2nd Batch BR Digests

1
Case Name: Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee

Citation: 456 U.S. 694, 102 S. Ct. 2099 (1982)
Rule: The requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction flows not from U.S. Const. art. III, but from
the Due Process Clause. The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an individual
liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter
of individual liberty. Thus, the test for personal jurisdiction requires that the maintenance of the suit not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Facts: Petitioners provided excess business interruption insurance to cover respondent's operations in a
foreign country. Respondent allegedly experienced mechanical problems, resulting in a business
interruption loss. Respondent brought suit when all of the insurers refused to indemnify respondent.
When petitioners failed to produce documents requested by respondent during discovery, the district
court assumed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b) that petitioners were subject to in personam jurisdiction due to
their business contacts with the state.
Issue: Is It valid for personal jurisdiction to be found when a defendant does not follow court orders?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: When defendant does not question the court’s jurisdiction over a case, it means one has
submitted itself to litigation. However, it was the argument of the insurers that they were not yet bound
by the jurisdiction, hence, the disobedience towards court orders. The court affirmed and held that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that petitioners were subject to personal jurisdiction
under the applicable sanction.
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Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-5H60-003B-S53N-00000-00
2
Case Name: Esteves v. Esteves

Citation: 680 A.2d 398 (D.C. 1996)
Rule: An interpreter may be appointed for a "communication-impaired person." D.C. Code Ann. § 31-
2701 (1993). The statute defines a "communication-impaired person" as a person whose hearing is
impaired or who does not speak English. D.C. Code Ann. § 31-2701(2). A "non-English speaking person" is
defined as one who is unable to readily understand oral and written communications in the English
language or who cannot communicate effectively in the spoken English language.
Facts: Parents and son owned a house together and parents lived in the house for 18 years, paying the
mortgage and upkeep, but no rent to son for their occupancy. The parties sold the house and parents
brought an action for the equitable division of the proceeds of the house.
Issue: Is it a violation of due process if the court was not able to provide for an interpreter and had no
knowledge that the wife had difficulty communicating?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The trial court did not violate the wife's due process rights by failing to request if she needed
an interpreter, as her command of the language did not give any reason for an inquiry regarding her ability
to communicate. Sanctions were appropriate for discovery violations, but the trial court focused on the
wife's failure to prove fraud rather than her pre-filing conduct in imposing sanctions for filing a frivolous
pleading. The trial court also failed to explain why either sanction award was imposed solely against the
wife.
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1d24e226ffb3&pdsearchterms=680+A.2d+398+(D.C.+1996)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearc
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Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RRT-8J70-003G-10CK-00000-00
3
Case Name: Esteves v. Esteves

Citation: 341 N.J. Super. 197, 775 A.2d 163 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001)
Rule: Notwithstanding the general rules, when on a final accounting following sale, a tenant who has been
in sole possession of the property demands contribution toward operating and maintenance expenses
from his co-owner, fairness and equity dictate that the one seeking that contribution allow a
corresponding credit for the value of his sole occupancy of the premises. To reject such a credit and
nonetheless require a contribution to operating and maintenance expenses from someone who had
enjoyed none of the benefits of occupancy would be patently unfair.
Facts: The wife argued that the trial court's orders unduly prejudiced her and were not in the interests of
justice. The court held that the orders on the attorney's withdrawal and the trial continuance were not an
abuse of discretion but that the sanctions were not supported by requisite factual findings. The wife's
prior notification of her attorney's intent to withdraw gave her sufficient time to obtain other counsel,
and she later consented to withdrawal knowing that trial would proceed in three days. A two-month
continuance was already granted and the wife's dilatory conduct in failing to depose the husband during
that interim period was unexplained.
Issue: Is a tenant required to allow a corresponding credit for sole occupancy when a cotenant has own
possession of property and asks for money for operating and maintenance expenses for the non-
possessing cotenant?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The burden of demonstrating the actual value for rental of the property is on the non-
possessing co-tenant. The trial determined that both Manuel and Flora were to get half of the $61, 892.00
to operate and maintain the house. But since Joao was demanded his contribution, a corresponding credit
for 18 years is to be given to him.
The judgment entered against the wife upon the trial of her fraud case without an attorney was affirmed.
To require the husband to wait for trial, through no fault of his own, and in view of the wife's dilatory
behavior, would not have been in the interests of justice. The sanctions awards were remanded to permit
the trial court to make findings on all relevant issues and to explain why sanctions were not imposed
against the wife's attorney.
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Doc ID: urn:contentItem:438M-C450-0039-44DR-00000-00
4
Case Name: James v. Taylor

Citation: 62 Ark. App. 130, 969 S.W.2d 672 (1998)
Rule: In Arkansas, and in many other states, statutes have been adopted which presumptively construe
an instrument to create a tenancy in common rather than a joint tenancy. These statutes do not prohibit
joint tenancies but merely provide for a construction against a joint tenancy if the intention to create it is
not clear. A statute such as Ark. Code Ann. § 18-12-603 (1987) is not an expression of a public policy
against joint tenancies but is merely a choice by the legislature of a rule of construction that selects one
of two possible interpretations of a provision otherwise ambiguous.
Facts: The deed in question was executed by the grantor to the three grantees "jointly and severally, and
unto their heirs, assigns and successors forever," with the grantor retaining a life estate. Two of the three
grantees predeceased the grantor. The surviving grantee sought a declaration in the chancery court that
the grantor intended to convey the property to the grantees as joint tenants, thereby making the surviving
grantee the sole owner of the property. The descendents of the two deceased grantees argued that the
deed created a tenancy in common among the grantees.
Issue: If there is no intent to create a right of survivorship found in the instrument of conveyance, is it
valid to establish a joint tenancy?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The law of Arkansas construes that creation of common tenancy must show a clear intent to
create a right of survivorship. The court found that the use of the words "jointly and severally" did not
create a joint tenancy. There was no mention in the deed of "survivorship." Thus, the court held that the
language of the deed was insufficient to overcome the statutory presumption in Ark. Code Ann. § 18-12-
603 (1987) of a tenancy in common. The court noted that evidence of the grantor's intention also could
not prevail over the statute.
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Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3SRJ-3MK0-0039-43HJ-00000-00
5
Case Name: Higgins v. Superior Court

Citation: 140 Cal. App. 4th 1238, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 293 (2006)
Rule: Unconscionability has both a procedural and a substantive element, the former focusing on
oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on overly harsh or one-sided results.
Procedural and substantive unconscionability must both be present in order for a court to exercise its
discretion to refuse to enforce a contract or clause under the doctrine of unconscionability. But they need
not be present in the same degree. Essentially, a sliding scale is invoked which disregards the regularity of
the procedural process of the contract formation, that creates the terms, in proportion to the greater
harshness or unreasonableness of the substantive terms themselves. The more substantively oppressive
the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion
that the term is unenforceable and vice versa.
Facts: The siblings claimed that an arbitration clause contained in a written agreement they executed
before the program was broadcast was unconscionable. The court agreed, holding that the arbitration
clause was procedurally unconscionable. The siblings were young and unsophisticated, and had recently
lost both parents. The arbitration provision appeared in one paragraph near the end of a lengthy, single-
spaced document. No words were printed in bold letters or larger font, nor were they capitalized.
Although the siblings were required to place their initials in boxes adjacent to six other paragraphs, no
box appeared next to the arbitration provision. The arbitration provision was also substantively
unconscionable. It required only the siblings to submit their claims to arbitration.
Issue: Is an arbitration clause avoidable and may be not enforced due to unconscionability?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: Arbitration clauses are subject to the same ground at law for revocation like any other
contract including unconscionability. They are valid and enforceable as well. The court finds that the
arbitration clause is both procedurally and thus, unenforceable. The petition for writ of mandate was
granted. The lower court was directed to vacate that part of its order granting the petition of the television
defendants to compel arbitration and to enter a new and different order denying the petition to compel
arbitration.
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Doc ID: urn:contentItem:4K8S-RFC0-0039-413D-00000-00
6
Case Name: Freeland v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,

Citation: 632 F.3d 250 (6th Cir. 2011)
Rule: In actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief, it is well established that the amount in
controversy is measured by the value of the object of the litigation. Applying this principle, where a party
seeks a declaratory judgment, the amount in controversy is not necessarily the money judgment sought
or recovered, but rather the value of the consequences which may result from the litigation.
Facts: The insureds sought a declaratory judgment that their insurance policy provided uninsured,
underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) insurance coverage up to $100,000 per accident, instead of the $25,000
per accident maximum that appeared on the policy's face. Thus, if they prevailed in the case, they would
receive a declaration that their policy provided up to $100,000 in UM/UIM coverage. If they did not
prevail, their policy would remain as is, with only $25,000 in UM/UIM coverage. The value of the
consequences which could result from the litigation, that is, the monetary consequences that would result
from a victory for the insureds—was the difference between $100,000 and $25,000. That amount was
$75,000 exactly. However, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S. § 1332, in order for the district court to have original
jurisdiction the matter in controversy had to exceed the sum or value of $75,000.
Issue: Is the litigation the determining factor of declaratory judgment action?

Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The value of consequences that can result for action is the basis to determine the value of
consequences from the action. Therefore, the court ruled that the only proper course was to remand this
case back to state court for lack of federal jurisdiction. The amount in controversy in the action was exactly
one penny short of the jurisdictional minimum of the federal courts.
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692695a9e67a&pdsearchterms=Freeland+v.+Liberty+Mut.+Fire+Ins.+Co.%2C+632+F.3d+250&pdstarti
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Doc ID: urn:contentItem:523M-B631-652R-404T-00000-00
7
Case Name: Hill v. Edmonds

Citation: 26 A.D.2d 554, 270 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (App. Div. 1966)
Rule: Where separate acts of negligence combine to produce directly a single injury, each tort-feasor is
responsible for the entire result, even though his act alone might not have caused it.
Facts: At the close of the injured party's case, the trial court dismissed the complaint against the alleged
tortfeasor who, on a stormy night, left a tractor truck parked without lights in the middle of a road. The
car in which the injured party was a passenger collided with the truck from the rear. From the testimony
of the driver of the car, the trial court concluded that the driver was guilty of negligence and was solely
responsible for the collision.
Issue: Could multiple acts to cause a single harm, but each single act cannot commit the harm, may each
tortfeasor be sanctioned?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: Separate acts of negligence combined all together causing one direct harm, the liability is
directed to each tortfeasor even if each act may not have caused the harm. Still, the driver left his truck
without the lights contributing to harm. The court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the injured party's
negligence claim and granted the injured party a new trial.
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9d2a72d85eb0&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fcases%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A3RRT-
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Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RRT-0YD0-003C-C1TF-00000-00
8
Case Name: Frier v. Vandalia

Rule: Two suits may entail the same "cause of action" even though they present different legal theories,
and the first suit operates as an absolute bar to a subsequent action not only as to every matter which
was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter
which might have been offered for that purpose.
Facts: Plaintiff had several cars towed by defendant for blocking access to a street. After losing in state
court seeking replevin, plaintiff turned to the district court alleging a due process violation under U.S.
Const. amend. XIV because defendant towed his cars without subsequently holding a prompt hearing.
Issue: Is a state replevin claim barred by federal due process?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: Frier’s federal claim is barred by res judicata. There were different legal theories in support
of the state and federal claims. However, same facts as Frier’s cars being towed by the city-claim bars the
second one. The court further found that the replevin theory contained the elements that made up a due
process theory, and therefore, the court concluded that the state court would have treated both theories
as one "cause of action."
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5c811118c99b&pdsearchterms=Frier+v.+Vandalia%2C+770+F.2d+699&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdty
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Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-FDR0-0039-P106-00000-00
9
Case Name: Hill v. Sparks

Citation: 546 S.W.2d 473 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976)
Rule: The standard of the reasonable man requires only a minimum of attention, perception, memory,
knowledge, intelligence, and judgment in order to recognize the existence of the risk. If the actor has in
fact more than the minimum of these qualities, he is required to exercise the superior qualities that he
has in a manner reasonable under the circumstances.
Facts: Plaintiffs' decedent was killed while riding on a ladder on an earth moving machine operated by the
machine operator at a field demonstration of heavy construction equipment. The machine operator
claimed that there was no evidence from which the jury could have found that he was negligent in failing
to warn the decedent of the perils of riding on the ladder because the danger was obvious. He also claimed
that the decedent was contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
Issue: Was there enough evidence showing that the operator was able to meet the requisite standard of
care to free himself from negligence and liability?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: Court found that contributory negligence cannot be attributed to the death of Patricia Hill.
The existence of a factual issue was established as soon as it submissible case has been made. The fact
that evidence on the contributory negligence issue came largely from plaintiffs' witnesses does not affect
the right of the trial court to exercise the discretionary authority granted it.
Order affirmed and cause remanded for a new trial.
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c9a73b4fe568&pdsearchterms=Hill+v.+Sparks%2C+546+S.W.2d+473+(Miss+Ct.+App.+1976)&pdstartin
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Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RX6-H680-003F-C27C-00000-00
10
Case Name: Lasley v. Combined Transp., Inc.

Citation: 234 Or. App. 11, 227 P.3d 1200 (2010)
Rule: Whether any particular cause, or any individual actor's conduct, is sufficiently substantial to warrant
the imposition of liability depends on a consideration of the whole.
Facts: A truck owned by the trucking company dropped 12,000 pounds of glass onto the highway; traffic
was stopped while emergency responders took an hour to clean up the highway. Defendant intoxicated
driver struck decedent's vehicle from behind. In a wrongful death action, the jury found the trucking
company 22 percent at fault and the intoxicated driver 78 percent at fault.
Issue: Is Combined Transport liable for the death of the decedent for its accidental spill?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The court found that Combined Transport is 22 percent liable for the glass spill and is
supplemental to Clemmer’s 78 percent liability for her DUII and previous conviction of the same that both
caused the death of Lasley.
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760855b2c8d7&pdsearchterms=Lasley+v.+Combined+Transport%2C+Inc.%2C+234+Or+App+11%2C+2
27+P3d+1200+(2010)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=Sear
chBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=49eb6256-6084-4385-886e-
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Doc ID: urn:contentItem:7XXK-YSV0-YB0T-D00T-00000-00
11
Case Name: Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md.

Citation: 437 U.S. 117, 98 S. Ct. 2207 (1978)
Rule: The Commerce Clause protects the interstate market, not particular interstate firms, from
prohibitive or burdensome regulations. It may be true that the consuming public will be injured by the
loss of the high-volume, low-priced stations operated by the independent refiners, but again that
argument relates to the wisdom of the statute, not to its burden on commerce.
Facts: Petitioners, producers of petroleum products, contended that certain provisions of Md. Ann. Code
art. 56, § 157E, violated the Due Process and Commerce Clauses, and directly conflicted with the
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 13. The provisions in question did not allow petitioners to operate any
retail service stations in the state, and required petitioners to extend voluntary allowances to all service
stations they supplied.
Issue: Is it valid for a state to enact legislation that is not favorable for some interstate companies
operating in the state in reference to the Commerce Clause?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: There is no guarantee for existing market structures to be protected under the Commerce
Clause from changes and possible enactment of legislations. Exxon’s claim for the violation of due process
is not valid because there is a reasonable relationship established with regard to Maryland’s control over
the oil market. Hence, the statute is constitutional and the decision of the court is affirmed.
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b3ab730e578b&pdsearchterms=Exxon+Corp.+v.+Governor+of+Maryland%2C+437+U.S.+117+(1978)&
pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and
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Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-8RJ0-003B-S1KH-00000-00
12
Case Name: Galloway v. United States

Citation: 319 U.S. 372, 63 S. Ct. 1077 (1943)
Rule: U.S. Const. amend. VII preserves the basic institution of jury trial in only its most fundamental
elements, not the great mass of procedural forms and details.
Facts: Petitioner sued respondent to recover benefits for total and permanent disability by reason of
insanity. Specifically, he claimed that the strain of active military service abroad brought on an immediate
change, which was the beginning of a mental breakdown that eventually became a total and permanent
disability.
Issue: Does Seventh Amendment protect people from a direct verdict?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: There is no violation in the Seventh Amendment with regard to direct verdict. There is nothing
in history that supports the latter. In this case, there was insufficient evidence to prove that the mental
disability of Galloway is total and permanent. Hence, the court’s granted the motion for a directed verdict
by the United States.
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e4ae66ad30d9&pdsearchterms=Galloway+v.+United+States%2C+319+U.S.+372%2C+63+S.+Ct.+1077+(
1943)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttyp
e=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=aab3f7ed-4c32-44e2-aa78-b3ab730e578b&cbc=0
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-4GG0-003B-72NN-00000-00
13
Case Name: Hobbs v. Massasoit Whip Co.

