TORTS CASES 67-87

67) Adarne vs Aldaba.A.C. No. 801. June 27, 1978.83 SCRA 734

Facts: Complainant Cesario Adarne were the defendants in an action for forcible entry filed by plaintiffs
Spouses Cumpion in the Justice of the Peace of Alangalang, Leyte. He was first represented by Atty. Isauro
Marmita (first lawyer) who raised the issue of ownership of the land in question. It was dismissed but upon
appeal to Court of First Instance (CFI) Leyte, it was remanded to the lower court. It was again dismised.

Again, plaintiffs appealed to CFI Leyte. This time, complainant was represented by Atty. Mirales and
Casimpan (2nd and 3rd lawyer). At the hearing of the case on Aug 7, 1961, the said lawyers were absent so he
asked her third degree cousin, Atty. Damian Aldaba to make a SPECIAL APPEARANCE and moved for
postponement of trial and dismissal of case (the plaintiffs lawyers were also absent). Both motions were
granted.

Plaintiffs appealed to CA where the said court remanded the case to CFI Leyte. Again, complainant
asked Atty. Aldaba to enter a “special appearance”. They asked if they could be allowed to file action for
quieting of title. However, during the hearing in June 17, 1965, complainant failed to appear and plaintiffs
presented evidence. CFI Leyte rendered decision in favor of the plaintiffs.

Aggrieved, complainant filed disbarment complaint against Atty. Aldaba for being negligent as
cousel which led him to lose in the civil case. Atty. Aldaba denied they have an agreement with complainant
to handle the case except for “special appearance”.

Issue: Should Atty. Aldaba be disbarred?

Ruling: No. An attorney is not bound to exercise extraordinary diligence, but only a reasonable degree of
care and skill having reference to the character of the business he undertakes to do. Prone to err like any
other human being, he is not answerable for every error or mistake, and will be protected as long as he acts
honestly and in good faith to the best of his skill and knowledge.

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant and for the Court to
exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent attorney must be established by convincing
proof. The Supreme Court ruled that the judgment by default rendered against complainant cannot be
attributed to respondent attorney as the blamed lies with the former for having engaged the services of
several lawyers to handle his case without formally withdrawing the authority he had given them to appear in
his behalf as to place the responsibility upon the Respondent. Finding no convincing proof to warrant the
disbarment of respondent attorney, the administrative complaint filed against him was dismissed.

68) Garcia-Rueda vs Pascasio.G.R. No. 118141. September 5, 1997. 278 SCRA 769

Facts:Florencio V. Rueda, husband of petitioner Leonila Garcia-Rueda, died while undergoing surgical
operation for removal of stone in UST hospital. NBI autopsy confirmed that her death was caused by lack of
care by attending physician in administering anaesthesia.Pursuant to its findings, the NBI recommended that
Dr. Domingo Antonio and Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes be charged for Homicide through Reckless
Imprudence before the Office of the City Prosecutor. Of Manila.

However, during the preliminary investigation, almost all the prosecutors refused to handle the case
due to relationships with the docors, partiality among others. Some of the doctors were exonerated including
Dr. Reyes. Eventualy, the case was dismissed.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed graft charges specifically for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 301 against Prosecutors Guerrero, Macaraeg, and Arizala for manifest partiality in favor of Dr. Reyes
before the Office of the Ombudsman. However, on July 11, 1994, the Ombudsman issued the assailed
resolution dismissing the complaint for lack of evidence.

Issue: Is there a medical negligence in this case?

Held: Yes. Though the Supreme Court affirmed the Ombudsman ruling, it held that petitioner could still
appeal dismissal with the Secretary of Justice.

As for the issue of medical negligence, no less than the NBI pronounced after conducting an autopsy
that there was indeed negligence on the part of the attending physicians in administering the anaesthesia. The
fact of want of competence or diligence is evidentiary in nature, the veracity of which can best be passed
upon after a full-blown trial for it is virtually impossible to ascertain the merits of a medical negligence case
without extensive investigation, research, evaluation and consultations with medical experts. Clearly, the
City Prosecutors are not in a competent position to pass judgment on such a technical matter, especially
when there are conflicting evidence and findings. The bases of a partys accusation and defenses are better
ventilated at the trial proper than at the preliminary investigation.

A word on medical malpractice or negligence cases. In its simplest terms, the type of lawsuit which
has been called medical malpractice or, more appropriately, medical negligence, is that type of claim which a
victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medical professional which has caused
bodily harm.
In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that a health care provider, in most
cases a physician, either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have
done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that that
failure or action caused injury to the patient. Hence, there are four elements involved in medical negligence
cases: duty, breach, injury and proximate causation.
Evidently, when the victim employed the services of Dr. Antonio and Dr. Reyes, a physician-patient
relationship was created. In accepting the case, Dr. Antonio and Dr. Reyes in effect represented that, having
the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field, they will
employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of their patients. They have a duty to use at least the
same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same
circumstances. The breach of these professional duties of skill and care, or their improper performance, by a
physician surgeon whereby the patient is injured in body or in health, constitutes actionable
malpractice. Consequently, in the event that any injury results to the patient from want of due care or skill
during the operation, the surgeons may be held answerable in damages for negligence.
Moreover, in malpractice or negligence cases involving the administration of anaesthesia, the
necessity of expert testimony and the availability of the charge of res ipsa loquitur to the plaintiff, have been
applied in actions against anaesthesiologists to hold the defendant liable for the death or injury of a patient
under excessive or improper anaesthesia.Essentially, it requires two-pronged evidence: evidence as to the
recognized standards of the medical community in the particular kind of case, and a showing that the
physician in question negligently departed from this standard in his treatment.

69) Bernales vs Northwest Airlines.G.R. No. 182395, October 05, 2015(BAD FAITH)

Facts: Petitioner Bernales is a lawyer and board member of Sanggunian Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur.
Together with prominent personalities from Bicol, they went to Hawaii as delegates of trade and tourism
mission for the province riding as passengers for Northwest Airlines(NWA) flight from Manila to Honolulu
via Narita, Japan.

