EN BANC

[G.R. No. 118303. January 31, 1996]

SENATOR HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, SENATOR JOSE D. LINA, JR.,

MR. NICASIO B. BAUTISTA, MR. JESUS P. GONZAGA, MR.
SOLOMON D. MAYLEM, LEONORA C. MEDINA, CASIANO S.
ALIPON, petitioners, vs. HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in
his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. RAFAEL ALUNAN, in
his capacity as Secretary of Local Government, HON.
SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget,
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON. JOSE MIRANDA, in his
capacity as Municipal Mayor of Santiago and HON. CHARITO
MANUBAY, HON. VICTORINO MIRANDA, JR., HON. ARTEMIO
ALVAREZ, HON. DANILO VERGARA, HON. PETER DE JESUS,
HON. NELIA NATIVIDAD, HON. CELSO CALEON and HON. ABEL
MUSNGI, in their capacity as SANGGUNIANG BAYAN
MEMBERS, MR. RODRIGO L. SANTOS, in his capacity as
Municipal Treasurer, and ATTY. ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, in his
capacity as Municipal Administrator, respondents.

DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

Of main concern to the petitioners is whether Republic Act No. 7720, just recently
passed by Congress and signed by the President into law, is constitutionally infirm.
Indeed, in this Petition for Prohibition with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction, petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act No.
7720, entitled, An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an
Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago, mainly because the
Act allegedly did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as mandated
by Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Also, petitioners claim that the Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum
average annual income required under Section 450 of the Local Government Code of
1991 in order to be converted into a component city.
Undisputed is the following chronicle of the metamorphosis of House Bill No. 8817
into Republic Act No. 7720:
 On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled An Act Converting
the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the
City of Santiago, was filed in the House of Representatives with Representative Antonio
Abaya as principal author. Other sponsors included Representatives Ciriaco Alfelor,
Rodolfo Albano, Santiago Respicio and Faustino Dy. The bill was referred to the House
Committee on Local Government and the House Committee on Appropriations
on May 5, 1993.
On May 19, 1993, June 1, 1993, November 28, 1993, and December 1, 1993,
public hearings on HB No. 8817 were conducted by the House Committee on Local
Government. The committee submitted to the House a favorable report, with
amendments, on December 9, 1993.
On December 13, 1993, HB No. 8817 was passed by the House of Representatives
on Second Reading and was approved on Third Reading on December 17, 1993.
On January 28, 1994, HB No. 8817 was transmitted to the Senate.
Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243, entitled, An Act
Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent] Component City to be
Known as the City of Santiago, was filed in the Senate. It was introduced by Senator
Vicente Sotto III, as principal sponsor, on May 19, 1993. This was just after the House
of Representatives had conducted its first public hearing on HB No. 8817.
On February 23, 1994, or a little less than a month after HB No. 8817 was
transmitted to the Senate, the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted
public hearings on SB No. 1243. On March 1, 1994, the said committee submitted
Committee Report No. 378 on HB No. 8817, with the recommendation that it be
approved without amendment, taking into consideration the reality that H.B. No. 8817
was on all fours with SB No. 1243. Senator Heherson T. Alvarez, one of the herein
petitioners, indicated his approval thereto by signing said report as member of the
Committee on Local Government.
On March 3, 1994, Committee Report No. 378 was passed by the Senate on
Second Reading and was approved on Third Reading on March 14, 1994. On March
22, 1994, the House of Representatives, upon being apprised of the action of the
Senate, approved the amendments proposed by the Senate.
The enrolled bill, submitted to the President on April 12, 1994, was signed by the
Chief Executive on May 5, 1994 as Republic Act No. 7720. When a plebiscite on the Act
was held on July 13, 1994, a great majority of the registered voters of Santiago voted in
favor of the conversion of Santiago into a city.
The question as to the validity of Republic Act No. 7720 hinges on the following twin
issues: (I) Whether or not the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) are to be included in
the computation of the average annual income of a municipality for purposes of its
conversion into an independent component city, and (II) Whether or not, considering
that the Senate passed SB No. 1243, its own version of HB No. 8817, Republic Act No.
7720 can be said to have originated in the House of Representatives.
 I

The annual income of a local

government unit includes the IRAs
-----------------------------------------------------------
Petitioners claim that Santiago could not qualify into a component city because its
average annual income for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant
prices falls below the required annual income of Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00)
for its conversion into a city, petitioners having computed Santiagos average annual
income in the following manner:

Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for 1991 P20,379,057.07

Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for 1992 P21,570,106.87

Total income for 1991 and 1992 P41,949,163.94

Minus:

IRAs for 1991 and 1992 P15,730,043.00

Total income for 1991 and 1992 P26,219,120.94

Average Annual Income P13,109,960.47

By dividing the total income of Santiago for calendar years 1991 and 1992, after
deducting the IRAs, the average annual income arrived at would only be
P13,109,560.47 based on the 1991 constant prices. Thus, petitioners claim
that Santiagos income is far below the aforesaid Twenty Million Pesos average annual
income requirement.
The certification issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the
Department of Finance, which indicates Santiagos average annual income to be
P20,974,581.97, is allegedly not accurate as the Internal Revenue Allotments were not
excluded from the computation. Petitioners asseverate that the IRAs are not actually
income but transfers and! or budgetary aid from the national government and that they
fluctuate, increase or decrease, depending on factors like population, land and equal
sharing.
In this regard, we hold that petitioners asseverations are untenable because Internal
Revenue Allotments form part of the income of Local Government Units.
It is true that for a municipality to be converted into a component city, it must,
among others, have an average annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the
last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices. 1 Such income must be
duly certified by the Department of Finance.2
Resolution of the controversy regarding compliance by
the Municipality of Santiago with the aforecited income requirement hinges on a
correlative and contextual explication of the meaning of internal revenue allotments
(IRAs) vis-a-vis the notion of income of a local government unit and the principles of
local autonomy and decentralization underlying the institutionalization and intensified
empowerment of the local government system.
A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted
by law and possessed of substantial control over its own affairs. 3 Remaining to be an
intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, but not intended, however, to be an
imperium in imperio,4 the local government unit is autonomous in the sense that it is
given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources.5 Power which used to be
highly centralized in Manila, is thereby deconcentrated, enabling especially the
peripheral local government units to develop not only at their own pace and discretion
but also with their oWn resources and assets.6
The practical side to development through a decentralized local government system
certainly concerns the matter of financial resources. With its broadened powers and
increased responsibilities, a local government unit must now operate on a much wider
scale. More extensive operations, in turn, entail more expenses. Understandably, the
vesting of duty, responsibility and accountability in every local government unit is
accompanied with a provision for reasonably adequate resources to discharge its
powers and effectively carry out its functions.7 Availment of such resources is
effectuated through the vesting in every local government unit of (1) the right to create
and broaden its own source of revenue; (2) the right to be allocated a just share in
national taxes, such share being in the form of internal revenue allotments
(IRAs); and (3) the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization
and development of the national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries. 8.
The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs and national wealth utilization proceeds
accrue to the general fund of the local government and are used to finance its
operations subject to specified modes of spending the same as provided for in the Local
Government Code and its implementing rules and regulations. For instance, not less
than twenty percent (20%) of the IRAs must be set aside for local development
projects.9 As such, for purposes of budget preparation, which budget should reflect the
estimates of the income of the local government unit, among others, the IRAs and the
share in the national wealth utilization proceeds are considered items of income.
This is as it should be, since income is defined in the Local Government Code to
be all revenues and receipts collected or received forming the gross accretions of funds
of the local government unit.10
The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the
funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the
local treasury without need of any further action on the part of the local government
unit.11 They thus constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon
as the source of much needed funds.
 For purposes of converting the Municipality of Santiago into a city, the Department
of Finance certified, among others, that the municipality had an average annual income
of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991
constant prices. This, the Department of Finance did after including the IRAs in its
computation of said average annual income.
Furthermore, Section 450 (c) of the Local Government Code provides that the
average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive
of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. To reiterate, IRAs are a regular,
recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the same as a special fund
or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the
Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or
transfers referred to when the Code speaks of funding support from the national
government, its instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled corporations.12
Thus, Department of Finance Order No. 359313 correctly encapsulizes the full import
of the above disquisition when it defined ANNUAL INCOME to be revenues and receipts
realized by provinces, cities and municipalities from regular sources of the Local
General Fund including the internal revenue allotment and other shares provided for in
Sections 284, 290 and 291 of the Code, but exclusive of non-recurring receipts, such as
other national aids, grants, financial assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fixed assets,
and similar others (Italics ours).14 Such order, constituting executive or
contemporaneous construction of a statute by an administrative agency charged with
the task of interpreting and applying the same, is entitled to full respect and should be
accorded great weight by the courts, unless such construction is clearly shown to be in
sharp conflict with the Constitution, the governing statute, or other laws. 15