Citation: 158 Mass. 194, 33 N.E. 495 (1893)
Rule: Conduct which imports acceptance or assent is acceptance or assent in the view of the law, whatever
may have been the actual state of mind of the party, a principle sometimes lost sight of in the cases.
Facts: Plaintiff testified that, as in previous sales, he delivered the skins in question to an individual who
forwarded them to defendant. The action was initiated when plaintiff was not paid for the eel skins and
defendant kept them for some months until they were destroyed.
Issue: Is mere silence a manifestation of acceptance of an offer if the parties have previously had a similar
deal?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: If there is a reasonable assumption that the offer is accepted then silence can be taken as an
acceptance. In this case, a previous purchase was made. The implication was if there was an objection
with regard to the deal, then the petitioner would have said it. The trial court is affirmed.
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5823f128dd2e&pdsearchterms=Hobbs+v.+Massasoit+Whip+Co.%2C+158+Mass.+194+(Mass.+1893)&p
dstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&
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Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RX4-76F0-003C-V0RT-00000-00
14
Case Name: Iseberg v. Gross,

Citation: 227 Ill. 2d 78, 316 Ill. Dec. 211, 879 N.E.2d 278 (2007)
Rule: To state a legally sufficient claim of negligence, the complaint must allege facts establishing the
existence of a duty of care owed by the defendants to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and an injury
proximately caused by that breach. Whether a duty is owed is a question of law for the court to decide,
while breach and proximate cause are factual matters for the jury.
Facts: The claimant was an attorney purchasing land to develop it. One of the two business partners
contacted him because that business partner and the former mutual business partner were building in
the same area. After disagreements arose, litigation occurred. A settlement was reached, which caused a
joint venture to be created. It also froze out the claimant from having anything to do with the land. Despite
the joint venture's efforts, the land was not sold. The former mutual business partner was forced to
surrender his interest in the land and lost his entire investment. The former mutual business partner's
threats to harm the claimant, whom he blamed, were communicated to the two business partners. They
did not warn the claimant or inform police. The former mutual business partner then shot and wounded
the claimant. The claimant sued the two business partners for, inter alia, negligence.
Issue: If there is no relationship between two parties involved in the case, is one bound to warn or protect
another?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: Because if no special relationship existed between parties, no obligation lies on the other to
warn of the threats of Slavin towards Iseberg. The decision in favor of Gross is affirmed.
URL:https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=e547b53f-05c6-4d84-bced-
6432480c7da1&pdsearchterms=Iseberg+v.+Gross%2C+879+N.E.2d+278+(2007)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%
3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=
&ecomp=532bk&prid=35f91d33-b499-4fb3-9e82-5823f128dd2e
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:4PPR-MXP0-TXFS-P28G-00000-00
15
Case Name: Favale v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Bridgeport,

Citation: 233 F.R.D. 243 (D. Conn. 2005)
Rule: Both negligent hiring and negligent supervision claims turn upon the type of wrongful conduct that
actually precipitated the harm suffered by a plaintiff. It is well settled that defendants cannot be held
liable for their alleged negligent hiring, training, supervision or retention of an employee accused of
wrongful conduct unless they had notice of the employee's propensity for the type of behavior causing
the plaintiff's harm.
Facts: The assistant alleged that the principal of the elementary school where she worked subjected her
to sexual harassment. Counsel for the assistant and her husband asked the principal at a deposition about
any psychological and psychiatric illnesses she may have had as well as any related medical treatment.
Counsel also asked about the principal's alleged anger management history. The diocese objected to the
requests on the grounds that the information was irrelevant and privileged. However, the assistant and
her husband argued that the information was discoverable because the diocese negligently hired and
supervised an individual who was not fit to be a school principal as she had limited experience and
emotional issues that presented a risk to the school's students and staff.
Issue: In a motion to compel, does a party need to prove that information requested is relevant?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: In this case, any proof related to the anger management issues of Stobierski is not relevant
to Favale’s claims denying the motion to compel. The motion by the administrative assistant and her
husband to compel discovery was denied; the objection by the diocese to the motion to compel discovery
was sustained, and the motion by the diocese for a protective order was granted.
URL:https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=a7b3e2fd-c843-4b8e-8784-
36f28029c20a&pdsearchterms=Favale+v.+Roman+Catholic+Diocese+of+Bridgeport%2C+233+F.R.D.+2
43+(2005)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pd
qttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=e547b53f-05c6-4d84-bced-6432480c7da1
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:4HJ3-3GV0-0038-Y4K0-00000-00
16
Case Name: Hodgeden v. Hubbard 46 Am.Dec. 167 (1846)

Citation:
Rule:
Facts:
Issue:
Answer:
Conclusion:
URL:
Doc ID:
17
Case Name: Hogan v. Tavzel

Citation: 660 So. 2d 350 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
Rule: A cause of action in battery will lie, and consent will be ineffective, if the consenting person was
mistaken about the nature and quality of the invasion intended.
Facts: Appellant ex-wife challenged the dismissal of her complaint against appellee ex-husband for
negligence, battery, fraudulent concealment, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress. The
parties separated after 15 years of marriage. During a period of attempted reconciliation, appellee
infected appellant with genital warts. Appellee knew of his condition but failed to warn appellant or take
precautions against infecting her.
Issue: Is a person with sexually transmitted disease that infects a spouse, and failing to warn the spouse
could make the person liable for battery?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: In Florida, sexually transmitted disease that was to their knowledge possible to infect other
people without warning them may be held liable for battery. Hogan did not have any idea with regard to
Tavzel’s condition having the sexually transmissible disease, hence, did not consent to getting exposed to
it. The battery count was a case of first impression. The court aligned itself with the majority view and
held that a tortfeasor could be liable for battery for infecting another with a sexually transmissible disease.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=c531e1d8-019c-4abd-88cd-
8ba0e8fc821e&pdsearchterms=Hogan+v.+Tavzel%2C+660+So.+2d+350+(Fla.+Ct.+App.+1995)&pdstarti
n=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=or&pdquery
templateid=&ecomp=5pfLk&prid=c36b34d8-ef95-46e7-90b4-3c84ecd00603
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RX4-5CT0-003F-32P8-00000-00
18
Case Name: Johnson v. City of Shelby

Citation: 135 S. Ct. 346 (2014
Rule:
Facts:
Issue:
Answer:
Conclusion:
URL:https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=b89e0b5a-cee8-4c2a-9898-
462c8b3e0a82&pdsearchterms=Johnson+v.+City+of+Shelby%2C+135+S.+Ct.+346+(2014)&pdstartin=hl
ct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=or&pdquerytem
plateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=c531e1d8-019c-4abd-88cd-8ba0e8fc821e
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:5DJV-8YX1-F04K-F3F3-00000-00
19
Case Name: Johnson v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc

Citation: 236 F.R.D. 535 (D. Kan. 2006)
Rule: Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 governs requests for production of documents. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b) provides that
a party who produces documents for inspection shall produce them as they are kept in the usual course
of business or shall organize and label them to correspond with the categories in the request.
Facts: The court found that plaintiff's "general objections" made it impossible for defendants to
determine which of the "general objections" applied to a particular request or interrogatory, and thus
they were deemed waived. The court held that plaintiff's tax returns were relevant to the issue of damages
where he claimed economic losses and back and front pay. Plaintiff was not required to execute a release
allowing defendants to obtain the tax records from third parties because there was no basis in Fed. R. Civ.
P. 34 to compel a party signature. Because plaintiff failed to provide any information establishing that
documents were produced as kept in the ordinary course of business under Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b), he was
required to organize and label them to correspond with the categories in each request.
Issue: Was petitioner’s motion to compel valid?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The court granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion to compel discovery
responses. The court deemed plaintiffs' general objections waived, ordered plaintiff to produced tax
returns, but allowed him to redact information concerning his spouse, denied the motion to compel
responses to certain interrogatories, and required plaintiff to submit amended responses.
URL:https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=cb350fb3-2b4b-4a4f-8c3b-
b4c1a5cb0133&pdsearchterms=Johnson+v.+Kraft+Goods+North+America%2C+236+F.R.D+535+(D.+Ka
n+2006)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqt
type=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=b89e0b5a-cee8-4c2a-9898-462c8b3e0a82
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:4K77-X3F0-TVV7-W2JX-00000-00
20
Case Name: Glidden v. Szybiak

Citation: 95 N.H. 318, 63 A.2d 233 (1949)
Rule: One who without consensual or other privilege to do so, uses or otherwise intentionally
intermeddles with a chattel which is in the possession of another is liable for a trespass to such person if,
but only if, (a) the chattel is impaired as to its condition, quality or value, or (b) the possessor is deprived
of the use of the chattel for a substantial time, or (c) bodily harm is thereby caused to the possessor or
harm is caused to some person or thing in which the possessor has a legally protected interest.
Facts: Defendants' dog injured plaintiff. Defendants contended that plaintiff was engaged in the
commission of a trespass at the time of her injury and was therefore, barred from recovery under the
statute.
Issue: Is a chattel considered trespassed if the condition, quality and/or value is not impaired?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: If a chattel’s condition, quality and/or value is not impaired, it is not trespassed. Court found
that in this case, Toby’s condition was not trespassed by Glidden. However, contributory negligence is
considered a trespass to chattel when one intentionally intermeddles with another person’s chattel
without consent and privilege impairing the quality of the latter. The judgment against the defendant
owner was affirmed, as she alone was responsible for the conduct of the dog. However, the judgment
against the defendant non-owner was set aside, as she was not in possession of the dog at the time of the
injury.
URL:https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=0ffc2a49-8355-4917-b72a-
8bcc2de9316d&pdsearchterms=Glidden+v.+Szybiak%2C+63+A.2d+233+(1949)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3
A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=
&ecomp=532bk&prid=cb350fb3-2b4b-4a4f-8c3b-b4c1a5cb0133
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RXP-62C0-003G-B1YV-00000-00
21
Case Name: Fair Hous. Council v. Roommate.com, LLC

Rule: An organization has direct standing to sue when it shows a drain on its resources from both a
diversion of its resources and frustration of its mission. However, standing must be established
independent of the lawsuit filed by the plaintiff. An organization cannot manufacture an injury by
incurring litigation costs or simply choosing to spend money fixing a problem that otherwise would not
affect the organization at all. An organization cannot, of course, manufacture the injury necessary to
maintain a suit from its expenditure of resources on that very suit.
Facts: Users of the operator's website were required to create a profile by answering questions about
their sex, sexual orientation, and whether children would be living with them, and they were asked to list
their preferences for roommate characteristics, including sex, sexual orientation, and familial status. The
district court held that the operator violated the FHA and the FEHA by prompting discriminatory
preferences from users and matching users based on that information.
Issue: Are the selection of roommates protected by Fair Housing Act’s provision on anti-discrimination?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: There is a protection of possible discrimination on basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial
status, or national origin by the FHA. However, it does not simply apply or allow the selection of
roommates. A roommate relationship is considered an intimate one that the government cannot interfere
between them. The court also found that FHA is inapplicable to share living units. The district court's
judgment was vacated and remanded for entry of judgment for the operator.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=eff1f7af-6273-456d-99d0-
6d592a858414&pdsearchterms=Fair+Hous.+Council+v.+Roommate.com%2C+LLC%2C+666+F.3d+1216
+(9th+Cir.+2012)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchB
ox&pdqttype=and&pdpsf=&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=z8-L9kk&earg=pdpsf&prid=bf2af282-b36b-
418d-980c-174d82e496ad
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:54W2-9751-F04K-V0N3-00000-00

22
Case Name: Goldwater v. Carter

Citation: 444 U.S. 996, 100 S. Ct. 533 (1979)
Rule:
Facts:
Issue:
Answer:
Conclusion:
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=5b5ad96c-915d-4d43-aff6-
c32af36faea4&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fcases%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A3S4X-
7NX0-003B-S418-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A3S4X-7NX0-003B-S418-00000-
00&pdcontentcomponentid=6443&pdteaserkey=sr0&pditab=allpods&ecomp=5ypck&earg=sr0&prid=
4ec00dfe-6e3c-4bb3-807b-038eacf64c8b
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-7NX0-003B-S418-00000-00
23
Case Name: Klein v. Pyrodyne Corp.

Citation: 117 Wash. 2d 1, 810 P.2d 917 (1991)
Rule: No part of a statute should be deemed inoperative or superfluous unless it is the result of obvious
mistake or error. This requires that every word, clause, and sentence of a statute be given effect, if
possible.
Facts: Fireworks discharged by defendant pyrotechnic company exploded near a crowd and injured
plaintiff onlookers. The discharge of fireworks was an abnormally dangerous activity justifying imposition
of strict liability: that is, it was an activity that is not of common usage and that presents an ineliminably
high risk of serious bodily injury or property damage. Fairness weighed in favor of requiring the
pyrotechnicians who present the displays to bear the loss, rather than the unfortunate spectators who
suffer the injuries. The problem of proof the case presented for the plaintiffs also supported imposing
strict liability on defendant.
Issue: Is any form of injury caused by Pyrodyne’s public fireworks display their liability?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The fireworks set on public is considered to be abnormally dangerous and is high risk for
putting the crowd in danger. The public policy is a reinforcement of the conclusion. Public fireworks
display have insurances to cover any damage or negligence of the operator. The court found that the
licensing and bonding requirements of Wash. Rev. Code § 70.77.285 imposed statutory strict liability, as
it was necessary to interpret the statute as mandating coverage of all damages caused by fireworks
displays, regardless of whether those damages were caused by negligence of the pyrotechnicians.
Intervening acts of third persons could only relieve the defendant from strict liability for abnormally
dangerous activities if their acts were unforeseeable in relation to the extraordinary risk created by the
activity.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=48c86346-0623-44a5-b24b-
d8059e635089&pdsearchterms=Klein+v.+Pyrodyne+Corp.%2C+117+Wash.+2d+1%2C+810+P.2d+917+(
e=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=5b5ad96c-915d-4d43-aff6-c32af36faea4
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S3J-W0D0-003F-W3BY-00000-00
24
Case Name: Goodman v. Dicker

Citation: 83 U.S. App. D.C. 353, 169 F.2d 684 (1948)
Rule: He who by his language or conduct leads another to do what he would not otherwise have done,
shall not subject such person to loss or injury by disappointing the expectations upon which he acted.
Such a change of position is sternly forbidden. This remedy is always so applied as to promote the ends of
justice.
Facts: Appellees sued appellants for breach of contract. The trial court found appellants, by their
representations and conduct, induced appellees to incur expenses in preparing for business under a
franchise that was never granted. The trial court held even though no contract had been proven,
appellants were estopped from denying one existed, and judgment was entered for appellees for the
amount covering their cash outlays and anticipated profits from the sale of radios. Appellants sought
review of the decision.
Issue: Is a representation of a company to grant franchise and the franchisee assumes so to its expense,
and later on the company does not grant it, is the latter liable for damages?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: Any misrepresentation by a party deceiving another causing detrimental reliance is liable for
damages. Judgment that appellants estopped from denying that a contract existed affirmed. However,
the court modified damage judgment to include only the loss sustained by expenditures made in reliance
on the assurance of the franchise dealer, not the anticipated loss of profits on the sale of the radios.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=6cd93e73-e847-4de1-bea6-
773b3f512266&pdsearchterms=Goodman+v.+Dicker%2C+169+F.2d+684+(D.C.+Cir.+1948)&pdstartin=
hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=or&pdqueryte
mplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=48c86346-0623-44a5-b24b-d8059e635089
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-2V10-003B-04NT-00000-00
25
Case Name: Halbman v. Lemke

Citation: 99 Wis. 2d 241, 298 N.W.2d 562 (1980)
Rule: Absent misrepresentation or tortious damage to the property, a minor who disaffirms a contract for
the purchase of an item, which is not a necessity, may recover his purchase price without liability for use,
depreciation, damage, or other diminution in value.
Facts: Plaintiff minor purchaser filed a suit against defendant seller to disaffirm a contract for the purchase
of a car that was no longer operable.
Issue: Is a minor liable for disaffirming a contract of a car purchase for damages incurred when it was in
his possession?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: It was not necessary for a minor to purchase a vehicle, and the minor had all the right to
disaffirm the contract. The minor is entitled to recover his full payment. However, the urge of Lemke to
recover the depreciation value of the vehicle was not granted. The court affirmed an order of the appellate
court, which affirmed an order of the trial court, which entered a judgment for plaintiff minor purchaser
in a suit against defendant seller to disaffirm a contract for the purchase of a car. Defendant was denied
restitution for any use or depreciation of the car. Plaintiff did not misrepresent his age when he purchased
the car.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=0bb0286a-5090-4486-b8fd-
6590f9537ce7&pdsearchterms=Halbman+v.+Lemke%2C+298+N.W.2d+562%2C+99+Wis.+2d+241+(198
0)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=a
nd&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=6cd93e73-e847-4de1-bea6-773b3f512266
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S3J-W5C0-003G-30T9-00000-00
26
Case Name: Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie

Citation: 452 U.S. 394, 101 S. Ct. 2424 (1981)
Rule: A final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating
issues that were or could have been raised in that action.
Facts: Respondents were two of several private litigants who had brought federal actions against
petitioner department store seeking treble damages as a proposed class of retail purchasers following an
antitrust action against petitioner.
Issue: Is the modification allowed by res judicata?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: Petitioner removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss on the ground of res
judicata. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, but the court of appeals reversed the dismissal
when the actions of the other private litigants were reinstated on appeal. The court of appeals found that
although respondents' actions were technically barred by res judicata, basic principles of public policy and
simple justice required an exception to that doctrine. Petitioner appealed and the court reversed the
decision and remanded the cause for further proceedings, finding that the dismissal of respondents'
original actions was final when they failed to appeal and, under such circumstances, there was no
equitable doctrine that provided an exception to the principle of res judicata.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=b4f17040-f3f6-4ee0-94f1-
75dabe023786&pdsearchterms=Federated+Department+Stores%2C+Inc.+v.+Noitie%2C+452+U.S.+394
+(1981)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqtt
ype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=0bb0286a-5090-4486-b8fd-6590f9537ce7
Doc ID:urn:contentItem:3S4X-6B80-003B-S0JN-00000-00
27
Case Name: Largey v. Rothman

Citation: 110 N.J. 204, 540 A.2d 504 (1988)
Rule: The "reasonable patient" or "prudent patient" standard is where informed consent gives rise to a
duty on the part of a physician to warn of the dangers lurking in the proposed treatment and to impart
information that the patient has every right to expect, as well as a duty of reasonable disclosure of the
choices with respect to proposed therapy and the dangers inherently and potentially involved. The scope
of the duty to disclose must be measured by the patient's need, and that need is the information material
to the decision. The test for determining whether a particular peril must be divulged is its materiality to
the patient's decision: all risks potentially affecting the decision must be unmasked. And to safeguard the
patient's interest in achieving his own determination on treatment, the law must itself set the standard
for adequate disclosure.
Facts: The court remanded for a new trial after reversing the trial court's determination that plaintiff
patient had consented to an operative procedure performed by defendant physician, and that he had not
failed to provide her with sufficient information so that she could give informed consent. The court
adopted a new standard, the "reasonable patient" or "prudent patient" standard, to determine the issue
of a patient's informed consent to treatment and discarded the previous "reasonable physician" or
"professional" standard.
Issue: Is “prudent patient” a determining standard if informed consent was obtained before medical
procedure?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: In New Jersey Courts, the “prudent patient” standard is the duty of physicians to inform their
patients of the procedure or treatment to be done for them to be able to make an informed decision. The
said doctrine should determine if Rothman obtained consent of the patient before excising her lymph
nodes. The court remanded for a new trial after reversing the determination that defendant physician had
not failed to provide plaintiff patient with sufficient information for her to give informed consent, and
instructed the retrial to use the "reasonable patient" or "prudent patient" standard in resolving the issue
of whether the risk of lymphedema would influence a prudent patient in deciding on whether to submit
to surgery.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=52580977-2f88-431f-bfbd-
30a3a38423f9&pdsearchterms=Largey+v.+Rothman%2C+110+N.J.+204+(1988)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%
&ecomp=532bk&prid=b4f17040-f3f6-4ee0-94f1-75dabe023786
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S3J-VW30-003C-P4C2-00000-00
28
Case Name: Hancock v. AT&T Co.

