9 CITIBANK VS SABENIANO

FACTS:
Respondent have several deposits and market placements with petitioners. At the same time, respondent
had outstanding loans with petitioner Citibank, incurred at Citibank-Manila. Despite repeated demands by petitioner
Citibank to pay, respondent failed to pay her outstanding loans. Thus, petitioner Citibank used respondent’s deposits
and money market placements to off-set and liquidate her outstanding obligations.
Respondent, however, denied having any outstanding loans with petitioner Citibank. She likewise denied that she
was duly informed of the off-setting or compensation thereof made by petitioner Citibank using her deposits and
money market placements with petitioners. Hence, respondent sought to recover her deposits and money market
placements.
The RTC had rendered judgment declaring the setoff null and void but ordered the respondent to pay her obligation
with the bank.

ISSUE: Whether or not Citibank failed to establish by competent evidence the alleged indebtedness of plaintiff-
appellant.

RULING:
Yes. Without the Declaration of Pledge, petitioner Citibank had no authority to demand the remittance of
respondent’s dollar accounts with Citibank-Geneva and to apply them to her outstanding loans. Even if there was,
respondent denied that it was her signature on the Declaration of Pledge. She claimed that the signature was a
forgery. When a document is assailed on the basis of forgery, the best evidence rule applies.

Basic is the rule of evidence that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence is
admissible other than the original document itself except in the instances mentioned in Section 3, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Mere photocopies of documents are inadmissible pursuant to the best evidence rule.This is
especially true when the issue is that of forgery.

As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and
the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. The best evidence of a forged signature in an instrument is the
instrument itself reflecting the alleged forged signature. As far as the Declaration of Pledge is concerned, petitioners
failed to submit any new evidence or argument that was not already considered by this Court when it rendered its
Decision.

10 ARCEO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: Arceo obtained a loan from private complainant Josefino Cenizal to which petitioner issued a check in
favor of Cenizal. Cenizal did not deposit the check immediately for the reason that Arceo promised that he would
replace the check with cash. Such promise was made verbally seven (7) times. When his patience ran out, Cenizal
brought the check to the bank for encashment but it was dishonored.

Despite the demand to make good the amount of the check, the petitioner still failed to do the same. As a
consequence, Cenizal filed his complaint for estafa and violation of BP 22 against petitioner. The check in question
and the return slip were however lost by Cenizal as a result of a fire that occurred near his residence. Both the trial
court and the CA found the petitioner guilty as charged.

ISSUE: Whether or not the courts erred in convicting him despite the failure of the prosecution to present
the dishonored check during the trial.
RULING:

No. Petitioner’s insistence on the presentation of the check in evidence as a condition sine qua non for
conviction under BP 22 is wrong. Petitioner anchors his argument on Rule 130, Section 3, of the Rules of Court,
otherwise known as the best evidence rule. However, the rule applies only where the content of the document is the
subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is the execution or existence of the document or the circumstances
surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.

The gravamen of the offense is the act of drawing and issuing a worthless check. Hence, the subject of the inquiry is
the fact of issuance or execution of the check, not its content.

Although the check and the return slip were among the documents lost by Cenizal in a fire that occurred near his
residence on September 16, 1992, he was nevertheless able to adequately establish the due execution, existence and
loss of the check and the return slip in an affidavit of loss as well as in his testimony during the trial of the case.

Moreover, petitioner himself admited that he issued the check. He never denied that the check was presented for
payment to the drawee bank and was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds.

11 Villarey transit vs Eusebio Transit

FACTS: Jose M. Villarama sold two certificates of public convenience to PANTRANCO with the condition that the
seller (Villarama) "shall not for a period of 10 years from the date of this sale, apply for any TPU service identical or
competing with the buyer."
three months thereafter Villarey Transit bought five certificates of public convenience from one Valentin
Fernando. However, before the PSC could take final action on said application for approval of sale, the Sheriff of
Manila, on July 7, 1959, levied on two of the five certificates of public convenience involved therein, a public sale
was conducted where Eusebio Ferrer was the highest bidder, and a certificate of sale was issued in his name.
Thereafter, Ferrer sold the two certificates of public convenience to Pantranco, and jointly submitted for approval
their corresponding contract of sale to the PSC. Pantranco therein prayed that it be authorized provisionally to
operate the service involved in the said two certificates.
On November 4, 1959, the Corporation filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila, a complaint for the annulment
of the sheriff's sale of the aforesaid two certificates of public convenience (PSC Cases Nos. 59494 and 63780) in
favor of the defendant Ferrer, and the subsequent sale thereof by the latter to Pantranco, against Ferrer, Pantranco
and the PSC. The plaintiff Corporation prayed therein that all the orders of the PSC relative to the parties' dispute
over the said certificates be annulled.
Pantranco, on its part, filed a third-party complaint against Jose M. Villarama, alleging that Villarama and
the Corporation, are one and the same; that Villarama and/or the Corporation was disqualified from operating the
two certificates in question by virtue of the aforementioned agreement between said Villarama and Pantranco, which
stipulated that Villarama "shall not for a period of 10 years from the date of this sale, apply for any TPU service
identical or competing with the buyer."
ISSUE: Whether the stipulation between Villarama and Pantranco binds Villa Ret Transit.

