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Rule 36
So v. Food Fest (Caveat: I see no relation with Rule 36 or Civpro, please see full text for
yourself to confirm; Maybe separate judgment)

Facts: Daniel So owns a commercial space in San Antonio Village Makati, and entered a
Contract of Lease with Food Fest Land for the latter to operate a KFC branch. Prior to the
execution of the Contract, the two entered into a preliminary agreement which stated that
the COL shall not be binding until all permits and licenses necessary for the operation of the
branch is secured, with the assistance of So. Food Fest managed to secure the necessary
permits and licenses for the first two years. However, on the third year, it was unable to
secure a brgy. clearance and its application was held in abeyance. Fearing losses, Food Fest
asked So to terminate the COL twice. So instead asked for payment of rental arrears, and
offered to help with the clearance. Food Fest denied liability and started removing the
fixtures and equipment from the premises. So sent Food Fest a Final Notice of Termination
w/ demand to pay and vacate. So then filed a complaint for ejectment with damages with
the MetC.

The MetC held that food fest is liable to pat unpaid rentals and damages. The RTC reversed
MeTC's decision, asserting that Food Fest already vacated before the filing of the complaint,
and that the amount of rentals demanded (P123,000.00) exceeded the MeTC's jurisdiction,
and treated the complaint as an original complaint with the RTC. The CA upheld the RTC's
jurisdiction, however asseting that Food Fest's obligation is not extinguished. The two
parties both filed MR's.

Issue: Is Food Fest still liable for rentals under the contract?

Held: Yes.

[side note, the SC consolidated the two cases "Daniel So v. Food Fest" and "Food Fest v.
Daniel So" together --- must be the lesson?]

The Contract of Lease is binding since the preliminary agreement holding the acquisition of
permits and licenses as a condition precedent only refers to the initial application to which
Food Fest enjoyed and acquired, but not to the permits/licenses for the succeeding years.
Furthermore, the doctrine of Rebus Sic Stantibus under Art. 1267 of the NCC does not apply
since the same only refers to unforeseen events, inapplicable to rhe case at bar.

However, So is not entitled to damages by virtue of unrealized profits since So has not
proffered any proof of his entitlement to the same. So did not utilize or repair the premises
for three years, which Food Fest had nothing to do thereof.

SPOUSES JOSE and ESTER MARCHADESCH, FELIX VILLAMOR, and REV. FR. MANUEL GOMEZ,
petitioner, vs. JUANITA CINCO VDA. DE YEPES, respondent.
G.R. No. 151160. November 11, 2004
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FACTS:On January 30, 1984, respondent Juanita Cinco Vda. de Yepes filed a Complaint with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Palo, Leyte, against the petitioners, the Spouses Jose and
Ester Marchadesch, Felix Villamor and Fr. Manuel Gomez, for ownership, possession and
annulment of documents.

The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 6822 was raffled to Branch 6 of the court presided by
Judge Godofredo P. Quimsing, a resident of Tacloban City. On October 6, 1986, the case was
submitted for decision. However, as an aftermath of the political upheaval in 1986, Judge
Quimsing submitted his resignation which was accepted by the President of the Philippines
on January 31, 1987. Per Administrative Order No. 105-91 of the Court Administrator, dated
October 2, 1991, Judge Quimsing was detailed as Assisting Judge in the RTC of General
Santos City. In a letter to the Deputy Court Administrator dated November 12, 1991, he
requested that he be allowed to stay in Tacloban City to enable him to decide the seven (7)
of the cases heard by him during his incumbency as Presiding Judge of Branch 6 of the RTC
of Palo, Leyte.

On December 12, 1991, Judge Quimsing rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6822 in favor
of the respondent and against the petitioners. Judge Quimsing signed the decision as
Presiding Judge of of the RTC of Tacloban City, Branch 6. The petitioners appealed the
decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), which appeal was given due course by Judge Francisco
on January 15, 1992. On July 13, 2001, the CA rendered judgment in favor of the respondent
and against the petitioners.

