Professional Documents
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in
Marine Engineers Review (India) September 2013 www.imare.in 3
4 Marine Engineers Review (India) September 2013 www.imare.in
contents
Editorial 7
IMEI News 9
Branch News 13
Marine Engineers Review (India)
Journal of The Institute of Marine Un Bel Di 22
Engineers (India)
News 27
Administration Office
IMEI House
Report of Investigation into the Fire Onboard the 31
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Printed, Published and Edited by Mr. Indra Nath Bose on behalf of The Institute of Marine Engineers (India).
Published from 1012 Maker Chambers V, 221 Nariman Point, Mumbai – 400 021, and Printed from Compact Photo Offset,
116 “Shriniwas”, Behind Gograswadi, Dombivli (E) – 421 201. District Thane
S
container carrier split in two off Yemen
hortly after midnight on 14 August International Maritime Organization.
with AIS data showing it had sailed at
2013, explosion and resultant fire
18 knots into a Force 7 storm. The two Japanese Government has launched a
destroyed Indian Navy submarine INS
halves eventually sank in the following committee to review safety standards
Sindhurakshak and caused tragic death of
weeks in rough sea with 1,700 containers for Container ships in the industry. The
18 of its crew members in Mumbai Naval
and 1,500 tonnes of bunker fuel on board.
Dockyard. Fire tenders from the Dockyard committee comprises shipping lines, yards,
Fortunately, no loss of life was sustained
as well as the Mumbai Fire Brigade class societies and research institutes. It
in this incident. Indian Coast Guard (ICG)
were immediately pressed into action. plans to publish new safety guidelines for
Mumbai, had coordinated operations to
However, due to the extensive damage containerships by end-September.
help rescue all 26 sailors and had also
suffered, the submarine submerged at her
pressed into service its vessel to fight All above is a hallmark of ideal way
berth with only a portion visible above
subsequent fire which raged in the aft part of dealing with an accident, where the
the surface. INS Sindhurakshak was a
of the vessel.
Russian-made Kilo-class 877EKM diesel- focus is on finding root causes in a no-
electric submarine. Commissioned on 24 It was the largest Container ship lost to blame culture and in consultation with
December 1997, it was the ninth of the ten date and was one of the six same-type stakeholders, publication of incident
Kilo-class submarines in the Indian Navy. vessels that Mitsubishi Heavy Industries investigation report in a time bound
built for Mitsui OSK Lines in 2007-2008, manner and implementing corrective
Defence Minister A. K. Antony has stated
all classed with ClassNK. actions promptly.
"preliminary investigations indicate that
the explosion was due to the possible The Owners reacted swift and decisively.
ignition of armament. The cause of They withdrew all her sister ships
ignition is, however, yet to be established. from service for strengthening of hull I. N. Bose
Forensic examinatiaon would throw more structure as a precautionary measure. The Hon Editor - MERI
light into the possible cause of ignition." Owners along with Mitsubishi Heavy editormer@imare.in
66th GC Meeting at HO
mainly with the former aspect, i.e. faulty design, he spoke about
how problems arise because of wrong dimensions, shape, material
composition, metal treatment, surface finishing, etc. The lecture
was very well presented and well received by the members present.
It was, perhaps, the largest attendance ever at a paper reading at
this lecture hall. There was a lively question and answer session
afterwards, with many members joining the discussions.
24-07-1957—23-08-2013
We are deeply saddened by the demise of our member Shri
Bollapragada Divakar M-13885.
After successful completion of his marine engineering
apprentice with the Visakhapatnam Port Trust (1973-1978), he
joined Damodar Bulk Carriers as a Junior Engineer Officer and
rose to the rank of Chief Engineer Officer. Then he joined Fleet
Management Limited, and was with the Company for over 15
years.
He is survived by his wife, son & daughter.
Hydraulic Dredgers Cutter suction dredgers are suitable for almost all types of soil
depending on the power of the cutter. The installed cutter power
Trailing suction hopper dredgers, or TSHDs, as they are can vary from 20KW on smaller dredgers to 5000KW on larger
commonly known, trail a pipe along the seabed which sucks up ones. They are not suitable for very hard rock cutting.
material that is then off-loaded into an on board hopper. In order
to dispose of the material the dredger usually sails away from the DIFF FORMS OF DREDGING
dredging site to a designated discharge area and then either pumps Capital dredging : Creating an infrastructure like
the material out from its hopper, pipes it ashore or dumps it into the
ports, channels, harbors etc.
water through doors in the bottom of the hopper.
