SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN, petitioner, vs.
SPOUSES marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating
PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA L. TAN,
respondents.**
Anti-Violence against Women and Their Children Act of
2004 (R.A. No. 9262); Conspiracy; Words and Phrases;
“Violence against Women and Their Children,”
Defined; While Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 provides that the
offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage,
former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
** The present petition impleaded the Court of Appeals as
respondent. Pursuant to Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the name
of the Court of Appeals is deleted from the title.
232
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Go-Tan vs. Tan
does not preclude the application of the principle of
conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC).—Section 3
of R.A. No. 9262 defines ‘‘[v]iolence against women and their
children’’ as “any act or a series of acts committed by any
person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or
against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual
or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child,
or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate,
within or without the family abode, which result in or is
likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty.” While the said provision provides that
the offender be related or connected to the victim by
relationship, it does not preclude the application of the
principle of conspiracy under the RPC.
Same; Same; If the principle of conspiracy under Article
8 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is applied to B.P. 22 in the
absence of a contrary provision therein, with more reason
could the same principle be applied suppletorily to R.A. No.
9262 because of the express provision of Section 47 that the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) shall be supplementary to said
law.—Most recently, in Ladonga v. People, 451 SCRA 673
(2005), the Court applied suppletorily the principle of
conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 in the
absence of a contrary provision therein. With more reason,
therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the
RPC may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of
the express provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be
supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of the
RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may
be applied suppletorily. Thus, the principle of conspiracy
may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or
action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the
act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise
extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.
Same; Same; Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly
recognizes that the acts of violence against women and their
children may be committed by an offender through another.—
It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262
expressly recognizes that the acts of violence against women
and their children may be committed by an offender through
another, thus: SEC. 5. Acts of Violence against233
VOL. 567, SEPTEMBER 30, 2008 233
Go-Tan vs. Tan
 Women and Their Children.—The crime of violence
against women and their children is committed through any
of the following acts: x x x (h) Engaging in purposeful,
knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through
another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall
include, but not be limited to, the following acts: x x x
Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The intent of the
statute is the law.—It bears mention that the intent of the
statute is the law and that this intent must be effectuated by
the courts. In the present case, the express language of R.A.
No. 9262 reflects the intent of the legislature for liberal
construction as will best ensure the attainment of the object
of the law according to its true intent, meaning and spirit—
the protection and safety of victims of violence against
women and children.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The maxim
“expressio unios est exclusio alterius” is only an ancillary rule
of statutory construction which should be applied only as a
means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise
manifest and should not be permitted to defeat the plainly
indicated purpose of the legislature.—Contrary to the RTC’s
pronouncement, the maxim “expressio unios est exclusio
alterius” finds no application here. It must be remembered
that this maxim is only an “ancillary rule of statutory
construction.” It is not of universal application. Neither is it
conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of
discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise
manifest and should not be permitted to defeat the plainly
indicated purpose of the legislature.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 94.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Alfred Joseph T. Jamora for petitioner.
Jeanie S. Pulido for respondents.
234
234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Go-Tan vs. Tan
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review
on Certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Resolution1 dated March 7, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94, Quezon City in
Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 and the RTC
Resolution2 dated July 11, 2005 which denied
petitioner’s Verified Motion for Reconsideration.
The factual background of the case:
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan
(petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven) were
married.3 Out of this union, two female children were
born, Kyra Danielle4 and Kristen Denise.5 On January
12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner
filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Protective Order (TPO)6against Steven and
her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and
Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She
alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents,
were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses
upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs
(e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)7 of Republic Act (R.A.)
_______________
1 Penned by Judge Romeo F. Zamora, Records, p. 209.
2 Id., at p. 501.
3 Records, p. 21.
4 Id., at p. 22.
5 Id., at p. 23.
 6 Id., at p. 1.
7 SEC. 5. Acts of Violence against Women and Their Children.—
The crime of violence against women and their children is committed
through any of the following acts:
xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to
engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist
from or to desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the
right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman’s
or her child’s freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of
force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or
intimidation directed against the woman
235
VOL. 567, SEPTEMBER 30, 2008 235
Go-Tan vs. Tan
No. 9262,8 otherwise known as the “Anti-Violence
against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.”
On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an
Order/Notice9 granting petitioner’s prayer for a TPO.
On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to
Dismiss with Opposition to the Issuance of Permanent
Protection
_______________
or her child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts
committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the
woman’s or child’s movement or conduct:
xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children
of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately
providing the woman’s children insufficient financial support;
(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of
a legal right;
(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity, or controlling the victim’s
own money or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or common
money, or properties;
xxxx
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct,
personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial
emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This
shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:
xxxx
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or
humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to,
repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support
or custody of minor children or denial of access to the woman’s
child/children.
