violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be said
tohave been conjured out of thin air as it was properly backed up
 Soria vs Desierto 125 phil 313 Art 125
Facts:
Petitioners Rodolfo Soria and Edimar Bista were arrested on May
13, 2001 (a Sundayand the day before May 14 elections) without
a warrant by respondents for alleged illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition. One police identified Bista to have a
standing warrant of arrest for violation of BP Blg. 6.From the time
of Soria’s detention up to the time of his release, 22 hours had
already elapsed and Bista was detained for 26 days. The crimes
for which Soria was arrested without warrant are punishable by
correctional penalties or their equivalent, thus, criminal
complaints or information should be filed with the proper judicial
authorities within 18 hours of his arrest. The crimes for which
Bista was arrested are punishable by afflictive or capital
penalties, or their equivalent, thus, he could only bedetained for
36 hours without criminal complaints or information having been
filed with the proper judicial authorities.
Article 125 stated that Delay in the delivery of detained persons
to the proper judicial authorities. - The penalties provided in the
next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or
employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and
shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities
within the period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses
punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18)
hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional
penalties, or their equivalent; and thirty-six (36)hours, for crimes
or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their
equivalent.
Petitioners filed with the Office of the Ombudsman for Military
Affairs a complaint-affidavit for violation of Art. 125 of the
Revised Penal Code against herein private respondents. The office
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Petitioners then filed
their motion for reconsideration which was denied for lack of
merit in the second assailed Resolution
.Issue:W/O officers of the Office of the Ombudsman gravely
abused their discretion in dismissing the complaint for violation
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code (Delay in the delivery of
detained persons)
Held:
Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer concerned
which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. Theabuse
of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or avirtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law.
No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the
respondents. Their disposition of petitioners' complaint for
by law and jurisprudence.Regarding the complaint of Soria, based
on applicable laws and jurisprudence, anelection day or a special
holiday, should not be included in the computation of the period
prescribed by law for the filing of complaint/information in
courts in cases of warrantless arrests,it being a 'no-office day.
Hence, there could be no arbitrary detention or violation of
Article 125of the Revised Penal Code.In the same vein, the
complaint of Bista against the respondents for Violation of
Article125, will not prosper because the running of the thirty-six
(36)-hour period prescribed by law for the filing of the complaint
against him from the time of his arrest was tolled by one day
(electionday). Moreover, he has a standing warrant of arrest for
Violation of B.P. Blg. 6 and he couldonly be released if he has no
other pending criminal case requiring his continuous detention.
 Villavicencio vs Lukban, At 127
Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton
Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of about 170
women at the night of October 25, 1918 without the women’s
knowledge and consent and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao
specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers in a
banana plantation. Said women are inmates of the houses of
prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of
Sampaloc.
 The purpose of sending this women to davao is to
exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for
women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a
number of years.
Some of the women were able to escape and return to Manila. The
attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of
the deportees presented an application for heabes corpus to the
Supreme Court.
The City of Manila Mayor and police moved to dismiss the case
saying that those women were already out of their jurisdiction
and that, it should be filed in the city of Davao instead.
ISSUE RELEVANT TO SECTION 1 ARTICLE II of the
Constitution
1. WHETHER OR NOT MAYOR LUKBAN WHO IS AN OFFICER OF
THE STATE, TO ERADICATE VICES IN ITS CITY HAVE THE RIGHT
TO DEPORT SAID WOMEN OF ILL-REPUTE?
OTHER ISSUE
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CITY OF MANILA DOES NOT HAVE A
JURISDICTION TO ISSUE A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS TO DAVAO
CITY TO PRODUCE THE BODY OF THE WOMEN SINCE IT IS OUT
OF THEIR JURISDICTION AND THUS, DISOBEYING THE WRIT
ISSUED BY THE COURT TO PRODUCE THE BODY OF THE
WOMEN?
HELD:
Page 1 of 36
· The petition was granted. Respondent Lukban is found in
contempt of court for not following the order of the court to
produce the body of the women and shall pay into the office of
the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days the sum of one
hundred pesos (P100)
RATIO:
1. On the first issue, the court’s decision is based on the
principle of Republicanism wherein “Ours is a government of
laws and not of men”
Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that”No
freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his
freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or
any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor condemn
him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.
No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The courts
are the forum which functionate to safeguard individual
liberty and to punish official transgressors
2. On the second issue, the court believed that the true
principle should be that, if the respondent (Mayor Lukban) is
within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey
the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has
inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. The writ of habeas
corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the
parties are left untouched by decision on the writ, whose
principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty.
3. In other words, If the mayor and the chief of police, acting
under no authority of law, could deport these women from
the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must
necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao
to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may
not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by
forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with
impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her
birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ
of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.
 Pp vs Baes, 68 phil 203, Art 133
FACTS:
Baes, the parish priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Lumban,
Laguna, charged the accused
with an offense against religion for causing the funeral of a
member of the “Church of Christ” to pass
through the churchyard fronting the Roman Catholic Church,
belonging to said church and devoted to the religious worship
thereof. The parish priest opposed this, but through force and
threats of physical violence by the accused, was compelled to
allow the funeral to pass through the said churchyard.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the act complained of is notoriously offensive to
the religious feelings of the Catholics, thereby violating Article
133 of the RPC.
HELD:
The facts alleged in the complaint constitute the offense defined
and penalized in article 133 of the Revised Penal Code, and
should the fiscal file an information alleging the said facts and a
trial be thereafter held at which the said facts should be
conclusively established, the court may find the accused guilty of
the offense complained of, or that of coercion, or that of trespass
under article 281 of the Revised Penal Code.
Whether or not the act complained of is offensive to the religious
feelings of the Catholics, is a question of fact which must be
judged only according to the feelings of the Catholic and not those
of other faithful ones. Laurel dissent: Offense to religious feelings
should not be made to depend upon the more or less broad or
narrow conception of any given particular religion, but should be
gauged having in view the nature of the acts committed and after
scrutiny of all the facts and circumstance which should be viewed
through the mirror of an unbiased judicial criterion. Otherwise,
the gravity or leniency of the offense would hinge on the
subjective characterization of the act from the point of view of a
given religious denomination or sect, and in such a case, the
application of the law would be partial and arbitrary, withal,
dangerous,
especially in a country said to be "once the scene of religious
intolerance and persecution.”
Article 133, RPC:
Offending the religious feelings. – The penalty of arresto mayor in
its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period shall be imposed upon anyone who, in a place devoted to
religious worship or during the celebration of any religious
ceremoncy, shall perform acts notoriously offensive to the
feelings of the faithful.
 Pp vs Hernandez, Rebellion
Facts:
About March 15, 1945, Amado Hernandez and other appellants
were accused of conspiring, confederating and cooperating with
each other, as well as with the thirty-one (31) defendants charged
in the criminal cases of the Court of First Instance of Manila. They
were accused of being members of PKP Community Party of the
Philippines which was actively engaged in an armed rebellion
Page 2 of 36
against the government of the Philippines. With the party of
HUKBALAHAP (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa mga Hapon), they
committed the crime of rebellion causing murder, pillage, looting
plunder, etc., enumerated in 13 attacks on government forces or
civilians by HUKS.
Crime Committed:
Rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies
Contention of the State:
The government, headed by the Solicitor General,
argued that the gravity of the crime committed required the
denial of bail. Moreover, the complex crime charged by the
government against Hernandez has been successfully imposed
with other arrested communist leaders and was sentenced to life
imprisonment.
Contention of the Accused:
An appeal prosecuted by the defendants regarding the
judgment rendered by the CFI in Manila that rebellion cannot be a
complex crime with murder, arson or robbery.
Ruling:
The court ruled that “murder, arson, and robbery are
mere ingredient of the crime of rebellion as means “necessary”
for the perpetration of the offense. Such common offense is
absorbed or inherent of the crime of rebellion. Inasmuch as the
acts specified in Article 135 constitutes, one single crime it
follows that said acts offer no occasion for the application of
Article 48 which requires therefore the commission of at least
two crimes.
*** HERNANDEZ DOCTRINE: Rebellion cannot be
complexed with common crimes such as killings, destruction of
property, etc., committed on the occasion and in furtherance
thereof. The thinking is not anymore correct more so that there is
no legal basis for such rule now. Rebellion constitutes ONLY ONE
CRIME. ***
 Pp vs Geronimo, Rebellion
Not every act of violence is deemed absorbed in the
crime of rebellion solely because it was committed
simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion.
If the killing, robbing, etc. were done for private
purposes or profit, without any political motivation,
the crime would be separately punishable and would
not be absorbed by the rebellion and the individual
misdeed could not be taken with the rebellion to
constitute a complex crime, for the constitutive acts
and intent would be unrelated to each other. The
individual crime would not be a means necessary for
committing the rebellion, as it would not be done in
preparation or in furtherance of the latter.
 Enrile vs Salazar 186 scra 217 Rebellion
Facts:
In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor
Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement
officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of
Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime
Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in
Criminal Case No. 9010941.
The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that
day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State
Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R.
Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr.,
charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda
Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with
murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed
during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to
December 10, 1990.
Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI
headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having
been recommended in the information and none fixed in the
arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he
was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he
was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the
Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through
counsel, filed the petition for habeas corpus herein (which was
followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990),
alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights.
Issue:
(a) Whether the petitioner has committed complex crimes (delito
compleio) arising from an offense being a necessary means for
committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of
Article 48, Revised Penal Code?
Held:
There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that why
Article 48 of the Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If
murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes
were punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the
following penalties would be imposable upon the movant,
namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding
P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period,
depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but never
exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of
murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death,
depending upon the modifying circumstances present. In other
Page 3 of 36
words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme
penalty could not be imposed upon him. However, under Article
48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the
absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said
provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the
prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime
that does not exist in the statute books, while technically correct
so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed
with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must
therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the
context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the
petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the Revised
Penal Code: simple rebellion.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the
light of the Court's reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to
petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that
the information against him should be considered as charging
only the crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable before
conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition.
But the question remains: Given the facts from which this case
arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court the
appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its
denial? The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the
normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have
provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original
jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The
correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by
filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per
se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only
after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review
jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not
without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief
was also available there.
The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in
People vs. Hernandez, the questioned information filed against
petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and
Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only,
hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction,
as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners
being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both
cases are ordered remanded to the respondent Judge to fix the
amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed
by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding
bail bond flied with this Court shall become functus oficio. No
pronouncement as to costs.
 PP VS TAHIR SEDITION
 PP VS UMALI SEDITION
Facts:
On the eve of the election, at the house of Pasumbal’s father,
Congressman Umali instructed Pasumbal to contact the Huks
through Commander Abeng so that Punzalan would be killed. It
would seem that Umali and Pasumbal had a feeling that Punzalan
was going to win in the election and that his death was the surest
way to eliminate him from the electoral fight.
In the evening of the same day, Pasumbal reported to Umali about
his conference with Commander Abeng, saying that the latter was
agreeable to the proposition and even outlines the manner of
attack.
After waiting for sometimes, Abeng and his troops numbering
about fifty, armed with garlands and carbines, arrived.
Congressman Umali, holding a revolver, was seen in the company
of Huk Commander Torio and about 30 armed men. The shots
were heard. Afterwards they saw Umali and his companions leave
in the direction of Taguan, by way of railroad tracks.
Issue: Whether or not the crime is of rebellion or sedition.
Held:
The crime committed were not rebellion but rather that of
sedition. The purpose of the raid and the act of the raiders is
rising publicly and taking up arms was not exactly against the
Government and for the purpose of doing things defined in
Article 134 of the RPC.
The raiders did not even attack the Presidencia, the seat of the
local Government. Rather the object was to attain by means of
force, intimidation, etc., one object, to wit, to inflict an act of hate
or revenge upon the person or property of a public official,
namely Punzalan who was then mayor of Tiaong.
***Common crimes are not absorbed in sedition***
 ESPUELAS VS PEOPLE 90 PHIL 524
INCITING TO SEDITION
Facts:
On June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the town of
Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture
taken, making it to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at the end
of a piece of rope suspended form the limb of the tree, when in
truth and in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel. After
securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same
to Free Press, the Evening News, the Bisayas, Lamdang of general
circulation and other local periodicals in the Province of Bohol
but also throughout the Philippines and abroad, for their
publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to
appear that it was written by a fictitious suicide, Alberto
Reveniera and addressed to the latter's supposed wife translation
of which letter or note, stating his dismay and administration of
Page 4 of 36
President Roxas, pointing out the situation in Central Luzon and
Leyte, and directing his wife his dear wife to write to President
Truman and Churchill of US and tell them that in the Philippines
the government is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis.
Issue:
Whether the accused is liable of seditious libel under Art. 142 of
the RPC against the Government of the Philippines?
Held:
Yes. The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And
there being no question as to the legality of the penalty imposed
on him, the decision will be affirmed with costs.
Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences, the
article written bybthe accused, cannot fail to impress thinking
persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of sedition and strife. The
infuriating language is not a sincere effort to persuade, what with
the writer's simulated suicide and false claim to martyrdom and
what with is failure to particularize. When the use irritating
language centers not on persuading the readers but on creating
disturbances, the rationable of free speech cannot apply and the
speaker or writer is removed from the protection of the
constitutional guaranty.
If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire
governmental structure but only President Roxas and his men,
the reply is that article 142 punishes not only all libels against the
Government but also "libels against any of the duly constituted
authorities thereof." The "Roxas people" in the Government
obviously refer of least to the President, his Cabinet and the
majority of legislators to whom the adjectives dirty, Hitlers and
Mussolinis were naturally directed. On this score alone the
conviction could be upheld.
Regarding the publication, it suggests or incites rebellious
conspiracies or riots and tends to stir up people against the
constituted authorities, or to provoke violence from opposition
who may seek to silence the writer. Which is the sum and
substance of the offense under consideration.
The essence of seditious libel may be said to its immediate
tendency to stir up general discontent to the pitch of illegal
courses; that is to say to induce people to resort to illegal
methods other than those provided by the Constitution, in order
to repress the evils which press upon their minds.
 PP VS ROMUALDEZ 57 PHIL 151 ART 171
Facts:
Case of Bar Exam where the scores of a certain Mabunay were
changed.
On the composition of a bar candidate, the grades 73%-Civil Law
and 64%-Remedial Law were written by an employee of the SC,
after striking out the grade of 63% and 58%.
ISSUE:
WON the altered grades were public or official documents.
HELD:
The examination of candidates for admission to the bar is a
judicial function. The alterations made in such papers, under the
circumstances proven in this case, of the grades given to them by
the correctors, constitute the crime of falsification of public
documents.
The acts of falsification are
1. Making alterations on genuine document,
2. Making it appear that correctors had participated in blotting
out the grades and
3. Attributing to the correctors statements other than those made