HELD:
Yes. The evidence has disclosed that Villarama, albeit was not an incorporator or stockholder of the
Corporation, alleging that he did not become such, because he did not have sufficient funds to invest, his wife,
however, was an incorporator with the least subscribed number of shares, and was elected treasurer of the
Corporation.
The evidence further shows that the initial cash capitalization of the corporation of P105,000.00 was mostly
financed by Villarama.
The testimonies of Alfonso Sancho and Joaquin Amansec, both employees of said bank, have proved that
the drawer of the check was Jose Villarama himself.
Further, the evidence shows that when the Corporation was in its initial months of operation, Villarama purchased
and paid with his personal checks Ford trucks for the Corporation. Exhibits 20 and 21 disclose that the said
purchases were paid by Philippine Bank of Commerce Checks Nos. 992618-B and 993621-B, respectively. Exhibits
6 to 19 and Exh. 22, which are photostatic copies of ledger entries and vouchers showing that Villarama had co-
mingled his personal funds and transactions with those made in the name of the Corporation, are very illuminating
evidence. Villarama has assailed the admissibility of these exhibits, contending that no evidentiary value whatsoever
should be given to them since "they were merely photostatic copies of the originals, the best evidence being the
originals themselves." According to him, at the time Pantranco offered the said exhibits, it was the most likely
possessor of the originals thereof because they were stolen from the files of the Corporation and only Pantranco was
able to produce the alleged photostat copies thereof.
Section 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides for the requisites for the admissibility of secondary evidence
when the original is in the custody of the adverse party, thus: (1) opponent's possession of the original; (2)
reasonable notice to opponent to produce the original; (3) satisfactory proof of its existence; and (4) failure or
refusal of opponent to produce the original in court. Villarama has practically admitted the second and fourth
requisites. As to the third, he admitted their previous existence in the files of the Corporation and also that he had
seen some of them. Regarding the first element, Villarama's theory is that since even at the time of the issuance of
the subpoena ducestecum, the originals were already missing, therefore, the Corporation was no longer in possession
of the same. However, it is not necessary for a party seeking to introduce secondary evidence to show that the
original is in the actual possession of his adversary. It is enough that the circumstances are such as to indicate that
the writing is in his possession or under his control. Neither is it required that the party entitled to the custody of the
instrument should, on being notified to produce it, admit having it in his possession. Hence, secondary evidence is
admissible where he denies having it in his possession. The party calling for such evidence may introduce a copy
thereof as in the case of loss. For, among the exceptions to the best evidence rule is "when the original has been lost,
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court." The originals of the vouchers in question must be deemed to have been
lost, as even the Corporation admits such loss. Viewed upon this light, there can be no doubt as to the admissibility
in evidence of Exhibits 6 to 19 and 22.
Taking account of the foregoing evidence, together with Celso Rivera's testimony, it would appear that: Villarama
supplied the organization expenses and the assets of the Corporation, such as trucks and equipment; there was no
actual payment by the original subscribers of the amounts of P95,000.00 and P100,000.00 as appearing in the
books; Villarama made use of the money of the Corporation and deposited them to his private accounts; and the
Corporation paid his personal accounts.
The foregoing circumstances are strong persuasive evidence showing that Villarama has been too much involved in
the affairs of the Corporation to altogether negative the claim that he was only a part-time general manager. They
show beyond doubt that the Corporation is his alter ego.

