I.
Revolutionary kind of expropriation (Confed v DAR)
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court is not entirely disregarded in the implementation of
RA 6657. The petitioners' main objection to paragraphs (d), (e) and (f) of Section
16 of RA 6657 is that they are allegedly in complete disregard of the expropriation
proceedings prescribed under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
The petitioners' argument does not persuade. As declared by the Court in
Association of Small Landowners, we are not dealing here with the traditional
exercise of the power of eminent domain, but a revolutionary kind of
expropriation:
The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands
whenever found and of whatever kind as long as they are in excess of
the maximum retention limits allowed their owners. This kind of
expropriation is intended for the benefit not only of a particular
community or of a small segment of the population but of the entire
Filipino nation. And, finally, let it not be forgotten that it is no less than
the Constitution itself that has ordained this revolution in the farms,
calling for "a just distribution" among the farmers of lands that have
heretofore been the prison of their dreams and deliverance.
Despite the revolutionary character of RA 6657, however, the chief limitations on
the exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) public use; and (2)
payment of just compensation, is embodied therein as well as in the Constitution.
With respect to "public use," the Court in Association of Small Landowners
declared that the requirement of public use had already been settled by the
Constitution itself as it "calls for agrarian reform, which is the reason why private
agricultural lands are to be taken from their owners, subject to the prescribed
maximum retention limits. The purposes specified in P.D. No. 27, 47 Proc. No.
131 48 and RA No. 6657 are only an elaboration of the constitutional injunction
that the State adopt the necessary measures 'to encourage and undertake the
just distribution of all agricultural lands to enable farmers who are landless to
own directly or collectively the lands they till.'
II. RA 3844: Agrarian Land Reform Code
Section 4. Abolition of Agricultural Share Tenancy
Agricultural share tenancy—declared to be contrary to public policy and shall be
abolished:
1. Provided, That existing share tenancy contracts may continue in force
any region, to be governed in the meantime by the pertinent
provisions of RA 1199, as amended, until the end of the agricultural
year when the National Land Reform Council proclaims that all the
government machineries and agencies in that region or locality
relating to leasehold envisioned in this Code are operating, unless such
contracts provide for a shorter period or the tenant sooner exercise
his option to elect the leasehold system.
2. Provided, further, That in order not to jeopardize international
commitments, lands devoted to crops covered by marketing
allotments shall be made the subject of a separate proclamation that
adequate provisions, such as the organization of cooperatives,
marketing agreements, or other similar workable arrangements, have
been made to insure efficient management on all matters requiring
synchronization of the agricultural with the processing phases of such
crops.
3. Provided, furthermore, That where the agricultural share tenancy
contract has ceased to be operative by virtue of this Code, or where
such a tenancy contract has been entered into in violation of the
provisions of this Code and is, therefore, null and void, and the tenant
continues in possession of the land for cultivation, there shall be
presumed to exist a leasehold relationship under the provisions of
this Code, without prejudice to the right of the landowner and the
former tenant to enter into any other lawful contract in relation to the
land formerly under tenancy contract, as long as in the interim the
security of tenure of the former tenant under Republic Act 1199, as
amended, and as provided in this Code, is not impaired.
4. Provided, finally, that if a lawful leasehold tenancy contract was
entered into prior to the effectivity of this Code, the rights and
obligations arising therefrom shall continue to subsist until modified
by the parties in accordance with the provisions of this Code.
Security of Tenure
Section 7. Tenure of Agricultural Leasehold Relation. The agricultural leasehold
relation once established shall confer upon the agricultural lessee the right to
continue working on the landholding until such leasehold relation is extinguished.
The agricultural lessee shall be entitled to security of tenure on his landholding
and cannot be ejected therefrom unless authorized by the Court for causes herein
provided.
Grounds to extinguish
Section 8. Extinguishment of Agricultural Leasehold Relation. The agricultural
leasehold relation established under this Code shall be extinguished by:
1
(1) Abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the
agricultural lessor;
(2) Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee,
written notice of which shall be served three months in advance; or
(3) Absence of the persons under Section 9 to succeed to the lessee, in the
event of death or permanent incapacity of the lessee.
Section 9.
