SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT
prepare for this defense pursuant to the due process
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. ISAAC PEREZ, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-21049 December 22, 1923
MALCOLM, J.:
FACTS:
Accused-appellant was charged for rape. The
information alleged that the victim was his
stepdaughter but did not allege that the victim was
only 13 years old at the time of the rape.
During arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to
the accusation against him. During trial it was
proved that the victim was the stepdaughter of the
accused and was in fact 13 years old at the time the
crime of rape was committed. Accused was then
convicted of qualified rape and was meted out the
penalty of death.
ISSUE: WON an accused may be convicted of
qualified rape when the information alleged only
simple rape?
HELD: NO. Citing People vs. Garcia, the court
held that it would be a denial of the right of the
accused to be informed of the charges against
him and, consequently, a denial of due process, if
he is charged with simple rape and be convicted
of its qualified form punishable by death,
although the attendant circumstance qualifying
the offense and resulting in capital punishment
was not alleged in the indictment on which he
was arraigned. Procedurally, then, while the
minority of Maribel and the relationship of
appellant and his victim were established during the
trial, appellant can only be convicted of simple rape
because he cannot be punished for a graver offense
than that with which he was charged.
Under the rules of criminal procedure, a qualifying
circumstance to be considered as such must be so
alleged in the information, which is not required
of aggravating circumstances.
The requirement for complete allegations on the
particulars of the indictment is based on the right of
the accused to be fully informed of the nature of the
charge against him, so that be may adequately
clause of the Constitution.
Separate Opinions
JOHNSON, J., concurring:
I agree with the opinion of Mr. Justice Villamor. I
cannot give assent to a doctrine which permits a
complaint to be presented upon one theory and the
trial to be carried through upon that theory and then
to condemn the defendant upon a theory which he
nor the prosecution ever dreamed of.
VILLAMOR, J., concurring and dissenting:
I agree in that the accused should be sentenced to
suffer two months and one day of arresto
mayor with costs, as imposed by the court a quo,
under the provisions of article 256 of the Penal
Code, but not under section 8 of Act No. 292. The
accused, in my opinion, should not be convicted of
the crime of sedition because there is no allegation
in the complaint nor proof in the record, showing
that when the accused uttered the words that gave
rise to these proceedings, he had the intention of
inciting others to gather for an illicit purpose, or to
incite any conspiracy or rebellion, or to disturb the
peace of the community or the safety and order of
the Government which are the acts penalized by
section 8 of Act No. 292. On the contrary, having
due regard to the place and time when the
discussion arose between Lodovice and the accused,
the political rivalry between them and the difference
of opinion that they entertained regarding the
administration of the Governor-General, the
Honorable Leonard Wood, it would appear evident
that the accused expressed himself in biting and
poignant language, unbecoming and improper of a
law abiding citizen and highly detrimental and
insulting to the authority of the Governor-General
which is the thing prohibited and punished by
article 256 of the Penal Code.