by them.
 Pp v sendaydiego 81 scra 120 Art 172
Facts:
In these three cases of malversation through falsification, the
prosecution's theory is that in 1969 Licerio P. Sendaydiego, the
provincial treasurer of Pangasinan, in conspiracy with Juan
Samson y Galvan, an employee of a lumber and hardware store in
Dagupan City, and with Anastacio Quirimit, the provincial auditor,
as an accomplice, used six (6) forged provincial vouchers in order
to embezzle from the road and bridge fund the total sum of
P57,048.23.
The provincial voucher in these cases has several parts. In the
upper part with the legend "ARTICLE OR SERVICE" the nature of
the obligation incurred is indicated. That part is supposed to be
signed by two officials of the provincial engineer's office and by
the governor's representative.
The middle part of the voucher contains five numbered printed
paragraphs.
Paragraph 1 is a certificate to be signed by the creditor. It is stated
therein that the creditor vouches that the expenses "were actually
and necessarily incurred". In the instant cases paragraph 1 was
Page 5 of 36
not signed presumably because it is not relevant to the purchase
of materials for public works projects. Paragraph 2 is a
certification that the expenses are correct and have been lawfully
incurred. It is signed by the provincial engineer. Paragraph 3
contains these words: "Approved for pre-audit and payment,
appropriations and funds being available therefore." This is
signed by the provincial treasurer. Paragraph 4 is a certification
which, as filed up in Exhibit K, Voucher No. 10724 dated February
28, 1969, certifying that the voucher has been pre-audited and
signed by the auditor. Paragraph 5 is a certification signed by the
provincial treasurer that the account mentioned in the provincial
engineer's certification "was paid in the amount and on the date
shown below and is chargeable as shown in the summary hereof.
" It may be noted that the provincial treasurer signs two part of
the voucher.
Issue:
Whether or not appellants are liable for the crimes of
falsicification of public documents and six crimes of
malversation?
Held:
Samson is convicted of six crimes of falsification of a public
document and six crimes of malversation. In lieu of the penalties
imposed by the trial court, he is sentenced to the following
penalties: For each of the six falsification of the vouchers (Exh. K,
O, P, Q, R and S), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
of two (2) years of prison correccional minimum, as minimum, to
four (4) years of prision correccional medium, as maximum, and
to pay a fine of three thousand pesos. For the malversation of the
sum of P16,727.52 covered by voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K),
Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12)
years of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17)
years of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum; to pay a fine in
the amount of P16,727.52, and to indemnify the province of
Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case NO. 23349, L-
33252). For the malversation of the sum of P14,571.81 covered
by voucher No. 11995 (Exh. O), Samson is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor
maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion
temporal medium, as maximum; to pay a fine in the sum of
P14,571.81, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the
same amount (Criminal Case No. 23351, L-33254). For the
malversation of the sum of P6,290.60 covered by voucher No.
11870 (Exh. Q), Samson is sentenced to an indertiminate penalty
of nine (9) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to
thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum;
to pay a fine of P6,290.60, and to indemnify the province of
Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-
33253). For the malversation of the sum of P9,769.64 covered by
voucher No. 11871 (Exh. R), Samson is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of nine (9) years of prision mayor medium,
as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal
minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P9,769.64, and to
indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount
(Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253). For the malversation of the
sum of P5,187.28, covered by voucher No. 11869 (Exh. P),
Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years
of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to eight (8) of
prision mayor minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P5,187.28,
and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount
(Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).
For the malversation of the sum of P4,501.38 covered by voucher
no. 11872 (Exh. S), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional maximum, as
minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum, as
maximum; to pay a fine of P4,501.38, and to indemnify the
province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No.
23350, L-33253). In the service of the twelve penalties meted to
Samson, the threefold limit provided for in article 70 of the
Revised Penal Code should be observed (People vs. Escares, 102
Phil. 677), meaning that the maximum penalty that he should
serve is three times the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12)
years to seventeen (17) years, the severest penalty imposed on
him, or thirty-six (36) years to fifty-one (51) years (see People vs.
Penñ as, 68 Phil. 533). The maximum duration of his sentences
should not exceed forty (40) years (Penultimate par. of art. 70;
People vs. Alisub, 69 Phil. 362; People vs. Concepcion, 59 Phil.
518, 68 Phil. 530 and 69 Phil. 58).
The estate of the late Licerio P. Sendaydiego is ordered to
indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the sum of P57,048.23.
Samson and the said estate are solitarily liable for the said
indemnity (Art. 110, Revised Penal Code). Samson should pay
one-half of the costs. SO ORDERED.
 PP VS HILVANO 99 PHIL 655 ART 177
 US VS TU LE PIU 35 PHIL 4 ART 178
 PEOPLE VS ESTRADA GR NO. 164368
FACTS:
Page 6 of 36
On 4 April 2001, an Information for plunder was filed against
former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada (aâ €œFPres.
Estradaaâ €), together with Jose aâ €œJinggoyaâ € Estrada, Charlie
aâ €˜Atongaâ € Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma
Alfaro, Eleuterio Tan, a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane
Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John & Jane Does, for the crime of
Plunder defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended
by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659. The Information was subsequently
amended, as follows:
AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB,
Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a. aâ €œASIONG
SALONGAaâ € AND a.k.a. aâ €œJOSE VELARDEaâ €, together with
Jose aâ €˜Jinggoyaâ €™ Estrada, Charlie aâ €œAtongaâ € Ang, Edward
Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a.
Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a.
Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder,
defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec.
12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER,
BEING THEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY
with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY,
RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS
ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY
TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION,
AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass,
accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY,
ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount OR TOTAL VALUE of
FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less,
THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT
THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE
AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A
combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR
SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL
INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE
HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00),
MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF
GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with
co-accused CHARLIE aâ €˜ATONGaâ €™ ANG, JOSE aâ €˜Jinggoyaâ €™
Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES
AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR
PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR
misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR
PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS [P130,000,000.00], more or
less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION
PESOS [P200,000,000.00] tobacco excise tax share allocated for
the Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF
AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie aâ €˜Atongaâ €™
Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio
Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER
JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL
GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) TO PURCHASE, 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE
OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000
SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE
CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE
BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY
FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY
CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN
HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE
THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
[P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR
LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION
FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN
PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY
COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE
DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID
PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS [P189,700,000.00], MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE
CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME aâ €œJOSE
VELARDEaâ €;
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS,
SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION
TWO HNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND AND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING
THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME aâ €œJOSE VELARDEaâ € 
AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
After the prosecution finished presenting its evidence, FPres.
Estrada filed, with leave of court, a demurrer to evidence. The
demurrer, however, was denied by the court. Accused Serapio
opted not to present his own evidence, and instead adopted the
evidence presented by FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada.
Incidentally, in 2007, the Sandiganbayan approved the Plea
Bargaining Agreement between the prosecution and accused
Atong Ang, the latter pleading guilty to a lesser offense of
Page 7 of 36
Corruption of Public Officials under Article 212 in relation to
Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code. Accused Atong Ang was
sentenced to two years and four months of prision correccional
minimum, as minimum, to six years of prision correccional
maximum, as maximum, and to pay the amount of
P25,000,000.00 to the Government as his civil liability. Accused
Atong Ang is now out of jail under probation.
RULING OF THE COURT
The elements of the crime of plunder, pursuant to RA 7080 and as
laid down by the Supreme Court in the earlier case of Joseph
Ejercito Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148560, 19
November 2001), are as follows:
(1) That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons;
(2) That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of the following overt or criminal
acts described in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080 as amended; and
(3) That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten
wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least
P50,000,000.00.
The terms aâ €œCombinationaâ € and aâ €œSeriesaâ € were
likewise defined in the above-cited case. aâ €œCombinationaâ €
refers to at least two acts falling under different categories of
enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public
treasury in Sec.1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance
of assets belongings to the National Government under Sec.1, par.
(d), subpar. (3). On the other hand, to constitute a aâ €œseriesaâ €,
there must be two or more overt or criminal acts falling under the
same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say,
misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury,
all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1).
Section 1 (d) reads:
Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise
or material possession of any person within the purview of
Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or in directly
through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or
business associates by any combination or series of the following
means or similar schemes:
1) Through misappropriation, conversation, misuse, or
malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit
from any person and/ or entity in connection with any
government contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public officer concerned;
3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of asset
belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivision,
agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or
aâ €“controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any
shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including promises of future employment in any
business enterprise or undertaking;
5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial
monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of
decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or
special interests; or
6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
The prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the
elements of plunder as against former President Estrada, thus:
(a) The principal accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, at the time of
the commission of the acts charged in the Amended Information
was the President of the Republic of the Philippines;
(b) He acted in connivance with then Governor Luis
aâ €œChavitaâ € Singson, who was granted immunity from suit by
the Office of the Ombudsman, and with the participation of other
persons named by prosecution witnesses in the course of the trial
of this case, in amassing, accumulating and acquiring ill-gotten
wealth as follows:
(i) by a series of acts of receiving bi-monthly collections from
aâ €œjuetengaâ €, a form of illegal gambling, during the period
beginning November 1998 to August 2000 in the aggregate
amount of P545,291,000.00. Out of this amount, P200,000,000.00
was deposited in the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation; and
(ii) by a series consisting of two acts of ordering the GSIS and the
SSS to purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation and
collecting or receiving commission from the sales of Belle Shares
in the amount of P189,700,000.00 which was deposited in the
Jose Velarde account.
These two acts – (i) and (ii) – correspond to sub-paragraphs (a)
and (c) of the Amended Information. However, there is
uncertainty as to the participation of Jinggoy Estrada and Serapio
in the allegations under sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended
Information (both are not included in sub-paragraph [c] of the
Amended Information).
With respect to Jinggoy Estrada, there was no evidence that the
money he turned over to Gov. Singson or the latteraâ €™s
representatives was part of the jueteng protection money
collected from Bulacan or that he received funds from a certain
Viceo. The prosecution did not also rebut the bank certification
presented by the defense that Jinggoy Estrada did not have an
Page 8 of 36
account with the United Overseas Bank, disproving the testimony
of Emma Lim that the deposit slip in the amount said to be part of
jueteng money was turned over to her by Jinggoy Estrada from
his account at the United Overseas Bank. The gaps in the
prosecutionaâ €™s evidence as to Jinggoy Estrada create
uncertainty in the mind of the Court as to the participation of
Jinggoy Estrada in the collection and receipt of jueteng money.
With respect to Serapio, neither Gov. Chavit Singsonaâ €™s
testimony nor the ledger entries proved that Serapio was
involved in any way in the collection or disbursement of jueteng
protection money. It is difficult to presume any criminal intent on
the part of Serapio to conceal or launder jueteng protection
money in order to contribute to the amassing and accumulation
of ill-gotten wealth by FPres. Estrada in connection with the
transfer of the P200,000,000.00 to the Erap Muslim Youth
Foundation.
On the other hand, the prosecution failed to establish beyond
reasonable doubt the allegations under sub-paragraph (b) and
(d) of the amended Information:
1. Acts under sub-paragraph (b) of the Amended Information. –
With respect to the act of divesting, receiving or misappropriating
a portion of the tobacco excise tax share allocated for the
Province of Ilocos Sur, the paper trail in relation to the
P130,000,000.00 diverted tobacco excise taxes began with Gov.
Singson and ended with Atong Ang. This Court does not find the
evidence sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt that
FPres. Estrada or any member of his family had instigated and/or
benefited from the diversion of said funds. The prosecution failed
to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, who among the accused
benefited from the misappropriation of the excise tax share of
Ilocos Sur and in what amounts.
2. Acts under sub-paragraph (d) of the Amended Information. –
While the prosecution presented overwhelming evidence that
there were numerous deposits of astoundingly large sums of
money into the Jose Velarde account, it failed to prove the
predicate act/s as defined under Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080
through which the said deposits could have been acquired or
amassed, except for the amount of P189,700,000.00, representing
illegal commissions from the sales of Belle shares and the money
collected from illegal gambling. It is not per se the accumulation
of wealth which is proscribed by the Anti-Plunder Law. The
acquisition of wealth of not less than P50,000,000.00 must be
linked to the commission of overt or criminal acts falling within
the ambit of the said law. All that the prosecution has succeeded
in showing is that the Jose Velarde account is the repository or
receptacle of vast wealth belonging to FPres. Estrada.
However, the two different series of predicate acts outlined above
(particularly, first, the regular and methodical acquisition of ill-
gotten wealth through collections from illegal gambling, and,
second, the receipt of unlawful commissions from the sales of
Belle shares twice), whether taken separately or independently of
the other or in combination with each other, unquestionably
constitute the crime of plunder as defined by Section 2, in
relation to Section 1(d) of RA 7080 as amended.
A pattern was established by the carefully planned system of
jueteng money collection on a regular bi-monthly basis from the
dfferent provinces nationwide to enrich FPres. Estrada with the
connivance and/or participation of Gov. Singson, Yolanda
Ricaforte, Emma Lim, Carmencita Itchon, SPO2 Artates, Jamis
Singson and other jueteng collectors referred to in the Amended
Information as aâ €œJohn Doesaâ € and aâ €œJane Does.aâ € As
proven, the collections in aâ €œseveral instancesaâ € from illegal
gambling money went way beyond the minimum of
P50,000,000.00 set by the Anti-Plunder Law. These repeated
collections of jueteng money from November 1998 to August
2000 would fall within the purview of a aâ €œseriesaâ €  of illegal
acts constituting plunder. The said series of acts, on its own,
would have been sufficient to convict the principal accused,
FPres. Estrada. However, this Court also finds that FPres. Estrada
is criminally liable for plunder for receiving commissions from
the purchase of Belle Shares by the GSIS and by the SSS in grave
abuse of his power on two separate occasions as charged in sub-
paragraph (b) of the Amended Information. Clearly, the receipt of
these commissions on two occasions likewise meets the
definition of a series of two similar unlawful acts employing the
same scheme to accumulate ill-gotten wealth.
It is unnecessary to indulge in an exposition of whether the two
series of acts falling under sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of the
Amended Information, proven in the course of the trial could
have amounted to two (2) counts of plunder. It would be a purely
academic exercise, as the accused cannot be convicted of two
offenses or two counts of plunder on the basis of a single
Information, clearly charging him of only one count of plunder,
because that would violate his constitutional rights to due
process, given the severity of the crime charged in this case.
The predicate acts alleged in sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of the
Amended Information, which formed two separate series of acts
of a different nature, were linked by the fact that they were
plainly geared towards a common goal which was the
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth for FPres. Estrada and that they
shared a pattern or a common method of commission which was
the abuse or misuse of the high authority or power of the
Presidency.
In sum, the Court finds that prosecution has proven beyond
reasonable doubt the commission by the principal accused
former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada of the crime of plunder
but not so in the case of former Mayor Jose Jinggoy Estrada and
Atty. Edward Serapio.
THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada is GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of PLUNDER, defined in and
penalized by Republic Act No. 7080, as amended. On the other
hand, for failure of the prosecution to prove and establish their
Page 9 of 36
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Court finds the accused Jose
aâ €œJinggoyaâ € Estrada and Atty. Edward S. Serapio NOT GUILTY
of the crime of plunder, and accordingly, the Court hereby orders
their ACQUITTAL.
The penalty imposable for the crime of plunder under Republic
Act No. 7080, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is Reclusion
Perpetua to Death. There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, however, the lesser penalty shall be applied in
accordance with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accordingly, accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and
the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of
sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification.
Moreover, in accordance with Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080,