(a) The surviving spouse;
(b) The eldest direct descendant by consanguinity; or
(c) The next eldest descendant or descendants in the order
of their age
Coderias v. Chioco (2013)
1. Deceased Chioco owned 4-hectare farm. Coderias, tiller of farm was
issued Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT). Friends of Chioco threatened
to kill Coderias if he did not leave the farm. Coderias eventually left the
farm. After learning Chioco’s death, he returned. He filed with DARAB
against Chioco’s estate that the leasehold contract be executed. Heirs
of Chioco contended that the action prescribed under 3844 since
Coderias only file in 1995 from dispossession in 1980; prescriptive
period is 3 years.
2. SC: Under Section 8 of RA 3844, the agricultural leasehold relation shall
be extinguished only under any of the following three circumstances,
to wit:
"(1) abandonment of the landholding without the
knowledge of the agricultural lessor; (2) voluntary
surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee,
written notice of which shall be served three months in
advance; or (3) absence of the persons under Section 9 to
succeed the lessee . . . ."
None of these is obtaining in this case. In particular, petitioner cannot
be said to have abandoned the landholding. It will be recalled that
Chioco forcibly ejected him from the property through threats and
intimidation. His house was bulldozed and his crops were destroyed.
Petitioner left the farm in 1980 and returned only in 1993 upon
learning of Chioco's death. Two years after, or in 1995, he filed the
instant Petition.
3. Since the farm is considered expropriated and placed under the
coverage of the land reform law, Chioco had no right to evict petitioner
and enter the property. More significantly, Chioco had no right to claim
that petitioner's cause of action had prescribed. In this case, we deem
it proper to reckon petitioner's cause of action to have accrued only
upon his knowledge of the death of Chioco in 1993, and not at the time
he was forcibly ejected from the landholding in 1980. For as long as
the intimidation and threats to petitioner's life and limb existed,
petitioner had a cause of action against Chioco to enforce the
recognition of this juridical tie. Since the threats and intimidation
ended with Chioco's death, petitioner's obligation to file a case to
assert his rights as grantee of the farm under the agrarian laws within
the prescriptive period commenced. These rights, as enumerated
above, include the right to security of tenure, to continue in possession
of the land he works despite the expiration of the contract or the sale
or transfer of the land to third persons, the pre-emptive right to buy
the land, as well as the right to redeem the land, if sold to a third
person without his knowledge.
4. Respondent had no right to claim prescription because a CLT had
already been issued in favor of petitioner. The farm is considered
expropriated and placed under the coverage of the land reform law.
As such, respondent had neither the right to evict petitioner nor to
claim prescription.
Section 9. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Death or
Incapacity of the Parties
In case of death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee to work his
landholding, the leasehold shall continue between the agricultural lessor and the
person who can cultivate the landholding personally, chosen by the agricultural
lessor within one month from such death or permanent incapacity, from among
the following:
1. the surviving spouse;
2. the eldest direct descendant by consanguinity; or
3. the next eldest descendant or descendants in the order of their age:
Provided, That in case the death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee
occurs during the agricultural year, such choice shall be exercised at the end of
that agricultural year: Provided, further, That in the event the agricultural lessor
fails to exercise his choice within the periods herein provided, the priority shall be
in accordance with the order herein established.
In case of death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessor, the leasehold
shall bind his legal heirs.
Grounds to dispossess
TOP-FNS
a. Failure to comply with terms and conditions of agreement
b. Planting of crops or the use of land for other purpose than that agreed upon
c. Failure to adopt proven farm practices to conserve land
d. Fault or negligence resulting in substantial damage
e. Non-payment of rental when due
f. Employed a sublessee
Section 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions - Notwithstanding any
agreement as to the period or future surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee
shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when
his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and
executory if after due hearing it is shown that:
1. The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his immediate
family will personally cultivate the landholding or will convert the
landholding, if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital
or school site or other useful non-agricultural purposes:
Provided; That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to
disturbance compensation equivalent to five years rental on his
landholding in addition to his rights under Sections 25 and 34,
except when the land owned and leased by the agricultural
lessor, is not more than five hectares, in which case instead of
disturbance compensation the lessee may be entitled to an
advanced notice of at least one agricultural year before
ejectment proceedings are filed against him: Provided, further,
That should the landholder not cultivate the land himself for
three years or fail to substantially carry out such conversion
within one year after the dispossession of the tenant, it shall be
presumed that he acted in bad faith and the tenant shall have the
right to demand possession of the land and recover damages for
any loss incurred by him because of said dispossessions.