Rule: The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviews a district court's grant of a motion
to compel arbitration de novo. Where the parties dispute the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, a
court may grant a motion to compel arbitration if there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding
the parties' agreement. Courts should give to the opposing party the benefit of all reasonable doubts and
inferences that may arise.
Facts: The customers first contended that customers could not knowingly accept the service's TV/voice
and internet terms. This argument focused on whether the sellers' standard practice gave customers
adequate disclosure of the terms and an adequate opportunity to review and accept them. Second, the
customer argued that the district court failed to draw reasonable inferences and resolve disputed facts in
their favor.
Issue: Is a clickwrap agreement that gives consumers sufficient notice of the terms and opportunity to
read and accept them valid?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The court enforces clickwrap agreements when agreement is clearly presented to customers
with the opportunity to read and the latter’s choice to agree. In this case, customers are required to click
an acknowledgement button certifying that they have read and agreed to the terms of service. The
argument that the e-mail of AT&T has been buried in 2008, but a bulletpoint states that there is a change
in the applicable terms and service. The court affirmed the district court's orders dismissing the customers'
TV/voice-related and internet-related claims.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=a137125b-1434-4c23-bd88-
a595ea40efe1&pdsearchterms=Hancock+v.+AT%26T%2C+701+F.3d+1248+(10th+Cir.+2012)&pdstartin
templateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=52580977-2f88-431f-bfbd-30a3a38423f9
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:577X-M031-F04K-W29N-00000-00
29
Case Name: Hancock v. Northcutt

Citation: 808 P.2d 251 (Alaska 1991)
Rule: The general rule is that where a tortfeasor's negligence causes emotional distress without physical
injury, such damages may not be awarded. W. Prossor and W. Keeton, The Law of Torts § 54, at 361 (5th
ed. 1984). The courts have recognized the application of this rule in several cases in which the plaintiffs
have suffered emotional distress upon observing a loved one who has been physically injured by the act
of a tortfeasor. In those cases the courts recognized an exception to the general rule where the plaintiff
is shocked by observing the physically injured victim more or less contemporaneously with the plaintiff's
learning of the nature of the victim's injuries.
Facts: Appellant contractors were negligent in the construction of concrete pods for an earth-sheltered
concrete house. Appellee owners of the house brought an action against appellants and recovered
monetary damages, including damages for the cost of demolishing and rebuilding the house, storage
costs, and for temporary housing.
Issue: Did the trial court err in the instruction given to the jury for its ruling?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The court did not find sufficient evidence to inflict any emotional harm or punitive damages.
For the above reasons, the judgment is reversed with respect to the award of rebuilding, storage and
temporary housing costs, and damages for emotional distress. The court's refusal to award prejudgment
interest on demolition and moving costs is reversed. The court's award of attorney's fees is vacated. In all
other respects the judgment of the superior court is affirmed. The case is remanded for a new trial to
determine the difference between the value the house would have had if it had been built as promised
and the value the house actually has.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=eecb1d51-660f-448c-9731-
5e6cbddcfc30&pdsearchterms=Hancock+v.+Northcutt%2C+808+P.2d+251+(Alaska+1991)&pdstartin=h
lct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdqueryte
mplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=a137125b-1434-4c23-bd88-a595ea40efe1
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RX3-W8B0-003C-G15W-00000-00
30
Case Name: Lopez v. Winchell's Donut House

Citation: 126 Ill. App. 3d 46, 81 Ill. Dec. 507, 466 N.E.2d 1309 (1984)
Rule: The common law tort of false imprisonment is defined as an unlawful restraint of an individual's
personal liberty or freedom of locomotion. Imprisonment has been defined as any unlawful exercise or
show of force by which a person is compelled to remain where he does not wish to remain or to go where
he does not wish to go. In order for a false imprisonment to be present, there must be actual or legal
intent to restrain.
Facts: The trial court determined that the answers given in the employee's deposition stated that she
voluntarily accompanied an agent of the employer into the baking room where she was questioned, she
stayed in the room in order to protect her reputation, and she was never threatened with the loss of her
job and never put in fear of her safety. On appeal the employee alleged that her written response to the
employer's motion for summary judgment did not contradict the statements made in her discovery
deposition.
Issue: Is false imprisonment a ground for a plaintiff to recover if it is voluntary?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: A false imprisonment is a restraint to a person’s liberty or freedom of movement where there
is unlawful action. Hence, there is no false imprisonment in case. The court disagreed and affirmed the
summary judgment. The court held that for the tort of false imprisonment it was not enough for the
employee to have felt compelled to remain in the baking room in order to protect her reputation. The
evidence had to have established that she was restrained against her will. The evidence revealed no such
constraint of a threat, express or implied, or to physical force of any kind.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=5b57453e-aeb8-4ab5-a4be-
b3c0b540d0b7&pdsearchterms=Lopez+v.+Winchell%27s+Donut+House%2C+466+N.E.2d+1309+(1984)
&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=an
d&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=eecb1d51-660f-448c-9731-5e6cbddcfc30
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RRM-5NY0-0054-H3HS-00000-00
31
Case Name: In re Banks

Citation: 295 N.C. 236, 244 S.E.2d 386 (1978)
Rule: Criminal statutes must be strictly construed. But the courts must nevertheless construe it with
regard to the evil which it is intended to suppress. The intent of the legislature controls the interpretation
of a statute. When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial
construction and the courts must give the statute its plain and definite meaning, and are without power
to interpolate provisions and limitations not contained therein. But when a statute is ambiguous or
unclear in its meaning, resort must be had to judicial construction to ascertain the legislative will, and the
courts will interpret the language to give effect to the legislative intent. The legislative intent is to be
ascertained by appropriate means and indicia, such as the purposes appearing from the statute taken as
a whole, the phraseology, the words ordinary or technical, the law as it prevailed before the statute, the
mischief to be remedied, the remedy, the end to be accomplished, statutes in pari materia, the preamble,
the title, and other like means. Other indicia are the legislative history of an act and the circumstances
surrounding its adoption; earlier statutes on the same subject; the common law as it was understood at
the time of the enactment of the statute; and previous interpretations of the same or similar statutes.
Facts: On review, the court reversed and remanded. The court found that, interpreting the language of
the statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202 prohibited the wrongful spying into a room upon a female with the
intent of violating the female's legitimate expectation of privacy.
Issue: Is secret peeping into a female’s room violate of privacy void for vagueness or overbreadth
criminalized by the Peeping Tom statute?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: It is neither void for vagueness nor overbreadth because as long as a criminal statute gives
notice that it is criminalizing such crime, there is no vagueness. he court determined that such an
interpretation was sufficient to inform a person of ordinary intelligence, with reasonable precision, of
those acts the statute intended to prohibit, so that he knew what acts he should avoid in order that he
would not bring himself within its provisions. The court held, therefore, that § 14-202 was sufficiently
definite to give an individual fair notice of the conduct prohibited, and to guide a judge in its application
and a lawyer in defending one charged with its violation, and that this statute violated neither N.C. Const.
art. I, § 19, nor the due process clause of the federal constitution by reason of vagueness and uncertainty,
nor was the statute unconstitutional for overbreadth.
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1d64f4f8fd65&pdsearchterms=In+Re+Banks+244+S.E.2d+386+(1978)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdty
peofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=
532bk&prid=5b57453e-aeb8-4ab5-a4be-b3c0b540d0b7
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S3J-YBP0-003G-00HS-00000-00
32
Case Name: Greenfield v. Philles Records

Citation: 98 N.Y.2d 562, 750 N.Y.S.2d 565, 780 N.E.2d 166 (2002)
Rule: Long-settled common-law contract rules still govern the interpretation of agreements between
artists and their record producers. The fundamental, neutral precept of contract interpretation is that
agreements are construed in accord with the parties' intent. The best evidence of what parties to a written
agreement intend is what they say in their writing. Thus, a written agreement that is complete, clear, and
unambiguous on its face must be enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms.
Facts: In the early 1960s, two sisters and their cousin formed a singing group and signed a contract with
a record production company. The members of the group agreed to perform exclusively for the
production company and the company acquired ownership rights to the group's recordings but agreed to
pay royalties. A member of the group married a person who owned the production company, but that
marriage was terminated several years later by a California court. After the singing group disbanded, the
production company sold albums containing the group's songs, and licensed master recordings of the
group's performances for use in movies and television productions.
Issue: If an agreement is complete and unambiguous, is it admissible if parties’ intent is not in the terms
of the written agreement?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: As long as an agreement is unambiguous, clear and complete, it is sufficient as an evidence
that shows that the parties’ intent must be as is. The state high court modified the intermediate appellate
court's judgment finding that the defendants had breached their contract with members of the singing
group, but remitted the case to the trial court for recalculation of its judgment based on the state high
court's finding that members of the signing group were entitled to payment of royalties.
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18d1894ea10c&pdsearchterms=Greenfield+v.+Philles+Records%2C+Inc.%2C+98+N.Y.2d+562+(2002)&
&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=efc33c4a-5bb3-40f8-9113-1d64f4f8fd65
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:4713-4CH0-0039-42BC-00000-00
33
Case Name: Davies v. McDowell Nat'l Bank

Citation: 407 Pa. 209, 180 A.2d 21 (1962)
Rule: Social guests are gratuitous licensees. To this class, the owner of a premises is liable for bodily harm
caused by a latent dangerous condition existing thereon only if he has knowledge of the condition and
fails to give warning thereof, realizing that it involves an unreasonable risk to his guests and that they are
not likely to discover its existence.
Facts: The husband and his wife visited the business office of the wife's stepfather. A carbon monoxide
leak in the office poisoned the couple and the stepfather resulting in the deaths of both the wife and
stepfather and serious injuries to the husband. Actions for damages on behalf of the husband and the
wife's estate were brought against the stepfather's estate.
Issue: Is it valid to take damages by way of wife’s estate brought against the stepfather’s estate even if
they were only guests?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: There is no sufficient proof showing that the stepfather had knowledge of the dangerous
condition on which the cause was based. They were guests, and the only entitlement they have was of
warnings about the latent condition.
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107b12d63168&pdsearchterms=Davies+v.+McDowell+Nat%27l+Bank%2C+407+Pa.+209%2C+180+A.2
d+21+(1962)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&
pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=16d2333c-6a23-4645-80ef-18d1894ea10c
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RRM-TYS0-003C-M1C6-00000-00
34
Case Name: Curtis v. Loether

Citation: 415 U.S. 189, 94 S. Ct. 1005 (1974)
Rule: The Seventh Amendment applies to actions enforcing statutory rights, and requires a jury trial upon
demand, if the statute creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the
ordinary courts of law.
Facts: Petitioner filed suit pursuant to § 812 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.S. § 3612, seeking
injunctive relief and actual and punitive damages due to respondents' refusal to rent an apartment to her
because of her race. Respondents requested a jury trial, which was denied by the district court.
Issue: Is a demand for a jury trial by either party valid under Seventh Amendment?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: Any controversy in an amount exceeding $20 is protected by the Seventh Amendment. The
court held that a damage suit under 42 U.S.C.S. § 3612 was an action to enforce "legal rights" within the
meaning of the Seventh Amendment. Petitioner's action under the Civil Rights Act of 1968 was a tort
action; therefore the Seventh Amendment applied to preserved respondents' right to a jury trial, where
the statute created legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts
of law. Moreover, the relief sought, actual and punitive damages, was the traditional form of relief offered
in the courts of law.
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d62eede506a8&pdsearchterms=Curtis+v.+Loether%2C+415+U.S.+189%2C+94+S.+Ct.+1005+(1974)&pd
startin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&p
dquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=fd15f51e-ceb6-4d7a-9b94-107b12d63168
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-CF30-003B-S414-00000-00
35
Case Name: Christian v. Mattel, Inc.

Rule: A finding of significant delay or expense is not required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. Where the complaint
is the primary focus of Rule 11 proceedings, a district court must conduct a two-prong inquiry to
determine: (1) whether the complaint is legally or factually baseless from an objective perspective; and
(2) if the attorney has conducted a reasonable and competent inquiry before signing and filing it.
Facts: The sanctions arose out of the attorney's actions in representing a marketer of dolls against the
toy company for copyright infringement. The trial court imposed sanctions after finding that the attorney
had filed a meritless claim against the company. The attorney argued, inter alia, that even if the trial court
were justified in sanctioning him under Rule 11 based on the complaint and the following motions, its
conclusion was tainted because it impermissibly considered other misconduct that could not have been
sanctioned under Rule 11, such as discovery abuses, misstatements made during oral argument, and
conduct in other litigation.
Issue: When an lawyer files a mockery copyright claim, is the lawyer liable for sanctions in the Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: Under this rule, the lawyer has a duty to conduct an investigation to establish facts before
filing a complaint. The claim is found to be meritless in this case because Barbie had been manufactured
even before Claudene that is not possible for Mattel to copy. Hence the judgment was vacated and case
was remanded.
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cb45733c7a42&pdsearchterms=Christian+v.+Mattel%2C+Inc.%2C+286+F.3d+1118+(9th+Cir.+2003)&p
pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=3e9c0042-11d2-4878-823c-d62eede506a8
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:45KM-H6J0-0038-X507-00000-00
36
Case Name: Conrad v. Fields

Citation: No. A06-1387, 2007 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 744 (July 24, 2007)
Rule: In actions based on promissory estoppel, relief may be limited to damages measured by the
promisee's reliance. In other words, relief may be limited to the party's out-of-pocket expenses made in
reliance on the promise.
Facts: The judgment awarded the student damages based on promissory estoppel. The facts showed that
appellant suggested that the student attend law school and that he offered to pay for her education. The
student quit her job to attend law school. Appellant made one tuition payment and then paid nothing
more. Affirming, the court held that the student's allegations that she would not have attended law school
but for appellant's inducement and assurances that he would pay for her education was sufficient to
satisfy the notice-pleading requirements of Minn. R. Civ. P. 8.01 and Minn. R. Gen. Prac. Dist. Ct. 507.
Further, each of the elements of promissory estoppel were present. Appellant reasonably should have
expected his promise to induce action by the student, the promise did induce such action, and the student
was left with a substantial debt when appellant failed to keep his promise. Further, because it would have
been unjust to have required the student to pay a debt that she incurred in reliance on appellant's promise
to pay the education debt, appellant's promise was enforceable despite the statute of frauds set forth
inMinn. Stat. § 513.01(1) (2006).
Issue: If no contract existed between promisor and promisee, should promisor expect to induce and action
or forbearance on the part of the promisee and is binding?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: A promise that a promisor should reasonably expect to induce an action or forebearance is
binding on the promisor even without the contract, this is under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. All
the elements of the latter was established by Conrad. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment and
granted in part the student's motion to strike appellant's brief and index. The court granted that motion
to the extent that it related to deposition transcripts and a tax document that were not part of the record
on appeal.
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5bda5980deaa&pdsearchterms=Conrad+v.+Fields%2C+No.+A06-
1387%2C+2007+Minn.+App.+Unpub.+LEXIS+744+(July+24%2C+2007)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdty
peofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=
532bk&prid=694182c1-56d8-4f5e-bce5-cb45733c7a42
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:4P8G-D8V0-TXFT-S34N-00000-00
37
Case Name: Duncan v. Louisiana

Citation: 391 U.S. 145, 88 S. Ct. 1444 (1968)
Rule: The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which, were they to
be tried in a federal court, would come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee.
Facts: Defendant was charged with simple battery, a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum of two
years imprisonment and a $ 300 fine. Defendant sought trial by jury, but because the Louisiana
Constitution grants jury trials only in cases in which capital punishment or imprisonment at hard labor
may be imposed, the trial court denied the request. Defendant was convicted and sentenced to serve 60
days in the parish prison and pay a fine of $ 150. After the state supreme court denied his petition for a
writ of certiorari, defendant sought review in the federal court.
Issue: Is capital punishment or imprisonment at hard labor a violation of the constitution at a jury trial?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The appellant’s demand for jury was refused and this is considered a violation of the
Constitution. Not all criminal trial is unfair or that a defendant may be treated failed by a judge. The Court
reversed defendant's simple battery conviction and remanded for further proceedings because the trial
court erred in denying defendant's request for a jury trial. The Court ruled that although the offense was
a misdemeanor, because it carried a maximum two-year sentence, it was a serious crime for which
defendant was entitled to a jury trial.
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6d15c02ac390&pdsearchterms=Duncan+v.+Louisiana%2C+391+U.S.+145+(1968)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1
%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplatei
d=&ecomp=532bk&prid=97f5b057-63ab-4c09-8bdb-5bda5980deaa
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-FJB0-003B-S0J1-00000-00
38
Case Name: Delaney v. Reynolds

Citation: 63 Mass. App. Ct. 239, 825 N.E.2d 554 (2005)
Rule: There are four elements to a negligence claim: (1) a legal duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant;
(2) a breach of that duty by the defendant; (3) causation; and, (4) actual loss by the plaintiff.
Facts: The boyfriend was a police officer. It was his practice to store his handgun, loaded and unlocked, in
his bedroom in a duffle bag or in a bureau drawer. On a night when the girlfriend had been drinking and
taking drugs, the parties fought, and the boyfriend told her to pack her belongings. While packing, she
noticed the duffle bag, removed the handgun, aimed it at a window, and pulled the trigger twice. The gun
did not fire. The boyfriend jumped from a sofa and ran after the girlfriend who then went into the master
bedroom, put the gun beneath her chin, and pulled the trigger. The gun fired and a bullet entered her
chin and existed her right check.
Issue: Is it negligence on defendant’s part considering that it is unforeseeable matter of law at the attempt
of a plaintiff’s suicide?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the boyfriend upon the ground that the
girlfriend's intervening act of shooting herself was a superseding cause of her injuries. On appeal, the
girlfriend asserted that she did not believe the gun was loaded, did not intend to harm herself, and that
her state of mind was a question of fact. The court agreed and held that the trial court erred in disposing
of the girlfriend's claim because numerous questions of fact existed, including whether the risk of injury
was foreseeable.
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283ce6634e44&pdsearchterms=Delaney+v.+Reynolds%2C+63+Mass.+App.+Ct.+239+(2005)&pdstartin
templateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=973e66da-e8d0-4eca-ad61-6d15c02ac390
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:4FY4-JBK0-0039-435F-00000-00
39
Case Name: Bd. of Educ. v. Hughes

Citation: 118 Minn. 404, 136 N.W. 1095 (1912)
Rule: A deed which is a nullity when delivered because the name of the grantee is omitted becomes
operative without a new execution or acknowledgment if the grantee, with either express or implied
authority from the grantor, inserts his name in the blank space left for the name of the grantee.
Facts: Defendant bought a city lot in May 1906. Defendant did not fill in the grantee's name on the deed
until shortly before it was recorded on December 16, 1910. In April 1909, real estate dealers paid the
same grantor for a quitclaim deed to the same lot. They did not record their deed until December 21,
1910. However, they delivered a warranty deed to plaintiff, who recorded that deed in January 1910.
Issue: Is a blank deed, knowing that the name of the grantee is to be written, a valid delivery?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: There is a nullification where the grantee’s name is filled in. This was not notice to defendant
of the prior unrecorded conveyance by his grantor. He was a subsequent purchaser in good faith for a
valuable consideration, and he was thus protected by the recording of his deed before the prior deed was
recorded. The court reversed a judgment in favor of plaintiff in an action against defendant to determine
adverse claims to a city lot. The case was remanded for a new trial.
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a3668b60b7f8&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fcases%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A3RRJ-
4H40-003G-S1PB-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A3RRJ-4H40-003G-S1PB-00000-
00&pdcontentcomponentid=7841&pdshepid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A7XW7-38J1-2NSD-T06N-00000-
00&pdteaserkey=sr0&pditab=allpods&ecomp=5ypck&earg=sr0&prid=00b92e9d-b435-49fb-88d3-
91c17e7a8379
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RRJ-4H40-003G-S1PB-00000-00
40
Case Name: Baska v. Scherzer

Citation: 283 Kan. 750, 156 P.3d 617 (2007)
Rule: Assault is defined in Kansas as an intentional threat or attempt, coupled with apparent ability, to do
bodily harm to another, resulting in immediate apprehension of bodily harm. No bodily contact is
necessary. Battery is defined as the unprivileged touching or striking of one person by another, done with
the intent of bringing about either a contact or an apprehension of contact, that is harmful or offensive.
The gravamen of a civil assault and battery is grounded upon the actor's intention to inflict injury.
Facts: An altercation broke out between the two fighters. The injured party intervened and stepped
between the two fighters. The injured party was "unintentionally" struck by the fighters' punches
intended for each other. The injured party filed suit more than one year, but less than two years, after the
injury. The supreme court determined that the one-year statute of limitations in Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-
514(b) for assault and battery barred the injured party's action.
Issue: Is the two boys are liable for hitting Baska’s injury from punches struck for the defendants, but
unintentionally hit the petitioner?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: There was an unintentional hit and cause of injuries by the respondents. The injured party's
action was one for assault and battery, rather than negligence, because (1) the fighters' acts of throwing
punches were intentional actions since each fighter intended to strike at the other in order to cause harm,
(2) under the doctrine of transferred intent, the fact that the fighters struck the injured party did not
change the fact that their actions were intentional, and (3) the fact that the injured party's petition
described her claims as actions for negligence did not alter the nature of those claims. The supreme court
reversed the appellate court's decision and affirmed the district court.
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53d71ba8f810&pdsearchterms=Baska+v.+Scherzer%2C+283+Kan.+750%2C+156+P.3d+617+(2007)&pd
dquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=d5272e40-315e-412b-934c-a3668b60b7f8
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:4NKR-4FV0-TXFT-02D2-00000-00
41
Case Name: Bruce v. State