12 ENRIQUEZ VS RAMOS
FACTS:
 On 24 November 1958, Rodrigo Enriquez and the spouses Urbano Dizon and Aurea Soriano de Dizon sold
to Socorro A. Ramos eleven (11) parcels of land covered by their corresponding certificates of title. To secure the
said balance on the agreed term of payment, the vendee Socorro A. Ramos, in the same deed of sale, mortgaged the
eleven parcels in favor of the vendors.
Because of the vendee-mortgagor's failure to comply with some conditions of the mortgage, this action for
foreclosure of the mortgage was filed by the vendors-mortgagees. After trial, on 16 December 1959, the Court of
First Instance of Quezon City rendered judgment against defendant Ramos; ordered her to pay P96,000.00, with
12% interest from 24 February 1959 until payment, 10% of the amount due as attorney's fees, and the costs of the
suit; and further decreed the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged properties in case of non-payment within ninety (90)
days.
Socorro Ramos appealed directly to this Court, and here insists that the action should be dismissed on account of the
alleged splitting of appellee's cause of action, and that the obligation not having fixed a period, although one was
intended, the court below should have set first a date of maturity before ordering payment or foreclosure.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was no date of maturity before ordering payment or foreclosure.

HELD:
The stipulation in the mortgage contract that the obligation for P96,000.00 was to be —without interest,
payable within ninety (90) days from this date, provided that in case of default it shall bear interest at the rate of
12% per annum,clearly fixes a date of maturity, the stipulated twelve per cent in case of default being nothing more
than a penalty, designed to induce the debtor to pay on or before the expiration of the ninety (90) days. Hence, there
was no call upon the court to set another due date.

13 Lechugas vs. CA

FACTS: Petitioner filed an unlawful entry case against private respondent “the Loza’s”. Another case was filed for
recovery and possession of the same property and both cases was tried jointly. Petitioner testified that she bought the
land from Lasangue in 1950. Private respondent contended that the same land in question was bought by their father
from the father of petitioner in 1941. Plaintiff’s vendor testified for the defendant stating that she sold the south part
of the land which is lot 5522 not lot 5456 which plaintiff claims

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court of appeals erred in considering, parol evidence over the objection of petitioner.

HELD:
The appellate court is correct in upholding the trial court’s action in admitting the testimony of Leoncia.
Petitioner alleges that lot 5522 was sold to her by Leonora, not Leoncia, who was never presented as witness in any
proceeding in the lower cour.
the parol evidence rule does not apply and may not properly be involved by either party to litigation against
the other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to a written instrument in the
question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation
established thereby. As stated Parol evidence rule cannot be invoked where at least one party to the suit is not a
party or privy to the written instrument in question. As explained by a leading commentator on our Rules of Court,
the parol evidence rule does not apply, and may not properly be invoked by either party to the litigation against the
other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of. The rule is not applicable where the
controversy is between one of the parties to the document and third persons. Through the testimony of Leoncia, it
was shown that what she really intended to sell is lot 5522 but not being able to read and write and fully relying on
the good faith of her cousin, petitioner, she just placed her thumb mark on a piece of paper.
 14 PEOPLE VS DE LEON
FACTS:
August 23, 1992. Eleuterio de Leon killed Marcelino Santiago. He was thereafter arrested on 13 April
1993. Then he filed a motion to fix bail. Upon their separate arraignments, the accused entered a plea of not guilty.
Thereafter, the court conducted hearings on the motion to fix bail with the express agreement between the parties
that the evidence to be presented at such hearings would be considered as evidence on the merits of the case.
The prosecution presented three witnesses: the two eyewitnesses, namely, Simon Mariano, a farmer from Angat,
Bulacan, and Ramon Chavez, an employee of Robal Transit; and SPO2 Alfredo Bartolome. The substance of their
testimony was that at approximately 9:30 a.m. of 23 August 1992 in the vicinity of the Robal Transit Terminal in
Angat, Bulacan, they saw the accused gun down Marcelino Santiago, one of the managers of Robal Transit, while
the latter was driving his jeep. Mariano was walking in the opposite direction that the jeep was headed, while
Chavez was following the vehicle of the victim as the former wanted to tell the latter something.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and
collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony?

HELD: NO. The Petition is dimissed. Inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses with respect to
minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of
their testimony. In fact, these inconsistencies, if only in minor details, reinforce rather than weaken their credibility,
for it is usual that witnesses to a stirring event would see differently some details of a startling occurrence. Rather
than discredit the testimony of the witnesses, such discrepancies serve to add credence and veracity to their
categorical, straightforward, and spontaneous testimony.