Maintenance dredging : Maintenance of infrastructure
This type of dredger can only be used in the sea and in fact some
especially against siltation
of the largest dredgers in the world are trailing suction hopper
dredgers Preparatory dredging : during construction of bridges,
dams, canals etc.
The basic operations of a THSD are:
Land reclamation : To cater for increasing population
Vessel is made to sail over the dredging site at speed of about 2
and need for more and more space
– 3 knots……One or more suction tubes provided with suction
to live, create infrastructure and
mouths (drag heads) which are dragged over the seabed during
irrigation this type of dredging is
dredging. …..One or more dredge pumps to suck the material from
becoming increasingly popular.
the seabed…..A hopper in which the dredged material can settle.
…..Easy operational bottom doors or valves in the hopper to dump Beach nourishment : These schemes are designed to
the dredge material…..Gantries and winches to operate the suction prevent or reduce the likelihood of
tubes. erosion or flooding on beaches by
replacing the sand and gravels back
Swell compensator : to control the contact between the suction
on eroding beach.
mouth and the seabed when dredging is being done in swell.
Harvesting materials : This type of dredging is used to
The size of a TSHD is expressed in the hopper volume. These recover the precious metals and
are generally suitable for dredging soft clay, silt and gravels. Not minerals or to remove the over
suitable for compact sand, hard soil and rocks. Burdon to reach these minerals.
Cutter suction dredgers, also referred to with the abbreviation Seabed mining- future plans
CSD, are the most well known and most versatile type of dredger.
They are very popular because of their Construction materials :Sand and gravels required for
constructio n of infrastructure are
- Ability to cut a wide range of materials; supplied by dredging.
- Ability to pump cut material directly to the disposal site;
- Ability to work at widely varying depths, including in shallow The presentation was attended by the Master Mariners, Marine
waters; Engineers and the 2nd year diploma cadets of The Institute of
- Ability to cut precise profiles, producing uniform and level maritime Studies. Senior Member Shri Saumil Desai presented a
water beds; memento to Shri Pradip Sawant for his fine presentation.
Now let us look at how the TRIBOLOGY works at CROSS Moral of The Story: The Centrifugal Brake Mechanism and
PURPOSE with centrifugal clutch. associated chamber should be inspected whenever it falls due. It
is not correct to ignore physical inspection just because it is found
Purpose of Tribology is to reduce power consumption and wear by working fine, on the assumption that there is nothing inside which
reducing friction. can go wrong.
22 Marine Engineers Review (India) September 2013 www.imare.in
Marine Engineers Review (India) September 2013 www.imare.in 23
Technical
Anchor Tales
Extract: It is possible to use port windlass to pick-up starboard situations, so he took full 5 turns of the rope on the Starboard
anchor and vice-versa. winch drum, took the rope over Starboard Fairlead, then over Port
Fairlead, then onto the Port winch drum. It was in a manner that
Introduction: Al Jazeera is a well Known news channel. Jazeera pulling the rope (after taking up slack manually on both ends) over
in Arabic means Island in English. One of my Algerian friends the Starboard winch drum would help heave up the Port anchor via
told me that his country is called Al JaZair in Arabic, meaning The the turning of the Port winch drum which was engaged to the Port
Islands. “But Algeria is not an Island” I wondered aloud. “Well, it Windlass. As the anchor chain came up by some amount, by effort
was, at one time-when Sahara to the south was sea”, he told. That of both windlasses together, Port windlass was able to heave the
made Algeria an island, with Mediterranean Sea to the north and rest of it alone.
Sahara to the south. Sahara is still a sea, rather an ocean, of sand.
With places like Beni Abbes in Algeria reportedly being witness to While still on the topic of anchors, it may be worthwhile to
shifting walls of sands 480 km wide travelling at 30 Kilometres per recount another hearsay about anchors, which could be hilarious
hour, swallowing fleets of ships of the desert (the camel caravans) for some but embarrassment for others. A ship left the dry dock at
within their rolling crests. port A to make it to next port B, nearly 5 days away, which also
happened to be corporate headquarters.