II

In the enactment of RA No. 7720,

there was compliance with Section 24,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
-----------------------------------------------------------
Although a bill of local application like HB No. 8817 should, by constitutional
prescription,16 originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the claim of
petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the
Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the
House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate. Petitioners
themselves cannot disavow their own admission that HB No. 8817 was filed on April 18,
1993 while SB No. 1243 was filed on May 19, 1993. The filing of HB No. 8817 was thus
precursive not only of the said Act in question but also of SB No. 1243. Thus, HB No.
8817, was the bill that initiated the legislative process that culminated in the enactment
of Republic Act No. 7720. No violation of Section 24, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution
is perceptible under the circumstances attending the instant controversy.
 Furthermore, petitioners themselves acknowledge that HB No. 8817 was already
approved on Third Reading and duly transmitted to the Senate when the Senate
Committee on Local Government conducted its public hearing on HB No. 8817. HB No.
8817 was approved on the Third Reading on December 17, 1993 and transmitted to the
Senate on January 28, 1994; a little less than a month thereafter, or on February 23,
1994, the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted public hearings on SB
No. 1243. Clearly, the Senate held in abeyance any action on SB No. 1243 until it
received HB No. 8817, already approved on the Third Reading, from the House of
Representatives. The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt
of the bill from the House, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill
of local application should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the
Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.
We have already addressed this issue in the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary of
Finance.17 There, on the matter of the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law, which,
as a revenue bill, is nonetheless constitutionally required to originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, we explained:

x x x To begin with, it is not the law-but the revenue bill-which is required by the
Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. It is important
to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive
changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. x x x as a result
of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute-
and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the
enactment of the law-must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to
deny the Senates power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose
amendments. It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two
houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.

xxx xxx xxx

It is insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 was passed not in substitution of H. No.
11197 but of another Senate bill (S. No. 1129) earlier filed and that what the Senate
did was merely to take [H. No. 11197] into consideration in enacting S. No. 1630.
There is really no difference between the Senate preserving H. No. 11197 up to the
enacting clause and then writing its own version following the enacting clause (which,
it would seem petitioners admit is an amendment by substitution), and, on the other
hand, separately presenting a bill of its own on the same subject matter. In either case
the result are two bills on the same subject.

Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue,
tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and
bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory
that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected
to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators,
who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the
national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such
laws.

Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in
anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as
a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. x x x18

III

Every law, including RA No. 7720,

has in its favor the presumption
of constitutionality
--------------------------------------------------------------------
It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that on the side of every law lies the
presumption of constitutionality.19 Consequently, for RA No. 7720 to be nullified, it must
be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a
doubtful and equivocal one; in other words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and
beyond reasonable doubt.20 Those who petition this court to declare a law to be
unconstitutional must clearly and fully establish the basis that will justify such a
declaration; otherwise, their petition must fail. Taking into consideration the justification
of our stand on the immediately preceding ground raised by petitioners to challenge the
constitutionality of RA No. 7720, the Court stands on the holding that petitioners have
failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petition is, therefore,
inevitable.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit with costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Sources of Powers of Municipal Corporations

1) Gacal vs Municipality of Vigan

2) Pango vs Socrates

EN BANC
 [G.R. No. 110249. August 21, 1997]

ALFREDO TANO, BALDOMERO TANO, DANILO TANO, ROMUALDO

TANO, TEOCENES MIDELLO, ANGEL DE MESA, EULOGIO
TREMOCHA, FELIPE ONGONION, JR., ANDRES LINIJAN,
ROBERT LIM, VIRGINIA LIM, FELIMON DE MESA, GENEROSO
ARAGON, TEODORICO ANDRE, ROMULO DEL ROSARIO,
CHOLITO ANDRE, ERICK MONTANO, ANDRES OLIVA, VITTORIO
SALVADOR, LEOPOLDO ARAGON, RAFAEL RIBA, ALEJANDRO
LEONILA, JOSE DAMACINTO, RAMIRO MANAEG, RUBEN
MARGATE, ROBERTO REYES, DANILO PANGARUTAN, NOE
GOLPAN,ESTANISLAO ROMERO, NICANOR DOMINGO,
ROLDAN TABANG, PANGANIBAN, ADRIANO TABANG,
FREDDIE SACAMAY, MIGUEL TRIMOCHA, PACENCIO LABABIT,
PABLO H. OMPAD, CELESTINO A. ABANO, ALLAN ALMODAL,
BILLY D. BARTOLAY, ALBINO D. LIQUE, MELCHOR J. LAYSON,
MELANI AMANTE, CLARO E. YATOC, MERGELDO B. BALDEO,
EDGAR M. ALMASET A., JOSELITO MANAEG, LIBERATO
ANDRADA, JR., ROBERTO BERRY, RONALD VILLANUEVA,
EDUARDO VALMORIA, WILDREDO MENDOZA, NAPOLEON
BABANGA, ROBERTO TADEPA, RUBEN ASINGUA, SILVERIO
GABO, JERRY ROMERO, DAVID PANGAGARUTAN, DANIEL
PANGGARUTAN, ROMEO AGAWIN, FERNANDO EQUIZ, DITO
LEQUIZ, RONILO ODERABLE, BENEDICTO TORRES, ROSITO A.
VALDEZ, CRESENCIO A. SAYANG, NICOMEDES S. ACOSTA,
ERENEO A. SEGARINO, JR., WILDREDO A. RAUTO, DIOSDADO
A. ACOSTA, BONIFACIO G. SISMO, TACIO ALUBA, DANIEL B.
BATERZAL, ELISEO YBAEZ, DIOSDADO E. HANCHIC, EDDIE
ESCALICAS, ELEAZAR B. BATERZAL, DOMINADOR HALICHIC,
ROOSEVELT RISMO-AN, ROBERT C. MERCADER, TIRSO
ARESGADO, DANIEL CHAVEZ, DANILO CHAVEZ, VICTOR
VILLAROEL, ERNESTO C. YABANEZ, ARMANDO T. SANTILLAN,
RUDY S. SANTILLAN, JODJEN ILUSTRISIMO, NESTOR
SALANGRON, ALBERTO SALANGRON, ROGER L. ROXAS,
FRANCISCO T. ANTICANO, PASTOR SALANGRON,
BIENVENIDO SANTILLAN, GILBUENA LADDY, FIDEL BENJAMIN
JOVELITO BELGANO, HONEY PARIOL, ANTONIO SALANGRON,
NICASIO SALANGRON, & AIRLINE SHIPPERS ASSOCIATION OF
PALAWAN, petitioners, vs. GOV. SALVADOR P. SOCRATES,
 MEMBERS OF SANGGUNIAN PANLALAWIGAN OF PALAWAN,
namely, VICE-GOVERNOR JOEL T. REYES, JOSE D. ZABALA,
ROSALINO R. ACOSTA, JOSELITO A. CADLAON, ANDRES R.
BAACO, NELSON P. PENEYRA, CIPRIANO C. BARROMA,
CLARO E. ORDINARIO, ERNESTO A. LLACUN, RODOLFO C.
FLORDELIZA, GILBERT S. BAACO, WINSTON G. ARZAGA,
NAPOLEON F. ORDONEZ and GIL P. ACOSTA, CITY MAYOR
EDWARD HAGEDORN, MEMBERS OF SANGGUNIANG
PANLUNGSOD NG PUERTO PRINCESA, ALL MEMBERS OF
BANTAY DAGAT, MEMBERS OF PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
OF PALAWAN, PROVINCIAL AND CITY PROSECUTORS OF
PALAWAN and PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, and ALL JUDGES OF
PALAWAN, REGIONAL, MUNICIPAL AND
METROPOLITAN, respondents.

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Petitioners caption their petition as one for Certiorari, Injunction With

Preliminary Mandatory Injunction,with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and pray that this Court: (1) declare as unconstitutional: (a) Ordinance No. 15-
92, dated 15 December 1992, of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto
Princesa; (b) Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, dated 22 January 1993,
issued by Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero of Puerto Princesa City; and (c)
Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, dated 19 February 1993,
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan; (2) enjoin the enforcement
thereof; and (3) restrain respondents Provincial and City Prosecutors of
Palawan and Puerto Princesa City and Judges of Regional Trial Courts,
Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Palawan from
[1]

assuming jurisdiction over and hearing cases concerning the violation of the
Ordinances and of the Office Order.
More appropriately, the petition is, and shall be treated as, a special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition.
The following is petitioners summary of the factual antecedents giving rise
to the petition:

1. On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City

enacted Ordinance No. 15-92 which took effect on January 1, 1993 entitled: AN
ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER
OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY
1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES THEREOF, the full text of which reads as follows:

Section 1. Title of the Ordinance. - This Ordinance is entitled: AN ORDINANCE

BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE
PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998
AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
THEREOF.

Section 2. Purpose, Scope and Coverage. - To effectively free our City Sea Waters
from Cyanide and other Obnoxious substance, and shall cover all persons and/or
entities operating within and outside the City of Puerto Princesa who is are [sic]
directly or indirectly in the business or shipment of live fish and lobster outside the
City.

Section 3. Definition of terms. - For purpose of this Ordinance the following are
hereby defined:

A. SEA BASS - A kind of fish under the family of Centropomidae, better known as
APAHAP;

B. CATFISH - A kind of fish under the family of Plotosidae, better known as HITO-
HITO;

C. MUDFISH - A kind of fish under the family of Orphicaphalisae better known as

DALAG

D. ALL LIVE FISH - All alive, breathing not necessarily moving of all specie[s] use
for food and for aquarium purposes.

E. LIVE LOBSTER - Several relatively, large marine crustaceans of the genus

Homarus that are alive and breathing not necessarily moving.