They arrived at Narita airport in Japan but their flight was cancelled due to a typhoon. Due to NWA
policy, affected passengers are accommodated with priority for next flight if seats are available. Delegates
waited to be wait-listed. They were given “dummy” boarding passes.

According to petitioner, when they are about to board, NWA Service Agent Ohashi entered shuttle
bus and informed him he could not take flight as there were no more seats left to him as there are other
priority passengers. He shouted at him saying “Get Out!”. This was refuted by NWA stating that Ohashi was
polite and it was petitioner who was rude. They arrived at Hawaii but they missed the courtesy class for the
governor of Hawaii.

Bernales then filed complaint for moral and exemplary damges against NWA for breach of contract
of carriage. RTC ruled for petitioner. On appeal to CA, it was reversed.
Issue: Is Bernales entitled for moral damages from NWA from its alleged rude treatment to him?

Held: No. Moral damages predicated upon a breach of a carriage contract is only recoverable in instances
where the mishap results in the death of a passenger, or where the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith. Bad
faith is not simple negligence or bad judgment; it involves ill intentions and a conscious design to do a
wrongful act for a dishonest purpose.

Under the carriage contract, NWA had the obligation to transport the petitioner from Narita
International Airport to Honolulu, Hawaii, on 1 October 2002 at 8:40 p.m. NWA failed to perform this duty
because a strong typhoon hit Japan that evening, forcing widespread flight cancellations (fortuitous event).
Nevertheless, NWA attempted to fly the petitioner to Honolulu on a later flight after the typhoon passed. This
attempt failed because NWA was prevented by the mandatory airport curfew. NWA was only able to fulfill its
obligation at 3:35 p.m. the following day

The primary cause of NWA's delay in the fulfillment of its obligation was the unusually strong
typhoon that struck Japan that evening. We take notice that this was Typhoon Higos, one of the most
powerful typhoons to hit Japan as of that date causing cancellation to more than 200 flights.
Evidently, the real and proximate cause of NWA's breach of contract was a fortuitous event.

Moreover, NWA demonstrated good faith when it exerted its best efforts to accommodate the delayed
Flight No. 10 passengers on Flight No. 22. While Flight No. 22 also failed to leave, the failure was caused by
the 1:00 p.m. Narita curfew. Again, we cannot attribute malice on NWA.
As the CA did, we do not believe the petitioner's accusations that Ohashi barged into shuttle bus,
verbally abused him, and forced him off the bus. It makes no sense for Ohashi to suddenly yell,"Bullshit,
Marito Bernales, you are not included in the manifest. Get out! Get out!" out of nowhere without any prior
exchanges. Moreover, we find it hard to believe that neither the petitioner nor the other delegates protested
on the spot against the alleged abusive treatment. As the CA observed, this version of events is contrary to
ordinary human experience.

Moreover, Ohashi has a good track record in customer service and was the recipient of several
commendation letters that were presented in court. We agree with the petitioner that under the rules of
evidence, his previous acts are not admissible to prove how Ohashi behaved during the incident. Ohashi's
track record contradicts the petitioner's portrayal of him as an unreasonably rude person.

70) Cruz vs Agas Jr.G.R. No. 204095, June 15, 2015 (MEDICAL HYGIENE)

Facts: Respondent Dr. Agas performed colonoscopy procedure to petitioner Dr. Cruz at the St. Lukes
Medical Center (SLMC).Petitioner complained that after procedure, he had a hard time digesting his food.
He asserted that at the time of the filing of the complaint, he was still weak, tired and in pain.
Petitioner filed complaint-affidavit before Office of City Prosecutor of Quezon City against Dr. Agas for
Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless Imprudence and Medical Malpractice. It was dismissed. On
appeal to DOJ, it was likewise dismissed. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Should the medical negligence case filed by Dr. Cruz against Dr. Agas be dismissed?

Held: Yes. In the case at bench, Dr. Cruz failed to show that the DOJ gravely abused its discretion in finding
that there was lack of probable cause and dismissing the complaint against Dr. Agas for Serious Physical
Injuries through Reckless Imprudence and Medical Malpractice.

A medical negligence case can prosper if the patient can present solid proof that the doctor, like in
this case, either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent doctor would have done, or that he did
something that a reasonably prudent doctor would not have done, and such failure or action caused injury to
the patient.

To successfully pursue this kind of case, a patient must only prove that a health care provider either
failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he did
something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to
the patient. Simply put, the elements are duty, breach, injury and proximate causation.
In this case, Dr. Cruz has the burden of showing the negligence or recklessness of Dr. Agas.
Although there is no dispute that Dr. Cruz sustained internal hemorrhage due to a tear in the serosa of his
sigmoid colon, he failed to show that it was caused by Dr. Agas's negligent and reckless conduct of the
colonoscopy procedure. In other words, Dr. Cruz failed to show and explain that particular negligent or
reckless act or omission committed by Dr. Agas. Stated differently, Dr. Cruz did not demonstrate that there
was "inexcusable lack of precaution" on the part of Dr. Agas.

71) Spouses Mamaril vs Boy Scouts of the Philippines.G.R. No. 179382.January 14, 2013-PERLAS-
BERNABE (PROBABLE BAR EXAMINER)

Facts: Spouses Mamaril are jeepney operators who park their six (6) passenger jeepneys every night at the
Boy Scout of the Philippines' (BSP) compound in Malate, Manila for a fee of P300.00 per month for each
unit.

On the evening of May 26, 1995 at 8 o'clock in the evening, one of the vehicles with Plate No. DCG
392 was stolen and was never recovered. According to the security guards Peña and Gaddi of AIB Security
Agency, Inc. (AIB) with whom BSP had contracted for its security and protection, a male person who looked
familiar to them took the subject vehicle out of the compound.

