#10

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 118303 January 31, 1996
SENATOR HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, SENATOR JOSE D. LINA, JR., MR. NICASIO B. BAUTISTA, MR. JESUS
P. GONZAGA, MR. SOLOMON D. MAYLEM, LEONORA C. MEDINA, CASIANO S. ALIPON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. RAFAEL ALUNAN, in his
capacity as Secretary of Local Government, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of
Budget, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON. JOSE MIRANDA, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of Santiago
and HON. CHARITO MANUFAY, HON. VICTORINO MIRANDA, JR., HON. ARTEMIO ALVAREZ, HON. DANILO
VERGARA, HON. PETER DE JESUS, HON. NELIA NATIVIDAD, HON. CELSO CALEON and HON. ABEL
MUSNGI, in their capacity as SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBERS, MR. RODRIGO L. SANTOS, in his capacity
as Municipal Treasurer, and ATTY. ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, in his capacity as Municipal
Administrator, respondents.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Of main concern to the petitioners is whether Republic Act No. 7720, just recently passed by Congress and signed by
the President into law, is constitutionally infirm.
Indeed, in this Petition for Prohibition with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Prohibitory
Injunction, petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act No. 7720, entitled, “An Act Converting the Municipality of
Santiago, Isabela into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago,” mainly because the Act
allegedly did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as mandated by Section 24, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.
Also, petitioners claim that the Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum average annual income required
under Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in order to be converted into a component city.
Undisputed is the following chronicle of the metamorphosis of House Bill No. 8817 into Republic Act No. 7720:
On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled “An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent
Component City to be known as the City of Santiago,” was filed in the House of Representatives with Representative
Antonio Abaya as principal author. Other sponsors included Representatives Ciriaco Alfelor, Rodolfo Albano, Santiago
Respicio and Faustino Dy. The bill was referred to the House Committee on Local Government and the House
Committee on Appropriations on May 5, 1993.
On May 19, 1993, June 1, 1993, November 28, 1993, and December 1, 1993, public hearings on HB No. 8817 were
conducted by the House Committee on Local Government. The committee submitted to the House a favorable report,
with amendments, on December 9, 1993.
On December 13, 1993, HB No. 8817 was passed by the House of Representatives on Second Reading and was
approved on Third Reading on December 17, 1993. On January 28, 1994, HB No. 8817 was transmitted to the Senate.
Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243, entitled, “An Act Converting the Municipality of
Santiago into an Independent Component City to be Known as the City of Santiago,” was filed in the Senate. It was
introduced by Senator Vicente Sotto III, as principal sponsor, on May 19, 1993. This was just after the House of
Representatives had conducted its first public hearing on HB No. 8817.
On February 23, 1994, or a little less than a month after HB No. 8817 was transmitted to the Senate, the Senate
Committee on Local Government conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. On March 1, 1994, the said committee
submitted Committee Report No. 378 on HB No. 8817, with the recommendation that it be approved without
amendment, taking into consideration the reality that H.B. No. 8817 was on all fours with SB No. 1243. Senator
Heherson T. Alvarez, one of the herein petitioners, indicated his approval thereto by signing said report as member of
the Committee on Local Government.
On March 3, 1994, Committee Report No. 378 was passed by the Senate on Second Reading and was approved on
Third Reading on March 14, 1994. On March 22, 1994, the House of Representatives, upon being apprised of the
action of the Senate, approved the amendments proposed by the Senate.
The enrolled bill, submitted to the President on April 12, 1994, was signed by the Chief Executive on May 5, 1994 as
Republic Act No. 7720. When a plebiscite on the Act was held on July 13, 1994, a great majority of the registered voters
of Santiago voted in favor of the conversion of Santiago into a city.
The question as to the validity of Republic Act No. 7720 hinges on the following twin issues: (I) Whether or not the
Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) are to be included in the computation of the average annual income of a
municipality for purposes of its conversion into an independent component city, and (II) Whether or not, considering
that the Senate passed SB No. 1243, its own version of HB No. 8817, Republic Act No. 7720 can be said to have
originated in the House of Representatives.
I
The annual income of a local government unit includes the IRAs
Petitioners claim that Santiago could not qualify into a component city because its average annual income for the last
two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices falls below the required annual income of Twenty Million
Pesos (P20,000,000.00) for its conversion into a city, petitioners having computed Santiago’s average annual income
in the following manner:

Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for 1991 P 20,379,057.07

Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for 1992 P 21,570,106.87

Total income for 1991 and 1992 P 41,949,163.94

Minus:

IRAs for 1991 and 1992 P 15,730,043.00

Total income for 1991 and 1992 P 26,219,120.94

Average Annual Income P 13,109,560.47

===============

By dividing the total income of Santiago for calendar years 1991 and 1992, after deducting the IRAs, the average
annual income arrived at would only be P13,109,560.47 based on the 1991 constant prices. Thus, petitioners claim
that Santiago’s income is far below the aforesaid Twenty Million Pesos average annual income requirement.
The certification issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance, which indicates
Santiago’s average annual income to be P20,974,581.97, is allegedly not accurate as the Internal Revenue Allotments
were not excluded from the computation. Petitioners asseverate that the IRAs are not actually income but transfers
and/or budgetary aid from the national government and that they fluctuate, increase or decrease, depending on factors
like population, land and equal sharing.
In this regard, we hold that petitioners asseverations are untenable because Internal Revenue Allotments form part of
the income of Local Government Units.
It is true that for a municipality to be converted into a component city, it must, among others, have an average annual
income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices. 1 Such
income must be duly certified by the Department of Finance.
Resolution of the controversy regarding compliance by the Municipality of Santiago with the aforecited income
requirement hinges on a correlative and contextual explication of the meaning of internal revenue allotments (IRAs) vis-
a-vis the notion of income of a local government unit and the principles of local autonomy and decentralization
underlying the institutionalization and intensified empowerment of the local government system.
A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law and possessed of substantial
control over its own affairs.3 Remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, but not intended,
however, to be an imperium in imperio,4 the local government unit is autonomous in the sense that it is given more
powers, authority, responsibilities and resources.5 Power which used to be highly centralized in Manila, is thereby
deconcentrated, enabling especially the peripheral local government units to develop not only at their own pace and
discretion but also with their own resources and assets.
The practical side to development through a decentralized local government system certainly concerns the matter of
financial resources. With its broadened powers and increased responsibilities, a local government unit must now
operate on a much wider scale. More extensive operations, in turn, entail more expenses. Understandably, the vesting
of duty, responsibility and accountability in every local government unit is accompanied with a provision for reasonably
adequate resources to discharge its powers and effectively carry out its functions.7 Availment of such resources is
effectuated through the vesting in every local government unit of (1) the right to create and broaden its own source of
revenue; (2) the right to be allocated a just share in national taxes, such share being in the form of internal revenue
allotments (IRAs); and (3) the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of
the national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries.8
The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs and national wealth utilization proceeds accrue to the general fund of the
local government and are used to finance its operations subject to specified modes of spending the same as provided
for in the Local Government Code and its implementing rules and regulations. For instance, not less than twenty percent
(20%) of the IRAs must be set aside for local development projects. 9 As such, for purposes of budget preparation,
which budget should reflect the estimates of the income of the local government unit, among others, the IRAs and the
share in the national wealth utilization proceeds are considered items of income. This is as it should be, since income
is defined in the Local Government Code to be all revenues and receipts collected or received forming the gross
accretions of funds of the local government unit.10
The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit.
The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of the
local government unit.11 They thus constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source
of much needed funds.
For purposes of converting the Municipality of Santiago into a city, the Department of Finance certified, among others,
that the municipality had an average annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive
years based on 1991 constant prices. This, the Department of Finance did after including the IRAs in its computation
of said average annual income.
Furthermore, Section 450 (c) of the Local Government Code provides that “the average annual income shall include
the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.” To reiterate,
IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the same as a special fund or transfer,
since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code that unequivocally
makes it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of “funding support from the national
government, its instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled corporations”.12
Thus, Department of Finance Order No. 35-9313 correctly encapsulizes the full import of the above disquisition when it
defined ANNUAL INCOME to be “revenues and receipts realized by provinces, cities and municipalities from regular
sources of the Local General Fund including the internal revenue allotment and other shares provided for in Sections
284, 290 and 291 of the Code, but exclusive of non-recurring receipts, such as other national aids, grants, financial
assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fixed assets, and similar others” (Emphasis ours).14 Such order, constituting
executive or contemporaneous construction of a statute by an administrative agency charged with the task of
interpreting and applying the same, is entitled to full respect and should be accorded great weight by the courts, unless
such construction is clearly shown to be in sharp conflict with the Constitution, the governing statute, or other laws. 15
II
In the enactment of RA No. 7720, there was compliance with Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
Although a bill of local application like HB No. 8817 should, by constitutional prescription, 16 originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, the claim of petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not originate exclusively in the House
of Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable because
it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in
the Senate. Petitioners themselves cannot disavow their own admission that HB No. 8817 was filed on April 18, 1993
while SB No. 1243 was filed on May 19, 1993. The filing of HB No. 8817 was thus precursive not only of the said Act
in question but also of SB No. 1243. Thus, HB No. 8817, was the bill that initiated the legislative process that culminated
in the enactment of Republic Act No. 7720. No violation of Section 24, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution is perceptible
under the circumstances attending the instant controversy.
Furthermore, petitioners themselves acknowledge that HB No. 8817 was already approved on Third Reading and duly
transmitted to the Senate when the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted its public hearing on HB No.
8817. HB No. 8817 was approved on the Third Reading on December 17, 1993 and transmitted to the Senate on
January 28, 1994; a little less than a month thereafter, or on February 23, 1994, the Senate Committee on Local
Government conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. Clearly, the Senate held in abeyance any action on SB No.
1243 until it received HB No. 8817, already approved on the Third Reading, from the House of Representatives. The
filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene the
constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long
as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.
We have already addressed this issue in the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance.17 There, on the matter of the
Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law, which, as a revenue bill, is nonetheless constitutionally required to originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, we explained:
. . . To begin with, it is not the law — but the revenue bill — which is required by the Constitution to “originate exclusively”
in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo
such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. . . . as a result of the Senate
action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute — and not only the bill which initiated the
legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law — must substantially be the same as the House bill would
be to deny the Senate’s power not only to “concur with amendments” but also to “propose amendments.” It would be
to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the
Senate.
xxx xxx xxx
It is insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 was passed not in substitution of H. No. 11197 but of another Senate bill (S.
No. 1129) earlier filed and that what the Senate did was merely to “take [H. No. 11197] into consideration” in enacting
S. No. 1630. There is really no difference between the Senate preserving H. No. 11197 up to the enacting clause and
then writing its own version following the enacting clause (which, it would seem petitioners admit is an amendment by
substitution), and, on the other hand, separately presenting a bill of its own on the same subject matter. In either case
the result are two bills on the same subject.
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an
increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on
the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive
to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach
the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.
Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from
the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. . . .18
III
Every law, including RA No. 7720, has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality
It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that on the side of every law lies the presumption of
constitutionality.19Consequently, for RA No. 7720 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one; in other words, the grounds for nullity must be
clear and beyond reasonable doubt.20 Those who petition this court to declare a law to be unconstitutional must clearly
and fully establish the basis that will justify such a declaration; otherwise, their petition must fail. Taking into
consideration the justification of our stand on the immediately preceding ground raised by petitioners to challenge the
constitutionality of RA No. 7720, the Court stands on the holding that petitioners have failed to overcome the
presumption. The dismissal of this petition is, therefore, inevitable.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit with costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco
and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

#11

EN BANC
[ GR No. 159110, Dec 10, 2013 ]
VALENTINO L. LEGASPI v. CITY OF CEBU +
DECISION
G.R. No. 159110

BERSAMIN, J.:

The goal of the decentralization of powers to the local government units (LGUs) is to ensure the enjoyment by each of
the territorial and political subdivisions of the State of a genuine and meaningful local autonomy. To attain the goal, the
National Legislature has devolved the three great inherent powers of the State to the LGUs. Each political subdivision
is thereby vested with such powers subject to constitutional and statutory limitations.

In particular, the Local Government Code (LGC) has expressly empowered the LGUs to enact and adopt ordinances
to regulate vehicular traffic and to prohibit illegal parking within their jurisdictions. Now challenged before the Court are
the constitutionality and validity of one such ordinance on the ground that the ordinance constituted a contravention of
the guaranty of due process under the Constitution by authorizing the immobilization of offending vehicles through the
clamping of tires. The challenge originated in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at the instance of the petitioners vehicle
owners who had borne the brunt of the implementation of the ordinance with the RTC declaring the ordinance
unconstitutional, but it has now reached the Court as a consolidated appeal taken in due course by the petitioners after
the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the judgment of the RTC.

Antecedents

On January 27, 1997 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu enacted Ordinance No. 1664 to authorize the
traffic enforcers of Cebu City to immobilize any motor vehicle violating the parking restrictions and prohibitions defined
in Ordinance No. 801 (Traffic Code of Cebu City).[1] The pertinent provisions of Ordinance No. 1664 read:

Section 1. POLICY It is the policy of the government of the City of Cebu to immobilize any motor vehicle violating any
provision of any City Ordinance on Parking Prohibitions or Restrictions, more particularly Ordinance No. 801, otherwise
known as the Traffic Code of Cebu City, as amended, in order to have a smooth flow of vehicular traffic in all the streets
in the City of Cebu at all times.

Section 2. IMMOBILIZATION OF VEHICLES Any vehicle found violating any provision of any existing ordinance of the
City of Cebu which prohibits, regulates or restricts the parking of vehicles shall be immobilized by clamping any tire of
the said violating vehicle with the use of a denver boot vehicle immobilizer or any other special gadget designed to
immobilize motor vehicles. For this particular purpose, any traffic enforcer of the City (regular PNP Personnel or Cebu
City Traffic Law Enforcement Personnel) is hereby authorized to immobilize any violating vehicle as hereinabove
provided.

