2018-137 Attachment Item 4.3 Appendix 1 Wellington Hospital Campus Infra...

Wellington Hospital Campus Infrastructure
Resilience Report
Capital and Coast District Health Board
16-Jun-2017
Wellington Hospital
Campus Infrastructure
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and Total Energy Centre
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Resilience Report
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\\NZWLG1FP001\Projects\605X\60545594\8. Issued Docs\8.1 Reports\Infrastructure Review - Rev C\Wellington Hospital Campus Infrastructure
Resiliency Report.docx
Revision C – 16-Jun-2017
Prepared for – Capital and Coast District Health Board – Co No.: N/A
AECOM Wellington Hospital Campus Infrastructure Resilience Report
Wellington Hospital Campus Infrastructure and Total Energy Centre

Resilience Report
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Client: Capital and Coast District Health Board
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Co No.: N/A
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Prepared by
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AECOM New Zealand Limited
8 Mahuhu Crescent, Auckland 1010, PO Box 4241, Auckland 1140, New Zealand
T +64 9 967 9200 F +64 9 967 9201 www.aecom.com
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16-Jun-2017
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Job No.: 60545594

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AECOM in Australia and New Zealand is certified to the latest version of ISO9001, ISO14001, AS/NZS4801 and OHSAS18001.
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© AECOM New Zealand Limited (AECOM). All rights reserved.

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AECOM has prepared this document for the sole use of the Client and for a specific purpose, each as expressly stated in the document. No other
party should rely on this document without the prior written consent of AECOM. AECOM undertakes no duty, nor accepts any responsibility, to any
third party who may rely upon or use this document. This document has been prepared based on the Client’s description of its requirements and
AECOM’s experience, having regard to assumptions that AECOM can reasonably be expected to make in accordance with sound professional
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principles. AECOM may also have relied upon information provided by the Client and other third parties to prepare this document, some of which
may not have been verified. Subject to the above conditions, this document may be transmitted, reproduced or disseminated only in its entirety.
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Quality Information
Document Wellington Hospital Campus Infrastructure and Total Energy Centre
Ref 60545594
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Date 16-Jun-2017
Prepared by James McGeachin, Barry Corrigan, Lana Duboka
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Reviewed by Duncan Richards, Nick Fraser, Kevin Miller
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Revision History
Authorised
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Rev Revision Date Details
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Name/Position Signature
A 12-Jun-2017 Work In Progress Draft Mark Rollason

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Report Associate Director
B 15-Jun-2017 For Information Mark Rollason
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Associate Director
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C 16-Jun-2017 For Information Mark Rollason

Associate Director
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Table of Contents
Executive Summary i
1.0 Overview 1
1.1 Background 1
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1.2 Purpose 1
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1.3 Methodology 1
1.4 Summary Findings 4
1.5 Short Term Works Options 6
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2.0 Electrical 9
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2.1 Overview 9
2.2 Incoming Supply 10
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2.3 Total Energy Centre 12
2.4 HV Switchboards 15
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2.5 HV Cabling 16
2.6 Transformers 18
3.0 Mechanical Services 20
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3.1 Chilled Water 20
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3.2 Heating and Domestic Hot Water 20
3.3 Chiller Heat Rejection (Cooling Towers) 21
3.4 Pipework Reticulation 22
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4.0 Building Surveying 23
4.1 Survey 23
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5.0 Structural Engineering 25
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5.1 Total Energy Centre Building 25

5.1.1 Previous TEC Building Assessment 25
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5.1.2 AECOM recommendations 25

5.2 Main Street Substation Building 26
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5.2.1 Previous MSS Building Assessment 26

5.2.2 AECOM recommendations 27
6.0 Appendix A – Building Criticality 28
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7.0 Appendix B – Risk Register 29

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AECOM Wellington Hospital Campus Infrastructure and Total Energy Centre i
Executive Summary
Critical elements of infrastructure supporting the Wellington Hospital campus, specifically the site HV
network and the emergency generator system, were originally installed circa 1980 and are considered
to be at the end of their economic life. Based on the age, condition and recent equipment failures,
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we consider that there is a high risk of a catastrophic failure of the site electrical infrastructure
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potentially leading to a complete loss of power to critical buildings potentially jeopardising
patient safety.
Reliable electricity supply to hospital buildings is a requirement for most acute medical procedures and
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business continuity functions such as data networks. The campus electrical infrastructure is arranged
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to incorporate redundancy in most components so that single failures are unlikely to result in loss of
electricity supply to site buildings. However the entire high voltage network is now aged beyond
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what would normally be considered its useful life and showing signs of significant dilapidation
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creating a high risk of complete network failure. This is considered to be a grave situation and may
interrupt the operation of the clinical business.
The age of this infrastructure and associated reduction in inherent equipment reliability have
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generated concerns that the infrastructure may fail to support the campus during either disasters or
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‘business as usual’ situations. Under normal circumstances most failures of a single element of the
high voltage network can be accommodated by redundant systems and supply paths. However as the
back-up systems are similarly dilapidated there is a significant risk that concurrent failures could occur.
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In the event of a major civil defence emergency (e.g. a significant seismic event) there is high potential
for multiple failures to occur resulting in a complete outage. These concerns have escalated in recent
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years as a number of major failures have occurred in the hospital generator system.
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Purpose
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This report has been commissioned to provide a high level review of the site infrastructure condition
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and resilience and identify associated risks to Capital and Coast District Health Board (CCDHB).
The following elements are reviewed:
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· Campus HV Electrical network including diesel standby generator system and incoming supply
from Wellington Electricity network.
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· TEC mechanical services including central domestic / heating hot water system and the central
chilled water system.
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· Desktop review of TEC and MSS structural engineering reports

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Building survey of the Total Energy Centre (TEC) to identify issues which may affect the
resilience of the engineering infrastructure
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Findings and Risks

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Issues identified during this review have implications of either loss of reliability or complete failure of
the campus electrical infrastructure which presents extreme safety, operational and reputational risks
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to CCDHB. A risk register is included in Appendix B which lists and grades the major risks associated with
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the site infrastructure. Where the risk affects the buildings a criticality table (Appendix A) has been used to
assess potential operational consequences based on a likelihood and assigned risk category.
Most of the critical components of site electrical infrastructure have reached the end of their economic
life and are wearing out despite dedicated maintenance. This is evidenced by recent failures and
degradation of the site emergency generators.
Neither the utility electricity supply nor the emergency generator system has redundant capacity during
periods of high electrical demand. The utility supply to the site contains single points of failure.
The internal HV network cabling and Link Block HV switchboard is vulnerable to a single event, such
as fire, resulting in complete loss of supply to critical site buildings. Degradation of the HV cabling
presents extreme health and safety risks to site staff and patients.
AECOM Wellington Hospital Campus Infrastructure and Total Energy Centre ii
The mechanical systems assessed do not present the same level of risks to the site due to additional
newer equipment installed at other locations on the site providing redundancy. It is noted that the
cooling towers contain asbestos which presents a risk of asbestos exposure which must be managed
by staff maintaining the towers.
The TEC and MSS building structures, based upon desktop review of previous seismic assessments,
were rated at seismic strength of 75% NBS and 100% NBS respectively. It is recommended that
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works are carried out to verify the findings of these reports.
The TEC building roof membrane is at the end of its expected life, evidenced by the number of patch
repairs. The TEC building may encounter major water ingress issues due to failure of this membrane.
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This may result in water ingress into the components of the emergency generator system and resulting
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in equipment failure.
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The only costs we have identified are for Short Term works to reduce risk exposure and these are high level
budgets. The estimates are for a minimum expenditure for the next 3 year period and this estimate of
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works could be in the region of $300,000 - $500,000 plus GST for construction costs only. Please refer
to Appendix B for details of the scope of these costs which for clarity exclude a roof replacement. We
do recommend this but this may want to be considered in conjunction with the larger project due to the
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requirement of removal mechanical equipment
Recommendations In
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It is recommended that a complete upgrade of the site high voltage electrical infrastructure including
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standby generation be undertaken as soon as possible. This recommendation is based on some of
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the identified issues being widespread across the site or resulting from the fundamental arrangement
of some network elements.
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Short term measures to reduce the risk exposure associated with identified reliability and resilience
issues include:
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· Continuing and enhancing maintenance of existing equipment

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· Reviewing and enhancing site emergency response procedures in light of identified issues to
enable an organised response to failure of any critical infrastructure element.
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· Widening the pool of knowledge of key site systems amongst site maintenance staff to reduce the
reliance on single individuals.
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· Provide LV mobile generator link panels for highly critical building loads to allow temporary
portable generators to be connected quickly should the site network suffer catastrophic failure.
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· Installation of VESDA fire detection system in the MSS HV switch room to permit early detection
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and response to fire initiated in the switch room.

· Removal of redundant bus tie switch from MSS HV switchboard and replacement with fixed bus
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section.
· Survey cable supports and rectify supports deemed be insufficient or failed.
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· Replace the sections of degraded cabling on the services link bridge with modern HDPE
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sheathed cabling.
· Undertake analysis to confirm capacity of TEC-NRH feeder to carry site demand in the event of
failure of TEC-LNK cable pathway.
· Full replacement of the TEC roof membrane to reduce the risk of water ingress affecting
operation of the standby generators.
· Undertaking site investigations to confirm seismic assessment report findings
AECOM Wellington Hospital Campus Infrastructure and Total Energy Centre 1
1.0 Overview
1.1 Background
A major expansion of Wellington Hospital during the late 1970’s and early 1980’s involved the
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construction of new buildings including the Total Energy Centre (TEC) and major upgrades to campus
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infrastructure. The TEC was originally commissioned as a primary power plant and co-generation
facility, providing electricity and thermal energy (hot water and chilled water) to the hospital campus.
In this configuration, mains supply from the electricity grid was used as backup supply.
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The TEC was subsequently modified to serve as backup power supply (circa 1996) with central
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thermal facilities mostly decommissioned in favour of new facilities serving individual buildings. The
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other major project affecting site reticulated infrastructure is the New Regional Hospital (NRH) project.
The NRH project provided only new infrastructure inside the NRH building and new connections into
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the existing network at the Mein Street substation, Link Block HV switchboard and TEC.
There are concerns about the present condition and arrangement of the infrastructure. AECOM
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(formerly URS) has conducted previous condition reviews and feasibility studies for installing
additional emergency generation or replacing the existing infrastructure. Recent seismic activity and
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major equipment failures within the TEC have renewed concerns about the hospitals exposure to
failures within the reticulated infrastructure, particularly electrical infrastructure.
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AECOM have been engaged by Capital & Coast District Health Board (CCDHB) to provide a review of
the resilience, condition and key failure points of the campus infrastructure at Wellington Hospital.
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1.2 Purpose
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The report provides a high level review of the resilience, condition and key failure points of the
campus-wide engineering infrastructure at Wellington Hospital. The report identifies issues affecting
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the condition and resilience of the site and evaluates the resulting safety, operational and business
risks to CCDHB.
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This review includes a summary of assessments previously undertaken with supplementary site
inspection of key components to provide further detail as required.
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The review encompasses the following services:

· HV electrical network from the Mein Street intake substation to the output of each distribution
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transformer.
· The diesel standby generator system including controls and supporting systems.
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· TEC mechanical systems including central domestic / heating hot water system and central
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chilled water system.

