations develop with Armenia, will the events of the
past be discussed?
V.V. They will be discussed inevitably. In my opinion, this is not an impediment
blocking the normalization of relations. The term “genocide” is a
descriptor that was created long after our historic events. However, this
descriptor has become largely banal today. Every inhuman act is termed
“genocide” at some point. There is little doubt that the events we went
through had very painful and tragic aspects. There is also little doubt that
the Armenians see them as a tremendous act of injustice against them. It is
fact that they think that they were forcefully uprooted from the places
where they were born and raised. You cannot erase those sentiments. You
cannot tell them not to think this way. Nonetheless, you can tell them:
“Yes, these events occurred, but we cannot spend our lives on those events.
164 APPENDIX
We have another life ahead of us. Let us build that life together in
friendship.”
N.D. Does Armenia really expect only this little from Turkey in connection
with history? Is it enough to say these to them to establish peace?
V.V. The Armenians will of course stir up the issue of genocide. They will seek
ways of doing that. There will always be movements to make the entire
world accept this position. In the meantime, the establishment of a “joint
history commission” between the two countries may, at first glance, be a
good step forward, but I think that Armenia is not in a position to make a
significant contribution with respect to history. In my opinion, the
problem is not in history. I do not share the assumption that the
historical facts are not known. The facts are known. Very many things are
known. The whole problem is how these known facts are perceived, what
marks they have left, and how those marks can affect the future.
N.D. I did not understand.
V.V. An Armenian may sincerely think that what happened to his nation was
genocide. We may think otherwise. If we get stuck on this, we cannot get
anywhere. Arguing that “the historians should clarify this to us” means
giving too much importance to historians. Every historian has a different
interpretation of every event. The problem revolves around how the
psychological problem will be overcome. Ter-Petrosyan told me: “Let us
put that issue to one side. Let us look at the future. It is obvious that we will
not reach an agreement on this issue. We should allow the two peoples to
commingle by other means. Let us bypass the genocide issue this way.” I
also think that this is what needs to be done. There is no point in delving
too much into this issue.
N.D. There is a very large Armenian Diaspora, mainly in the United States
and France. Will they not insist on the recognition of the genocide?
V.V. Of course they will. However, if relations between Turkey and Armenia
improve, the Diaspora cannot have its present influence. This is because the
people of Armenia will see the concrete benefits of good neighborly ties.
When the borders open, trade will grow and they will become rich.
N.D. Could Turkey acknowledge that the Ittihadists perpetrated a great
massacre of the Armenians?
V.V. That would be hard. I think that we painted ourselves into a corner.
Initially, we acted as if nothing like this happened. Now we are saying
that “yes, some things happened but they were reciprocal.” I do not know
where these discussions may go tomorrow, but I think certain
psychological steps may be taken on this issue.
N.D. What can be done?
V.V. What would I do if I was in a position of authority? I would say: “All
Armenians and members other minorities who lived within the current
APPENDIX 165
borders of Turkey at the time of the Ottoman Empire and who were
subjected to deportation in one way or another—even if this deportation
was to other regions of the Empire—will be admitted to Turkish
citizenship automatically if they request it.” I do not know how many
people would take up this offer, but, at a minimum, people who were
driven out of their villages, towns, or cities by force would have been told:
“The republic is granting you and people of your ancestry the right to
return and to become citizens of this country.” People who apply would be
granted this right.
N.D. So what would happen to the properties and assets the Armenians left
behind during the deportation?
V.V. These can be discussed. A fund may be established. The return of the
properties and providing a full accounting for them is now very difficult,
but a symbolic reparation is possible. What matters is that we show that we
are not insensitive in the face of a painful situation, that we empathize with
the situation, and that we are considering certain ways of compensation as a
humanitarian responsibility. I would actually apologize. It is quite
debatable under what conditions but [. . .]. Regardless, if someone is
forced to leave this country [. . .]. I do not mean this only for Armenians.