Sps. Mamaril filed a complaint for damages before RTC Manila, Branch 39, against BSP, AIB, Peña
and Gaddi.They averred that the loss of the subject vehicle was due to the gross negligence of the above-
named security guards on-duty who allowed the subject vehicle to be driven out by a stranger despite their
agreement that only authorized drivers duly endorsed by the owners could do so. Peña and Gaddi even
admitted their negligence during the ensuing investigation.

BSP denied liability, arguing that their parking ticket states that "Management shall not be
responsible for loss of vehicle or any of its accessories or article left therein." RTC ruled for Spouses
Mamaril. This was reversed by CA.

Issue: Should BSP be held solidarily liable for loss of vehicle together with AIB?

Held. NO. In this case, it is undisputed that the proximate cause of the loss of Sps. Mamaril's vehicle was
the negligent act of security guards Peña and Gaddi in allowing an unidentified person to drive out the
subject vehicle. Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury or loss, and without which the result would
not have occurred.
On the other hand, the records are bereft of any finding of negligence on the part of BSP. Hence, no
reversible error was committed by the CA in absolving it from any liability for the loss of the subject vehicle
based on fault or negligence.
Neither will the vicarious liability of an employer under Article 218017 of the Civil Code apply in
this case. It is uncontested that Peña and Gaddi were assigned as security guards by AIB to BSP pursuant to
the Guard Service Contract. Clearly, therefore, no employer-employee relationship existed between BSP and
the security guards assigned in its premises. Consequently, the latter's negligence cannot be imputed against
BSP but should be attributed to AIB, the true employer of Peña and Gaddi.1

72) PNB vs Santos.G.R. No. 208293/G.R. No. 208295. December 10, 2014 (Standard Diligence by a
Bank)-LEONEN

Facts: Respondents are children and heirs Angel C. Santos who died on 1991. They learned in 1995 that
their father maintained a premium savings account with petitioner Philippine National Bank
(PNB) as well as a time deposit.They went to PNB to withdraw their father's deposit.

Lina B. Aguilar, the Branch Manager of PNB-Sta. Elena-Marikina City Branch, required them to
submit some documents such death certificate, estate tax payment certificate from BIR among others. They
submitted it but they discovered that a certain Manimbo have released the contents of the deposit.
 This led them to the filing of complaint for sum of money and damages against PNB before RTC
Marikina City. Respondents questioned the release of the deposit amount to Manimbo who had no authority
from them to withdraw their father’s deposit and who failed to present to PNB all the requirements for such
withdrawal.

RTC ruled for respondents and ordered PNB to pay. CA affirmed it.

Issue: Is PNB liable for the loss of the money in the deposit owned by respondent's father?

Held: YES. The standard of diligence required of banks is higher than the degree of diligence of a good
father of a family.

Other industries, because of their nature, are bound by law to observe higher standards of diligence.
Common carriers, for example, must observe “extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for
the safety of [their] passengers” because it is considered a business affected with public interest.
“Extraordinary diligence” with respect to passenger safety is further qualified as “carry[ing] the passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautiouspersons,
with a due regard for all the circumstances.”

Similar to common carriers, banking is a business that is impressed with public interest. It affects
economies and plays a significant role in businesses and commerce. The public reposes its faith and
confidence upon banks, such that “even the humble wage-earner has not hesitated to entrust his life’s savings
to the bank of his choice, knowing that they will be safe in its custody and will even earn some interest for
him.” This is why we have recognized the fiduciary nature of the banks’ functions, and attached a special
standard of diligence for the exercise of their functions.

Based on these enumerations, petitioners PNB and Aguilar either have no fixed standards for the
release of their deceased clients’ deposits or they have standards that they disregard for convenience, favor,
or upon exercise of discretion. Both are inconsistent with the required diligence of banks. These threaten the
safety of the depositors’ accounts as they provide avenues for fraudulent practices by third persons or by
bank officers themselves.
In this case, petitioners PNB and Aguilar released Angel C. Santos’ deposit to Manimbo without
having been presented the BIR-issued certificate of payment of, or exception from, estate tax. This is a legal
requirement (PD 1158) before the deposit of a decedent is released.

73) R Transport Corp vs Yu.G.R. No. 174161, February 18, 2015

Facts: Loreta J. Yu died after alighting from a passenger bus as she was hit and run by a bus driven by
Gimena who was then employed by petitioner R Transport Corporation. Husband of deceased, herein
respondent Luisito Yu filed complaint for damages befire RTC Makati City agains R Transport Corp, Gimena
and registered owner MMTC. RTC ruled for respondent. CA affirmed it.

Issue: Who are liable for the death of Loreta Yu?

Held: Gimena, the driver, R Transport Corporation as his employer and MMTC as the registered owner of
the bus. In this case, the records show that driver Gimena was clearly running at a reckless speed. As
testified by the police officer on duty at the time of the incident and indicated in the Autopsy Report not only
were the deceased’s clothes ripped off from her body, her brain even spewed out from her skull and spilled
over the road. Indeed, this Court is not prepared to believe petitioner’s contention that its bus was travelling
at a “normal speed” in preparation for a full stop in view of the fatal injuries sustained by the deceased.
Moreover, the location wherein the deceased was hit and run over further indicates Gimena’s negligence.
Ultimately, Gimena should have observed due diligence of a reasonably prudent man by slackening his speed
and proceeding cautiously while passing the area.

R Transport is also liable. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, employers are liable for the
damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Once negligence on the
part of the employee is established, a presumption instantly arises that the employer was remiss in the
selection and/or supervision of the negligent employee. To avoid liability for the quasi-delict committed by
its employee, it is incumbent upon the employer to rebut this presumption by presenting adequate and
convincing proof that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employees. Unfortunately, however, the records of this case are bereft of any proof
showing the exercise by petitioner of the required diligence.

MMTC is likewise solidarily liable under the registered owner rule. The court has consistently been
of the view that it is for the better protection of the public for both the owner of record and the actual
operator to be adjudged jointly and severally liable with the driver.As aptly stated by the appellate court, “the
principle of holding the registered owner liable for damages notwithstanding that ownership of the offending
vehicle has already been transferred to another is designed to protect the public and not as a shield on the
part of unscrupulous transferees of the vehicle to take refuge in, inorder to free itself from liability arising
from its own negligent act.”