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the Court hereby declares
the forfeiture in favor of the government of the following: (1) The
total amount of P545,291,000.00, with interest and income
earned, inclusive of the amount of P200,000,000.00, deposited in
the name and account of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation; (2)
The amount of P189,000,000.00, inclusive of interests and
income earned, deposited in the Jose Velarde account; and (3)
The real property consisting of a house and lot dubbed as
aâ €œBoracay Mansionaâ € located at #100 11th Street, New
Manila, Quezon City.
 US VS SOLIMAN 36 PHIL 5
Facts:
Soliman, testifying in his on behalf in the course of another
criminal case in which he, with several others, was charged with
estafa, swore falsely to certain material allegations of fact. He
testified falsely that a sworn statement offered in evidence in
support of the charge of estafa, which was in effect an
extrajudicial confession of his guilt, had not been executed
voluntarily, and that its execution had not been procured by the
police by the use of force, intimidation and prolonged torture.
The trial judge who presided in the former case acquitted him on
the ground that there was room for reasonable doubt. Soliman is
however, guilty of perjury as defined and penalized in Section 3 of
Act No. 1697. However, since judgement was entered on
November 1915, section 3 of Act No. 1697 was expressly repealed
by the enactment of the Administrative Code which was effective
on july 1, 1916 and it has been suggested that the judgement
convicting and sentencing the accused under the provisions of
that statute should not be sustained and the repeal of the statute
should be held to have the effect of remitting and extinguishing
the criminal liability of the accused incurred under the provisions
of the repealed law prior to the enactment of the Administrative
Code.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the repeal of Section 3 of Act No. 1697 by the
enactment of the Administrative code had the effect of providing
new and distinct penalties for the commission of the crime of
perjury.
(2) Whether or not the new penalties are more favorable to the
convict in the case at bar than those imposed by the trial judge.
Held:
(1) Section 3 of Act No. 1697, which defined and penalized the
crime of perjury, repealed the provisions of the Penal Code
defining and penalizing the crime of perjury, not expressly, but by
implication, and we are of opinion that the repeal of Act No. 1697
revived those provisions of the code. The old rule continues in
force where a law which repeals a prior law, not expressly but by
implication, it itself repealed; and that in such cases the repeal of
the repealing law revives the prior law, unless the language of the
repealing statute provides otherwise. In the case at bar, the
express repeal of section 3 of Act No. 1697 by the enactment of
the Administrative Code (Act No. 2657) revived the provisions of
the Penal Code touching perjury, which were themselves
repealed, not expressly but by implication, by the enactment of
Act No. 1697.
(2) The penalties prescribed in the Penal Code is less than that
imposed in Section 3 of Act # 1697. Hence, the penalty imposed
by the court below must be revoked and the penalty prescribed in
the Penal Code should be imposed.
 PP VS BANZIL
FACTS
Appellant herein is a twenty-eight (28) year-old construction
worker residing in Quiapo, Manila, who wasarrested by a team of
policemen, upon an informer's tip that appellant was one of the
suspects in the killingof three persons some weeks before in
Quiapo, Manila.
Responding to the information, the officers proceeded to the
Muslim area. One of said persons had asuspicious bulge in his
stomach, and when frisked, a .45 cal. pistol with an extended
magazine and six (6)live bullets was recovered from the center
front of his waist line.
That same day, SPO3 Mendoza received the person of the accused
and the subject firearm for safekeeping. The defendant
categorically denies ever having in his possession a gun at the
time he was arrested
RTC: “[T]he accused is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Violation of P.D. 1866 as chargedand therefore, the
accused, Datukon Bansil y Alog is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusionperpetua”
ISSUE: WoN the trial court erred in relying on the testimony of
the prosecution witnesses in convicting appellant?
HELD:
Page 10 of 36
Yes. We find the same insufficient to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the culpability of the appellant for the crime charged. We
find the testimony of SPO4 Clemente full of inconsistencies on
material points. We find that there was no probable cause for the
warrantless arrest of the appellant notwithstanding the putative
application of Section5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure based on the informant's tip and the "bulging
waistline" of theaccused. The arresting team was only armed with
the knowledge of the suspect's "attire" which the prosecution
witness admitted during trial he cannot even remember. The
team did not have a physical description of the suspect nor his
name. They were not even given a specific place within which to
target their search of the suspect, only av icinity of the Muslim
Area in Quiapo, near the Muslim Mosque. Yet the arresting team
directly zeroed in on the accused and his companions who were
only eating halo-halo at a small restaurant, surely not a crime in
itself. WhileSPO4 Clemente claims that accused had a "bulging
waistline", this alone, in the light of the availing circumstances, is
insufficient to constitute probable cause for the arrest of the
accused. Further, the essence of the crime of illegal possession is
the possession, whether actual or constructive, of the subject
firearm, without which there can be no conviction for illegal
possession. Faced with outright denial of the accused of the
possession of the gun, the prosecution had all the opportunity to
cross-examine the accused and his witness in order to ferret out
the truth and expose the falsity of their allegations. This the
public prosecution failed to do.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and appellant DATUKON BANSIL is hereby ACQUITTED for
insufficiency of evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Appellant's immediate release is ordered unless he is
detained for some other lawful
 ALVIZO VS SB
Facts:
Petitioners Alvizo et.al. were charged of violation of RA 3019
(Anti-graft and corrupt practices act) for issuances of fake Letters
of Advice of Allotments (LAAs) and Sub-Advices of Cash
Disbursement Ceilings (SACDCs) during the period of 1976-1978
in various Highway Engineering Districts (HEDs) of Region VII.
The Audit team found out that fake LAAs and SACDCs were issued
in the year 1977 leading to irregular disbursements of public
funds for the payment of
“ghost” projects.
Testimonies which the prosecution presented are:
Of the then Supervising COA Auditor Ruth Paredes which
established the standard operating procedure in the releases of
allotments to fund the highway projects or the maintenance and
repair of the existing ones in the different regions of the MPH;
Prosecution witness Felicitas Ona, then Auditor V, who was
assigned as a member of the team formed by the Performance
Audit Office to investigate the extent of the anomaly in the MPH
Central and the Regional Offices; Prosecution witness Manuel
Dionisio, a Senior Agent of the NBI and member of the Special
Task Force of the Cabinet Committee; Accused-turned-state
witness, Delia Preagido who testified that she was employed in
the MPH, Region VII, holding the position of Accountant III,
sometime in the last week of January 1977,accused Mangubat,
Chief Accountant of RegionVII, asked her to stay after office hours
and told her that they could get a big money out of the simulated
LAAs by selling them to the Contractors, District Accountant,
District Engineer and the Assistant District Engineer. Fe delos
Reyes, then Auditing Examiner II at theCebu 2 nd HED, likewise an
accused-turned state witness, testified that sometime in the first
quarter of 1977, she was instructed by petitioner Auditor Efren
Coyoca to inspect the delivery of supplies and materials at the
project site of the Argao Dalaguete project but she found no
deliveries therein. She then reported the non-delivery to
petitioner Coyoca who told her that he had to confer the matter
with petitioner Engr.Rafael Rabaya, Jr. She was later called by
petitioner Coyoca to his office and told her, in the presence of
petitioner Rabaya, to just sign all the prepared tally sheets and
inspection reports as Coyoca would assume the responsibility if
anything went wrong. Thereafter, she just signed tally sheets and
reports without actually going to the jobsites to inspect the
deliveries of supplies and materials because she knew that there
would be no deliveries to be made.
Issue:
Whether the evidence of the prosecution has proven beyond
reasonable doubt that the crime charged was committed by
petitioners.
Ruling:
The evidence for the prosecution had clearly established the
existence of these fake LAAs and SACDCs which became the bases
of the subject 199 general vouchers and checks issued to
contractors/suppliers in payment for the alleged deliveries of
materials in the different project sites. Prosecution witnesses
Ruth Paredes and Felicitas Ona, both COA Auditors who were
tasked to investigate the issuances of these fake LAAs and
SACDCs, had clearly identified the badges of fraud in the
issuances of these fake LAAs which were released to Cebu 2nd
HED. It was established among others that while the regular LAAs
were recorded in the logbook maintained by the Regional Office,
the fake LAAs and SACDCs following their issuances were not
entered in the logbook. The entry in the logbook is an important
safeguard against fraud; thus, the failure to enter the LAAs and
SACDCs in the logbook necessarily indicates irregularity and
fraud.
Such finding by the COA were corroborated by no less than
prosecution witness Delia Preagido, an accused-turned-state
witness, who had a first hand knowledge of how such falsification
was done. The plea of guilty entered by accused Regional
Accountant Rolando Mangubat as the author of such fraud and
the signatory of all the fake LAAs and SACDCs, in effect, confirms
the testimony of Delia Preagido on the falsity of the LAAs.
 FLORDELIS VS HIMALALOAN GR L-48088
The information in question, which was filed with the City Court
of Tagbilaran City, presided over by respondent judge, on January
13, 1978 reads as follows:
The undersigned, 3rd Assistant City Fiscal, City of Tagbilaran,
Philippines, hereby accuses Gotardo Flordelis of the crime of
Perjury, committed as follows:
Page 11 of 36
That, on or about the 2nd day of July, 1977, in the City of
Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, moved by a desire to
evade payment of a just debt and Attorneys' fees for legal services
rendered, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
execute and sign a verified answer to the complaint of Atty.
Sulpicio Tinampay and filed with the City Court of Tagbilaran City
and which alleges, among other things, that the herein accused
did not owe anything from Atty. Sulpicio Tinampay, much less, did
he engage his legal services, when in truth and in fact, as said
accused fully well knew, such statement on a material matter is
false for the records would show that said accused had actually
engaged the legal services of Atty. Sulpicio Tinampay in the cases
of THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GOTARDO FLORDELIS',
docketed as Criminal Case No. 4639, for Usurpation of Official
Function, and "THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FERMIN O
MAR, ET AL.", docketed as Criminal Case No. 4640, for Perjury;
thus, said accused herein had in said manner willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously made an untruthful statement in a narration of
facts, thereby causing upon said Atty. Sulpicio Tinampay trouble
and embarrassment, to his damage and prejudice in the amount
to be proved during the trial of the case.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 183 of the
Revised Penal Code.
City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, December 28, 1977.
(Sgd.) MARIANO CAPAYAS 3rd Asst. City Fiscal
APPROVED:
(Sgd.) JOVENCIO S. ORCULLO City Fiscal
(Pages 24-25, Record.)
On February 13, 1978, petitioner filed a motion to quash this
information on the two grounds already stated at the outset of
this opinion. On even date, respondent judge denied the said
motion to quash thus:
ORDER
The Court is not yet in the position to resolve the issues thus
raised in the motion to quash filed by the accused thru counsel at
this stage of the proceedings without allowing the People to
present in Court the questioned pleadings as basis of the charge
of perjury, otherwise, the Court would be denied of its right to
scrutinize the evidence of the prosecution if the case will be
quashed, and if also, the prosecution is not given a chance to
present the questioned document or pleadings as evidence in
Court.
Thus, the issues adverted to in the motion to quash are all
question of evidence which the Court cannot resolve without
allowing the People to present first its evidence in Court.
WHEREFORE, the motion to quash filed by the accused thru
counsel should be denied, as it is hereby denied for being
premature.
Notify the prosecuting Fiscal and Atty. Amado R. Olis of this order
accordingly.
SO ORDERED. (Page 41, Record.)
It is plain from even a cursory reading of the above-quoted
information that the allegedly false statement attributed to the
petitioner was made by him in "a verified answer to the
complaint of Atty. Sulpicio Tinampay and filed with the City Court
of Tagbilaran City".
Without delving any further into the detailed circumstances of
the proceeding in the City Court of Tagbilaran City referred to in
the information and confining Our attention even only to the
mention thereon of "a verified answer to a complaint — filed in
the City Court", it is at once apparent that one element of the
crime of perjury is absent in the charge as filed against petitioner,
namely, that the sworn statement complained of must be
required by law. (The Revised Penal Code by Justice Ramon C.
Aquino, Vol. 111, 1976 ed., pp. 1062-1063.) The answer to a
complaint in an ordinary civil action need not be under oath.
Moreover, it is likewise clear that any statement contained in an
appropriate pleading filed in court that is relevant to the issues in
the case to which it relates is absolutely privileged and it is the
Page 12 of 36
law that the same may not be made the subject of a criminal
prosecution. (People vs. Aquino, 18 SCRA 555.)
The assertion of respondent judge in his order in question that
the prosecution should first be allowed to "present in court the
questioned pleadings as basis of the charge of perjury" overlooks
quite surprisingly that petitioner had attached to his motion to
quash the complaint and the verified answer, and it is not claimed
that the authenticity of any of them has been put in issue by the
prosecution. Thus, further evidence to show (1) that those
pleadings were filed in an ordinary action where there is no
requirement that the answer to a complaint does not have to be
verified and (2) the relevancy of the allegedly perjured
statements and consequently their absolutely privileged
character was superfluous. Actual presentation thereof at the
formal trial could not have altered their legal import in the
determination of whether or not under the facts alleged in the
information petitioner could be convicted of perjury.
 PP VS HAO Y CHAO PAGE 625 ART 283
Facts:
According to the employee of Salustiana Dee by the name of Tee
Tek Suan, Hao Y. Chao and Sia Sy Ho dropped in her store three or
four times sometime in December, 1953, telling said Tee Tek Suan
that they knew his employer had bought a parcel of land in
Binondo, that she had evaded payment of taxes; and that they
were going to report the case to the authorities. When Mrs. Dee
was apprised about the matter by Tee Tek Suan, she became
fearful, especially because the two were not known to her. She
then instructed her employee that should the pair come around
again, he should tell them to wait and treat them with drinks.
Thus, when Hao Y. Chao and Sia Sy Ho came to the store on
December 21, 1953, Tee Tek kept them waiting. On the other
hand, Mrs. Dee contacted the office of the city mayor, reporting
the presence of the pair. In response to the call, detectives
Florentino Jueco and Gerardo Tamayo were dispatched. Mrs.
Detective Jueco, who was in civilian clothes, was led into the room
of Dee, and pretending to be a Chinese customer and reading the
Chinese newspaper, he seated himself in a corner. Hao Y. Chao and
Sia Sy Ho were then brought inside the office of Mrs. Dee. Hao Y.
Chao showed a piece of paper concerning the acquisition of a
piece of land in Binondo by Mrs. Dee and, accusing her of tax
evasion, threatened to report the matter to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and to the N.B.I, for which she would be prosecuted and
deported like Co Pak and others unless she come across with
Pl.OOO. Under the circumstances, Mrs. Dee handed P1,000 to Tee
Tek Suan who in turn delivered the same to Hao Y. Chao. The
money was subsequently turned over to Sia Sy Ho who after
wrapping the same with his handkerchief, pocketed it. At that
juncture, detective Jueco arrested the pair from whom he
recovered the amount of P1,000. Counsel for appellant Sia Sy Ho
maintains that he was erroneously declared guilty of the crime of
grave threats, which is committed in the following manner —
"Any person who shall threaten another with the infliction upon
the person, honor or property of the latter or of his family of any
wrong amounting to a crime" * * *. (Art. 282, R.P.C.) It is argued
that the alleged threat upon the complainant, by telling her that
she would be reported to the Bureau of Internal Revenue for tax
evasion, does not amount to a crime.
Held:
We agree with this view. However, Sia Sy Ho, together with his co-
accused, committed another crime — that of light threats,
contrary to the contention of his counsel that no crime was
committed by him. As the threat made by the accused, that they
would report the offended party to the authorities, did not
constitute a crime, the crime committed by them when they made
the threat demanding money was only light threats, defined and
penalized in Article 283 of the Revised Penal Code.
 PP VS CABAHUG 3/4/05 (phobe)
 BARBASA VS TOQUERO 575 SCRA 102 ART 286
F:
Petitioner is the president of Push-Thru Marketing, Inc., which
leases commercial, owned by Tutuban Properties, Inc., (TPI). On
June 30, 1999, Angelina Hipolito, merchandising officer of Push-
Thru Marketing, received a notice of disconnection of utilities
from private respondent Grace Guarin, the Credit and Collection
Manager of TPI, for failure of Push-Thru Marketing to settle its
outstanding obligations for Common Usage and Service Area
(CUSA) charges, utilities, electricity and rentals.
Petitioner settled the charges for CUSA, utilities and electricity,
which payment was accepted by private respondent Guarin, but
petitioner failed to pay the back rentals. Thus, on July 1, 1999,
private respondents Guarin, together with several armed guards,
disconnected the electricity in the stalls occupied by Push-Thru
Marketing.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a criminal complaint for Grave
Coercion against TPI and its officers,.4 The complaint alleged that
TPI and its officers cut off the electricity in petitioner’s stalls "in a
violent and intimidating manner"5 and by unnecessarily
employing "several armed guards to intimidate and frighten"6
petitioner and his employees and agents.
I:
Whether private respondents’ act of disconnecting the supply of
electricity to petitioner’s stalls and the manner by which it was
carried out constitute grave coercion.
R:
After carefully considering petitioner’s appeal, we are in
agreement to deny it for utter lack of merit.
Page 13 of 36
The crime of grave coercion has three elements: (a) that a person
is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by
law, or compelled to do something against his or her will, be it
right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected
by violence, either by material force or such a display of it as
would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the
will of the offended party; and (c) that the person who restrains
the will and liberty of another has no right to do so; in other
words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in
the exercise of any lawful right.17
The records show that there was no violence, force or the display
of it as would produce intimidation upon petitioner’s employees
when the cutting off of petitioner’s electricity was effected. On the
contrary, it was done peacefully and after written notice to
petitioner was sent. We do not subscribe to petitioner’s claim that
the presence of armed guards were calculated to intimidate him
or his employees. Rather, we are more inclined to believe that the
guards were there to prevent any untoward or violent event from
occurring in the exercise of TPI’s rights under the lease
agreements. If the respondents desired a violent result, they
would have gone there unannounced or cut petitioner’s
electricity through less desirable and conspicuous means.
It is likewise clear from the penalty clause in the Contracts of
Lease entered into by the parties that TPI is given the option to
cut off power and other utility services in petitioner’s stalls in
case petitioner fails to pay at any time the installments on the
priority premium, lease rentals or CUSA and utility charges
corresponding to a total of three months until full payment of
said charges, expenses, penalty and interest is made.18 The
stipulation under said clause is clear; there is no ambiguity in
what is stated. There could be no grave coercion in the private
respondents’ act of exercising in behalf of TPI a right afforded to
TPI under the solemn and unequivocal covenants of a contract to
which petitioner had agreed and which he did execute and sign.
We find that the resort to the penalty clause under the lease
agreements was justified.
 ALEJANDRO ET AL VS BERNAS GR NO. 179243
9/17/11,ART 286 (louys)
Petitioner Joseph Anthony M. Alejandro (Alejandro) is the lessee-
purchaser of condominium unit with the lessor-seller Oakridge
Properties, Inc. (OPI).
On October 15, 2000, Alejandro sub-leased the Unit to the other
petitioners Firdausi I.Y. Abbas (Firdausi), Carmina M. Alejandro-
Abbas (Carmina) and Ma. Elena Go Francisco (Ma. Elena) to be
used as a law office.
A defect in the air-conditioning unit prompted petitioners to
suspend payments until the problem is fixed by the management.
Instead of addressing the defect, OPI instituted an action for
ejectment before the MeTC against Alejandro for failure to pay
rentals.
During the pendency of the ejectment case or on June 10, 2004,