This tale, though, relates to the Northern Sea Coast of Algeria, in
the MediTerranean Sea (Medi=Middle, Terra=Land), i.e. the Sea in A rock on the way (a tourist attraction) was too much of temptation,
the Middle of the Land. Mostly calm, but sometimes unbelievably so the top management decided to take a well deserved - off the
violent. record- break, after such a gruelling dry dock. Vessel anchored,
everyone went to the rock in life boats and spent the day there, only
The Tale: the junior most officers and some skeleton crew were left behind.
It was a Heated Product Carrier of 30000 MT, anchored offshore As the picnic ended in the evening and heaving of anchor was tried,
Algeria for the night. At around 2000 hrs., there was a weather it got stuck in the ground and wouldn’t come off. With some rough
warning. Master decided to weigh anchor and move. His Mate went weather around and so much delay on the cards, wise thing was
forward to heave the anchor- the port one in this case- and reported done and anchor was let go along with the chain.
that windlass was unable to lift the anchor. Either the chain was
paid out way too much or the anchor was in the rocks. On his first But this absence of one anchor needed to be explained when the
command, Master did not wish to let the anchor go. Bosun had Super came on board on arrival the head quarters. Suddenly the
given too many jerky movements on the joystick, to dislodge the ship staff remembered that anchor was left in the dry dock at the
anchor; consequently several O-rings of hydraulic motor had given time of departure. So Superintendent contacted the dry dock to
way. It began to leak copious quantities of oil. demand explanation for the retention of the Anchor & Chain. Dry
Dock authorities refuted it altogether. Further deep investigation
All the Allen Bolts of the Hydraulic Motor for the Windlass were led to spilling of beans by the skeletons which were left behind on-
seized & frozen in rust. board while picnic was on the rock, with embarrassing moments
Could the Starboard Windlass be used to pick up the Port Anchor! and consequences.
There was no answer with anyone. At one time it was proposed Another anchor tail: In a 6000 tonner, anchor was let go on arrival
to shift the Hydraulic Motor from Starboard windlass to Port anchorage. The chain kept going and then it was completely gone.
windlass, but it was soon clear that pipe fittings of STBD hydraulic Reason: as revealed by Investigation, was that the bitter end was
motor were mirror image of that of Port hydraulic motor, so it not secured by the pin to the bulkhead, but was tied to the eye in
wouldn’t have fitted. the bulkhead by means of a wire rope and shackle. The rope would
Finally, the engine was put to Dead Slow Ahd all night, to take the have been new and strong when fitted, but it was reduced to some
load off the anchor chain. In roaring winds, the engine staff worked rusted and thinned apology of a rope, at the time of this happening.
there from 2200 hrs. to 0430 hrs., to dismantle the Hydraulic Report was sent to the company, and blame lay on the bygones that
Motor with frozen bolts and change the O-Rings. All this while had used rope instead of using the pin.
Master manned the Bridge and his mate stood forward and watched
the load on the anchor chain. When the windlass was ready at 0430, Well, there was no cause of major worry, because ship was due for
anchor was heaved, with a sigh of relief from everyone, as the ship lay-up in the coming month, and she still had another anchor left.
was able to move to a safe place away from the bad weather. Next week, the Starboard anchor was let go at another anchorage.
It kept going, and finally was gone, just like the previous one in the
But, was it possible to use STBD windlass to heave Port anchor? previous week.
Yes, it was witnessed on another ship where the Port anchor chain Reason: exactly same as that in the case of Port anchor.
was paid out too much in the deep and Port windlass was not able
to heave it back. This Master had some experience of similar With both anchors gone, lay up was pre-poned.
Ballast Tales
Extract: Cargo and Ballast operations are very critical operations, completely, while Forward and Aft tanks were still full. Tanker
where mistakes can lead to loss of ship and seafarers’ lives, along sank on the terminal, blocking it for almost one year. It took a
with tremendous damage to shipping operations and environment. submersible heavy lift ship to lift the two parts clear off the ground
One of the more prominent mishaps during Cargo and Ballast by use of ropes passed under the wreck, and re-sink it in the deeps
operations happened in yester years in a major European port in of Atlantic Ocean. Mate on duty owned up to his mistake, offered
the Eastern Atlantic when a tanker broke up into two on the cargo just one reason: he was awake for more than 72 hours, so it led to
terminal itself. It happened so that a mid-ship tank was discharged a faulty judgement.