74) Allied Banking vs BPI.G.R. No. 188363.February 27, 2013 (Diligence of Banks)

Facts: A check in the amount of P1 ,000,000.00 payable to "Mateo Mgt. Group International" (MMGI) was
presented for deposit and accepted at petitioner Allied Banking Kawit Branch.

The check, post-dated "Oct. 9, 2003", was drawn against the account of Marciano Silva, Jr. (Silva)
with respondent Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) Bel-Air Branch. Upon receipt, petitioner sent the check
for clearing to respondent through the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC).

MMGI’s account was closed and all the funds therein were withdrawn. A month later, Silva
discovered the debit of P1,000,000.00 from his account. In response to Silva’s complaint, respondent
credited his account with the aforesaid sum.

In 2003, respondent returned a photocopy of the check to petitioner for the reason: “Postdated.”
Petitioner, however, refused to accept and sent back to respondent a photocopy of the check. Thereafter, the
check, or more accurately, the Charge Slip, was tossed several times from petitioner to respondent, and back
to petitioner.

Acting on the request, PCHC directed the respondent to deliver the original check and informed it of
PCHC’s authority under Clearing House Operating Memo (CHOM) No. 279 dated 06 September 1996 to
split 50/50 the amount of the check subject. Case was refered to PCHC Arbitration Committee which
rendered decision finding both parties negligent in the performance of their duties, the Committee applied
the doctrine of “Last Clear Chance” and ruled that the loss should be shouldered by respondent alone.

Case was appealed to RTC which affirmed PCHC ruling. On appeal to CA, the RTC judgment was
set aside and ruled for a 60-40 sharing of the loss as it found petitioner guilty of contributory negligence in
accepting what is clearly a post-dated check. The CA found that petitioner’s failure to notice the irregularity
on the face of the check was a breach of its duty to the public and a telling sign of its lack of due diligence in
handling checks coursed through it. While the CA conceded that the drawee bank has a bigger responsibility
in the clearing of checks, it declared that the presenting bank cannot take lightly its obligation to make sure
that only valid checks are introduced into the clearing system. According to the CA, considerations of public
policy and substantial justice will be served by allocating the damage on a 60-40 ratio.

Issue: Whether the doctrine of last clear chance applies in this case?

Held: Yes. The doctrine of last clear chance, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not
preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising
reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding
the plaintiff’s negligence. The doctrine necessarily assumes negligence on the part of the defendant and
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and does not apply except upon that assumption. Stated
differently, the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages caused
by the supervening negligence of the defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm
by the exercise of due diligence.

In this case, the evidence clearly shows that the proximate cause of the unwarranted encashment of
the subject check was the negligence of respondent who cleared a post-dated check sent to it thru the PCHC
clearing facility without observing its own verification procedure. As correctly found by the PCHC and
upheld by the RTC, if only respondent exercised ordinary care in the clearing process, it could have easily
noticed the glaring defect upon seeing the date written on the face of the check “Oct. 9, 2003”. Respondent
could have then promptly returned the check and with the check thus dishonored, petitioner would have not
credited the amount thereof to the payee’s account. Thus, notwithstanding the antecedent negligence of the
petitioner in accepting the post-dated check for deposit, it can seek reimbursement from respondent the
amount credited to the payee’s account covering the check.

75) Almendras vs Almendras.G.R.No. 179491.January 14, 2015- SERENO

Facts: Petitioner Alejandro Almendras sent letters with similar contents in 1996 to House Speaker Jose de
Venecia, Jr., and to Dr. Nemesio Prudente, President of Oil Carriers, Inc. Both letters described the
respondet, his brother Alexis Almendras as a “blackmailer”.

Respondent filed an action for damages arising from libel and defamation against petitioner in the
RTC Digos City. Said court granted moral, exemplary and attorneys fees. CA affirmed the ruling.

Issue: Are the said letters libelous in nature?

Held: YES. Under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Coe, every defamatory imputation ispresumed to be
malicious, even if true, if no good intention and justifiable motive is shown. As an exception to the rule, the
presumption of malice is done away with when the defamatory imputation qualifies as privileged
communication.

Construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning as they
would naturally be understood by the personsreading them, unless it appears that they were used and
understood in anothersense.In the instant case, the letters tag respondent as a “reknown black
mailer,” a vengeful family member who filed cases against his mother and siblings, and with nefarious
designs. Even an impartial mind reading these descriptions would be led to entertain doubts on the person’s
character, thereby affecting that person’s reputation. and shame to respondent’s reputation.

Lastly, having duly proved that all the elements of libel are present in this case, we rule that the
damages awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court must be modified and equitably
reduced.
In awarding damages in libel cases, the court is given ample discretion to determine the amount, depending
upon the facts of the particular case. Article 2219 of the Civil Code expressly authorizes the recovery of
moral damages in cases of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. However,
“while no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, x x x it is
nevertheless essential that the claimant should satisfactorily show the existence of the factual basis of
damages and its causal connection to defendant’s acts.”

76) Davao Holiday Transport vs Spouses Emphasis.G.R. No. 211424. Nov 26, 2014-Reyes

Facts: Petitioner Davao Holiday was the operator of taxi that was driven by Tungal which figured in
accident in Davao City that caused the death of a 12-year-old boy,Christian Emphasis (Christian), son of
respondents Spouses Emphasis.

The spouses filed criminal action for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was filed against
Tungal as well as action for damages against Tungal and Davao Holiday which was consolidated before
RTC Davao City. RTC convicted Tungal and ordered petitioners to pay the spouses civil indemnity and
moral and actual damages. CA affirmed the ruling.