ISSUE:CAN THIS NEWLY RE-APPOINTED REGIONAL TRIAL COURT JUDGE WITHOUT

AUTHORITY FROM THE SUPREME COURT NOR ANY REQUEST FROM THE PARTIES NOR
FROM THE INCUMBENT PRESIDING REGIONAL TRIAL COURT JUDGE OF BRANCH 6,
TACLOBAN CITY WHERE THE CASE IS PENDING DECISION, ON HIS OWN, VALIDLY DECIDE THE
PENDING UNDECIDED CASE?

RULING:Yes. Under the Courts Resolution of 10 February 1983, Rule 135 of the Rules of
Court and Section 9 thereof, what is essential is that the Judge who pens the decision of a
case heard by him before he was assigned or transferred to another district or branch of the
court of equal jurisdiction is an incumbent Judge, i.e., in this case, a Judge of the same court
(Regional Trial Court), albeit assigned to a different branch at the time the decision was
promulgated. There is no reason why the rule and Resolution of the Court should not apply
to a case where a Presiding Judge who resigned after a case tried by him had already been
submitted for decision, and was, thereafter, re-appointed as Presiding Judge of another
regional district and branch of the RTC.

In the present case, Judge Quimsing heard Civil Case No. 6822 after which it was submitted
for decision. Although he resigned, he was, however, re-appointed as Presiding Judge of the
RTC in Calbiga, Samar. It was then that he decided said case. He was an incumbent Judge
when he rendered the decision. His authority to decide the said case under said Rule and
Resolution of the Court was affirmed by the Court.

In fine then, the ruling of the Court of Appeals that Judge Godofredo Quimsing had the
authority to decide Civil Case No. 6822 on December 12, 1991 is affirmed.
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Neypes v CA

FACTS:
*Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or
reconveyance and/or reversion against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands,
Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo
*The trial court the denied the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of del Mundo,
based on prescription because there were factual matters that could be determined
only after trial.
*The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion
to dismiss on the ground that the trial court could very well resolve the issue of prescription
from the bare allegations of the complaint itself without waiting for the trial proper.
*The trial court dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground that the action had already
prescribed.
*Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998.
*On the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, pettioners filed a motion for
reconsideration.
*On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for
reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998.
*Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal to the court a quo *The
trial court denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late.
This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998.
*In petitioners appeal under Rule 65, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition ruling
that the 15day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day
they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint.
*Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration was denied.
*SC, Petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
reconsideration should be construed as the final order, not the February 12, 1998 order
which dismissed their complaint.

ISSUE 1:
What therefore should be deemed as the final order, receipt of which triggers the start of
the 15day reglementary period to appeal the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the
complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the MR?

HELD:
We sustain petitioners view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.

ISSUE 2:
If July 1, 1998 was the start of the 15day reglementary period to appeal, did petitioners in
fact file their notice of appeal on time?

HELD:
YES.
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Arguments:
*According to the trial court, the MR only interrupted the running of the 15day appeal
period. It ruled that petitioners, having filed their MR on the last day of the 15day
reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal upon
receipt of the notice of denial of their MR.
*Petitioners, however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules to a fresh period of 15
days from receipt of the final order or the order dismissing their motion for reconsideration.

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. To standardize the appeal
periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases,
the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice
of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion
for a new trial or motion for reconsideration

Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the
Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the
Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasijudicial Agencies
to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.

We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period
of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion
for reconsideration

The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for
new trial or motion for reconsideration.The trial court which rendered the assailed decision
is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify
any error of judgment

In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to when the 15day
appeal period should be counted from receipt of notice of judgment (March 3, 1998) or
from receipt of notice of final order appealed from (July 22, 1998).

VERGINESA-SUAREZ vs DILAG
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint against public respondent Dilag and Pascua for allegedly
collecting P30K from litigants in consideration of favourable judgments in cases for
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage. Suarez further pointed out the existence of
conflicting decisions rendered by Judge Dilag in a number of cases. Among those cases is the
case of Moreno v Moreno which is also a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, the
petition was originally denied in a decision. But a Motion for New Trial was filed alleging
newly discovered evidence consisting, among other things, of the psychological report
concerning defendant, which would show that indeed he was psychologically incapacitated
to perform the marital obligations. The motion was granted and the marriage was declared
null and void. An entry of judgment was made but without a return or certificate showing
that the OSG had received a copy of the decision/order.
A judicial audit was conducted and an investigating justice of the court of appeals was
assigned. It was later found out and respondent subsequently charged with gross
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misconduct and/or gross negligence and gross ignorance of the law in the handling of the
above-mentioned cases as set forth by the OCA.
ISSUE: WON respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law in reversing the
Moreno v Moreno case.
HELD:
Yes. The grant of motion for new trial in the Moreno v Moreno case was not proper because
the psychological report and affidavit of the psychiatrist who conducted the examination
were not attached to the motion pursuant to the 2nd par of Sec 2 Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure which requires that a motion for new trial based on newly-discovered
evidence shall be supported by affidavits of witnesses by whom such evidence is expected
to be given, or by duly authenticated documents which are proposed to be introduced in
evidence. Likewise, the psychological report cannot be considered as newly discovered
evidence because it did not exist yet at the time of the trial as the psychological examination
was conducted only after the case was initially dismissed. It is well-entrenched that newly-
discovered evidence refers to evidence already existing prior to or during the trial but which
could not have been secured and presented during the trial despite reasonable diligence on
the part of the litigant offering it or his counsel.

UY vs. First Metro Integrated Steel Corp.

FACTS:
Private Respondent filed before RTC Manila a complaint for sum of money with prayer for
writ of preliminary attachment against Robert Uy, Midland Integrated Construction
Company and Elpidio Uy (Petitioner). It is alleged that Respondent delivered deformed steel
bars to petitioner and as payment petitioner issued check, however it was dishonored upon
presentment. Despite demands, petitioner refused to pay.
Robert and MICC, in their Answer with counterclaim, alleged that they are strangers to the
contract between petitioner and respondent. Petitioner claimed that he had no business
transaction with respondent, thus he stopped the payment since it was not intended as
payment for respondent.
Hearings were conducted for reception of evidence of respondent. Initial reception of
evidence for petitioner was cancelled due to petitioner's influenza. It was reset but
cancelled and moved twice; then petitioner's counsel withdrew his appearance as counsel.
Atty. Banares entered his appearance and requested for resetting, it was granted by trial
court. On the date, the counsel appeared but instead of presenting evidence, he requested
for postponement and resetting of hearing. During the scheduled date, petitioner's counsel
arrived late. Thus upon motion of respondent, trial court ordered that petitioner's right to
present evidence is deemed waived and parties were directed to filed respective
memorandum.
Trial court rendered judgment. Petitioner received copy of decision April 4, 2003 and on
April 21, 2003 filed a motion for new trial on the ground of gross negligence of petitioner's
counsel in failing to attend the hearing for the reception of evidence, thus impairing his right
to due process. The court denied. Petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari which CA
dismissed. CA held that Trial court's denial of motion for new trial is correct since it was filed
out of time.
ISSUE:
WON the motion for new trial was filed out of reglementary period to appeal—YES
WON ground for Motion for new trial was valid--- NO
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HELD:
1. YES, it was filed on time. The motion was received on April 28, 2003 but the Registry
Receipt attached to the affidavit of service and the stamp on envelope reveals that it was
filed on April 21, 2003, Monday because April 19,2003, the last day for filing was a Saturday.
The rule provides that if last day falls on Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, the time shall not
run until next working day.
2. Ground is not valid. Under Section 1, Rule 37 paragraph (a) Fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence … however in this case, the negligence of petitioner's counsel in failing
to attend the hearings for reception of evidence inexcusable. The trial court rescheduled the
hearing for seven times, and postponements and cancellations are without any justification.
In addition, rule required that motion must be accompanied by affidavits of merits like
afidavits showing the facts constituting the valid cause of action or defense which the
movant may prove in case a new trial is granted, because a new trial would serve no
purpose and would just waste the time of the court as well as the parties if the complaint is
after all groundless or the defense is ineffective. The moving party must show that he has
meritorious. The petitioner's motion did not contain clear statements of facts constituting
good and valid defense. An affidavit of merit should state facts, and not mere opinion or
conclusions of law
Petitioner's counsel's inexcusable negligence did not amount to pettioner's deprivation of
due process of law since petitioner was given several opportunities to be heard and to
submit evidence but he squandered them. Mistakes in the conduct of the proceedings in the
trial court as a result of ignorance, inexperience or incompetence of counsel do not qualify
as a ground for new trial.

JULIET VITUG MADARANG AND ROMEO BARTOLOME, REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEYS-IN-

FACT AND ACTING IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITIES, RODOLFO AND RUBY BARTOLOME v.
SPOUSES JESUS D. MORALES AND CAROLINA N. MORALES
G.R. No. 199283, June 09, 2014

FACTS: Spouses Morales filed with the RTC-Quezon City a complaint for judicial foreclosure
of a house and lot located in Bago Bantay, Quezon City which was used as a security for the
loan obtained by Spouses Bartolome.

In the meantime, the Spouses Bartolome died. The Spouses Morales, thus, filed a complaint
for judicial foreclosure of the Bago Bantay property against herein petitioners.

In their answer, defendants assailed the authenticity of the deed of real estate mortgage
covering the Bago Bantay property, specifically, the Spouses Bartolome’s signatures on the
instrument. They added that the complaint was already barred since it had been dismissed
in another branch of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for failure to comply with an
order of the trial court.

In its decision dated, the trial court ordered defendants to pay the Spouses Morales. Should
defendants fail to pay, the Bago Bantay property shall be sold at public auction to satisfy the
judgment.
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Defendants filed their motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s decision. They
amended their motion for reconsideration and filed a request for a Philippine National
Police handwriting expert to examine the authenticity of the Spouses Bartolome’s alleged
signatures on the deed of real estate mortgage.

According to the trial court, the motion for reconsideration and its amendment were pro
forma as defendants failed to specify the findings and conclusions in the decision that were
not supported by the evidence or contrary to law.

The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration, its amendment, and the request for a
handwriting expert.

Defendants filed a notice of appeal. The trial court denied due course the notice of appeal
for having been filed out of time. According to the trial court, defendants, through their
counsel, Atty. Arturo F. Tugonon, received a copy of the order denying the motion for
reconsideration on June 24, 2010. This is evidenced by the registry return receipt on file
with the court. Consequently, they had 15 days from June 24, 2010, or until July 9, 2010, to
appeal the trial court’s decision. However, they filed their notice of appeal only on August
11, 2010, which was beyond the 15-day period to appeal.

Defendants filed a petition for relief from judgment, blaming their 80-year-old lawyer who
failed to file the notice of appeal within the reglementary period. They argued that Atty.
Tugonon’s failure to appeal within the reglementary period was a mistake and an excusable
negligence due to their former lawyer’s old age.

The trial court denied the petition for relief from judgment. The trial court held that the
petition for relief was filed beyond 60 days from the finality of the trial court’s decision,
contrary to Section 3, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Petitioners filed the petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. In its resolution, the
appellate court denied outright the petition for certiorari . The CA found that petitioners
did not file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the petition for relief from
judgment, a prerequisite for filing a petition for certiorari.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration that the CA denied in its resolution.

Petitioners filed the petition22 for review on certiorari with this court. They argue that they
need not file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their petition for relief from
judgment because the questions they raised in the petition for relief were pure questions of
law.
ISSUE: Whether the failure of petitioners’ former counsel to file the notice of appeal within
the reglementary period is excusable negligence.

HELD: This court agrees that the petition for relief from judgment was filed out of time.
However, the trial court erred in counting the 60-day period to file a petition for relief from
the date of finality of the trial court’s decision. Rule 38, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is clear that the 60-day period must be counted after petitioner learns of the
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judgment or final order. The period counted from the finality of judgment or final order is
the six-month period.

The double period required under Section 3, Rule 38 is jurisdictional and should be strictly
complied with. A petition for relief from judgment filed beyond the reglementary period is
dismissed outright. This is because a petition for relief from judgment is an exception to the
public policy of immutability of final judgments.
A party filing a petition for relief from judgment must strictly comply with two (2)
reglementary periods: (a) the petition must be filed within sixty (60) days from knowledge of
the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside; and (b) within a fixed period of six
(6) months from entry of such judgment, order or other proceeding. Strict compliance with
these periods is required because provision for a petition for relief from judgment is a final
act of liberality on the part of the State, which remedy cannot be allowed to erode any
further the fundamental principle that a judgment, order or proceeding must, at some
definite time, attain finality in order at last to put an end to litigation.

It should be noted that the 60-day period from knowledge of the decision, and the 6-month
period from entry of judgment, are both inextendible and uninterruptible. We have also
time and again held that because relief from a final and executory judgment is really more
of an exception than a rule due to its equitable character and nature, strict compliance with
these periods, which are definitely jurisdictional, must always be observed.

Mesina vs. Meer

G.R. No. 146845. July 2, 2002

FACTS:
On January 12, 1994, Humberto Meer sought the cancellation of TCT No. 166074 with
the MTC Manila. It was alleged that such title was issued to Lerma Bunquin because Meer’s
signature was forged. On the same day, a notice of lis pendens was annotated at the of said
title.
On June 15, 1994, while the case was pending, TCT No. 166074 was cancelled and
replaced by TCT No. 216518 issued in the name of the petitioners, spouses Michaelangelo
and Grace Mesina. It appears that the subject property has been conveyed by Bunquin to
the petitioners on September 28, 1993, prior to the annotation of lis pendens. The transfer
of the title from Lerma Bunquin to petitioners was effected only on June 15, 1994 because
of some requirements imposed by the National Housing Authority.
Thus, Meer impleaded petitioners as additional party defendants.
The MTC ruled that spouses Mesina were buyers in good faith. Upon appeal, the RTC
reversed MTC’s decision. They again appealed in the CA, which affirmed RTC’s decision in its
May 10, 2000 Resolution.
Spouses Mesina filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment and prayed that the Court of
Appeals set aside its Resolution dated May 10, 2000 for the following reasons: (a) extrinsic
fraud was committed which prevented petitioners from presenting his case to the court
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and/or was used to procure the judgment without fair submission of the controversy; (b)
mistake and excusable negligence has prevented the petitioner from taking an appeal within
the prescribed period; and (c) petitioner has good and substantial defense in his action.
On the first ground, petitioners argued that there has been collusion between the
respondent and the Bunquins during the trial of the case at the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Had the Bunquins testified in court as to the validity of the Deed of Sale as well as the
authenticity of the respondents signature, petitioners argued that the result would have
been in their favor. Anent the second ground, petitioners averred that their failure to file
the requisite appeal on time was largely due to the delay of counsel of record to produce
the requested documents of the case. Finally, petitioners claim that they have good and
substantial defense.
The CA denied the petition ruling:
a. the first ground raised by the petitioner spouses should have been filed before the court
of origin, the Metropolitan Court of Manila, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure as amended; and
b. the remedy of a petition for relief under Rule 38 may not be availed of from a judgment
of the Court of Appeals in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA’s denial of the petition is proper.

HELD:
YES
1. They must have raised the issue of extrinsic fraud in the MTC.
As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the petitioners allegation of extrinsic
fraud should have been brought at issue in the Metropolitan Trial Court. If they truly believe
that the default of the spouses Mesina prejudiced their rights, they should have questioned
this from the beginning. Yet, they chose to participate in the proceedings and actively
presented their defense. And their efforts were rewarded as the Metropolitan Trial Court
ruled in their favor.
When the respondent appealed the case to the Regional Trial Court, they never raised
this issue. Even after the Regional Trial Court reversed the finding of the MeTC, and the
Court of Appeals sustained this reversal, petitioners made no effort to bring this issue for
consideration. This Court will not allow petitioners, in guise of equity, to benefit from their
own negligence.
2. The remedy of a petition for relief under Rule 38 may not be availed of from a judgment
of the Court of Appeals.
Under the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition for relief must be filed
within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or other
proceeding to be set aside and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud,
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accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the
petitioners good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. Most
importantly, it should be filed with the same court which rendered the decision, viz:

Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings.- When a judgment
or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any
court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in
such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set
aside.

While Rule 38 uses the phrase “any court”, it refers only to municipal/metropolitan and
regional trial courts.
The procedure in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court are governed by
separate provisions of the Rules of Court and may, from time to time, be supplemented by
additional rules promulgated by the Supreme Court through resolutions or circulars. As it
stands, neither the Rules of Court nor the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals
allow the remedy of petition for relief in the Court of Appeals.