8 Entitled “AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
AND THEIR CHILDREN PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE
MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES
THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.”
9 Records, p. 26.
236
236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Go-Tan vs. Tan
Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the
Petition,10contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction
over their persons since, as parents-in-law of the
petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262.
On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a Comment on
Opposition11 to respondents’ Motion to Dismiss arguing
that respondents were covered by R.A. No. 9262 under
a liberal interpretation thereof aimed at promoting the
protection and safety of victims of violence.
On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a
Resolution12dismissing the case as to respondents on the
ground that, being the parents-in-law of the petitioner,
they were not included/covered as respondents under
R.A. No. 9262 under the well-known rule of law
“expressio unius est exclusio alterius.”13
On March 16, 2005, petitioner filed her Verified
Motion for Reconsideration14 contending that the
doctrine of necessary implication should be applied in
the broader interests of substantial justice and due
process.
On April 8, 2005, respondents filed their Comment
on the Verified Motion for Reconsideration15 arguing
that petitioner’s liberal construction unduly broadened
the provisions of R.A. No. 9262 since the relationship
between the offender and the alleged victim was an
essential condition for the application of R.A. No. 9262.
_______________
10 Records, p. 36.
11 Id., at p. 147.
12 Id., at p. 209.
13 Latin maxim meaning “The expression of one thing is the
exclusion of another.” (San Miguel Corporation Employees Union-Phil.
Transport and General Workers Org. v. San Miguel Packaging
Products Employees Union-Pambansang Diwa ng Manggagawang
Pilipino, G.R. No. 171153, September 12, 2007, 533 SCRA 125, 152).
14 Records, p. 316.
15 Id., at p. 376.
237
VOL. 567, SEPTEMBER 30, 2008 237
Go-Tan vs. Tan
On July 11, 2005, the RTC issued a
Resolution16denying petitioner’s Verified Motion for
Reconsideration. The RTC reasoned that to include
respondents under the coverage of R.A. No. 9262 would
be a strained interpretation of the provisions of the law.
Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law,
to wit:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES
PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTS-IN-LAW OF
SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR
THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN
ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE “ANTI-VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF
2004.”17
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be
understood in the light of the provisions of Section 47 of
R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for the
suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
and, accordingly, the provision on “conspiracy” under
Article 8 of the RPC can be suppletorily applied to R.A.
No. 9262; that Steven and respondents had community
of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her
insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring
her to be ejected from the family home; and in
repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally
and physically; that respondents should be included as
indispensable or necessary parties for complete
resolution of the case.
On the other hand, respondents submit that they are
not covered by R.A. No. 9262 since Section 3 thereof
explicitly provides that the offender should be related to
the victim only by marriage, a former marriage, or a
dating or sexual relationship; that allegations on the
conspiracy of respondents require a factual
determination which cannot be
_______________
 16 Id., at p. 510.
17 Rollo, p. 8.
238
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Go-Tan vs. Tan
done by this Court in a petition for review; that
respondents cannot be characterized as indispensable
or necessary parties, since their presence in the case is
not only unnecessary but altogether illegal, considering
the non-inclusion of in-laws as offenders under Section
3 of R.A. No. 9262.
The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ‘‘[v]iolence against
women and their children’’ as “any act or a series of acts
committed by any person against a woman who is his
wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or
with whom he has a common child, or against her child
whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without
the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery,
assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation
of liberty.”
While the said provision provides that the offender
be related or connected to the victim by marriage,
former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it
does not preclude the application of the principle of
conspiracy under the RPC.
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly
provides for the suppletory application of the RPC, thus:
“SEC. 47. Suppletory Application.—For purposes of this
Act, the Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws,
shall have suppletory application.” (Emphasis supplied)
Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:
“ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this
Code.—Offenses which are or in the future may be
punishable under special laws are not subject to the
provisions of this Code. This Code shall be
supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should
specially provide the contrary.” (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code
may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes
punished239
VOL. 567, SEPTEMBER 30, 2008 239
Go-Tan vs. Tan
under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in which the
special law is silent on a particular matter.
Thus, in People v. Moreno,18 the Court applied
suppletorily the provision on subsidiary penalty under
Article 39 of the RPC to cases of violations of Act No.
3992, otherwise known as the “Revised Motor Vehicle
Law,” noting that the special law did not contain any
provision that the defendant could be sentenced with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
In People v. Li Wai Cheung,19 the Court applied
suppletorily the rules on the service of sentences
provided in Article 70 of the RPC in favor of the accused
who was found guilty of multiple violations of R.A. No.
6425, otherwise known as the “Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972,” considering the lack of similar rules under the
special law.
 In People v. Chowdury,20 the Court applied
suppletorily Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the RPC to define
the words “principal,” “accomplices” and “accessories”
under R.A. No. 8042, otherwise known as the “Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,” because
said words were not defined therein, although the
special law referred to the same terms in enumerating
the persons liable for the crime of illegal recruitment.