2. The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with any of
the terms and conditions of the contract or any of the provisions
of this Code unless his failure is caused by fortuitous event or
force majeure;
3. The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the landholding for
a purpose other than what had been previously agreed upon;
4. The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices as
determined under paragraph 3 of Section twenty-nine;
5. The land or other substantial permanent improvement thereon
is substantially damaged or destroyed or has unreasonably
deteriorated through the fault or negligence of the agricultural
lessee;
6. The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it falls
due: Provided, That if the non-payment of the rental shall be due
to crop failure to the extent of seventy-five per centum as a result
of a fortuitous event, the non-payment shall not be a ground for
dispossession, although the obligation to pay the rental due that
particular crop is not thereby extinguished; or
7. The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in violation
of the terms of paragraph 2 of Section twenty-seven.
Section 31. Prohibitions to the Agricultural Lessor
It shall be unlawful for the agricultural lessor:
1. To dispossess the agricultural lessee of his landholding except
upon authorization by the Court under Section thirty-six. Should
the agricultural lessee be dispossessed of his landholding without
authorization from the Court, the agricultural lessor shall be
liable for damages suffered by the agricultural lessee in addition
to the fine or imprisonment prescribed in this Code for
unauthorized dispossession;
2. To require the agricultural lessee to assume, directly or
indirectly, the payment of the taxes or part thereof levied by the
government on the landholding;
3. To require the agricultural lessee to assume, directly or
indirectly, any part of the rent, "canon" or other consideration
which the agricultural lessor is under obligation to pay to third
persons for the use of the land;
4. To deal with millers or processors without written authorization
of the lessee in cases where the crop has to be sold in processed
form before payment of the rental; or
5. To discourage, directly or indirectly, the formation, maintenance
or growth of unions or organizations of agricultural lessees in his
landholding, or to initiate, dominate, assist or interfere in the
formation or administration of any such union or organization.
Non-payment of rental as ground to dispossess
Santa Ana v. Carpo (2008)
1. Carpo owned a land devoted for rice and corn, which was tenanted by
Domingo. Domingo’s wife executed transfer of rights to Santa Ana.
Carpo filed ejectment case against Santa Ana for non-payment of lease
rentals.
2. Issue: Whether the petitioner, as an agricultural tenant, failed to pay
her lease rentals when the same fell due as to warrant her
dispossession of the subject land.
3. SC: No. Under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 3844, 40 as amended,
coupled with the fact that the respondents are the complainants
themselves, the burden of proof to show the existence of a lawful
cause for the ejectment of the petitioner as an agricultural lessee rests
upon the respondents as agricultural lessors. 41 This proceeds from
2
the principle that a tenancy relationship, once established, entitles the
tenant to security of tenure. Petitioner can only be ejected from the
agricultural landholding on grounds provided by law.
4. The agricultural tenant's failure to pay the lease rentals must be willful
and deliberate in order to warrant his dispossession of the land that
he tills. We held that under our law and jurisprudence, mere failure of
a tenant to pay the landholder's share does not necessarily give the
latter the right to eject the former when there is lack of deliberate
intent on the part of the tenant to pay.
5. We agree with the findings of the DARAB that it was not the fault of
petitioner that the lease rentals did not reach the respondents
because the latter chose to ignore the notices sent to them. Good faith
was clearly demonstrated by Marciano and petitioner when, because
respondents refused to accept the proffered payment, they even went
to the point of seeking government intervention in order to address
their problems with respondents. Absent such deliberate and willful
refusal to pay lease rentals, petitioner's ejectment from the subject
land is not justified.
Natividad v. Mariano (2013)
1. An agricultural land owned by Yuzon. Mariano was the tenant.
Natividad filed ejectment case and collection of lease rentals against
Mariano. Natividad alleged he purchased the land. Despite repeated
demands, Mariano refused to heed.
2. SC: Natividad has no cause to eject. Section 7 of R.A. No. 3844 ordains
that once the tenancy relationship is established, a tenant or
agricultural lessee is entitled to security of tenure. The subsequent R.A.
No. 6657 further reiterates, under its Section 6, that the security of
tenure previously acquired shall be respected. Finally, in order to
protect this right, Section 37 of R.A. No. 3844 rests the burden of
proving the existence of a lawful cause for the ejectment of the
agricultural lessee on the agricultural lessor.
3. Ernesto Natividad did not present any evidence, such as the affidavit
of the person or persons present at that time, to prove that he
demanded from the respondents the payment of the lease rentals.