15 PEOPLE VS MEJIA
FACTS:
10 March 1994 along the expressway at Barangay Ventinilla, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, several persons on
board a passenger jeepney driven by Teofilo Landingin attacked the latter and a passenger, Virgilio Catugas, thereby
inflicting upon them multiple stab wounds. Landingin was pulled out from his seat and dumped on the shoulder of
the road. One of the attackers took the wheel of the jeepney and drove away. Catugas was thrown out to the middle
of the road when the jeepney started to move away. Landingin died as a consequence of the injuries he sustained.
Catugas survived.
The accused were Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Pedro Paraan, Joseph Fabito, Romulo Calimquim, one alias
Dennis, Alex Mamaril, one alias Mondragon, and another unidentified person. Mejia and Benito were taken into
police custody a few hours after the incident; Paraan, the following day; and Fabito, five days after. Calimquim was
found dead three days after the incident in question, while the others have remained at large. Three separate criminal
complaints for murder, frustrated murder, and violation of R.A. No. 6539 (Anti Carnapping Act of 1992, as
amended) were filed against them with the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan.
Despite service on them of subpoenas requiring submission of counter-affidavits, accused Mejia, Benito, Paraan,
and Fabito did not submit their counter-affidavits.
Judge Lilia C. Espanol issued an order declaring the accused to have waived their right to be heard in
preliminary investigation; finding a prima facie case against the accused; recommending that they be charged with
and prosecuted for the crimes of murder, frustrated murder, and violation of R.A. No. 6539, as amended; and
ordering that the records of the cases be forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.

After appropriate proceedings, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Dagupan City three separate informations for murder, frustrated murder, and violation of the Anti-
Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, against the aforenamed persons.
ISSUE: Whether or not the consolidation of which was separately tried in different courts under the Rules of
Evidence be resolved on the basis of the evidence presented before such courts?
HELD: . The crimes charged in the informations filed before the LARON court and CASTILLO court are
irretrievably linked with or related to one another. They arose out of the same incident, are founded on the same
factual milieu, and would be proved by testimonies of the same witnesses. The three cases then should have been
consolidated and jointly tried in one branch of the RTC of Dagupan City. What were jointly tried were only the cases
for murder and frustrated murder. Section 14 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 14. Consolidation of trials of related offenses. Charges for offenses founded on the same facts or forming part
of a series of offenses of similar character may be tried jointly at the courts discretion.
The purpose or object of consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression or abuse, prevent
delay, clear congested dockets, simplify the work of the trial court, and save unnecessary cost or expense; in short,
the attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties litigants. i[48] In Raymundo v. Elipe,ii[49]
we held that although consolidation of several cases involving the same parties and the same subject matter is one
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, joint hearing becomes a matter of duty if two or more cases are
tried before the same judge, or even filed with the different branches of the same court, provided one of such cases
has not been partially tried.
We are unable to understand why neither the LARON court or the CASTILLO court nor any of the parties caused,
or moved for, a consolidation of the case for violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act (which has the higher docket
number) with the cases for murder and frustrated murder in the LARON court (which have lower docket numbers).
It was only after the filing of their separate Appellants Brief in G.R. Nos. 118940-41 and in G.R. No. 119407 that the
appellants moved to consolidate the latter with the former.
This failure to consolidate the three cases at the trial court level could contribute some difficulty in the appreciation
of the evidence. The principal witnesses of the parties testified in all the three cases. Yet, the assessment of their
testimony and credibility in the LARON court must not be influenced by their testimonies in the case before the
CASTILLO court, and vice versa. In the LARON court, prosecution witness Catugas was unclear in some details of
the incident, but clear in the CASTILLO court. Upon the other hand, there were details he disclosed in one of the
courts which were not given in the other court. The same observation may be had on the testimonies of the
appellants before both courts. As one reads the transcripts of the testimonies of these witnesses in both cases, it
would be quite difficult to avoid forming impressions in light of the totality of their testimonies in both courts. Our
minds and mental processes must be kept away from the pitfalls of such impressions, for the rules on evidence and
the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the appellants dictate that we resolve the appeals in the cases
before the LARON court and the case before the CASTILLO court solely on the basis of the evidence presented
before such courts, respectively.
As to the alleged participation of the appellants in the commission of the crimes, the prosecution had to rely solely
on the testimony of VirgilioCatugas. The totality of his testimony in the cases before the LARON court leaves much
to be desired. The prosecutor who conducted the direct examination was unable to propound sensible questions to
elicit clear answers bound to reconstruct faithfully the events surrounding the commission of the alleged crimes.
This deficiency thus tempted the trial judge to ask more questions. Despite the latters participation, the testimony of
Catugas fails to convince us that the appellants indeed participated in the commission of the crimes. On cross-
examination in the LARON court, Catugas categorically admitted that he did not know the names of the appellants
and that he could recognize only three of the nine accused.
The LARON court gave credence to the version of the prosecution and even took the incident as offer of
compromise, which may be considered an implied admission of guilt. Said court misapplied Section 27 of Rule 130
of the Rules of Court.iii[74] There is no evidence whatsoever that any of the appellants authorized his parents to
approach Catugas or knew the matter of payment of P80,000. Moreover, if one were to believe the explanation of
Catugas that the amount of P80,000 represented the expenses he incurred for his hospitalization and medical bills,
then the offer to reimburse it is not admissible in evidence as proof of criminal liability pursuant to the last
paragraph of Section 27 of Rule 130.
On the whole then we entertain, unavoidably, serious doubt on the participation of the appellants in the commission
of the crimes charged.
16 GERALDEZ VS CA