Section 4. It shall be unlawful [for] any person or any business enterprise or company
to ship out from Puerto Princesa City to any point of destination either via aircraft or
seacraft of any live fish and lobster except SEA BASS, CATFISH, MUDFISH, AND
MILKFISH FRIES.

Section 5. Penalty Clause. - Any person/s and or business entity violating this
Ordinance shall be penalized with a fine of not more than P5,000.00 or imprisonment
of not more than twelve (12) months, cancellation of their permit to do business in the
City of Puerto Princesa or all of the herein stated penalties, upon the discretion of the
court.

Section 6. If the owner and/or operator of the establishment found vilating the
provisions of this ordinance is a corporation or a partnership, the penalty prescribed in
Section 5 hereof shall be imposed upon its president and/or General Manager or
Managing Partner and/or Manager, as the case maybe [sic].

Section 7. Any existing ordinance or any provision of any ordinance inconsistent to

[sic] this ordinance is deemed repealed.

Section 8. This Ordinance shall take effect on January 1, 1993.

SO ORDAINED.

xxx

2. To implement said city ordinance, then Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero issued
Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993 dated January 22, 1993 which reads as follows:

In the interest of public service and for purposes of City Ordinance No. PD426-14-74,
otherwise known as AN ORDINANCE REQUIRING ANY PERSON ENGAGED
OR INTENDING TO ENGAGE IN ANY BUSINESS, TRADE, OCCUPATION,
CALLING OR PROFESSION OR HAVING IN HIS POSSESSION ANY OF THE
ARTICLES FOR WHICH A PERMIT IS REQUIRED TO BE HAD, TO OBTAIN
FIRST A MAYORS PERMIT and City Ordinance No. 15-92, AN ORDINANCE
BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE
PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998, you
are hereby authorized and directed to check or conduct necessary inspections on
cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from the Puerto Princesa
Airport, Puerto Princesa Wharf or at any port within the jurisdiction of the City to any
point of destinations [sic] either via aircraft or seacraft.

The purpose of the inspection is to ascertain whether the shipper possessed the
required Mayors Permit issued by this Office and the shipment is covered by invoice
or clearance issued by the local office of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources and as to compliance with all other existing rules and regulations on the
matter.

Any cargo containing live fish and lobster without the required documents as stated
herein must be held for proper disposition.
In the pursuit of this Order, you are hereby authorized to coordinate with the PAL
Manager, the PPA Manager, the local PNP Station and other offices concerned for the
needed support and cooperation. Further, that the usual courtesy and diplomacy must
be observed at all times in the conduct of the inspection.

Please be guided accordingly.

xxx

3. On February 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of

Palawan enacted Resolution No. 33 entitled: A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THE
CATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT
OF LIVE MARINE CORAL DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMS, TO WIT:
FAMILY: SCARIDAE (MAMENG), EPINE PHELUS
FASCIATUS (SUNO). CROMILEPTES ALTIVELIS (PANTHER OR SENORITA),
LOBSTER BELOW 200 GRAMS AND SPAWNING, TRADACNA
GIGAS (TAKLOBO), PINCTADA MARGARITEFERA (MOTHER PEARL,
OYSTERS, GIANT CLAMS AND OTHER SPECIES), PENAEUS
MONODON (TIGER PRAWN-BREEDER SIZE OR MOTHER), EPINEPHELUS
SUILLUS (LOBA OR GREEN GROUPER) AND
FAMILY: BALISTIDAE (TROPICAL AQUARIUM FISHES) FOR A PERIOD
FIVE (5) YEARS IN AND COMING FROM PALAWAN WATERS, the full text of
which reads as follows:

WHEREAS, scientific and factual researches [sic] and studies disclose that only five
(5) percent of the corals of our province remain to be in excellent condition as [a]
habitat of marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms;

WHEREAS, it cannot be gainsaid that the destruction and devastation of the corals of
our province were principally due to illegal fishing activities like dynamite fishing,
sodium cyanide fishing, use of other obnoxious substances and other related activities;

WHEREAS, there is an imperative and urgent need to protect and preserve the
existence of the remaining excellent corals and allow the devastated ones to
reinvigorate and regenerate themselves into vitality within the span of five (5) years;

WHEREAS, Sec. 468, Par. 1, Sub-Par. VI of the [sic] R.A. 7160 otherwise known as
the Local Government Code of 1991 empowers the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to
protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties [upon] acts which endanger
the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing,
among others.
NOW, THEREFORE, on motion by Kagawad Nelson P. Peneyra and upon
unanimous decision of all the members present;

Be it resolved as it is hereby resolved, to approve Resolution No. 33, Series of 1993 of

the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and to enact Ordinance No. 2 for the purpose, to wit:

ORDINANCE NO. 2
Series of 1993

BE IT ORDAINED BY THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN IN SESSION

ASSEMBLED:

Section 1. TITLE - This Ordinance shall be known as an Ordinance Prohibiting the

catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live marine coral
dwelling aquatic organisms, to wit: 1. Family: Scaridae (Mameng), 2. Epinephelus
Fasciatus (Suno), 3. Cromileptes altivelis (Panther or Senorita), lobster below 200
grams and spawning), 4. Tridacna Gigas (Taklobo), 5. Pinctada Margaretefera
(Mother Pearl, Oysters, Giant Clams and other species), 6. Penaeus Monodon (Tiger
Prawn-breeder size or mother), 7. Epinephelus Suillus (Loba or Green Grouper) and
8. Family: Balistidae (Topical Aquarium Fishes) for a period of five (5) years in and
coming from Palawan Waters.

Section II. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

1. Sec. 2-A (Rep. Act 7160). It is hereby declared, the policy of the state that the
territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful
local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national
goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for [a] more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization
whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority,
responsibilities and resources.

2. Sec. 5-A (R.A. 7160). Any provision on a power of [a] local Government Unit shall
be liberaly interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be
resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower government units.Any fair
and reasonable doubts as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of
the Local Government Unit concerned.

3. Sec. 5-C (R.A. 7160). The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally
interpreted to give more powers to local government units in accelerating economic
development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community.
4. Sec. 16 (R.A. 7160). General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise
the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance; and
those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare.

Section III. DECLARATION OF POLICY. - It is hereby declared to be the policy of

the Province of Palawan to protect and conserve the marine resources of Palawan not
only for the greatest good of the majority of the present generation but with [the]
proper perspective and consideration of [sic] their prosperity, and to attain this end,
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan henceforth declares that is [sic] shall be unlawful for
any person or any business entity to engage in catching, gathering, possessing, buying,
selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms as enumerated in
Section 1 hereof in and coming out of Palawan Waters for a period of five (5) years;

Section IV. PENALTY CLAUSE. - Any person and/or business entity violating this
Ordinance shall be penalized with a fine of not more than Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00), Philippine Currency, and/or imprisonment of six (6) months to twelve
(12) months and confiscation and forfeiture of paraphernalias [sic] and equipment in
favor of the government at the discretion of the Court;

Section V. SEPARABILITY CLAUSE. - If for any reason, a Section or provision of

this Ordinance shall be held as unconditional [sic] or invalid, it shall not affect the
other provisions hereof.

Section VI. REPEALING CLAUSE. - Any existing Ordinance or a provision of any

ordinance inconsistent herewith is deemed modified, amended or repealed.

Section VII. EFFECTIVITY. - This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days after its
publication.

SO ORDAINED.

xxx

4. The respondents implemented the said ordinances, Annexes A and C hereof thereby
depriving all the fishermen of the whole province of Palawan and the City of Puerto
Princesa of their only means of livelihood and the petitioners Airline Shippers
Association of Palawan and other marine merchants from performing their lawful
occupation and trade;

5. Petitioners Alfredo Tano, Baldomero Tano, Teocenes Midello, Angel de Mesa,

Eulogio Tremocha, and Felipe Ongonion, Jr. were even charged criminally under
criminal case no. 93-05-C in the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Cuyo-Agutaya-
Magsaysay, an original carbon copy of the criminal complaint dated April 12, 1993 is
hereto attached as Annex D; while xerox copies are attached as Annex D to the copies
of the petition;

6. Petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, on the other hand, were charged by the
respondent PNP with the respondent City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City, a xerox
copy of the complaint is hereto attached as Annex E;