4. Non-payment of the lease rentals whenever they fall due is a ground
for the ejectment of an agricultural lessee. The agricultural lessee's
failure to pay the lease rentals, in order to warrant his dispossession
of the landholding, must be willful and deliberate and must have lasted
for at least two (2) years. The respondents' alleged non-payment did
not last for the required two-year period. To reiterate our discussion
above, the respondents' rental payments were not yet due and the
respondents were not in default at the time Ernesto filed the petition
for ejectment as Ernesto failed to prove his alleged prior verbal
demands.
5. Ernesto purchased the subject property in 1988. However, he only
demanded the payment of the lease rentals in 1998. Ernesto should
have demanded from the respondents the payment of the lease rental
soon after he purchased the subject property.
Nieves v. Duldulao (2014)
1. Nieves owned agricultural rice land. Duldulao were tenants. Nieves
claimed that Duldulao failed to pay rentals, thus seeking ejectment.
2. SC: To eject the agricultural lessee for failure to pay the leasehold
rentals, jurisprudence instructs that the same must be willful and
deliberate in order to warrant the agricultural lessee's dispossession
of the land that he tills. While respondents indeed admit that they
failed to pay the full amount of their respective leasehold rentals as
they become due, they claim that their default was on account of the
debilitating effects of calamities like flashfloods and typhoons. This
latter assertion is a defense provided under the same provision which,
if successfully established, allows the agricultural lessee to retain
possession of his landholding. The records of this case are, however,
bereft of any showing that the aforestated claim was substantiated by
any evidence tending to prove the same. Keeping in mind that bare
allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof,
31 the Court cannot therefore lend any credence to respondents'
fortuitous event defense.
3. Respondents' failure to pay leasehold rentals to the landowner also
appears to have been willful and deliberate. They, in fact, do not deny
— and therefore admit— the landowner's assertion that their rental
arrearages have accumulated over a considerable length of time, i.e.,
from 1985 to 2005 but rely on the fortuitous event defense, which as
above-mentioned, cannot herein be sustained.
Period of redemption
Section 12. Lessee's Right of Redemption. In case the landholding is sold to a third
person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the
right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration: Provided, That
the entire landholding sold must be redeemed: Provided, further, That where
these are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said right of
redemption only to the extent of the area actually cultivated by him. The right of
redemption under this Section may be exercised within two years from the
registration of the sale, and shall have priority over any other right of legal
redemption.
Po v. Dampal (2009)
 1. Two farm lots were mortgaged by Causin to rural bank. Because of
failure to pay, it was foreclosed and sold to Po. Po sold one lot to
Mutia. Causin and his tenant Dampal filed annulment of mortgage and
sale against the bank. Dampal filed for legal redemption against Po and
Mutia.
2. SC: DARAB held absence of written notice to the tenant of the sale, as
well as to the DAR, is indispensable, particularly in view of Sec. 12 of
Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, which
mandates that the 180-day period must be reckoned from the notice
in writing upon registration of the sale.
3. The admitted lack of written notice on Dampal and the DAR thus tolled
the running of the prescriptive period. Petitioners' (Po and Mutia)
contention that Dampal must be considered to have had constructive
knowledge thereof fails in light of the express requirement for notice
to be in writing.
Reclassification of land as ground to extinguish leasehold
Davao New Town v. Saliga (2013)
1. Once the property is reclassified to non-agricultural uses, it is
already outside the coverage of CARL (after it took effect on July
15, 1988).
2. Notably, under Section 36 (1) of R.A. No. 3844, as amended by
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6389, declaration by the department head,
upon recommendation of the National Planning Commission, to
be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other
urban purposes, terminates the right of the agricultural lessee to
continue in its possession and enjoyment. The approval of the
conversion, however, is not limited to the authority of the DAR
or the courts.
3. “In effect, therefore, whether the leasehold relationship
between the respondents and Eugenio had been established by
virtue of the provisions of R.A. No. 3844 or of the five-year lease
contract executed in 1981, this leasehold relationship had been
terminated with the reclassification of the property as non-
agricultural land in 1982. The expiration the five-year lease
contract in 1986 could not have done more than simply finally
terminate any leasehold relationship that may have prevailed
under the terms of that contract.”