In Yu v. People,21 the Court applied suppletorily the
provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39
of the RPC to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22, otherwise
known as the “Bouncing Checks Law,” noting the
absence of an express provision on subsidiary
imprisonment in said special law.
Most recently, in Ladonga v. People,22 the Court
applied suppletorily the principle of conspiracy under
Article 8 of the
_______________
18 60 Phil. 712 (1934).
19 G.R. Nos. 90440-42, October 13, 1992, 214 SCRA 504.
20 G.R. Nos. 129577-80, February 15, 2000, 325 SCRA 572.
21 G.R. No. 134172, September 20, 2004, 438 SCRA 431.
22 G.R. No. 141066, February 17, 2005, 451 SCRA 673.
240
240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Go-Tan vs. Tan
RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary
provision therein.
With more reason, therefore, the principle of
conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied
suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express
provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be
supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of
the RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily
applicable, may be applied suppletorily.
Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to
R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or action in concert
to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is
the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or
modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.23
It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No.
9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of violence
against women and their children may be committed by
an offender through another, thus:
“SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their
Children.—The crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the following acts:
xxx
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless
conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or
causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the
woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to,
the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in
public or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the
residence of the woman or her child;
_______________
23 Ladonga v. People, supra note 22; People v. Felipe, G.R. No. 142505,
December 11, 2003, 418 SCRA 146, 176; People v. Julianda, Jr., G.R. No.
128886, November 23, 2001, 370 SCRA 448, 469; People v. Quinicio, G.R.
No. 142430, September 13, 2001, 365 SCRA 252, 266.
241
 VOL. 567, SEPTEMBER 30, 2008 241
Go-Tan vs. Tan
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the
property of the woman or her child against her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or
inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or her child;
and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
x x x.” (Emphasis supplied)
In addition, the protection order that may be issued
for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence
against the woman or her child may include individuals
other than the offending husband, thus:
“SEC. 8. Protection Orders.—x x x The protection
orders that may be issued under this Act shall include any,
some or all of the following reliefs:
(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to
commit or committing, personally or through another, any
of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act;
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing,
annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly;
x x x” (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal
construction of the law, thus:
“SEC. 4. Construction.—This Act shall be liberally
construed to promote the protection and safety of victims of
violence against women and their children.” (Emphasis
supplied)
It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the
law24 and that this intent must be effectuated by the
courts. In the present case, the express language of R.A.
No. 9262 reflects
_______________
24 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R.
No. 160528, October 9, 2006, 504 SCRA 90, 101; Eugenio v. Drilon, 322
Phil. 112; 252 SCRA 106 (1996); Philippine National Bank v. Office of
the President, 322 Phil. 6, 14; 252 SCRA 5, 11 (1996); Ongsiako v.
Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50, 57 (1950); Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil. 141, 145-146
(1931).
242
242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Go-Tan vs. Tan
the intent of the legislature for liberal construction as
will best ensure the attainment of the object of the law
according to its true intent, meaning and spirit - the
protection and safety of victims of violence against
women and children.
Thus, contrary to the RTC’s pronouncement, the
maxim “expressio unios est exclusio alterius” finds no
application here. It must be remembered that this
maxim is only an “ancillary rule of statutory
construction.” It is not of universal application. Neither
is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of
discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise
manifest and should not be permitted to defeat the
plainly indicated purpose of the legislature.25
The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues
at great length on the attendance of circumstances
evidencing the conspiracy or connivance of Steven and
respondents to cause verbal, psychological and
economic abuses upon her. However, conspiracy is an REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the dismissal of
evidentiary matter which should be threshed out in a the petition against respondents is concerned.
full-blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined SO ORDERED.
in the present petition since this Court is not a trier of
facts.26 It is thus premature for petitioner to argue
evidentiary matters since this controversy is centered
only on the determination of whether respondents may
be included in a petition under R.A. No. 9262. The
presence or absence of conspiracy can be best passed
upon after a trial on the merits.
Considering the Court’s ruling that the principle of
conspiracy may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262,
the Court will no longer delve on whether respondents
may be
_______________

25 Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, G.R. No.

132527, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 47, 78; Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., G.R.
No. 96859, October 15, 1991, 202 SCRA 779, 792; Primero v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. Nos. 48468-69, November 22, 1989, 179 SCRA 542, 548-
549.
26 Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. v. Philippine
National Construction Company, G.R. No. 169596, March 28, 2007,
519 SCRA 432, 441; Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 126850, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 79, 85.

243
VOL. 567, SEPTEMBER 30, 2008 243
Go-Tan vs. Tan
considered indispensable or necessary parties. To do so
would be an exercise in superfluity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.
The assailed Resolutions dated March 7, 2005 and July
11, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon
City in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 are hereby PARTLY