Section 3. PENALTIES Any motor vehicle, owner or driver violating any ordinance on parking prohibitions, regulations
and/or restrictions, as may be provided under Ordinance No. 801, as amended, or any other existing ordinance, shall
be penalized in accordance with the penalties imposed in the ordinance so violated, provided that the vehicle
immobilizer may not be removed or released without its owner or driver paying first to the City Treasurer of Cebu City
through the Traffic Violations Bureau (TVB) all the accumulated penalties for all prior traffic law violations that remain
unpaid or unsettled, plus the administrative penalty of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) for the immobilization of the said
vehicle, and receipts of such payments presented to the concerned personnel of the bureau responsible for the release
of the immobilized vehicle, unless otherwise ordered released by any of the following officers:

a) Chairman, CITOM
b) Chairman, Committee on Police, Fire and Penology
c) Asst. City Fiscal Felipe Belciña

3.1 Any person who tampers or tries to release an immobilized or clamped motor vehicle by destroying the denver boot
vehicle immobilizer or other such special gadgets, shall be liable for its loss or destruction and shall be prosecuted for
such loss or destruction under pain or penalty under the Revised Penal Code and any other existing ordinance of the
City of Cebu for the criminal act, in addition to his/her civil liabilities under the Civil Code of the Philippines; Provided
that any such act may not be compromised nor settled amicably extrajudicially.

3.2 Any immobilized vehicle which is unattended and constitute an obstruction to the free flow of traffic or a hazard
thereof shall be towed to the city government impounding area for safekeeping and may be released only after the
provision of Section 3 hereof shall have been fully complied with.

3.3 Any person who violates any provision of this ordinance shall, upon conviction, be penalized with imprisonment of
not less than one (1) month nor more than six (6) months or of a fine of not less than Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00)
nor more than Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), or both such imprisonment and fine at the discretion of the court.[2]

On July 29, 1997, Atty. Bienvenido Jaban (Jaban, Sr.) and his son Atty. Bienvenido Douglas Luke Bradbury Jaban
(Jaban, Jr.) brought suit in the RTC in Cebu City against the City of Cebu, then represented by Hon. Alvin Garcia, its
City Mayor, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City and its Presiding Officer, Hon. Renato V. Osmeña, and the
chairman and operatives or officers of the City Traffic Operations Management (CITOM), seeking the declaration of
Ordinance No. 1644 as unconstitutional for being in violation of due process and for being contrary to law, and
damages.[3] Their complaint alleged that on June 23, 1997, Jaban Sr. had properly parked his car in a paying parking
area on Manalili Street, Cebu City to get certain records and documents from his office;[4] that upon his return after less
than 10 minutes, he had found his car being immobilized by a steel clamp, and a notice being posted on the car to the
effect that it would be a criminal offense to break the clamp; [5] that he had been infuriated by the immobilization of his
car because he had been thereby rendered unable to meet an important client on that day; that his car was impounded
for three days, and was informed at the office of the CITOM that he had first to pay P4,200.00 as a fine to the City
Treasurer of Cebu City for the release of his car;[6] that the fine was imposed without any court hearing and without due
process of law, for he was not even told why his car had been immobilized; that he had undergone a similar incident of
clamping of his car on the early morning of November 20, 1997 while his car was parked properly in a parking lot in
front of the San Nicolas Pasil Market in Cebu City without violating any traffic regulation or causing any obstruction;
that he was compelled to pay P1,500.00 (itemized as P500.00 for the clamping and P1,000.00 for the violation) without
any court hearing and final judgment; that on May 19, 1997, Jaban, Jr. parked his car in a very secluded place where
there was no sign prohibiting parking; that his car was immobilized by CITOM operative Lito Gilbuena; and that he was
compelled to pay the total sum of P1,400.00 for the release of his car without a court hearing and a final judgment
rendered by a court of justice.[7]

On August 11, 1997, Valentino Legaspi (Legaspi) likewise sued in the RTC the City of Cebu, T.C. Sayson, Ricardo
Hapitan and John Does to demand the delivery of personal property, declaration of nullity of the Traffic Code of Cebu
City, and damages.[8] He averred that on the morning of July 29, 1997, he had left his car occupying a portion of the
sidewalk and the street outside the gate of his house to make way for the vehicle of the anay exterminator who had
asked to be allowed to unload his materials and equipment from the front of the residence inasmuch as his daughter's
car had been parked in the carport, with the assurance that the unloading would not take too long; [9] that while waiting
for the anay exterminator to finish unloading, the phone in his office inside the house had rung, impelling him to go into
the house to answer the call; that after a short while, his son-in-law informed him that unknown persons had clamped
the front wheel of his car;[10] that he rushed outside and found a traffic citation stating that his car had been clamped by
CITOM representatives with a warning that the unauthorized removal of the clamp would subject the remover to criminal
charges;[11] and that in the late afternoon a group headed by Ricardo Hapitan towed the car even if it was not obstructing
the flow of traffic.[12]

In separate answers for the City of Cebu and its co-defendants,[13] the City Attorney of Cebu presented similar defenses,
essentially stating that the traffic enforcers had only upheld the law by clamping the vehicles of the plaintiffs;[14] and that
Ordinance No. 1664 enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality and validity. [15]

The cases were consolidated before Branch 58 of the RTC, which, after trial, rendered on January 22, 1999 its decision
declaring Ordinance No. 1664 as null and void upon the following ratiocination:

In clear and simple phrase, the essence of due process was expressed by Daniel Webster as a "law which hears before
it condemns". In another case[s], "procedural due process is that which hears before it condemns, which proceeds
upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It contemplate(s) notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment
is rendered affecting ones (sic) person or property." In both procedural and substantive due process, a hearing is
always a pre-requisite, hence, the taking or deprivation of one's life, liberty or property must be done upon and with
observance of the "due process" clause of the Constitution and the non-observance or violation thereof is, perforce,
unconstitutional.

Under Ordinance No. 1664, when a vehicle is parked in a prohibited, restrycted (sic) or regulated area in the street or
along the street, the vehicle is immobilized by clamping any tire of said vehicle with the use of a denver boot vehicle
immobilizer or any other special gadget which immobilized the motor vehicle. The violating vehicle is immobilized, thus,
depriving its owner of the use thereof at the sole determination of any traffic enforcer or regular PNP personnel or Cebu
City Traffic Law Enforcement Personnel. The vehicle immobilizer cannot be removed or released without the owner or
driver paying first to the City Treasurer of Cebu through the Traffic Violations Bureau all the accumulated penalties of
all unpaid or unsettled traffic law violations, plus the administrative penalty of P500.00 and, further, the immobilized
vehicle shall be released only upon presentation of the receipt of said payments and upon release order by the
Chairman, CITOM, or Chairman, Committee on Police, Fire and Penology, or Asst. City Fiscal Felipe Belcina. It should
be stressed that the owner of the immobilized vehicle shall have to undergo all these ordeals at the mercy of the Traffic
Law Enforcer who, as the Ordinance in question mandates, is the arresting officer, prosecutor, Judge and collector.
Otherwise stated, the owner of the immobilized motor vehicle is deprived of his right to the use of his/her vehicle and
penalized without a hearing by a person who is not legally or duly vested with such rights, power or authority. The
Ordinance in question is penal in nature, and it has been held;
x x x x

WHEREFORE, premised (sic) considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 1664 unconstitutional
and directing the defendant City of Cebu to pay the plaintiff Valentino Legaspi the sum of P110,000.00 representing
the value of his car, and to all the plaintiffs, Valentino L. Legaspi, Bienvenido P. Jaban and Bienvenido Douglas Luke
Bradbury Jaban, the sum of P100,000.00 each or P300,000.00 all as nominal damages and another P100,000.00 each
or P300,000.00 all as temperate or moderate damages. With costs against defendant City of Cebu.