Crisostomo v. Victoria (2015)
1. Crisostomo owned Riceland. He entered into lease contract with
Hipolito. As Hipolito died without known heirs, Crisostomo sought to
reclaim possession. However, Victoria began cultivating it without
Hipolito’s knowledge and consent. Victoria alleged that Hipolito was
her uncle.
2. SC: Hipolito was not clothed with authority to allow Victoria to be the
tenant. Hipolito, as lessee, was entitled as legal possessor only,
nothing more. Nothing authorized him to enter into tenancy
relationship with another.
3. Crisostomo never consented Victoria. The core of tenancy is consent.
Velasquez v. Cruz (2015)
1. Cruz owned a land. He file recovery of possession against Velasquez.
Cruz alleged Velasquez’s ‘father’ was a tenant of the land until 1985
when he relinquished his tenancy rights via a document. Thereafter
Cruz discovered that Velasquez entered the lot without consent and
never paid for the use of land. Velasquez contented that Coronel, who
leased the property from Cruz, permitted him.
2. It appears that the element of consent and sharing of harvests are
clearly lacking. [Petitioner] merely alleged that he was verbally asked
by all the heirs of Guillerma Coronel to continue working on the land.
The fact that [petitioner] was allowed to stay on the property does not
mean that [respondents] impliedly recognized the existence of a
leasehold relation with [petitioner]. Occupancy and continued
possession of the land will not ipso facto make one a dejure tenant.
3. In this case, [petitioner]could not present any evidence showing that
[respondents] had recognized him as tenant.
4. Petitioner’s claim that he succeeded Navarro as tenant is questionable.
Section 9 of RA 3844 provides an exclusive enumeration of those who
are qualified to succeed to the leasehold rights of a deceased or
incapacitated tenant.
5. Again, being a relative only by affinity of the deceased Bernabe
Navarro, [petitioner cannot lay claim as his successor. The (c)ourt
cannot accept his assertion that he was already identified by the DAR
as the successor on the basis of land amortization receipts. Said
receipts merely show that [petitioner] was the payor but these do not,
in any way, recognize him as the tenant-beneficiary of the land. It could
be that it was in the account of Bernabe Navarro. The [c]ourt has not
come across any official document from the DAR that expressly
identified him as Bernabe Navarro's successor.
III. PD 27 Suppletory application on just compensation
LBP v. Rokaya (2012)
1. When the reform process is still incomplete because the payment has
not been settled yet and considering the passage of R.A. 6657, just
3
compensation should be determined and the process concluded under
the said law.
LBP v. Santos (January 2016)
1. The Court has repeatedly held that the seizure of landholdings or
properties covered by PD 27 did not take place on October 21, 1972,
but upon the payment of just compensation. Thus, if the agrarian
reform process is still incomplete, as in this case where the just
compensation due the landowner has yet to be settled, just
compensation should be determined and the process concluded under
RA 6657.
2. The procedure for the determination of just compensation under RA
6657 commences with the LBP determining the initial valuation of the
lands under the land reform program. 78 Using the LBP's valuation, the
DAR makes an offer to the landowner. 79 In case the landowner rejects
the offer, the DAR adjudicator conducts a summary administrative
proceeding to determine the compensation for the land by requiring
the landowner, the LBP, and other interested parties to submit
evidence on the just compensation of the land. A party who disagrees
with the decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring the matter to the
RTC designated as a Special Agrarian Court for final determination of
just compensation.
LBP v. Munsayac (March 2016)
1. When the agrarian reform process under P.D. 27 remains incomplete
and is overtaken by R.A. 6657, the rule is that just compensation for
the landowner — if it has yet to be settled — should be determined
and the process concluded under R.A. 6657, with P.D. 27 and E.O. 228
applying only suppletorily.
2. It is clear from the above that R.A. 6657 is the applicable law when the
acquisition process under P.D. 27 is still incomplete and is overtaken
by the former's enactment. Petitioners, therefore, cannot insist on
applying P.D. 27; otherwise, Section 75 of R.A. 6657 would be rendered
inutile.
IV. RA 6657: CARL, as amended
Agricultural activity vis-à-vis raising of livestock
Luz Farms v. DAR (1990)
1. The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it
was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include
livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-
mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.
2. Section 11 of R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands
devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the
definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the
aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the
agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to
include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform.