Citation: 317 Md. 642, 566 A.2d 103 (1989)
Rule: To secure a conviction for first degree murder under the felony murder doctrine, the state is
required to prove a specific intent to commit the underlying felony and that death occurred in the
perpetration or attempt to perpetrate the felony; it is not necessary to prove a specific intent to kill or to
demonstrate the existence of willfulness, deliberation, or premeditation. Homicide arising in the
perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate, a felony is murder whether death was intended or not,
the fact that the person was engaged in such perpetration or attempt being sufficient to supply the
element of malice.
Facts: Defendant was convicted of attempted felony murder, robbery with a deadly weapon and two
handgun offenses. On appeal, defendant argued that attempted felony murder was not a crime in the
state of Maryland. The court granted certiorari and reversed the conviction for attempted felony murder.
Issue: Is a crime with no specific intent by a defendant be guilty of crime?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: A criminal attempt must be proven that the defendant had a specific intent to commit the
crime. The court determined that defendant could not be convicted of an attempt at a crime that did not
require an element of intent The court held that the defendant's remaining convictions were unaffected
by its determination. The court reversed defendant's conviction for attempted felony murder. The cause
was remanded to the circuit court for the imposition of sentencing on the remaining convictions.
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43bcc6087c82&pdsearchterms=Bruce+v.+State%2C+317+Md.+642%2C+566+A.2d+103+(1989)&pdstar
tin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdqu
erytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=96bbc458-4779-431d-90b8-53d71ba8f810
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RX4-3MJ0-003G-21RJ-00000-00
42
Case Name: Denman v. Spain

Citation: 242 Miss. 431, 135 So. 2d 195 (1961)
Rule: The Supreme Court of Mississippi has many times held that verdicts cannot be based on
possibilities.
Facts: The decedent was killed when his northbound car collided with the southbound car in which the
minor was a passenger. No survivor could recall the accident. A northbound driver testified that the
decedent's car passed him going 75 or 80 miles per hour. The jury found for the minor in her negligence
suit. The court ruled that the driver's testimony was admissible because he stated that the decedent did
not slow down before the collision.
Issue: Is a personal injury be judged as a civil suit simply by being a possibility?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: A court determines that despite the jury’s finding, a reasonable jury could not come up with
the same conclusion. The court held that the trial court did not err in entering judgment notwithstanding
the verdict for the executrix because there was no sound or reasonable basis upon which a jury or the
court could say that the minor met her burden of proof. The driver's testimony showed only that the
deceased's car was being operated at an excessive and negligent rate of speed. It otherwise showed that
the decedent's car was in its proper lane. The cars were so badly damaged that the pictures afforded no
reasonable explanation as to what person or persons were legally responsible for their condition.
Although by speculation and conjecture, several conclusions could be reached as to how the accident
occurred, a verdict could not be based on possibilities.
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bd02961afe63&pdsearchterms=Denman+v.+Spain%2C+242+Miss.+431%2C+135+So.+2d+195+(1961)&
&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=611a8789-0e21-406e-9431-43bcc6087c82
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RRM-YVX0-000H-3123-00000-00
43
Case Name: Cole v. Turner

Citation: 108 Ark. 537, 158 S.W. 493 (1913)
Rule: Where a landlord makes advances to his tenant and takes as security the tenant's note with a surety
thereon, and agrees to a transfer of the lease from the tenant to a subtenant, and in order to collect the.
amount of his advance, recovers judgment against the tenant and surety, the landlord will be held to have
waived, by his conduct, his landlord's lien upon the crops of the tenants.
Facts: The landlord rented his farm to the tenants. The landlord provided them 100 bushels of corn and
took their note for $ 65, with the surety guaranteeing the note. The surety took a mortgage on the crop
for supplies. Later, one tenant sold his interest in the crop to the other tenant, who then made an
exchange of gathering crops with defendant. Some weeks later, the remaining tenant sold his interest in
the crop to defendant. Defendant finished gathering the crop and he and the remaining tenant paid off
the mortgage given to the surety. Later on, the landlord went to the surety and demanded payment of
the note. A suit was brought, and the surety paid the resulting judgment. The surety brought suit against
defendant and asked that he be subrogated to the landlord's lien upon the crop for advances made by
him.
Issue: Did the landlord waive his lien for rent and advances made to his tenant?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The trial court found for defendant. The court affirmed. The court found that the landlord, by
his conduct, waived his lien for rent and advances made to his tenant by taking a note therefor with
personal security. The court found his conduct showed he did not intend to rely upon his landlord's lien
for satisfaction of the note. Thus, the surety cannot obtain subrogation.
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968b0e50e4c9&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fcases%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A3YTR-
R370-00KR-D54X-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A3YTR-R370-00KR-D54X-00000-
00&pdcontentcomponentid=4300&pdshepid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A7XXB-NTJ1-2NSD-M0BK-00000-
00&pdteaserkey=sr0&pditab=allpods&ecomp=5ypck&earg=sr0&prid=80b4fce9-7d87-4411-845a-
67ec85304fc5
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3YTR-R370-00KR-D54X-00000-00
44
Case Name: Cole v. Turner, 522 U.S. 1056 (1998)

Citation:
Rule:
Facts:
Issue:
Answer:
Conclusion:
URL:
Doc ID:
45
Case Name: Buck v. Bell

Citation: 274 U.S. 200, 47 S. Ct. 584 (1927)
Rule: The public welfare may call upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not
call upon those who already sap the strength of the state for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be
such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all
the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle
that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the fallopian tubes. Three
generations of imbeciles are enough.
Facts: Defendant in error, the superintendent of the state institution, sought an order for the sterilization
by salpingectomy of plaintiff in error, an inmate in a state institution. After a hearing, the state trial court
ordered that plaintiff in error be sterilized. The state supreme court affirmed the sterilization order, and
plaintiff in error sought review.
Issue: Is right to reproduce considered a fundamental liberty?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: According to Virginia’s state law, the permission on involuntary sterilization of a person who
is ill is not a violation of a person’s substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The
court held that the state could properly sterilize those determined to be feeble minded to prevent the
birth of feeble minded children who might lead lives of crime or indigency. The fact that the sterilization
order procedure only applied to inmates in state facilities and not to the general public did not deprive
the inmates of equal protection.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=2bf782e0-e625-4736-a2cc-
8ead68a750fd&pdsearchterms=Buck+v.+Bell%2C+274+U.S.+200%2C+47+S.+Ct.+584+(1927)&pdstartin
templateid=&ecomp=5pfLk&prid=c5fc20e1-0694-4a9a-9a0c-f0e6aded22b1
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-G000-003B-743W-00000-00
46
Case Name: Bowers v. Hardwick

Citation: 478 U.S. 186, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986)
Rule: The rights qualifying for heightened judicial protection includes those fundamental liberties that are
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were
sacrificed. A different description of fundamental liberties characterizes them as liberties that are deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. Neither of these formulations would extend a fundamental
right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy.
Facts: Respondent was charged with violating O.G.C.A. § 16-6-2 (1984), which criminalized sodomy.
Respondent allegedly engaged in sodomy with another adult male in the bedroom of his home. After the
district attorney decided not to present the matter to the grand jury unless further evidence developed,
respondent brought suit in federal district court, challenging the constitutionality of the statute insofar as
it criminalized consensual sodomy.
Issue: Does the U.S. Constitution protect the fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The engagement in homosexual sodomy is not protected by the Constitution through a
fundamental right. The court of appeals held that § 16-6-2 violated respondent's fundamental rights
because his homosexual activity was a private and intimate association that was beyond the reach of state
regulation by reason of U.S. Const. amends. XI and XIV. Reversing that judgment, the Court held that the
Due Process Clause of U.S. Const. amend. XIV did not confer any fundamental right on homosexuals to
engage in acts of consensual sodomy, even if the conduct occurred in the privacy of their own homes.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=3c273e61-f0f8-4c2a-8306-
46f468d230bd&pdsearchterms=Bowers+v.+Hardwick%2C+478+U.S.+186+(1986)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1
d=&ecomp=532bk&prid=2bf782e0-e625-4736-a2cc-8ead68a750fd
Doc ID:
47
Case Name: El Di, Inc. v. Bethany Beach

Citation: 477 A.2d 1066 (Del. 1984)
Rule: A court will not enforce a restrictive covenant where a fundamental change has occurred in the
intended character of the neighborhood that renders the benefits underlying imposition of the
restrictions incapable of enjoyment.
Facts: The corporation was granted a license to sell alcohol, by the State Alcoholic Beverage Control
Commission, at a restaurant owned and operated by the corporation, on the finding of public need and
convenience. The corporation herein appealed a permanent injunction granted on application by the
town enjoining the sale of alcoholic beverages under the license on the basis of the undisputed chain of
title for the restaurant that included a restrictive covenant prohibiting such sales.
Issue: Is the prohibition of sale of alcohol enforceable against a restaurant in town that previously was a
tourist spot?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The court reversed the grant of the permanent injunction finding that the trial court erred in
holding that the change of conditions was insufficient to negate the restrictive covenant. Since 1901, the
character of that area of the old-town section now zoned C-1 was so substantial as to justify modification
of the deed restriction. The business uses, the availability of alcohol in close proximity to this section of
town, and the repeated use of "brown-bagging" in the C-1 district rendered the originally intended
benefits of the covenants unattainable in what had become an area detached in character from the strictly
residential surroundings to the west and made enforcement of the covenant unreasonable.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=a9383f8c-7748-4474-af86-
d4069b178c03&pdsearchterms=El+Di%2C+Inc.+v.+Bethany+Beach%2C+477+A.2d+1066+(Del.+1984)&
&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=3c273e61-f0f8-4c2a-8306-46f468d230bd&cbc=0
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RRT-7MY0-003C-K1DY-00000-00
48
Case Name: Desertrain v. City of L.A.

Rule: Leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires, Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), and this policy is
to be applied with extreme liberality. Five factors are taken into account to assess the propriety of a
motion for leave to amend: bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, futility of amendment,
and whether the plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.
Facts: The district court abused its discretion by refusing to consider the merits of homeless individuals'
claim that Los Angeles, Cal., Municipal Code § 85.02, which prohibited use of a vehicle as living quarters,
was unconstitutionally vague, as the individuals should have been granted leave to amend their complaint
to add the claim
Issue: Is it vague and unconstitutional for a municipal law prohibit the use of automobiles as living quarters
and is it a violation of Due Process Clause?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: Yes. The municipal law is vague and unconstitutional. The law seemed to target homeless
individuals in the enforcement of this law. The court found it discriminatory enforcement of sort. The
judgment of the court is reversed.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=330dbd8e-85e6-4dac-a1cf-
ae67de80bfd8&pdsearchterms=Desertrain+v.+City+of+L.A.%2C+754+F.3d+1147+(9th+Cir.+2014)&pdst
artin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pd
querytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=a9383f8c-7748-4474-af86-d4069b178c03
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:5CG4-V2M1-F04K-V08M-00000-00
49
Case Name: Emp't Div. v. Smith

Citation: 494 U.S. 872, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990)
Rule: The Free Exercise Clause of U.S. Const. amend. I, which has been made applicable to the states by
incorporation into the U.S. Const. amend. XIV, provides that Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. U.S. Const. amend. I. The free exercise
of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one
desires. Thus, the First Amendment obviously excludes all governmental regulation of religious beliefs as
such. The government may not compel affirmation of religious belief, punish the expression of religious
doctrines it believes to be false, impose special disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious
status, or lend its power to one or the other side in controversies over religious authority or dogma.
Facts: Respondent employees were fired by a drug rehabilitation organization after ingesting peyote for
sacramental purposes. The Employment Division denied them unemployment compensation because
peyote use was criminal under Oregon law, making their discharge work-related "misconduct."
Issue: Does the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment permit the state of Oregon to penalize
religious practices that are against applicable laws?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The respondents claim that they should be granted an exemption from Oregon state criminal
laws for certain religious acts using illicit drugs. The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed on U.S. Const.
amend. I, Free Exercise grounds. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, but determined that the criminality
of peyote use was irrelevant to the employees' constitutional claim. The United States Supreme Court
held that the criminality of peyote use was relevant, but remanded for a determination of the applicability
of the law to sacramental peyote use. On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the statute
prohibited religious use and violated the Free Exercise Clause. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=598b9f6f-52ae-458d-bbe1-
dc89f07c3a43&pdsearchterms=Emp%27t+Div.+v.+Smith%2C+494+U.S.+872%2C+110+S.+Ct.+1595+(19
90)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=
and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=330dbd8e-85e6-4dac-a1cf-ae67de80bfd8
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-73K0-003B-405T-00000-00
50
Case Name: Bernier v. Bos. Edison Co.

Citation: 380 Mass. 372, 403 N.E.2d 391 (1980)
Rule: For purposes of limitations, the date of commencement of the action tolls the statute, even in
respect to a transaction-related defendant added after the running of the statutory period.
Facts: Defendant drivers collided in an intersection, and one became dazed and unknowingly let her foot
slip from the brake to the gas pedal. She accelerated across the street and down a sidewalk, where she
knocked down an electric light pole owned by defendant electric company. The pole struck plaintiff
teenagers on the sidewalk. Both plaintiffs were injured and commenced actions against defendant drivers,
which were consolidated, and defendant electric company was later joined. The jury returned verdicts
against one defendant driver and defendant electric company, and defendant electric company appealed,
arguing, inter alia, that the interest on the damage award should have been calculated from the date of
its joinder.
Issue: is a product creating an unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm a negligence on the part of the
manufacturer?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The court took the case on its own motion for appellate review, and affirmed. The court held
that the interest was properly calculated from the date when the action was initiated because the statute
was literal in its award of interest to compensate for the delay in plaintiffs' obtaining their money. The
fact that defendant electric company was added later did not affect plaintiffs' entitlement to interest from
the date of commencement of the action.
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8fe4524db05e&pdsearchterms=Bernier+v.+Bos.+Edison+Co.%2C+380+Mass.+372%2C+403+N.E.2d+39
1+(1980)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqt
type=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=598b9f6f-52ae-458d-bbe1-dc89f07c3a43
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RX4-6220-003C-V1J9-00000-00

51
Case Name: Charrier v. Bell

Citation: 496 So. 2d 601 (La. Ct. App. 1986)
Rule: La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3414 provides that there are five ways of acquiring property by occupancy,
to wit: by hunting, by fowling, by fishing., by finding (that is, by discovering precious stones on the sea
shore, or things abandoned, or a treasure.)
Facts: The archeologist alleged that he obtained the permission of a person, who he believed was the
owner of the land, to survey the property with a metal detector for possible burial locations. The
archeologist located and excavated about 30 to 40 burial plots, lying in a circular pattern. The archeologist
contended that he was then advised that the purported owner was the caretaker.
Issue: Is the burial of deceased with artifacts or other objects an abandonment of those artifacts?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: An individual’s deceased is buried with objects or artifacts; their intentions are meant to serve
sentimental purpose and not for taking for free. The relinquishment of possession is not equal to intent
to relinquish ownership. The court affirmed the decision denying both of the archeologist's claims against
Indian descendants as owner of Indian artifacts and the archeologist's request for compensation for his
excavation work in uncovering those artifacts under the theory of unjust enrichment.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=03266210-439d-4b33-84a0-
7db087ca3d13&pdsearchterms=Charrier+v.+Bell%2C+496+So.+2d+601+(La.+Ct.+App.+1986)&pdstarti
n=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquer
ytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=fe045298-9732-4f23-a678-8fe4524db05e
Doc ID:
52
Case Name: Abdouch v. Lopez

Citation: 285 Neb. 718, 829 N.W.2d 662 (2013)
Rule: Personal jurisdiction is the power of a tribunal to subject and bind a particular entity to its decisions.
Before a court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the court must determine,
first, whether the long-arm statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-536 (Reissue 2008), is satisfied and, if the long-
arm statute is satisfied, second, whether minimum contacts exist between the defendant and the forum
state for personal jurisdiction over the defendant without offending due process.
Facts: Plaintiff's inscribed copy of a book was stolen. The out-of-state defendants bought the stolen copy
from a seller in Georgia and sold it to a customer not in Nebraska. Plaintiff alleged defendants had violated
her privacy rights by using the inscription in the stolen copy to advertise on defendants' website.
Issue: If a party engaged in conduct purposely directed at the forum state is personal jurisdiction over a
party valid?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The court concluded that plaintiff's complaint failed to plead facts to demonstrate that
defendants had sufficient minimum contacts with Nebraska. Defendants could not have anticipated being
haled into a Nebraska court for their online advertisement. Although the website used to post the
advertisement was interactive, the contacts created by the website were unrelated to plaintiff's cause of
action. Furthermore, the pleadings failed to establish that defendants uniquely or expressly aimed their
tortious conduct at Nebraska. Personal jurisdiction over defendants could not be created by a telephone
call from plaintiff's representative to the owner. Such contact was insufficient for personal jurisdiction
purposes.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=c7426756-294c-4a4e-a300-
3d661790db2f&pdsearchterms=AbDouch+v.+Lopez%2C+829+N.W.2d+662+(2013)&pdstartin=hlct%3A
1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=or&pdquerytemplateid
=&ecomp=532bk&prid=03266210-439d-4b33-84a0-7db087ca3d13
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:5878-THR1-F04H-P005-00000-00
53
Case Name: Camacho v. Honda Motor Co.