SO ORDERED.[16] (citations omitted)

The City of Cebu and its co-defendants appealed to the CA, assigning the following errors to the RTC, namely: (a) the
RTC erred in declaring that Ordinance No. 1664 was unconstitutional; (b) granting, arguendo, that Ordinance No. 1664
was unconstitutional, the RTC gravely erred in holding that any violation prior to its declaration as being unconstitutional
was irrelevant; (c) granting, arguendo, that Ordinance No. 1664 was unconstitutional, the RTC gravely erred in
awarding damages to the plaintiffs; (d) granting, arguendo, that the plaintiffs were entitled to damages, the damages
awarded were excessive and contrary to law; and (e) the decision of the RTC was void, because the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) had not been notified of the proceedings.

On June 16, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed decision,[17] overturning the RTC and declaring Ordinance No. 1664
valid, to wit:

The principal thrust of this appeal is the constitutionality of Ordinance 1664. Defendants-appellants contend that the
passage of Ordinance 1664 is in accordance with the police powers exercised by the City of Cebu through the
Sangguniang Panlungsod and granted by RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code. A thematic
analysis of the law on municipal corporations confirms this view. As in previous legislation, the Local Government Code
delegates police powers to the local governments in two ways. Firstly, it enumerates the subjects on which the
Sangguniang Panlungsod may exercise these powers. Thus, with respect to the use of public streets, Section 458 of
the Code states:

Section 458 (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative branch of the city, x x x shall x x x

(5) (v) Regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, park and other public places and approve the
construction, improvement, repair and maintenance of the same; establish bus and vehicle stops and terminals or
regulate the use of the same by privately owned vehicles which serve the public; regulate garages and the operation
of conveyances for hire; designate stands to be occupied by public vehicles when not in use; regulate the putting up of
signs, signposts, awnings and awning posts on the streets; and provide for the lighting, cleaning and sprinkling of
streets and public places;

(vi) Regulate traffic on all streets and bridges; prohibit encroachments or obstacles thereon and, when necessary in the
interest of public welfare, authorize the removal of encroachments and illegal constructions in public places.

It then makes a general grant of the police power. The scope of the legislative authority of the local government is set
out in Section 16, to wit:

Section 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare.

This provision contains what is traditionally known as the general welfare clause. As expounded in United States vs.
Salaveria, 39 Phil 102, the general welfare clause has two branches. One branch attaches itself to the main trunk of
municipal authority, and relates to such ordinances and regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law. The second branch of the clause is much
more independent of the specific functions of the council, and authorizes such ordinances as shall seem necessary
and proper to provide for health, safety, prosperity and convenience of the municipality and its inhabitants.

In a vital and critical way, the general welfare clause complements the more specific powers granted a local
government. It serves as a catch-all provision that ensures that the local government will be equipped to meet any local
contingency that bears upon the welfare of its constituents but has not been actually anticipated. So varied and protean
are the activities that affect the legitimate interests of the local inhabitants that it is well-nigh impossible to say
beforehand what may or may not be done specifically through law. To ensure that a local government can react
positively to the people's needs and expectations, the general welfare clause has been devised and interpreted to allow
the local legislative council to enact such measures as the occasion requires.

Founded on clear authority and tradition, Ordinance 1664 may be deemed a legitimate exercise of the police powers
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu. This local law authorizes traffic enforcers to immobilize and tow
for safekeeping vehicles on the streets that are illegally parked and to release them upon payment of the announced
penalties. As explained in the preamble, it has become necessary to resort to these measures because of the traffic
congestion caused by illegal parking and the inability of existing penalties to curb it. The ordinance is designed to
improve traffic conditions in the City of Cebu and thus shows a real and substantial relation to the welfare, comfort and
convenience of the people of Cebu. The only restrictions to an ordinance passed under the general welfare clause, as
declared inSalaveria, is that the regulation must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of
the corporation, consistent with national laws and policies, and not unreasonable or discriminatory. The measure in
question undoubtedly comes within these parameters.

Upon the denial of their respective motions for reconsideration on August 4, 2003, the Jabans and Legaspi came to
the Court via separate petitions for review on certiorari. The appeals were consolidated.
Issues

Based on the submissions of the parties, the following issues are decisive of the challenge, to wit:

1. Whether Ordinance No. 1664 was enacted within the ambit of the legislative powers of the City of Cebu; and

2. Whether Ordinance No. 1664 complied with the requirements for validity and constitutionality, particularly the
limitations set by the Constitution and the relevant statutes.

Ruling

The petitions for review have no merit.

A.

Tests for a valid ordinance

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,[18] the Court restates the tests of a valid ordinance thusly:

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid,
it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to
the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.[19]

As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance was enacted within the
corporate powers of the LGU, and whether it was passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law), and the
substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution
and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy).

B.

Compliance of Ordinance No. 1664 with the formal requirements

Was the enactment of Ordinance No. 1664 within the corporate powers of the LGU of the City of Cebu?

The answer is in the affirmative. Indeed, with no issues being hereby raised against the formalities attendant to the
enactment of Ordinance No. 1664, we presume its full compliance with the test in that regard. Congress enacted the
LGC as the implementing law for the delegation to the various LGUs of the State's great powers, namely: the police
power, the power of eminent domain, and the power of taxation. The LGC was fashioned to delineate the specific
parameters and limitations to be complied with by each LGU in the exercise of these delegated powers with the view
of making each LGU a fully functioning subdivision of the State subject to the constitutional and statutory limitations.

In particular, police power is regarded as "the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as
it does 'to all the great public needs.'"[20] It is unquestionably "the power vested in the legislature by the constitution, to
make, ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with
penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subject of the same."[21] According to Cooley: "[The police power] embraces the whole
system of internal regulation by which the state seeks not only to preserve the public order and to prevent offences
against itself, but also to establish for the intercourse of citizens with citizens, those rules of good manners and good
neighborhood which are calculated to prevent the conflict of rights and to insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment
of his own, so far as it is reasonably consistent with the right enjoyment of rights by others."[22]

In point is the exercise by the LGU of the City of Cebu of delegated police power. In Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.,[23] the Court cogently observed:

It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group
or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power
to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local
government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on
them by the national lawmaking body. (emphasis supplied)

The CA opined, and correctly so, that vesting cities like the City of Cebu with the legislative power to enact traffic rules
and regulations was expressly done through Section 458 of the LGC, and also generally by virtue of the General
Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16 of the LGC.[24]

Section 458 of the LGC relevantly states:

Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Composition. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of
the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided
for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

x x x x

(5) Approve ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of the basic services and
facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to said services and facilities, shall:

x x x x

(v) Regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, parks and other public places and approve
the construction, improvement repair and maintenance of the same; establish bus and vehicle stops and
terminals or regulate the use of the same by privately-owned vehicles which serve the public; regulate garages
and operation of conveyances for hire; designate stands to be occupied by public vehicles when not in use;
regulate the putting up of signs, signposts, awnings and awning posts on the streets; and provide for the
lighting, cleaning and sprinkling of streets and public places;

(vi) Regulate traffic on all streets and bridges; prohibit encroachments or obstacles thereon and, when
necessary in the interest of public welfare, authorize the removal of encroachments and illegal constructions
in public places; (emphasis supplied)

The foregoing delegation reflected the desire of Congress to leave to the cities themselves the task of confronting the
problem of traffic congestions associated with development and progress because they were directly familiar with the
situations in their respective jurisdictions. Indeed, the LGUs would be in the best position to craft their traffic codes
because of their familiarity with the conditions peculiar to their communities. With the broad latitude in this regard
allowed to the LGUs of the cities, their traffic regulations must be held valid and effective unless they infringed the
constitutional limitations and statutory safeguards.