OPI, allegedly through respondent Atty. Marie Lourdes Sia-Bernas
(Sia-Bernas), ordered that the Unit be padlocked.
MeTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order in favor of
Alejandro.
OPI thru Atty. Jose Bernas, again padlocked the Unit. It was
executed by Amor, as Property Manager and respondent Eduardo
Aguilar (Aguilar) as head of the security unit, together with
security officers John Doe and Peter Doe. Respondents, likewise,
cut off the electricity, water and telephone facilities
MeTC Decision in the ejectment case in favor of Alejandro as
suspension of payment was justified. RTC reversed and set aside
decision
CA affirm
October 27, 2004, petitioners filed acriminal complaint for grave
coercionagainst respondents Bernas, Sia-Bernas, Amor, Aguilar,
Peter Doe and John Doe with the Office of the City Prosecutor
(OCP)
Petitioners claimed that the padlocking of the Unit was illegal,
felonious and unlawful which prevented them from entering the
premises and that the cutting off of facilities had unduly
prejudiced them
Defense:nowhere in petitioners’ complaint was
it alleged that respondents employed violence which is an
essential element of grave coercion. And that petitioners in fact
gained access to the Unit by forcibly destroying the padlock.
The OCP held that respondents could not be charged with grave
coercion as no violence was employed by the latter. In padlocking
the leased premises and cutting off of facilities, respondents
Amor and Aguilar were found to be probably guilty of the crime
of unjust vexation.
Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ) but the appeal was
dismissed for their failure to submit a legible true copy of the
joint counter-affidavit
CA: On whether or not there was probable cause for the crime of
grave coercion (no). as the mere presence of the security guards
was insufficient to cause intimidation WON there was grave
coercion (no)
On probable cause: determination of whether probable cause
exists to warrant the prosecution in court of an accused should be
consigned and entrusted to the DOJ, as reviewer of the findings of
public prosecutors. This Court, as a rule, does not interfere with
the prosecutor’s determination of probable cause
Page 14 of 36
Probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information is
defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is
probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial person of
ordinary caution and prudence to believe or entertain an honest
or strong suspicion that a thing is so.
On grave coercion:
For grave coercion to lie, the following elements must be present:
1. that a person is prevented by another from doing something
not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his
will, be it right or wrong; 2. that the prevention or compulsion is
effected by violence, threats or intimidation; and 3. that the
person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right
to do so, or in other words, that the restraint is not made under
authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right.
Admittedly, respondents padlocked the Unit and cut off the
electricity, water and telephone facilities. Petitioners were thus
prevented from occupying the Unit and using it for the purpose
for which it was intended
The problem, however, lies on the second element.
We find that the mere presence of the security guards is
insufficient to cause intimidation to the petitioners.
There is intimidation when one of the parties is compelled by a
reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil
upon his person or property, or upon the person or property of
his spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his consent
Material violence is not indispensable
for there to be intimidation. I
ntense fear
produced in the mind of the victim which restricts or hinders the
exercise of the will is sufficient petitioners claim that respondents
padlocked the Unit and cut off the facilities in the presence of
security guards. But it was not alleged that the security guards
committed anything to intimidate petitioners, nor was it alleged
that the guards were not customarily stationed there and that
they produced fear on the part of petitioners.
To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex and
condition of the person shall be borne in mind.
Here, the petitioners who were allegedly intimidated by the
guards are all lawyers who presumably know their rights
On Unjust vexation:
Petitioners’ Joint Affidavit
-Complaint adequately alleged the elements of unjust vexation.
The second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code
which defines and provides for the penalty of unjust vexation is
broad enough to include any human conduct which, although not
productive of some physical or material harm, could unjustifiably
annoy or vex an innocent person.Nevertheles
s, Amor and Aguilar may disprove petitioners’ charges but such
matters may
only be determined in a full-blown trial on the merits
 ZULUETA VS CA GR. NO, 10783 2/20/96 ART 290
FACTS:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent
Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1962, petitioner entered the clinic
of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her
mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly
opened the drawers and cabinet of her husband's clinic and took
157 documents consisting of private respondents between Dr.
Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting cards, cancelled
check, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The
documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case
for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of
medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
ISSUE: Whether or not the papers and other materials obtained
from forcible entrusion and from unlawful means are admissible
as evidence in court regarding marital separation and
disqualification from medical practice.
HELD:
Indeed the documents and papers in question are
inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injuction declaring
"the privacy of communication and correspondence to be
inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who
thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infedility) who is the
party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced.
The only exception to the prohibition in the constitution is if
there is a "lawful order from the court or which public safety or
order require otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of
this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for
any purpose in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify
anyone of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other
and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital
infedility. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed
her/his integrity or her/his right to privacy as an individual and
the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between
the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife
Page 15 of 36
may testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be
examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other
during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing
is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for
each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
 US VS ALBAO 29 PHIL 86
Facts:
Defendant Alejandro Albao, a police officer, seized a quantity of
opium from one Vicente Lizarraga by pointing a revolver to the
latter and telling him that if Lizarraga took the tins of opium with
him, they would catch him again and Albao will be bribed P6, 000
by one Anatalio Ariola to get the tins back. Albao was charged
with robbery.
During the trial, Albao tried to prove that Lizarraga was not the
owner, but just a possessor, of the tins of opium. It was further
found out that Albao seized the opium upon arrangement with its
supposed buyer that the opium will be obtained via swindle.
Issue: WON Albao is guilty of robbery.
Held:
Yes. In U.S. V. Navarro, the acts of the defendants in entering the
store of a Chinaman, displaying a badge and pretending to be
revenue officers, and later searching the premises and finding a
small amount of opium, then offering to release the Chinaman
upon payment of P400, were held to constitute robbery.
In robbery, it is sufficient that the property is taken by means of
threats and violence, for the purpose of gain. Possession of the
property is sufficient. Ownership is not necessary.
 PP VS REGALA 4/5/00
Facts:
On the night of September 11, 1995, at Barangay Bangon in
Aroroy, Masbate, then 16-year old victim Nerissa Tagala and her
grandmother, Counselo Arevalo, were sleeping, when appellant
Armando Regala and his two other companions entered the
former’s house.
Appellant and his companions entered the house through the
kitchen and went to the room of the victims and poked at 8-inch
gun on them, one after the other, and hogtied both of them.
Armando raped Nerissa in bed while her grandmother was
hogtied on the floor. Later, she saw her grandmother’s aparador
being opened where two rings, two wrist watches, and money
were taken from the aparador. After raping her in bed, Nerissa
saw accused-appellant counting the money taken from the
aparador. Thereafter, she was brought to the kitchen, still hogtied
and was raped again by the accused.
He was convicted in the lower court but accused-appellant
appealed his criminal case at the Regional Trial Court in Masbate.
He questioned the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence in
identifying him as one of the perpetrators of the crime charged.
And based on medico-legal, Dr. Conchita Ulanday, a health officer
of Aroroy, testified herself that the complaining witness “either”
voluntarily submitted to a sexual act or was forced into one.
Issue:
(a) Whether additional rape committed in a crime of robbery be
considered as an aggravating circumstance?
Held:
On cross-examination, both Nerissa Tagala and Consuelo Arevalo,
separately testified that they saw the face of Regala, despite of no
electricity at the commission of the crime, because he used a
flashlight and took off the mask he was wearing, and thus, they
remembered him wearing an earring of his left ear, which he was
still wearing at the time of the police line-up inside the police
station.
The trial court held that contradiction referred to a minor detail,
cannot detract from the fact, that both Nerissa and Consuelo
positively identified the accused-appellant. As correctly pointed
out by the appellee, the victim was a 16-year old barrio lass, not
exposed to the ways of the world and was not shown to have any
ill-motive to falsely implicate accused-appellant, who was a
stranger. Hence, Dr. Ulanday’s testimony does not support the
contention of accused-appellant that the victim voluntarily
submitted to sexual advances of Regala.
The crime of robbery with rape was committed in 1995 when RA
7659 was already in force. Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code as amended, now provides, under paragraph 1 thereof: (1)
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when for any reason
of or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have
been committed, or when the robbery shall have been
accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
In this case, the additional rape committed by herein accused-
appellant should not be considered as aggravating. The penalty of
reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court is proper. The
judgment convicting Armando Regala y Abriol guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape, where the
victim is entitled to an additional award of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity.
 PP VS SULTAN 4/27/00
FACTS:
Complaining witness Juditha Bautistaa was on her way home
when a certain FernandoSultan pointed an ice pick on her,
announcing it was hold-up. The accused grabbed Bautista onhis
house and get all her jewelries of the latter and a sum of P 130.00.
Page 16 of 36
After taking the valuable,Sultan raped Bautista two times using
intimidation.
Crime Committed:
Special Complex Crime of Robbery and Rape
Contention of the People:
All elements of the crime of robbery as stated by Article 293 of
theRevised Penal Code were present. Likewise, on the crime of
rape, the used of intimidation wassufficient to make the
complainant submit herself to him against her will for fear of life
andpersonal safety.
Contention of the Accused:
For the crime of robbery, the testimony of the complaint should
notbe given weight and credence as no evidence was presented in
the court to prove her claim. Asto the rape, the requisite for or
intimidation was not proven beyond reasonable doubt
becauseconsent to the sexual intercourse was given.
HELD:
Fernando Sultan was found guilty of the special complex of crime
of robbery with rape,however, the additional rape committed was
not considered aggravating circumstance becausethere is no law
passed providing that the additional rape/s may be considered
aggravating.
 PP VS TIMPLE 238 SCRA 52
Robbery with Homicide; where rape was committed during the
course of the robbery with homicide, the rape is considered as an
aggravating circumstance.- The trial court correctly designated
the crime as robbery with homicide, with rape being considered
as an aggravating circumstance. In the two instances when the
assailants struck, their overriding intention was to commit
robbery. After the children had been hogtied in the Semacios
premises, one of the armed men demanded money and jewelry.
Thereafter, they started to ransack the house. When the husband
of Zenaida arrived, the robbers went out promptly and killed him
and his luckless companions. In the house of the Samoys, all the
male occupants were asked to come out first. Only then did the
men begin to ransack the place. After ransacking the house, the
male occupants were shot to death. As for the rapes committed
then, the trial court was correct in treating the rapping of Elvira
Samoh and Zenaida Semacio as an aggravating circumstance.
The number of persons killed does not alter the characterization
of the offense as robbery with homicide, but the multiplicity of
the victims slain should be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance.- While the number of persons killed does not alter
the characterization of the offense as robbery with homicide, the
multiplicity of the victims slain should have been appreciated as
an aggravating circumstance. This would preclude an anomalous
situation where, from the standpoint of the gravity of the offense,
robbery with one killing should be treated in the same way that
robbery with multiple killings would be.
 PP VS SURILLA JR G.R. No. 178540
The accused was found guilty of the crime of rape committed
against his 14 year old daughter.
HELD:
There are 3 guiding principles in rape cases: (1) an accusation for
rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more
difficult for the person accused, though innocent to disprove; (2)
in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only 2
persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant
must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence
for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the defense. Here, the trial court’s finding as to the
credibility of the complainant’s testimony deserve respect.
Further, the accused escaped from jail and was only recaptured.
Flight is an implied admission of guilt and his desire to evade
responsibility therefore. Death penalty however cannot be
imposed because relationship of complainant with the accused
was not alleged in the information.
 PP VS OPERO 6/11/1981
Facts:
At about 4:00 o'clock in the morning of April 27, 1978, Salvador
Oliver, a GSIS security guard assigned to the House International
Hotel at Ongpin Street, Binondo, Manila, was informed by
Demetrio Barcing another security guard, that the latter picked
up a little girl about three years old loitering at the second floor
of the building. Rafael Ordona a janitor of the House International
Hotel, told Oliver that the little girl is residing at Room 314 of the
hotel. Oliver called up Room 314 by telephone and when nobody
answered, he and Barcing brought the little girl to said Room 314.
Upon reaching Room 314, Oliver knocked at the door, and when
nobody answered, he pushed the door open but he smelled foul
odor emanating from the room. Oliver covered his nose with a
handkerchief and together with Barcing and the little girl, they
entered the room where they saw prostrate on a bed a dead
person with the face down and both feet tied. Oliver called up the
homicide division of the Manila Police. Patrolman Fajardo who
was assigned to investigate the report of Oliver, together with
some funeral parlor men arrived at the scene, and they saw a
small baby crying and trying to get out of a crib near the bed of
the dead person.
The dead body at Room 314 of the House International Hotel was
that of Liew Soon Ping, Room 314 had been ransacked and
personal belongings thrown all around. The hands and feet of the
dead person were tied and the body was bloated. A towel was
tied around the mouth of the victim.
After conducting a preliminary inquiry around the vicinity of the
incident, Patrolman Fajardo made an advance report naming
therein three suspects, namely, Diego Opero, Milagros Villegas,
Asteria Avila and a fourth unidentified suspect. Diego Opero and
Page 17 of 36
Asteria Avila were picked up by the Samar P.C. and some of the
missing articles, namely, one (1) camera, flashlight, bill fold, and
other personal belongings were recovered from them
Opero in his supplemental statement admitted that he had
robbed the victim and Identified some of the missing articles
recovered from his possession. He described in detail how he
planned the robbery and named the rest of his coaccused as
willing participants. He also narrated in his said supplemental
statement that he and his co-accused Lacsinto subdued the victim
by assaulting her, tying up her hands and feet stabbing her and
stuffing her mouth with a piece of pandesal. In his first
assignment of error, appellant advances the theory that he never
intended to kill the deceased, his intention being merely to rob
her, for if indeed he had the intention to kill her, he could have
easily done so with the knife, and therefore, his liability should be
only for robbery.
Issue: Whether or not the appellant is guilty of robbery only.
Ruling:
No. It was been repeatedly held that when direct and intimate
connection exists between the robbery and the killing, regardless
of which of the two precedes the other, or whether they are
committed at the same time, the crime committed is the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide. If the circumstances
would indicate no intention to kill, as in the instant case were
evidently, the intention is to prevent the deceased from making
an outcry, and so a "pandesal" was stuffed into her mouth, the
mitigating circumstance of not having intended to commit so
grave a wrong may be appreciated. The stuffing of the "pandesal"
in the mouth would not have produced asphyxiation had it not
slid into the neckline, "caused by the victim's own movements, "
according to Dr. Singian. The movements of the victim that caused
the "pandesal" to slide into the neckline were, however,
attributable to what appellant and his co-accused did to the
victim, for if they did not hogtie her, she could have easily
removed the "pandesal" from her mouth and avoided death by
asphyxiation.
It may not avail appellant to contend that the death was by mere
accident for even if it were so, which is not even beyond doubt for
the sliding of the pandesal into the neckline to produce
asphyxiation could reasonably have been anticipated, it is a
settled doctrine that when death supervenes by reason or on the
occasion of the robbery, it is immaterial that the occurrence of
death was by mere accident. What is important and decisive is
that death results by reason or on the occasion of the robbery.
 PP VS ABAY JR 9/19/08ART 299
Facts:
Appellant Roberto Abay was charged with the rape of AAA, a
minor, 13 years of age. According to Dr.Guerrero-Manalo, AAA
confided to her that appellant had been sexually abusing her for
six years. This wasconfirmed by AAA¶s physical examination
indicating prior and recent penetration injuries.BBB
corroborated AAA¶s testimony. She testified that she knew about
appellant¶s dastardly acts. However, because he would beat her
up and accuse AAA of lying whenever she confronted him, she
kept her silence.Thus, when she caught appellant in the act of
molesting her daughter on December 25, 1999, she immediately
proceeded to the police station and reported the incident.The
Trial Court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
committing the crime of rape under Article335 of the Revised
Penal Code in relation to Section 5 Article III of RA 7610 and
sentenced him to death.The appellate court on the other hand
affirmed the findings of the trial court but modified the penalty
and awardof damages. In view of the enactment of RA 8353 and
RA 9346, the CA found appellant guilty only of simplerape and
reduced the penalty imposed to reclusion perpetua.
Issue:
Is the accused correctly charged with simple rape?
Ruling:
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with
modification. He is found guilty of simple rape and issentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and pay damages.
Under Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353,
if the victim of sexual abuse is below 12years of age, the offender
should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for statutory rape
under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code and
penalized with reclusion perpetua.
On the other hand, if the victim is 12years or older, the offender
should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of
RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of
the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be accused
of both crimes for the same act because his right against double
jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice
to criminal liability for a single criminal act. Likewise, rape cannot
be complexed with a violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Under
Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code (on complex crimes),a
felony under the Revised Penal Code (such as rape) cannot be
complexed with an offense penalized by a special law. In this case,
the victim was more than 12 years old when the crime was
committed against her. The Information against appellant stated
that AAA was 13 years old at the time of the incident. Therefore,
appellant may be prosecuted either for violation of Section 5(b)
of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph1[d]) of
the Revised Penal Code. While the Information may have alleged
the elements of both crimes, the prosecution’s evidence only
established that appellant sexually violated the person of AAA
through force and intimidation by threatening her with a bladed
instrument and forcing her to submit to his bestial designs.
Thus ,rape was established.
Page 18 of 36