· Building survey of the Total Energy Centre (TEC) to identify issues which may affect the
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resilience of the engineering infrastructure (e.g. water ingress through the roof).
Development of solutions and / or replacement strategies is specifically excluded from this review
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however it should be noted that elements of this have been presented in previous reports.
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Recommendations are provided on temporary measures that could be put in place to increase the
resilience of elements that are considered to be at high risk of failure.
1.3 Methodology
Desktop surveys were conducted on available information including:
· Previous AECOM/URS reports regarding the hospital electrical infrastructure
· Information provided by CCDHB
Site inspections were conducted to:
· Visually review major plant items and

· Discuss maintenance history with facilities management staff.
Condition assessments have generally been made based upon the following basis:
· Age
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· Visual review of asset condition
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· Asset condition assessments forwarded by CCDHB
· Anecdotal maintenance history, particularly failures and irregularities, discussed with CCDHB and
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facility management staff.
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These facilities reviews identified specific issues affecting the reliability and resiliency of the site.
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These issues along with potential failures and resulting outcomes are described in detail in the
relevant discipline sections. Risks associated with these issues were assessed in accordance with
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relevant sections CCDHB risk management process and reporting procedure.
This procedure sets out the risk categories relevant to CCDHB. These categories include:
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· Safety risks affecting patient or staff safety.
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· Operational risks affecting ability to deliver quality services.
· Strategic risks affecting the financial or contractual performance of the business.
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· Reputational risks affecting relationships with public, regulatory bodies and other parties.
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· Project risks affecting successful and timely delivery of project objectives.

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Risks associated with each issue are assessed based on subjectively assessment of the likelihood of
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an event associated with the issue occurring and subjective assessment of the consequences of the
event.
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Likelihood of an event has been assessed based on the guidance table in the CCDHB risk
management procedure.
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Consequences of an event have been assessed for each risk category based on the key
consequences guidance table in the CCDHB risk management procedure.
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For the purposes of this review, there are no known relevant projects affected by these issues and the
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project risk has not been assessed.

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Where a risk affects individual buildings, a CCDHB provided criticality table (Appendix A) has been
used to assess the potential operational consequence on the basis that building risk categories 1 and
2 potential house key services. Where a risk affects multiple buildings, typically the whole site, it is
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treated as though it affects a key service.

Based on the likelihood and consequences, each risk category associated with the issue can be
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assigned category can be assigned a Risk Assessment Code and associated description based on the
guidance tables in the CCDHB risk management procedure.
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For this report, the overall risk associated with an issue has been determined based an average
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across the risk categories. However in evaluating each issue consideration needs to be given to each
of the risk scores e.g. an extreme safety risk would still warrant urgent attention even if the risk score
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in each of the other categories is low.

Short term works to reduce the risk exposure are nominated along with high level budget costings
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where reasonable. Identified issues, risk assessments and short term works options nominated in this
report are listed in a risk register (Appendix B).
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1.4 Summary Findings

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Electrical
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· A majority of the electrical infrastructure is past the end of its economic lifespan and as a result
individual components are expected to have a higher likelihood of failing. The network is
generally arranged such that individual failures can be bypassed. The arrangement of
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emergency supply on the site is reliant on this infrastructure to provide emergency backup and is
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therefore compromised by most of the concerns noted in this report. Failure of the emergency
supply or loss of redundancy in the network may reduce clinical confidence and result in deferral
of key services.
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· The incoming supply from Wellington Electricity and Mein Street Substation contains single points
of failure and lacks redundancy during periods of high site electrical demand. Fire or destruction
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of the MSS would result in long term isolation of the hospital network and reliance on the TEC
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supply. This is considered to be an extreme risk to CCDHB as long term loss of utility supply
associated with MSS failure impacting delivery of key services and potentially resulting in media
interest.
· The TEC generator system is approaching the end of its economic life. This is evidenced by the
increasing rate of major generator failures. In the event of loss of utility supply, the campus is
dependent on the supply from the emergency system for patient safety and delivery of key
services. The consequences of TEC failure are extreme however likelihood of total failure is
moderated by the requirement for both initial utility supply failure and subsequent TEC failure to
occur. The overall risk to CCDHB is considered to be moderate.
· The extent of HV cabling on the site presents a high exposure to cable faults occurring resulting
in reduced redundancy on the site and associated disruption to key services. There are instances
of redundant pathways installed along the same cable routes being vulnerable to common failure
from events such as fire resulting in complete loss of supply to buildings. The cabling and
supports are weathered and damaged which presents risk of injury to staff and damage to other
services in the event of a fault. Notably, the exposed wire sheath on cabling installed on the
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services link bridge presents an extreme risk to staff and patient health and safety. Cable testing
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to identify insulation strength and likelihood of failure has not been carried out since installation.
These issues are considered to present an extreme risk to CCDHB.
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The Link Block and TEC HV switchboards are approximately 37 years old and at the end of their
useful life. There are no apparent or reported condition concerns however availability of spares is
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a concern. The Link Block HV switchboard and its associated battery system are each prone to
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complete failure in the event of a fire occurring in their associated rooms. This would cause loss
of supply and compromised control and protection to the original site buildings. These issues are
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considered to be a moderate risk to CCDHB.
· The Academic Block transformers are the oldest major transformers on the site by four years and
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have a number of reported condition concerns. As the Academic Block is not considered a critical
building, these issues are considered to be a moderate risk to CCDHB. The CCDHB building
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transformers generally appear to be in acceptable condition and there are no reported issues.
Mechanical
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· The hot water generation plant serving the sites heating and domestic hot water demand is
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considered to represent a low risk to CCDHB, with failure of plant within the network considered
unlikely. N+1 capacity is available from the two boilers based on current site demand.
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· The chilled water generation plant serving the sites cooling demand is considered to represent a
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low risk to CCDHB. Failure of plant within this network is considered unlikely. N+1 capacity is
available from the two chillers based on current site demand. It is further noted that the NRH
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building is provided with a standalone chiller to satisfy the essential requirements of that building,
thus further reducing the risk profile.
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· Condition of the chilled, heating and domestic hot water pipework reticulation is understood to be
in reasonable order, however there is a single point of failure presented at the link bridge, where
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the pipework leaves the services trench and enters the hospital building. It is further understood
that capital expenditure is already approved to address this moderate risk item.
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· The cooling towers for generator and chiller heat rejection are considered to represent a
moderate risk to CCDHB, with the original cooling towers containing significant asbestos and
being well past their economic life. Replacement of the cooling towers is recommended in the
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next 1-2 years. Failure of the cooling towers has potential to result in unplanned loss of electrical
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supply to critical buildings and therefore non-delivery of key services.

Building Surveying
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The TEC building is over 40 years old and is generally behaving as a 40 year old concrete structure
should, there are no major issues with the building apart from at roof level. The building is subject to
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general wear and tear issues, however, regular maintenance will address this.
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As noted above the major issue with the building is at roof level where the waterproofing fabric has, to
a large extent, out lived it usefulness and is failing causing water ingress issues. A complication is the
asbestos encountered in the roof level fabric, not unexpected in a system installed during the 1970’s.
Structural
Total Energy Centre Building Seismic Assessment Findings
Based on the structural engineering report titled “Detailed Seismic Assessment Total Energy Centre,
Newtown, Wellington”, dated 26 March 2013 produced by Clendon Buren and Park Ltd the building
seismic performance in a design level earthquake is summarised below:
· The building’s current seismic strength is 75%NBS when assessed as an Importance Level 4
building. The building rating is governed by capacity of the shear wall located at the eastern end
of the building. All other primary structural components of the lateral load resisting system meet
current code requirements.
· In terms of Section 122 of the Building Act 2004 the Building is not Earthquake Prone.
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· The building is not Earthquake Risk as the seismic strength is greater than 67%NBS.
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· In terms of the NZSEE Grading System the building has a “B” grading.
Main Street Substation Building Seismic Assessment Findings
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Based on the Detailed Seismic Assessment of the building completed by AECOM the building seismic
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performance in the design level earthquake is summarised below
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building.
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· In terms of the NZSEE Grading System the building has an “A” grading.
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1.5 Short Term Works Options
Electrical
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It is recommended that a complete upgrade of the site high voltage infrastructure be undertaken based
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on extent of the dilapidated assets and risks posed by fundamental arrangement of these assets.
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Further details on solutions for permanent upgrading are outside of the scope of this review however
elements of this have been addressed in previous AECOM reports.
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Options for short term measures to reduce risk exposure associated with identified HV infrastructure
reliability and resilience issues have been identified. The options are listed grouped into high level
categories based upon the type of measure. Some measures involve minimal capital expenditure and
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consist of formalising the adaptation of site administration, operations (both technical and clinical) and
maintenance to particular risks identified. Other measures involve capital works to address high risk
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issues or enhancing the existing infrastructure against potential threats.