C.

Compliance of Ordinance No. 1664with the substantive requirements

The first substantive requirement for a valid ordinance is the adherence to the constitutional guaranty of due process
of law. The guaranty is embedded in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, which ordains:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.

The guaranty of due process of law is a constitutional safeguard against any arbitrariness on the part of the
Government, whether committed by the Legislature, the Executive, or the Judiciary. It is a protection essential to every
inhabitant of the country, for, as a commentator on Constitutional Law has vividly written: [25]

x x x. If the law itself unreasonably deprives a person of his life, liberty, or property, he is denied the protection of due
process. If the enjoyment of his rights is conditioned on an unreasonable requirement, due process is likewise violated.
Whatsoever be the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or merely a statute, its unjustified withholding would
also be a violation of due process. Any government act that militates against the ordinary norms of justice or fair play
is considered an infraction of the great guaranty of due process; and this is true whether the denial involves violation
merely of the procedure prescribed by the law or affects the very validity of the law itself.

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,[26] the Court expounded on the aspects of the guaranty of due process of law as a
limitation on the acts of government, viz:

This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on government, usually called "procedural due
process" and "substantive due process."

Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it
deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Classic procedural due process issues are concerned with that kind of
notice and what form of hearing the government must provide when it takes a particular action.

Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the government has an adequate reason for taking
away a person's life, liberty, or property. In other words, substantive due process looks to whether there is sufficient
justification for the government's action. Case law in the United States (U.S.) tells us that whether there is such a
justification depends very much on the level of scrutiny used. For example, if a law is in an area where only rational
basis review is applied, substantive due process is met so long as the law is rationally related to a legitimate government
purpose. But if it is an area where strict scrutiny is used, such as for protecting fundamental rights, then the government
will meet substantive due process only if it can prove that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government
purpose.

The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of
the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or
despotically as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard
due to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it
bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of
public interest or public welfare. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the
person to his life, liberty and property.[27]
The Jabans contend that Ordinance No. 1664, by leaving the confiscation and immobilization of the motor vehicles to
the traffic enforcers or the regular personnel of the Philippine National Police (PNP) instead of to officials exercising
judicial authority, was violative of the constitutional guaranty of due process; that such confiscation and immobilization
should only be after a hearing on the merits by courts of law; and that the immobilization and the clamping of the cars
and motor vehicles by the police or traffic enforcers could be subject to abuse.

On his part, Legaspi likewise contends that Ordinance No. 1664 violated the constitutional guaranty of due process for
being arbitrary and oppressive; and that its provisions conferring upon the traffic enforcers the absolute discretion to
be the enforcers, prosecutors, judges and collectors all at the same time were vague and ambiguous. [28] He reminds
that the grant of police powers for the general welfare under the LGC was not unlimited but subject to constitutional
limitations;[29] and that these consolidated cases should not be resolved differently from the resolution of a third case
assailing the validity of Ordinance No. 1664 (Astillero case), in which the decision of the same RTC declaring Ordinance
No. 1664 as unconstitutional had attained finality following the denial of due course to the appeal of the City of Cebu
and its co-defendants.

Judged according to the foregoing enunciation of the guaranty of due process of law, the contentions of the petitioners
cannot be sustained. Even under strict scrutiny review, Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and
constitutionality by its conformity with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the
requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy.

To us, the terms encroachment and obstacles used in Section 458 of the LGC, supra, were broad enough to include
illegally parked vehicles or whatever else obstructed the streets, alleys and sidewalks, which were precisely the subject
of Ordinance No. 1664 in avowedly aiming to ensure "a smooth flow of vehicular traffic in all the streets in the City of
Cebu at all times" (Section 1). This aim was borne out by its Whereas Clauses, viz:

WHEREAS, the City of Cebu enacted the Traffic Code (Ordinance No. 801) as amended, provided for Parking
Restrictions and Parking Prohibitions in the streets of Cebu City;

WHEREAS, despite the restrictions and prohibitions of parking on certain streets of Cebu City, violations
continued unabated due, among others, to the very low penalties imposed under the Traffic Code of Cebu City;

WHEREAS, City Ordinance 1642 was enacted in order to address the traffic congestions caused by illegal
parkings in the streets of Cebu City;

WHEREAS, there is a need to amend City Ordinance No.1642 in order to fully address and solve the problem
of illegal parking and other violations of the Traffic Code of Cebu City; [30] (emphasis supplied)

Considering that traffic congestions were already retarding the growth and progress in the population and economic
centers of the country, the plain objective of Ordinance No. 1664 was to serve the public interest and advance the
general welfare in the City of Cebu. Its adoption was, therefore, in order to fulfill the compelling government purpose of
immediately addressing the burgeoning traffic congestions caused by illegally parked vehicles obstructing the streets
of the City of Cebu.

Legaspi's attack against the provisions of Ordinance No. 1664 for being vague and ambiguous cannot stand scrutiny.
As can be readily seen, its text was forthright and unambiguous in all respects. There could be no confusion on the
meaning and coverage of the ordinance. But should there be any vagueness and ambiguity in the provisions, which
the OSG does not concede,[31] there was nothing that a proper application of the basic rules of statutory construction
could not justly rectify.

The petitioners further assert that drivers or vehicle owners affected by Ordinance No. 1664 like themselves were not
accorded the opportunity to protest the clamping, towing, and impounding of the vehicles, or even to be heard and to
explain their side prior to the immobilization of their vehicles; and that the ordinance was oppressive and arbitrary for
that reason.

The adverse assertions against Ordinance No. 1664 are unwarranted.

Firstly, Ordinance No. 1664 was far from oppressive and arbitrary. Any driver or vehicle owner whose vehicle was
immobilized by clamping could protest such action of a traffic enforcer or PNP personnel enforcing the ordinance.
Section 3 of Ordinance No. 1664, supra, textually afforded an administrative escape in the form of permitting the release
of the immobilized vehicle upon a protest directly made to the Chairman of CITOM; or to the Chairman of the Committee
on Police, Fire and Penology of the City of Cebu; or to Asst. City Prosecutor Felipe Belciña officials named in the
ordinance itself. The release could be ordered by any of such officials even without the payment of the stipulated fine.
That none of the petitioners, albeit lawyers all, resorted to such recourse did not diminish the fairness and
reasonableness of the escape clause written in the ordinance. Secondly, the immobilization of a vehicle by clamping
pursuant to the ordinance was not necessary if the driver or vehicle owner was around at the time of the apprehension
for illegal parking or obstruction. In that situation, the enforcer would simply either require the driver to move the vehicle
or issue a traffic citation should the latter persist in his violation. The clamping would happen only to prevent the
transgressor from using the vehicle itself to escape the due sanctions. And, lastly, the towing away of the immobilized
vehicle was not equivalent to a summary impounding, but designed to prevent the immobilized vehicle from obstructing
traffic in the vicinity of the apprehension and thereby ensure the smooth flow of traffic. The owner of the towed vehicle
would not be deprived of his property.

In fine, the circumstances set forth herein indicate that Ordinance No. 1664 complied with the elements of fairness and
reasonableness.