FACTS: Petitioner booked the Volare 3 tour with Kenstar. The tour covered a 22-day tour of Europe for $2,990.00
which she paid the total equivalent amount of P190,000.00 charged by private respondent for her and her sister,
Dolores. At the tour, petitioner claimed that what was alleged in the brochure was not what they experienced. There
was no European tour manager as stated in the brochure, the hotels where they stayed in which were advertised as
first class were not, the UGC leather factory which was specifically included as a highlight of the tour was not
visited and The Filipino tour guide provided by Kenstar was a first timer thus inexperienced. The Quezon City RTC
rendered a decision ordering respondent Kenstar to pay moral, nominal, and exemplary damages totalling
P1,000,000 and P50,000 attorney’s fees. However the Court of Appeals deleted the award of moral and exemplary
damages and reduces the nominal damages and attorney’s fees.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the private respondent explained the concept of a European Tour Manager to its clients at
the pre-departure briefing.
2. Whether or not the tour was satisfactory given the fact that only one of its clients complained.

HELD:

1. private respondent further contends that it explained the concept of a European tour manager
to its clients at the pre-departure briefing, which petitioner did not attend. Significantly,
however, private respondent failed to present even one member of the tour group to
substantiate its claim. It is a basic rule of evidence that a party must prove his own affirmative
allegations. Besides, if it was really its intention to provide a juridical European tour manager, it
could not have kept on promising its tourists during the tour that a European tour manager
would come, supposedly to join and assist them.
2. Private respondent submits likewise that the tour was satisfactory, considering that only
petitioner, out of eighteen participants in the Volare 3 Tour Program, actually complained.
We cannot accept this argument. Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court declares that the
rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, a
statutory adaptation of the first branch of the hornbook rule of res inter aliosacta.

17 TERESITA VS CA
FACTS:
A lot located in Mandaue City was originally owned by the late Carmeno Jayme andMargarita de Jayme. In
1947, an extra-judicial partition was executed. Distributed as follows:
1. 1/3 in favor of - (a) their grandchild Nicanor Jayme, the deceased spouse of privaterespondent Candida Flores and
the father of private respondents Emmanuel, Dina, Eveliaand Gesila, all surnamed Jayme; and (b) their grandchild
Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, whoseheirs are private respondents Angelo Baclay, Elnora Baclay and Carmen Jayme-
Daclan;
2. 1/3 to their daughter Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, mother of petitioner Teresita P.Bordalba; and
3. 1/3 to an unidentified party.
Nicanor's house stands on the land adjudicated to the heirs. Sometime in 1964, petitioner's mother, filed with the
RTC an amended application for the registration of the lot. Nicanorand Asuncion filed their opposition contending
that said application included the 1/3portion inherited by them in the extra-judicial partition. The case was
dismissed.
Subsequently, petitioner filed with the Bureau of Lands an application for a free patent. Petitioner was successfully
granted a free patent. Thereafter, petitioner subdivided the lot into 6.
The private respondents filed with the RTC, the instant complaint against thepetitioner and the director of the
Bureau of Lands. The trial court, finding that fraud was employed by the petitioner, declared said patent and title
void and ordered its cancellation. However, it declaredthat spouses Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala as well as
the Rural Bank of Mandaue as purchasers and mortgagee in good faith, respectively; and consequently upheld as
validthe sale of the lot. Both petitioner and private respondents appealed to the CA whichaffirmed with modification
the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lot in question is the lot adjudicated to the parties in the extra-judicial partition.
HELD:
The boundaries of the lot referred to in the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition can be explained by the
fact that the disputed lot is only a portion of the entire parcel of land described in the Deed. At any rate, the records
show that the parcel of land adjudicated to the predecessors-in-interest of the parties herein was the lot found on the
corner of Plaridel and Mabini Streets in Looc, Mandaue City.
As admitted further by both parties, Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was part of the land allotted to their predecessors-in-
interest in the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition. Moreover, petitioners mother acknowledged in her application
for registration of Lot No. 1242 that the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition was the source of her claim over the lot
sought to be registered. She further admitted that the lot now known as Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was part of the parcel
of land inherited by her and her co-heirs, to the extent of 1/3 share each.
Under Section 31, Rule 130, of the Revised Rules on Evidence, where one derives title to property from another, the
act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the
former.
It is true that the private respondents were not able to show the extent of their 1/3 right over the property.
However they have nevertheless established their claim over the lot.