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These options include:

· Review and enhance site operating procedures and knowledge based on identified condition
issues and associated risks including:
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- Spreading CCDHB and Broadspectrum staff site knowledge and capability to provide support
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and assistance to experienced site staff. I.e. having more than one person intimately familiar
with each of the key systems.
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- Reviewing emergency response plans, including clinical response plans, based on likely
failure scenarios associated with present generator system condition. Reassess load
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shedding priority and building ultimate loads in concert with review of emergency response
plans.
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· Continue and enhance existing maintenance and testing regimes including:

- Undertaking thermographic scanning on critical equipment
- Undertaking cable insulation testing.
- Continued monitoring of diesel tank wall thickness.
· Addressing particularly high risk issues including:
- Removal of redundant bus tie switch from MSS HV switchboard and replacement with fixed
bus section.
- Survey of cable supports and rectification where supports are deemed to be insufficient or
failed.
- Replace the sections of degraded cabling on the services link bridge with modern HDPE
sheathed cabling.
- Treatment of diesel tank corrosion and repainting.
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- Relocating Link Block battery systems into fire separated rooms
· Enhance existing infrastructure against potential threats including:
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- Installation of enhanced fire detection in critical rooms including the Link Block HV switch
room and MSS switch room.
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- Providing allowance for connection of temporary LV mobile generators to highly critical loads
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in during periods of reduced network redundancy.
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Mechanical
Options for short term measures to reduce risk exposure associated with identified mechanical
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services reliability and resilience issues include:
· Upgrade the link bridge pipework support and restraints. It is noted that this work is already an
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approved capital expenditure project. al
Building Surveying
Regular maintenance of the building is necessary as the building ages. The fabric itself is generally
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hardwearing; as such maintenance will not be excessive.
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The main area of concern is roof level where the short term options are basically to continue
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addressing repair needs to the roofing membrane as and when required. The risk is that the more
patch repairs are applied the more likely a major failure is likely to occur.
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Structural
Total Energy Centre Building
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Based on our review of the provided DSA report we recommend the following actions to confirm the
report findings and improve the building performance in terms of its post disaster function:
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· Carry out intrusive site investigations to confirm finding of the DSA Report:
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- Verify concrete and reinforcement steel strengths at various locations in the building.
- Verify the as-built reinforcing matches the sizes and spacings indicated in the original
drawings.
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- Some other investigations may also be required to confirm the assessment assumptions.
· Commission revision of previous report to take into consideration site investigations findings as
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required.
· Commission peer review of the previously prepared DSA Report to obtain second opinion on the
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report findings.
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· Carry out intrusive building investigations to assess condition, durability and likely remaining life
of the existing structure.
· Following completion of the building investigations and peer review process strengthen the
building to achieve 100%NBS at Importance Level 4 to increase the building resilience against
collapse in the earthquake event.
Mein Street Substation Building
Based on our DSA we recommend the following actions to confirm our assessment findings:
- Verify the as-built reinforcing in the masonry shear walls matches the sizes and spacings
indicated in the original drawings.
- Verify the as-built grouting of the masonry walls.
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required.
· Due to the age of the building carry out intrusive building investigations to assess condition,
durability and likely remaining life of the existing structure.
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· Investigate plywood roof rotting to determine any remedial works required to the ceiling and roof.
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2.0 Electrical
This section reviews the site HV electrical infrastructure including utility connection and emergency
generation. The age and arrangement of the system as well as individual high level components are
reviewed. Specific issues affecting resiliency or reliability and associated risks for CCDHB are
discussed where identified.
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This report does not specifically address disaster scenarios (e.g. fire, flood, earthquake) but rather the
modes of failure of the electrical system that may occur either during normal operation of the hospital
or when a disaster event occurs. Further analysis is recommended in relation to specific disaster
scenarios that may present modes of failure to the system not otherwise contemplated within this
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report.
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2.1 Overview
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Electricity used on the Wellington Hospital site is sourced either from the Wellington Electricity network
via the Mein Street Substation (MSS) or from the emergency generator system in the Total Energy
Centre (TEC). The normal source of electricity used on the site is the utility connection to the
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Wellington Electricity network. The TEC generator system is configured to operate as emergency
supply in the event of failure of the Wellington Electricity supply.
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Electricity is sourced, generated and reticulated around the site at high voltage (HV, 11kV). This
supply is stepped down to low voltage (LV, 400V) at transformers located inside the site buildings to
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supply site buildings via substation main switchboards. The only exception to this arrangement is the
central chiller in the TEC, which is supplied at 3.3kV.
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Uninterruptible Power Supplies (UPS) are installed inside some buildings to provide short term backup
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to equipment that would not tolerate the loss of supply between mains failure and connection of
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emergency generator. UPS are not intended to provide long term backup power as this is the role of
the generator system. These UPS are typically supplied from the relevant main switchboard for the
building being served.
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Arrangement
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The arrangement of the site infrastructure centralises the emergency generation and distributes
emergency electricity supply to buildings via the campus HV network. Under this arrangement, the
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reliability of the emergency supply to each site building is influenced by the infrastructure along which
it is carried. The performance (with regard to connection time) and reliability of the emergency supply
itself should meet the highest clinical requirements on the site.
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The network has been arranged to minimise single points of failure and provide redundant pathways
from the utility and emergency power sources and building loads. Some points of failure in
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implementation of this arrangement have been identified by this review and are discussed in individual
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sections below.
In situations where redundancy in the network has been lost, the risk of total supply failure should be
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considered in operational and clinical decisions. It is expected that, outside of exceptional

circumstances such as natural disasters, loss of redundancy would result in non-delivery of clinical
services dependent on reliable electricity supply such as acute procedures. In the event of a failure
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requiring replacement of major items of equipment, this period of non-delivery may be dependent on
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equipment lead times ranging from a few weeks to several months.

Long term approaches to mitigate this risk include decentralising the generation on the site to increase
redundancy and improving the condition of the site infrastructure. Discussion of such arrangements
fall outside the scope of this review however examples can be found in previous AECOM and URS
studies commissioned for the Wellington Hospital site (2015 AECOM Electrical Infrastructure Upgrade
Feasibility Report, 2012 URS New Standby Generators for New Hospital Site Feasibility Report).
A short term, targeted option to address loss of network reliability is to provide facility for connecting
temporary LV generators to critical loads in the event of site network failure. This facility would consist
of a generator link panel connected directly the critical switchboard via an automatic transfer switch.
This arrangement would provide additional redundant backup to the central emergency supply from
the TEC and site network.
Age
The HV electrical infrastructure on the site is understood to have been completely overhauled during
the late 1970’s and early 1980’s as part of the major hospital expansion works including construction
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of the TEC.
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Major upgrades or modifications to the infrastructure since these works include:
· Conversion of the TEC from a primary co-generation power station into a standby emergency
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power facility in 1996. This project installed a site wide SCADA system to replace existing
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generator and substation controls.
·
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The NRH project, completed in 2009, provided new HV infrastructure inside the new building and
new HV links to the MSS, TEC and Link Block HV switchboard. The NRH project extended the
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site SCADA to accommodate the new substations.
· Replacement of two substation main switchboards, Clinical Support Block in 2010 and Ward
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Support Block in 2012.
The majority of the site electrical infrastructure is between 35 to 40 years old. The typical overall
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economic life of an electrical installation is approximately 30 years due to physical degradation of
switchboard and generator components and decreased availability of spare parts.
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Operating large sections of infrastructure at end of life presents operational and strategic risks to the
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hospital. Failure of site equipment and cabling is expected to result in rectification works requiring
high costs and lengthy timeframes, due in part to the reduced availability of spare parts or support.
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The timeframe for rectification of these faults could range between a few weeks to several months.
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Bypassing these failures and continuing to operate the network with reduced redundancy during
rectification of the failure presents a risk of additional, unrelated failures occurring and resulting in
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complete loss of supply to site buildings. Equipment at the end of its operational life is more likely to
fail due to the typical increase of ‘wear out’ failures which increases the likelihood of additional network
failures during the rectification timeframe.
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Operation and Maintenance

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Detailed knowledge of site electrical infrastructure history and arrangement is limited to one CCDHB
staff member and one Broadspectrum staff member. This limitation would constrain response to any
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external emergencies or internal failures and may result in extended outages if the staff are not
available to undertake fault finding or reinstatement of supply.
Short Term Works Options
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The following short term options for improving resilience could be considered:
· Provide LV mobile generator link panels for highly critical building loads to allow additional backup
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emergency supply to be connected.

· Increase CCDHB and Broadspectrum staff site knowledge and capability to provide support and
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assistance to experienced site staff.

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2.2 Incoming Supply

The sole utility electricity connection to the Wellington Hospital site is from a single Wellington
Electricity 11kV substation located on the southern boundary of the site beside Mein Street. This
substation is referred to as the Mein Street Substation (MSS). Presently, the substation building is
owned by CCDHB and the equipment housed inside is owned by Wellington Electricity.
The arrangement of the MSS and upstream Wellington Electricity network presents a risk of complete
loss of utility supply to the site. On the loss of utility supply, due to either failure of MSS or upstream
Wellington Electricity network, the entire hospital campus is reliant on emergency electricity supply
from the TEC.
In assessment of risks associated with the incoming supply, the consequences of these failures will be
considered in isolation of the risk of failure of the TEC when called upon to provide emergency supply.
Discussion of risks associated with TEC failure will be addressed in Section 2.3.
It is noted that installation of a second, fully redundant, supply from the Wellington Electricity network
would address most of the issues noted below and reduce the likelihood of reliance of the site on the
TEC which in turn would reduce the risk associated with its condition. Discussion of such large scale,
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long term works is outside the scope of this report and further details can be found in the 2015
AECOM Electrical Infrastructure Upgrade Feasibility Report.
Mein Street Substation Building
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The MSS HV switchboard is housed in a single room in the substation building. This arrangement is
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not uncommon for a Wellington Electricity substation of this type but presents a single point of failure
in the utility supply to the hospital. Potential failure scenarios involving the MSS resulting in long term
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loss of supply to the site include destruction of the building and destruction of the HV switchboard.
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There are no automatic fire detection or suppression systems installed within the MSS. This prevents
detection of a fire initiated within the substation. Failure to detect a fire initiated in the substation
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would prevent a response to the fire before it takes hold and potentially destroys the substation and
equipment housed within.
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The risk of internal failure of the HV switchboard or associated electrical equipment is considered
highly unlikely. The likelihood of internal switchboard failure is dependent on the condition of the
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switchboard itself. Ownership and maintenance of the electrical equipment inside the MSS is the
responsibility of Wellington Electricity. Detailed comment on the condition and maintenance of this
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switchboard is unavailable but it is understood that Wellington Electricity is aware of the critical role the
MSS has in maintaining operation of the hospital and it is assumed that the condition of the equipment
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is maintained accordingly.
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The MSS building has high public visibility on the hospital site. Damage to the building and the
associated response is expected to generate public interest and any associated reductions in hospital
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service due to long term loss of utility supply are expected to draw media interest. Failure or
destruction of the MSS would require considerable reconstruction works resulting in unplanned cost
and extended site operation on TEC supply.
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Mein Street Substation Switchboard