Did Ordinance No. 1664 meet the requirements of procedural due process?
Notice and hearing are the essential requirements of procedural due process. Yet, there are many instances under our
laws in which the absence of one or both of such requirements is not necessarily a denial or deprivation of due process.
Among the instances are the cancellation of the passport of a person being sought for the commission of a crime, the
preventive suspension of a civil servant facing administrative charges, the distraint of properties to answer for tax
delinquencies, the padlocking of restaurants found to be unsanitary or of theaters showing obscene movies, and the
abatement of nuisance per se.[32] Add to them the arrest of a person in flagrante delicto.[33]

The clamping of the petitioners' vehicles pursuant to Ordinance No. 1664 (and of the vehicles of others similarly
situated) was of the same character as the aforecited established exceptions dispensing with notice and hearing. As
already said, the immobilization of illegally parked vehicles by clamping the tires was necessary because the
transgressors were not around at the time of apprehension. Under such circumstance, notice and hearing would be
superfluous. Nor should the lack of a trial-type hearing prior to the clamping constitute a breach of procedural due
process, for giving the transgressors the chance to reverse the apprehensions through a timely protest could equally
satisfy the need for a hearing. In other words, the prior intervention of a court of law was not indispensable to ensure a
compliance with the guaranty of due process.

To reiterate, the clamping of the illegally parked vehicles was a fair and reasonable way to enforce the ordinance
against its transgressors; otherwise, the transgressors would evade liability by simply driving away.

Finally, Legaspi's position, that the final decision of the RTC rendered in the Astillero case declaring Ordinance No.
1664 unconstitutional bound the City of Cebu, thereby precluding these consolidated appeals from being decided
differently, is utterly untenable. For one, Legaspi undeservedly extends too much importance to an irrelevant decision
of the RTC irrelevant, because the connection between that case to these cases was not at all shown. For another, he
ignores that it should be the RTC that had improperly acted for so deciding the Astillero case despite the appeals in
these cases being already pending in the CA. Being the same court in the three cases, the RTC should have anticipated
that in the regular course of proceedings, the outcome of the appeal in these cases then pending before the CA would
ultimately be elevated to and determined by no less than the Court itself. Such anticipation should have made it refrain
from declaring Ordinance No. 1664 unconstitutional, for a lower court like itself, appreciating its position in the
"interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation," should have exercised a "becoming modesty"
on the issue of the constitutionality of the same ordinance that the Constitution required the majority vote of the
Members of the Court sitting en banc to determine.[34] Such "becoming modesty" also forewarned that any declaration
of unconstitutionality by an inferior court was binding only on the parties, but that a declaration of unconstitutionality by
the Court would be a precedent binding on all.[35]

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitions for review on certiorari for their lack of merit; AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on June 16, 2003 by the Court of Appeals; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez,
Mendoza, Reyes, and Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

#12

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-32096 October 24, 1970

ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner, petitioner,

vs.
HON. VICENTE G. ERICTA in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Br. XVIII, Quezon
City, and TEDDY C. GALO respondents.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor General Hector C. Fule and Solicitor Vicente
A. Torres for petitioner.

Teddy C. Galo in his own behalf.

Judge Vicente Ericta in his own behalf.

FERNANDO, J.:.

Petitioner Romeo F. Edu, the Land Transportation Commissioner, would have us rule squarely on the constitutionality
of the Reflector Law1 in this proceeding for certiorari and prohibition against respondent Judge, the Honorable Vicente
G. Ericta of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, to annul and set aside his order for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction directed against Administrative Order No. 2 of petitioner for the enforcement of the
aforesaid statute, in a pending suit in his court for certiorari and prohibition, filed by the other respondent Teddy C. Galo
assailing; the validity of such enactment as well as such administrative order. Respondent Judge, in his answer, would
join such a plea asking that the constitutional and legal questions raised be decided "once and for all." Respondent
Teddy C. Galo who was quite categorical in his assertion that both the challenged legislation and the administrative
order transgress the constitutional requirements of due process and non-delegation, is not averse either to such a
definitive ruling. Considering the great public interest involved and the reliance by respondent Galo and the allegation
that the repugnancy to the fundamental law could be discerned on the face of the statute as enacted and the executive
order as promulgated, this Court, sees no obstacle to the determination in this proceeding of the constitutional questions
raised. For reasons to be hereafter stated, we sustain the validity of the Reflector Law and Administrative Order No. 2
issued in the implementation thereof, the imputation of constitutional infirmity being at best flimsy and insubstantial.

As noted in the answer of respondent Judge, respondent Galo on his behalf and that of other motorist filed on May 20,
1970 a suit for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction assailing the validity of the challenged Act as an
invalid exercise of the police power, for being violative of the due process clause. This he followed on May 28, 1970
with a manifestation wherein he sought as an alternative remedy that, in the event that respondent Judge would hold
said statute constitutional, Administrative Order No. 2 of the Land Transportation Commissioner, now petitioner,
implementing such legislation be nullified as an undue exercise of legislative power. There was a hearing on the plea
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction held on May 27. 1970 where both parties were duly represented, but
no evidence was presented. The next day, on May 28, 1970, respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a preliminary
injunction directed against the enforcement of such administrative order. There was the day after, a motion for its
reconsideration filed by the Solicitor General representing petitioner. In the meanwhile, the clerk of court of respondent
Judge issued, on June 1, 1970 the writ of preliminary injunction upon the filing of the required bond. The answer before
the lower court was filed by petitioner Edu on June 4, 1970. Thereafter, on June 9, 1970, respondent Judge denied the
motion for reconsideration of the order of injunction. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition filed with this court
on June 18, 1970.

In a resolution of June 22, 1970, this Court required respondents to file an answer to the petition for certiorari and
prohibition. Respondent Judge, the Honorable Vicente G. Ericta, did file his answer on June 30, 1970 explaining why
he restrained the enforcement of Administrative Order No. 2 and, as noted at the outset, joining the Solicitor General
in seeking that the legal questions raised namely the constitutionality of the Reflector Law and secondly the validity of
Administrative Order No. 2 alleged to be in excess of the authority conferred on petitioner and therefore violative of the
principle of non-delegation of legislative power be definitely decided. It was on until July 6, 1970 that respondent Galo
filed his answer seeking the dismissal of this petition concentrating on what he considered to be the patent invalidity of
Administrative Order No. 2 as it went beyond the authority granted by the Reflector Law, even assuming that it is
constitutional. In the meanwhile, on July 2, 1970, the petition was called for hearing with Solicitor Vicente Torres
appearing for petitioner and respondent Galo for himself. It was made clear during the course of such argumentation
that the matter of the constitutionality of the Reflector Law was likewise under consideration by this Court. The case is
thus ripe for decision.

We repeat that we find for petitioner and sustain the Constitutionality of the Reflector Law as well as the validity of
Administrative Order No. 2.