Republic v. Lopez (2011)
1. The Lopez lands of SNLABC are actually and directly being used for
livestock and are thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
2. MARO in its ocular inspection 22 found on the Lopez lands several
heads of cattle, carabaos, horses, goats and pigs, some of which were
covered by several certificates of ownership. There were likewise
structures on the Lopez lands used for its livestock business, structures
consisting of two chutes where the livestock were kept during
nighttime.
3. As the primary official in charge of investigating the land sought to be
exempted as livestock land, the MARO's findings on the use and nature
of the land, if supported by substantial evidence on record, are to be
accorded greater weight, if not finality, [against classification in tax
declaration].
Holy Trinity Corp. v. Dela Cruz (2014)
1. Land on which no agricultural activity is being conducted is not subject
to the coverage of either Presidential Decree No. 27 or Republic Act
No. 6657.
2. Consequently, before land may be placed under the coverage of
Republic Act No. 6657, two requisites must be met, namely: (1) that
the land must be devoted to agricultural activity; and (2) that the land
must not be classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land. Considering that the Dakila property has not been
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial, the
second requisite is satisfied. For the first requisite to be met, however,
there must be a showing that agricultural activity is undertaken on the
property.
3. Here, no evidence was submitted to show that any agricultural activity
— like cultivation of the land, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees,
raising of livestock, or poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such
farm products, and other farm activities and practices — were being
performed on the Dakila property in order to subject it to the coverage
of Republic Act No. 6657. 3. Definition of agricultural land
(Natalia Realty v DAR, Alangilan v OP, LBP v Estate of Araneta)
Agrarian Dispute (Sec. 50-A, Isidro v CA, Bejasa v CA, Almuete v Andres, Nicorp
Devt v De Leon, Sps Fajardo v Flores, Estate of Pastor Samson v Susano, Heirs of
Quilo v DBP, Reyes v Heirs of Floro, Davao New Town v Sps. Saliga, Automat v
Cruz, Caluzor v Llanillo, Ligtas v People, DAR v Robles)
Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements,
whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farm workers' associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking
to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this
Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to
farm workers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
ESSENTIAL REQUISITIES: PSC-PPS
1) Parties (landowner & tenants)
2) Subject matter is agricultural land
3) Consent of parties
4) Purpose is agricultural production
5) Personal cultivation by tenant
6) Sharing of harvest between parties
All requisites must concur, absence of one does not make one a tenant.
1. Jurisdiction over subject matter determined from allegations of
complaint. Court does not lose jurisdiction by defense of tenancy
relationship and only after hearing that, if tenancy is shown, the court
should dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Case involving agricultural land
does not automatically make such case agrarian. Six requisites were
not present. There was no contract to cultivate & petitioner failed to
substantiate claim that he was paying rent for use of land. (Isidro)
2. The controversy mainly lies on whether the parties are the true and
legitimate landowner and tenant. Reyes relies on the certifications
from the MARO and Bautista, the alleged original owner, manifesting
that he was a tenant of the subject land to prove that a tenancy
relationship exists. This is untenable. The MARO certification is merely
preliminary and does not bind the courts as conclusive evidence that
Reyes is a lessee who cultivates the land for purposes of agricultural
production. ||| (Reyes v. Heirs of Floro, G.R. No. 200713, [December
11, 2013])
3. It bears stressing that while the rule is that DARAB's jurisdiction is
limited to agrarian disputes where tenancy relationship between the
parties exists, Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 and Section 17 of E.O. No.
229 both plainly state that the DAR is vested with the primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters. It is
also noteworthy that while Section 3 (d) 26 of R.A. No. 6657 defined
the term "agrarian dispute," no specific definition was given by the
same law to the term "agrarian reform matters." In view thereof, the
Court cannot restrict the DARAB's quasi-judicial jurisdiction only to
those involving agrarian disputes where tenancy relationship exists
between the parties, for it should also include other "agrarian reform
matters" which do not fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Office
of the Secretary of DAR, the Department of Agriculture and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as well as the
Special Agrarian Courts.
DAR v. Woodland (2015)
1. Clearly, Section 63 refers to the implementation of the CARL in its
entirety, not just the funding source. Indeed, R.A. 8532 specifically
amended Section 63 of R.A. 6657, but it does not follow that only
Section 63 had been affected by the amendment. The fact that Section
63 falls under the chapter on "Financing" only emphasizes its general
applicability. Hence, the phrase "until the year 2008" used in R.A. 8532
unmistakably extends the DAR's authority to issue NOCs for purposes
of acquiring and distributing private agricultural lands.