Citation: 741 P.2d 1240 (Colo. 1987)
Rule: A manufacturer may be strictly liable to the user of a product when failure to provide adequate
warnings renders the product defective and unreasonably dangerous. The purpose of a warning is to
ensure that an otherwise dangerous product is used in a reasonably safe manner.
Facts: Plaintiff sustained serious leg injuries in a low speed motorcycle crash and sued defendant
motorcycle manufacturer under a theory of strict liability. Plaintiff argued that the absence of leg
protection devices rendered the motorcycle a defective and unreasonably dangerous product.
Issue: Is it valid to hold a manufacturer liable for a product’s defect that create a danger contemplated by
the purchaser?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The test to prove the liability is whether a product is unreasonably dangerous in general and
in consideration to all the factors. Summary judgment was reversed because the motorcycle manufacturer
had a duty to exercise reasonable care in the design of its product to minimize foreseeable injury to users
and a factual issue existed as to whether the design strategies were reasonable.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=21d16c37-cf8f-417a-bfbe-
3ac9339ee47d&pdsearchterms=Camacho+v.+Honda+Motor+Co.%2C+741+P.2d+1240+(Colo.+1987)&p
pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=c7426756-294c-4a4e-a300-3d661790db2f
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RX4-10R0-003D-950F-00000-00
54
Case Name: Bradwell v. State

Citation: 83 U.S. 130 (1873)
Rule: Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
States. The protection designed by this clause has no application to a citizen of the State whose laws are
complained of. If a plaintiff is a citizen of the State of Illinois, this provision of the Constitution gives her
no protection against its courts or its legislation.
Facts: On appeal, the applicant argued that there were certain privileges and immunities, which belonged
to a citizen of the United States, and that admission to the bar of a state, for a person who possessed the
requisite learning and character, was one of those that a state could not deny.
Issue: Does the Fourteenth Amendment on Privileges or Immunities Clause protect a woman’s right to
equality in job opportunities?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The United States Supreme Court agreed that there were privileges and immunities belonging
to United States citizens that a state was forbidden to abridge. However, the Court held that the right of
admission to practice in the courts of a state was not one of these privileges and immunities and that this
right in no sense depended on citizenship of the United States. The Court reasoned that the right to control
and regulate the granting of license to practice law in the courts of a state was one of those powers that
was not transferred for its protection to the federal government. The Court found that its exercise was in
no manner governed or controlled by citizenship of the United States in the party seeking such license.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=28192106-00f8-42c6-bce2-
d225acff6a5f&pdsearchterms=Bradwell+v.+Ill.%2C+83+US+130+(1873)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pd
typeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp
=532bk&prid=21d16c37-cf8f-417a-bfbe-3ac9339ee47d
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-JM90-003B-H12Y-00000-00
55
Case Name: Dillon v. Legg,

Citation: 68 Cal. 2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968)
Rule: In determining a case where plaintiff suffers a shock that resulted in physical injury, whether
defendant should reasonably foresee the injury to plaintiff, or, in other terminology, whether defendant
owes plaintiff a duty of due care, the courts will take into account such factors as the following: (1)
Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted with one who was a distance
away from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the
sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident
from others after its occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as contrasted
with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant relationship.
Facts: Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her action to recover damages for emotional trauma and physical
injury caused by witnessing the death of her infant daughter, who was struck and killed by a car negligently
driven by defendant.
Issue: Is a defendant, with reasonably foreseeable emotional harm, liable for harm caused to the plaintiff
due to negligent actions?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The trial court dismissed plaintiff's action because she was not within the "zone of danger,"
but the court refused to dismiss a complaint filed on behalf of another of plaintiff's infant daughters,
whom the court determined to be within the zone of physical impact. The court reversed the judgment,
holding that the "zone of danger" doctrine was improperly restricted to those exposed to physical injury.
The court extended the doctrine to encompass those exposed to emotional injury, expressly
overruling Amaya v. Home Ice Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1963), to the extent it was inconsistent
with its ruling.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=5f526014-2d5f-47bc-94e7-
a5d931a7e6b8&pdsearchterms=Dillon+v.+Legg%2C+441+P.2d+912+(Cal.+1968)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%
&ecomp=532bk&prid=28192106-00f8-42c6-bce2-d225acff6a5f
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RRK-KF90-003C-H1F2-00000-00

56
Case Name: Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood

Citation: 82 S. Ct. 894
Rule: The constitutional right to trial by jury cannot be made to depend upon the choice of words used in
the pleadings. The necessary prerequisite to the right to maintain a suit for an equitable accounting, like
all other equitable remedies, is the absence of an adequate remedy at law. Consequently, in order to
maintain such a suit on a cause of action cognizable at law, the plaintiff must be able to show that the
"accounts between the parties" are of such a "complicated nature" that only a court of equity can
satisfactorily unravel them.
Facts: The action arose out of a controversy involving a written licensing contract in which petitioner
agreed to pay respondents for the exclusive right to use a trademark. Respondents filed a complaint and
sought temporary and permanent injunctions to restrain petitioner from any future use of or dealing in
the franchise and the trademark. Respondents also sought an accounting to determine the exact amount
of money due from petitioner and a judgment for that amount. Petitioner indorsed a jury demand upon
the answer in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(a) provided that the right of trial by
jury as declared by U.S. Const. amend. VII or as given by a statute of the United States shall be preserved
to the parties inviolate. Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(a) required that any legal issues for which a trial by jury was
timely and properly demanded shall be submitted to a jury. Petitioner claimed that he was entitled to a
jury trial insofar as the complaint contained legal claims.
Issue: Is a claim for money damages an equitable issue for the wrong words used in the pleading?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: In a case with both legal and equitable issues, when there is equitable claim, a right to a jury
trial is lost through the determination of such. The Supreme Court reversed the order denying the petition
for mandamus and remanded the case for further proceedings, concluding that the legal claims involved,
to which petitioner was entitled to a trial by jury, must be determined prior to any final court
determination of respondents' equitable claims.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=c1f45f76-a63a-49d6-98c2-
531dac9506b1&pdsearchterms=Dairy+Queen%2c+Inc.+v.+Wood%2c+369+U.S.+469%2c+82+S.+Ct.+89
4+(1962)&pdstartin=hlct%3a1%3a1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqt
type=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=5f526014-2d5f-47bc-94e7-
a5d931a7e6b8&aci=la&cbc=0&lnsi=92d2f43a-f2ec-49c8-b384-
749e146438c9&rmflag=0&sit=1533173533794.588
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-H9D0-003B-S0H7-00000-00
57
Case Name: Adamson v. California

Citation: 332 U.S. 46, 67 S. Ct. 1672 (1947)
Rule: A right to a fair trial is a right protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Facts: Defendant contended that he could not take the stand to deny the evidence against him because
he would be subjected to a cross-examination as to former crimes to impeach his veracity and the
evidence so produced could have brought about his conviction. Such cross-examination was allowable in
California under Cal. Penal Code § 1323 and Cal. Const. art. I, § 13, and defendant contended that they
denied him due process.
Issue: In a situation where a defendant fails to deny evidence against him and the jury inferred guilt is a
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The due process clause did not protect defendant's freedom from giving testimony by
compulsion in state trials. TheFourteenth Amendment prevented a state from abridging the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States, but a state was free to abridge, within the limits of the due
process clause, the privileges and immunities flowing from state citizenship. Failure of defendant to testify
was not an admission of the truth of the adverse evidence. Instructions told the jury that the burden of
proof remained upon the state and the presumption of innocence with defendant. Comment on failure
to deny proven facts did not in California tend to supply any missing element of proof of guilt.
URL:https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=1488ba5f-9a17-4f61-a025-
cc8256a065b3&pdsearchterms=Adamson+v.+California%2C+332+U.S.+46+(1947)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1
%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=or&pdquerytemplateid=
&ecomp=532bk&prid=c1f45f76-a63a-49d6-98c2-531dac9506b1
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-JTX0-003B-S06J-00000-00
58
Case Name: Dalury v. S-K-I, Ltd.

Citation: 164 Vt. 329, 670 A.2d 795 (1995)
Rule: For an exculpatory clause relating to an area that is open to the public, the major public policy
implications are those underlying the law of premises liability. In Vermont, a business owner has a duty
of active care to make sure that its premises are in safe and suitable condition for its customers.
Facts: While skiing at the resort's facilities, the skier sustained serious injuries when he collided with a
metal pole that formed part of the control maze for a ski lift line. The skier signed a form releasing the
resort area from liability, which the resort required of all of its customers. The skier and his wife filed a
complaint against the resort, alleging negligent design, construction, and replacement of the maze pole.
The resort filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the release of liability barred the
negligence action.
Issue: Is the exculpatory agreement void if it is a violation of public policy interest in protecting skiers?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the resort, finding that
the exculpatory agreements which the resort required all skiers, including the plaintiff, to sign, releasing
the resort from all liability resulting from negligence, were void as contrary to public policy. The resort
owed its customers a duty of active care to make sure its premises were in a safe and suitable condition.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=0df6e928-523d-4b98-8562-
77420eed0ca4&pdsearchterms=Dalury+v.+S-K-
I+Ltd%2C+670+A.2d+795+(Vt.+1995)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pds
earchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=1488ba5f-9a17-
4f61-a025-cc8256a065b3
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RXR-0T30-003G-G0HW-00000-00
59
Case Name: Berge v. State

Citation: 2006 VT 116, 181 Vt. 1, 915 A.2d 189
Rule: When, as a result of the division and sale of commonly owned land, one parcel is left entirely without
access to a public road, the grantee of the landlocked parcel is entitled to a way of necessity over the
remaining lands of the common grantor or his successors in title.
Facts: A property owner conveyed land, which became a wildlife area, to the State of Vermont. However,
the owner reserved a lot on the western shore of a pond. The deed reserved no express easement for
access to the excluded area across the land that was conveyed. The owner later conveyed the excluded
area to developers. The deed again contained no reference to any easement across the wildlife area. The
buyer purchased two lots in the excluded area from a successor in title to the developers. Thereafter, he
regularly accessed his property by car over a gravel road that crossed the wildlife area. Although he owned
a fishing boat which he launched in the spring from a public boat-access on the opposite shore of the
pond, he did not use the boat to access the property. When the State placed a gate across the access road,
the buyer was deprived of overland access to his property.
Issue: Is the reservation of an easement requires the element of necessity as defined for an easement by
necessity or any other standard needed to be met?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: It was rather difficult for the Court to define whether to implement a strict or loose necessity
in easement-by-necessity cases. The court found that, because the trial court's holding was based solely
on the erroneous conclusion that water access defeated the buyer's easement-by-necessity claim, the
trial court erred in awarding summary judgment to the State without addressing additional elements of
the easement-by-necessity claim.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=995b9046-577e-41f9-99b1-
e44817fbed68&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fcases%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A4M9X-
Y9N0-0039-42KS-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A4M9X-Y9N0-0039-42KS-00000-
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00000-00&pdteaserkey=sr0&pditab=allpods&ecomp=5ypck&earg=sr0&prid=06afa097-6f88-400a-
9d27-38ffca009873
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:4M9X-Y9N0-0039-42KS-00000-00
60
Case Name: Buffaloe v. Hart

Citation: 114 N.C. App. 52, 441 S.E.2d 172 (1994)
Rule: To qualify under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-2-201(3)(c), the seller must deliver the goods and have them
accepted by the buyer. Acceptance must be voluntary and unconditional and may be inferred from the
buyer's conduct in taking physical possession of the goods or some part of them. The official comment
to § 25-2-201explains that for the buyer, he is required to deliver something that is accepted by the seller
as such performance. Thus, part payment may be made by money or check, accepted by the seller. Under
this standard, § 25-2-201(3)(c) presents questions of fact, which are questions for the jury, on the issue of
acceptance.
Facts: The tobacco farmer entered into an oral agreement to purchase five barns located on the property
owners' farm. The tobacco farmer already had possession of the barns under a rental agreement. The
tobacco farmer gave the property owners a check for partial payment on the barns, but the property
owners returned the check four days later and informed the tobacco farmer that they had sold the barns
to another buyer.
Issue: In a partial performance of a binding contract, can the latter be enforceable even if it falls under
the Statute of Frauds?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: A jury found in favor of the tobacco farmer on his breach of contract claim. The court affirmed
the trial court's denial of the property owners' motions for directed verdict and for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. The court agreed with the property owners that the personal check was not
sufficient to constitute a writing under the statute of frauds, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-2-201(1) (1986), because
it was not endorsed by the property owners. The court, however, concluded that there was substantial
relevant evidence that the tobacco farmer "accepted" the purchased barns and that the property owners
"accepted" the tobacco farmer's check, thus taking the contract out of the statute of frauds.
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4f7f94f09b0b&pdsearchterms=Buffaloe+v.+Hart%2C+114+N.C.+App.+52%2C+441+S.E.2d+172+(1994)
d&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=995b9046-577e-41f9-99b1-e44817fbed68
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S3K-04C0-003G-012H-00000-00
61
Case Name: Albinger v. Harris

Citation: 2002 MT 118, 310 Mont. 27, 48 P.3d 711
Rule: According to Montana law, a gift is a transfer of personal property made voluntarily and without
consideration. Mont. Code Ann. § 70-3-101. The essential elements of an inter vivos gift are donative
intent, voluntary delivery and acceptance by the recipient. Delivery, which manifests the intent of the
giver, must turn over dominion and control of the property to the recipient. Such a gift, made without
condition, becomes irrevocable upon acceptance. When clear and convincing evidence demonstrates the
presence of the essential elements of donative intent, voluntary delivery and acceptance, the gift is
complete and the Montana Supreme Court will not void the transfer when the giver experiences a change
of heart.
Facts: Harris and Albinger met in June 1995, and began a troubled relationship that endured for the next
three years, spiked by alcohol abuse, emotional turmoil and violence. Albinger presented Harris with a
diamond ring and diamond earrings on December 14, 1995. The ring was purchased for $ 29,000. Days
after accepting the ring, Harris returned it to Albinger and traveled to Kentucky for the holidays. Albinger
immediately sent the ring back to Harris by mail. The couple set a tentative wedding date of June 27, 1997,
but plans to marry were put on hold as Harris and Albinger separated and reconciled several times.
Issue: In the satisfaction of all the common elements of an engagement ring, does it become irrevocable?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The assessment of $ 2500 for damages for pain and suffering was not excessive and did not
"shock the conscience" of the instant court. The instant court reversed the trial court's conclusion of law
and held the engagement ring to be a gift given without implied or express condition. It affirmed the trial
court's denial of reimbursement to the man for telephone charges and the monetary award for the
woman's emotional distress, pain, and suffering resulting from the assault and battery.
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ad5924e8cab7&pdsearchterms=Albinger+v.+Harris%2C+2002+MT+118%2C+310+Mont.+27%2C+48+P.
3d+711+(2002)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox
&pdqttype=or&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=12f2d995-3833-48d3-830b-4f7f94f09b0b
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:461J-4XD0-0039-410T-00000-00
62
Case Name: Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn

Citation: 563 U.S. 125, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011)
Rule: The minimum constitutional requirements for standing have been explained as follows: First, the
plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"--an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a)
concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there
must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of--the injury has to be fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some
third party not before the court. Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. In requiring a particular injury, it is meant that the injury
must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.
Facts: Section 43-1089 allowed tax credits for contributions to school tuition organizations (STOs), which
provided scholarships to students attending private schools, including religious schools. The taxpayers
claimed that the STO tax credit violated the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court held that the
taxpayers lacked standing under U.S. Const. art. III. The general rule against taxpayer standing applied,
and the taxpayers failed to establish that they fell within the exception to the rule for claims of extraction
and spending of tax money in violation of theEstablishment Clause. The tax credit under § 43-1089 was
not a governmental expenditure; contributors to STOs spent their own money, not money collected by
the state from taxpayers. The tax credit was not tantamount to a religious tax or a tithe.
Issue: Can a taxpayer file a case against a plaintiff’s tax contributing to an establishment?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: A plaintiff must show Article III of the United States Constitution to prove its standing.
However, this Court does not have direct expenditure to the said establishment. The causation and
redressability requirements for standing also were not satisfied; although the state afforded the
opportunity to create and contribute to an STO, the tax credit system was implemented by private action
with no state intervention, and an injunction limiting the tax credit's operation would not have remedied
the alleged injury.
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ed7aa9d53807&pdsearchterms=Ariz.+Christian+Sch.+Tuition+Org.+v.+Winn%2C+563+U.S.+125%2C+1
31+S.+Ct.+1436+(2011)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=Se
archBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=29fd92c2-45dc-4e98-9e64-
ad5924e8cab7
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:52J6-MYX1-F04K-F25H-00000-00
63
Case Name: Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n

Citation: 436 U.S. 371, 98 S. Ct. 1852 (1978)
Rule: Only with respect to those "privileges" and "immunities" bearing upon the vitality of the nation as
a single entity must the state treat all citizens, resident and nonresident, equally.
Facts: The resident and the nonresidents paid different fees for licenses. As a result, a suit was instituted
alleging an unconstitutional disparity between residents and nonresidents in the state license system
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Const., art. IV, § 2, and the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Issue: Is there discrimination against non-citizens in Montana statute violating Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Constitution?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The court concluded that the nonresidents' interest in sharing the limited resource on more
equal terms with residents simply did not fall within the purview of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
Equality in access to state elk was not basic to the maintenance or well-being of the union, and whatever
rights or activities were fundamental under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, elk hunting by
nonresidents was not one of them. The legislative choice was an economic means not unreasonably
related to the preservation of a finite resource and a substantial regulatory interest of the state. It served
to limit the number of hunter days.
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a4adceae4d6b&pdsearchterms=Baldwin+v.+Fish+%26+Game+Comm%27n%2C+436+U.S.+371%2C+98
+S.+Ct.+1852+(1978)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=Sear
chBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=283b9d6d-919d-4153-89a4-
ed7aa9d53807
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-8TP0-003B-S20S-00000-00
64
Case Name: Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc

Citation: 294 U.S. 511, 55 S. Ct. 497 (1935)
Rule: A state tax upon merchandise brought in from another state, or upon its sales, whether in original
packages or not, after it has reached its destination and is in a state of rest, is lawful only when the tax is
not discriminating in its incidence against the merchandise because of its origin in another state. In brief,
the test of the original package is not an ultimate principle. It is an illustration of a principle. It marks a
convenient boundary and one sufficiently precise save in exceptional conditions. What is ultimate is the
principle that one state in its dealings with another may not place itself in a position of economic isolation.
Formulas and catchwords are subordinate to this overmastering requirement. Neither the power to tax
nor the police power may be used by the state of destination with the aim and effect of establishing an
economic barrier against competition with the products of another state or the labor of its residents.
Facts: The New York Milk Control Act (Act), 1933 N.Y. Laws 158, 1934 N.Y. Laws 126, established a system
of minimum prices to be paid by milk dealers to producers in New York. The milk dealer bought its milk in
Vermont at prices lower than the New York minimum and refused to agree to conform to the New York
statute and regulations in the sale of the imported product. The milk dealer was thus unable to obtain a
New York business license.
Issue: Is it valid for a New York state law to prohibit sale of milk imported from Vermont if it does not
reach a pricing criteria?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The Court held that the district court properly restrained the enforcement of the Act in its
application to sales in the original packages but erred in refusing to grant an injunction with respect to
milk in bottles. The form of the packages was immaterial. New York's attempt to regulate the price to be
paid for milk acquired in Vermont had the same unconstitutional effect as a customs duty. The Court
rejected the state officials' arguments that the purpose of the Act was not to protect its farmers from
competition but to ensure an adequate supply of milk and to avoid tempting farmers to save the expense
of sanitary precautions. Allowing a health exception would have destroyed the rule, and the relation was
too indirect to obstruct interstate commerce.
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348d4e8eb97f&pdsearchterms=Baldwin+v.+G.+A.+F.+Seelig%2C+Inc.%2C+294+U.S.+511%2C+55+S.+Ct
.+497+(1935)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&
pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=6ca6d2dc-c1db-4a60-8f1f-a4adceae4d6b
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-BCF0-003B-752F-00000-00
65
Case Name: Eldred v. Ashcroft

Citation: 537 U.S. 186, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003)
Rule: In addition to spurring the creation and publication of new expression, copyright law contains built-
in First Amendment accommodations. First, it distinguishes between ideas and expression and makes only
the latter eligible for copyright protection. Specifically, 17 U.S.C.S. § 102(b) provides: In no case does
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. This idea/expression dichotomy strikes a definitional
balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts
while still protecting an author's expression. Due to this distinction, every idea, theory, and fact in a
copyrighted work becomes instantly available for public exploitation at the moment of publication.
Facts: Under the CTEA, Congress enlarged the duration of copyrights by 20 years in order to, inter alia,
harmonize the baseline United States copyright term with the term adopted by the European Union.
Petitioners argued that the CTEA violated the "limited times" prescription of the Copyright Clause. As to
the First Amendment, petitioners contended that the CTEA was a content-neutral regulation of speech
that failed inspection under the heightened judicial scrutiny appropriate for such regulations.
Issue: Are existing copyright terms that are extended for those requirements under the Copyright Clause
valid?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The CTEA's extension of existing copyrights did not exceed Congress' power under the
Copyright Clause. The Court rejected petitioners' arguments that (1) the extension was a congressional
attempt to evade or override the "limited times" constraint, (2) Congress could not extend an existing
copyright absent new consideration from the author, and (3) the extensions should have been subject to
heightened judicial review. The Court also rejected petitioners' argument that the CTEA violated the First
Amendment.
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d5e4a2bf566e&pdsearchterms=Eldred+v.+Ashcroft%2C+537+U.S.+186+(2003)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3
&ecomp=532bk&prid=67f2f19e-6d41-48a7-a6ab-348d4e8eb97f
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:47P7-BT40-004B-Y018-00000-00
66
Case Name: Doe v. Johnson