 PP VS PUNO 219 SCRA 85 ART 299
Facts:
In the afternoon of January 13, 1988, the accused Isabelo Puno
who is the personal driver of Mrs Sarmiento’s husband (who was
away in Davao) told Mrs. Socorro that her own driver was not
available so Isabelo had to take his place. Going home, a young
man, accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the car. The car sped off
north towards the North superhighway. There Isabelo, Beloy as
he is called, asked Ma. Socorro to issue a check for P100,000.00.
Ma. Socorro complied. She drafted 3 checks in denominations of
two for P30 thousand and one for P40 thousand. Mrs Socorro
was able to jump out of the car and flag down a fish vendor van.
She then reported the matter to the authorities.
RTC: Robbery with extortion committed on a highway (Violation
of P.D. 532) sentenced to reclusion perpetua and indemnify the
victim.
Issue: W/N the crime committed is kidnapping for ransom under
Art. 267 as charged in the information or violation of the PD 532
(anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974) as found by
the trial court, or the offense of simple robbery punished by par.
5, Art. 294, as claimed by the defense?
SC: RTC decision SET ASIDE. Convicted of Simple Robbery, par 5
of Article 294 in rel to Art. 295 of the RPC. Imposing on them an
indeterminate sentence of 4 years and 2 months of prision
correctional as minimum to 10 years of prison mayor as
maximum and to indemnify victims plus damages.
Ruling:
1. The crime is not kidnapping for ransom. For this crime to exist,
there must be proof that the actual intent of the malefactors was
to deprive the victim of her liberty and not where such restraint
of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the
commission of another offense primarily intended by the
offenders. In this case, the defendants had no intention
whatsoever to kidnap or to deprive the complainant of her
personal liberty as demonstrated in the confessional testimony of
Puno. (They were willing to let her go after receiving the money)
Neither was there ransom, which is defined as the money, price or
consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured
person or persons, a payment that releases from captivity. The
complainant gave cash and checks demanded from her at
gunpoint which cannot be reconciled with the concept of ransom
in the law of kidnapping.
2. The crime is not of highway robbery as contemplated by PD
532, which is a modification of Art. 306 and 307 on brigandage.
PD 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage only acts of
robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against person
on Philippine highways. Furthermore, the decree does not require
that there be at least four armed persons forming a band of
robbers; and the presumption in the Code that said accused are
brigands if they use unlicensed firearms no longer obtains under
the decree.
The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the
formation of bands of robbers. The heart of the offense consists in
the formation of a band by more than three armed persons for
the purpose indicated in art. 306. Such formation is sufficient to
constitute a violation of art. 306. It would not be necessary to
show, in a prosecution under it, that a member or members of the
band actually committed robbery or kidnapping or any other
purpose attainable by violent means. The crime is proven when
the organization and purpose of the band are shown to be such as
are contemplated by art 306. On the other hand, if robbery is
committed by a band, whose members were not primarily
organized for the purpose of committing robbery or kidnapping,
etc., the crime would not be brigandage, but only robbery
It is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a
particular person chosen by the accused could be considered as
committed on the “innocent and defenseless inhabitants who
travel from one place to another” and which would be capable of
“stunting economic and social progress of the people.” Moreover,
The court erred in ruling that the fact that the crime of robbery
committed by appellants should be covered by the said
amendatory decree just because it was committed on a highway.
3. The crime IS simple robbery defined in Art. 293 punished
under par 5 of Art. 294 of the RPC. Appellants have indisputably
acted in conspiracy as shown by their concerted acts evidentiary
of a unity of thought and community of purpose. In the
determination of their respective liabilities, the aggravating
circumstances of craft shall be appreciated against both
appellants and that of abuse of confidence shall be further
applied against appellant Puno, with no mitigating circumstance
in favor of either of them. At any rate, the intimidation having
been made with the use of a firearm, the penalty shall be imposed
in the maximum period as decreed by Article 295 of the Code.
No procedural obstacle on conviction of appellants despite the
information charging them with kidnapping for ransom, since the
former offense which has been proved is necessarily included in
the latter offense with which they are charged.
 VALENZUELA VS PEOPLE 6/21/07ART 308
Principle:
The most fundamental notion in the crime of theft is the taking of
the thing to be appropriated into the physical power of the thief,
which idea is qualified by other conditions, such as that the
taking must be effected animo lucrandi and without the consent
of the owner; and it will be here noted that the definition does
not require that the taking should be effected against the will of
the owner but merely that it should be without his consent, a
distinction of no slight importance.
Page 19 of 36
Facts:
Accused Valenzuela was charged for the crime of theft.
He and Jovy Calderon were spotted by Security Guard Lorenzo
Lago within the Super Sale Club, inside SM complex along North
Edsa. Lago saw the accused hauling a push cart with cases of Tide
detergent. The accused unloaded the cases in an open parking
space, returned inside the supermarket with more Tide
detergent. He then hailed a taxi and headed to where Calderon
waited. All the detergents were loaded on board the taxi. Lago
then asked him for a receipt of the merchandise, both the accused
and Calderon fled on foot but Lago fired a warning shot to alert
other security guards in the area. They were apprehended. The
aggregate value of the goods amounted to P12,090.00. They were
charged with theft.
The RTC convicted both of the accused for the crime of
consummated theft and were sentenced to two years of prision
correccional as minimum to seven years of prision mayor as
maximum. Only the accused petitioner filed his brief before the
Court of Appeals, arguing that he should be liable only for the
crime of frustrated theft since he was never placed in a position
to freely dispose of the article stolen. The Court of Appeals
rejected this contention.
Issue: Whether or not he committed theft in its Frustrated or
Consummated theft.
Ruling: Consummated theft.
Statutory definition of theft.
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. Theft is
committed by any person who, with intent to
gain but without violence against or
intimidation of persons nor force upon things,
shall take personal property of another
without the latters consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found
lost property, shall fail to
deliver the same to the local
authorities or to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having
maliciously damaged the
property of another, shall
remove or make use of the
fruits or object of the
damage caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an
inclosed estate or a field
where trespass is forbidden
or which belongs to another
and without the consent of
its owner, shall hunt or fish
upon the same or shall
gather cereals, or other
forest or farm products.
Article 308 provides for a general definition of theft, and three
alternative and highly idiosyncratic means by which theft may be
committed. In the present discussion, we need to concern
ourselves only with the general definition since it was under it
that the prosecution of the accused was undertaken and
sustained. On the face of the definition, there is only one
operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft ─ the
taking of personal property of another. It is also clear from the
provision that in order that such taking may be qualified as theft,
there must further be present the descriptive circumstances that
the taking was with intent to gain; without force upon things or
violence against or intimidation of persons; and it was without
the consent of the owner of the property.
Essential matter to ask whether the crime of theft is
frustrated or consummated.
On the critical question of whether it was consummated or
frustrated theft, we are obliged to apply Article 6 of the Revised
Penal Code to ascertain the answer. Following that provision, the
theft would have been frustrated only, once the acts committed by
petitioner, if ordinarily sufficient to produce theft as a
consequence, do not produce [such theft] by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator. There are clearly two
determinative factors to consider: that the felony is not produced,
and that such failure is due to causes independent of the will of
the perpetrator. The second factor ultimately depends on the
evidence at hand in each particular case. The first, however, relies
primarily on a doctrinal definition attaching to the individual
felonies in the Revised Penal Code as to when a particular felony
is not produced, despite the commission of all the acts of
execution. So, in order to ascertain whether the theft is
consummated or frustrated, it is necessary to inquire as to how
exactly is the felony of theft produced. Parsing through the
statutory definition of theft under Article 308, there is one
apparent answer provided in the language of the law that theft is
already produced upon the tak[ing of] personal property of
another without the latters consent.
When is there unlawful taking; in the case at bar; only
attempted or consummated.
Page 20 of 36
 Indeed, we have, after all, held that unlawful taking,
or apoderamiento, is deemed complete from the moment the
offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no
opportunity to dispose of the same. And long ago, we asserted
in People v. Avila:
x x x [T]he most fundamental notion in the
crime of theft is the taking of the thing to be
appropriated into the physical power of the
thief, which idea is qualified by other
conditions, such as that the taking must be
effected animo lucrandi and without the
consent of the owner; and it will be here noted
that the definition does not require that the
taking should be effected against the will of the
owner but merely that it should be without his
consent, a distinction of no slight importance.
Insofar as we consider the present question, unlawful taking is
most material in this respect. Unlawful taking, which is the
deprivation of ones personal property, is the element which
produces the felony in its consummated stage. At the same time,
without unlawful taking as an act of execution, the offense could
only be attempted theft, if at all. With these considerations, we
can only conclude that under Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code, theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be
attempted or consummated.
 PEOPLE VS AVILA
Eman, a vagrant, found a bag containing identification cards and a
diamond ring along Roxas Blvd. Knowing that it was not his, he
went to a nearest police station to seek help in finding the owner
of the bag. At the precint PO1 Melvin attended to him. In the
investigation Eman proposed to PO1 Melvin, "in case you don't
find the owner let's just pawn straight to the pawnshop and
pawned the ring for P50,000.00 Eman never saw PO1 Melvin
again.
a. What is the criminal liability of Eman, If any? Explain.
( 3% )
b. What is the criminal liability of PO1 Melvin, is any?
Explain ( 3% )
Facts:
The wife of Lucio Pilares carried a purse containing
paper money, a gold coin and jewels. When they alighted from the
carratela, she left the purse in the carratela. The driver of the
carratela, Tiburcio de los Santos, cleaned or arranged the interior
and found the purse and picked it up. The accused, Clemente
Avila, policeman, alos boarded the carratela, along with two other
passenger. Tiburcio handed the purse to the accused and asked
the accused to return it to Lucio Pilares. The purse was never
returned. As a result, the Pilares made a complaint and Tiburcio
was arrested. He initially denied knowledge of the purse but
eventually told the authorities that he handed the purse to
Clemente Avila. A search warrant was procured and the search in
the home of the accused produced a solitaire stone and a locket
containing picture of Lucio Pilares and his wife.
Issue: 1st, whether or not Tiburcio de los Santos is liable for the
crime of theft.
2nd, whether or not Clemente was properly accused of Theft.
Ruling:
1st issue, No.
In the meeting the case thus sketched the efforts of the defense
appear to have been chiefly directed towards the creation of a
doubt upon the point whether or not the valuables might not
have been appropriated by Tiburcio de los Santos, but a perusal
of the testimony of the two girls who got into the carretela at the
same time as the accused is convincing that the purse was
delivered intact to him by Tiburcio, and without knowledge on
the part of the latter of the valuable contents contained therein.
Nor do we think there is any force in the suggestion that the
officers searching the house of the accused may have
surreptitiously introduced the objects which were found in or
under the dresser.
2nd issue, Theft.
Fundamental Considerations.
The most fundamental notion in the crime of theft is the taking of
the thing to be appropriated into the physical power of the thief,
which idea is qualified by other conditions, such as that the
taking must be effected animo lucrandi and without the consent
of the owner; and it will be here noted that the definition does
not require that the taking should be effected against the will of
the owner but merely that it should be without his consent, — a
distinction of no sight importance.
Upon these considerations it is evident that the taking and
appropriation of a thing by one who finds it, knowing the same to
have been misplaced or lost by the true owner, and with
knowledge of his identity, is legitimately within the classical
definition of theft; and in giving expression to the second
subsection of article 517 of the Penal Code, the authors of the
Page 21 of 36
Code have merely extended the general definition to a special
case about which otherwise some doubt might have existed; and
we cannot impute to them the clumsy mistake of having imported
into the law of theft a form of offense foreign to that conception
and which should properly have been incorporated in the chapter
dealing with estafa.
What has been said is of the greatest practical importance in
dealing the problem now in hand, for it determines the proper
point of view for the correct interpretation of the provision
relating to the theft of found property; namely, that the provision
should be interpreted according to its true spirit and conformably
with the doctrines that inform it. If we had discovered that this
form of theft is really a specifies of estafa wrenched from its
proper associations and artificially placed under a heading where
it does not belong, much could be said in favor of a strict and
literal interpretation; but when it is made to appear that the
criminal misappropriation of found property is theft upon
general principles of jurisprudence and not some other crime, it
becomes obvious that the provision in question should be applied
in accordance with its true spirit.
Why Theft?
We now approach the noteworthy fact, which is, that although the
common law has exactly the same general definition of theft as
that found in the Spanish Code, and notwithstanding the further
fact that the crime has never been specially defined so as to
include the offense of misappropriation by the finder,
nevertheless the common-law courts in modern times are
unanimous upon the proposition that the misappropriation of
lost property, under the conditions defined in subsection 2 of
article 517 of the Penal Code, constitutes theft and no other
crime. We shall not incumber this opinion with any detailed
statements of the development of American and English law on
this subject; but we insert reference that will enable any person
whose curiosity has been aroused to examine the matter for
himself. (Stephen, History of Criminal Law of England, vol. III, pp.
121-176; Pollock, Possession in Common Law, pp. 171-187;
State vs. Hayes, 37 L. R. A., 116, 121, et seq.; People vs. Miller, 88
Am. St. Rep., 546, 559; 25 Cyc., 35.) Says the author of the title
"Larceny" in Ruling Case Law; ". . . The place where the property
is found does not affect the question whether it is a subject of
larceny. The accepted definition of the offense extends to the
taking and carrying away of goods from any place. Property
which has been thrown away and abandoned becomes no man's
property. The former owner loses his title and all claim to it, and
one who finds it can claim it as his own. Hence, property which
has been abandoned is not the subject of larceny. It is a crime
against the United States to steal property from a wrecked
vessels. Property must have been voluntarily abandoned or the
taking may constitute larceny. Thus it has been held to be larceny
to take clothes from a dead body cast up by the sea, on the ground
that they were not voluntarily abandoned." (17 R. C. L., 36.)
The same writer then passes on to a proposition more directly
connected with the case now before us, since it relates to the act
of misappropriation by one who receives the property by
voluntary substitution from the actual finder. Upon this the rule
there formulated is this: "One who receives property from the
finder thereof assumes, in legal contemplation, by voluntary
substitution, as to the property and the owner, the relation
occupied by the finder, placing himself in the finder's stead. In
such a case, whether the person taking the property in guilty
must be determined on the same principles that govern in the
case of the actual finder." (17 R. C. L., 36.)
In Allen vs. State (91 Ala., 19), some children found a pocketbook
containing money and certain papers sufficient to identify the
owner. Upon arriving home, the children delivered the purse to
their father, who converted it to his own use. It was held that the
accused was properly convicted and that his guilt was to be
determined by the same principles that would have governed if
he had been the actual finder. In the course of the opinion the
following language was used:
* * * Finding it, and its delivery to the defendant by the
finder, did not deprive the money, as to the owner, of the
character or status of lost property; the ownership
remained in him, drawing to it, constructively, the right
of possession. When defendant took the money from his
children, he knew it had been lost, and took it as such. It
is manifest the children had no felonious intent, and
properly delivered the money to their father for his
disposition. By receiving it from his children, knowing it
was lost, defendant assumed, in legal contemplation, by
voluntary substitution, as to the money and the owner,
the relation occupied by the finders, placing himself in
their stead. Otherwise a person knowingly receiving lost
property from the finder, who had no intent to steal,
with the felonious intent to appropriate it to his own
use, escapes punishment. In such case, whether or not
the person taking the money is guilty of larceny must be
determined on the same principles which govern in the
case of the actual finder.
 PEOPLE VS LAOG GR 1783281
 SERRANO VS CA ART 315
ROSALINDA SERRANO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 123896. June 25, 2003]
Facts:
Page 22 of 36
Three informations were filed on June 18, 1985, charging
petitioner, along with Nelia Giron (Nelia) and Edna Sibal (Edna),
with estafa through falsification of commercial documents.
Petitioner posits that from the handwritten memorandum dated
June 8, 1988 reading:
Witnesses hereat confirms (sic) that Edna Sibal signed a
promissory note for P553,500.- dated October 9, 1984 in favor of
Mr. Ramon C. Mojica. This supersedes the promissory note of
Edna Sibal signed in favor of Rosalina (sic) Serrano.
below which Mojica affixed his signature along with two others,
she is exculpated from criminal liability.
By petitioners claim, under the promissory note dated October 9,
1984 mentioned in the above-quoted handwritten memorandum
which note was, by the way, never presented in evidence, Edna
undertook to return the proceeds of the subject dollar
transactions, which undertaking was allegedly unconditionally
accepted by Mojica. To petitioner, the acceptance by Mojica of
Ednas promise to pay effectively converted or novated the
transactions of the parties into ordinary creditor-debtor
relationship, hence, Mojica is in estoppel to insist on their original
relationship.
Ruling:
Petitioners position is bereft of merit. Novation is not one of the
grounds prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the extinction
of criminal liability.
[I]t is well-settled that criminal liability for estafa is not affected
by compromise or novation of contract, for it is a public offense
which must be prosecuted and punished by the Government on
its own motion though complete reparation should have been
made of the damage suffered by the offended party. As was said in
the case of People vs. Gervacio, a criminal offense is committed
against the People and the offended party may not waive or
extinguish the criminal liability that the law imposes for the
commission of the offense. The fact, therefore, that the accused