I also mean it with respect to people who left after the 6–7 September
[1955] incidents. I mean it with respect to our Greek citizens.
N.D. When you say “apologize,” what form of apology do you have in
mind?
V.V. These events are unbecoming for Turkey. We do not approve them. The
people who were forced to leave this country have our sympathy. We see
them as our brothers. If they wish, we are prepared to admit them to
Turkish citizenship.
N.D. And we apologize for the pain we have caused them.
V.V. Yes. For the pain [. . .]. Yes. These are the best steps that can be taken. This
is what a state like ours should do.
While so much else in the Soviet nation is reeling with political fury and
dire warning, Mr. Ter-Petrosyan, the new President of the Armenian
republic, is carving a different path to the very same full independence
that far more celebrated republics like Lithuania and Georgia are seeking
in headlined confrontations.
President Ter-Petrosyan is a 46-year-old Oriental scholar, once
imprisoned by the Gorbachev Government, who has lately been giving
lessons in finessing the Kremlin rather than railing against it. Behind the
Scenes in Lithuania.
He was a critical figure in volunteering as a behind-the-scenes mediator
in calming the January crisis in Lithuania after Soviet troops killed 16 civilian
independence demonstrators.
He successfully disarmed his own republic’s spirited nationalist guerrilla
gangs rather than pander to them for short-term populist gains and face
long-term law-and-order headaches.
He barred, without melodramatic comment, Mr. Gorbachev’s vague
national unity referendum from his voting booths last month as an obvious
act of propaganda rather than self-determination. Far more, he counter-
moved by scheduling a September independence plebiscite here.
The plebiscite would appear to be a minor masterpiece of political
craftsmanship, for it is the first to be composed within the legal require-
ments of the Soviet Constitution, with a six-month advance notice to the
Kremlin. It therefore is less easily dismissed by Kremlin strategists steeped in
techniques of legalistic diktat.
The Ter-Petrosyan plebiscite also has the candid premise that Armenia
will, unlike other republics, be glad to take years to complete the break, to
build the free-market economic underpinnings Mr. Ter-Petrosyan views as
critical to surviving independently on something more than oratory.
New-Era Soviet Politician.
“Mr. Gorbachev was trained by our competitors,” Mr. Ter-Petrosyan
says, assessing him as a worthy leader of a lost, dangerously terminal, cause,
a leader who must be prodded for his own sake now, he stresses, by Western
governments trapped in the time warp of Gorbomania.
“Right now Western aid is strengthening the position of the central
Government conservatives,” he says, warning that the West must accept a
basic fact that Mr. Gorbachev helped sow and now is resisting: “The very
idea of the Soviet Union is now unthinkable in any other form but a
partnership, like the European community.”
APPENDIX 167
The Armenian leader is the sort of new-era Soviet politician who can
smile as he concedes casually that Mr. Gorbachev, in trying to ride the tired
tiger of Communism, might yet resort to some return to totalitarianism.
“But it must fail,” he said in an interview, turning his cigarette holder as if
fine-focusing the future. “Sooner or later Mr. Gorbachev and the central
Government will have to accept the new reality that the republics already are
exercising real power out here, and that bloodless political ways are begin-
ning to be found to solving problems.”
Here on the streets of this dusty, downtrodden capital, the success of
President Ter-Petrosyan’s fresh new politics is undeniable in rallying the
popular spirit of this southern republic. Slow, Quiet Success.
Hundreds of thousands of refugees were created by the 1988 earthquake
and by the explosion of inter-ethnic violence in Baku, the capital of the rival
Azerbaijan republic. Mr. Ter-Petrosyan agrees his agenda includes such
seemingly intractable issues as Nagorno-Karabagh, the embattled,
Armenian-populated enclave ruled by Azerbaijan. But he claims slow suc-
cess in building new contacts with Azerbaijani officials on a quiet basis.