Without seeking redress from the concerned local government units,

prosecutors office and courts, petitioners directly invoked our original
jurisdiction by filing this petition on 4 June 1993. In sum, petitioners contend
that:
First, the Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood,
and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of
Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution.
Second, Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition under
which the Mayors permit could be granted or denied; in other words, the
Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue permit.
Third, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan altogether prohibited
the catching, gathering, possession, buying, selling and shipping of live
marine coral dwelling organisms, without any distinction whether it was caught
or gathered through lawful fishing method, the Ordinance took away the right
of petitioners-fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as
petitioners-members of Airline Shippers Association are concerned, they were
unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering into contracts
which are proper, necessary, and essential to carry out their business
endeavors to a successful conclusion.
Finally, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is null and
void, the criminal cases based thereon against petitioners Tano and the
others have to be dismissed.
In the Resolution of 15 June 1993 we required respondents to comment
on the petition, and furnished the Office of the Solicitor General with a copy
thereof.
In their comment filed on 13 August 1993, public respondents Governor
Socrates and Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan
defended the validity of Ordinance No.2, Series of 1993, as a valid exercise of
the Provincial Governments power under the general welfare clause (Section
16 of the Local Government Code of 1991 [hereafter, LGC]), and its specific
power to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts
which endanger the environment, such as dynamite fishing and other forms of
destructive fishing under Section 447 (a) (1) (vi), Section 458 (a) (1) (vi), and
Section 468 (a) (1) (vi), of the LGC. They claimed that in the exercise of such
powers, the Province of Palawan had the right and responsibilty to insure that
the remaining coral reefs, where fish dwells [sic], within its territory remain
healthy for the future generation. The Ordinance, they further asserted,
covered only live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms which were
enumerated in the ordinance and excluded other kinds of live marine aquatic
organisms not dwelling in coral reefs; besides the prohibition was for only five
(5) years to protect and preserve the pristine coral and allow those damaged
to regenerate.
Aforementioned respondents likewise maintained that there was no
violation of due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. As
to the former, public hearings were conducted before the enactment of the
Ordinance which, undoubtedly, had a lawful purpose and employed
reasonable means; while as to the latter, a substantial distinction existed
between a fisherman who catches live fish with the intention of selling it live,
and a fisherman who catches live fish with no intention at all of selling it live,
i.e., the former uses sodium cyanide while the latter does not. Further, the
Ordinance applied equally to all those belonging to one class.
On 25 October 1993 petitioners filed an Urgent Plea for the Immediate
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order claiming that despite the
pendency of this case, Branch 50 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan was
bent on proceeding with Criminal Case No. 11223 against petitioners Danilo
Tano, Alfredo Tano, Eulogio Tremocha, Romualdo Tano, Baldomero Tano,
Andres Lemihan and Angel de Mesa for violation of Ordinance No. 2 of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan. Acting on said plea, we issued on 11
November 1993 a temporary restraining order directing Judge Angel Miclat of
said court to cease and desist from proceeding with the arraignment and pre-
trial of Criminal Case No. 11223.
On 12 July 1994, we excused the Office of the Solicitor General from filing
a comment, considering that as claimed by said office in its Manifestation of
28 June 1994, respondents were already represented by counsel.
The rest of the respondents did not file any comment on the petition.
In the resolution of 15 September 1994, we resolved to consider the
comment on the petition as the Answer, gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. [2]
 On 22 April 1997 we ordered impleaded as party respondents the
Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
and required the Office of the Solicitor General to comment on their behalf.
But in light of the latters motion of 9 July 1997 for an extension of time to file
the comment which would only result in further delay, we dispensed with said
comment.
After due deliberation on the pleadings filed, we resolved to dismiss this
petition for want of merit, on 22 July 1997, and assigned it to the ponente for
the writing of the opinion of the Court.
I

There are actually two sets of petitioners in this case. The first is
composed of Alfredo Tano, Baldomero Tano, Danilo Tano, Romualdo Tano,
Teocenes Midello, Angel de Mesa, Eulogio Tremocha, Felipe Ongonion, Jr.,
Andres Linijan, and Felimon de Mesa, who were criminally charged with
violating Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution No. 33 and Ordinance No. 2,
Series of 1993, of the Province of Palawan, in Criminal Case No. 93-05-C of
the 1 Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Palawan; and Robert Lim and
st [3]

Virginia Lim who were charged with violating City Ordinance No. 15-92 of
Puerto Princesa City and Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, of the Province of
Palawan before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa. All of [4]

them, with the exception of Teocenes Midello, Felipe Ongonion, Jr., Felimon
de Mesa, Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, are likewise the accused in Criminal
Case No. 11223 for the violation of Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Palawan, pending before Branch 50 of the Regional Trial
Court of Palawan. [5]

The second set of petitioners is composed of the rest of the petitioners

numbering seventy-seven (77), all of whom, except the Airline Shippers
Association of Palawan -- an alleged private association of several marine
merchants -- are natural persons who claim to be fishermen.
The primary interest of the first set of petitioners is, of course, to prevent
the prosecution, trial and determination of the criminal cases until the
constitutionality or legality of the Ordinances they allegedly violated shall have
been resolved. The second set of petitioners merely claim that they being
fishermen or marine merchants, they would be adversely affected by the
ordinances.
As to the first set of petitioners, this special civil for certiorari must fail on
the ground of prematurity amounting to a lack of cause of action. There is no
showing that the said petitioners, as the accused in the criminal cases, have
filed motions to quash the informations therein and that the same were
denied. The ground available for such motions is that the facts charged
therein do not constitute an offense because the ordinances in question are
unconstitutional. It cannot then be said that the lower courts acted without or
[6]

in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion to justify recourse to

the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition. It must further be stressed
that even if the petitioners did file motions to quash, the denial thereof would
not forthwith give rise to a cause of action under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. The general rule is that where a motion to quash is denied, the remedy
therefrom is not certiorari, but for the party aggrieved thereby to go to trial
without prejudice to reiterating special defenses involved in said motion, and
if, after trial on the merits of adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom
in the manner authorized by law. And , even where in an exceptional
[7]

circumstance such denial may be the subject of a special civil action

for certiorari, a motion for reconsideration must have to be filed to allow the
court concerned an opportunity to correct its errors, unless such motion may
be dispensed with because of existing exceptional circumstances. Finally, [8]

even if a motion for reconsideration has been filed and denied, the remedy
under Rule 65 is still unavailable absent any showing of the grounds provided
for in Section 1 thereof. For obvious reasons, the petition at bar does not,
[9]

and could not have , alleged any of such grounds.

As to the second set of petitioners, the instant petition is obviously one for
DECLARATORY RELIEF, i.e., for a declaration that the Ordinances in
question are a nullity ... for being unconstitutional. As such, their petition
[10]

must likewise fail, as this Court is not possessed of original jurisdiction over
petitions for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved, it [11]

being settled that the Court merely exercises appellate jurisdiction over such
petitions.[12]

II

Even granting arguendo that the first set of petitioners have a cause of
action ripe for the extraordinary writ of certiorari, there is here a clear
disregard of the hierarchy of courts, and no special and important reason or
exceptional or compelling circumstance has been adduced why direct
recourse to us should be allowed. While we have concurrent jurisdiction with
Regional Trial courts and with the Court of Appeals to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such
concurrence gives petitioners no unrestricted freedom of choice of court
forum, so we held in People v. Cuaresma: [13]

This concurrence of jurisdiction is not to be taken as according to parties seeking any

of the writs an absolute unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which
application therefor will be directed. There is after all hierarchy of courts. That
hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A
becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for
the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should be filed
with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals.
A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly
and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy
necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are
better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further
over-crowding of the Courts docket.

The Court feels the need to reaffirm that policy at this time, and to enjoin strict
adherence thereto in the light of what it perceives to be a growing tendency on the part
of litigants and lawyers to have their applications for the so-called extraordinary writs,
and sometimes even their appeals, passed upon and adjudicated directly and
immediately by the highest tribunal of the land.

In Santiago v. Vasquez, this Court forcefully expressed that the

[14]

propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts must be

put to a halt, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this
Court, but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or
otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or
referred to the lower court, the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or
as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts.
We reiterated the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to
it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or
where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a
remedy within and calling for the exercise of [its] primary jurisdiction.
III

Notwithstanding the foregoing procedural obstacles against the first set of

petitioners, we opt to resolve this case on its merits considering that the
lifetime of the challenged Ordinances is about to end. Ordinance No. 15-92 of
the City of Puerto Princesa is effective only up to 1 January 1998, while
Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan, enacted on 19 February 1993, is
effective for only five (5) years. Besides, these Ordinances were undoubtedly
enacted in the exercise of powers under the new LGC relative to the
protection and preservation of the environment and are thus novel and of
paramount importance. No further delay then may be allowed in the resolution
of the issues raised.
 It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by local
government units) enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. To overthrow
[15]

this presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the

Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction. In short,
the conflict with the Constitution must be shown beyond reasonable
doubt. Where doubt exists, even if well founded, there can be no finding of
[16]

unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain. [17]

After a scrunity of the challenged Ordinances and the provisions of the

Constitution petitioners claim to have been violated, we find petitioners
contentions baseless and so hold that the former do not suffer from any
infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws.
Petitioners specifically point to Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7,
Article XIII of the Constitution as having been transgressed by the
Ordinances.
The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Article XII reads:

SEC. 2. x x x

The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial
sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to
Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by

Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence
fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.

Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII provide:

Sec. 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create
economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.

xxx

SEC. 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local
communities, to the preferential use of the communal marine and fishing resources,
both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through
appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing
assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such
resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence
fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their
labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.
 There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a
subsistence or marginal fisherman. In their petition, petitioner Airline Shippers
Association of Palawan is described as a private association composed of
Marine Merchants; petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, as merchants;
while the rest of the petitioners claim to be fishermen, without any
qualification, however, as to their status.
Since the Constitution does not specifically provide a definition of the
terms subsistence or marginal fishermen, they should be construed in their
[18]

general and ordinary sense. A marginal fisherman is an individual engaged in

fishing whose margin of return or reward in his harvest of fish as measured by
existing price levels is barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of
gathering the fish, while a subsistence fisherman is one whose catch yields
[19]

but the irreducible minimum for his livelihood. Section 131(p) of the LGC
[20]

(R.A. No. 7160) defines a marginal farmer or fisherman as an individual

engaged in subsistence farming or fishing which shall be limited to the sale,
barter or exchange of agricultural or marine products produced by himself and
his immediate family. It bears repeating that nothing in the record supports a
finding that any petitioner falls within these definitions.
Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to
subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the
nations marine wealth. What the provision merely recognizes is that the State
may allow, by law, cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence
fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons. Our survey of
the statute books reveals that the only provision of law which speaks of the
preferential right of marginal fishermen is Section 149 of the LGC of 1991
which pertinently provides:

SEC. 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and Charges. -- x x x

(b) The sangguniang bayan may:

(1) Grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds
or bangus fry areas, within a definite zone of the municipal waters, as determined by
it: Provided, however, That duly registered organizations and cooperatives of
marginal fishermen shall have preferential right to such fishery privileges ....

In a Joint Administrative Order No. 3, dated 25 April 1996, the Secretary of the
Department of Agriculture and the Secretary of the Department of Interior and
Local Government prescribed the guidelines on the preferential treatment of
small fisherfolk relative to the fishery right mentioned in Section 149. This
case, however, does not involve such fishery right.
 Anent Section 7 of Article XIII, it speaks not only of the use of communal
marine and fishing resources, but of their protection, development, and
conservation. As hereafter shown, the ordinances in question are meant
precisely to protect and conserve our marine resources to the end that their
enjoyment by the people may be guaranteed not only for the present
generation, but also for the generations to come.
The so-called preferential right of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the
use of marine resources is not at all absolute. In accordance with the Regalian
Doctrine, marine resources belong to the State, and, pursuant to the first
paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their exploration,
development and utilization ... shall be under the full control and supervision
of the State. Moreover, their mandated protection, development, and
conservation as necessarily recognized by the framers of the Constitution,
imply certain restrictions on whatever right of enjoyment there may be in favor
of anyone. Thus, as to the curtailment of the preferential treatment of marginal
fisherman, the following exchange between Commissioner Francisco Rodrigo
and Commissioner Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., took place at the plenary session
of the Constitutional Commission:

MR. RODRIGO:

Let us discuss the implementation of this because I would not raise the hopes
of our people, and afterwards fail in the implementation. How will this be
implemented? Will there be a licensing or giving of permits so that
government officials will know that one is really a marginal fisherman? Or if
policeman say that a person is not a marginal fisherman, he can show his
permit, to prove that indeed he is one.

MR. BENGZON:

Certainly, there will be some mode of licensing insofar as this is concerned

and this particular question could be tackled when we discuss the Article on
Local Governments -- whether we will leave to the local governments or to
Congress on how these things will be implemented. But certainly, I think our
Congressmen and our local officials will not be bereft of ideas on how to
implement this mandate.

xxx

MR. RODRIGO:
 So, once one is licensed as a marginal fisherman, he can go anywhere in the
Philippines and fish in any fishing grounds.

MR. BENGZON:

Subject to whatever rules and regulations and local laws that may be
passed, may be existing or will be passed. (underscoring supplied for
[21]

emphasis).

What must likewise be borne in mind is the state policy enshrined in the
Constitution regarding the duty of the State to protect and advance the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature. On this score, in Oposa v. Factoran, this Court
[22] [23]

declared:

While the right to balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration
of Principles the State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that
it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter.
Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing
less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation - aptly and fittingly stressed by the
petitioners - the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments
and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in
the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If
they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the
well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn
obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second , the day would not
be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for
those to come - generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable
of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it a correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment ...

The LGC provisions invoked by private respondents merely seek to give

flesh and blood to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology.
In fact, the General Welfare Clause, expressly mentions this right:

SEC. 16. General Welfare.-- Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which
are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right
of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public
morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment
among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants. (underscoring supplied).

Moreover, Section 5(c) of the LGC explicitly mandates that the general
welfare provisions of the LGC shall be liberally interpreted to give more
powers to the local government units in accelerating economic development
and upgrading the quality of life for the people of the community.
The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in
municipal waters and to impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize,
by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous
substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing;
and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishery
laws. Further, the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod and
[24]

thesangguniang panlalawigan are directed to enact ordinances for the general

welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants, which shall include, inter alia,
ordinances that [p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties
for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other
forms of destructive fishing ... and such other activities which result in
pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological
imbalance. [25]

Finally, the centerpiece of LGC is the system of decentralization as [26]

expressly mandated by the Constitution. Indispensable

[27]
thereto
is devolution and the LGC expressly provides that [a]ny provision on a power
of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case
of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of
powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt
as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local
government unit concerned, Devolution refers to the act by which the
[28]

National Government confers power and authority upon the various local
government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities. [29]

One of the devolved powers enumerated in the section of the LGC on

devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the
conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes enactment of
[30]
ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal
waters.
The term municipal waters, in turn, include not only streams, lakes, and
tidal waters within the municipality, not being the subject of private ownership
and not comprised within the national parks, public forest, timber lands, forest
reserves, or fishery reserves, but also marine waters included between two
lines drawn perpendicularly to the general coastline from points where the
boundary lines of the municipality or city touch the sea at low tide and a third
line parallel with the general coastline and fifteen kilometers from it. Under [31]

P.D. No. 704, the marine waters included in municipal waters is limited to
three nautical miles from the general coastline using the above perpendicular
lines and a third parallel line.
These fishery laws which local government units may enforce under
Section 17(b), (2), (i) in municipal waters include: (1) P.D. No. 704; (2) P.D.
No. 1015 which, inter alia, authorizes the establishment of a closed season in
any Philippine water if necessary for conservation or ecological purposes; (3)
P.D. No. 1219 which provides for the exploration, exploitation, utilization, and
conservation of coral resources; (4) R.A. No. 5474, as amended by B.P. Blg.
58, which makes it unlawful for any person, association, or corporation to
catch or cause to be caught, sell, offer to sell, purchase, or have in
possession any of the fish specie called gobiidae or ipon during closed
season; and (5) R.A. No. 6451 which prohibits and punishes electrofishing, as
well as various issuances of the BFAR.
To those specifically devolved insofar as the control and regulation of
fishing in municipal waters and the protection of its marine environment are
concerned, must be added the following:
1. Issuance of permits to construct fish cages within municipal waters;
2. Issuance of permits to gather aquarium fishes within municipal waters;
3. Issuance of permits to gather kapis shells within municipal waters;
4. Issuance of permits to gather/culture shelled mollusks within municipal waters;
5. Issuance of licenses to establish seaweed farms within municipal waters;
6. Issuance of licenses to establish culture pearls within municipal waters;
7. Issuance of auxiliary invoice to transport fish and fishery products; and
8. Establishment of closed season in municipal waters.

These functions are covered in the Memorandum of Agreement of 5 April

1994 between the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Interior
and Local Government.
In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined
in the LGC and the powers granted to local government units under Section
16 (the General Welfare Clause), and under Sections 149, 447 (a) (1) (vi), 458
(a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which unquestionably involve the exercise of
police power, the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted.
Parenthetically, we wish to add that these Ordinances find full support
under R.A. No. 7611, otherwise known as the Strategic Environmental Plan
(SEP) for Palawan Act, approved on 19 July 1992. This statute adopts a
comprehensive framework for the sustainable development of Palawan
compatible with protecting and enhancing the natural resources and
endangered environment of the province, which shall serve to guide the local
government of Palawan and the government agencies concerned in the
formulation and implementation of plans, programs and projects affecting said
province.[32]

At this time then, it would be appropriate to determine the relation between

the assailed Ordinances and the aforesaid powers of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Sangguniang
Panlalawiganof the Province of Palawan to protect the environment. To begin,
we ascertain the purpose of the Ordinances as set forth in the statement of
purposes or declaration of policies quoted earlier.
It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal objectives
or purposes: (1) to establish a closed season for the species of fish or aquatic
animals covered therein for a period of five years, and (2) to protect the corals
of the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of
Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities.
The accomplishment of the first objective is well within the devolved power
to enforce fishery laws in municipal waters, such as P.D. No. 1015, which
allows the establishment of closed seasons. The devolution of such power
has been expressly confirmed in the Memorandum of Agreement of 5 April
1994 between the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Interior
and Local Government.
The realization of the second objective falls within both the general welfare
clause of the LGC and the express mandate thereunder to cities and
provinces to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for
acts which endanger the environment. [33]

The destruction of the coral reefs results in serious, if not irreparable,

ecological imbalance, for coral reefs are among the natures life-support
systems. They collect, retain, and recycle nutrients for adjacent nearshore
[34]

areas such as mangroves, seagrass beds, and reef flats; provide food for
marine plants and animals; and serve as a protective shelter for aquatic
organisms. It is said that [e]cologically, the reefs are to the oceans what
[35]
forests are to continents: they are shelter and breeding grounds for fish and
plant species that will disappear without them. [36]