herein had, with the consent of the offended party, assumed the
obligation of paying the rentals, which he collected, out of his own
salary after he had committed the misappropriation, does not
obliterate the criminal liability incurred.
The handwritten memorandum, even assuming that the alleged
promissory note of Edna mentioned therein actually exists,
cannot exculpate petitioner from criminal liability, especially in
the absence of a showing that there was an unmistakable intent
to extinguish the original relationship between Mojica on the one
hand, and petitioner, Nelia and Edna on the other.
 PP VS BUSTINERA 6/8/04 ART 315
FACTS:
ESC Transport hired Luisito Bustinera as a taxi driver. It was
agreed that appellant would drive the taxi from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00
p.m., after which he would return it to ESC Transport's garage and
remit the boundary fee in the amount of P780.00 per day. On
December 25,1996, appellant admittedly reported for work and
drove the taxi, but he did not return it on the same day as he was
supposed to. The owner of ESC reported the taxi stolen. On
January 9, 1997, Bustinera's wife went to ESC Transport and
revealed that the taxi had been abandoned. ESC was able to
recovered. The trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of qualified theft.
HELD:
Bustinera was convicted of qualified theft under Article 310 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended for the unlawful taking of a
motor vehicle. However, Article 310 has been modified, with
respect to certain vehicles, by Republic Act No. 6539, as amended,
otherwise known as "AN ACT PREVENTING AND PENALIZING
CARNAPPING. "When statutes are in pari materia or when they
relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons
or things, or cover the same specific or particular subject matter,
or have the same purpose or object, the rule dictates that they
should be construed together. The elements of the crime of theft
as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1)
that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property
belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to
gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the
owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use
of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things. Theft is qualified when any of the following circumstances
is present: (1) the theft is committed by a domestic servant; (2)
the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence; (3) the
property stolen is either a motor vehicle, mail matter or large
cattle; (4) the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the
premises of a plantation; (5) the property stolen is fish taken
from a fish pond or fishery; and (6) the property was taken on the
occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any
other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. On the
other hand, Section 2 of Republic Act No.6539, as amended
defines "car napping" as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a
motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent,
or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by
using force upon things." The elements of car napping are thus:
(1) the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to another; (2)
the taking is without the consent of the owner or by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons or by using force upon
things; and (3) the taking is done with intent to gain. Car napping
is essentially the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle, the
concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and car napping
being the same. From the foregoing, since appellant is being
accused of the unlawful taking of a Daewoo sedan, it is the anti-
car napping law and not the provisions of qualified theft which
would apply.
 PP VS NERY 10 SCRA 244
Estafa-Novation
F:
Page 23 of 36
On 15 November 1954, in a market stall in Bacolod City, the said
accused received from Federico Matillano two (2) diamond rings
to be sold by her on commission. The agreement was for the
accused to deliver, on the following the sum of P230.00 to her
principal, to whom the accused had represented having a ready
buyer, and whatever overprice price could be obtained in the sale
would be retained the accused as her commission.
Soledad Nery failed to show up on the following day; after several
days, in a casual encounter with Francisco Matillano, she claimed
that her prospective buyer withdrew from the transaction and
that she was looking for another buyer. Days, weeks, and months
passed; and, his patience exhausted, Federico brought the matter
to attention of the police authorities of Bacolod on 5 January
1955. In no time, Soledad was found and brought to the police
station; then and there, she promised, in writing (Exh. "A"), to
deliver the price of the rings on 25 January 1955.
When the last-mentioned date arrived and Soledad failed to
comply with her promise, the City Attorney, at the instance of
Federico Matillano, filed on 12 February 1955 a complaint with
the municipal court. The case was either withdrawn or dismissed,
however, the accused making two payments of P20.00 each to
Federico. After these payments the accused failed to pay further;
hence, the fiscal filed the corresponding information dated 30
June 1958 with the court of first instance.
On 10 October 1958, during the pendency of the case in the court
of first instance, the accused, assisted by counsel, Atty. Marcos
Gomez, executed a deed, which is copied hereunder as follows:
Bacolod City
October 10, 1958
I hereby promise to pay Mr. Federico Matillano, the sum of One
Hundred Ninety Pesos (P190.00) Philippine Currency, to be paid
in the following manner:
For the month of Nov. 1958 — P50.00
For the month of Dec. 1958 — 40.00
For the month of Jan. 1959 — 100.00
During the month of March, 1959, the accused Soledad Nery
tendered a P50.00-payment to Federico Matillano, which the
latter accepted, but the balance of the price of type two rings was
never paid.
I:
The accused in the present case insists that there is no
prohibition in our law to prevent the parties to a contract to
novate it so that any incipient criminal liability under the first is
thereby avoided.
R:
The novation theory may perhaps apply prior to the filing of the
criminal information in court by the state prosecutors because up
to that time the original trust relation may be converted by the
parties into an ordinary creditor-debtor situation, thereby
placing the complainant in estoppel to insist on the original trust.
But after the justice authorities have taken cognizance of the
crime and instituted action in court, the offended party may no
longer divest the prosecution of its power to exact the criminal
liability, as distinguished from the civil.
In the Galsim case, the principal had accepted the sub-agent to
answer for the jewelry, thereby releasing the agent. In the case of
Trinidad, the Court expressly found that the compromise had
taken place "immediately after the loss of the money in question,
and long before the case was brought to court". In the case before
us, however, the alleged novation occurred after the criminal case
had been instituted, and while it was pending trial. The novation
theory advanced by the accused has been rejected by the
Supreme Court.
 PP VS LEE 4/11/05
 PP VS NEPOMOCENO 4/ 30/08
 GUINGONA VS CITY FISCAL OF MANILA 128
SCRA 577
 U.S. VS. KOTTINGER
Facts:
On 24 November 1922, detective Juan Tolentino raided the
premises known as Camera Supply Co. at 110 Escolta, Manila. He
found and confiscated the post-cards which subsequently were
used as evidenced against J. J. Kottinger, the manager of the
company. The information filed in court charged him with living
kept for sale in the store of the Camera Supply Co., obscene and
indecent pictures, in violation of section 12 of Act 277. To this
information, Kottinger interposed a demurrer based upon the
ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an offense
and were not contrary to law; but the trial court overruled the
demurrer. Following the presentation of evidence by the
Government and the defense, judgment was rendered finding
Kottinger guilty of the offenses charged and sentencing him to
pay a fine of P50 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and the costs. Kottinger appealed.
Issue: Whether pictures portraying the inhabitants of the
country in native dress and as they appear and can be seen in the
regions in which they live, are obscene or indecent.
Held:
The pictures which it is argued offend against the law on account
of being obscene and indecent, disclose six different postures of
non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines ("Philippines, Bontoc
Woman"; a picture of five young boys and carries the legend
"Greetings from the Philippines"; "Ifugao Belle, Philippines.
Greetings from the Philippines"; "Igorrot Girl, Rice Field
Page 24 of 36
Costume"; "Kalinga Girls, Philippines"; and "Moros, Philippines")
None of the pictures represented posses which he had not
observed on various occasions, and that the costumes worn by
the people in the pictures are the true costumes regularly worn
by them, according to Dr. H. Otley Beyer, Professor in the
University of the Philippines. Although the Federal statutes
prohibits the importation of shipment into the Philippine Islands
of the following: "Articles, books, pamphlets, printed matter,
manuscripts, typewritten matter, paintings, illustrations, or
objects of obscene or indecent character or subversive of public
order"; there are, in the record, copies of reputable magazines
which circulate freely thru-out the United States and other
countries, and which are admitted into the Philippines without
question, containing illustrations into the Philippines without
question, containing illustrations identical in nature to those in
the present case. Publications of the Philippine Government have
also been offered in evidence such as Barton's "Ifugao Law," the
"Philippine Journal of Science" for October, 1906, and the Reports
of the Philippine Commission for 1903, 1912, and 1913, in which
are found illustrations either exactly the same or nearly akin to
those which are now impugned. Tested by the standard set up by
the Congress of the United States, it would be extremely doubtful
if the pictures here challenged would be held obscene or indecent
by any state of Federal court. It would be particularly unwise to
sanction a different type of censorship in the Philippine than in
the United States, or for that matter in the rest of the
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 42 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
world. The pictures in question merely depict persons as they
actually live, without attempted presentation of persons in
unusual postures or dress. The aggregate judgment of the
Philippine community, the moral sense of all the people in the
Philippines, would not be shocked by photographs of this type.
The court is convinced that the post-card pictures in the present
case cannot be characterized as offensive to chastity, or foul, or
filthy.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
RA 7610
PEOPLE VS ABELLO
[G.R. No. 151952. March 25, 2009.
FACTS: The victim in these cases is twenty-one (21) year old
AAA. She contracted polio when she was seven (7) months old.
She was not able to study on account of her difficulty in walking.
On June 30, 1998 at around 4:00 o'clock (sic) in the
early morning, AAA was sleeping in their house in
Kalyeng Impiyerno, Navotas, Metro Manila along with
her sister-in-law and nephew. She was suddenly
awakened when Abello . . . mashed her breast. Come July
2, 1999 at around 3:00 a.m. Abello again mashed the
breast of AAA practically under the same previous
situation while the latter was sleeping. In these two
occasions AAA was able to recognize Abello because of
the light coming from outside which illuminated the
house. Then on July 8, 1998, at around 2:00 a.m., Abello
this time placed his soft penis inside the mouth of AAA.
The latter got awaken when Abello accidentally kneeled
on her right hand. AAA exclaimed "Aray" forcing the
accused to hurriedly enter his room. He was
nevertheless seen by AAA. The victim on the same date
reported the incident to her sister-in-law and mother.
ISSUE: WON AAA is a covered under the definition of
child in RA 7610.
RULING: NO.
More importantly, AAA cannot be considered a child under
Section 3 (a) of R.A. No. 7610 which reads:
(a) "Children" refers to person below
eighteen (18) years of age or
those over but are unable to
fully take care of themselves or
protect themselves from abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of a
physical or mental disability or
condition; [Emphasis supplied]
The implementing rules elaborated on this definition when it
defined a "child" as one who is below 18 years of age or over
said age who, upon evaluation of a qualified physician,
psychologist or psychiatrist, is found to be incapable of
taking care of herself fully because of a physical or mental
disability or condition or of protecting herself from abuse.
While the records show that the RTC, the CA and the investigating
prosecutor who filed the corresponding Informations, considered
AAA's polio as a physical disability that rendered her incapable of
normal function, no evidence was in fact presented showing the
prosecution's compliance with the implementing rules.
Specifically, the prosecution did not present any evidence,
testimonial or documentary, of any medical evaluation or
medical finding from a qualified physician, psychologist or
psychiatrist attesting that AAA's physical condition rendered
her incapable of fully taking care of herself or of protecting
herself against sexual abuse. Under the circumstances, we
cannot consider AAA a child under Section 3 (a) of R.A. No. 7610.
Page 25 of 36
In arriving at this conclusion, we consider that since R.A. No.
7610 is a special law referring to a particular class in society, the
prosecution must show that the victim truly belongs to this
particular class to warrant the application of the statute's
provisions. Any doubt in this regard we must resolve in favor of
the accused. DcIHSa
From another perspective, we also note that no evidence has
been adduced showing that AAA's physical disability prevented
her from resisting Abello's attacks; the evidence only reveals that
Abello took advantage of the opportunity presented to him (i.e.,
that AAA and her companions who were then asleep) to commit
the sexual abuses; this inference is supported by the fact that he
stopped his sexual assault when AAA started to awaken. It can
also be reasonably deduced from these circumstances that Abello
sought to commit the sexual abuses with impunity — without
AAA's knowledge and without any interference on her part.
In light of these conclusions, we cannot hold Abello liable
under R.A. No. 7610. However, we still find him liable for acts
of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, as amended.
|||
PEOPLE VS DELANTAR
G.R. No. 169143. February 2, 2007|||
FACTS:Accused Simplicio Delantar y Redondo delivered his
daughter [AAA] to an Arab national by the name of Mr. Hammond
from their house at 2165-A P. Burgos St., Pasay City sometime in
1994 selling her in prostitution to the said [A]rab who committed
acts of lasciviousness on her person by kissing her on her lips, her
breast, her private parts and even rubbing his penis against her
private parts.
Accused Simplicio Delantar pimped and delivered the
complainant, an eleven (11) year old minor to Congressman
Romeo Jalosjos of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte at the
Ritz Tower in Makati where the said Congressman for eight (8)
times committed acts of lasciviousness on her person when he
kissed her on her lips, private organ and even raped her. That all
these times, the accused brought his child from their residence at
2165-A P. Burgos St., Pasay City
ISSUE: WON there was a violation of RA 7610.
RULING: YES. Appellant's violation of Sec. 5, Art. III of R.A. No.
7610 is as clear as day. The provision penalizes anyone who
engages in or promotes, facilitates or induces child prostitution
either by: (1) acting as a procurer of a child prostitute; or (2)
inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of
written or oral advertisements or other similar means; or (3) by
taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as
a prostitute; or (4) threatening or using violence towards a child
to engage him as a prostitute; or (5) giving monetary
consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefits to the child with
the intent to engage such child in prostitution. CIHAED
The purpose of the law is to provide special protection to children
from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and
discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development. 70 A child exploited in prostitution may seem to
"consent" to what is being done to her or him and may appear not
to complain. However, we have held that a child who is "a person
below eighteen years of age or those unable to fully take care of
themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation or discrimination because of their age or mental
disability or condition" is incapable of giving rational consent 71
to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse. In fact, the absence of
free consent is conclusively presumed when the woman is below
the age of twelve.
Under R.A. No. 7610, Sec. 31 (c), relationship is not a
qualifying circumstance but only an ordinary generic
aggravating circumstance. Thus, although it was not alleged in
the information it can nevertheless be taken into account in fixing
the penalty for the crime because it was proven. 74 A generic
aggravating circumstance provides for the imposition of the
prescribed penalty in its maximum period, while a qualifying
circumstance changes the nature of the crime. 75
In the case at bar, the only evidence presented to establish AAA's
alleged relationship to appellant is her birth certificate 76 which
mentions appellant as the father. However, said document does
not bear appellant's signature. In fact, appellant, in his testimony,
denied that he is AAA's father.
PEOPLE VS OLAYON
[G.R. No. 171863. August 20, 2008.]|||
FACTS: The then 22-year old herein respondent Gaspar Olayon
was charged with violation of Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No.
7610 (THE SPECIAL PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AGAINST
ABUSE, EXPLOITATION, AND DISCRIMINATION ACT) in two
separate Informations filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasig City, of which the then 14-year old AAA was alleged to be
the victim.||
| On or about 10:00 a.m. and 2: 00 pm of January 27, 1997 in
Taguig, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused, with lewd designs, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse
with and commit lewd and lascivious acts upon the person of
[AAA], a minor, fourteen (14) years of age.
ISSUE: whether consensual sexual intercourse with a minor is
classified as child abuse under Section 10 of R.A. No. 7610.
RULING: NO. As Section 10 refers to acts of child abuse prejudicial
to the child's development other than child prostitution and other
sexual abuse 16 under Section 5, attempt to commit child
prostitution, 17 child trafficking, 18 attempt to commit child
trafficking, 19 and obscene publications and indecent shows, 20
the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
holding that ". . . 'sexual abuse' [as defined under Section 5] . . . is
a completely distinct and separate offense from 'child abuse' [as
defined under Section 10]."
Page 26 of 36
Consensual sexual intercourse or even acts of lasciviousness with
a minor who is 12 years old or older could constitute a violation
of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610. For Section 5 (b) punishes sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child exploited
in prostitution but also with a child subjected to other sexual
abuse. 21
Section 2 (g) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and
Investigation of Child Abuse Cases, promulgated to implement
R.A. No. 7610, defines "sexual abuse" as including "the
employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or
coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to
engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the
molestation, prostitution, or incest with children." (Underscoring
supplied)
For consensual sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a
minor, who is not exploited in prostitution, to thus fall within the
purview of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, "persuasion,
inducement, enticement or coercion" of the child must be
present.
In People v. Larin, 22 the information alleged that the therein
accused took advantage of his authority, influence, and moral
ascendancy as trainor/swimming instructor of the minor victim
23 which the Court found constituted "psychological coercion".
24 In convicting the therein accused for lascivious acts, the Court
held:
It must be noted that [Republic Act No.
7610] covers not only a situation in which a
child is abused for profit, but also one in
which a child, through coercion or
intimidation, engages in any lascivious
conduct. 25 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
And even in Malto v. People 26 wherein the accused was convicted
for violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, the information
alleged, and the prosecution proved, that the therein accused who
was the minor's professor obtained the minor's consent by taking
advantage of his relationship and moral ascendancy to exert
influence on her. SDHTEC
In the case at bar, even if respondent were charged under Section
5 (b), instead of Section 10 (a), respondent would just the same
have been acquitted as there was no allegation that an element of