The court recognizes the 1/3 share of the respondents and remands such case to the lower court to
determine what part of the lot is included in the deed of extrajudicial partition.

18PEOPLE VS BIENVENIDO PARAGSA

FACTS: Mirasol Magallanes a 12 yr old was rape by Bienvenido Paragsa at their house. When Bienvenido was
arrested he admitted having sexual intercourse with the victim and alledge that they have done this for the reason
that they were sweethearts. that on the day of the incident, it was Mirasol who invited him to the latter's house where
they had sexual intercourse after kissing each other; and that the intercourse they had that afternoon was, as a matter
of fact, their third sexual intercourse.
Mirasol did not bother at all to rebut the testimony of the appellant and his witnesses to the effect that the accused
and Mirasol were actually sweethearts; and that they had had two previous sexual communications before July 13,
1971, one of which happened on June 29, 1971 in the house of the accused, where Mirasol and the accused slept
together in the evening of the same day after the mother of the accused and Mirasol had returned from the town
fiesta of Bantayan

ISSUE: Whether the failure of Mirasol to rebut constituted as an admission by silence.

HELD:
 The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the truth of the statements
uttered in his presence is applicable in criminal cases. But before the silence of a party can be taken as an admission
of what is said, it must appear:
(1) that he heard and understood the statement;
(2) that he was at liberty to interpose a denial;
(3) that the statement was in respect to some matter affecting his rights or in which he was then interested, and
calling, naturally, for an answer;
(4) that the facts were within his knowledge; and
(5) that the fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his silence would be material to the issue.
These requisites of admission by silence all obtain in the present case. Hence, the silence of Mirasol on the facts
asserted by the accused and his witnesses may be safely construed as an admission of the truth of such assertion.
24 People vs. Silvestre
FACTS:
Jose Silvestre was convicted before the court of Malabon for the crime of murder. On appeal the accused-
appellant argues that the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the
lone testimony of Felicitas Torres. According to the accused-appellant, Torres testified that she did not actually
witness the accused shooting the victim because she merely heard two shots fired and sought cover for a short while,
and hence it was doubtful whether she saw the man with a gun shooting at the fallen man two more times. As it was
a startling or frightful experience for a woman, it was not probable that she was brave enough to witness the
shooting which was merely five arm's length away from her; and that the prosecution witness merely speculated on
the identity of the perpetrator from what she heard "binaril na ni Jojo si Palencia." Moreover, accused-appellant
claims that there was an inconsistency between the sworn statement of Torres and her testimony in Court. In her
sworn statement, she had stated that ". . . nakita ko ang isang lalaki na natumba at isa pang lalaki na nakatayo sa
harapan noong natumba . . ." while in her direct testimony, she testified that: ". . . I saw a man slumped head face
down . . . besides that man slumped on the ground a man with a gun". 15 He also avers that the identification made
by Torres was not positive and was a "suggested identification" since no police line-up was conducted when she was
identified him at the police station. In addition, appellant argues that the lower court erred in treating the statement
of Bernadette Matias as hearsay despite the fact that the prosecution admitted the existence and contents of her
statement. He claims that he vigorously tried to secure subpoenas ad testificandum for the witnesses, Bernadette
Matias and SPO1 Crizaldo Castillo but the trial court opted instead to have the parties stipulate on their testimonies.
It is alleged that the trial court's insistence that the parties stipulate on Matias' declaration led him to believe that it
was not necessary to present her to testify under oath as the contents thereof were already admitted.
ISSUE: 1.) Whether or not Felicita Torres was a credible witness

2.) Whether or not Felicita statement should not be admitted because it was inconsistent

3.) Whether or not the court is correct in treating Bernadette Matias testimony as a hearsay

HELD:
1.) Yes. Felicitas Torres categorically stated that she saw the accused Jose Silvestre whom she identified in
Court, shoot at the fallen man two times after hearing two gunshots. While she did not see the accused-
appellant actually fire the first two shots, she turned her head upon hearing the two gunshots and saw a man
slumped on the ground and a man with a gun beside him. After seeking cover for a short while, she saw the
man with the gun shoot the fallen man two more times moments after the first two shots were fired.
This leads to no other logical conclusions than that the accused-appellant was the one who fired
them.