Issue: Is the petitioner liable for the negligent acts of its employee?
Held: YES. Article 2180 of the New Civil Code provides that an obligation for damages is demandable not
only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom he is responsible. Employers, in
particular, shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks. The responsibility of employers shall only cease upon proof that they observed all the diligence of the
good father of a family to prevent damage.
The CA correctly held that the petitioner, being Tungal’s employer, was presumed liable to the heirs
of Christian after a finding that it was Tungal who should be faulted for the accident that caused the death of
the child. In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience and service records. With respect to the supervision of employees, employers must
formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary measures for
breaches thereof.
Holiday did not present documentary proof of Tungal’s qualification, experience and service records.
Even the result of the actual driving tests was not presented to be examined by the court a quo. The claim of
trainings and constant monitoring of all their drivers including Tungal are unsubstantiated. In addition,
Holiday presented no record of Tungal attending those trainings.

77) Tamargo vs CA.G.R. No. 85044. June 3, 1992.209 SCRA 518

Facts: Adelberto Bundoc, 10 years old minor , shot and killed Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle. Civil
complaint for damages was filed with the RTC Vigan, Ilocos Sur, by Petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer’s
adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer’s natural parents, against
respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto’s natural parents with whom he was living at the
time of the tragic incident. Adelberto, was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that
he had acted without discernment.

Prior to the incident the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor
Adelberto Bundoc before the then CFI Ilocos Sur. Adoption was granted after Adelberto had shot and killed
Jennifer. Respondents Bundoc disclaimed liability claiming that the the approval of adoption cut their
parental authority over Bundoc and the Rapisura spouses should be held liable.

Issue: Is the adopting parents Alberto Bundoc liable for his tortious acts?

Held: NO. It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc’s voluntary act of shooting Jennifer Tamargo
with an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him. (Article 2176 of the Civil Code)
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, for any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with them. (Article 2180 of the Civil
Code) This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious liability, or
the doctrine of "imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where a person is not only liable for
torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship
and for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties
and responsibilities of parents

However, under the Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, parental authority is
provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of a
decree of adoption, precisely because the adopting parents are given actual custody of the child during such
trial period. In the instant case, the trial custody period either had not yet begun or had already been
completed at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any case, actual custody of Adelberto was then with his
natural parents, not the adopting parents.

78) Aguilar vs Commercial Savings Bank.G.R. No. 128705.June 29, 2001. 412 Phil. 834

Facts: A Lancer car driven by Ferdinand Borja but registered under respondent Commercial Savings Bank
in which Borja was assistant vice-presidenth it Conrado Aguilar Jr and his companion. The impact killed
Aguilar. Petitioner Conrado Aguilar Sr, the victim's father, filed a complaint for damages against
respondents in RTC Makati against Borja where it driver was held liable.
 Respondent bank appealed to CA where RTC decision was reversed.The appellate court found no
evidence that Borja had acted as respondent bank’s assistant vice-president at the time of the mishap.

Issue: Whether or not respondent bank, as the Lancer’s registered owner, is liable for damages?

Held: YES. As early as Erezo vs. Jepte 102 Phil. 103,the Court . had synthesized the rationale for holding the
registered owner of a vehicle directly liable. There we said:
Registration is required not to make said registration the operative act by which ownership in vehicles is
transferred, as in land registration cases, because the administrative proceeding of registration does not bear
any essential relation to the contract of sale between the parties (Chinchilla vs. Rafael and Verdaguer, 39
Phil. 888), but to permit the use and operation of the vehicle upon any public highway (section 5 [a], Act No.
3992, as amended.) The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident
happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor
can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner.

The rationale well postulated in Erezo applies in the present case. Thus far no change in
jurisprudence has been brought to our attention. In our view, respondent bank, as the registered owner of the
vehicle, is primarily liable for Aguilar, Jr.’s death. The CA erred when it concluded that the bank was not
liable simply because (a) petitioner did not prove that Borja was acting as the bank’s vice president at the
time of the accident; and (b) Borja had, according to respondent bank, already bought the car at the time of
the mishap. For as long as the respondent bank remained the registered owner of the car involved in the
vehicular accident, it could not escape primary liability for the death of petitioner’s son.

79) Andamo vs IAC.G.R. No. 74761. November 6, 1990. 191 SCRA 203 (Art. 2176, Fault or Negligence)

Facts: Petitioner spouses Andamo owned a parcel of lan in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite adjacent to that of
private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.

Respondent corporation, construction within its land waterpaths and contrivances, including an
artificial lake, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners’ land, caused a young man to drown,
damaged petitioners’ crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and
their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.

Petitioners filed another action for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction against respondent corporation before RTC Tagaytay City. It was however dismissed due to lack
of jurisdiction as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. CA
affirmed the ruling.

Issue: Is the respondent liable for the damages that the artificial lake brought to its adjoining landowners like
the petitioners?

Held: YES. It must be stressed that the use of one’s property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the
Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the
rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners
have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so
as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to
build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care
so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of
nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can
claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.

80) Llana vs Biong.G.R. No. 182356. December 4, 2013

Facts: On March 30, 2000, while driving her Toyota Corolla car along North Avenue, Quezon City, Dra.
Llana was hit by the truck driven by Joel Primero. It stated that Joel was recklessly imprudent in driving the
truck. Joel later revealed that his employer was respondent Rebecca Biong, doing business under the name
and style of “Pongkay Trading”. Apart from these minor wounds, Dra. dela Llana did not appear to have
suffered from any other visible physical injuries.

In the first week of May 2000, Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left side of
her neck and shoulder. The pain became more intense as days passed by. She demanded from Rebecca
compensation for her injuries, but Rebecca refused to pay.

Dra. dela Llana sued Rebecca for damages before the RTC Quezon City . She alleged that she lost
the mobility of her arm as a result of the vehicular accident and claimed medical expenses.In defense,
Rebecca maintained that Dra. dela Llana had no cause of action against her as no reasonable relation existed
between the vehicularaccident and Dra. dela Llana’s injury. She pointed out that Dra. dela Llana’s illness
became manifest one month and one week from the date of the vehicular accident.
The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana and held that the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana’s
whiplash injury to be Joel’s reckless driving. It found that a whiplash injury is an injury caused by the sudden
jerking of the spine in the neck area. It pointed out that the massive damage the car suffered only meant that
the truck was over-speeding.
CA reversed the RTC ruling. It held that Dra. dela Llana failed to establish a reasonable connection
between the vehicular accident and her whiplash injury by preponderance of evidence.