Citation: 817 F. Supp. 1382 (W.D. Mich. 1993)
Rule: A plaintiff may maintain negligence and fraud claims based on wrongful transmission of venereal
diseases, including genital herpes and a defendant's actual knowledge that s/he is infected with an
infectious disease is sufficient to establish a duty for purposes of negligence and fraud.
Facts: The woman claimed that the man was sexually active, engaging in sexual intercourse with multiple
partners, prior to having sex with her and, thus, knew or should have known that he had a high risk of
becoming infected with the HIV virus because of his sexually active, promiscuous lifestyle. Thus, the
woman claimed that the man had a duty and, in fact, should have warned her of his past lifestyle. The
woman further claimed that he did in fact have the HIV virus, and should have either not had sex with her
or used a condom. The court determined that the man owed a legal duty to disclose the fact that he might
have the HIV virus if he had actual knowledge that he had the HIV virus, had experienced symptoms
associated with the HIV virus, or had actual knowledge that a prior sex partner had the HIV virus.
Issue: Is the intent to cause batter require the defendant to harm someone?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: There is no need to show that there is intent on the defendant’s part to hurt someone. The
court determined that the man owed a legal duty to disclose the fact that he might have the HIV virus if
he had actual knowledge that he had the HIV virus, had experienced symptoms associated with the HIV
virus, or had actual knowledge that a prior sex partner had the HIV virus. The court found that the man
owed the woman no duty to disclose that he had engaged in any high-risk activity that increased the odds
of carrying or transmitting the HIV virus. It also concluded that strict liability did not apply to the
circumstances of this case and that consortium did not apply because no acts were directed at the
woman's daughter.
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2518f24ccc32&pdsearchterms=Doe+v.+Johnson%2C+817+F.+Supp.+1382+(W.D.+Mich.+1993)&pdstart
in=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdque
rytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=ca1fd8fd-af3a-4d62-9815-d5e4a2bf566e
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4N-VDT0-001T-61PF-00000-00
67
Case Name: Bd. of Regents v. Roth

Citation: 408 U.S. 564, 92 S. Ct. 2701 (1972)
Rule: Property interests are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions
are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law -
- rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those
benefits.
Facts: The professor was hired for his first teaching job as an assistant professor at a state-run university.
He was hired for a fixed term of one year and was not re-hired the following year. The professor brought
suit against the university alleging that he was denied his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process
because the university never gave him a reason for their decision not to re-hire him and further he had
no opportunity to challenge their decision at a hearing.
Issue: Does the due process clause under the Fourteenth Amendment protect interests of individuals with
regard to liberty and property rights after they have been denied of reemployment?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The lower court granted summary judgment on the procedural issue and ordered the
university to provide the professor with reasons and a hearing. The appellate court affirmed and the board
of regents sought review. On review, the Court held that the professor had no protected interest in
continued employment, as he had completed his contracted for term, therefore, there could be
no Fourteenth Amendmentprotection. The decision of the lower court and the appellate court was
reversed and the case was remanded.
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b3f26976c841&pdsearchterms=Bd.+of+Regents+v.+Roth%2C+408+U.S.+564%2C+92+S.+Ct.+2701+(197
2)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=a
nd&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=d4036dfd-46b1-4672-99a4-2518f24ccc32
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-D560-003B-S27N-00000-00
68
Case Name: Doe v. Manheimer

Citation: 212 Conn. 748, 563 A.2d 699 (1989)
Rule: To prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish that a defendant's conduct "legally
caused" any injuries. The first component of "legal cause" is "causation in fact." The test for cause in fact
is, simply, would an injury have occurred were it not for an actor's conduct. The second component of
"legal cause" is proximate cause, which is an actual cause that is a "substantial factor" in a resulting harm.
Facts: An abductor viciously assaulted and raped the victim and the evidence suggested that the sexual
assault had been planned with the owner's property in mind. The assailant was never identified or caught.
Issue: May a landowner, of an overgrown vegetation where, a third party’s rape occurred, be held liable?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The court held that the trial court properly set aside the verdict. No evidence demonstrated
that the owner had any past experience that might have reasonably led him to foresee that violent
criminal activity could have been caused by his negligent maintenance of the land.
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ada1-
5417c1b60b3d&pdsearchterms=Doe+v.+Manhaimer%2C+563+A.2d+699+(1989)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1
d=&ecomp=532bk&prid=a956ca7a-a085-4c2d-a3a9-b3f26976c841
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RX4-0J20-003D-84VN-00000-00
69
Case Name: Empro Mfg. Co. v. Ball-Co Mfg., Inc.

Rule: If intent were wholly subjective there would be no parol evidence rule, no contract case could be
decided without a jury trial, and no one could know the effect of a commercial transaction until years
after the documents were inked. That would be a devastating blow to business. Contract law gives effect
to the parties' wishes, but they must express these openly. Put differently, "intent" in contract law is
objective rather than subjective. As a matter of law parties who make their pact "subject to" a later
definitive agreement manifest an objective intent not to be bound, which under the parol evidence rule
becomes the definitive intent even if one party later says that the true intent was different. Intent must
be determined solely from the language used when no ambiguity in its terms exists. Parties may decide
for themselves whether the results of preliminary negotiations bind them, but they do this through their
words.
Facts: Plaintiff buyer sued defendant seller claiming that a letter of intent to purchase defendant's assets
signed by the parties obliged defendant to sell only to plaintiff. Plaintiff sought a temporary restraining
order.
Issue: Is a letter of an agreement binding if it stipulates conditions that are more likely a formal
agreement?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The court noted that plaintiff insulated itself from binding effect by listing, among the
conditions to which the deal was "subject," the approval of plaintiff's shareholders and board of directors.
Plaintiff even took care to require the return of its earnest money without set off, in the event the
transaction was not closed, although the seller usually got to keep the earnest money if the buyer changed
its mind. Neither the text nor the structure of the letter suggested that it was to be a one-sided
commitment, an option in plaintiff's favor binding only defendant.
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76838cf41b37&pdsearchterms=Empro+Manufacturing+Co.+Inc.+v.+Ball-
co+Manufacturing%2C+Inc.%2C+870+F.2d+423+(7th+Cir.+1989)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofs
earch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk
&prid=7dce4c16-b48e-42a0-ada1-5417c1b60b3d
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-CRS0-003B-535N-00000-00

70
Case Name: Allied Steel & Conveyors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.
Rule: In the absence of fraud or wilful deceit, one who signs a contract which he has had an opportunity
to read and understand, is bound by its provisions.
Facts: Appellee automobile manufacturer brought an action against appellant machinery and equipment
manufacturer, seeking indemnification under a contract clause that purported to hold appellant
responsible for an injury sustained by appellant's employee, even though caused by appellee's
negligence.
Issue: Is it valid to accomplish an acceptance through a commencing performance when there is a
preferred method of acceptance?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The prescribed method of acceptance must be observed. The district court found that a
binding contract was formed at the time appellant began performance by delivery and installation of
machinery upon appellee's premises. The court applied the rule that, in the absence of fraud or wilful
deceit, a party signing a contract after having an opportunity to read and understand it was bound by its
provisions. Amendments to the parties' agreement, with all of their provisions and conditions, constituted
a binding bilateral contract at the time appellant, with appellee's knowledge and consent, began
performance by delivery and installation of the machinery upon appellee's premises.
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e5ccd68ee079&pdsearchterms=Allied+Steel+%26+Conveyors%2C+Inc.+v.+Ford+Motor+Co.%2C+277+F
.2d+907+(6th+Cir.+1960)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=
SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=ef55ec57-a98a-4b07-8de9-
76838cf41b37
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-5J50-0039-Y341-00000-00
71
Case Name: Dolan v. City of Tigard

Citation: 512 U.S. 374, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994)
Rule: No precise mathematical calculation is required for the rough proportionality test, but a city must
make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and
extent to the impact of the proposed development.
Facts: Petitioner applied to respondent city for a permit to redevelop her business. Respondent granted
the permit conditioned on petitioner dedicating some of her property to respondent in furtherance of its
land use plan. Petitioner brought suit on the grounds that respondent's dedication requirements were not
related to the proposed development, and therefore, constituted a taking without just compensation
under the U.S. Const. amend. V.
Issue: Is it valid to require a landowner to find a proportional connection to provide portions of her
property for the use of pedestrian/bicycle and the government’s use to prevent flood and reduce traffic?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The government is not allowed to impose a land use restriction on a property unless it is
found that there is a proportionality on the conditions imposed of the land use. The Supreme Court of
Oregon found that the conditions were reasonably related to the proposed development. On appeal, the
Court held that there must be an essential nexus existing between the legitimate state interest and the
permit condition by the respondent. The Court held that if a nexus existed, then exactions imposed by
respondent must be roughly proportionate to the projected impact of the proposed development.
Respondent's conditions were not reasonably related to the impact of the proposed development, and
therefore, the judgment was overturned.
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677842d759b9&pdsearchterms=Dolan+v.+City+of+Tigard%2C+512+U.S.+374%2C+114+S.+Ct.+2309+(1
994)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype
=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=aa07f0c9-5435-4cbf-9bd6-e5ccd68ee079
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S65-JV00-003B-R52D-00000-00
72
Case Name: United States v. Stanley

Citation: 109 U.S. 3, 3 S. Ct. 18 (1883)
Rule: It is state action of a particular character that is prohibited by U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Individual
invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment. It nullifies and makes void all
state legislation and state action which impairs the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States, or which injures them in life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or which denies to
any of them the equal protection of the laws. It also invests Congress with power to enforce it by
appropriate legislation. It does not invest Congress with power to legislate upon subjects which are within
the domain of state legislation. It does not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law for the
regulation of private rights, but to provide modes of redress against the operation of state laws and the
action of state officers executive or judicial.
Facts: Five civil rights cases were consolidated before the court in order to decide if the Civil Rights Act of
1875, 18 Stat. 335, §§ 1, 2 (1875), were constitutional. These cases were all founded on the first and
second sections of the Act of Congress, known as the Civil Rights Act, passed March 1st, 1875, entitled
"An Act to protect all citizens in their civil and legal rights."
Issue: Is it valid for Congress to pass an act that prohibits discrimination?

Answer: No.
Conclusion: The court held that U.S. Const. amend. XIII prohibited the badges and incidents of slavery,
and individual discrimination against African Americans did not rise to the level of slavery. The court
further held that U.S. Const. amend XIV did not provide authority to enact these sections of the Civil Rights
Act, as it was aimed at the state legislatures rather than the individual person. As such, the court held the
sections unconstitutional in respect to the five cases brought before it.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=3cf80ef0-64c4-4ca0-a1f8-
d3be66240d26&pdsearchterms=United+States+v.+Stanley%2C+109+U.S.+3%2C+3+S.+Ct.+18+(1883)&
&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=6c9d130c-4eba-4c64-8770-677842d759b9
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-HW40-003B-H38X-00000-00
73
Case Name: Clark v. Arizona

Citation: 548 U.S. 735, 126 S. Ct. 2709 (2006)
Rule: The United States Supreme Court reads the Arizona Supreme Court's Mott restriction refusing to
allow psychiatric testimony to negate specific intent to apply to evidence addressing the two issues in
testimony that characteristically comes only from psychologists or psychiatrists qualified to give opinions
as expert witnesses: mental-disease evidence (whether at the time of the crime a defendant suffered from
a mental disease or defect, such as schizophrenia) and capacity evidence (whether the disease or defect
left him incapable of performing or experiencing a mental process defined as necessary for sanity such as
appreciating the nature and quality of his act and knowing that it was wrong). The Arizona Supreme Court
was careful to distinguish this kind of opinion evidence from observation evidence generally and even
from observation evidence that an expert witness might offer, such as descriptions of a defendant's
tendency to think in a certain way or his behavioral characteristics; the Arizona court made it clear that
this sort of testimony was perfectly admissible to rebut the prosecution's evidence of mens rea. Thus, only
opinion testimony going to mental defect or disease, and its effect on the cognitive or moral capacities on
which sanity depends under the Arizona rule, is restricted.
Facts: Defendant, a driver, shot and killed a police officer conducting a traffic stop. Initially defendant was
found incompetent to stand trial and was committed to a state hospital for treatment, but two years later
the same trial court found his competence restored and ordered him to be tried. At trial, defendant did
not contest the shooting and death, but relied on his undisputed paranoid schizophrenia at the time of
the incident in denying that he had the specific intent to shoot a law enforcement officer or knowledge
that he was doing so, as required by Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1105(A)(3).
Issue: Is the state’s determination of expert testimony on a defendant’s mental incapacity allowed on the
element of mens rea violating due process?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The Court held that history showed no deference to M'Naghten that could elevate its formula
to the level of fundamental principle, so as to limit the traditional recognition of a State's capacity to
define crimes and defenses. Because allowing mental-disease evidence on mens rea could easily mislead,
it was not unreasonable to confine consideration of that kind of evidence to the insanity defense. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=8f348840-86e0-4d3d-a989-
c7ec39005c48&pdsearchterms=Clark+v.+Arizona%2C+548+U.S.+735%2C+126+S.+Ct.+2709+(2006)&pd
dquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=3cf80ef0-64c4-4ca0-a1f8-d3be66240d26
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:4K94-P3R0-004B-Y03Y-00000-00
74
Case Name: Carr v. Deking

Citation: 52 Wash. App. 880, 765 P.2d 40 (1988)
Rule: It is well settled that each tenant in common of real property may use, benefit and possess the entire
property subject only to the equal rights of cotenants. Thus, a cotenant may lawfully lease his own interest
in the common property to another without the consent of the other tenant and without his joining in the
lease. The nonjoining cotenant is not bound by this lease of the common property to third persons. The
lessee steps into the shoes of the leasing cotenant and becomes a tenant in common with the other
owners for the duration of the lease. A nonjoining tenant may not demand exclusive possession as against
the lessee, but may only demand to be let into copossession.
Facts: The cotenant, tenant-lessor, and lessee had an oral agreement regarding the lease of the tenants
in common property. Subsequently, the lessee entered a written lease with the tenant-lessor without the
agreement of the cotenant.
Issue: Is it a requirement of a tenant-lessor to secure a consent from a cotenant before having his
undivided interest in land be leased?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The court affirmed the summary judgment granted to the lessee on the cotenant's ejectment
claim because the tenant-lessor could lease his undivided interest in land without the consent of the
cotenant, and the lessee stepped into the tenant-lessor's shoes as a tenant in common for the duration
of the lease. Further, the non-joining cotenant's sole remedy was partition of the land. The court also
affirmed the striking of the cotenant's affidavit in support of his motion for summary judgment because
his lay person testimony that the tenant-lessor was mentally incompetent was merely unsupported
conclusional statements that could not be considered in a motion for summary judgment. The trial court's
clarification of the relationship between the cotenant and lessee was remanded because the cotenant
had the option of choosing, until partition, whether he was bound by the oral lease arrangement or the
written lease arrangement.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=216db985-00bc-40a7-a69c-
62bc5f95ad28&pdsearchterms=Carr+v.+Deking%2C+765+P.2d+40+(Wash.+Ct.+App.+1988)&pdstartin
templateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=8f348840-86e0-4d3d-a989-c7ec39005c48
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S3J-X8F0-003F-W2FJ-00000-00

75
Case Name: Stevens v. Tillman, 885 F. 2d 394 (7th Cir. 1988)

Citation:
Rule:
Facts:
Issue:
Answer:
Conclusion:
URL:
Doc ID:
76
Case Name: Stevens v. Veenstra

Citation: 226 Mich. App. 441, 573 N.W.2d 341 (1997)
Rule: Generally, in the context of negligence actions, the capability of minors, seven years of age or older,
is not determined on the basis of an adult standard of conduct, but rather is determined on the basis of
how a minor of similar age, mental capacity, and experience would conduct himself. However, Michigan
has a longstanding policy of holding all drivers, even minors, to an adult standard of care. A minor who
engages in an adult activity that is dangerous, e.g., driving an automobile, is charged with the same
standard of conduct as an adult.
Facts: On the first day of the minor's driver's education course, he turned too sharply and struck the
injured party. Both the minor and his driving instructor attempted to turn the automobile away, but were
unsuccessful.
Issue: Is the same standard of care applied to minors when they participate in dangerous adult activities?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The requirements under Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.811(6) (Mich. Stat. Ann. § 9.2511(6)) that a
minor pass a driver's education course in order to obtain a license, did not mean that the minor was not
engaged in an adult activity and should not have been held to an adult standard of conduct. The minor
was engaged in the adult activity of driving an automobile, and the court did not consider the reasons
behind his undertaking the activity to justify departure from the general rule that all drivers be held to an
adult standard of care.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=00cd1652-a9b1-47d7-843b-
53655ba81067&pdsearchterms=Stevens+v.+Veenstra%2C+226+Mich.+App.+441%2C+573+N.W.2d+34
1+(1997)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqt
type=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=e20c742b-5c36-4fac-82e3-66fa46682418
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3SHJ-2MD0-0039-42GS-00000-00
77
Case Name: State v. Lyerla

Citation: 424 N.W.2d 908 (S.D. 1988)
Rule: In order to attempt to commit a crime, there must exist in the mind of the perpetrator the specific
intent to commit the acts constituting the offense. To attempt second-degree murder one must intend to
have a criminally reckless state of mind, that is perpetrating an imminently dangerous act while evincing
a depraved mind, regardless of human life, but without a design to kill any particular person.
Facts: While driving on a highway, defendant fired three shots at a pickup truck carrying three teenage
girls. One of the girls was killed. The trial court convicted defendant of second degree murder and two
counts of attempted second-degree murder.
Issue: Is it considered a criminal offense if it is attempted second degree murder?

Answer: No.
Conclusion: It is not a criminal offense in South Dakota. The court affirmed the second-degree murder
conviction and reversed the attempted second-degree murder convictions. The court held that: (1)
although the prosecutor violated state law in authorizing the release of the pickup truck, the violation did
not automatically vitiate the conviction of second-degree murder; (2) although not identical to the lost
evidence, comparable evidence was available for defendant to fully assert his defense; (3) attempted
second-degree murder did not exist in South Dakota; and (4) to commit murder one needed not intend
to take a life, but to be guilty of an attempt to murder, one had to so intend.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=d401fc3e-d718-4c7d-9bc7-
2641f9b9c7da&pdsearchterms=State+v.+Lyerla%2C+424+N.W.2d+908+(S.D.+1988)&pdstartin=hlct%3
A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplat
eid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=00cd1652-a9b1-47d7-843b-53655ba81067
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S71-2J70-003G-D1GF-00000-00
78
Case Name: Uhr v. E. Greenbush Cent. Sch. Dist.