the offense — coercion or influence or intimidation — attended
its commission.
PEOPLE VS ABAY
[G.R. No. 177752. February 24, 2009.]|||
FACTS:
On March 8, 2000, appellant Roberto Abay y Trinidad was
charged with rape in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of RA
7610 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 4 1
under the following Information:
That sometime in December 1999, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, [appellant] by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly commit sexual abuse and lascivious conduct
against [AAA], a minor, 13 years of age, by then and
there kissing her breast and whole body, lying on top of
her and inserting his penis into her vagina, thus
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her, against
her will and consent thereafter threatening to kill her
should she report the incident, thereby gravely
endangering her survival and normal growth and
development, to the damage and prejudice of [AAA].
ISSUE: WON ACCUSED IS GUILTY UNDER RA 7610.
RULING: NO.
In view of the enactment of RA 8353 7 and RA 9346, 8 the CA
found appellant guilty only of simple rape and reduced the
penalty imposed to reclusion perpetua.|||
Under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 12 in relation to RA
8353, 13 if the victim of sexual abuse 14 is below 12 years of age,
the offender should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for
statutory rape under Article 266-A (1) (d) of the Revised Penal
Code 15 and penalized with reclusion perpetua. 16 On the other
hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be
charged with either sexual abuse 17 under Section 5 (b) of RA
7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1 [d]) of the
Revised Penal Code.However, the offender cannot be accused of
both crimes 18 for the same act because his right against double
jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice
to criminal liability for a single criminal act. 19 Likewise, rape
cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610.
Under Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code (on complex crimes),
20 a felony under the Revised Penal Code (such as rape) cannot
be complexed with an offense penalized by a special law. 21
DCASEc
In this case, the victim was more than 12 years old when the
crime was committed against her. The Information against
appellant stated that AAA was 13 years old at the time of the
incident. Therefore, appellant may be prosecuted either for
violation of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A
(except paragraph 1 [d]) of the Revised Penal Code.While the
Information may have alleged the elements of both crimes, the
prosecution's evidence only established that appellant sexually
violated the person of AAA through force and intimidation 22 by
threatening her with a bladed instrument and forcing her to
submit to his bestial designs. Thus, rape was established.
BONGALON VS PEOPLE
[G.R. No. 169533. March 20, 2013.]|||
FACTS:
on May 11, 2002, Jayson dela Cruz (Jayson) and Roldan, his older
brother, both minors, joined the evening procession for the Santo
Ninñ o at Oro Site in Legazpi City; that when the procession passed
in front of the petitioner's house, the latter's daughter Mary Ann
Rose, also a minor, threw stones at Jayson and called him "sissy";
that the petitioner confronted Jayson and Roldan and called them
names like "strangers" and "animals"; that the petitioner struck
Jayson at the back with his hand, and slapped Jayson on the face;
Page 27 of 36
4 that the petitioner then went to the brothers' house and
challenged Rolando dela Cruz, their father, to a fight, but Rolando
did not come out of the house to take on the petitioner; that
Rolando later brought Jayson to the Legazpi City Police Station
and reported the incident; that Jayson also underwent medical
treatment at the Bicol Regional Training and Teaching Hospital; 5
that the doctors who examined Jayson issued two medical
certificates attesting that Jayson suffered the following
contusions, to wit: (1) contusion .5 x 2.5 scapular area, left; and
(2) +1 x 1 cm. contusion left zygomatic area and contusion .5 x
2.33 cm. scapular area, left
ISSUE: WON accused is guilty of Child Abuse under RA 7610.
Ruling: NO.
The law under which the petitioner was charged, tried and found
guilty of violating is Section 10 (a).
The records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his
laying of hands on Jayson had been intended to debase the
"intrinsic worth and dignity" of Jayson as a human being, or that
he had thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The
records showed the laying of hands on
Jayson to have been done at the spur of the moment and in anger,
indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern
for the personal safety of his own minor daughters who had just
suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of
his self-control, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade
or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human
being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse.
Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child
constitutes the crime of child abuse under Section 10 (a) of
Republic Act No. 7610. 1 Only when the laying of hands is
shown beyond reasonable doubt to be intended by the
accused to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth
and dignity of the child as a human being should it be
punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under the
Revised Penal Code.|||
Considering that Jayson's physical injury required five to seven
days of medical attention, 19 the petitioner was liable for slight
physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code|||
ROSALDES VS PEOPLE
[G.R. No. 173988. October 8, 2014.]|||
FACTS: The petitioner, a public schoolteacher, was charged with
and found guilty of child abuse, a violation of Republic Act No.
7610. 1 The victim was her own Grade 1 pupil whom she
physically maltreated for having accidentally bumped her knee
while she was drowsing off on a bamboo sofa as he entered the
classroom. Her maltreatment left him with physical injuries, as
duly certified by a physician.
ISSUE: WON Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner
by holding that the acts of the petitioner constitute child abuse
penalized under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 761O
RULING: NO.
Although the petitioner, as a schoolteacher, could duly discipline
Michael Ryan as her pupil, her infliction of the physical injuries
on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy even
fainted from the violence suffered at her hands. 13 She could not
justifiably claim that she acted only for the sake of disciplining
him. Her physical maltreatment of him was precisely prohibited
by no less than the Family Code, which has expressly banned the
infliction of corporal punishment by a school administrator,
teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special
parental authority (i.e., in loco parentis)|||
In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the
maltreatment may consist of an act by deeds or by words that
debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a
child as a human being. The act need not be habitual. The CA
concluded that the petitioner "went overboard in disciplining
Michael Ryan, a helpless and weak 7-year old boy, when she
pinched hard Michael Ryan on the left thigh and when she held
him in the armpits and threw him on the floor[; and as] the boy
fell down, his body hit the desk causing him to lose consciousness
[but instead] of feeling a sense of remorse, the accused-appellant
further held the boy up by his ears and pushed him down on the
floor." 15 On her part, the trial judge said that the physical pain
experienced by the victim had been aggravated by an emotional
trauma that caused him to stop going to school altogether out of
fear of the petitioner, compelling his parents to transfer him to
another school where he had to adjust again. 16 Such established
circumstances proved beyond reasonable doubt that the
petitioner was guilty of child abuse by deeds that degraded and
demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of Michael Ryan as a
human being.
DE OCAMPO VS SEC. OF JUSTICE
[G.R. No. 147932. January 25, 2006.|||
FACTS:
The present case arose from a sworn statement of respondent
Magdalena B. Dacarra ("Magdalena") executed before the
Women's Desk of the CPD Police Station in Batasan Hills, Quezon
City on 10 December 1999. Magdalena stated that on 4 December
1999, her nine-year-old son Ronald complained of dizziness upon
arriving home at about six in the evening. Ronald then vomited,
prompting Magdalena to ask what happened. Ronald replied that
petitioner, who was Ronald's teacher, banged his head against
that of his classmate Lorendo Orayan ("Lorendo"). Magdalena
inspected Ronald's head and saw a woundless contusion. Due to
Ronald's continued vomiting, Magdalena brought him to a quack
doctor (arbularyo) on 5 December 1999. The following morning,
Magdalena brought Ronald to the East Avenue Medical Center
where he underwent an x-ray. The attending physician informed
Magdalena that Ronald's head had a fracture. Blood oozed out of
Ronald's nose before he died on 9 December 1999
ISSUE: Whether there is probable cause against petitioner for
homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code in relation
to Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610 and for violation of Section
10(a), Article VI of RA 7610.|||
Page 28 of 36
RULING: There is probable cause for the offenses charged against
petitioner. Probable cause is the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind
that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably
guilty of the crime. 23
In the present case, Ronald, a nine-year-old student, died five
days after his teacher, petitioner in this case, allegedly banged his
head against that of his classmate Lorendo. There is nothing in
the records showing petitioner's specific denial of the occurrence
of such act. Petitioner simply stated that "the head-banging
incident happened but [she] did not perpetrate it." 24 In effect,
petitioner admits the occurrence of the head-banging incident
but denies committing it.
The alleged intervening events before Ronald died, namely: (a)
the consultation with a quack doctor, and (b) the three-day
confinement in the East Avenue Medical Center, are not sufficient
to break the relation of the felony committed and the resulting
injury. Were it not for the head-banging incident, Ronald might
not have needed medical assistance in the first place.
Charges of Homicide and Child Abuse
Petitioner's single act of allegedly banging the heads of her
students had two distinct victims, namely Ronald and Lorendo.
Therefore, petitioner has to face prosecution for cruelty to each
victim. For Ronald's death, petitioner is being charged with
homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code 27 in
relation to Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610 punishable by
reclusion perpetua. 28 However, this does not mean that
petitioner is being charged with the distinct offenses of homicide
and child abuse for Ronald's death. On the other hand, for her
cruelty to Lorendo, petitioner is being charged with violation of
Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610 punishable by prision mayor
in its minimum period.
RA 9208
"Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003."|||
PEOPLE VS CASIO
[G.R. No. 211465. December 3, 2014.]|||
FACTS:
Accused Shirley A. Casio was charged for the violation of Republic
Act No. 9208, Section 4 (a), qualified by Section 6 (a).|||
On May 2, 2008, International Justice Mission (IJM), 5 a non-
governmental organization, coordinated with the police in order
to entrap persons engaged in human trafficking in Cebu City. 6
Chief PSI George Ylanan, SPO1 Felomino Mendaros, SPO1 Fe
Altubar, PO1 Albert Luardo, and PO1 Roy Carlo Veloso composed
the team of police operatives. 7 PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso were
designated as decoys, pretending to be tour guides looking for
girls to entertain their guests. 8 IJM provided them with marked
money, which was recorded in the police blotter. 9
The team went to Queensland Motel and rented Rooms 24 and
25. These rooms were adjacent to each other. Room 24 was
designated for the transaction while Room 25 was for the rest of
the police team. 10
PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street in
Barangay Kamagayan, Cebu City's red light district. Accused
noticed them and called their attention by saying "Chicks mo
dong?" (Do you like girls, guys?). 11 HcaDIA
During trial, PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso testified that their
conversation with accused went as follows:
Accused:Chicks mo dong? (Do you like girls, guys?)
PO1 Luardo:Unya mga bag-o? Kanang batan-on kay naa
mi guests naghulat sa motel. (Are they new? They must
be young because we have guests waiting at the motel.)
Accused:Naa, hulat kay magkuha ko. (Yes, just wait and
I'll get them.) 12
At that point, PO1 Luardo sent a text message to PSI Ylanan that
they found a prospective subject. 13
After a few minutes, accused returned with AAA and BBB, private
complainants in this case. 14
Accused: Kining duha kauyon mo ani? (Are you satisfied
with these two?)
PO1 Veloso: Maayo man kaha na sila modala ug kayat?
(Well, are they good in sex?) 15
Accused gave the assurance that the girls were good in sex. PO1
Luardo inquired how much their services would cost. Accused
replied, "Tag kinientos" (PhP500.00). 16
PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo convinced accused to come with
them to Queensland Motel. Upon proceeding to Room 24, PO1
Veloso handed the marked money to accused. 17
As accused counted the money, PO1 Veloso gave PSI Ylanan a
missed call. This was their pre-arranged signal. The rest of the
team proceeded to Room 24, arrested accused, and informed her
of her constitutional rights. The police confiscated the marked
money from accused. 18 Meanwhile, AAA and BBB "were brought
to Room 25 and placed in the custody of the representatives from
the IJM and the DSWD."
ISSUE: Whether accused was properly convicted of trafficking in
persons, considering that AAA admitted that she works as a
prostitute.|||
RULING: Knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense
under Republic
Act No. 9208.|||
Page 29 of 36
As defined under Section 3 (a) of Republic Act No. 9208,
trafficking in persons can still be committed even if the victim
gives consent.
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act:
a. Trafficking in Persons — refers to the recruitment,
transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of
persons with or without the victim's consent or
knowledge, within or across national borders by means
of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of
position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the
persons, or, the giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having
control over another person for the purpose of
exploitation which includes at a minimum, the
exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms
of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery,
servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
The recruitment transportation, transfer, harboring or
receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall
also be considered as "trafficking in persons" even if it
does not involve any of the means set forth in the
preceding paragraph. 70(Emphasis supplied)
The victim's consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive,
abusive, or deceptive means employed by perpetrators of human
trafficking. 71 Even without the use of coercive, abusive, or
deceptive means, a minor's consent is not given out of his or her
own free will.
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9208 enumerates the different acts
of trafficking in persons. Accused was charged under Section 4
(a), which states:
SEC. 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. — It shall be
unlawful for any person, natural or judicial, to commit
any of the following acts.
a. To recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, provide, or
receive a person by any means, including those done
under the pretext of domestic or overseas employment
or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of
prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced
labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage; 72
Based on the definition of trafficking in persons and the
enumeration of acts of trafficking in persons, accused performed
all the elements in the commission of the offense when she
peddled AAA and BBB and offered their services to decoys PO1
Veloso and PO1 Luardo in exchange for money. The offense was
also qualified because the trafficked persons were minors.
Here, AAA testified as to how accused solicited her services for
the customers waiting at Queensland Motel. AAA also testified
that she was only 17 years old when accused peddled her. Her
certificate of live birth was presented as evidence to show that
she was born on January 27, 1991.
The prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
accused committed the offense of trafficking in persons, qualified
by the fact that one of the victims was a child. As held by the trial
court:
[T]he act of "sexual intercourse" need not have been
consummated for the mere "transaction" i.e., that
'solicitation' for sex and the handing over of the "bust
money" of Php1,000.00 already consummated the said
act.
|||
Elements of
trafficking in
persons
The elements of trafficking in persons can be derived from its
definition under Section 3 (a) of Republic Act No. 9208, thus:
(1) The act of "recruitment, transportation, transfer or
harbouring, or receipt of persons with or without the
victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national
borders."
(2) The means used which include "threat or use of
force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud,
deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve
the consent of a person having control over another;
and
(3) The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which
includes "exploitation or the prostitution of others or
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or
services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of
organs."
The Court of Appeals found that AAA and BBB were recruited by
accused when their services were peddled to the police who
acted as decoys. 65 AAA was a child at the time that accused
peddled her services. 66 AAA also stated that she agreed to work
as a prostitute because she needed money. 67 Accused took
advantage of AAA's vulnerability as a child and as one who need
money, as proven by the testimonies of the witnesses.|||
People v. Lalli y Purih
[G.R. No. 195419. October 12, 2011.]|||
FACTS:
This is a consolidated criminal case filed against the accused-
appellants for the crimes of Illegal Recruitment (Criminal
Case No. 21930) and Trafficking in Persons (Criminal CaseNo.
21908).|||
In the evening of June 3, 2005, while Lolita Sagadsad Plando, 23
years old, single, was in Tumaga, Zamboanga City on her way to
the house of her grandfather, she met Ronnie Masion Aringoy and
Page 30 of 36
Rachel Aringoy Canñ ete. Ronnie greeted Lolita, "Oy, it's good you
are here" ("oy, maayo kay dia ka"). Rachel asked Lolita if she is Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in
interested to work in Malaysia|||
large scale shall be considered an offense involving
On June 6, 2005, Lolita went to Zamboanga City wharf at 2:00 economic sabotage.
o'clock in the afternoon bringing a bag containing her make-up
and powder. She met at the wharf Hadja Jarma Lalli, Ronnie
xxx xxx xxx
Aringoy, Honey and Michele. Ronnie gave to Lolita her boat ticket
for the vessel M/V Mary Joy bound for Sandakan, Malaysia; a
passport in the name of Marife Plando but with Lolita's picture on Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate
it, and P1,000.00 in cash. Hadja Jarma, Lolita, Honey, Michele and
if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons
two other women boarded the boat M/V Mary Joy bound for
Sandakan. Ronnie Aringoy did not go with them. He did not board conspiring or confederating with one another.
the boat. . . . After the boat sailed, Hadja Jarma Lalli and Nestor
Relampagos approached Lolita and her companions. Nestor told (Emphasis supplied)
them that they will have a good job in Malaysia as restaurant
entertainers. They will serve food to customers. They will not be
harmed.||| It is clear that a person or entity engaged in recruitment and
placement activities without the requisite authority from the
M/V Mary Joy arrived at the port of Sandakan, Malaysia at 10:00 Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), whether for profit
o'clock in the morning of June 7, 2005. When they were already at or not, is engaged in illegal recruitment. |||
the restaurant, a Filipina woman working there said that the
place is a prostitution den and the women there are used as
prostitutes.||| Lolita Plando was forced to work as entertainer at It is clear that through the concerted efforts of Aringoy, Lalli and
Pipen Club.|||
Relampagos, Lolita was recruited and deployed to Malaysia to
ISSUE: whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible work as a prostitute. Such conspiracy among Aringoy, Lalli and
error in affirming in toto the RTC Decision which found accused-
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Illegal Relampagos could be deduced from the manner in which the
Recruitment and Trafficking in Persons.|||
crime was perpetrated — each of the accused played a pivotal
Ruling: NO.
role in perpetrating the crime of illegal recruitment, and evinced
Criminal Case No. 21930 (Illegal Recruitment)||| a joint common purpose and design, concerted action and