Issue: Whether Joel’s reckless driving is the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury?

Held: NO. Proceedings before the trial court shows that Dra. dela Liana did not present any testimonial or
documentary evidence that directly shows the causal relation between the vehicular accident and Dra. dela
Liana's injury. Her claim that Joel's negligence caused her whiplash injury was not established because of the
deficiency of the presented evidence during trial.
We point out in this respect that courts cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause
whiplash injuries. This proposition is not public knowledge, or is capable of unquestionable demonstration,
or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. In sum, Dra. dela Liana miserably failed
to establish her case by preponderance of evidence. Her claim, unsupported bypreponderance of evidence, is
merely a bare assertion and has no leg to stand on.

81) PAL vs Savillo.G.R. No. 149547.July 4, 2008.557 SCRA 66

Facts: Private respondent Savillo was invited to participate in the 1993 ASEAN Seniors Annual Golf
Tournament held in Jakarta, Indonesia. He and several companions decided to purchase their respective
passenger tickets from PAL. They were made to understand by PAL that its plane would take them from
Manila to Singapore, while Singapore Airlines would take them from Singapore to Jakarta

Upon their arrival in Singapore, they proceeded to the Singapore Airlines office to check-in for their
flight to Jakarta. Singapore Airlines rejected the tickets of private respondent and his group because they
were not endorsed by PAL. It was explained to private respondent and his group that if Singapore Airlines
honored the tickets without PAL’s endorsement, PAL would not pay Singapore Airlines for their passage.
Private respondent tried to contact PAL’s office at the airport, only to find out that it was closed.

Stranded at the airport in Singapore and left with no recourse, private respondent was in panic and at
a loss where to go; and was subjected to humiliation, embarrassment, mental anguish, serious anxiety, fear
and distress. Eventually, they were forced to purchase tickets from Garuda Airlines and board its last flight
bound for Jakarta. After the series of nerve-wracking experiences, private respondent became ill and was
unable to participate in the tournament.

He sent a demand letter to PAL and Singapore Airlines. However, both airlines disowned liability
and blamed each other for the fiasco. On 15 August 1997, private respondent filed a Complaint for Damages
before the RTC Iloilo City.
PAL filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the said complaint was barred on the ground of
prescription under Section 1(f) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.It argued that the Warsaw Convention,
particularly Article 29 thereof, governed this case, as it provides that any claim for damages in connection
with the international transportation of persons is subject to the prescription period of two years.
 RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. It maintained that the provisions of the Civil Code and other
pertinent laws of the Philippines, not the Warsaw Convention, were applicable to the present case. The CA
likewise dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by PAL and affirmed RTC ruling.

Issue: Is the Warsaw Convention provision on prescription for claim for damages applicable in this case?

Held: NO. Jurisprudence in the Philippines and the United States also recognizes that the Warsaw
Convention does not "exclusively regulate" the relationship between passenger and carrier on an
international flight. This Court finds that the present case is substantially similar to cases in which the
damages sought were considered to be outside the coverage of the Warsaw Convention.
In United Airlines v. Uy, this Court distinguished between the (1) damage to the passenger’s
baggage and (2) humiliation he suffered at the hands of the airline’s employees. The first cause of action was
covered by the Warsaw Convention which prescribes in two years, while the second was covered by the
provisions of the Civil Code on torts, which prescribes in four years.

In the Petition at bar, private respondent’s Complaint alleged that both PAL and Singapore Airlines
were guilty of gross negligence, which resulted in his being subjected to "humiliation, embarrassment,
mental anguish, serious anxiety, fear and distress." The emotional harm suffered by the private respondent as
a result of having been unreasonably and unjustly prevented from boarding the plane should be distinguished
from the actual damages which resulted from the same incident. Under the Civil Code provisions on tort,
such emotional harm gives rise to compensation where gross negligence or malice is proven.

82) Aquinas School vs Sps.Inton.G.R. No. 184202. January 26, 2011 (VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF
SCHOOL)

Facts: Respondent Jose Luis Inton was a grade three student at Aquinas School. Respondent Sister
Margarita Yamyamin (Yamyamin) taught Jose Luis grade three religion class. Due to Inton's unruly behavior,
she kicked him on the legs several timesand pulled and shoved his head on the classmates seat.

Respondents Jose and Victoria Inton filed an action for damages on behalf of their son Jose Luis
against Yamyamin and Aquinas before the RTC Pasig City seeking actual, moral, and exemplary damages. It
was granted. CA affirmed it and also held Aquinas School as Yamyamin's employer liable.

Issue: Is Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin for the damages awarded to Jose Luis?

Held: NO. The Court has consistently applied the four-fold test to determine the existence of an employer-
employee relationship: the employer (a) selects and engages the employee; (b) pays his wages; (c) has power
to dismiss him; and (d) has control over his work. Of these, the most crucial is the element of
control. Control refers to the right of the employer, whether actually exercised or reserved, to control the
work of the employee as well as the means and methods by which he accomplishes the same.[4]

In this case, the school directress testified that Aquinas had an agreement with a congregation of
sisters under which, in order to fulfill its ministry, the congregation would send religion teachers to Aquinas
to provide catechesis to its students. Aquinas insists that it was not the school but Yamyamins religious
congregation that chose her for the task of catechizing the schools grade three students, much like the way
bishops designate the catechists who would teach religion in public schools. Under the circumstances, it was
quite evident that Aquinas did not have control over Yamyamins teaching methods. The Intons had not
refuted the school directress testimony in this regard. Consequently, it was error for the CA to hold Aquinas
solidarily liable with Yamyamin.

Of course, Aquinas still had the responsibility of taking steps to ensure that only qualified outside
catechists are allowed to teach its young students. In this regard, it cannot be said that Aquinas took no steps
to avoid the occurrence of improper conduct towards the students by their religion teacher.