That reminds me of a Road Accident on Mumbai-Pune Expressway In fact, one of the reasons as to why man hole doors are oval in
on 28 May 2012 near Khalapur, where a truck driver drove his shape, was understood to be that whoever enters the tank, should
truck into two stationery Marriage Party Buses which were parked take the manhole door along with her/him inside the tank; lest
on a Lay By (Service Road), killed 27 persons at one go and injured somebody tightens the door from outside.
29. He told the police that he was driving since previous 3 days.
The police arrested the owner too, who was driving the driver to An incident about a DB tank not getting de-ballasted for 10 hours
drive continuously without ensuring adequate rest. It may just be a is also etched in the author’s memory, where almost everyone was
matter of time before Maintenance of Rest Hours Record becomes looking for the reasons for baffling phenomenon for long time.
mandatory for Road Transport drivers. Are they not governed by Ultimately, the sounding pipe was blown through with air. The next
the ITF (International Transport Workers’ Federation) too? sounding showed an empty tank.
Another story that I remember was about a 60000 GRT OBO, There is an incident report too, about Classification Society
which was loading ore, in a fast loading port. Loader arm was Surveyors and ship staff sinking to death in a Cargo Hold which
loading in the forward most hold. Planning by the loader was to
was carrying ballast water. It happened so that Surveyors needed to
load in aft most hold on port side to the extent that trim aft and
check the sides of the cargo hold for complete height of the hold.
port list became unbearable; then shift to forward most hold, and
So they took to a rubber dinghy in a partially ballasted tank. Every
kill two birds with one stone, i.e. load on starboard side so that aft
now and then, the ballast would be filled up by another meter or so,
trim and port list – both – would be corrected simultaneously. Then
load some more so that trim fwd and starboard list would become to allow the inspecting party to check at that level. During one such
unbearable. Then shift back again to load on port side. ballasting, a huge air bubble appeared just below the dinghy, and
resulted in sinking of personnel inside. Since then, there is advisory
The plan was perfect virtually, except that only the trim got to carry out such operation with Life Jacket on, and come out of
corrected. Aft part of the ship remained listed to port while forward hold during every ballasting.
part got listed to starboard.
But most interesting one, which was recounted to me by a
The ship was twisted. Superintendent, is the one about a ship after she left Dry Dock.
Consequently, all ballast tanks developed internal leaks. It happened so that while ballasting a particular Top Side Tank
(TST), corresponding Double Bottom Tank (DBT) used to start
Shore management converted the ship permanently to an ore
getting filled too. After the TST overflowed, ballasting would be
carrier, i.e. no more to be used as a tanker.
stopped. Then after some time, DBT would overflow and the TST
There is another one about the ballasting operation, when the would be found empty. Ship Board Management (SBM) reported
mate began to de-ballast the middle hold of an ore carrier which the problem to the Management Ashore (say, MA). From there,
was carrying ballast to the brim for reasons of stability (rest of the Superintendent advised to check the piping of TST, which was
holds were empty). passing through DBT. SBM reported that it has been checked
and everything was fine. So Superintendent flew to the ship to do
It would have been a rather routine operation, except that the duty something about this mystery. As he entered the DBT and flashed
personnel forgot to uncap the vent of that hold. his light, he saw a Dresser coupling missing from the TST Ballast
pipe. SBM refused to believe it, “It was there when we saw it”.
After sometime, both hatch covers caved in and fell inside the hold,
because of vacuum inside the hold. Nevertheless, fitting a Dresser Coupling solved the problem.
But, once, it became otherwise. The hole in the pipe was nearly 4 mm diameter approximately.
Will the steam packing hold for 10 hrs?
At the time of 2 hours’ Notice before departure, it was noticed that
fuel was dripping from the insulation along this pipe, outside the “Put the biggest size steam gland packing and tighten, it will hold”,
abovementioned compartment. the fitter assured.