The prohibition against catching live fish stems, in part, from the modern
phenomenon of live-fish trade which entails the catching of so-called exotic
tropical species of fish not only for aquarium use in the West, but also for the
market for live banquet fish [which] is virtually insatiable in ever more affluent
Asia. These exotic species are coral-dwellers, and fishermen catch them by
[37]

diving in shallow water with corraline habitats and squirting sodium cyanide
poison at passing fish directly or onto coral crevices; once affected the fish are
immobilized [merely stunned] and then scooped by hand. The diver then
[38]

surfaces and dumps his catch into a submerged net attached to the skiff
. Twenty minutes later, the fish can swim normally. Back on shore, they are
placed in holding pens, and within a few weeks, they expel the cyanide from
their system and are ready to be hauled. Then they are placed in saltwater
tanks or packaged in plastic bags filled with seawater for shipment by air
freight to major markets for live food fish. While the fish are meant to survive,
[39]

the opposite holds true for their former home as [a]fter the fisherman squirts
the cyanide, the first thing to perish is the reef algae, on which fish feed. Days
later, the living coral starts to expire. Soon the reef loses its function as habitat
for the fish, which eat both the algae and invertebrates that cling to the
coral. The reef becomes an underwater graveyard, its skeletal remains brittle,
bleached of all color and vulnerable to erosion from the pounding of the
waves. It has been found that cyanide fishing kills most hard and soft corals
[40]

within three months of repeated application. [41]

The nexus then between the activities barred by Ordinance No. 15-92 of
the City of Puerto Princesa and the prohibited acts provided in Ordinance No.
2, Series of 1993 of the Province of Palawan, on one hand, and the use of
sodium cyanide, on the other, is painfully obvious. In sum, the public purpose
and reasonableness of the Ordinances may not then be controverted.
As to Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, issued by Acting City Mayor
Amado L. Lucero of the City of Puerto Princesa, we find nothing therein
violative of any constitutional or statutory provision. The Order refers to the
implementation of the challenged ordinance and is not the Mayors Permit.
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo relies upon the
lack of authority on the part of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto
Princesa to enact Ordinance No. 15, Series of 1992, on the theory that the
subject thereof is within the jurisdiction and responsibility of the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under P.D. No. 704, otherwise
known as the Fisheries Decree of 1975; and that, in any event, the Ordinance
is unenforceable for lack of approval by the Secretary of the Department of
Natural Resources (DNR), likewise in accordance with P.D. No. 704.
The majority is unable to accommodate this view. The jurisdiction and
responsibility of the BFAR under P. D. no. 704, over the management,
conservation, development, protection, utilization and disposition of all fishery
and aquatic resources of the country is not all-encompassing. First, Section 4
thereof excludes from such jurisdiction and responsibility municipal waters,
which shall be under the municipal or city government concerned, except
insofar as fishpens and seaweed culture in municipal in municipal centers are
concerned. This section provides, however, that all municipal or city
ordinances and resolutions affecting fishing and fisheries and any disposition
thereunder shall be submitted to the Secretary of the Department of Natural
Resources for appropriate action and shall have full force and effect only upon
his approval.[42]

Second, it must at once be pointed out that the BFAR is no longer under
the Department of Natural Resources (now Department of Environment and
Natural Resources). Executive Order No. 967 of 30 June 1984 transferred the
BFAR from the control and supervision of the Minister (formerly Secretary) of
Natural Resources to the Ministry of Agriculture and Food (MAF) and
converted it into a mere staff agency thereof, integrating its functions with the
regional offices of the MAF.
In Executive Order No. 116 of 30 January 1987, which reorganized the
MAF, the BFAR was retained as an attached agency of the MAF. And under
the Administrative Code of 1987, the BFAR is placed under the Title
[43]

concerning the Department of Agriculture. [44]

Therefore, it is incorrect to say that the challenged Ordinance of the City of

Puerto Princesa is invalid or unenforceable because it was not approved by
the Secretary of the DENR. If at all, the approval that should be sought would
be that of the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture (not DENR) of
municipal ordinances affecting fishing and fisheries in municipal waters has
been dispensed with in view of the following reasons:
(1) Section 534 (Repealing Clause) of the LGC expressly repeals or
amends Section 16 and 29 of P.D. No. 704 insofar that they are inconsistent
[45]

with the provisions of the LGC.

(2) As discussed earlier, under the general welfare clause of the LGC,
local government units have the power, inter alia, to enact ordinances to
enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology. It likewise specifically
vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal
waters, and impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by
appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous
substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing;
and to prosecute other methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of
the provisions of applicable fishing laws. Finally, it imposes upon
[46]

the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod, and the sangguniang

panlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to [p]rotect the environment and
impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such
as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing and such other
activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and
lakes or of ecological imbalance. [47]

In closing, we commend the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of

Puerto Princesa and Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Palawan
for exercising the requisite political will to enact urgently needed legislation to
protect and enhance the marine environment, thereby sharing in the
herculean task of arresting the tide of ecological destruction. We hope that
other local government units shall now be roused from their lethargy and
adopt a more vigilant stand in the battle against the decimation of our legacy
to future generations. At this time, the repercussions of any further delay in
their response may prove disastrous, if not, irreversible.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
temporary restraining order issued on 11 November 1993 is LIFTED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Vitug, Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Romero, Melo, Puno, and Francisco, JJ., joined the ponencias of Justices
Davide and Mendoza.
Bellosillo, J., see dissenting opinion.
Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., join Justice Bellosillo in his dissenting
opinion.
Mendoza, see concurring opinion.
Regalado, J., on official leave.

LAdcao vs Labra

LAGCAO V. LABRA

October 13, 2004 | Corona, J.

FACTS: The case is about the validity of Ordinance No. 1843 authorizing the mayor of Cebu City to
initiate expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of lot (1029) of petitioners Diosdado, Doroteo and
Ursula Lagcao.

In 1964, Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu, one of which is the lot 1029. 1965,
petitioners purchased said lot on installment but in late 1925, these 210 lots reverted to the Province of
Cebu. The latter tried to annul sale which resulted to the filing of the case of the petitioners. RTC and CA
ruled in their favor and as such a deed of sale was executed and a TCT was issued in their favor. When
they tried to take possession of the land, they found out that it was occupied by squatters. Thus, they
instituted ejectment proceedings which was later on granted by the MTCC and affirmed by RTC.
However, Mayor Garcia wrote letters requesting the deferment of the demolition since the city was still
looking for a relocation site for the squatters; this was granted. During the suspension the Sang.
Panlungsod of Cebu passed a resolution and 2 ordinances (all about the lot 1029). Ord. No. 1843
likewise appropriated the amount of 6, 881, 600 for the payment of subject land; this was approved by
the Mayor.

ISSUE: Whether or not the exercise of eminent domain is valid in the case at bar.

HELD: NO, it is NOT VALID. The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity
and that necessity must be of public character. Govt. may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose which
private property should be expropriated. In this case, there was no showing at all why petitioners’
property was singled out for expropriation by the city ordinance or what necessity impelled the
particular choice or selection. Ordinance no. 1843 stated no reason for the choice of petitioners’
property as the site of a socialized housing project. Moreover, under RA 7279, private lands rank last in
the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation proceedings may
be resorted to only after the other modes of acquisition are exhausted. Thus, the ordinance in question
is likewise null because: (1) it is repugnant to the pertinent provisions of RA 7279 and 7160 (LGC); (2)
the precipitate manner in which it was enacted was plain oppression masquerading as pro-poor
ordinance; (3) the fact that the land was singled out manifests partiality against petitioners; (4) it failed
to show that there was reasonable relation bet. the end sought and the means adopted.

EN BANC
DIOSDADO LAGCAO, G.R. No. 155746
DOROTEO LAGCAO and
URSULA LAGCAO,
Petitioners, Present:
DAVIDE, C.J.,
PUNO,
PANGANIBAN,
QUISUMBING,
 YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,*
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,*
TINGA and
CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.
JUDGE GENEROSA G. LABRA,
Branch 23, Regional Trial Court,
Cebu, and the CITY OF CEBU,
Respondent. Promulgated:

October 13, 2004

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review of the decision dated July 1,

2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Cebu City[1] upholding
the validity of the City of Cebus Ordinance No. 1843, as well as the
lower courts order dated August 26, 2002 denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration.

In 1964, the Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu.
One of these lots was Lot 1029, situated in Capitol Hills, Cebu City,
with an area of 4,048 square meters. In 1965, petitioners
purchased Lot 1029 on installment basis. But then, in late 1965,
the 210 lots, including Lot 1029, reverted to the Province of
Cebu.[2] Consequently, the province tried to annul the sale of Lot
1029 by the City of Cebu to the petitioners. This prompted the latter
to sue the province for specific performance and damages in the
then Court of First Instance.

On July 9, 1986, the court a quo ruled in favor of petitioners

and ordered the Province of Cebu to execute the final deed of sale in
favor of petitioners. On June 11, 1992, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court. Pursuant to the ruling of the
appellate court, the Province of Cebu executed on June 17, 1994 a
deed of absolute sale over Lot 1029 in favor of petitioners.
Thereafter, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 129306 was issued
in the name of petitioners and Crispina Lagcao.[3]

After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot

only to discover that it was already occupied by squatters. Thus, on
June 15, 1997, petitioners instituted ejectment proceedings against
the squatters. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch
1, Cebu City, rendered a decision on April 1, 1998, ordering the
squatters to vacate the lot. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTCCs
decision and issued a writ of execution and order of demolition.