In Armenia, Mr. Ter-Petrosyan’s chief critic is Parvir Airikyan, a charis-
matic fellow dissident. He arrived from American exile after
Mr. Ter-Petrosyan’s political success was forged and he has criticized the
President for not confronting Moscow enough.
“As long as people see we are pursuing realistic policy, they will remain
on our side,” says Mr. Ter-Petrosyan.
The closest run-in they had was over Mr. Airikyan’s attempt to seize a
city Communist Party building in what he called fair compensation for his
years in prison as a dissident nationalist. President Ter-Petrosyan sent militia
to evict him on the grounds that the new Armenia had to demonstrate more
lawful ways if its drive for independence is to be taken seriously. Taking on
Tradition.
In the highly energized, newly insurgent Parliament, the President went
against the grain of traditional Armenian politics on the subject of Turkey,
which brutally uprooted Armenian civilians in World War I, when vast
numbers of them died by starvation and massacre. He urged that a heated
denunciation of that history be deleted from some early independence
legislation, keeping in mind that a truly free Armenia would want a new
era of closer relations with its neighbors.
He lost that legislative fight but suffered little in public esteem as a man
looking for fresh ways to engage the future. The Armenian leader’s style is
168 APPENDIX
to resist, then reject Mr. Gorbachev’s initiatives but not make a habit of
announcing it. “We are not subordinate to Soviet law,” he says simply.
But his technique also is to keep splitting the difference with the Kremlin.
For example, while Lithuania dramatically used the draft issue to order its
young men not to serve in the Soviet army and turned them into pawns who
were arrested and prosecuted, Mr. Ter-Petrosyan has gradually negotiated a
workable compromise directly with military officials. It lets most young
Armenian men serve within the republic, but protects the careers of others
who wish to serve elsewhere. Avoiding Confrontation.
“We did not act as the Lithuanians did,” He says. “We try and avoid
unnecessary confrontation. Our policy is more flexible. The only lesson that
could be drawn from the Lithuanian event was that policy had to be more
flexible,” he said, referring to his mediator’s role there as a member of a
presidential panel.
Characteristically, Mr. Ter-Petrosyan got appointed to it by privately
contacting Lithuanian and Kremlin officials so that finally it could be seen
as Mr. Gorbachev’s calming idea.
“I met with Gorbachev, and after that meeting I understood that the
worst had been left behind,” he says. He concluded that while
Mr. Gorbachev had decided to let the hard-line centrists crack down in
Lithuania with “an attempted coup,” he at least was smart enough to
retreat. Mr. Ter-Petrosyan estimates that by the fall even Mr. Gorbachev
will begin conceding the de facto rise of republic power more realistically,
and to the point where the republics will find the tables turned and begin
worrying about the central Government’s stability.
“We see that the Soviet Union is no longer a reliable guarantor of our
future,” he says. “That is why we have to create our own guarantees of our
existence.”
NOTES
1. Congressional Record, 102nd Congress (1991–1992), pp. S16459–S16460.
2. Archives of First President, folder 03/3.13.01.1993.
3. Archives of First President, folder 03/5.17.02.1998.
4. Archives of First President, folder 03/3.09.02.1993.
5. haqqin.az/news/96114, March 30, 2017.
6. Translated by Ara Arabian: forum.hyeclub.com, 11.09.2008.
7. The New York Times, 15.04.1991.
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I M
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Oskanian, V., 36, 64, 67–9, 93, 105,
106
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174 INDEX
P T
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Pan-Turkism, 3, 5, 14, 20n1 106
Paris conference, 112 Treaty of Batumi, 56
Peace Now movement, 144 Treaty of Berlin, 28, 134
phased plan, 116 Treaty of Kars, 40, 41, 58n10,
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Woodrow Wilson’s Arbitral Award, 121,
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S
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Sevres Peace Treaty, 121
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soccer diplomacy, 6, 92–5, 100 Z
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