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The configuration of the MSS switchboard has two bus sections separated by a bus tie switch. One
bus section connects all three incomers from the Wellington Electricity network and the other bus
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section connects all four outgoing feeders to the hospital campus network. A fault occurring in this
switchboard would isolate the site from utility supply.
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The most likely failure mode is considered to be failure of the bus tie switch. This would separate the
incoming supply from the outgoing feeders and result in medium term loss of the utility supply to the
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site while the switch is repaired or replaced. Previous AECOM liaison with Wellington Electricity in
2015 established that this switch is no longer required and could be removed. Undertaking removal of
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this switch would still require isolation of utility supply to the site however this isolation would be
conducted under controlled conditions in coordination with hospital operations.
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Wellington Electricity Incomers

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The MSS is connected to three 11kV incomers from the WE network. These three incomers connect
the site to Wellington Electricity substations located at 74 Riddiford Street, 94 Riddiford Street and 381
Adelaide Road. Previous reviews of these feeders found a number of factors that would affect the
reliability of supply from the WE network.
· Despite originating from three separate substations, all three feeders are ultimately supplied from
the Palm Grove Zone Substation. The supply to the site would be susceptible to any issues or
failures affecting the Palm Grove Zone Substation. Previous assessments of peak load at Palm
Grove substation in 2015 noted that there are periods in winter months is currently in breach of
the N+1 capacity of the substation supply transformers.
· Previous liaison between Wellington Electricity and AECOM in 2015 identified that the Adelaide
Road incomer was currently permanently isolated as the incomer lacks sufficient capacity to
service the site and inappropriate protection present to permit its energisation. The permanent
isolation of this incomer leaves only the two Riddiford Street incomers to service the hospital load.
· The two Riddiford Street incomers serving the site each do not have sufficient capacity to service
the ultimate demand of the hospital campus. Previous AECOM assessment in 2015 found that,
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for 20% of the year, the electrical demand of the site is greater than the capacity of either
incomer. It is anticipated, during these periods, that a failure of either of the incomers would
result in tripping and failure of the other incomer due to overload.
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Due to these factors, there is not considered to be any guaranteed redundancy available in the
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incoming supply to the site. Failures or damage to relevant portions of the WE 11kV network or the
Palm Grove ZSS would result in loss of utility supply to the site. The assets involved are operated by
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Wellington Electricity and it is expected that reinstatement of supply to the hospital site would be a
high priority in any events affecting the Wellington Electricity network. Interruption of supply in typical
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circumstances is expected to be short or medium term.
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· Installation of VESDA fire detection system in the MSS HV switch room to permit early detection
and response to fire initiated in the switch room.
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· Removal of redundant bus tie switch from MSS HV switchboard and replacement with fixed bus
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section.
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2.3 Total Energy Centre

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The TEC is a combined electrical and thermal energy facility located in an elevated position on the hill
above the main hospital site on Mein Street. The TEC houses electrical infrastructure items including
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the HV emergency generator system, TEC HV switchboard, site wide SCADA and control room. The
TEC houses auxiliary items including bulk diesel fuel storage for the TEC generators and boilers.
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This section reviews relevant TEC items except for the TEC HV switchboard, which is discussed in
Section 2.4.
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HV Generators
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Four 2.8MW HV diesel generators are installed within the TEC. The generators were installed under
the original construction of the TEC in the early 1980s and each consists of a Mirrlees engine
connected to a Brush alternator. Each generator has its own individual controls and remote cooling
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system. The generators were originally intended to operate continuously as primary power supply for
the site and were repurposed as emergency backup generators in 1996.
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All four generators have experienced major failures in the previous three years.
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· Generator 1 HV alternator catastrophically failed in 2015. It was identified that the failure was
most likely caused by moisture ingress in to the windings resulting in partial discharge, tracking
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and subsequent short circuit failure of the winding. It is believed the moisture ingress was caused
by extended periods of low temperatures due to disconnection of heating and the lack of running
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of a generator set originally intended for continuous operation. All remaining generators have
since been fitted with supplementary alternator heating.
· Generator 3 controls have experienced issues and were swapped out with Generator 1 controls.
· Generator 4 turbocharger failed in March 2017. This resulted in a plume of black smoke being
emitted and media interest. The failed turbocharger has been replaced with Generator 1’s
turbocharger and the generator put back in service.
· Generator 2 maximum output has been reduced 1.3MW as of June 2017 due to ongoing diesel
contamination of engine lubricating oil. The oil will be changed to address the immediate shortfall
but cause of this contamination has not been identified. Next proposed works to attempt to rectify
is refurbishment of engine cylinder heads.
In May 2015, following failure of Generator 1, Brush Aftermarket were engaged by CCDHB to inspect
and report on the condition of all four generators at the site. AECOM reviewed and commented on this
report in September 2015. The Brush report noted that the remaining three generators, at the time,
were in similar condition to Generator 1 and that there had been a lack of regular and complete
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maintenance on these sets for many years. In the AECOM review it was commented that these
remaining three generators should not be relied on indefinitely for emergency electrical support to the
site and any set could follow a similar breakdown to that suffered by Generator 1 at any time.
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CCDHB have undertaken a program of monthly run testing of the generators with quarterly ‘black start’
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testing of the facility. CCDHB have advised that there have been issues with generators not always
starting when required during monthly testing.
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Previous load projections estimate the site ultimate demand as approximately 5MW. Based on this it
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is expected that two generators at full output are required to support the full site ultimate demand. The
TEC system presently has two generators (Generator 4 and 3) providing full rated output, one
generator at partial output (Generator 2) and the remaining generator (Generator 1) is not operational.
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The system presently does not have redundancy between its generators during periods of high
demand.
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These condition issues pose risks predominantly when the TEC is called upon to provide emergency
power in the event of loss of utility supply. The likelihood of these risks considers the initial failure of
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the utility supply.
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In the event of failure of a generator during operation, or failure of a generator to start, the site SCADA
will operate to establish any remaining redundant generators and control the load on the remaining
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generators. If insufficient redundant generation is unavailable or fails to start, then the load of the site
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must be reduced to be supported by the remaining operating generation through load shedding. Load
shedding on the site is automatically performed one a per-building basis based on a priority list and
available generator capacity. Depending on the disposition of building demand at the time of failure,
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there is a possibility of critical buildings lower on the priority list being automatically isolated.
The consequences of isolation of supply to critical buildings include non-delivery of services and
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potential interruption of supply to procedures requiring electrical supply. The clinical response to this
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loss of supply would vary depending on situation however it is anticipated that urgent response would
be required to maintain patient safety especially where it is reliant on electricity supply.
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The generators and associated auxiliary equipment and unrelated mechanical plant are installed in a
single hall without any separating walls. The TEC HV switchboard is located in separate fire
separated rooms. There is a possibility that fire initiated in one part of the hall, particularly in the
generator section, could propagate and result in failure of the overall generator system and long term
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loss of emergency supply to the site. While this would not affect utility supply to the site, the long term
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loss of emergency generator could interrupt delivery of services requiring reliable electricity supply
such as acute procedures.
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Generator Cooling System

Each generator is provided with a heat rejection system consisting of a closed primary cooling loop
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that passes waste heat through a heat exchanger to a secondary cooling loop that dissipates the heat
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via a cooling tower mounted on the roof. The cooling towers, like the generators, are well past their
economic life. The efficiency of the towers is considered sub-optimal due to degraded condition and
excessive water drift and evaporation. Failure of the cooling system would result in generator failure
due to overheating.
The secondary cooling systems are reliant on external utility water supply for extended operation.
Failure of this utility water supply would reduce the amount of time the system can operate for before
the secondary cooling loop runs out of water due to evaporation.
It is noted that there is significant asbestos present in the cooling towers and staff are required to wear
asbestos PPE in order to conduct daily maintenance. This presents a moderate risk of asbestos
exposure to CCDHB and Broadspectrum staff and would confound efforts to rectify faults in the event
of a failure.
Generator Battery System
Two separate battery systems are provided to supply power for generator controls. Each system
consists of two redundant battery chargers and battery strings. Each system serves two of the four
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generators, one system supplies Generator 1 and 2 and the other system supplies Generator 3 and 4.
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Generator Fuelling and Oil System
The generator fuelling and oil systems each consist of central storage diesel fuel and lubricating oil
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and pumped reticulation to the generator day tanks and oil sump.
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The generator fuelling system consists of three bulk storage tanks located in an underground chamber
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adjacent the generator hall. Two redundant pumps supply fuel to individual generator day tanks
located at high level in the generator hall. Fuel is then supplied by gravity to the generators.
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Visual review of the fuel tanks identified areas of localised corrosion of outer walls of the tanks.
Degradation of the tank walls presents risks of fuel leaks and tank ruptures. CCDHB advised that the
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tanks have recently undergone wall thickness testing.
The oil system consists of centralised oil tanks with pumped reticulation by two redundant pumps to
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generator oil sumps.
These systems are critical to continuing operation of the generators hence the redundancy of critical
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components. Complete failure of either of these systems would typically not have immediate effect.
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The generators would continue to run on their own stores of fuel and oil for a period of time before
shutting down due to fuel starvation or engine overheating. This would result in loss of emergency
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supply to the site.

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Generator Air Start and Pneumatic Controls

The TEC generators are started using compressed air to turn over the engines. A dedicated
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compressed air system is used to supply high pressure air to a dedicated air start receivers for
generator. The air start system consists of two redundant compressors, one containing redundant
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electrical and diesel drivers and the other electrically driven, located near Generator 4.
In addition to the air start system, other generator start functions are controlled pneumatically from a
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separate system. Control air is sourced from the general TEC tool compressed air system via a
dedicated control air receiver per set. The TEC tool air system consists of two redundant electric
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compressors located in the TEC equipment hall.

The air start and pneumatic controls are critical to the operation of the generator facility in the event of
loss of supply. Failure of these systems would result in the generators not starting in response to
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mains failure. There is redundancy in the major components of each system and there are no
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apparent or reported condition issues.