2. Finally, R.A. 9700 extended the acquisition and distribution of all
agricultural lands until 30 June 2014. The title alone of R.A. 9700 — An
Act Strengthening the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP), Extending the Acquisition and Distribution of All Agricultural
Lands, Instituting Necessary Reforms, Amending for the Purpose
Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 6657, Otherwise Known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, As Amended, and
Appropriating Funds Therefor — reveals that the CARP was indeed
extended from 1998 to 2008 via R.A. 8532. Had there been no prior
extension from 1998 to 2008, how else could the CARP have been
extended by R.A. 9700 until 30 June 2014? There could have been an
extension only if the program sought to be extended had not expired.
Homestead patent (Section 6, who can claim exemption)
HOMESTEAD PATENT
1. A mode of acquiring alienable and disposable lands of public domain
for agricultural purposes conditioned upon actual cultivation and
residence.
2. Filed at CENRO where land being applied is located.
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3. who are qualified - citizens of Philippines over 18 years old & not an
owner of more than 12 hectares of land (Art XII, Sec. 3, 1987
Constitution)
4. Designed to distribute disposable agricultural lots of the State to land
destitute citizens for their home and cultivation. Pursuant to such
benevolent intention the State prohibits the sale or encumbrance of
the homestead (CA 141, Section 116) within five years after the grant
of the patent. After that five-year period the law impliedly permits
alienation of the homestead, but in line with the primordial purpose
to favor with the homesteader and his family the statute provides that
such alienation or conveyance (Section 117) shall be subject to the
right of repurchase by the homesteader, his widow or heirs. CARL
recognizes rights of homesteaders(Sec.6,)
5. expressly recognized in Sec. 6, Art XIII, Constitution
6. SEC. 6. Retention Limits. - Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no
person may own or retain, directly, any public or private agricultural
land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable
family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain,
infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential
Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case
shall the retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three
(3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject
to the following qualifications:
a. that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and
b. that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the
farm:
Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by
Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally
retained by them thereunder; Provided, further, That original
homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the
original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain
the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or
contiguous, shall pertain, to the landowner: Provided, however, That
in case the area selected for retention by the landowner is tenanted,
the tenant shall have the option to choose whether to remain therein
or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land with similar
or comparable features. In case the tenant chooses to remain in the
retained area, he shall be considered a leaseholder and shall lose his
right to be a beneficiary under this Act. In case the tenant chooses to
be a beneficiary in another agricultural land, he loses his right as a
leaseholder to the land retained by the landowner. The tenant must
exercise this option within a period of one (1) year from the time the
landowner manifests his choice of the area for retention.
In all cases, the security of tenure of the farmers or farm workers on
the land prior to the approval of this Act shall be respected. Upon the
effectivity of this Act, any sale, disposition, lease, management
contract or transfer of possession of private lands executed by the
original landowner in violation of this Act shall be null and void.
Exemption from coverage (Section 10, Central Mindanao v DARAB, DAR v DECS)
SECTION 10. Exemptions and Exclusions. —Lands actually, directly and exclusively
used and found to be necessary for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation,
fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds, and mangroves, national
defense, school sites and campuses including experimental farm stations
operated by public or private schools for educational purposes, seeds and
seedlings research and pilot production centers, church sites and convents
appurtenant thereto, mosque sites and Islamic centers appurtenant thereto,
communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms actually
worked by the inmates, government and private research and quarantine centers
and all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those already
developed shall be exempt from the coverage of the Act.
 Concha v Rubio
 Ways in distributing lands to qualified beneficiaries under CARL
 Jurisdiction in identification and selection of beneficiaries
 Jurisdiction to cancel leasehold contract
 Jurisdiction to cancel CLOA
 Compulsory acquisition (procedure under Section 16, Confed v DAR,
LBP v Heirs of Trinidad, Heirs of Deleste v LBP)
 Just compensation (preliminary determination, Assoc. of Small
Landowners v Sec of Dar, LBP v Dumlao, Sps Lee v LBP, LBP v Yatco, LBP
v Livioco, LBP v Nable, Heirs of Lorenzo v LBP, DAR v Heirs of Domingo,
Heirs of Deleste v LBP, governing law, payment of interest - Apo Fruits
v. CA, LBP v. Rivera and LBP v. Gallego, LBP v Hababag, PD 27 v RA 6657,
as amended)
 Is prior recourse to DARAB necessary?
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