Citation: 94 N.Y.2d 32, 698 N.Y.S.2d 609, 720 N.E.2d 886 (1999)
Rule: When a statute itself expressly authorizes a private right of action, there is no need for further
analysis. When a statute is silent, courts have had to determine whether a private right of action may be
fairly implied. In making the determination, a court asks: (1) whether the plaintiff is one of the class for
whose particular benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether recognition of a private right of action
would promote the legislative purpose; and (3) whether creation of such a right would be consistent with
the legislative scheme.
Facts: N.Y. Educ. Law §905(1) required school authorities in New York to examine students between eight
and sixteen years of age for scoliosis at least once in each school year. Plaintiffs alleged that, as a result of
defendant school district's failure to comply with this screening requirement, plaintiffs' daughter's ailment
was allowed to progress undetected. Plaintiffs' complaint was based on the alleged violation of N.Y. Educ.
Law §905(1), as well as a claim of common law negligence.
Issue: Is a tort liability be inferred from a statute violation as a private right of action?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: Defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted and affirmed on appeal, the court
having determined that N.Y. Educ. Law §905(1) did not create a private right of action, and that plaintiffs
had otherwise failed to state a claim for common law negligence. A private right of action was not
consistent with the statutory scheme.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=14e6665d-e86c-436f-bf29-
aee68c4eae6f&pdsearchterms=Uhr+v.+E.+Greenbush+Cent.+Sch.+Dis.%2C+720+N.E.2d+886+(1999)&
&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=d401fc3e-d718-4c7d-9bc7-2641f9b9c7da
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3XP7-XG50-0039-40GY-00000-00
79
Case Name: Woodrick v. Wood

Citation: 70 Ohio St. 3d 1433, 638 N.E.2d 584 (1994)
Rule:
Facts:
Issue:
Answer:
Conclusion:
URL:
Doc ID: https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=eaa65f09-5fe2-40dc-b797-
f45cdaece446&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fcases%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A5CWB-
WBV1-F04H-44NK-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A5CWB-WBV1-F04H-44NK-00000-
00&pdcontentcomponentid=9249&pdteaserkey=sr3&pditab=allpods&ecomp=5ypck&earg=sr3&prid=
ce6c3610-b59a-4e57-8bde-45512207fd24
80
Case Name: People v. Hood

Rule: The general rule is that the trial court must instruct the jury on the general principles of law relevant
to the issues raised by the evidence, even though not requested to do so, but need not instruct on its own
motion on specific points developed at the trial.
Facts: Defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon and assault with intent to murder.
Defendant asserted that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury with respect to lesser-included
offenses, and it also erred in instructing on the effect of intoxication.
Issue: Is voluntary intoxication considered as an evidence in a jury trial to determine guilt in a general
intent crime?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: It is to be considered depending on whether the crime was committed with a specific or
general intent. The court reversed, holding that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the lesser-
included offense was prejudicial error, because it deprived defendant of his constitutional right to have
the jury determine every material issue presented by the evidence. Furthermore, after the lower court
instructed the jury to consider intoxication in determining whether defendant had the specific intent to
commit murder, it followed with instructions which applied to general intent crimes and in no way made
clear to the jury that the latter instruction did not apply to the charge of assault with intent to commit
murder.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=cacd6e5d-8b66-4906-b7c5-
4b691caed306&pdsearchterms=People+v.+Hood%2C+462+P.2d+370+(1969)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A
1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&e
comp=532bk&prid=eaa65f09-5fe2-40dc-b797-f45cdaece446
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RRK-JTR0-003C-H13R-00000-00
81
Case Name: Woodside Vill. Condo. Ass'n v. McClernan

Citation: 806 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 2002)
Rule: A declaration of condominium strictly governs the relationships among the condominium unit
owners and the condominium association.
Facts: The condominium association adopted an amendment to the declaration of condominium limiting
all owners' ability to lease their units. The owners were notified two of their units did not comply with
these limitations. The owners purchased these units before the amendment. The leasing restriction
prevented a corporation which obtained federal financing to purchase units and lease them to
handicapped persons from obtaining such financing, and it sued the association.
Issue: Is it valid to impose on condominium owners to prohibit them from leasing their units through an
amendment to a declaration of condominiums?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: For as long as it is not a violation of public policy or constitutional rights of owners, the
imposition is valid. The restriction did not violate public policy or the owners' constitutional rights, as Fla.
Stat. ch. 718.110(1)(a) (2000) granted broad authority to amend the declaration. The distinction between
the owners and the corporation owning exempted units was not an arbitrary or discriminatory creation
of two classes of owners, but was related to providing handicapped persons an equal opportunity to enjoy
a unit in the complex.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=5a33240d-433e-4bc1-b734-
31dde3af150c&pdsearchterms=Woodside+Vill.+Condo.+Ass%27n+v.+McClernan%2C+806+So.+2d+452
+(Fla.+2002)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&p
dqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=cacd6e5d-8b66-4906-b7c5-4b691caed306
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:44TW-GHC0-0039-452X-00000-00
82
Case Name: State v. Smith

Citation: 210 Conn. 132, 554 A.2d 713 (1989)
Rule: Connecticut's first degree sexual assault statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-70, applies to a person
who compels another person to engage in sexual intercourse by the use of force or by the threat of use
of force which reasonably causes such person to fear physical injury. Although the consent of the
complainant is not expressly made a defense to such a crime, it is abundantly clear that the draftsmen of
the penal code endorsed the principle that non-commercial sexual activity in private, whether
heterosexual or homosexual, between consenting, competent adults, not involving corruption of the
young by older persons, is no business of the criminal law. A finding that a complainant had consented
would implicitly negate a claim that the actor had compelled the complainant by force or threat to engage
in sexual intercourse. Consent is not made an affirmative defense under the sex offense statutes, so, as in
the case of the defense of alibi, the burden is upon the State to prove lack of consent beyond a reasonable
doubt whenever the issue is raised.
Facts: Defendant invited a woman back to his apartment and made advances on her. Though the woman
repeatedly rejected his advances, defendant persisted. The woman testified that she believed defendant
was determined to have sex with her and that he would hurt her if she did not go along with it. She
reported the assault immediately. Defendant was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree in
violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-70.
Issue: Is it a requirement to intend to perform sexual acts with another individual who does not consent
it to be guilty of sexual assault?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The defendant claimed several errors including that the trial court should have granted his
motion for acquittal due to insufficiency of the evidence on the element of lack of consent. Defendant
argued that he did not realize that the woman was not consenting, and that such subjective intent on his
part was an element of the crime. The court disagreed. According to the court, the jury could properly
have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the woman's words and actions could not reasonably be
viewed to indicate her consent to intercourse. The court held that the inquiry on the issue of consent was
not the subjective state of mind of defendant or the victim, but rather the victim's manifestations of lack
of consent by words or conduct.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=3e0c319b-68f9-4883-92dd-
7f0ab03e6105&pdsearchterms=State+v.+Smith%2C+554+A.2d+713+(1989)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1
&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ec
omp=532bk&prid=5a33240d-433e-4bc1-b734-31dde3af150c
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RX4-0KP0-003D-8541-00000-00
83
Case Name: State v. Leidholm

Citation: 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983)
Rule: An objective standard of reasonableness requires the factfinder to view the circumstances
surrounding the accused at the time he used force from the standpoint of a hypothetical reasonable and
prudent person. Under such a view, the unique physical and psychological characteristics of the accused
are not taken into consideration in judging the reasonableness of the accused's belief.
Facts: Defendant was convicted of manslaughter as a result of the stabbing and killing of her husband
after a night of drinking and arguing.
Issue: If there is an instruction to the jury that subjective standard of reasonableness must apply in cases
involving self-defense, is it also equivalent to the relevance of battered woman syndrome?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: he court held that defendant's conduct was not to be judged by what a reasonably cautious
person would or would not do or consider necessary to do under the like circumstances, but what
defendant in good faith honestly believed and had reasonable ground to believe was necessary for her to
do to protect herself from apprehended death or great bodily injury. The trial court should have directed
the jury to assume the physical and psychological properties peculiar to defendant and then decide
whether or not the particular circumstances surrounding her at the time she used force were sufficient to
create in her mind a sincere and reasonable belief that the use of force was necessary to protect herself
from imminent and unlawful harm.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=d84d3a6a-8b4f-4c87-b990-
e42d91e90286&pdsearchterms=State+v.+Leidholm%2C+334+N.W.2d+811+(N.D.+1983)&pdstartin=hlc
t%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytem
plateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=3e0c319b-68f9-4883-92dd-7f0ab03e6105
Doc ID:
84
Case Name: Tioga Coal Co. v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp.

Citation: 519 Pa. 66, 546 A.2d 1 (1988)
Rule: If a true owner has not ejected the interloper within the time allotted for an action in ejectment,
and all other elements of adverse possession have been established, hostility will be implied, regardless
of the subjective state of mind of the trespasser.
Facts: Appellant coal company challenged the appellate court decision which affirmed the trial court's
holding that appellant's use of a street was not hostile or adverse to the true owner, appellee
supermarket, as required to perfect its claim of adverse possession.
Issue: May adverse possession be established by way of subjective hostility?

Answer: No.
Conclusion: It is not a requirement to establish adverse possession. The appellate court required proof of
appellant's objective hostility toward the true owner of the street, which was lacking because appellant
believed that the city owned the street. Appellant claimed that its taking and use of the street in excess
of the statutory period was sufficiently hostile. The court agreed, finding that if the true owner did not
eject an interloper from its property during the time allotted for an action in ejectment, and all other
elements of adverse possession were met, then hostility would be implied, regardless of the trespasser's
subjective state of mind. The court further held that the trial court's findings that the other requirements
of adverse possession had been met would not be disturbed. The court reversed the appellate court's
decision and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=72276ee7-829f-4435-a6e6-
66902eb42232&pdsearchterms=Tioga+Coal+Co.+v.+Supermarkets+Gen.+Corp.%2C+546+A.2d+1+(Pa.+
e=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=d84d3a6a-8b4f-4c87-b990-e42d91e90286
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S3J-XTX0-003C-S4CG-00000-00
85
Case Name: Troxel v. Granville

Citation: 530 U.S. 57, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000)
Rule: The court has recognized the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care,
custody, and control of their children.
Facts: Petitioner grandparents petitioned a Washington Superior Court for the right to visit their
grandchildren. Respondent mother opposed the petition. The case ultimately reached the Washington
Supreme Court, which reversed the order of visitation entered by the superior court.
Issue: Is any person permitted to petition the high court for visitation rights and be granted such for the
best interest of the child, and is it a violation of the due process clause to deny such?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The state superior court failed to accord the determination of respondent, a fit custodial
parent, any material weight; announced a presumption in favor of grandparent visitation; and failed to
accord significant weight to respondent's already having offered meaningful visitation to petitioners. The
court concluded that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution did not permit a state to
infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions. Accordingly, the court held
that Wash. Rev. Code § 26.10.160(3), as applied in this case, was unconstitutional.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=73d32ebb-c111-4ce5-b824-
122a511f8c93&pdsearchterms=Troxel+v.+Granville%2C+530+U.S.+57+(2000)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3
&ecomp=532bk&prid=72276ee7-829f-4435-a6e6-66902eb42232
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:40DT-5CT0-004C-1010-00000-00
86
Case Name: Slayton v. McDonald

Citation: 29257 ( La. App. 2 Cir 02/26/97), 690 So. 2d 914
Rule: La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2315 is the basis for tort liability in Louisiana. However, Louisiana's aggressor
doctrine precludes tort recovery where the plaintiff acts in such a way to provoke a reasonable person to
use physical force in fear or anticipation of further injury at the hand of the aggressor plaintiff, unless the
person retaliating has used excessive force to repel the aggression. A plaintiff is said to be the aggressor
when he is at fault in provoking the altercation in which he was injured. The question of which party is the
aggressor must be decided on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each situation. Even when another
party is the initial aggressor, the victim may use only so much force as is reasonably necessary to repel
the attack and if the victim goes beyond that point, he is liable for damages. In determining the amount
of force which is justified in repelling an attack, all facts and circumstances at the scene of the incident
must be considered.
Facts: The parties sons had a disagreement on the school bus. Plaintiff's son, who was the larger of the
two boys, went to defendant's home. Defendant's son told the other boy to leave, retreated into his home
and called 911. The 911 tape recorded defendant's son ordering plaintiff's son to leave the home.
Plaintiff's son refused and was taped saying that if he was shot he would get back up and "beat"
defendant's son. Defendant's son shot plaintiff's son in the knee. Plaintiff sued defendant for damages
and defendant filed a reconventional demand.
Issue: Is the use of any dangerous weapon such as a shotgun to defend self from imminent threat
justified?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The court noted plaintiff's son size, that his reputation for fighting, his refusal to leave
defendant's home when asked, and his threats. The court also noted defendant's son had already
retreated into the home and plaintiff's son continued to advance. The court stated that under such
circumstances, the trial court's conclusion that defendant's son used reasonable force to repel plaintiff's
son's attack was reasonable. Because the incident arose because of the fault of plaintiff's son, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in assessing all costs to plaintiff.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=d041db29-ab0a-4bed-aa70-
2e93179915ad&pdsearchterms=Slayton+v.+McDonald%2C+690+So.+2d+914+(La.+Ct.+App.+1997)&pd
dquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=73d32ebb-c111-4ce5-b824-122a511f8c93
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RJN-2KC0-0039-43VM-00000-00
87
Case Name: Truman L. Flatt & Sons Co. v. Schupf

Rule: Summary judgment is proper when the resolution of a case hinges on a question of law and the
moving party's right to judgment is clear and free from doubt. In considering a motion for summary
judgment, the court must consider the affidavits, depositions, admissions, exhibits, and pleadings on file
and has a duty to construe the evidence strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the nonmoving
party. The motion will be granted if the court finds there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A triable issue of fact exists where there is a
dispute as to material facts or where the material facts are undisputed but reasonable persons might draw
different inferences from those facts. In a case involving summary judgment, a reviewing court reviews
the evidence in the record de novo.
Facts: Promissee claimed that it was entitled to specific performance after defendant promissor failed to
convey a parcel of real estate as promised. The court agreed and held that triable issues of fact existed.
Issue: Is it possible to rescind anticipatory repudiation if it has not been relied upon that presents the
contract to be repudiated?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The court found that promissor was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the
purported repudiation by promissee would not have constituted a clearly implied threat of
nonperformance. It was insufficient to constitute a repudiation under well-settled Illinois law. Moreover,
even if promissee had repudiated the contract, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment
because it timely retracted its repudiation. Applying the actual common-law rule promissee's letter, which
clearly and unambiguously indicated it intended to perform under the contract, dispelled any and all
theories that anticipatory breach would occur.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=8be3e5b6-c6f9-4459-8aac-
a14bba2e4fe1&pdsearchterms=Truman+L.+Flatt+%26+Sons+Co.+v.+Schupf%2C+649+N.E.2d+990%2C+
271+Ill.+App.+3d+983+(1995)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchty
pe=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=d041db29-ab0a-4bed-
aa70-2e93179915ad
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S36-H0W0-003D-H225-00000-00
88
Case Name: Yun v. Ford Motor Co.

Citation: 143 N.J. 162, 669 A.2d 1378 (1996)
Rule:
Facts:
Issue:
Answer:
Conclusion:
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=3e2f6f88-4dcb-4536-9ecd-
d6063795bb16&pdsearchterms=Yun+v.+Ford+Motor+Co.%2C+143+N.J.+162%2C+669+A.2d+1378+(19
96)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=
and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=8be3e5b6-c6f9-4459-8aac-a14bba2e4fe1
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S3J-VD30-003C-P1FV-00000-00
89
Case Name: Vogan v. Hayes Appraisal Assocs.

Citation: 588 N.W.2d 420 (Iowa 1999)
Rule: Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of a promise is an intended
beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the
intention of the parties and either the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the
promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to
give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance. An incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary
who is not an intended beneficiary.
Facts: Appellant was hired by a bank to monitor the progress of new home construction for appellees,
who had obtained a construction loan from the bank. The contractor defaulted after all of the original
construction loan proceeds and a portion of a second mortgage loan had been paid out by the bank.
Appellees recovered judgment against appellant on a third-party beneficiary theory based on its alleged
failure to properly monitor the progress of construction, which allowed funds to be improperly released
to the defaulting contractor.
Issue: Is it valid for a third-party beneficiary of a contract recover damages for certain circumstances in
the performance of a contract?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: While an intended third-party beneficiary of a contract may recover damages from a breach,
the other kind of a third-party beneficiary cannot, which is the incidental type. The court of appeals
reversed the judgment because erroneous progress reports were not the cause of any loss to appellees.
The court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the district court
because appellees qualified as third-party beneficiaries of the agreement between the bank and
appellant. The court found that although the initial construction loan might have been disbursed prior to
the faulty completion estimate, the erroneous reporting of the project's completion caused the bank to
disburse other funds of appellees that would have been retained had the report been accurate.
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e076223a1cff&pdsearchterms=Vogan+v.+Hayes+Appraisal+Assocs.+588+N.W.2d+420+(1999)&pdstart
in=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdque
rytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=3e2f6f88-4dcb-4536-9ecd-d6063795bb16
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3VM7-1TH0-0039-421J-00000-00
90
Case Name: Whitney v. California

Citation: 274 U.S. 357, 47 S. Ct. 641 (1927)
Rule: That the freedom of speech which is secured by the United States Constitution does not confer an
absolute right to speak, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and
unbridled license giving immunity for every possible use of language and preventing the punishment of
those who abuse this freedom; and that a state in the exercise of its police power may punish those who
abuse this freedom by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to incite to crime, disturb the
public peace, or endanger the foundations of organized government and threaten its overthrow by
unlawful means, is not open to question.
Facts: Petitioner sought review of a judgment affirming her conviction under the state Criminal
Syndicalism Act. The conviction was based on her involvement with the Communist Labor Party of
California, including membership in the party.
Issue: Does prohibition on syndicalism a violation of First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Answer: No.
Conclusion: It is a guaranteed protection on freedom of speech, however, not absolute. The Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment upholding the conviction. The court held that it had jurisdiction to review
the state court's judgment where an order of the appeals court indicated that a federal question regarding
the Act's constitutionality had been presented and decided. The court held that the essence of the offense
was the combining with others in an association for the accomplishment of desired ends through the
advocacy and use of criminal and unlawful methods and that the Act was not an unreasonable or arbitrary
exercise of the police power of the state that unwarrantably infringed any right of free speech, assembly,
or association. The Act, as applied, did not violate either the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
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00c251cb9a61&pdsearchterms=Whitney+v.+California%2C+274+U.S.+357%2C+47+S.+Ct.+641+(1927)
d&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=f8e2b5a5-7f27-45a0-a302-e076223a1cff
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-G000-003B-743V-00000-00
91
Case Name: Whitney v. Robertson

Citation: 124 U.S. 190, 8 S. Ct. 456 (1888)
Rule: If there be any conflict between the stipulations of a treaty and the requirements of a law, the latter
must control. A treaty is primarily a contract between two or more independent nations, and is so
regarded by writers on public law. For the infraction of its provisions a remedy must be sought by the
injured party through reclamations upon the other. When the stipulations are not self-executing they can
only be enforced pursuant to legislation to carry them into effect, and such legislation is as much subject
to modification and repeal by Congress as legislation upon any other subject. If the treaty contains
stipulations which are self-executing, that is, require no legislation to make them operative, to that extent
they have the force and effect of a legislative enactment. Congress may modify such provisions, so far as
they bind the United States, or supersede them altogether. By the Constitution a treaty is placed on the
same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are declared by that instrument
to be the supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy is given to either over the other.
Facts: Merchants, who imported sugars from San Domingo into the United States, alleged that they
should not have had to pay duties on their imported products because the sugars were similar to goods
imported from the Hawaiian Islands, which were exempt from duties.
Issue: Will a treaty inconsistent with the federal statute prevail over the other?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: A self-executing treaty and a federal statute in consideration of the same matter with
inconsistency will always fall at a condition that what will prevail is the one entered at a later date. The
court held that the treaty between the United States and the Dominican Republic did not provide for any
concessions of special privileges, which exempted the imported sugar from duties, and the Court affirmed
the circuit court's judgment in favor of the collector of the port. The court held that the treaty did not
cover concessions like those made to the Hawaiian Islands for a valuable consideration. The treaty
imposed an obligation upon both countries to avoid hostile legislation that would discriminate against
one country's goods in favor of goods of like character imported from any other country. However, the
treaties were not intended to interfere with special arrangements with other countries founded upon a
concession of special privileges.
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1def8e1120f7&pdsearchterms=Whitney+v.+Robertson%2C+124+U.S.+190%2C+8+S.+Ct.+456+(1888)&
&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=f4c8dbb2-3dbe-4749-b5ca-00c251cb9a61
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S4X-H460-003B-H1HW-00000-00
92
Case Name: Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.