Slight investigation revealed that pipe was holed inside a clamp With little choice apart from cancelling the pilot and delaying the
which was hidden in the insulation. After due preparatory procedure ship, it was agreed to try the method and try out the engine.
and permits, the insulation was removed and clamp opened. Now it After due precaution of stopping the pump, depressurising the pipe,
would never be the same again, because the leak increased. isolating and draining it sufficiently; the packing was used to cover
With just 1 hour to go before the boarding of the pilot, everyone the hole and clamp tightened. Sure enough, the dripping, under
was standing and looking at the leakage. Various ideas, from Fast pressure, was reduced to wetness.
Drying Devcon to Cord O’ Bond, to lead sheet, to removal and The ship sailed out, with a few buckets and contraptions in
refitting of the pipe, were racing through everyone’s head- with attendance if leak sprang again, but nothing untoward happened
doubts over efficacy of each one, in the given time frame of 1 hour. till FWE.
The most prominent thought in everyone’s mind was, “Will We Be After FWE, the pipe was taken out and permanent repairs carried
Able to Sail?” out before embarking on a journey to cross the ocean.
While the top management was energetically discussing the ways, That left, etched in mind, an advice from a major engine builder,
and shooting down each method among them, it was becoming “Do not take lightly the advice from a shop-floor fitter”.
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Oct. 22-25, 2013 Busan, South Korea. International Shipbuilding and Marine Exhibition.
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Dec. 11-13, 2014 Mumbai, India. INMARCO-INAvation International Maritime Technology Conference & Exhibition.
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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY cables and eventually caused the loss of power. While the fire
was eventually self-extinguished, the failure of the installed CO2
On November 8, 2010 at 0600 (Local Time), the Carnival Splendor
system and the poor execution of the firefighting plan contributed
was underway off the coast of Mexico when the vessel suffered a
to the ineffectiveness of the crew’s firefighting effort.
major mechanical failure in the number five diesel generator. As a
result, engine components, lube oil and fuel were ejected through As a result of this casualty and the initial findings by investigators,
the engine casing and caused a fire at the deck plate level between the Coast Guard issued two safety alerts which covered the
generators five and six in the aft engine room which eventually operation, testing and maintenance of CO2 systems.
ignited the cable runs overhead. The fire in the cable runs was Furthermore, Carnival took steps to evaluate fire safety systems,
relatively small, but produced a significant volume of smoke firefighting doctrine & training, procedures for inspection & testing
which hampered efforts to locate and extinguish it. In addition, the of installed safety systems. Specifically, Carnival has removed
fire caused extensive damage to the cables in the aft engine room, the 40-second time delay from the automatic activation sequence
which contributed to the loss of power. for the Hi-Fog system and has implemented short and long-term
solutions to rectify the problems associated with the activation of
It took fire teams approximately two hours to locate the fire in the
the CO2 system.
cable runs. Once located, the fire teams attempted to extinguish
it with CO2 and dry powder portable extinguishers. However, There are five safety recommendations in this report which are
the fire was not fully controlled by these agents due to a lack of addressed to Carnival, Lloyd’s Register, Panama and the Coast
cooling of the cable conductors which held heat and caused the Guard. The recommendations address the conditions onboard the
cable insulation and jacket materials to continue to burn. Carnival Splendor which contributed to this casualty, as well as,
the problems with the CO2 system installation on all Dream class
Approximately five hours into the firefighting effort, the Captain vessels. In addition, the recommendations to the Coast Guard
evacuated the engine room and attempted to activate the installed address the need for improved guidance to enhance the conduct
CO2 system. The first attempt to activate the CO2 system from and evaluation of fire drills.
the remote location failed. Subsequently, ship’s crew attempted
to activate the system manually from the CO2 room. The second 2. GENERAL
attempt also failed because the section valve for the aft engine
room was inoperable. Additionally, after pressurizing the CO2
system numerous fittings and hose connections within the CO2
system leaked. In the end, no CO2 was released into the aft engine
room.
At 1315, the fire in the cable runs was extinguished, which was
most likely due to a lack of oxygen resulting from closure of the
watertight doors during the attempt to use the fixed CO2 system.
