EUGENIO BULYGIN

TRUE OR FALSE STATEMENTS IN NORMATNE DISCOURSE

I. My purpose in this paper is to investigate the different kinds of true or false

statements that occur in normative discourse. As a Leitfaden for this investigation, I
will take the work of Georg Henrik von Wright.
By normative discourse, I will understand a discourse containing typical normative
terms like "ought", "ought not", "may", "obligatory", "prohibited", "permissible",
etc. Sentences in which such normative or deontic terms occur von Wright calls
"deontic sentences". Deontic sentences are frequently used for formulating norms,
i. e., as norm-formulations. But norms can also be formulated by means of other
linguistic devices (as, for instance, traffic lights, sentences in the imperative mood,
and even sentences in the indicative). In Norm and Action, 1 von Wright introduces the
distinction between norms and norm-formulations, saying that "The norm-
formulation is the sign or symbol (the words) used in enunciating (formulating) a
norm" (N&A, p. 93). This seems to imply that norm-formulations are the linguistic
counterpart of norms. But later he adds that deontic sentences can also be used for
making normative statements. When a norm-formulation is used prescriptively, it
expresses a norm. Norms as prescriptions have no truth value: they are neither true nor
false. But the same norm-formulation can also be used descriptively, in which case it
expresses a normative statement that is true or false. It is a characteristic feature of
deontic sentences that "the very same words may [... ] be used to enunciate a norm
(give a prescription) and to make a normative statement" (N&A, p. 105).
In Norm and Action (as well as in some later publications, like "The Foundation
of Norms and Normative Statements" ,2 von Wright seems to distinguish four
different entities: norm-formulations, norms, normative statements, and norm-
propositions. A norm-formulation is a linguistic entity, and as such it is
characteristically ambiguous, since it can be used either prescriptively or
descriptively. If used prescriptively, it expresses a norm, which has no truth value;
if used descriptively, it can give rise either to a normative statement, or to a norm-
proposition, both of which have a truth value. Thus, we have two kinds of entities
that can be true or false. But it is not clear what a normative statement is, and how it
is related to norm-propositions.

A normative statement, schematically speaking, is a statement to the effect that something or other ought
to or mayor must not be done (by some agent or agents, on some occasion or generally, unconditionally or
provided certain conditions are satisfied). The term "statement" is here used in that which I propose to call
its "strict" sense. A statement in the strict sense is either true or false. (The sentence which is used in
making a statement expresses a proposition.) (N&A, p. 105)

183

R. Egidi (ed.), In Search of a New Humanism, 183-191.

©1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
184 EUGENIO BULYGIN

On the other hand, a nonn-proposition is defined as a proposition to the effect that a

nonn exists ("The proposition that such and such a nonn exists, I shall call a norm-
proposition"; N&A, p. 106).
These quotations suggest the following distinction: A sentence used (descriptively)
to say that some action is obligatory, prohibited, or permitted (i. e., that something
ought to, or must not, or may be done) expresses a nonnative statement, whereas a
sentence used to say that a nonn to such and such effect exists expresses a nonn-
proposition. To use a (slightly modified) example of von Wright: If in reply to a
question I say "You must not park your car in front of my house", and what I am
doing is not issuing a prohibition, but giving the questioner infonnation concerning
the regulations for parking a car, then my sentence is descriptive and the statement I
make is a nonnative statement. If, instead, I say "There is a nonn that prohibits
parking in this place", then my sentence expresses a nonn-proposition.
But that suggestion does not seem acceptable. What is the difference between
informing about the existing regulation and saying that there is a nonn prohibiting to
park a car in this place? How could I infonn someone about the existing regulation
other than by saying that there is a nonn that prohibits parking here? If my infonnation
is true, then there is in fact a nonn to the effect that parking is prohibited; and if there is
no such nonn, then my normative statement is false. Appearances notwithstanding,
both sentences say exactly the same thing. In other words, even if the nonnative
statement saying that parking is prohibited seems to refer to the action of parking, and
the nonn-proposition seems to refer to the existence of a nonn, both have exactly the
same truth conditions and, moreover, they have the same meaning. Von Wright's
assertion that a normative statement expresses a proposition can now be completed by
saying that the proposition expressed by a nonnative statement is a nonn-proposition.
But then, there are not three but only two (non-linguistic) entities: nonns and nonn-
propositions. What von Wright calls nonnative statements are nonn-propositions in
disguise. The sentences
(I) You must not park here
and
(2) There is a nonn that prohibits parking here
have the same meaning, (2) being an expanded fonn of (1). A sentence like (2),
expressing a nonn-proposition in its expanded fonn, has the advantage of no longer
being ambiguous: it could not possibly be used for issuing a prohibition, for it is
clearly descriptive, while sentence (1) is characteristically ambiguous, as it can be
used to fonnulate a nonn or to express a nonn-proposition.
This interpretation is supported by the fact that in later publications von Wright
himself no longer uses the tenn "nonnative statement" and speaks only of nonns and
nonn-propositions. In "Nonns, Truth and Logic" (1982, included in PR), he says: "In
Norm and Action (1963) I made a tripartite distinction which I think is useful between
nonns, nonn-fonnulations and nonn-propositions" (PR, p. 131), without even
mentioning nonnative statements.