community of interest.
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 (RA 8042) defines illegal

recruitment, as follows: For these reasons, this Court affirms the CA Decision, affirming

the RTC Decision, declaring accused Ronnie Aringoy y Masion and

[I]llegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing,
Hadja Jarma Lalli y Purih guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or
crime of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate in Criminal
procuring workers and includes referring, contact
Case No. 21930, with a penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
services, promising or advertising for employment
P500,000 imposed on each of the accused.
abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken

by a non-licensee or non-holder of Criminal Case No. 21908 (Trafficking in Persons)|||

authority contemplated under Article 13(f)

||| Section 3 (a) of Republic Act No. 9208 (RA 9208), otherwise
of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003, defines
known as the Labor Code of the Philippines. EHACcT
Trafficking in Persons, as follows: DaTICE

xxx xxx xxx

Page 31 of 36
Trafficking in Persons — refers to the recruitment,
transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of
persons with or without the victim's consent or
knowledge, within or across national borders by means
of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of
position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the
person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having
control over another person for the purpose of
exploitation which includes at a minimum, the
exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms
of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery,
servitude or the removal or sale of organs. . . . (Emphasis
supplied)
|||
Trafficking in Persons under Sections 3 (a) and 4 of RA 9208 is
not only limited to transportation of victims, but also includes the
act of recruitment of victims for trafficking. In this case, since it
has been sufficiently proven beyond reasonable doubt, as
discussed in Criminal Case No. 21930, that all the three accused
(Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos) conspired and confederated with
one another to illegally recruit Lolita to become a prostitute in
Malaysia, it follows that they are also guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Qualified Trafficking in Persons committed
by a syndicate under RA 9208 because the crime of recruitment
for prostitution also constitutes trafficking.
When an act or acts violate two or more different laws and
constitute two different offenses, a prosecution under one will
not bar a prosecution under the other. 50 The constitutional right
against double jeopardy only applies to risk of punishment twice
for the same offense, or for an act punished by a law and an
ordinance. 51 The prohibition on double jeopardy does not apply
to an act or series of acts constituting different offenses.
CASES ON VAWC
DABALOS VS QUAIMBAO
GR NO. 193960, JAN. 7, 2013
FACTS:
 Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5 (a) of
RA 9262.
 After examining the supporting evidence, the RTC found
probable cause and consequently, issued a warrant of
arrest against petitioner on November 19, 2009. ||
 Petitioner averred that at the time of the alleged
incident on July 13, 2009, he was no longer in a dating
relationship with private respondent; hence, RA 9262
was inapplicable.|||
 In her affidavit, private respondent admitted that her
relationship with petitioner had ended prior to the
subject incident. She narrated that on July 13, 2009, she
sought payment of the money she had lent to petitioner
but the latter could not pay. She then inquired from
petitioner if he was responsible for spreading rumors
about her which he admitted. Thereupon, private
respondent slapped petitioner causing the latter to
inflict on her the physical injuries alleged in the
Information. |||
ISSUE: WON ACCUSED CAN BE CHARGED WITH RA 9262.
RULING. YES.
The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications
for any act or series of acts to be considered as a crime of violence
against women through physical harm, namely: 1) it is committed
against a woman or her child and the woman is the offender's
wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or dating
relationship or with whom he has a common child; and 2) it
results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering.
In Ang v. Court of Appeals, 5 the Court enumerated the elements of
the crime of violence against women through harassment, to wit:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through
another, commits an act or series of acts of
harassment against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes
substantial emotional or psychological
distress to her. 6
Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a
sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman, for
Page 32 of 36
RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act
of violence be a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere
in the law can such limitation be inferred.
As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the
relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient
evidence showing the past or present existence of such
relationship between the offender and the victim when the
physical harm was committed.
Accordingly, the Information having sufficiently alleged the
necessary elements of the crime, such as: a dating relationship
between the petitioner and the private respondent; the act of
violence committed by the petitioner; and the resulting physical
harm to private respondent, the offense is covered by RA 9262
which falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC in accordance with
Sec. 7 of the said law.
DEL SOCORRO VS VAN WILSEM
GR NO. 193707
FACTS:
 Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst
Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in
Holland on September 25, 1990. 2 On January 19, 1994,
they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van
Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant
petition was sixteen (16) years of age.|||
 Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19,
1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the
appropriate Court of Holland. 4 At that time, their son
was only eighteen (18) months old. 5 Thereafter,
petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.|||
 respondent made a promise to provide monthly support
to their son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250)
Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or
less). 7 However, since the arrival of petitioner and her
son in the Philippines, respondent never gave support to
the son, Roderigo.|||
 Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines
and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then,
have been residing thereat.|||
 On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel,
sent a letter demanding for support from respondent.
However, respondent refused to receive the letter|||
ISSUE: Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally
liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to support his
minor child.
RULING: YES.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under
R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal obligation to support
exists.|||
we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article
195 34 of the New Civil Code in demanding support from
respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 35 of the
New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other
words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the
provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies
to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to
foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with
respect to family rights and duties. 36
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls
under family rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of
Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he
is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to
whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the
consequences of his failure to do so.
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not
obliged to support petitioner's son under Article 195 of the
Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained
in Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is
not obliged to support petitioner's son altogether. EHaASD
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law
applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign
law. 40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that
being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws
on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. 41 While
respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his
position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved
the same.
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself,
respondent is no longer liable to support his former wife.
Finally, we do not agree with respondent's argument that
granting, but not admitting, that there is a legal basis for charging
violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability
has been extinguished on the ground of prescription of crime 52
under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262.
The act of denying support to a child under Section 5 (e) (2)
and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing offense, 53 which
started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly,
the crime charged in the instant case has clearly not
prescribed. |||
REPUBLIC VS YAHON
G.R. No. 201043. June 16, 2014.
FACTS:
 Daisy R. Yahon (respondent) filed a petition for the
issuance of protection order under the provisions of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, 3 otherwise known as the
"Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of
2004," against her husband, S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon
(S/Sgt. Yahon), an enlisted personnel of the Philippine
Army who retired in January 2006. Respondent and
S/Sgt. Yahon were married on June 8, 2003. The couple
did not have any child but respondent has a daughter
with her previous live-in partner.|||
 On September 28, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO, as
follows:|||
“xxx
To insure that petitioner can receive a fair share of
respondent's retirement and other benefits, the
following agencies thru their heads are directed to
Page 33 of 36
 WITHHOLD any retirement, pension and other
benefits of respondent, S/SGT. CHARLES A. YAHON.”
ISSUE: whether petitioner military institution may be ordered to
automatically deduct a percentage from the retirement benefits
of its enlisted personnel, and to give the same directly to the
latter's lawful wife as spousal support in compliance with a
protection order issued by the RTC pursuant to R.A. No. 9262
RULING: YES.
It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable
conflict between two laws, the later enactment must prevail,
being the more recent expression of legislative will. 17 Statutes
must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to
form a uniform system of jurisprudence. 18 However, if several
laws cannot be harmonized, the earlier statute must yield to the
later enactment. The later law is the latest expression of the
legislative will. 19
We hold that Section 8 (g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later
enactment, should be construed as laying down an exception to
the general rule above-stated that retirement benefits are exempt
from execution. The law itself declares that the court shall order
the withholding of a percentage of the income or salary of the
respondent by the employer, which shall be automatically
remitted directly to the woman "[n]otwithstanding other laws to
the contrary.
|||
GO-TAN VS SPS TAN
[G.R. No. 168852. September 30, 2008.]|||
FACTS:
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven
L. Tan (Steven) were married. 3 Out of this union, two female
children were born, Kyra Danielle 4 and Kristen Denise. 5 On
January 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner
filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Protective Order (TPO) 6 against Steven and her parents-in-law,
Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before
the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents,
were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon
her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e) (2) (3) (4), (h) (5),
and (i) 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, 8 otherwise known as
the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of
2004"
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO
& JUANITA, PARENTS-IN-LAW OF SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED
IN THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER,
IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE "ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR
CHILDREN ACT OF 2004”.
RULING: The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and
their children'' as "any act or a series of acts committed by any
person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a
woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her
child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the
family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical,
sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty." CScaDH
While the said provision provides that the offender be related or
connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual
or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the
principle of conspiracy under the RPC.
the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For
once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design
is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the
precise extent or modality of participation of each of them
becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.
ANG VS CA
[G.R. No. 182835. April 20, 2010.]
FACTS:
 This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime
of violence against women when a former boyfriend
sent to the girl the picture of a naked woman, not her,
but with her face on it.|||
 The public prosecutor charged petitioner-accused
Rustan Ang (Rustan) before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Baler, Aurora, of violation of the Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act or Republic Act
(R.A.) 9262|||
 complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused Rustan
were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora
Province. Rustan courted Irish and they became "on-
and-off" sweethearts towards the end of 2004. When
Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in
partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant,
Irish broke up with him.|||
 In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received
through multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of
a naked woman with spread legs and with Irish's face
superimposed on the figure (Exhibit A). 2 The sender's
cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-
8084768, one of the numbers that Rustan used. Irish
surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a
shot he took when they were in Baguio in 2003 (Exhibit
B).|||
 After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text
messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy
for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her.
And he threatened to spread the picture he sent through
the internet.|||
ISSUES: Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed
between Rustan and Irish as this term is defined in R.A.
9262;
Whether or not a single act of harassment, like
the sending of the nude picture in this case, already
constitutes a violation of Section 5 (h) of R.A. 9262;
RULING:
Page 34 of 36
Section 3 (a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women
includes an act or acts of a person against a woman with whom
he has or had a sexual or dating relationship.
Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence against
women and these include any form of harassment that causes
substantial emotional or psychological distress to a woman. |||
The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the elements
of the crime of violence against women through harassment are:
1.The offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship with the offended
woman;
2.The offender, by himself or through
another, commits an act or series
of acts of harassment against the
woman; and
3.The harassment alarms or causes
substantial emotional or
psychological distress to her.
One. The parties to this case agree that the prosecution needed to
prove that accused Rustan had a "dating relationship" with Irish.
Section 3 (e) provides that a "dating relationship" includes a
situation where the parties are romantically involved over time
and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship.
Thus:
(e)"Dating relationship" refers to a
situation wherein the parties live as
husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or are romantically involved
over time and on a continuing basis
during the course of the relationship. A
casual acquaintance or ordinary
socialization between two individuals in
a business or social context is not a
dating relationship.
||| it seems clear that the law did not use in its provisions the
colloquial verb "romance" that implies a sexual act. It did not say
that the offender must have "romanced" the offended woman.
Rather, it used the noun "romance" to describe a couple's
relationship, i.e., "a love affair." 9
R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that "violence against women . . .
refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person
against a woman . . . with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship." Clearly, the law itself distinguishes a sexual
relationship from a dating relationship. Indeed, Section 3 (e)
above defines "dating relationship" while Section 3 (f) defines
"sexual relations." The latter "refers to a single sexual act which
may or may not result in the bearing of a common child." The
dating relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist
even without a sexual intercourse taking place between those
involved
||| An "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is
a common occurrence. Their taking place does not mean that the
romantic relation between the two should be deemed broken up
during periods of misunderstanding. Explaining what "away-bati"
meant, Irish explained that at times, when she could not reply to
Rustan's messages, he would get angry at her. That was all.
Indeed, she characterized their three-month romantic relation as
continuous.||| (Ang y Pascua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 182835,
[April 20, 2010], 632 PHIL 609-624)
the Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced
based on Rustan's low regard for the alleged moral sensibilities of
today's youth. What is obscene and injurious to an offended
woman can of course only be determined based on the
circumstances of each case. Here, the naked woman on the
picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irish's head and face,
was clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and
offensive one. Surely, any woman like Irish, who is not in the
pornography trade, would be scandalized and pained if she sees
herself in such a picture. What makes it further terrifying is that,
as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat to post it in
the internet for all to see. That must have given her a
nightmare.|||
TUA VS MANGROBANG
[G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014.
FACTS:
 On May 20, 2005, respondent Rossana Honrado-Tua
(respondent) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Imus, Cavite a Verified Petition 2 for herself and in
behalf of her minor children, Joshua Raphael, Jesse
Ruth Lois, and Jezreel Abigail, for the issuance of a
protection order, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9262
or the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children
Act of 2004, against her husband, petitioner Ralph Tua.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0464-05 and
raffled-off to Branch 22. Respondent claimed that she
and her children had suffered from petitioner's abusive
conduct; that petitioner had threatened to cause her
and the children physical harm for the purpose of
controlling her actions or decisions; that she was
actually deprived of custody and access to her minor
children; and, that she was threatened to be deprived of
her and her children's financial support.|||
 On May 23, 2005, the RTC issued a Temporary
Protection Order (TPO)|||)
 Petitioner contended that the issuance of the TPO on
May 23, 2005 is unconstitutional for being violative of
the due process clause of the Constitution.|||
ISSUE: A.) The issue of constitutionality of RA 9262 was raised by
petitioner in his Comment to respondent's Petition with Urgent
Motion to Lift TPO ||)
B. WON there is an invalid delegation of legislative power to the
court and to barangay officials to issue protection orders.
SC RULING:
Page 35 of 36
A. In Garcia v. Drilon, 13 wherein petitioner therein argued that determine that the violent acts against women and their children
Section 15 of RA 9262 is a violation of the due process clause of for the issuance of a TPO have been committed.||)
the Constitution, we struck down the challenge and held:

A protection order is an order issued to

prevent further acts of violence against
women and their children, their family or
household members, and to grant other
necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard
the offended parties from further harm,
minimize any disruption in their daily life
and facilitate the opportunity and ability to
regain control of their life. AEIHaS

The scope of reliefs in protection orders is

broadened to ensure that the victim or
offended party is afforded all the remedies
necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator
to the victim. This serves to safeguard the
victim from greater risk of violence; to
accord the victim and any designated family
or household member safety in the family
residence, and to prevent the perpetrator
from committing acts that jeopardize the
employment and support of the victim. It
also enables the court to award temporary
custody of minor children to protect the
children from violence, to prevent their
abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure |||
their financial support.

The rules require that petitions for

protection order be in writing, signed and
verified by the petitioner thereby
undertaking full responsibility, criminal or
civil, for every allegation therein. Since "time
is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further
violence is to be prevented," the court is
authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after
raffle but before notice and hearing when
the life, limb or property of the victim is in
jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to
believe that the order is necessary to protect
the victim from the immediate and
imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent
such violence, which is about to recur.

B. the issuance of a BPO by the Punong Barangay or, in his

unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders
the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the
woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or
her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is,
thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under
the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances,"
and to "maintain public order in the barangay." |||

Clearly, the court is authorized to issue a TPO on the date of the

filing of the application after ex parte determination that there is
basis for the issuance thereof. Ex parte means that the
respondent need not be notified or be present in the hearing for
the issuance of the TPO. Thus, it is within the court's discretion,
based on the petition and the affidavit attached thereto, to

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