Site SCADA
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The site SCADA monitors the site electrical infrastructure and performs control functions such as
automatic load shedding when the site is operating on generator. All information gathering and control
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functions from the SCADA are available at interfaces inside the TEC control room.
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The system presently consists of remote input/output units being installed in substations to interface to
equipment and connect to the central SCADA equipment panel in the TEC HV switch room.
There were no apparent condition issues but it was noted that there did not appear to be redundancy
in this system.
The remote IO units are intended only to carry IO signals back to the central system and do not
contain any internal logic of their own. This arrangement allows ready expansion of the system to
accommodate new substations but does not allow for continued operation of monitoring and control
functions in the event of communications failure.
The central SCADA equipment appears to consist of only one unit without any redundancy which
presents a single point of failure in the SCADA system.
A failure of the SCADA system is expected to result in lack of monitoring and control. In this scenario,
the generator may not start or site load would not be automatically shed to be supported by the
generator system. This would require manual intervention the event of mains fail and result in an
extended loss of supply to site buildings which would interrupt services.
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· Continue maintenance and testing regime. Undertake thermographic scanning on generator sets
while undertaking run tests to identify any abnormalities.
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· Review emergency response plans, including clinical response plans, based on likely failure
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scenarios associated with present generator system condition. Reassess load shedding priority
and building ultimate loads in concert with review of emergency response plans.
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· Treat diesel tank corrosion and repaint tanks. Monitor tank wall thickness.
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· Replace cooling towers serving the generators to improve cooling efficiency and remove risk of
asbestos exposure.
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2.4 HV Switchboards
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The site network consists of six CCDHB owned HV switchboards. There are two HV switchboards
provided to the TEC and Link Block as part of the original infrastructure and four HV switchboards
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installed under the NRH project.
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Link Block and TEC HV Switchboard
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The TEC HV switchboard is consists of four separate bus sections and is split across three separate
switchboard segments each housed in their own fire separated room. Two redundant battery systems
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powering TEC switchboard protection and controls are provided with one system housed with the
switchboard and the other located in the generator hall.
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The Link Block HV switchboard consists of three separate bus sections in a single switchboard housed
in a single switch room. Two redundant battery systems powering Link Block HV switchboard
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protection and controls and substation main switchboard load shedding controls are housed in a
separate adjacent room.
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Both TEC and Link Block HV switchboards are of the same manufacture and are understood to have
been installed in the early 1980s. The switchboards predominantly contain originally installed Reyrolle
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Pacific oil insulated circuit breakers and ASEA analogue protection relays.
The switchboards and original equipment contained inside are approximately 37 years old and are
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considered to be reaching the end of their useful life. Maintenance staff advised that these circuit
breakers are maintained regularly and that there is no apparent condition issues associated with these
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switchboards.
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Oil insulated circuit breakers contain combustible mineral oil and present a higher risk of explosion and
fire during failure than modern vacuum or gas insulated switchgear. For this reason these circuit
breakers are typically not used in modern installations.
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It is understood that there are ongoing difficulties in adequately calibrating the protection functions of
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the original ASEA protection relays during routine maintenance. Newer connections to the
switchboard utilised digital protection relays retrofitted to the switchboard. Maintenance staff advised
that there are spare parts available for the ASEA relays however it is anticipated that a major failure of
an ASEA relay would require complete replacement with a modern digital relay. This would result in
extended isolation of the supply after a fault.
There is evidence of degradation of controls wiring in substation main switchboards that are of similar
age to the HV switchboards. Failure of this control wiring could lead to nuisance tripping of the HV
circuit breakers or failure to trip in the event of a fault. These faults would result in short term loss of
supply while the erroneous controls are identified and rectified.
There is little evidence within the older HV switch rooms of any seismic bracing to critical switchgear.
This presents a risk of failure of the HV switchboard in a seismic event. This would result in long term
loss of supply to sections of the hospital.
The Link Block HV switchboard is housed in a single room. This switchboard is the source of supply
for both sets of redundant transformers serving the original site buildings. There is potential for fire, or
other damage, to affect the whole switchboard. This forms a potential single point of failure in the
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supply to site buildings and could result in unplanned long term loss of supply to critical buildings. This
presents an extreme risk due to the risk to patient safety and inability to deliver key services.
The Link Block battery system supplies auxiliary power for HV protection and load shedding of the Link
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Block HV switchboard and downstream substation main switchboards. Both redundant battery
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systems are located in the same room adjacent the Link Block HV switch room. The room housing the
battery charger is not fire separated from the remainder of the building and there is no fire separation
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between the battery chargers. Fire initiated in one of the battery strings or externally in the adjacent
plant space would result in failure of both battery systems and loss of protection and load shed
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controls. This would not immediately affect supply to the buildings but would disrupt protection
functions and load shed functions resulting in wider, medium term network outages in the event of a
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fault or loss of supply.
New Regional Hospital HV Switchboards
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The NRH substations each contain a HV switchboard using Reyrolle Pacific vacuum insulated circuit
breakers. The switchboards are arranged such that a failed switchboard can be bypassed to maintain
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supply to the whole hospital. Each NRH substation is independent and the substations are arranged
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such that loss of one substation can be bypassed. There are no apparent or reported condition issues
affecting these HV switchboards.
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·
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Investigate retrofit of seismic bracing to HV switchboards

· Relocate Link Block battery systems into fire separated rooms
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· Upgrade smoke detection in Link Block HV switch room to VESDA.

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2.5 HV Cabling
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There is a large gross length of HV cabling installed on the site due to the large geographic area
covered, the redundant pathways provided in the site network and the geographic separation of the
TEC from the main campus. The likelihood of damage or faults occurring in cabling is considered to
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be proportional to the overall length.

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There are two major HV cabling systems installed on the site:

· Primary distribution which interconnects the HV switchboards with the MSS and TEC, and
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· Secondary distribution which connects HV switchboards with distribution transformers to supply

building main switchboards.
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The consequence of HV network failure is complete, long term loss of supply to the site buildings as
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emergency supply to the site is generated centrally at HV. This would result in long term disruption to
site services while the cabling is replaced.
This consequence is acknowledged by the high level of redundancy provided for in the HV network
arrangement.
The distribution interconnections between the site switchboards are configured such that there are
redundant pathways for supply in the event of the failure of a single cable.
Transformer supplies are ‘radial’ in arrangement with a single cable supplying the transformer from a
HV switchboard. Failure of the cable would result in loss of supply to the transformer. Redundancy in
these sections of the network is achieved by supplying main switchboards through two redundant
transformers. The only facilities without redundant transformer supplies are the laundry building and
TEC central chiller.
Cable Routes
HV cables at the site are installed underground or exposed and supported via cable ladder or cable
clamps inside basements, plant areas and service tunnels.
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Redundant pairs of HV cables were observed to have been installed following common pathways in
basements and service tunnels. This arrangement presents a risk of common damage to both
redundant cables. Extreme examples of this risk include a fire in a service area along the cable run
resulting in failure of both cables.
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One notable instance of common containment was identified in the services tunnel and services bridge
carrying reticulated services from the TEC to the original campus via the ward support block. The two
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emergency HV feeders from the TEC to the Link Block HV switchboard are installed in this pathway.
Failure of this pathway would cut off these feeders and the site would be reliant on emergency supply
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via the one remaining emergency feeder connected to the NRH building. The capacity of this
remaining feeder to serve the full site load is unknown. If the capacity is insufficient then this would
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result in inability for the TEC to provide emergency supply to the site. This would present an extreme
risk to site operations and safety.
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Cable Supports
Cable supports are intended support the weight of the cables while allowing relative movement of
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cabling during seismic events and restraining cables against electrodynamic forces resulting from fault
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currents.
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The allowance of movement is to prevent cable breakage during seismic events. The restraint of the
cable prevents violent cable movement during a fault which could result in damage to the cable where
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it comes in contact with structure. Additional risks of cable movement during faults include damage to
adjacent services and injury to nearby staff.
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The suitability of the 1970’s supports for restraining the cabling during faults or supporting the cables
during seismic events is unknown. There were instances observed in cable pathways where there did
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not appear to be sufficient support for cable bends or where cable was run close to concrete or metal
edges in structure.
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There did not appear to be any systemic condition issues present in the sample of cable supports
witness during site investigations however there were some instances of the support not being
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completely engaged on the cable.

In the event of a fault on the network of sufficient magnitude, cables supplying the fault would carry the
fault current and would undergo corresponding electrodynamic forces. In the event of failure of cable
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supports there is risk of cable movement causing potential damage and personnel injury remote to the
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initiating fault. This would compound the consequence of the initiating fault and result in additional
works to rectify damage to the network.
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Cable Condition
Most of the HV cabling observed on site is paper insulated lead covered steel wire armoured (PILC
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SWA) multicore HV cable installed during the 1970’s. PILC is generally accepted as having a long
lifespan but is sensitive to temperature, humidity and movement.
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Cable runs in service areas and tunnels were observed during a site walkthrough.
Visual inspection of the cable alone does not provide a complete assessment of cable condition as the
cable does not rely on the outer sheath for electrical insulation. Condition of the cable insulation is
typically assessed using electrical testing of the cable. Previous AECOM review in 2015 identified that
there was no evidence of the cables having been tested at the site since their installation.
The HV cabling on site showed general showed signs of weathering and minor damage to the outer
cable sheath where visible. Some notable instances of cable damage were observed during the
walkthrough.
· Cabling installed exposed on the services bridge linking the TEC to the site, identified as Link
Block switchboard emergency feeders from the TEC, has had outer sheath completely worn away
and steel wire armour exposed.
· Transformer T31 feeder was observed to have leaked insulating material. This is expected to be
related to the temperature concerns noted regarding the academic block transformers.
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The exposed wire armour issue is considered to present a particularly high risk. The wire armour is
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expected to be connected to the HV switchboard earth. In the event of a HV earth fault, there is
expected to be a transfer potential between the wire armour and any metalwork that the wire armour is
in electrical contact with. The link bridge is of all metal construction and houses pipework services that
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reticulate throughout the site. There is considered to be a high risk of transfer potential causing
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electrocution and equipment damage at remote points in the site in the event of a fault.
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· Conduct routine cable testing to verify the integrity of the insulation of the site HV cabling. This is
expected to provide monitoring of cable health and identify any non-apparent condition issues.
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· Survey cable supports and rectify supports deemed be insufficient or failed.
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· Replace the sections of degraded cabling on the services link bridge with modern HDPE
sheathed cabling.
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· Undertake analysis to confirm capacity of TEC-NRH feeder to carry site demand in the event of
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failure of TEC-LNK cable pathway.
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2.6 Transformers
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The site transformers step the high voltage distribution down to low voltage for supply to site buildings
via the substation main switchboards. All original transformers are oil insulated and the NRH
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transformers are ‘dry type’.