1. The threshold question is whether on the basis of the petition, the answers, and the oral argument, it would be proper
for this Court to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of the Reflector Law. Our answer, as indicated, is in the
affirmative. It is to be noted that the main thrust of the petition before us is to demonstrate in a rather convincing fashion
that the challenged legislation does not suffer from the alleged constitutional infirmity imputed to it by the respondent
Galo. Since the special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed before him before respondent Judge would seek a
declaration of nullity of such enactment by the attribution of the violation the face thereof of the due process guarantee
in the deprivation of property rights, it would follow that there is sufficient basis for us to determine which view should
prevail. Moreover, any further hearing by respondent Judge would likewise to limited to a discussion of the constitutional
issues raised, no allegations of facts having made. This is one case then where the question of validity is ripe for
determination. If we do so, further effort need not be wasted and time is saved moreover, the officials concerned as
well as the public, both vitally concerned with a final resolution of questions of validity, could know the definitive answer
and could act accordingly. There is a great public interest, as was mentioned, to be served by the final disposition of
such crucial issue, petitioner praying that respondent Galo be declared having no cause of action with respondent
Judge being accordingly directed to dismiss his suit.

There is another reinforcement to this avenue of approach. We have done so before in a suit, Climaco v.
Macadaeg,2 involving the legality of a presidential directive. That was a petition for the review and reversal of a writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the then Judge Macadaeg. We there announced that we "have decided to pass upon
the question of the validity of the presidential directive ourselves, believing that by doing so we would be putting an end
to a dispute, a delay in the disposition of which has caused considerable damage and injury to the Government and to
the tobacco planters themselves."

There is no principle of constitutional adjudication that bars this Court from similarly passing upon the question of the
validity of a legislative enactment in a proceeding before it to test the propriety of the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
The same felt need for resolving once and for all the vexing question as to the constitutionality of a challenged
enactment and thus serve public interest exists. What we have done in the case of an order proceeding from one of
the coordinate branches, the executive, we can very well do in the matter before us involving the alleged nullity of a
legislative act. Accordingly, there is nothing to preclude the grant of the writs prayed for, the burden of showing the
constitutionality of the act having proved to be as will now be shown too much for respondent Galo.

2. The Reflector Law reads in full: "(g) Lights and reflector when parked or disabled. — Appropriate parking lights or
flares visible one hundred meters away shall be displayed at a corner of the vehicle whenever such vehicle is parked
on highways or in places that are not well-lighted or is placed in such manner as to endanger passing traffic.
Furthermore, every motor vehicle shall be provided at all times with built-in reflectors or other similar warning devices
either pasted, painted or attached to its front and back which shall likewise be visible at light at least one hundred
meters away. No vehicle not provided with any of the requirements mentioned in this subsection shall be registered."3 It
is thus obvious that the challenged statute is a legislation enacted under the police power to promote public safety.

Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came to force, Calalang v. Williams,4 identified police
power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote
the general welfare. Persons and property could thus "be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state." Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v.
Fugoso,5 reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as "the power to prescribe regulations to promote
the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people." The concept was set
forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as "that inherent and plenary power in the
State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society." 6 In that sense it could
be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc7 with the totality of legislative power.

It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It is to quote Justice Malcolm anew
"the most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable of powers," 8 extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out "to all
the great public needs." 9 Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future
where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances
thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: "Needs that were narrow or parochial in the
past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the
time." 10 The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the
conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional
rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment
of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.

It would then be to overturn a host of decisions impressive for their number and unanimity were this Court to sustain
respondent Galo. 11 That we are not disposed to do, especially so as the attack on the challenged statute ostensibly
for disregarding the due process safeguard is angularly unpersuasive. It would be to close one's eyes to the hazards
of traffic in the evening to condemn a statute of this character. Such an attitude betrays lack of concern for public safety.
How can it plausibly alleged then that there was no observance of due process equated as it has always been with that
is reasonable? The statute assailed is not infected with arbitrariness. It is not the product of whim or caprice. It is far
from oppressive. It is a legitimate response to a felt public need. It can stand the test of the most unsymphatetic
appraisal.

Respondent Galo is of a different mind, having been unable to resist the teaching of many American State Court
decisions referred to in the secondary source, American Jurisprudence principally relied upon by him. He ought to have
been cautioned against an indiscriminate acceptance of such doctrines predicated on what was once a fundamental
postulate in American public law, laissez faire.

It is to be admitted that there was a period when such a concept did influence American court decisions on constitutional
law. As was explicitly stated by Justice Cardozo speaking of that era: "Laissez-faire was not only a counsel of caution
which would do well to heed. It was a categorical imperative which statesmen as well as judges must obey." 12 For a
long time legislation tending to reduce economic inequality foundered on the rock that was the due process clause,
enshrining as it did the liberty of contract, based on such a basic assumption.

The New Deal administration of President Roosevelt more responsive to the social and economic forces at work
changed matters greatly. By 1937, there was a greater receptivity by the American Supreme Court to an approach not
too reverential of property rights. Even earlier, in 1935, Professor Coker of Yale, speaking as a historian, could already
discern a contrary drift. He did note the expending range of governmental activity in the United States. 13What is
undeniable is that by 1943, laissez-faire was no longer the dominant theory. In the language of Justice Jackson in the
leading case of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette: 14 "We must, transplant these rights to a soil in
which the laissez-faire concept or non-interference has withered at least as to economic affairs, and social
advancements are increasingly sought through closer integration of society and through expanded and strengthened
governmental controls."

While authoritative precedents from the United States federal and state jurisdictions were deferred to when the
Philippines was still under American rule, it cannot be said that the laissez-faire principle was invariably adhered to by
us even then As early as 1919, in the leading case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 15 Justice Malcolm already
had occasion to affirm: "The doctrines of laissez-faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of
economic and political theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown a widespread belief in the amplest possible
demonstration of government activity. The Courts unfortunately have sometimes seemed to trail after the other two
branches of the Government in this progressive march." People v. Pomar, 16 a 1924 decision which held invalid under
the due process clause a provision providing for maternity leave with pay thirty days before and thirty days after
confinement could be cited to show that such a principle did have its day. It is to be remembered though that our
Supreme Court had no other choice as the Philippines was then under the United States, and only recently the year
before, the American Supreme Court in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 17 in line with the laissez-faire theory, did hold
that a statute providing for minimum wages was constitutionally infirm.

What is more, to erase any doubts, the Constitutional Convention saw to it that the concept of laissez-faire was rejected.
It entrusted to our government the responsibility of coping with social and economic problems with the commensurate
power of control over economic affairs. Thereby it could live up to its commitment to promote the general welfare
through state action. No constitutional objection to regulatory measures adversely affecting property rights, especially
so when public safety is the aim, is likely to be heeded, unless of course on the clearest and most satisfactory proof of
invasion of rights guaranteed by the Constitution. On such a showing, there may be a declaration of nullity, but not
because the laissez-faire principle was disregarded but because the due process, equal protection, or non-impairment
guarantees would call for vindication.