Afterwards, vessel engineers were unable to restart the unaffected
main generators due to extensive damage to cables in the aft engine
room. Throughout the response, the emergency generator and Photograph 1 - CARNIVAL SPLENDOR
back-up battery system provided power for emergency services. The Carnival Splendor is a steel, passenger cruise ship constructed
for Carnival Corporation by Fincantieri - Cantieri Navali Italiani
There were no injuries or fatalities as a result of this marine S.P.A. at its yard in Genoa Italy. The vessel was constructed
casualty, and the vessel safely reached the port of San Diego on under Registro Italiano Navale Rules and at delivery transferred
November 11, 2010. to Lloyd’s Register (LR). The Carnival Splendor is a Dream class
Post casualty analysis of the event revealed that the installed vessel and was delivered on July 30, 2008. It has a maximum speed
Hi-Fog system for local protection was activated 15 minutes of 22 knots and is driven by a diesel electric propulsion plant. The
after the initial fire started. This delay was the result of a bridge plant consists of six identical Wartsila 46, twelve cylinder, four
watchstander resetting the fire alarm panel on the bridge. This was stroke cycle diesel engines arranged in two engine rooms that
a critical error which allowed the fire to spread to the overhead power two propulsion motors.
Marine Engineers Review (India) September 2013 www.imare.in 31
Technical
Figure 1 - Excerpt from the Carnival Splendor Fire Control Plan showing Deck C, Fire Zones 2 and 3
Plan annotated by USCG
3. CAUSUAL ANALYSIS was activated in machinery spaces outside of the affected area.
3.1 Hi-Fog System Performance The Hi-Fog system can be manually activated from the ECR. Based
on the EMS logs, it does not appear that the engineering watch
The machinery spaces on the Carnival Splendor are equipped with
manually activated the Hi-Fog system for the engine room before
a Hi-Fog local protection system. The Hi-Fog system is the first
evacuating.
line of defense in suppressing an engine room fire. However, in this
instance, it was ineffective at extinguishing the initial fire between As a result of the intervention by the bridge watch officer, the
DG5 and DG6. activation of the Hi-Fog local protection system for DG 5 and 6
was delayed by approximately 15 minutes. By the time the Hi-Fog
Figure 1 shows the location of the fire as well as the sequential
system was activated, the fire had spread to the cable runs over DG
activation of the fire/smoke sensors. Within 2 minutes, the smoke
5 and 6. Since the Hi-Fog system was designed for local protection,
traveled beyond fire zones 2 and 3. As a
the nozzles were positioned below the cables runs and the Hi-Fog
result, the Hi-Fog local protection system
system was not effective in suppressing or extinguishing the fire
in the cable runs.
3.2 Failure of the Installed CO2 System
3.2.1 Post-casualty inspection of the CO2 system
When investigators arrived onboard several days after the
casualty, the CO2 system remained pressurized and the ball
valves associated with the aft machinery space and the vent to
atmosphere were unable to be turned and opened with the cheater
bar that fits into the arm of the valve stem. The purpose of the
bar is for manual operations so that the valves can be opened in a
complete no power emergency.
Photograph 23 - Photo
Photograph 22 - CO2 system, 3-inch ball showing hemp packing in The system was eventually bled down using the relief valve
valve to aft machinery spaces CO2 system fittings circuitry. Once the pressure was taken off the system, the main
Photograph 19 – Vertical cable runs; note bare cables Photograph 20 – Cables above DG4 showing melted orange
due to fire damage cable covering
• The level of documentation for fire drills differed with each • Beyond the announcement and logging of drills, it does not
drill, and many drills had very little documentation beyond appear that the Captain and bridge crew participated in the fire
the logbook entry. As such, it is difficult to ascertain what was drills.
done during the drill and obtain any meaningful information • From May to November 2010, there were no fire drills
regarding the quality of the drill. conducted in the engine room.
• Several fire drills lasted less than 30 minutes.
3.5 Loss of Power and Propulsion
• It appears fire teams conducted drills on the aft mooring deck
3.5.1 Post-casualty Inspection of Aft Engine Room
or in the marshalling area, and not in the actual spaces.