Rule: Characteristics of the type of transaction in which exculpatory provisions will be held invalid
include the following: (1) as a result of the essential nature of the service performed by the party invoking
exculpation, in the economic setting of the transaction, the party invoking exculpation possesses a
decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the public who seeks his services; (2) in
exercising a superior bargaining power the party confronts the public with a standardized adhesion
contract of exculpation and makes no provision whereby a purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees
and obtain protection against negligence; and (3) as a result of the transaction, the person or property of
the purchaser is placed under the control of the seller, subject to the risk of carelessness by the seller or
his agents.
Facts: The decedent brought this action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have resulted
from the negligence of two physicians in the employ of the University of California Los Angeles Medical
Center, a hospital operated and maintained by the Regents as a nonprofit charitable institution.
Issue: Is exculpatory clause applicable to bar a patient’s medical malpractice action considering that a
hospital provides services of public interest?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: If an exculpatory clause does not involve “public interest” then it is valid. However, a hospital
does involve the interest of the public. The court found that the agreement exhibited all of the
characteristics set forth by the courts of the type of transaction in which exculpatory provisions would be
held invalid, including the following: (1) the agreement involved an institution subject to public regulation;
(2) the hospital's services to those who needed the particular skill of its staff and facilities constituted a
practical and crucial necessity; and (3) the hospital held itself out as willing to perform its services for
those qualified members of the public.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=b31f6716-3f74-4b70-9640-
c44be1d02a9f&pdsearchterms=Tunkl+v.+Regents+of+Univ.+of+Cal.%2C+60+Cal.+2d+92%2C+32+Cal.+
Rptr.+33%2C+383+P.2d+441+(1963)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdse
archtype=SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=b7533dca-399b-4c1f-
a713-1def8e1120f7
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RRK-MWF0-003C-H2DB-00000-00
93
Case Name: State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Tally
Citation: 102 Ala. 25, 15 So. 722 (1893)

Rule: The words aid and abet, in legal phrase, are pretty much the synonyms of each other. They
comprehend all assistance rendered by acts, or words of encouragement or support or presence, actual
or constructive, to render assistance should it become necessary. No particular acts are necessary. If
encouragement be given to commit the felony, or if, giving due weight to all the testimony, the jury are
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was present with a view to render aid should it
become necessary, then that ingredient of the offense is made out.
Facts: In removing the judge from office, the court recognized the rule of conviction beyond a reasonable
doubt was applicable. As the judge had no actual knowledge of the intent of the murderers at the time
they left his presence to accomplish their deed, he was to be not guilty of the charge of willfully neglecting
his duty as a magistrate in not exercising the power the law had clothed him with to stay their hands.
Issue: Is the crime being committed needed to have been successful with the help of the accomplice
before the latter becomes liable?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The intention of the accomplice and the contribution to the crime makes one guilty of such.
The court held that one could be guilty of murder by aiding and abetting if his actions prevented the
deceased from exercising one final chance at survival, even though it was likely that the result would have
been the same without his actions. He was constructively present, and thus guilty. The court specified
that their conclusion was not to influence criminal murder charges still pending.
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167db447c430&pdsearchterms=State+ex+rel.+Attorney+Gen.+v.+Tally%2C+15+So.+722+(Ala.+1893)&
&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=b31f6716-3f74-4b70-9640-c44be1d02a9f
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3Y8M-F540-0046-83CV-00000-00
94
Case Name: State v. Taft

Citation: 143 W. Va. 365, 102 S.E.2d 152 (1958)
Rule: If a vehicle is moved by some power beyond the control of the driver, or by accident, it is not such
an affirmative or positive action on the part of the driver as will constitute a driving of a vehicle within the
meaning of Section 2 of Article 5, Chapter 129 of the 1951 Acts of the Legislature, as amended, Michie's
1955 W. Va. Code, 17C-5-2.
Facts: Defendant was found guilty of driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor and of driving an automobile while under the influence of drugs and narcotics to a degree rendering
him incapable of safely driving the automobile. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred when it
instructed the jury that the term "driving" had been defined and construed as requiring that a vehicle be
in motion in order for the offense to be committed.
Issue: Is an accidental movement of a car without the affirming action of a driver considered “driving” in
cases of driving under the influence?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: There must be an affirmative action from any person with the intent to move the vehicle.
Court found that the mere motion of the vehicle did not constitute "driving" of the vehicle. Therefore, the
trial court's instruction, which had the effect of telling the jury that any accidental movement of the
vehicle was sufficient to constitute a driving of the vehicle, constituted prejudicial error. The court also
found that the evidence in the case did not support a verdict of guilty on the charge relating to the driving
of a vehicle by defendant while under the influence of drugs.
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167db447c430&pdsearchterms=State+ex+rel.+Attorney+Gen.+v.+Tally%2C+15+So.+722+(Ala.+1893)&
&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=b31f6716-3f74-4b70-9640-c44be1d02a9f
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3XMH-7VW0-00KR-C22R-00000-00
95
Case Name: People v. Harvey

Citation: 27 Ill. 2d 282, 189 N.E.2d 320 (1963)
Rule: The Constitution of the State of Illinois does not prohibit all searches, but only those which are
unreasonable. The question of what is a reasonable search following a valid arrest depends on the
surrounding facts and circumstances of each individual case. The critical issue in each case is whether the
situation that confronted the officer justified the search.
Facts: Defendant challenged his conviction on the ground that the trial court erred in denying his motion
to suppress evidence taken from his home that had been obtained as the result of an illegal search and
seizure in violation of Ill. Const. art. II, §§ 6, 10.
Issue: Is the right of the defendant violated during the search and seizure?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The court ruled that after defendant's lawful arrest the search of the premises in which the
crime had been committed only minutes previously in order to find and seize the fruits of the crime was
reasonable and, thus, the evidence was lawfully seized and properly admissible. The court also rejected
defendant's claim that the State failed to adduce evidence from which the trial court could find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the substance sold by defendant to a police informer was in fact heroin as charged
in the indictment. Noting that the testimony of the witnesses adequately traced the packages from
defendant to the police informer, to the arresting police officer, then to the chemist who examined the
contents of the packages and testified at trial that the packages contained heroin, the court concluded
that continuity of possession was fully established.
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27ef5892d0a9&pdsearchterms=People+v.+Harvey%2C+27+Ill.+2d+282%2C+189+N.E.2d+320+(1963)&
&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=f48bea55-128e-4abe-91c4-2e6c29a4d453
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RRM-2S20-003C-43P6-00000-00
96
Case Name: Winter v. NRDC, Inc.

Citation: 555 U.S. 7, 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008)
Rule: A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits,
that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities
tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.
Facts: Sharing the waters in the Navy's Southern California operating area were at least 37 species of
marine mammals, including dolphins, whales, and sea lions. The parties strongly disputed the extent to
which the Navy's training activities, specifically its use of active sonar, would harm those animals or disrupt
their behavioral patterns.
Issue: Is there consideration given on the balance of competing claims of injury and the effect of relief
being requested by each party?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The Court agreed with the Navy that the Ninth Circuit's "possibility" of irreparable injury
standard for preliminary relief was too lenient. The frequently reiterated standard required parties
seeking preliminary relief to demonstrate that irreparable injury was "likely" in the absence of an
injunction. The district court did not reconsider the likelihood of irreparable harm in light of four
restrictions not challenged by the Navy (the Navy was only challenging two out of six restrictions in the
injunction). Even if plaintiffs had shown irreparable injury from the Navy's training exercises, any such
injury was outweighed by the public interest and the Navy's interest in effective, realistic training of its
sailors. A proper consideration of such factors alone required denial of the requested injunctive relief.
URL: https://advance.lexis.com/search/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=689fa171-b811-4c09-8197-
b5ba655234e5&pdsearchterms=Winter+v.+Nat.+Resources+Def.+Council%2C+Inc.%2C+555+U.S.+7+(2
008)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=SearchBox&pdqttype
=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=59cd3eb8-b6dd-4229-ba38-27ef5892d0a9
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:4TX2-8KV0-TXFX-13DV-00000-00
97
Case Name: State v. Diana

Citation: 24 Wash. App. 908, 604 P.2d 1312 (1979)
Rule: Generally, necessity is available as a defense when the physical forces of nature or the pressure
of circumstances cause the accused to take unlawful action to avoid a harm which social policy deems
greater than the harm resulting from a violation of the law. The defense is not applicable where the
compelling circumstances have been brought about by the accused or where a legal alternative is available
to the accused.
Facts: The police entered defendant's home after speaking with his wife and observing defendant on the
floor through the window. Upon entering the home, the police observed marijuana in plain view on the
couch.
Issue: Is it valid to claim medical necessity for case against possession to suppress evidence of marijuana
seen from the window?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The court further held that the "knock and wait" rule under Wash. Rev. Code § 10.31.040 did
not apply because the police were presented with exigent circumstances. The court granted defendant's
request to remand his conviction for possession of a controlled substance for a determination of whether
defendant was entitled to a medical necessity defense in light of Controlled Substances Therapeutic Act,
which recognized marijuana as a medicinal drug. The court held that defendant would be required to
present medical testimony.
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0554d3303e45&pdsearchterms=State+v.+Diana%2C+604+P.2d+1312+(Wash.+1979)&pdstartin=hlct%3
eid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=689fa171-b811-4c09-8197-b5ba655234e5
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3S3J-XWF0-003F-W544-00000-00
98
Case Name: State v. DiPetrillo

Citation: 922 A.2d 124 (R.I. 2007)
Rule: When an appellate court reviews the denial of a R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 33 motion in the context
of a jury-waived trial, an appellate court applies the same deferential standard of review as would be
applied to the trial court justice's factual findings on the merits. Such determinations are entitled to great
weight and will not be disturbed unless the trial justice has overlooked or misconceived relevant and
material evidence or was otherwise clearly wrong.
Facts: Defendant's conviction arose from the sexual assault upon a young 19-year-old employee of
defendant. The court found that the trial justice properly articulated the element of physical force as set
forth in R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-1(2)(ii) (1956), but that it was not convinced that the trial justice's finding
of guilt based on physical force was not so inextricably intertwined with the erroneous finding of force
and coercion by implied threats that it constituted a separate and independent finding of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Issue: Was there enough evidence to prove that the defendant took advantage of the victim with authority
or physical force to inflict physical and psychological harm?
Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The trial justice's finding that all of the ingredients were present in order for the defendant
to overbear the will of the victim, either by his authority or by a modicum of physical force and his
conclusion that all of the relevant hallmarks of force or coercion, both physical and psychological, were
part and parcel of defendant's misconduct, caused the court concern. In light of the erroneous finding of
force and coercion by implied threats, the court was uncertain about whether defendant was convicted
based on a finding of force and coercion by physical force beyond a reasonable doubt that was separate
and apart from the error.
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2e8e54102c71&pdsearchterms=State+v.+DiPetrillo%2C+922+A.2d+124+(R.I.+2007)&pdstartin=hlct%3
eid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=8ae40f5a-be80-4161-a2b5-0554d3303e45
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:4NS1-FFS0-0039-43GR-00000-00
99
Case Name: Wishnatsky v. Huey

Citation: 1997 ND 35, 560 N.W.2d 878
Rule: Reasonable grounds exist for obtaining a restraining order under N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-31.2 when
the facts and circumstances presented to the judge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable
caution to believe that acts constituting disorderly conduct have been committed.
Facts: Appellant in his petition for a disorderly conduct restraining order alleged that appellee in one
incident threw his body weight against a door and forced appellant out of an office. In another incident
appellant saw appellee confront another individual and allegedly experienced severe physical and
emotional effects.
Issue: Was the appellant able to establish reasonable ground on his petition for temporary restraining
order?
Answer: No.
Conclusion: The trial court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the court held that appellant did not raise
reasonable grounds for a restraining order against appellee under N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-31.2.
Reasonable grounds existed if facts and circumstances were presented sufficient to warrant a person of
reasonable caution to believe that acts constituting the offense of disorderly conduct had been
committed. In the instant case appellant did not demonstrate in his petition a pattern of intimidation by
appellee or that appellee was stalking or seeking to harass appellant.
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d652af47d05a&pdsearchterms=Wishnatsky+v.+Huey%2C+1997+ND+35+(1997)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%
&ecomp=532bk&prid=bed9c838-387b-4bed-9c95-2e8e54102c71
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3T3J-PTN0-0045-6058-00000-00
100
Case Name: Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan

Citation: 452 Mass. 733, 897 N.E.2d 548 (2008)
Rule: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183C, § 1 et seq., the Massachusetts Predatory Home Loan Practices Act (Act),
prohibits a lender from making a "high-cost home mortgage loan" unless the lender reasonably believes
at the time the loan is made that the borrower will be able to make the scheduled payments to repay the
home loan based upon a consideration of the borrower's current and expected income, current and
expected obligations, employment status, and other financial resources other than the borrower's equity
in the dwelling which secures repayment of the loan. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183C, § 4. That section further
states, however, that a borrower is presumed to be able to repay the loan if the borrower's debt-to-
income ratio, calculated based on the fully indexed rate associated with an ARM loan, does not exceed 50
percent of the borrower's verified monthly gross income. The Act prohibits a high-cost home mortgage
loan from containing any provision for prepayment fees or penalties. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183C, § 5. That
chapter expressly provides that a violation of the statute constitutes a violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
93A, § 1 et seq. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183C, § 18(a).
Facts: The Commonwealth, acting through the Attorney General, commenced a consumer protection
enforcement action against the mortgage company, claiming that it, in originating certain "subprime"
mortgage loans in Massachusetts, acted unfairly in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 2.
Issue: Is a bank’s ability to foreclose on preliminary injunction against public interest?

Answer: No.
Conclusion: The preliminary injunction is not equal to prohibiting. The bank has a freedom to foreclose
on a loan, and it is not so considered to be against the public interest. The trial court properly found that
because borrowers were unlikely to be able repay the loans, the loans violated the Massachusetts
Predatory Home Loan Practices Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183C, § 4, and, thus, also violated Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 93A, § 2, (3) the mortgage company did not show any authority permitting the alleged unfair
practice, and (4) the preliminary injunction served the public interest.
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449e-b23c-
f40729c8dd1a&pdsearchterms=Commonwealth+v.+Fremont+Inv.+%26+Loan%2C+452+Mass.+733%2C
+897+N.E.2d+548+(2008)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=
SearchBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=2f148aed-747b-4063-8b12-
d652af47d05a
Doc ID: urn:contentItem:4V3V-95D0-TXFT-81R8-00000-00
101
Case Name: People v. Grant

Rule: A reviewing court cannot disturb a jury's finding of sanity unless it is so manifestly against the weight
of the evidence as to indicate that the verdict was based on passion or prejudice.
Facts: Third party was involved in an altercation with tavern owner. While third party was being arrested,
defendant broke through the crowd and struck one police officer in the face. Defendant suffered a seizure
in jail and was taken to the hospital. Defendant was charged with aggravated battery and obstructing a
police officer. Defendant claimed he suffered from an epileptic seizure at the time of the alleged offenses.
Issue: Is a defense of involuntary conduct entitled to a defendant?

Answer: Yes.
Conclusion: The court held that the jury's finding of sanity was not against the manifest weight of the
evidence because there was testimony that defendant was alert and in possession of his complete
faculties at the time he was arrested. The jury instructions were substantially defective because they did
not contain an instruction on the defense of involuntary conduct. The obstructing a police officer
conviction was reversed because defendant could not be convicted for separate offenses that arose from
the same course of conduct.
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930c-
75f2f8553a35&pdsearchterms=People+v.+Grant%2C+46+Ill.+App.+3d+125%2C+4+Ill.+Dec.+696%2C+3
60+N.E.2d+809+(1977)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype=Se
archBox&pdqttype=and&pdquerytemplateid=&ecomp=532bk&prid=9aca9881-6869-449e-b23c-
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2nd Batch BR Digests

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Copyright:

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2nd Batch BR Digests

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Copyright:

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1

Case Name: Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee

Case Name: Esteves v. Esteves

Case Name: Esteves v. Esteves

Case Name: James v. Taylor

Case Name: Higgins v. Superior Court

Case Name: Freeland v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,

Issue: Is the litigation the determining factor of declaratory judgment action?

Case Name: Hill v. Edmonds

Case Name: Frier v. Vandalia

Case Name: Hill v. Sparks

Case Name: Lasley v. Combined Transp., Inc.

Case Name: Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md.

Case Name: Galloway v. United States

Case Name: Hobbs v. Massasoit Whip Co.

Case Name: Iseberg v. Gross,

Case Name: Favale v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Bridgeport,

Case Name: Hodgeden v. Hubbard 46 Am.Dec. 167 (1846)

Case Name: Hogan v. Tavzel

Case Name: Johnson v. City of Shelby

Case Name: Johnson v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc

Case Name: Glidden v. Szybiak

Case Name: Fair Hous. Council v. Roommate.com, LLC

Doc ID: urn:contentItem:54W2-9751-F04K-V0N3-00000-00

Case Name: Goldwater v. Carter

Case Name: Klein v. Pyrodyne Corp.

Case Name: Goodman v. Dicker

Case Name: Halbman v. Lemke

Case Name: Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie

Case Name: Largey v. Rothman

Case Name: Hancock v. AT&T Co.

Case Name: Hancock v. Northcutt

Case Name: Lopez v. Winchell's Donut House

Case Name: In re Banks

Case Name: Greenfield v. Philles Records

Case Name: Davies v. McDowell Nat'l Bank

Case Name: Curtis v. Loether

Case Name: Christian v. Mattel, Inc.

Case Name: Conrad v. Fields

Case Name: Duncan v. Louisiana

Case Name: Delaney v. Reynolds

Case Name: Bd. of Educ. v. Hughes

Case Name: Baska v. Scherzer

Case Name: Bruce v. State

Case Name: Denman v. Spain

Case Name: Cole v. Turner

Case Name: Cole v. Turner, 522 U.S. 1056 (1998)

Case Name: Buck v. Bell

Case Name: Bowers v. Hardwick

Case Name: El Di, Inc. v. Bethany Beach

Case Name: Desertrain v. City of L.A.

Case Name: Emp't Div. v. Smith

Case Name: Bernier v. Bos. Edison Co.

Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RX4-6220-003C-V1J9-00000-00

Case Name: Charrier v. Bell

Case Name: Abdouch v. Lopez

Case Name: Camacho v. Honda Motor Co.

Case Name: Bradwell v. State

Case Name: Dillon v. Legg,

Doc ID: urn:contentItem:3RRK-KF90-003C-H1F2-00000-00

Case Name: Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood

Case Name: Adamson v. California

Case Name: Dalury v. S-K-I, Ltd.