2.) Yes. With regard to appellant's argument that there was an inconsistency between Torres' sworn statement
and her testimony in court, we agree with appellee that the alleged inconsistency pertains to a trivial matter.
 While she stated in her sworn statement that the accused was in front of ("sa harapan") the victim she
thereafter testified that the gunman was "beside" the victim. This statement refers only to how the accused
stood in relation to the victim and is not sufficient to weaken her positive assertion that she saw the accused
shoot the victim two times after hearing two shots previously fired. This Court has repeatedly ruled that
inconsistencies between the sworn statements and direct testimony given in open court do not necessarily
discredit the witness since affidavits are oftentimes incomplete and are generally inferior to the testimony
of the witness in open court. In addition, the appellant has failed to show any improper motive on the part
of Torres to falsely impute such a terrible crime to him. Torres did not know either the appellant or the
victim prior to the shooting on January 18, 1996. The testimony of a single witness, when credible and
trustworthy, is sufficient to convict and must be given full faith and credence when no reason to falsely
testify is shown.
3.) Yes. The lower court was therefore correct in admitting only the existence and contents and not the truth or
veracity of the unsworn statement of Matias as an "independently relevant statement". This statement
cannot be used to establish the veracity of it; it would hearsay as Matias was not presented in Court.
Appellant cannot fault the prosecution for the failure to present Bernadette Matias. The prosecution has
discretion to decide on who to call as witness during trial and its failure to do so did not give rise to the
presumption that "evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced" since the evidence was at
the disposal of both parties. If the defense believed that the testimony of Bernadette Matias was important
to its case, it should have insisted on presenting her as a witness, or as the appellee points out, made a
tender of excluded evidence of the witness in question under Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The same may be said of Joanna Santiago, another supposed witness to the shooting, who was also not
presented during trial.

25 People vs. Cusi

FACTS: In Criminal Case No. 6813 of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Arcadio Puesca, Walter Apa, Jose
Gustilo, Filomeno Macalinao, Ricardo Dairo, and Magno Montano were charged with robbery in band with
homicide, to which they pleaded not guilty. During the trial, and while Sgt. Lucio Bano of the Police Force of Digos,
Davao was testifying as a prosecution witness regarding the extrajudicial confession made to him by the accused
Arcadio Puesca, he said that the latter, aside from admitting his participation in the commission of the offense
charged, revealed that other persons conspired with him to to commit the offense, mentioning the name of each and
everyone of them.
Following up this testimony, the prosecuting officer asked the witness to mention in court the names of Puesca's
alleged co-conspirators. Counsel for the accused Macalinao, Gustilo and Dairo objected to this, upon the ground that
whatever the witness would say would be hearsay as far as his clients were concerned. The respondent judge
resolved the objection directing the witness to answer the question but without mentioning or giving the names of
the accused who had interposed the objection. In other words, the witness was allowed to answer the question and
name his co-conspirators except those who had raised the objection. The prosecuting officer's motion for
reconsideration of this ruling was denied. Hence the present petition for certiorari praying that the abovementioned
ruling of the respondent judge be declared erroneous and for a further order directing said respondent judge to allow
witness Bano to answer the question in full.

ISSUE:Whether or not the respondent judge is correct in the case at bar.

HELD: No. The question involved herein is purely one of evidence. There is no question that hearsay evidence, if
timely objected to, may not be admitted. But while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another
person, if intended to establish the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is
otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was
made or the tenor of such statement (People vs. Lew Yon, 97 Cal. 224; VI Wigmore 177-8).
In the present case, the purpose of the prosecuting officer, as manifested by him in the discussions below, is nothing
more than to establish the fact that the accused Puesca had mentioned to Sgt. Bano the names of those who
conspired with him to commit the offense charged, without claiming that Puesca's statement or the answer to be
given by Sgt. Bano would be competent and admissible evidence to show that the persons so named really conspired
with Puesca. For this limited purpose, we believe that the question propounded to the witness was proper and the
latter should have been allowed to answer it in full, with the understanding, however, that his answer shall not to be
taken as competent evidence to show that the persons named really and actually conspired with Puesca and later
took part in the commission of the offense.
On the other hand, the fact which the prosecuting officer intended to establish would seem to be relevant to explain
why the police force of the place where the offense was committed subsequently questioned and investigated the
persons allegedly named by Puesca.
26 Comilang vs. Burcena