• The roles and responsibilities of the Quick Response Team Photograph 19 and Photograph 20 show melted synthetic and
(QRT) and Fire Teams Charlie and Delta are not defined in the plastic components where flames were not present. In addition,
SMS. numerous wire ways and cabling, and switchboard components
CHAIRMAN
CHAIRMAN
This casualty was initiated by a hydrolock event which resulted 4.3 The Hi-Fog Fire Suppression System
in a bend in the B1 connecting rod of DG5. This condition went
undetected and eventually led to a fatigue fracture of the B1 It is likely that the activation of the Hi-Fog system for local
connecting rod on November 8, 2010. The fatigue fracture resulted protection would have extinguished and/or prevented the spread
in a loss of lube oil to the A1 cylinder and the destruction of various of the initial pool fire between DG5 and DG6 if the system was
components of the shared crankshaft bay. activated immediately following the engine failure. As such, the
lack of manual activation of the Hi-Fog system by the engineering
The poor condition of the air cooler on the B side of DG5 watchstanders, as well as the resetting of the fire alarm panel by
contributed to the hydrolock event. the bridge watchstanders were critical mistakes which allowed
Excessive rust particles from the plating that constructed the heat the initial fire to burn without impediment for several minutes and
exchanger base and other components at times may have performed propagate to the overhead cable runs.
like a check valve. When the engine was secured, drainage flow The Hi-Fog system was designed as a local application system for
from other operating engine air coolers that did not have excessive the protection of the diesel engine and consequently had limited
corrosion and corresponding blockage, could push past the particles effectiveness in extinguishing the fire in the cable runs because the
and enter the receiver space of DG 5. Hi-Fog nozzles in the vicinity of DG5 and DG6 were positioned
When DG 5 was started the nearly 3 bar (43 psi) of air pressure below the cable runs.
developed by the turbocharger may have partially forced the
4.4 Firefighting
particles back to the drains until they restricted flow. Fluid could
have also accumulated due to a leaking tube or tubes within the The manual firefighting efforts by the crew were ineffective in
heat exchange tube bank. At some point, enough fluid accumulated extinguishing the fire in the cable runs above DG5 and DG6 for the
in the receiver and eventually entered the B1 air intake port. following reasons:
The poor design of the air cooler system contributed to both the 1. The crew’s lack of familiarity with the engine room hampered
deterioration of the system and the excessive accumulation of fluid fire teams efforts to locate and extinguish the fire, and also allowed
in the B side air cooler for DG5. While Carnival had recognized for the further spread of both fire and smoke.
the problem with the air coolers on similar vessels, replaced the
2. While the use of portable dry chemical and CO2 extinguishers on
air cooler on the Carnival Splendor in July 2010 and took steps to
the small fire in the cable runs may have temporarily extinguished
prevent and manage the accumulation of fluid in the air coolers, the
the fire, the fire was not fully controlled by these agents due to a
lack of formal procedures to document these measures and the poor
lack of cooling of the cable conductors which held heat and caused
condition of the air coolers (as observed post-casualty) suggests
the cable insulation and jacket materials to continue to burn.
that these procedures were not routinely followed. Furthermore, the
solutions devised after the July 2010 air cooler replacement were 3. The poor maintenance of smoke boundaries allowed smoke
short-term fixes which relied on human intervention to manage the to spread to adjacent spaces. This hampered efforts to locate the
accumulation of water in the air cooler vice long-term engineering source of the fire while also activating fire/smoke detectors in
fixes to prevent the accumulation of fluid in the air coolers. unaffected spaces.
Whilst Classification of ships for commercial trade is generally 3 PROCESS OF NAVAL CLASSIFICATION
considered be defined as demonstration of compliance with a For a commercial vessel, there are two predominant routes for
relevant set of Classification Rules in order to satisfy statutory deciding the Class Society and the scope of Class. The first
requirements, for naval vessels where the statutory element does is a simple offer process from a shipyard to Class a particular
not normally exist, the service provided is more complex. To this design that is considered by the prospective owner to meet their
A key feature of the NSC though is that it provides guidance To this end, the International Naval Safety Association (INSA),
as to suitable ‘Solutions’, in terms of what standards might be who provide administrative support for the maintenance and
appropriate, through the inclusion of a comprehensive Guide. development of the Naval Ship Code are now considering how
Where no particular existing standard would provide a suitably MARPOL applies to naval ships.