To repeat, our Constitution which took effect in 1935 erased whatever doubts there might be on that score. Its
philosophy is a repudiation of laissez-faire. One of the leading members of the Constitutional Convention, Manuel A.
Roxas, later the first President of the Republic, made it clear when he disposed of the objection of Delegate Jose Reyes
of Sorsogon, who noted the "vast extensions in the sphere of governmental functions" and the "almost unlimited power
to interfere in the affairs of industry and agriculture as well as to compete with existing business" as "reflections of the
fascination exerted by [the then] current tendencies" in other jurisdictions. 18 He spoke thus: "My answer is that this
constitution has definite and well defined philosophy not only political but social and economic. ... If in this Constitution
the gentlemen will find declarations of economic policy they are there because they are necessary to safeguard the
interests and welfare of the Filipino people because we believe that the days have come when in self-defense, a nation
may provide in its constitution those safeguards, the patrimony, the freedom to grow, the freedom to develop national
aspirations and national interests, not to be hampered by the artificial boundaries which a constitutional provision
automatically imposes. 19

It was not expected then when in a concurring opinion, Justice Laurel, who likewise sat in the Constitutional Convention
and was one of its leading lights, explicitly affirmed in a concurring opinion, later quoted with approval in the leading
case of Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 20 that the Constitution did away with
the laissez-faire doctrine. In the course of such concurring opinion and after noting the changes that have taken place
calling for a more affirmative role by the government and its undeniable power to curtail property rights, he categorically
declared the doctrine in People v. Pomar no longer retains "its virtuality as a living principle." 21

It is in the light of such rejection of the laissez-faire principle that during the Commonwealth era, no constitutional
infirmity was found to have attached to legislation covering such subjects as collective bargaining, 22 security of
tenure, 23minimum wages, 24 compulsory arbitration, 25 the regulation of tenancy 26 as well as the issuance of
securities, 27 and control of public services. 28 So it is likewise under the Republic this Court having given the seal of
approval to more favorable tenancy laws, 29nationalization of the retail trade, 30 limitation of the hours of
labor, 31 imposition of price control, 32 requirement of separation pay for one month, 33 and social security scheme. 34

Respondent Galo thus could have profited by a little more diligence in the scrutiny of Philippine decisions rendered with
not unexpected regularity, during all the while our Constitution has been in force attesting to the demise of such a
shibboleth as laissez-faire. It was one of those fighting faiths that time and circumstances had upset, to paraphrase
Holmes. Yet respondent Galo would seek to vivify and resurrect it. That, it would appear, is a vain quest, a futile
undertaking. The Reflector Law is thus immune from the attack so recklessly hurled against it. It can survive, and quite
easily too, the constitutional test.

3. The same lack of success marks the effort of respondent Galo to impugn the validity of Administrative Order No. 2
issued by petitioner in his official capacity, duly approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, for
being contrary to the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. Such administrative order, which took effect on
April 17, 1970, has a provision on reflectors in effect reproducing what was set forth in the Act. Thus: "No motor vehicles
of whatever style, kind, make, class or denomination shall be registered if not equipped with reflectors. Such reflectors
shall either be factory built-in-reflector commercial glass reflectors, reflection tape or luminous paint. The luminosity
shall have an intensity to be maintained visible and clean at all times such that if struck by a beam of light shall be
visible 100 meters away at night." 35 Then came a section on dimensions, placement and color. As to dimensions the
following is provided for: "Glass reflectors — Not less than 3 inches in diameter or not less than 3 inches square;
Reflectorized Tape — At least 3 inches wide and 12 inches long. The painted or taped area may be bigger at the
discretion of the vehicle owner." 36 Provision is then made as to how such reflectors are to be "placed, installed, pasted
or painted." 37 There is the further requirement that in addition to such reflectors there shall be installed, pasted or
painted four reflectors on each side of the motor vehicle parallel to those installed, pasted or painted in front and those
in the rear end of the body thereof. 38 The color required of each reflectors, whether built-in, commercial glass,
reflectorized tape or reflectorized paint placed in the front part of any motor vehicle shall be amber or yellow and those
placed on the sides and in the rear shall all be red. 39

Penalties resulting from a violation thereof could be imposed. Thus: "Non-compliance with the requirements contained
in this Order shall be sufficient cause to refuse registration of the motor vehicle affected and if already registered, its
registration maybe suspended in pursuance of the provisions of Section 16 of RA 4136; [Provided], However, that in
the case of the violation of Section 1(a) and (b) and paragraph (8) Section 3 hereof, a fine of not less than ten nor more
than fifty pesos shall be imposed. 40 It is not to be lost sight of that under Republic Act No. 4136, of which the Reflector
Law is an amendment, petitioner, as the Land Transportation Commissioner, may, with the approval of the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications, issue rules and regulations for its implementation as long as they do not conflict
with its provisions. 41 It is likewise an express provision of the above statute that for a violation of any of its provisions
or regulations promulgated pursuant thereto a fine of not less than P10 nor not less than P50 could be imposed. 42
It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its
legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception that local governments may
over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make
laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves
the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry
must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions
when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy,
that may indeed be the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully been made
between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which
constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to exercised under and in
pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection call be made. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying
the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability.

To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature
itself determines matters of principle and lay down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication
may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, its maps out its boundaries and
specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be
effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative
office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.

The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard
though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered
as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety. That is sought to be attained as
in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads." 43

This is to adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not long after the
Constitution came into force and effect that the principle of non-delegation "has been made to adapt itself the
complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate
legislation" not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments." 44 He continued:
"Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation,
and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of
greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the courts." 45 Consistency with the
conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is authority non-legislative in character, the
completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed.

Our later decisions speak to the same effect. Thus from, Justice J. B. L. Reyes in People vs. Exconde: 46 "It is well
establish in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to
Congress, nevertheless the latter may constitutionally delegate authority to promulgate rules and regulations to
implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it impracticable
(if not impossible) to anticipate and proved for the multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the
law in effect. All that is required is that the regulation should germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the
regulation be not in contradiction with it; but conform to the standards that the law prescribes ... " 47

An even more explicit formulation of the controlling principle comes from the pen of the then Justice, now Chief Justice,
Concepcion: "Lastly, the legality of Circular No. 21 is assailed upon the ground that the grant of authority to issue the
same constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. It is true that, under our system of government, said power
may not be delegated except to local governments. However, one thing is to delegate the power to determine what the
law shall be, and another thing to delegate the authority to fix the details in the execution of enforcement of a policy set
out in the law itself. Briefly stated, the rule is that the delegated powers fall under the second category, if the law
authorizing the, delegation furnishes a reasonable standard which "sufficiently marks the field within which the
Administrator is to act so that it may be known whether he has kept within it in compliance with the legislative will."
(Yakus vs. United States, 88 L. ed.
848) ... It should be noted, furthermore, that these powers must be construed and exercised in relation to the objectives
of the law creating the Central Bank, which are, among others, "to maintain monetary stability in the Philippines," and
"to promote a rising level of production, employment and real income in the Philippines." (Section 2, Rep. Act No. 265).
These standards are sufficiently concrete and definite to vest in the delegated authority, the character
of administrative details in the enforcement of the law and to place the grant said authority beyond the category of a
delegation of legislative powers ... " 48

It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land Transportation Code. Republic Act No. 4136,
of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety which is the prime
consideration in statutes of this character. There is likewise a categorical affirmation Of the power of petitioner as Land
Transportation Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations to give life to and translate into actuality such
fundamental purpose. His power is clear. There has been no abuse. His Administrative Order No. 2 can easily survive
the attack, far-from-formidable, launched against it by respondent Galo.

WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for are granted, the orders of May 28, 1970 of respondent
Judge for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the writ of preliminary injunction of June 1, 1970 and his order
of June 9, 1970 denying reconsideration are annulled and set aside. Respondent Judge is likewise directed to dismiss
the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by respondent Teddy C. Galo, there being no cause of action as the
Reflector Law and Administrative Order No. 2 of petitioner have not been shown to be tainted by invalidity. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J. and Villamor, J., took no part.