First, Yamyamins transcript of records, certificates, and diplomas showed that she was qualified to
teach religion. Second, there is no question that Aquinas ascertained that Yamyamin came from a legitimate
religious congregation of sisters and that, given her Christian training, the school had reason to assume that
she would behave properly towards the students. Third, the school gave Yamyamin a copy of the schools
Administrative Faculty Staff Manual that set the standards for handling students. It also required her to
attend a teaching orientation before she was allowed to teach beginning that June of 1998.
Fourth, the school pre-approved the content of the course she was to teach to ensure that she was really
catechizing the students. And fifth, the school had a program for subjecting Yamyamin to classroom
evaluation. Unfortunately, since she was new and it was just the start of the school year, Aquinas did not
have sufficient opportunity to observe her methods. At any rate, it acted promptly to relieve her of her
assignment as soon as the school learned of the incident.It cannot be said that Aquinas was guilty of outright
neglect.

83) Far East Bank and Trust Company vs Chante.G.R. No. 170598. October 9, 2013- J BERSAMIN

Facts: Respondent Robert Mar Chante, also known as Robert Mar G. Chan (Chan), was a current account
depositor of petitioner Far East Bank & Trust Co. (FEBTC) at its Ongpin Branch and was issued a Far East
Card which acts as credit card and ATM transactions, was tagged in his current account. At that time, his
account balance is only P198,511.70

FEBTC filed a civil case against Chan before Manila RTC alleging that due to a computer system
bug, Chan mananged to withdraw almost P967,000.00 from different ATM branches. It sough to recover he
principal sum of P770,488.30 representing the unpaid balance of the amount fraudulently withdrawn from
Chan’s current account. RTC ruled for FEBT but on appeal to CA it was reversed. CA relieved the depositor
of any liability for the supposedly fraudulent withdrawals.

Issue: Is Chan liable for the fraudulent withdrawals?

Held: NO. FEBTC did not present preponderant evidence proving Chan’s liability for the supposedly
fraudulent withdrawals. It thus failed in discharging its burden of persuasion. As the rule indicates,
preponderant evidence refers to evidence that is of greater weight, or more convincing, than the evidence
offered in opposition to it.It is proof that leads the trier of facts to find that the existence of the contested fact
is more probable than its nonexistence.

To start with, Edgar Munarriz, FEBTC’s very own Systems Analyst, admitted that the bug infecting
the bank’s computer system had facilitated the fraudulent withdrawals. The RTC ignored the likelihood that
somebody other than Chan familiar with the bug infection of FEBTC’s computer system at the time of the
withdrawals and adept with the workings of the computer system had committed the fraud. This likelihood
was not far-fetched considering that FEBTC had immediately adopted corrective measures upon its
discovery of the system bug, by which FEBTC admitted its negligence in ensuring an error-free computer
system; and that the system bug had affected only the account of Chan.

84) Lim vs CA and Gonzales. G.R. No. 125817.January 16, 2002.

Facts: Private respondent Donato Gonzales purchased an Isuzu passenger jeepney from Gomercino Vallarta,
holder of a certificate of public convenience for the operation of public utility vehicles plying the
Monumento-Bulacan route. While Gonzales was the operator, Vallarta remained on record as its registered
owner and operator.

The jeepney collided with a ten-wheeler-truck owned by petitioner Abelardo Lim and driven by his co-
petitioner Esmadito Gunnaban. Gunnaban owned responsibility for the accident, explaining that while he
was traveling towards Manila the truck suddenly lost its brakes. Petitioner Lim shouldered the costs for
hospitalization of the wounded, compensated the heirs of the deceased passenger.

Gonzales filed complaint for damages against Lim and Gunnaban. RTC upheld Gonzales' claim and
awarded him compensatory damages and attorney's fees. Lim appealed to CA. According to petitioners, to
recognize an operator under the kabit system as the real party in interest and to countenance his claim for
damages is utterly subversive of public policy.

Issue: Should the prohibition on kabit system be applied against respondent, the victim Gonzales?
Held: NO. The kabit system is an arrangement whereby a person who has been granted a certificate of public
convenience allows other persons who own motor vehicles to operate them under his license, sometimes for
a fee or percentage of the earnings. Although the parties to such an agreement are not outrightly penalized by
law, the kabit system is invariably recognized as being contrary to public policy and therefore void and
inexistent under Art. 1409 of the Civil Code.

It would seem then that the thrust of the law in enjoining the kabit system is not so much as to
penalize the parties but to identify the person upon whom responsibility may be fixed in case of an accident
with the end view of protecting the riding public. The policy therefore loses its force if the public at large is
not deceived, much less involved.

In the present case it is at once apparent that the evil sought to be prevented in enjoining
the kabit system does not exist. First, neither of the parties to the pernicious kabit system is being held liable
for damages. Second, the case arose from the negligence of another vehicle in using the public road to whom
no representation, or misrepresentation, as regards the ownership and operation of the passenger jeepney was
made and to whom no such representation, or misrepresentation, was necessary. Thus it cannot be said that
private respondent Gonzales and the registered owner of the jeepney were in estoppel for leading the public
to believe that the jeepney belonged to the registered owner. Third, the riding public was not bothered nor
inconvenienced at the very least by the illegal arrangement. On the contrary, it was private respondent
himself who had been wronged and was seeking compensation for the damage done to him. Certainly, it
would be the height of inequity to deny him his right.

85) G.V. Florida Transport vs Heirs of Battung.G.R. No. 208802. October 14, 2015 PERLAS-
BERNABE

Facts: Romeo Battung was shot and killed by unknown co-passengers, while boarding petitioner's bus with
body bound for Manila. Respondents who were his heirs filed for damages based on a breach of contract of
carriage against GV Florida Transport before RTC Cabagan, Isabela. They contended that as a common
carrier, petitioner and its employees are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in ensuring the safety of
passengers; and in case of injuries and/or death on the part of a passenger, they are presumed to be at fault
and, thus, responsible therefor. As such, petitioner, et al. should be held civilly liable for Battung's death.