FACTS: Spouses Burcena together with their mother, Dominga filed a complaint for annulment of document w/
damages against Salvador Comilang.
The complaint alleges that respondents are the owners of a parcel of land located in Ilocos Sur and the
house built thereon. respondents acquired the subject property through their earnings while working abroad; the
subject property was declared for taxation purposes in Dominga's name as administrator thereof. Petitioner caused
the execution of a Deed of Donation over said property by taking advantage of Dominga's blindness, old age and
physical infirmity; the said Deed of Donation is null and void because: (a) Dominga had no right to donate the same
since she is not its owner, (b) Dominga did not give her consent and was misled to the execution of such document,
(c) granting Dominga had authority to donate, the donation is void because the property donated is the only property
declared in her name and therefore she could not have reserved for herself in full ownership sufficient property to
support herself; petitioner is in possession of the subject property, depriving respondents of its ownership and
enjoyment of its fruits.
In his Answer, petitioner contends that, the Deed of Donation was freely and voluntarily executed by
Dominga in consideration of her love and affection for him. The subject property was acquired by Dominga together
with her 2 sisters, Aniceta and Juana Reclusado, long before respondents went to Hawaii, Dominga erected a house
on the land long before the outbreak of World War II. Dominga financed out of her own money the construction of
the house and subsequent improvements thereof, she being a merchant when she could still travel to Cagayan Valley.
Granting that respondents had been sending money to Dominga, said money already belonged to her, if Dominga
used said money for improving the house, respondents have no right over the house.
During the pendency of the case and before she could take the witness stand, Dominga died. Following
pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. Witnesses for the plaintiffs were respondents and their aunt, Margarita Burcena
(Margarita); while petitioner testified on his own behalf.
RTC held that the donation is void because Dominga could not have validly disposed of the subject
property since it was bought with the money sent by respondents while working abroad, although declared for
taxation purposes in Dominga's name.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed an appeal with the CA. The CA found no cogent reason to disturb the factual
findings of the RTC, as well as the latter's assessment of the credibility of witnesses. The CA held that the case
involves an implied trust known as purchase price resulting trust under Article 1448, CC where property sold is
granted to one party but the price is paid for by another; that the evidence presented by the respondents convincingly
show that the subject property was bought with money belonging to respondents but declared in Dominga's name as
administrator thereof; and that Dominga's act of donating the property to petitioner was beyond her authority and
capacity, done without the consent of the real owners, herein respondents. Thus, the CA sustained the conclusion of
the RTC that the donation is void.

Petitioner's Motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not Margarita's statement on the witness stand should not have been given weight or credence
by the RTC and the CA because it is hearsay and has no probative value.
HELD: While it is true that the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to
establish the truth of the fact asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of
placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such
statement. Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when the fact that it has been made is relevant, the
hearsay rule does not apply and the statement may be shown. As a matter of fact, evidence as to the making of the
statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be circumstantially
relevant as to the existence of such a fact.
What was sought to be admitted in evidence, and what was actually admitted in evidence, was the fact that the
statement was made by Dominga to Margarita, not necessarily that the matters stated by her were true. The
statement attributed to Dominga regarding the source of the funds used to purchase the subject property related to
the court by Margarita is admissible if only to establish the fact that such statement was made and the tenor thereof.
Besides, the testimony of Margarita is not the main basis for the RTC decision. In fact, her testimony is not
indispensable. It merely serves to corroborate the testimonies of the respondents on the source of the funds used in
purchasing the subject property. The testimonies of all three witnesses for the plaintiffs were found to be convincing
and credible by the RTC. This Court will not alter the findings of the RTC on the credibility of witnesses, principally
because trial courts have vastly superior advantages in ascertaining the truth and in detecting falsehood as they have
the opportunity to observe the manner and demeanor of witnesses while testifying.

27 People vs. Alicando

251 SCRA 293

Facts: Accused was convicted with a crime of rape with homicide of a 4 year old girl. He was arrested and during
the interrogation he made a confession of the crime without the assistance of a counsel. By virtue of his un-
counselled confession the police came to know where to find the evidences consisting of the victim’s personal things
like clothes stained with blood which was admitted to court as evidences. The victim pleaded guilty during the
arraignment and was convicted with the death penalty. The case was forwarded to the SC for automatic review.

Issue: Whether or not due process during the custodial investigation was accorded to the accused.

Held: Due process was not observed in the conduct of custodial investigation for the accused. He was not informed
of his right to a counsel upon making his extrajudicial confession and the information against him was written in a
language he could not understand and was not explained to him. This is in violation of section 1(a) of Rule 116, the
rule implementing the constitutional right of the appellant to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. The lower court also violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant
without conducting a search inquiry on the voluntariness and full understanding of the accused of the consequences
of his plea. Moreover the evidences admitted by the court that warranted his convicted were inadmissible because
they were due to an invalid custodial investigation that did not provide the accused with due process of the law. Thus
the SC annulled the decision of the imposition of the death penalty and remanded the case back to the lower for
further proceeding.
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