‘navalised’ outcome, one is provided within the Code. It was
recognised that because of the wide range of naval vessels that the 5 ROLE OF CLASS
Code can be applied to, there could not be a single ‘Solution’ and The role of a Class Society in providing assurance services to
neither did the number of permutations lend themselves to neat navies has several facets.. The most important difference however
packaging along the lines of ship type as used in SOLAS. lies in the absence of any ‘mandatory’ element as we have with
commercial ships where Classification is an inherent requirement
Hence the Solution has been provided as a median measure, of the regulatory environment.
suitable for a corvette or simple frigate, being operated by a navy
for primarily constabulary purposes (littoral home waters defence For naval ships where this is not the position, Classification
and protection). It should be noted that not all sections have a becomes much more ‘advisory’ in its nature, both for the direct
defined Solution, as for a number it was felt that entirely suitable client (the ship operators) and for the naval flag authority. This
options existed, either as Classification Rules for Naval Ships, or requires Class to adopt a more flexible position and a philosophy
well established Naval Engineering Standards, such as those for that seeks to provide advice on best practice and risk, rather than
stability. compliance with prescriptive criteria.
Navies are moving quite rapidly to adopt this framework as it meets This is best expressed as becoming more of a ‘risk’ service, which
several of their needs, not least because of the pressures that they of course is becoming the overarching philosophy being applied by
have to adopt an independent assurance process as recommended regulators everywhere. However, in a naval context, it has a deeper
in several external reports into their procurement performance[1] meaning in that it is not just the safety risk that is of interest, but
[2], and to compliment their internal regulatory processes. It also because a navy has a military imperative as well, it needs to include
implements for them an opportunity to share ‘best practice’ where aspects of the ability to carry out specified functions that the vessel
this is common between navies, whilst leaving them free to retain has as these may take priority over the safety of the crew.
their unique approaches to meeting national military obligations.
6 LESSONS LEARNT FROM CLASSIFICATION OF
As these regulators evolve and understand their role in providing NAVAL SHIPS
a light touch governance process, other aspects of the holistic
regulatory process applied to commercial ships is being adopted The main lessons that arise from the involvement with navies to
and we are now seeing greater understanding of other IMO date can be summarised as being:
Conventions such as MARPOL, MLC and STCW. This does not οο Role of a Class Society in a Risk Management environment
mean necessarily that the same approach as used for developing a
navalised SOLAS is applied, but the same philosophy of understand οο Application of technical standards in Goal Based Regulation
why the convention exists and how it functions are essential. οο Value of technical standards for knowledge management
42 Marine Engineers Review (India) September 2013 www.imare.in
E-Learning for MEO Class IV Exams -
preparatory course
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IMEI House, Sector 19, Plot No. 94, Nerul, Navi Mumbai, Pin 400706
Tel : +91 22 2770 1664/32676735 l Fax :+91 22 2771 1663 E mail : hgs@imare.in; adminstration@imare.in, Website: www.imare.in
If the requirement had been viewed as a go/ no-go issue, rather than 1. Recommendation #15 - “Plan to Reform Support Ship Repair
a negotiable one, then design time and cost would have been saved. and Management Practices”, Paul J Rizzo, July 2011
Hence much of the existing portfolio of technical standards 2. Recommendation #7, paragraph 5.57 - “Acceptance into
is actually the result of hard won experience (usually through Service of Naval Capability”, ANAO Report No. 57, 2010-
an accident or incident) and to discard it would waste the costs 11
incurred to date. 3. Haddon Cave Report into loss of Nimrod VX230
7 CLASSIFICATION LEADERSHIP
9 AUTHORS BIOGRAPHY
Looking ahead, it is clear that the expertise and knowledge
Robert M. Simpson, CEng, MBA, FIMarEST. - A former seagoing
embedded in technical standards needs to be made more readily
engineer, presently Global Lead – Naval Ships for Lloyd’s Register
accessible to designers, engineers and operators if hard won lessons
(LR), responsible for the development of LR’s services to naval
are not to be lost.
clients. He is currently involved with all of the UK MoD’s
Whilst extensive effort is being made through information based on major naval projects along with various MoD Naval Authorities
web technology, there is still a place for experienced surveyors to as they develop a robust internal regulatory process modelled on
be able to interpret and link facets of design together to ensure that international and national statutory legislation. He is currently a
a holistic solution is achieved. In fact it has been one of the major member of the Steering Committee of INSA and has been Chair
benefits for those navies that LR provides services, is this holistic of two of the Working Groups developing specific chapters of the
view of a ship and its operation. Naval Ship Code.