RTC held petitioner liable. It was affirmed by CA.

Issue: Is petitioner GV Florida liable for damages for the death of Battung caused by willfull acts of its other
passengers?

Held: NO. Since Battung' s death was caused by a copassenger, the applicable provision is Article 1763 of
the Civil Code, which states that "a common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on
account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's
employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped
the act or omission." Notably, for this obligation, the law provides a lesser degree of diligence, i.e., diligence
of a good father of a family, in assessing the existence of any culpability on the common carrier's part.

In this case, records reveal that when the bus stopped at San Jose City to let four (4) men ride
petitioner's bus (two [2] of which turned out to be Battung's murderers), the bus driver, Duplio, saw them get
on the bus and even took note of what they were wearing. Moreover, Duplio made the bus conductor,
Daraoay, approach these men and have them pay the corresponding fare, which Daraoay did. During the
foregoing, both Duplio and Daraoay observed nothing which would rouse their suspicion that the men were
armed or were to carry out an unlawful activity. With no such indication, there was no need for them to
conduct a more stringent search (i.e., bodily search) on the aforesaid men. By all accounts, therefore, it
cannot be concluded that petitioner or any of its employees failed to employ the diligence of a good father of
a family in relation to its responsibility under Article 1763 of the Civil Code. As such, petitioner cannot
altogether be held civilly liable.
86) Aonuevo vs CA.G.R. No. 130003. October 20, 2004

Facts: Villagracia while biking along Boni Avenue was hit by the car was owned by Procter and Gamble Inc
bu driven by Aonuevo, employee of Procter and Gamble. was in the course of making a left turn towards
Libertad Street when the collision occurred. Villagracia sustained serious injuries as a result, which
necessitated his hospitalization and operations.
Villagracia instituted an action for damages against Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc. and Aonuevo
before the RTC Mandaluyong. RTC rendered judgment against Procter and Gamble and Aonuevo, ordering
them to pay Villagracia for actual and moral damages and for attorneys fees, as well as legal costs. CA
affirmed the ruling.
Aonuevo now appeal to the Court raising a nwa issue whether Article 2185 of Civil Code applies to
non-motorized vehicles like Villagracia's bicycle. It is undisputed that during the accident, Villagracia has no
safety gadgets as required by a 1948 municipal ordinance. His violation of the ordinance barred him from
seeking damages

Issue: Should Article 2185 of the New Civil Code should apply by analogy to non-motorized vehicles?

Held: NO. The Civil Code Commission was cognizant of the difference in the natures and attached
responsibilities of motorized and non-motorized vehicles. Art. 2185 was not formulated to compel or ensure
obeisance by all to traffic rules and regulations. If such were indeed the evil sought to be remedied or
guarded against, then the framers of the Code would have expanded the provision to include non-motorized
vehicles or for that matter, pedestrians. Yet, that was not the case; thus the need arises to ascertain the
peculiarities attaching to a motorized vehicle within the dynamics of road travel. The fact that there has long
existed a higher degree of diligence and care imposed on motorized vehicles, arising from the special nature
of motor vehicle, leads to the inescapable conclusion that the qualification under Article 2185 exists
precisely to recognize such higher standard. Simply put, the standards applicable to motor vehicle are not on
equal footing with other types of vehicles.

Thus, we cannot sustain the contention that Art. 2185 should apply to non-motorized vehicles, even
if by analogy. There is factual and legal basis that necessitates the distinction under Art. 2185, and to adopt
Aonuevos thesis would unwisely obviate this distinction.

87) Dela Torre vs Imbuido.G.R. No. 192973. September 29, 2014-Reyes

Facts: Carmen de la Torre, wife of petitioner Pedrito de la Torre, died while undergoing caesarian and other
operations in Divine Spirti General Hospital in Olongapo City. Operations were headed by Dr. Pasamba,
respondents. Pedrito claimed in his complaint that the respondents “failed to exercise the degree of diligence
required of them” as members of the medical profession, and were “negligent for practicing surgery on
[Carmen] in the most unskilled, ignorant and cruel manner.To support his claim, Pedrito presented the
testimony of Dr. Patilano, the medicolegal officer who conducted an autopsy on the body of Carmen.

Petitioner filed complaint for damages filed by Pedrito against herein respondents Dr. Arturo
Imbuido and Dr. Norma Imbuido (Dr. Norma) as the owners and operators of the Divine Spirit General
Hospital in Olongapo City, and Dr. Nestor Pasamba before RTC Olongapo. They ruled for petitioner.

On appeal to CA, the RTC decision was reversed. For the appellate court, it was not established that
the respondents failed to exercise the degree of diligence required of them by their profession as doctors.

Issue: Did petitioner proved medical negligence on the part of the respondents?

Held: NO. [M]edical malpractice or, more appropriately, medical negligence, is that type of claim which a
victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medical professional which has caused
bodily harm.” In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient, or his or her family as in this case,
“must prove that a health care provider, in most cases a physician, either failed to do something which a
reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably
prudent provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient.”
 The Court emphasized in Lucas, et al. v. Tuaño that in medical negligence cases, there is a physician-
patient relationship between the doctor and the victim, but just like in any other proceeding for damages, four
essential elements must be established by the plaintiff, namely: (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4)
proximate causation. All four elements must be present in order to find the physician negligent and, thus,
liable for damages.

Considering that it was not duly established that Dr. Patilano practiced and was an expert in the
fields that involved Carmen’s condition, he could not have accurately identified the said degree of care, skill,
diligence and the medical procedures that should have been applied by her attending physicians. Similarly,
such duty, degree of care, skill and diligence were not sufficiently established in this case because the
testimony of Dr. Patilano was based solely on the results of his autopsy on the cadaver of Carmen. His study
and assessment were restricted by limitations that denied his full evaluation of Carmen’s case. He could have
only deduced from the injuries apparent in Carmen’s body, and in the condition when the body was
examined.