Most substation main switchboards take supply from two redundant transformers and incorporate
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switching arrangements to isolate failed a transformer and take supply from the remaining operational
transformers.
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Testing of transformer oil is carried out on a regular basis to identify and track internal condition of the
transformers.
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Original Transformers
Most original site transformers are installed in individual fire separated rooms. This arrangement
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prevents a fire initiated in one transformer room from spreading to the other transformer room or the
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building itself.
The Ward Support Block transformers are housed inside a single fire separated room consisting of
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four transformer bays. Only two bays are occupied with the remaining two being available for future
expansion. The arrangement of the WSB transformers presents a risk of complete loss of supply to
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the Ward Support Block in the event of a fire occurring in the transformer room. Based on building
criticality provided by CCDHB, the Ward Support Block is understood to not house any key services
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and therefore the consequences would be primarily strategic as additional cost to replace both
transformers.
A number of condition issues have been identified in the Academic Block transformers - T31 and T32.
These two transformers were manufactured in 1976 and are the oldest major transformers on the site.
The remainder of the original clinical transformers were manufactured in 1980.
The Academic Block transformers appeared to be weeping oil during recent site walkthrough. The oil
levels inside the transformer are being maintained at an acceptable level and there is considered to be
little risk of transformer failure. The significance of the weeps being that they may be indicative of the
transformer casing seals degrading.
Facilities maintenance staff advised that previous oil testing had identified evidence of partial
discharge in the academic block transformers. The results are understood to have normalised after
rectification of ventilation to the transformer rooms.
The condition of the Academic Block transformers presents an increased likelihood of transformer
failure. This would result in a short term loss of supply to the Academic Block while the failed
transformer is bypassed. The Academic Block is understood to not house any key services and
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therefore the consequences of a failure would be primarily reputational. The Academic Block tenants
are understood to have raised already concerns regarding this infrastructure and a failure would be
expected to result in further complaints.
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The remaining original transformers reviewed during the site walk did not show any apparent condition
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issues and facilities maintenance has advised that these transformers show no abnormal oil testing
results.
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New Regional Hospital Transformers
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The NRH transformers are typically housed with the substation HV switchboard in each NRH
substation. Segregation between transformers is achieved by having two transformers supplying a
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single main switchboard located in separate substations.
There were no apparent condition issues identified or reported with these transformers.
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3.0 Mechanical Services

This section reviews the chilled, heating and domestic hot water generation within the TEC and
reticulation to the hospital buildings. Each system is summarised in high level and further defined in
terms of points of failure and associated risks for CCDHB.
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3.1 Chilled Water
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Chilled water is supplied to the hospital by 2-off water cooled centrifugal chillers located in the Chiller
Hall. Pumping is via a constant primary, variable secondary arrangement. Generally only one chiller is
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required to run, with the second required intermittently during the peak summer months. This indicates
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a good level of resilience is provided by the current chillers, with failure of either chiller considered
unlikely.
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provides a summary of each installed chiller including capacity, installation date and estimated
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remaining economic life.
Table 1 – Installed Chiller Details
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Chiller Capacity Installation Date Life Remaining Additional Notes
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Trane 2,500kW 2004 10-15 years Inherent past performance issues
Chiller but generally in good condition,
particularly due to stringent
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chemical dosing regime
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York 3,000kW 2009 15+ years In good condition
Chiller
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Secondary chilled water circulation is provided to the majority of the hospital via 3-off distribution
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pumps located in the TEC, however only two of these pumps are typically operational. These pumps
appear to be in good condition, with failure of either pump considered highly unlikely.
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Further to the chilled water generation provided in , an additional remote air cooled chiller has been
installed local to the NRH. This acts to serve as a backup chiller to service essential areas within the
NRH building, thus further improving the chilled water resilience rating across the hospital.
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The chilled water pipework reticulation from the TEC to the hospital is understood to generally be in
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good condition, with a good chemical dosing programme performed regularly. However, the condition
of the link bridge on which pipework crosses from the TEC to the hospital represents a likely failure
point.
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On the basis of the above, the overall TEC chilled water generation is considered to represent a low
risk to the CCDHB.
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3.2 Heating and Domestic Hot Water

Hot water is generated in the TEC by two gas fired boilers for the purposes of heating and domestic
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hot water circulation.

Both boilers were originally installed in 1979 and appear to be in good working condition. Generally
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only one boiler is required to operate at any one time, although both operate concurrently during
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periods in the winter months. This is generally done in case the lead boiler fails so a working backup
boiler is available at short notice. This indicates a good level of resilience is provided by the current
boilers, with failure of either boiler considered unlikely.
There are three secondary pumps to circulate heating hot water. Generally however, only 2 pumps
operate in winter during peak heating demand. Water is pumped from the TEC to the various
buildings’ basements to calorifiers or heat exchangers. These pumps appear to be in reasonable
condition, with failure of either pump considered unlikely.
Heating water in each separate building (past the heat exchanger or calorifier) of the hospital is
considered to be separate circuits with their own distribution and control. Resilience of these separate
networks have not been considered in this report but are recommended to be analysed to define their
own level of resilience.
Both boilers are duel fuel and the change-over is manually done at each boiler when required or for
test running purposes.
Table 2 – Installed Boiler Details
Boiler Capacity Installation Date Life Remaining Additional Notes
1 4,500kW 1979 Past typical life Replacement of controls and
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(approx) but appear in cabinet in 1996
good condition
2 4,500kW 1979 Past typical life New burner installed in 2014 and
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(approx) but appear in generally runs as the lead boiler at
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good condition a higher operating efficiency
The heating and domestic hot water pipework reticulation from the TEC to the hospital is understood
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to generally be in good condition, with a good chemical dosing programme performed regularly.
However, the condition of the link bridge on which pipework crosses from the TEC to the hospital
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represents a likely failure point.
On the basis of the above, the overall TEC hot water generation is considered to represent a low risk
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to the CCDHB.
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3.3 Chiller Heat Rejection (Cooling Towers) al
There are two operational cooling towers located on the TEC roof connected to the two chillers. There
are also two redundant cooling towers that are due for demolition and removal in the near future.
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Both operational cooling towers are of the induced draft counter flow type with wooden slats and
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concrete basins. They are both considered to be well past their economic life and are therefore due for
replacement.
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Further to the aged condition of the cooling towers, corrugated sheets on both towers and the flat
panels on the smaller tower contain significant asbestos, representing a significant health issue.
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Considering both the health risks and operational resilience it is recommended that they are replaced
in the next 1-2 years. Replacement is suggested to be undertaken as part of further recommendations
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to replace the TEC roof. It is considered technically feasible to replace the towers in a staged
approach while maintaining both chillers operational.
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Condition aside, it is noted that failure of either cooling tower would impact only the associated chiller
– reducing the available chilled water capacity to N instead of N+1. It is further noted that a backup air
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cooled chiller is available in the NRH to cater for essential services.

On the basis of the above, failure the chiller cooling towers is considered to represent a low risk to the
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CCDHB.
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Refer to the Building Surveying section of this report for further details around the roof condition.
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Figure 1 – Aerial view of the TEC roof indicating cooling towers
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3.4 Pipework Reticulation

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Chilled, heating and domestic water supply is distributed from the TEC via a service tunnel which
terminates at a link bridge before being distributed around the hospital. The link bridge is in poor
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condition in terms of pipework restraint and support and represents a single point of failure for
pipework reticulation. Replacement or upgrade of the support and restraint is recommended.
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It is noted that capital expenditure has been approved to undertake the upgrade of this link bridge. The
details of these works are independent to this scope of works and are not subject to assessment within
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this report.
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4.0 Building Surveying

This section is a high level visual Condition Survey of Total Energy Centre building, no intrusive
examination was undertaken.
The building is approximately 40 years old, comprising reinforced concrete foundation and ground
floor structure suitable to accommodate the specialist generators, incoming mains supplies and
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mechanical & electrical infrastructure. The superstructure is of concrete framing, precast concrete
panelling and a concrete roof structure. The roof level incorporates a mechanical plant area including
operational & redundant water cooling towers.
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Internally the building comprises largely of mechanical and electrical plant areas with associated
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office, workshop, control room and welfare facilities.
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The ground levels slope considerably resulting in roof areas to elements of the building being
pavement areas and access to office space. Large elements of the structure in the generator housing
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space are beneath external ground levels.
4.1 Survey
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The building is generally behaving as a 40 year old large concrete structure should, apart from the
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roof. There do not appear to be any major waterproofing issues with the structure at
substructure/external wall levels, although water ingress is noted at the lower roof (pavement) areas,
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particularly adjacent to the lift/office areas.
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The building is showing signs of wear and tear and is generally in need of maintenance to a degree
where replacement of elements are required, the external louvres and sound attenuators being a good
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example (refer to photographs below). However, the building is operable and aspects of the proposed
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maintenance could be described as being aesthetic in nature.
The building is, however, failing in a major nature in relation to the roof area. The roof is a concrete
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structure covered with a synthetic rubber waterproofing membrane solution known to contain
asbestos, a system that is in itself low maintenance but to operate correctly needs regular & thorough
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attention to the drainage outlets which does appear to be the case on this building. The material would
generally experience a 20 year warranty period and would, if maintained regularly, have a life
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expectancy of 30 years. This building exceeds both of these time periods and with the roof being a
trafficked area due to the water cooling towers and plant areas, has resulted in numerous patch
repairs where the system has failed over the years and continues to fail, there is evidence within the
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building of previous water ingress which appears to continue to this date.
There are roof areas, of a profiled metal sheeting nature, that are in a reasonable nature, however,
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there is early evidence of potential failure at joints/connections as the flashings are showing signs of
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rusting.
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Our strong recommendation is that the membrane roof covering, including the numerous upstands, is
completely replaced in the near future. This would be considered a major undertaking, particularly due
to the issues involved in maintaining operational mechanical plant and the asbestos elements of the
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water cooler housings and membrane fabric, however, the membrane is at the very end of its life
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cycle, to such a point that the concrete substrate may be affected by the prolonged water ingress
issues.
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5.0 Structural Engineering

5.1 Total Energy Centre Building
5.1.1 Previous TEC Building Assessment
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As a part of our commission we have obtained and reviewed the structural engineering report titled
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“Detailed Seismic Assessment Total Energy Centre, Newtown, Wellington”, dated 26 March 2013
produced by Clendon Buren and Park Ltd. We have not been provided with the existing building
drawings or any calculations or analyses carried out for the preparation of this report.
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AECOM have not carried out any assessments of the building. Our comments are based solely on the
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above mentioned report findings. We take no responsibility for the accuracy of that report or any
calculations or analyses carried out by another party in preparation of that report.
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Findings of the above mentioned report in regards to the building seismic performances are
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summarised below:
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building. The building rating is governed by capacity of the shear wall located at the eastern end
of the building. All other primary structural components of the lateral load resisting system meet
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current code requirements.
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Authors of the Detailed Seismic Assessment (DSA) Report made the following assumptions that
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require verification through site investigations:

· As-built structure is in general agreement with the original drawings and specifications
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· There are no durability issues with the existing structural elements

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Recommendations of the DSA report are:

· The building’s seismic strength is not below the current legal minimum as defined in section 122
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of the Building Act. As the building is not earthquake prone, the strengthening requirements of the
Wellington City Council earthquake prone building policy do not apply.
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· If there are no plans to lower the importance level of this building in the near future, report
recommended that consideration be given to improve the seismic strength of the building to
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100%NBS.
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5.1.2 AECOM recommendations

We understand this building houses critical plant and is critical to the hospital operations. As such this
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building is considered to have a post disaster function and is therefore classified as an Importance
Level 4 structure in accordance with AS/NZS 1170. Based on our review of the provided report we
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recommend the following actions to confirm the report findings and improve the building performance
in terms of its post disaster function:
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- Verify concrete and reinforcement steel strengths at various locations in the building.
- Verify the as-built reinforcing matches the sizes and spacings indicated in the original
drawings.
required.
· Commission peer review of the previously prepared DSA Report to obtain second opinion on the
report findings.
· Carry out intrusive building investigations to assess condition, durability and likely remaining life
of the existing structure.
· Following completion of the building investigations and peer review process strengthen the
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building to achieve 100%NBS at Importance Level 4 to increase the building resilience against
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collapse in the earthquake event.
· Due to the type of construction and likely detailing utilised in the building structure constructed in
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1970’s we agree with commentary in the DSA report that retrofitting the structure to 100%NBS
will not prevent some structural damage during a major design level earthquake. However the
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strengthening work will increase resilience against the collapse and reduce potential for damage
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to equipment that would keep the hospital operational immediately after a major earthquake
event.
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5.2 Main Street Substation Building
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5.2.1 Previous MSS Building Assessment
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As a part of previous commission AECOM completed DSA of the Main Street Substation Building.
Findings of our assessment were summarised in the report titled “Electrical Infrastructure Review –
Standby Generator Consent and Substation Seismic Assessment” dated 20 October 2016.
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Finding of the above mentioned assessment are summarised below:
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building. The building rating is governed by in-plane capacity of the reinforced masonry shear
wall located at the southern end of the building. The Northern reinforced masonry shear wall is
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assessed at 82%NBS. All other element of the building’s main lateral load resisting system
have been assessed at 100%NBS.
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The wall grouting and reinforcement arrangement assumptions used in our assessment were
based on the information available on the original drawings of the building.
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We have since re-evaluated our assessment to remove any conservatism from the shear wall
assessment and we concluded that the building assessment results are as follows:
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building.
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In terms of Section 122 of the Building Act 2004 the Building is not Earthquake Prone.
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· In terms of the NZSEE Grading System the building has an “A” grading.
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The building was inspected in August 2016 as part of Initial Seismic Assessment. At that time it was
observed that plywood roof was rotting in some parts and it likely needed replacement. No intrusive
investigations were carried out as part of the DSA.
Recommendations of the DSA report are:
· The building’s seismic load resisting capacity is not below the current legal minimum as defined in
section 122 of the Building Act. As the building is not earthquake prone, the strengthening
requirements of the Wellington City Council earthquake prone building policy do not apply.
· If there are no plans to lower the importance level of this building in the near future, our previous
report recommended that consideration be given to improve the seismic strength of the building to
80%NBS. However as a result of the above mentioned shear wall re-assessment we conclude
that seismic strengthening of this building is no longer required. This is subject to confirmation of
the masonry wall reinforcement arrangement and grouting through the intrusive site
investigations.
5.2.2 AECOM recommendations
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We understand this building houses critical plant and is critical to the hospital operations. As such this
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building is considered to have a post disaster function and is therefore classified as an Importance
Level 4 structure in accordance with AS/NZS 1170. Based on our DSA we recommend the following
actions to confirm our assessment findings:
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- Verify the as-built reinforcing in the masonry shear walls matches the sizes and spacings
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indicated in the original drawings.
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- Verify the as-built grouting of the masonry walls.
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required.
·
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Due to the age of the building carry out intrusive building investigations to assess condition,
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durability and likely remaining life of the existing structure.
· Investigate plywood roof rotting to determine any remedial works required to the ceiling and roof.
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6.0 Appendix A – Building Criticality

Building Date of Risk
Building Name
Code Construction Category
BTU Blood Centre 1990 1
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CHI Children's Hospital 1988 1
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CSB Clinical Services Block - Capital and Coast 1980*
DHB 1
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EDB Emergency Building 2000 1
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RES Water Reservoir 1
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SSU Short Stay Unit 2005 1
TEC Total Energy Centre 1982
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1
TWM Te Whare O Matairangi Mental Health 1971 1
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W01 Wellington Regional Hospital Building 2009 1
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WSL Ward/Seddon Link Bridge 1977 1
MSS Mein Street Sub Station 1978 2
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CHA Chapel & Nursing Education Centre 1964 3
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GNB Grace Neil Block 1973 3
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LNK Link Block 1979 3

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MSQ Administration Building 1966 3

SED Seddon Building Basement only 1960 3
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WSB Ward Support Block 1982 3

LBR Offices & Laundry Boiler Room 1970
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5
SR3 Riddiford Building 1957 5
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STO Laundry 1970 5

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7.0 Appendix B – Risk Register
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Client Name: Capital and Coast District Health Board
Project Name: Wellington Hospital Campus Infrastructure Resilience Report
Project No: 60545594
Risk Register
Safety Operational Strategic Reputational

Overall Short Term Risk
Service Issue No. Sub-Service Location Issue Activity Shortfall Consequence L C RAC C RAC C RAC C RAC RAC Reduction Cost Comment
Works to be
conducted by
Wellington
Electricity.
Contribution
Extended period of operation on generator set Remove bus tie and may be sought
Extended mains failure to
Electrical E-1 Incoming supply Mein Street Substation Redundant Bus Tie Present. Failure of bus tie. requiring additional fuel deliveries and generator U L 4 M 4 H 3 M 4 3 replace with busbar $ - from CCDHB
the site.
maintenance while failure is rectified. section. either through
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direct capital
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contribution or
increased
network
charges.
1. Failure of one cooling tower would still enable
chilled water production within the TEC, but from
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No short term
only one chiller, providing no redundancy of chilled
measures.
water production within the TEC.
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Requires
Chilled water would not
replacement of
Mechanical M-1 Cooling towers - Chillers TEC Age and condition of cooling towers Failure of cooling tower/s be available to the 2. Failure of both cooling towers would result in an U L 4 L 4 L 4 M 4 4
cooling towers.
general hospital extended period without chilled water production
Works can be
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within the TEC. The emergency chiller in the NRH
staged to reduce
would be utilised as the source of chilled water to
downtimes.
the hospital in the meantime, with other areas of
the hospital without cooling.
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No short term
measures.
Heat rejection from the
Requires
Generators would not be Unplanned loss of electrical supply to critical
Mechanical M-2 Cooling towers - Generators TEC Age and condition of cooling towers Failure of cooling tower/s U E 1 E 1 M 4 E 1 1 replacement of
available if required to buildings. Non delivery of key services.
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cooling towers.
run
Works can be
staged to reduce
1. Failure of one chiller would still enable chilled
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water production within the TEC, but from only one
chiller, providing no redundancy of chilled water
production within the TEC.
Chilled water would not
Mechanical M-3 Chilled water TEC Age and condition of chillers Failure of chiller/s be available to the 2. Failure of both chillers would result in an U L 4 L 4 L 4 M 4 4
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general hospital extended period without chilled water production
within the TEC. The emergency chiller in the NRH
would be utilised as the source of chilled water to
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the hospital in the meantime, with other areas of
the hospital without cooling.
1. Failure of one boiler would still enable hot water
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production within the TEC, but from only one boiler,
Heating and domestic hot providing no redundancy of hot water production
water would not be within the TEC.
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Mechanical M-4 Heating and domestic hot water TEC Age and condition of boilers Failure of boiler/s U L 4 M 4 L 4 M 4 4
available to the general
hospital 2. Failure of both boilers would result in an
extended period without hot water production within
the TEC.
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1. Failure of chilled water pipework would result in
an extended period without chilled water
reticulation from the TEC. The emergency chiller in
Capital
the NRH would be utilised as the source of chilled
Failure of support structure Chilled, heating and expenditure is
water to the hospital in the meantime, with other
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Condition of link bridge supporting main and associated chilled, domestic hot water would approved to
Mechanical M-5 Chilled, heating and domestic hot water pipework Link Bridge areas of the hospital without cooling. U L 4 M 4 L 4 M 4 4
pipework supply to Hospital buildings heating and domestic hot not be available to the undertake
water pipe at link bridge general hospital upgrades to the
2. Failure of the heating and domestic hot water
de link bridge.
pipework would result in an extended period without
heating and domestic hot water reticulation from
the TEC.
Extended period of operation on emergency supply
Long term loss of utility
including possible load shedding of less critical Install VESDA system to
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supply to the site.
Uncontained switchboard buildings. Additional fuel deliveries and increased provide early fire
Electrical E-2 Incoming Supply Mein Street Substation Existing switchboard housed in single room. Damage to substation L L 4 VH 2 VH 2 E 1 2 $ 20,000.00
failure and/or electrical fire. generator maintenance. Works to repair or replace detection and allow early
building and/or
the failed substation. Public damage to hospital response.
switchboard.
building.
No short term
measures.
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Recommend
Failure of one network Extended period of operation on emergency supply construction of
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incomer during a period of Short to medium term including possible load shedding of less critical second
Lack of redundant capacity in connections to
Electrical E-3 Incoming Supply Mein Street Substation sufficiently high demand loss of utility supply to the buildings. Additional fuel deliveries and increased L L 4 VH 2 VH 2 E 1 2 substation and
Wellington Electricity network
leading to protection trip on site. generator maintenance. Wellington Electricity take second
remaining incomer. works to resolve network failure. independent
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supply from
Wellington
Electricity.
Extended period of operation on emergency supply
Short to medium term including possible load shedding of less critical No short term
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All utility supply to site is via Palm Grove Zone Failure affecting Palm Grove
Electrical E-4 Incoming Supply Mein Street Substation loss of utility supply to the buildings. Additional fuel deliveries and increased L L 4 VH 2 VH 2 E 1 2 measures.
Substation Substation
site. generator maintenance. Wellington Electricity Refer Risk E-4.
works to resolve ZSS failure.
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Upgrade fire detection to