However, when the demolition order was about to be implemented,

Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two letters[4] to the MTCC,
requesting the deferment of the demolition on the ground that the
City was still looking for a relocation site for the squatters. Acting
on the mayors request, the MTCC issued two orders suspending the
demolition for a period of 120 days from February 22,
1999. Unfortunately for petitioners, during the suspension period,
the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu City passed a resolution
which identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site pursuant to
RA 7279.[5] Then, on June 30, 1999, the SP of Cebu City passed
Ordinance No. 1772[6] which included Lot 1029 among the identified
sites for socialized housing. On July, 19, 2000, Ordinance No.
1843[7] was enacted by the SP of Cebu City authorizing the mayor of
Cebu City to initiate expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of
Lot 1029 which was registered in the name of petitioners. The
intended acquisition was to be used for the benefit of the homeless
after its subdivision and sale to the actual occupants thereof. For
this purpose, the ordinance appropriated the amount
of P6,881,600 for the payment of the subject lot. This ordinance
was approved by Mayor Garcia on August 2, 2000.

On August 29, 2000, petitioners filed with the RTC an action for
declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 1843 for being
unconstitutional. The trial court rendered its decision on July 1,
2002 dismissing the complaint filed by petitioners whose
subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on
August 26, 2002.

In this appeal, petitioners argue that Ordinance No. 1843 is

unconstitutional as it sanctions the expropriation of their property
for the purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endeavor contrary
to the concept of public use contemplated in the
Constitution.[8] They allege that it will benefit only a handful of
people. The ordinance, according to petitioners, was obviously
passed for politicking, the squatters undeniably being a big source
of votes.

In sum, this Court is being asked to resolve whether or not the

intended expropriation by the City of Cebu of a 4,048-square-meter
parcel of land owned by petitioners contravenes the Constitution
and applicable laws.

Under Section 48 of RA 7160,[9] otherwise known as the Local

Government Code of 1991,[10] local legislative power shall
be exercised by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the city. The
legislative acts of the Sangguniang Panlungsod in the exercise of its
lawmaking authority are denominated ordinances.

Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain

and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the
legislature.[11] By virtue of RA 7160, Congress conferred upon local
government units the power to expropriate. Ordinance No. 1843
was enacted pursuant to Section 19 of RA 7160:

SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. − A local government unit may, through its
chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of
eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the
poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to
the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws xxx. (italics supplied).

Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized the expropriation of

petitioners lot was enacted by the SP of Cebu City to provide
socialized housing for the homeless and low-income residents of the
City.

However, while we recognize that housing is one of the most

serious social problems of the country, local government units do
not possess unbridled authority to exercise their power of eminent
domain in seeking solutions to this problem.

There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this
power: (1) no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws;[12] and (2) private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation.[13] Thus, the
exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain
is not absolute. In fact, Section 19 of RA 7160 itself explicitly states
that such exercise must comply with the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws.

The exercise of the power of eminent domain drastically affects a

landowners right to private property, which is as much a
constitutionally-protected right necessary for the preservation and
enhancement of personal dignity and intimately connected with the
rights to life and liberty.[14] Whether directly exercised by the State
or by its authorized agents, the exercise of eminent domain is
necessarily in derogation of private rights.[15] For this reason, the
need for a painstaking scrutiny cannot be overemphasized.
The due process clause cannot be trampled upon each time an
ordinance orders the expropriation of a private
individuals property. The courts cannot even adopt a hands-off
policy simply because public use or public purpose is invoked by an
ordinance, or just compensation has been fixed and
determined. In De Knecht vs. Bautista,[16] we said:

It is obvious then that a land-owner is covered by the mantle of protection

due process affords. It is a mandate of reason. It frowns on arbitrariness, it
is the antithesis of any governmental act that smacks of whim or caprice. It
negates state power to act in an oppressive manner. It is, as had been
stressed so often, the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. In that
sense, it stands as a guaranty of justice. That is the standard that must be
met by any governmental agency in the exercise of whatever competence
is entrusted to it. As was so emphatically stressed by the present Chief
Justice, Acts of Congress, as well as those of the Executive, can deny due
process only under pain of nullity. xxx.
The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine
necessity and that necessity must be of public
character.[17] Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose
which private property should be expropriated. In this case, there
was no showing at all why petitioners property was singled out for
expropriation by the city ordinance or what necessity impelled the
particular choice or selection. Ordinance No. 1843 stated no reason
for the choice of petitioners property as the site of a socialized
housing project.

Condemnation of private lands in an irrational or piecemeal

fashion or the random expropriation of small lots to accommodate
no more than a few tenants or squatters is certainly not the
condemnation for public use contemplated by the Constitution.
This is depriving a citizen of his property for the convenience of a
few without perceptible benefit to the public.[18]
RA 7279 is the law that governs the local expropriation of property
for purposes of urban land reform and housing. Sections 9 and 10
thereof provide:

SEC 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land. − Lands for socialized housing

shall be acquired in the following order:

(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions,

instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned
or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;

(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;

(d) Those within the declared Areas or Priority Development, Zonal

Improvement Program sites, and Slum Improvement and
Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been
acquired;

(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS

which have not yet been acquired; and

(f) Privately-owned lands.

Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous

to the beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply.
The local government units shall give budgetary priority to on-site
development of government lands. (Emphasis supplied).

SEC. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. − The modes of acquiring lands for
purposes of this Act shall include, among others, community mortgage,
land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to
the Government, joint venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and
expropriation: Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted
to only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted:
Provided further, That where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land
owned by small property owners shall be exempted for purposes of this
Act: xxx. (Emphasis supplied).
 In the recent case of Estate or Heirs of the Late Ex-Justice Jose
B.L. Reyes et al. vs. City of Manila,[19] we ruled that the above-
quoted provisions are strict limitations on the exercise of the power
of eminent domain by local government units, especially with
respect to (1) the order of priority in acquiring land for socialized
housing and (2) the resort to expropriation proceedings as a means
to acquiring it. Private lands rank last in the order of priority for
purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation
proceedings may be resorted to only after the other modes of
acquisition are exhausted. Compliance with these conditions
is mandatory because these are the only safeguards of oftentimes
helpless owners of private property against what may be a
tyrannical violation of due process when their property is forcibly
taken from them allegedly for public use.

We have found nothing in the records indicating that the City

of Cebu complied strictly with Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279.
Ordinance No. 1843 sought to expropriate petitioners property
without any attempt to first acquire the lands listed in (a) to (e) of
Section 9 of RA 7279. Likewise, Cebu City failed to establish that
the other modes of acquisition in Section 10 of RA 7279 were first
exhausted. Moreover, prior to the passage of Ordinance No. 1843,
there was no evidence of a valid and definite offer to buy petitioners
property as required by Section 19 of RA 7160.[20] We therefore find
Ordinance No. 1843 to be constitutionally infirm for being violative
of the petitioners right to due process.
 It should also be noted that, as early as 1998, petitioners had
already obtained a favorable judgment of eviction against the illegal
occupants of their property. The judgment in this ejectment case
had, in fact, already attained finality, with a writ of execution and
an order of demolition. But Mayor Garcia requested the trial court
to suspend the demolition on the pretext that the City was still
searching for a relocation site for the squatters. However, instead of
looking for a relocation site during the suspension period, the city
council suddenly enacted Ordinance No. 1843 for the expropriation
of petitioners lot. It was trickery and bad faith, pure and simple.
The unconscionable manner in which the questioned ordinance was
passed clearly indicated that respondent City transgressed the
Constitution, RA 7160 and RA 7279.

For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the

corporate powers of the city or municipality to enact but must also
be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. It must be
in accordance with certain well-established basic principles of a
substantive nature. These principles require that an ordinance (1)
must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be
unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4)
must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and
consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable.[21]

Ordinance No. 1843 failed to comply with the foregoing

substantive requirements. A clear case of constitutional infirmity
having been thus established, this Court is constrained to nullify
the subject ordinance. We recapitulate:

first, as earlier discussed, the questioned ordinance is

repugnant to the pertinent provisions of the Constitution, RA
7279 and RA 7160;

second, the precipitate manner in which it was enacted was

plain oppression masquerading as a pro-poor ordinance;

third, the fact that petitioners small property was singled out
for expropriation for the purpose of awarding it to no more
than a few squatters indicated manifest partiality against
petitioners, and

fourth, the ordinance failed to show that there was a

reasonable relation between the end sought and the means
adopted. While the objective of the City of Cebu was to provide
adequate housing to slum dwellers, the means it employed in
pursuit of such objective fell short of what was legal, sensible
and called for by the circumstances.

Indeed, experience has shown that the disregard of basic

liberties and the use of short-sighted methods in expropriation
proceedings have not achieved the desired results. Over the years,
the government has tried to remedy the worsening squatter
problem. Far from solving it, however, governments kid-glove
approach has only resulted in the multiplication and proliferation of
 squatter colonies and blighted areas. A pro-poor program that is
well-studied, adequately funded, genuinely sincere and truly
respectful of everyones basic rights is what this problem calls for,
not the improvident enactment of politics-based ordinances
targeting small private lots in no rational fashion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The July 1,

2002 decision of Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

W E C O N C U R:

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(on leave)
MA. ALICIA M. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
 Associate Justice Associate Justice

(on leave)
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

(on leave)
DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby

certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

3) Eurico vs Atienza

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-3001 June 17, 1950

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BENITO ATIENZA and JULIAN CLOSA, defendants.
JUNLIAN CLOSA, appellant.

Eulalio F. Legaspi for appellant.

Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Jose G. Bautista for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:

In the Court of First Instance of Mindoro, Benito Atienza and Julian Closa were charged with murder
for the killing of one Pedro Mendoza. Atienza pleaded guilty when arraigned and took the witness
stand to prove two mitigating circumstances, namely; drunkenness and lack of instruction. He was
sentenced to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of imprisonment by the trial court. He did not appeal.
The trial court proceeded as to his coaccused Julian Closa. After trial Closa was found guilty and
sentenced to life imprisonment, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay the heirs of the
deceased Pedro Mendoza the sum of P1,000, as indemnity, and to pay one-half of the costs. he was
credited with one-half of the preventive imprisonment suffered by him. He is now appealing from that
decision.

The trial in this case was conducted rather irregularly, due either to negligence or oversight on the
part of the court officials. After the prosecution had rested its case it was discovered that the two
defendants had not yet been arraigned. The provincial fiscal called the attention of the court to that
fact. The two accused were then arraigned and it was upon this arraignment that Atienza entered his
plea of guilty. the trial court declared all the proceedings up to the arraignment as null and void. The
fiscal moved to reproduce the evidence already submitted and said that he would be glad to present
again all his witnesses. The court said that it was unnecessary and decreed reproduced all the
evidence already submitted. Counsel of the appellant Closa said that he had no objection.

After a careful review of the record in this case, we find the following facts as fully established: Due
to a grudge that he entertained against Pedro Mendoza, appellant Closa in the evening of November
16, 1948, invited his close friend and codefedant Benito Atienza to go with him to Mendoza's house
and kill him. On the way to Mendoza's house, they asked Dominador if he had seen Pedro Mendoza.
When answered in the negative, the two accused proceeded westward in the direction of Mendoza's
house which was less than a kilometer from the house of Dominador. The two defendants found
Mendoza sleeping alone in his house. While Atienza remained in the kitchen, Closa quietly and
stealthily approached his sleeping victim and struck him several blows with his bolo called
"sinampalok" (Exhibit C). Then Atienza left the kitchen and entering the room where Mendoza was
lying down also inflicted blows on the prostrate victim with his bolo (Exhibit B). In all, Mendoza
received sixteen wounds, of which those in the abdomen were necessarily mortal and caused
Mendoza's death.

Very early the following morning the two defendants, on their way home, passed by the house of
Glicerio Lopez and were seen by the latter as they were coming from the direction of the house of
Pedro Mendoza. Not long thereafter, Atienza arrived at the house of his grandfather, Jose Atienza,
woke up the inmates who were his relatives and told them that: "They had killed somebody." His
clothes were then blood-stained.

In the course of the investigation conducted by the municipal authorities, Atienza made two sworn
statements (Exhibits D and F) which are quite similar in their contents. In these statements Atienza
said that he had been invited accompanied the former in going to the house of Pedro Mendoza
whom they found sleeping and whom they boloed to death. Atienza adding that after the killing Closa
threatened him with death if he revealed to any one what they had done.

Closa also made a written statement (Exhibit E) where he states that sometime in April, 1948, he
had a misunderstanding or altercation with the deceased Mendoza over a debt which Mendoza was
trying to collect from him in the presence of other persons, because of which he felt humiliated: that
on November 16, 1948, the day of the killing, he had a bolo, evidently similar to if not the same
weapon mentioned by Atienza in his statement, as having been used by Closa in boloing the
deceased.
Appellant Closa day of November 16, 1948, he was harvesting and threshing rice with Sofronio
Panganiban, his landlord, and that on that night he slept in Sofronio's house. The trial court rejected
this story of the defense not only because it was not convincing but also because it appeared too
elaborate and too well planned and calculated to make it appear impossible for Closa to have left the
house of his landlord that day and night. Moreover the trial court found that assuming that Closa was
at the house of Panganiban that night November 16, the place was only a kilometer away from the
house of Pedro Mendoza and that he could easily have slipped out of the house unnoticed and
committed the murder and then returned to the house. We fully agree with the finding and reasoning
of the trial court on this point. And as the Solicitor General points out, counsel for the appellant does
not in his brief touch upon this defense of alibi indicating that said counsel has not found it to be a
valid or reasonable defense.

Counsel for the appellant attacks the procedure followed in the trial already referred where the two
accused were arraigned after the prosecution had rested its case, and he claimed that the trial court
erred in considering such evidence, especially since the trial court itself had declared all the
proceedings had before arraignment as null and void. The error, if any, is non-prejudicial. The
interests of the appellant have not suffered thereby. His counsel entered into trial without any
objection on the ground that his client had not yet been arraigned. Said counsel cross-examined the
witnesses for the prosecution. When the fiscal offered to reproduce all his evidence by presenting
again his witnesses, instead of accepting said offer, he agreed or rather did not object to having that
same evidence for the government declared by the court as reproduced. We hold that this error or
irregularity has not prejudiced the right or interests of the appellant, and considering that appellant's
counsel had full opportunity of cross-examining all the witnesses who took the witness stand for the
government and that furthermore he agreed to the reproduction of the evidence for the prosecution,
the error or defect had been substantially or fully cured.

In conclusion, we find that the guilt of the appellant has been established beyond reasonable doubt.
It is true that no eyewitnesses to the actual killing testified against the appellant in court. However,
there is abundant evidence pointing to appellant Closa as one of the killers of Mendoza. As already
stated, on the night of the killing the appellant and Atienza passed by the house of Dominador
Mendoza, inquiring and looking for the deceased Pedro. From there they went in the direction of the
deceased's house. Early the following morning Closa and Atienza were seen coming from the
direction of the house of the deceased, and later Atienza informed the inmates in the house of his
grandfather that they, meaning he and Closa had killed somebody. Exhibits D and F, which are the
extrajudicial confessions of Atienza directly implicating appellant Closa, were introduced and
admitted in evidence during the trial without objection by the counsel of the appellant. By such failure
to object and the court proceedings being a joint trial, those exhibits were admissible against and
affected appellant Closa, and constitute competent evidence to prove his guilt (People vs. Bernadez,
CA-G.R. No. L-479, April 30, 1947 Off. Gaz., p. 2260). Furthermore, and this is important, when
Atienza was making the extrajudicial statement implicating Closa, the latter was present and kept
silent, but did not protest or remonstrate against the supposed false charge or implication. According
to rule 123, section 8, of the Rules of Court, "Any act or declaration made in the presence and within
the observation of party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to
call for action comment if not true, may be given in evidence against him."

The trial court that the killing was attended by the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and
dwelling. We agree with the Solicitor General that nighttime is absorbed in the treachery that
qualified the killing as murder.

With the modification that the indemnity imposed by the trial court is increased to P6,000, the
decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

LAGCAO V. LABRA

October 13, 2004 | Corona, J.

FACTS: The case is about the validity of Ordinance No. 1843 authorizing the mayor of Cebu City to
initiate expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of lot (1029) of petitioners Diosdado, Doroteo and
Ursula Lagcao.

In 1964, Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu, one of which is the lot 1029. 1965,
petitioners purchased said lot on installment but in late 1925, these 210 lots reverted to the Province of
Cebu. The latter tried to annul sale which resulted to the filing of the case of the petitioners. RTC and CA
ruled in their favor and as such a deed of sale was executed and a TCT was issued in their favor. When
they tried to take possession of the land, they found out that it was occupied by squatters. Thus, they
instituted ejectment proceedings which was later on granted by the MTCC and affirmed by RTC.
However, Mayor Garcia wrote letters requesting the deferment of the demolition since the city was still
looking for a relocation site for the squatters; this was granted. During the suspension the Sang.
Panlungsod of Cebu passed a resolution and 2 ordinances (all about the lot 1029). Ord. No. 1843
likewise appropriated the amount of 6, 881, 600 for the payment of subject land; this was approved by
the Mayor.

ISSUE: Whether or not the exercise of eminent domain is valid in the case at bar.

HELD: NO, it is NOT VALID. The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity
and that necessity must be of public character. Govt. may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose which
private property should be expropriated. In this case, there was no showing at all why petitioners’
property was singled out for expropriation by the city ordinance or what necessity impelled the
particular choice or selection. Ordinance no. 1843 stated no reason for the choice of petitioners’
property as the site of a socialized housing project. Moreover, under RA 7279, private lands rank last in
the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation proceedings may
be resorted to only after the other modes of acquisition are exhausted. Thus, the ordinance in question
is likewise null because: (1) it is repugnant to the pertinent provisions of RA 7279 and 7160 (LGC); (2)
the precipitate manner in which it was enacted was plain oppression masquerading as pro-poor
ordinance; (3) the fact that the land was singled out manifests partiality against petitioners; (4) it failed
to show that there was reasonable relation bet. the end sought and the means adopted.