Link Block Switchboard is housed inside one Extended, unplanned, loss of supply to critical site VESDA system to provide
Electrical E-5 HV Switchboards Link Block Switchroom Fire inside switchroom. Whole switchboard fails. U E 1 E 1 VH 2 E 1 1 $ 20,000.00
room buildings. early fire detection and
allow early response.
Review switchboard
Link Block Switchroom. HV switchboards do not appear to have seismic Extended, unplanned, loss of supply to critical site
Electrical E-6 HV Switchboards Seismic action Whole switchboard fails. U E 1 E 1 VH 2 E 1 1 fixings and retrofit seismic $ 10,000.00
TEC Switchroom bracing. buildings.
bracing
Relocate redundant
Link Block Battery systems not fire separated.
battery systems in to
Electrical E-7 HV Switchboards Link Block Switchroom Battery room not fire separated from external Fire inside switchroom. Battery system fails. Loss of tripping and load shed controls. U L 4 M 4 H 3 L 4 3 $ 15,000.00
separate fire separated
plant space.
cupboards
Electrodynamic force of Loss of supply. Damage to HV cabling in addition Audit cable supports and
Cable supports damaged. Cables routed around HV network fault of sufficient fault acts on cable and to initial fault. Damage to nearby services in replace or upgrade where
Electrical E-8 HV Cables Site-wide U L 4 VH 2 E 1 VH 2 2 $ 10,000.00
sharp bends. magnitude. potentially breaks cabling service tunnels. Extended interruptions to supply found to have failed or be
loose from supports. while rectification works are carried out. insufficient
Electrodynamic force of
Cable supports damaged. Cables routed around HV network fault of sufficient fault acts on cable and Serious injury to staff or contractors in vicinty of
Electrical E-9 HV Cables Site-wide HU E 3 L 4 E 3 E 3 3 (See Risk E-8) (See Risk E-8)
sharp bends. magnitude. potentially breaks cabling cable.
loose from supports.
Risk Register
Revision Rev A 12 June 2017 Page 1 of 2
\\NZWLG1FP001\Projects\605X\60545594\8. Issued Docs\8.1 Reports\Infrastructure Review - Rev C\RiskRegister.xlsx Print Date: 16/06/2017
Client Name: Capital and Coast District Health Board
Project Name: Wellington Hospital Campus Infrastructure Resilience Report
Project No: 60545594
Risk Register
Safety Operational Strategic Reputational

Overall Short Term Risk
Service Issue No. Sub-Service Location Issue Activity Shortfall Consequence L C RAC C RAC C RAC C RAC RAC Reduction Cost Comment
No short term
measures.
Potential complete loss of supply to buildings where Would require
Cables routed through in common pathways Cables are damaged and redundant cables are routed together. Extended construction of
Electrical E-10 HV Cables Site-wide Fire in service area. U VH 2 E 1 E 1 E 1 1
through service areas fail. interruptions in supply while rectification works are new cable
carried out. pathways and
installation of
new cables.
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Costing is to
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conduct study of
TEC -NRH link
only. Long term
Potential complete loss of supply to buildings where
Conduct study to confirm resolution would
Cables routed through in common pathways with Seismic action resuting in Cables are damaged and redundant cables are routed together. Extended
Electrical E-11 HV Cables Site-wide U VH 2 E 1 E 1 E 1 1 capacity of TEC-NRH $ 10,000.00 require
no apparent seismic allowances failure of pathway fail. interruptions in supply while rectification works are
feeder construction of
carried out.
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new cable
pathways and
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installation of
new cables.
No capital cost
however may
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Conduct routine cable
Cable sheaths of 30 year old cables seriously Penetration of moisture and Short term loss of supply while switching is carried require
Electrical E-12 HV Cables Site-wide Cable fails. U VH 2 H 3 VH 2 VH 2 2 testing to monitor cable $ -
degraded or completely worn away. contaminants into cable. out to bypass failure. Rectification works required. adjustment to
insulation strength.
maintenance
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budget.
Earthed wire armour transfers fault voltage where Audit cabling and replace Cost to condut
in contact with containment. Transfer voltage may where sheath is worn audit and
Cable sheaths of 35 - 40 year old cables Steel wire armour in contact Earth fault occurs on
Electrical E-13 HV Cables Site-wide be passed on to connected structural steel and U E 1 E 1 E 1 E 1 1 away. Only present $ 60,000.00 replace cables
seriously degraded or completely worn away. with metallic supports network.
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conductive reticulated services pipework. known instance is on on services
Electrocution risk to staff and patients. exterior services bridge. bridge.
No short term
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measures.
Recommend
dividing
Both transformers lost to Ward Support Block without supply for extended
Electrical E-14 Transformers Ward Support Block Transformers are not fire separated. Transformer fire. U L 4 H 3 H 3 H 3 3 transformer
fire. period.
room into two
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fire separated
transformer
rooms.
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No short term
measures.
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Recommendatio
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Short term loss of supply
Works to replace transformer. Involvement of liaison with
Electrical E-15 Transformers Academic Block Transformers in poor condition. Transformer failure. to Academic Block while U L 4 L 4 H 3 VH 2 3
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Academic Block tenants in review of failure. Otago SOM
fault is bypassed.
regarding
Academic Block
infrastructure
works.
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Automatic load shedding
Generator failure on call to Unplanned loss of supply to critical buildings. Non Continue maintenance Part of ongoing
Electrical E-16 HV Generators TEC Generators not reliably starting isolating supply to site L E 1 E 1 M 3 E 1 1 $ -
start. delivery of key services. and testing regime. maintenance.
buildings.
Generator failure when Automatic load shedding
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Lack of N+1 redundancy in generator system Unplanned loss of supply to critical buildings. Non Rectify oil contamination Part of ongoing
Electrical E-17 HV Generators TEC supporting site under high isolating supply to site L E 1 E 1 M 3 E 1 1 $ -
under some conditions delivery of key services. issue in Generator 2. maintenance.
load conditions buildings.
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measures.
Recommend
No emergency supply available for hospital
construction of
Electrical E-18 HV Generators TEC No fire separation between generators Fire in generator hall Destruction of generators campus. Cancellation of procedures requiring U L 4 E 1 E 1 E 1 1
another
redundant supply.
generator facility
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to decentralise
generators.
Order of
magnitude cost
Provide LV mobile estimate for a
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Potential loss of redundancy Power supply considered

TEC emergency supply reticulated by site wide generator link panels to single panel.
Electrical E-19 Site Wide Network Site Wide in supply from MSS and TEC unreliable for high risk Non-delivery of acute services. U L 4 E 1 L 4 VH 2 2 $ 30,000.00
HV network. supplement supply to Panel amounts
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due to network failure. medical procedures.

critical switchboards. and disposition
based on clinical
needs.
Strongly
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recommend a
full roof
membrane
Water ingress to Continue
Roof coverings exceeding replacement.
Building Survey B-1 Building fabric TEC Roof covering membrane failing structure, plant Non-delivery of acute services. C M 3 H 2 VH 1 VH 1 1 maintenance/patch repair $50,000/year
expected life expectancy Cost would
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equipment or generators regime.

exceed $1M but
costs if system
fails could
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exceed.
No short term
measures.
Requires
Staff maintenance of cooling replacement of
Mechanical M-6 Cooling towers TEC Asbestos present in cooling towers. PPE failure. Staff asbestos exposure. U VH 2 L 4 L 4 VH 2 3
towers. cooling towers.
Works can be
staged to reduce
downtimes.
Risk Register
Revision Rev A 12 June 2017 Page 2 of 2
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2018-137 Attachment Item 4.3 Appendix 1 Wellington Hospital Campus Infra...

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2018-137 Attachment Item 4.3 Appendix 1 Wellington Hospital Campus Infra...

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Wellington Hospital Campus Infrastructure

Wellington Hospital Campus Infrastructure and Total Energy Centre

Job No.: 60545594

© AECOM New Zealand Limited (AECOM). All rights reserved.

Prepared by James McGeachin, Barry Corrigan, Lana Duboka

A 12-Jun-2017 Work In Progress Draft Mark Rollason

C 16-Jun-2017 For Information Mark Rollason

5.1 Total Energy Centre Building 25

5.1.2 AECOM recommendations 25

5.2.1 Previous MSS Building Assessment 26

7.0 Appendix B – Risk Register 29

· Desktop review of TEC and MSS structural engineering reports

Findings and Risks

· Continuing and enhancing maintenance of existing equipment

and response to fire initiated in the switch room.

The review encompasses the following services:

chilled water system.

· Visually review major plant items and

· Project risks affecting successful and timely delivery of project objectives.

project risk has not been assessed.

treated as though it affects a key service.

in each of the other categories is low.

1.4 Summary Findings

supply to critical buildings and therefore non-delivery of key services.

issues or enhancing the existing infrastructure against potential threats.

These options include:

· Continue and enhance existing maintenance and testing regimes including:

considered in operational and clinical decisions. It is expected that, outside of exceptional

equipment lead times ranging from a few weeks to several months.

Operation and Maintenance

emergency supply to be connected.

assistance to experienced site staff.

2.2 Incoming Supply

Mein Street Substation Switchboard

Wellington Electricity Incomers

2.3 Total Energy Centre

Generator Cooling System

supply to the site.

Generator Air Start and Pneumatic Controls

compressors located in the TEC equipment hall.

apparent or reported condition issues.

Short Term Works Options

Investigate retrofit of seismic bracing to HV switchboards

· Upgrade smoke detection in Link Block HV switch room to VESDA.

be proportional to the overall length.

There are two major HV cabling systems installed on the site:

· Secondary distribution which connects HV switchboards with distribution transformers to supply

completely engaged on the cable.

transformers are ‘dry type’.

3.0 Mechanical Services

3.2 Heating and Domestic Hot Water

hot water circulation.

Boiler Capacity Installation Date Life Remaining Additional Notes

1 4,500kW 1979 Past typical life Replacement of controls and

cooled chiller is available in the NRH to cater for essential services.

3.4 Pipework Reticulation

4.0 Building Surveying

maintenance could be described as being aesthetic in nature.

building of previous water ingress which appears to continue to this date.

5.0 Structural Engineering

require verification through site investigations:

· There are no durability issues with the existing structural elements

Recommendations of the DSA report are: