EN BANC
Of this two rules, it is
G.R. No. L-18924 October 19, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), defendant-appellee.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellant.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, sustaining the demurrer presented by the defendant to the
information that initiated this case and in which the appellee is accused of having
illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality
while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores
of the city.
The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, which so
held and dismissed the case.
The question that presents itself for our consideration is whether such ruling is
erroneous or not; and it will or will not be erroneous according as said court has or
has no jurisdiction over said offense.
The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over
crime, like the one herein involved, committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in
our jurisdiction waters. 1awph!l.net
There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with
International Law; to wit, the French rule, according to which crimes committed
aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the
country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless their
commission affects the peace and security of the territory; and the English rule,
based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States, according to
which, crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the
courts of the country within territory they were committed.
the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the theories and
jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are authority in the
Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.
In the cases of The Schooner Exchange vs. M'Faddon and Others (7 Cranch [U. S.],
116), Chief Justice Marshall said:
. . . When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously
inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual
infraction, and the government to degradation, if such individuals or merchants did
not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not amenable to the jurisdiction
of the country. . . .
In United States vs. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this court held:
. . . No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense or crime
committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but
when she came within three miles of a line drawn from the headlands, which
embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new
set of principles became applicable. (Wheaton, International Law [Dana ed.], p. 255,
note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., secs. 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship
and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign
subject to such limitations as have been conceded by that sovereignty through the
proper political agency. . . .
It is true that in certain cases the comity of nations is observed, as in Mali and
Wildenhus vs. Keeper of the Common Jail (120 U.., 1), wherein it was said that:
. . . The principle which governs the whole matter is this: Disorder which disturb
only the peace of the ship or those on board are to be dealt with exclusively by the
sovereignty of the home of the ship, but those which disturb the public peace may
be suppressed, and, if need be, the offenders punished by the proper authorities of
the local jurisdiction. It may not be easy at all times to determine which of the two
jurisdictions a particular act of disorder belongs. Much will undoubtedly depend on
the attending circumstances of the particular case, but all must concede that
felonious homicide is a subject for the local jurisdiction, and that if the proper
authorities are proceeding with the case in the regular way the consul has no right
to interfere to prevent it.
Hence in United States vs. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), this court held that:
Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in the Philippine
Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit in any local port, does not, as a general
rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of the Islands, such vessels being
considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply
when the article, the use of which is prohibited in the Islands, is landed from the
vessels upon Philippine soil; in such a case an open violation of the laws of the land
is committed with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at
the place of the commission of the crime, no court other than that established in
the said place has jurisdiction of the offense, in the absence of an agreement under
an international treaty.
without being used in our territory, does not being about in the said territory those
effects that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not
considered a disturbance of the public order.
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign
merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it
causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously
contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid
repressive statute. Moreover, as the Attorney-General aptly observes:
. . . The idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a foreign vessel at anchor
in the port of Manila in open defiance of the local authorities, who are impotent to
lay hands on him, is simply subversive of public order. It requires no unusual stretch
of the imagination to conceive that a foreign ship may come into the port of Manila
and allow or solicit Chinese residents to smoke opium on board.

As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise to
renouncing such jurisdiction or a part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so far as
England is concerned, to which nation the ship where the crime in question was
committed belongs. Besides, in his work "Treaties, Conventions, etc.," volume 1,
page 625, Malloy says the following:
The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court
of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as
to costs. So ordered.

There shall be between the territories of the United States of America, and all the
territories of His Britanic Majesty in Europe, a reciprocal liberty of commerce. The
inhabitants of the two countries, respectively, shall have liberty freely and securely
to come with their ships and cargoes to all such places, ports and rivers, in the
territories aforesaid, to which other foreigners are permitted to come, to enter into
the same, and to remain and reside in any parts of the said territories, respectively;
also to hire and occupy houses and warehouses for the purposes of their
commerce; and, generally, the merchants and traders of each nation respectively
shall enjoy the most complete protection and security for their commerce, but
subject always to the laws and statutes of the two countries, respectively. (Art. 1,
Commerce and Navigation Convention.)

We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit
was held by this court not triable by or courts, because it being the primary object
of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against the
disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship,
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
Gibb & Gale, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the
testimony of the accused himself, because from the very nature of these facts and
from the circumstances surrounding the incident upon which these proceedings
rest, no other evidence as to these facts was available either to the prosecution or
to the defense. We think, however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt
as to the weight of the evidence touching those details of the incident as to which
there can be said to be any doubt, the following statement of the material facts
disclose by the record may be taken to be substantially correct:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27,"
Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased,
was employed as a house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27" as a
detached house situates some 40 meters from the nearest building, and in August,
19087, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No one slept in the house
except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the
building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of
the building, by which communication was had with the other part of the house.
This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height.
The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and
occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the
inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure
means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the room there was but
one small window, which, like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door
and window, there were no other openings of any kind in the room.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had
received for the night, was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the
door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard
no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed
open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the heavy
growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the
defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and
called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just
above the knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed against the door. In
the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted
by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar,
though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown
back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against which it rested.
Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck
out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual.
Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a desperately
wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately recognized him in
the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who
slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind
up Pascual's wounds.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the
incident just described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant
was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated
robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on
friendly and amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that
when either returned at night, he should knock at the door and acquiant his
companion with his identity. Pascual had left the house early in the evening and
gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibañez, servants
employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the mess hall. The three
returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at
their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments after
the party separated, Celestino and Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon
returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally wounded in the
stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs
and Healy, who immediately went to the aid of the wounded man.
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said
that he did it under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced
open the door of their sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings.
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals
suggests itself, unless it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on
his Chinese roommate, and sought to frightened him by forcing his way into the
room, refusing to give his name or say who he was, in order to make Ah Chong
believe that he was being attacked by a robber.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the
military hospital, where he died from the effects of the wound on the following day.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty
by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and
sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed
by law.
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate,
Pascual Gualberto, but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to
do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —
The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:
xxx xxx xxx
4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following
attendant circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would
be entitle to complete exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of
his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his room had been in fact
a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to be. No one, under
such circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such
an intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's
thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill the intruder if he
persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the night,
in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him
despite his warnings defendant would have been wholly justified in using any
available weapon to defend himself from such an assault, and in striking promptly,
without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron."
That neither the defendant nor his property nor any of the property under his
charge was in real danger at the time when he struck the fatal blow. That there was
no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant
believed he was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real "necessity" for
the use of the knife to defend his person or his property or the property under his
charge.
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be
held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act
for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he
supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or
assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he
committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we
hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always
that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is
sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary
ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder,
malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an
acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction
under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under
the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or
misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even
though it be different from that which he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal
Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited; Pettit vs.
S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y.,
509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only
question worthy of consideration is whether malice or criminal intent is an essential
element or ingredient of the crimes of homicide and assassination as defined and
penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that since the definitions there given of
these as well as most other crimes and offense therein defined, do not specifically
and expressly declare that the acts constituting the crime or offense must be
committed with malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor may be held
criminally liable, the commission of the acts set out in the various definitions
subjects the actor to the penalties described therein, unless it appears that he is
exempted from liability under one or other of the express provisions of article 8 of
the code, which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the general
rule of legislative enactment in the United States, the definitions of crimes and
offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely contain provisions expressly declaring
that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime, nevertheless,
the general provisions of article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or
criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and offense
therein defined, in the absence of express provisions modifying the general rule,
such as are those touching liability resulting from acts negligently or imprudently
committed, and acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor,
where the act committed is different from that which he intended to commit. And it
is to be observed that even these exceptions are more apparent than real, for
"There is little distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing
and indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and
within limits supplies the place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's New
Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again, "There is so little difference between a
disposition to do a great harm and a disposition to do harm that one of them may
very well be looked upon as the measure of the other. Since, therefore, the guilt of a
crime consists in the disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows by
committing it, and since this disposition is greater or less in proportion to the harm
which is done by the crime, the consequence is that the guilt of the crime follows
the same proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime in its own nature
does greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been otherwise
stated, the thing done, having proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the
same whether the corruption was of one particular form or another.
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless
the contrary shall appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal
liability, even though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he
had intended to commit.
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word
"voluntary" as used in this article, say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and
intentional act, and roundly asserts that without intention (intention to do wrong or
criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the word "voluntary" implies and
includes the words "con malicia," which were expressly set out in the definition of
the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the code of 1870, because,
as Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was redundant, being implied and
included in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be
said to exempt from criminal responsibility when the act which was actually
intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence of negligence or
imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in his discussion of the provisions
of this article of the code that in general without intention there can be no crime.
(Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have shown above, the exceptions insisted upon by
Viada are more apparent than real.
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:
In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there
is no intention there is no crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that
under our code there can be no crime if there is no act, an act which must fall within
the sphere of ethics if there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.)

And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for
example in its sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the following
language:
It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice
which is supposed from the operation of the will and an intent to cause the injury
which may be the object of the crime.
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that,
whatever may be the civil effects of the inscription of his three sons, made by the
appellant in the civil registry and in the parochial church, there can be no crime
because of the lack of the necessary element or criminal intention, which
characterizes every action or ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal
negligence."
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the
following language:
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their
absence in the commission of an act defined and punished by law as criminal, is not
a necessary question of fact submitted to the exclusive judgment and decision of
the trial court.
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an
essential element of the various crimes and misdemeanors therein defined
becomes clear also from an examination of the provisions of article 568, which are
as follows:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice,
would constitute a grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor
in its maximum degree, to prision correccional in its minimum degrees if it shall
constitute a less grave crime.
He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple
imprudence or negligence shall incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium
and maximum degrees.
In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their
discretion, without being subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the
crime is equal to or less than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which
case the courts shall apply the next one thereto in the degree which they may
consider proper.
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words
"criminal intent," and the direct inference from its provisions is that the commission
of the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of malice (criminal intent),
negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on the actor.
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to
approximate in meaning the word "willful" as used in English and American statute
to designate a form of criminal intent. It has been said that while the word "willful"
sometimes means little more than intentionally or designedly, yet it is more
frequently understood to extent a little further and approximate the idea of the
milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without justifiable
excuse. In one case it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation,
"wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable grounds to believe the
thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily in a statute it means "not
merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other words, corruptly." In English
and the American statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously," and
"malice aforethought" are words indicating intent, more purely technical than
"willful" or willfully," but "the difference between them is not great;" the word
"malice" not often being understood to require general malevolence toward a
particular individual, and signifying rather the intent from our legal justification.
(Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.)
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the
definition of a crime that it be committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with
malice aforethought," or in one of the various modes generally construed to imply a
criminal intent, we think that reasoning from general principles it will always be
found that with the rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime
evil intent must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with
numerous citations from the decided cases, thus forcely present this doctrine:
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as
to the intent. In controversies between private parties the quo animo with which a
thing was done is sometimes important, not always; but crime proceeds only from a
criminal mind. So that —
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words,
punishment is the sentence of wickedness, without which it can not be. And neither
in philosophical speculation nor in religious or mortal sentiment would any people
in any age allow that a man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is
therefore a principle of our legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the
essence of an offense is the wrongful intent, without which it can not exists. We find
this doctrine confirmed by —
Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct
on this subject. It consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit
reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention
were so;" Actus me incito factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me against my
will is not my act;" and others of the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal
jurisprudence differs from civil. So also —
Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the
intention, we inculpate or exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to the
happiness or misery actually produced. Let the result of an action be what it may,
we hold a man guilty simply on the ground of intention; or, on the dame ground, we
hold him innocent." The calm judgment of mankind keeps this doctrine among its
jewels. In times of excitement, when vengeance takes the place of justice, every
guard around the innocent is cast down. But with the return of reason comes the
public voice that where the mind is pure, he who differs in act from his neighbors
does not offend. And —
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man,
no one deems another to deserve punishment for what he did from an upright
mind, destitute of every form of evil. And whenever a person is made to suffer a
punishment which the community deems not his due, so far from its placing an evil
mark upon him, it elevates him to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself
spontaneously pleads the want of bad intent in justification of what has the
appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the plea, if its truth is
credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature
uttering one of her immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior to
all other doctrines, because first in nature from which the law itself proceeds, that
no man is to be punished as a criminal unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New
Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure
from this doctrine of abstract justice result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule
that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), without
which justice could not be administered in our tribunals; and compelled also by the
same doctrine of necessity, the courts have recognized the power of the legislature
to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make their
commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. Without discussing
these exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts have
always held that unless the intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of
certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is clear and beyond
question the statute will not be so construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158,
notes 76 and 77); and the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has been
said not to be a real departure from the law's fundamental principle that crime
exists only where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need not be to
break the law, and if suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in fact
forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and cases cited.)
But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity
therefore, requiring mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord
with the principles of abstract justice. On the contrary, the maxim here is Ignorantia
facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed
offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such
mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil
in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability provided always
there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The
guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him."
(Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb.,
342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625; Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox
C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say,
the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or
negligence fell into the mistake is to be determined by the circumstances as they
appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made, and the effect which the
surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in
forming the intent, criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the
existence of facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely in accord with
the principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he does
believe them — he is legally guiltless of the homicide; though he mistook the facts,
and so the life of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words,
and with reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious
authorities, it is the doctrine of reason and sufficiently sustained in adjudication,
that notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man
undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him.
If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself
correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be the law will not punish
him though they are in truth otherwise, and he was really no occassion for the
extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large array of cases
there cited.)
The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of
this rule is the case where a man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and
on a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol
demands his money or his life, but is killed by his friend under the mistaken belief
that the attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his
life and property are in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one will
doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer believed them to be he would be
innocent of the commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability,
although if he knew the real state of the facts when he took the life of his friend he
would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide or assassination. Under such
circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the facts overcomes the
presumption of malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a
necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases of homicide or
assassination) overcomes at the same time the presumption established in article 1
of the code, that the "act punished by law" was committed "voluntarily."
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a
felonious design against him, and under that supposition killed him, although it
should afterwards appear that there was no such design, it will not be murder, but it
will be either manslaughter or excusable homicide, according to the degree of
caution used and the probable grounds of such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in
Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of the case, p.7.)
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an
outstretched arms and a pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces against his life
as he advances. Having approached near enough in the same attitude, A, who has a
club in his hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant the pistol is
discharged; and of the wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded with powder
only, and that the real design of B was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say
that A is more criminal that he would have been if there had been a bullet in the
pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must require that a man so attacked must,
before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the pistol is loaded — a
doctrine which would entirely take away the essential right of self-defense. And
when it is considered that the jury who try the cause, and not the party killing, are
to judge of the reasonable grounds of his apprehension, no danger can be supposed
to flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by
Viada, a few of which are here set out in full because the facts are somewhat
analogous to those in the case at bar.
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night,
in company only of his wife, without other light than reflected from the fire, and
that the man with his back to the door was attending to the fire, there suddenly
entered a person whom he did not see or know, who struck him one or two blows,
producing a contusion on the shoulder, because of which he turned, seized the
person and took from his the stick with which he had undoubtedly been struck, and
gave the unknown person a blow, knocking him to the floor, and afterwards striking
him another blow on the head, leaving the unknown lying on the floor, and left the
house. It turned out the unknown person was his father-in-law, to whom he
rendered assistance as soon as he learned his identity, and who died in about six
days in consequence of cerebral congestion resulting from the blow. The accused,
who confessed the facts, had always sustained pleasant relations with his father-in-
law, whom he visited during his sickness, demonstrating great grief over the
occurrence. Shall he be considered free from criminal responsibility, as having acted
in self-defense, with all the circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the
Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he was an
illegal aggressor, without sufficient provocation, and that there did not exists
rational necessity for the employment of the force used, and in accordance with
articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code condemned him to twenty months of
imprisonment, with accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the accused, he
was acquitted by the supreme court, under the following sentence: "Considering,
from the facts found by the sentence to have been proven, that the accused was
surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife who was nursing her
child, was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish with which
they might have executed their criminal intent, because of the there was no other
than fire light in the room, and considering that in such a situation and when the
acts executed demonstrated that they might endanger his existence, and possibly
that of his wife and child, more especially because his assailant was unknown, he
should have defended himself, and in doing so with the same stick with which he
was attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he use means
which were not rationally necessary, particularly because the instrument with which
he killed was the one which he took from his assailant, and was capable of
producing death, and in the darkness of the house and the consteration which
naturally resulted from such strong aggression, it was not given him to known or
distinguish whether there was one or more assailants, nor the arms which they
might bear, not that which they might accomplish, and considering that the lower
court did not find from the accepted facts that there existed rational necessity for
the means employed, and that it did not apply paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal
Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme court of Spain, February 28, 1876.)
(Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a
retired part of the city, upon arriving at a point where there was no light, heard the
voice of a man, at a distance of some 8 paces, saying: "Face down, hand over you
money!" because of which, and almost at the same money, he fired two shots from
his pistol, distinguishing immediately the voice of one of his friends (who had before
simulated a different voice) saying, "Oh! they have killed me," and hastening to his
assistance, finding the body lying upon the ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak,
for God's sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had been the victim of a joke, and
not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a corpse, he retired from the
place. Shall he be declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the author of this
homicide, as having acted in just self-defense under the circumstances defined in
paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga
did not so find, but only found in favor of the accused two of the requisites of said
article, but not that of the reasonableness of the means employed to repel the
attack, and, therefore, condemned the accused to eight years and one day of prison
mayor, etc. The supreme court acquitted the accused on his appeal from this
sentence, holding that the accused was acting under a justifiable and excusable
mistake of fact as to the identity of the person calling to him, and that under the
circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc., the means employed were
rational and the shooting justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March 17, 1885.)
(Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)
QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night,
by a large stone thrown against his window — at this, he puts his head out of the
window and inquires what is wanted, and is answered "the delivery of all of his
money, otherwise his house would be burned" — because of which, and observing
in an alley adjacent to the mill four individuals, one of whom addressed him with
blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one the men, who, on the next morning was found
dead on the same spot. Shall this man be declared exempt from criminal
responsibility as having acted in just self-defense with all of the requisites of law?
The criminal branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of
Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor of the accused a majority of the requisites
to exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not that of reasonable necessity for
the means, employed, and condemned the accused to twelve months of prision
correctional for the homicide committed. Upon appeal, the supreme court acquitted
the condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at the malefactors, who attack his
mill at night in a remote spot by threatening robbery and incendiarism, was acting in
just self-defense of his person, property, and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I
Viada, p. 128.)
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that
the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm
belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief,
from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and
of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as
they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in
good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no
more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as
he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on
account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or
recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the
means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he
believe threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge.

The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be
reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his
bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instance de oficio. So ordered.

Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.

Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., dissent.

Separate Opinions

TORRES, J., dissenting:

The writer, with due respect to the opinion of the majority of the court, believes
that, according to the merits of the case, the crime of homicide by reckless
negligence, defined and punishes in article 568 of the Penal Code, was committed,
inasmuch as the victim was wilfully (voluntariomente) killed, and while the act was
done without malice or criminal intent it was, however, executed with real
negligence, for the acts committed by the deceased could not warrant the
aggression by the defendant under the erroneous belief on the part of the accused
that the person who assaulted him was a malefactor; the defendant therefore
incurred responsibility in attacking with a knife the person who was accustomed to
enter said room, without any justifiable motive.

By reason of the nature of the crime committed, in the opinion of the undersigned
the accused should be sentenced to the penalty of one year and one month of
prision correctional, to suffer the accessory penalties provided in article 61, and to
pay an indemnify of P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, with the costs of both
instances, thereby reversing the judgment appealed from.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-47722 July 27, 1943
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.
Antonio Z. Oanis in his own behalf.
Maximo L. Valenzuela for appellant Galanta.
Acting Solicitor-General Ibañez and Assistant Attorney Torres for appellee.
MORAN, J.:
Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the accused Antonio Z.
Oanis and Alberto Galanta, chief of police of Cabanatuan and corporal of the
Philippine Constabulary, respectively, were, after due trial, found guilty by the lower
court of homicide through reckless imprudence and were sentenced each to an
indeterminate penalty of from one year and six months to two years and two
months of prison correccional and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the
deceased in the amount of P1,000. Defendants appealed separately from this
judgment.
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary
Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a
telegram of the following tenor: "Information received escaped convict Anselmo
Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain
Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked that he be given four
men. Defendant corporal Alberto Galanta, and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio
Serna and D. Fernandez, upon order of their sergeant, reported at the office of the
Provincial Inspector where they were shown a copy of the above-quoted telegram
and a newspaper clipping containing a picture of Balagtas. They were instructed to
arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to follow the instruction contained in the
telegram. The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was
likewise called by the Provincial Inspector. When the chief of police was asked
whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina, he answered that he knew one of loose
morals of the same name. Upon request of the Provincial Inspector, the chief of
police tried to locate some of his men to guide the constabulary soldiers in
ascertaining Balagtas' whereabouts, and failing to see anyone of them he
volunteered to go with the party. The Provincial Inspector divided the party into two
groups with defendants Oanis and Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the route
to Rizal street leading to the house where Irene was supposedly living. When this
group arrived at Irene's house, Oanis approached one Brigida Mallare, who was
then stripping banana stalks, and asked her where Irene's room was. Brigida
indicated the place and upon further inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with
her paramour. Brigida trembling, immediately returned to her own room which was
very near that occupied by Irene and her paramour. Defendants Oanis and Galanta
then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping with his back towards
the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32
and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour
already wounded, and looking at the door where the shots came, she saw the
defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned
out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo
Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's
paramour. The Provincial Inspector, informed of the killing, repaired to the scene
and when he asked as to who killed the deceased. Galanta, referring to himself and
to Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." The corpse was thereafter brought to the
provincial hospital and upon autopsy by Dr. Ricardo de Castro, multiple gunshot
wounds inflicted by a .32 and a .45 caliber revolvers were found on Tecson's body
which caused his death.
These are the facts as found by the trial court and fully supported by the evidence,
particularly by the testimony of Irene Requinea. Appellants gave, however, a
different version of the tragedy. According to Appellant Galanta, when he and chief
of police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter asked Brigida where Irene's room
was. Brigida indicated the place, and upon further inquiry as to the whereabouts of
Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in the same room. Oanis went
to the room thus indicated and upon opening the curtain covering the door, he said:
"If you are Balagtas, stand up." Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, and Irene woke up
and as the former was about to sit up in bed. Oanis fired at him. Wounded, Tecson
leaned towards the door, and Oanis receded and shouted: "That is Balagtas."
Galanta then fired at Tecson.
On the other hand, Oanis testified that after he had opened the curtain covering the
door and after having said, "if you are Balagtas stand up." Galanta at once fired at
Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, while the latter was still lying on bed, and continued
firing until he had exhausted his bullets: that it was only thereafter that he, Oanis,
entered the door and upon seeing the supposed Balagtas, who was then apparently
watching and picking up something from the floor, he fired at him.
The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their testimonies are certainly
incredible not only because they are vitiated by a natural urge to exculpate
themselves of the crime, but also because they are materially contradictory. Oasis
averred that be fired at Tecson when the latter was apparently watching somebody
in an attitudes of picking up something from the floor; on the other hand, Galanta
testified that Oasis shot Tecson while the latter was about to sit up in bed
immediately after he was awakened by a noise. Galanta testified that he fired at
Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, when the latter was rushing at him. But Oanis
assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying on bed. It is
apparent from these contradictions that when each of the appellants tries to
exculpate himself of the crime charged, he is at once belied by the other; but their
mutual incriminating averments dovetail with and corroborate substantially, the
testimony of Irene Requinea. It should be recalled that, according to Requinea,
Tecson was still sleeping in bed when he was shot to death by appellants. And this,
to a certain extent, is confirmed by both appellants themselves in their mutual
recriminations. According, to Galanta, Oanis shot Tecson when the latter was still in
bed about to sit up just after he was awakened by a noise. And Oanis assured that
when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying in bed. Thus corroborated, and
considering that the trial court had the opportunity to observe her demeanor on
the stand, we believe and so hold that no error was committed in accepting her
testimony and in rejecting the exculpatory pretensions of the two appellants.
Furthermore, a careful examination of Irene's testimony will show not only that her
version of the tragedy is not concocted but that it contains all indicia of veracity. In
her cross-examination, even misleading questions had been put which were
unsuccessful, the witness having stuck to the truth in every detail of the occurrence.
Under these circumstances, we do not feel ourselves justified in disturbing the
findings of fact made by the trial court.
The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while Tecson was sleeping in his room
with his back towards the door, Oanis and Galanta, on sight, fired at him
simultaneously or successively, believing him to be Anselmo Balagtas but without
having made previously any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. And the question is
whether or not they may, upon such fact, be held responsible for the death thus
caused to Tecson. It is contended that, as appellants acted in innocent mistake of
fact in the honest performance of their official duties, both of them believing that
Tecson was Balagtas, they incur no criminal liability. Sustaining this theory in part,
the lower court held and so declared them guilty of the crime of homicide through
reckless imprudence. We are of the opinion, however, that, under the circumstances
of the case, the crime committed by appellants is murder through specially
mitigated by circumstances to be mentioned below.
In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake of fact,
appellants rely on the case of U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488. The maxim is
ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is committed
without fault or carelessness. In the Ah Chong case, defendant therein after having
gone to bed was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out
twice, "who is there," but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a
robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again., "If you enter the room I will kill
you." But at that precise moment, he was struck by a chair which had been placed
against the door and believing that he was then being attacked, he seized a kitchen
knife and struck and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his room-
mate. A common illustration of innocent mistake of fact is the case of a man who
was marked as a footpad at night and in a lonely road held up a friend in a spirit of
mischief, and with leveled, pistol demanded his money or life. He was killed by his
friend under the mistaken belief that the attack was real, that the pistol leveled at
his head was loaded and that his life and property were in imminent danger at the
hands of the aggressor. In these instances, there is an innocent mistake of fact
committed without any fault or carelessness because the accused, having no time or
opportunity to make a further inquiry, and being pressed by circumstances to act
immediately, had no alternative but to take the facts as they then appeared to him,
and such facts justified his act of killing. In the instant case, appellants, unlike the
accused in the instances cited, found no circumstances whatsoever which would
press them to immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep,
appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard
to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to
that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed, according to Irene Requinea.
This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of action for appellants to follow even if
the victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight
but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if resistance or aggression is
offered by him.
Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is
reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance,
prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily
harm (People vs. Delima, 46 Phil, 738), yet he is never justified in using unnecessary
force or in treating him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means
when the arrest could be effected otherwise (6 C.J.S., par. 13, p. 612). The doctrine
is restated in the new Rules of Court thus: "No unnecessary or unreasonable force
shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to
any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention." (Rule 109, sec. 2, par. 2).
And a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses
unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest (5 C.J., p. 753; U.S. vs. Mendoza, 2
Phil., 109). It may be true that Anselmo Balagtas was a notorious criminal, a life-
termer, a fugitive from justice and a menace to the peace of the community, but
these facts alone constitute no justification for killing him when in effecting his
arrest, he offers no resistance or in fact no resistance can be offered, as when he is
asleep. This, in effect, is the principle laid down, although upon different facts, in
U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234, 242).
It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm" without
regard to his right to life which he has by such notoriety already forfeited. We may
approve of this standard of official conduct where the criminal offers resistance or
does something which places his captors in danger of imminent attack. Otherwise
we cannot see how, as in the present case, the mere fact of notoriety can make the
life of a criminal a mere trifle in the hands of the officers of the law. Notoriety rightly
supplies a basis for redoubled official alertness and vigilance; it never can justify
precipitate action at the cost of human life. Where, as here, the precipitate action of
the appellants has cost an innocent life and there exist no circumstances
whatsoever to warrant action of such character in the mind of a reasonably prudent
man, condemnation — not condonation — should be the rule; otherwise we should
offer a premium to crime in the shelter of official actuation.
The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing
being intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to
another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act
performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939). In the words of Viada,
"para que se celifique un hecho de imprudencia es preciso que no haya mediado en
el malicia ni intencion alguna de dañar; existiendo esa intencion, debera calificarse
el hecho del delito que ha producido, por mas que no haya sido la intencion del
agente el causar un mal de tanta gravedad como el que se produjo." (Tomo 7, Viada
Codigo Penal Comentado, 5.a ed. pag. 7). And, as once held by this Court, a
deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of
reckless imprudence (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232; People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil.,
16), and where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the
intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence (People vs. Gona, 54
Phil., 605) to support a plea of mitigated liability.
As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the
qualifying circumstance of alevosia. There is, however, a mitigating circumstance of
weight consisting in the incomplete justifying circumstance defined in article 11, No.
5, of the Revised Penal Code. According to such legal provision, a person incurs no
criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of
a right or office. There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be
taken as a justifying one: (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or
in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise
of such right or office. In the instance case, only the first requisite is present —
appellants have acted in the performance of a duty. The second requisite is wanting
for the crime by them committed is not the necessary consequence of a due
performance of their duty. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or
alive if resistance is offered by him and they are overpowered. But through
impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to take no chances, they have exceeded
in the fulfillment of such duty by killing the person whom they believed to be
Balagtas without any resistance from him and without making any previous inquiry
as to his identity. According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty
lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be
imposed.
For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are hereby declared
guilty of murder with the mitigating circumstance above mentioned, and
accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from five (5) years of prision
correctional to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the
law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased Serapio Tecson jointly and severally an
indemnity of P2,000, with costs.
Yulo, C.J., Bocobo, Generoso and Lopez Vito, A., concur.
Separate Opinions

PARAS, J., dissenting:
Anselmo Balagtas, a life termer and notorious criminal, managed to escape and flee
form Manila to the provinces. Receiving information to the effect that he was
staying with one Irene in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, the office of the Constabulary in
Manila ordered the Provincial Inspector in Cabanatuan by telegram dispatched on
December 25, 1938, to get Balagtas "dead or alive". Among those assigned to the
task of carrying out the said order, were Antonio Z. Oanis, chief of police of
Cabanatuan, and Alberto Galanta, a Constabulary corporal, to whom the telegram
received by the Provincial Inspector and a newspaper picture of Balagtas were
shown. Oanis, Galanta and a Constabulary private, after being told by the Provincial
Inspector to gather information about Balagtas, "to arrest him and, if overpowered,
to follow the instructions contained in the telegram," proceeded to the place where
the house of Irene was located. Upon arriving thereat, Oanis approached Brigida
Mallari, who was then gathering banana stalks in the yard, and inquired for the
room of Irene. After Mallari had pointed out the room, she was asked by Oanis to
tell where Irene's paramour, Balagtas, was, whereupon Mallari answered that he
was sleeping with Irene. Upon reaching the room indicated, Oanis and Galanta, after
the former had shouted "Stand up, if you are Balagtas," started shooting the man
who was found by them lying down beside a woman. The man was thereby killed,
but Balagtas was still alive, for it turned out that the person shot by Oanis and
Galanta was one Serapio Tecson.
Consequently, Oanis and Galanta were charged with having committed murder. The
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, however, convicted them only of homicide
through reckless imprudence and sentenced them each to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of from 1 year and 6 months to 2 years and 2 months of prision correctional,
to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of Serapio Tecson in the amount of
P1,000, and to pay the costs. Oanis and Galanta have appealed.
In accomplishing the acts with which the appellants were charged, they
undoubtedly followed the order issued by the Constabulary authorities in Manila
requiring the Provincial Inspector in Cabanatuan to get Balagtas dead or alive, in the
honest belief that Serapio Tecson was Anselmo Balagtas. As the latter became a
fugitive criminal, with revolvers in his possession and a record that made him
extremely dangerous and a public terror, the Constabulary authorities were justified
in ordering his arrest, whether dead or alive. In view of said order and the danger
faced by the appellants in carrying it out, they cannot be said to have acted
feloniously in shooting the person honestly believed by them to be the wanted man.
Conscious of the fact that Balagtas would rather kill than be captured, the
appellants did not want to take chances and should not be penalized for such
prudence. On the contrary, they should be commended for their bravery and
courage bordering on recklessness because, without knowing or ascertaining
whether the wanted man was in fact asleep in his room, they proceeded thereto
without hesitation and thereby exposed their lives to danger.
The Solicitor-General, however, contends that the appellants were authorized to use
their revolvers only after being overpowered by Balagtas. In the first place, the
alleged instruction by the Provincial Inspector to that effect, was in violation of the
express order given by the Constabulary authorities in Manila and which was shown
to the appellants. In the second place, it would indeed be suicidal for the appellants
or, for that matter, any agent of the authority to have waited until they have been
overpowered before trying to put our such a character as Balagtas. In the third
place, it is immaterial whether or not the instruction given by the Provincial
Inspector was legitimate and proper, because the facts exist that the appellants
acted in conformity with the express order of superior Constabulary authorities, the
legality or propriety of which is not herein questioned.
The theory of the prosecution has acquired some plausibility, though quite
psychological or sentimental, in view only of the fact that it was not Balagtas who
was actually killed, but an "innocent man . . . while he was deeply asleep."
Anybody's heart will be profoundly grieved by the trade, but in time will be
consoled by the realization that the life of Serapio Tecson was not vainly sacrificed,
for the incident will always serve as a loud warning to any one desiring to follow in
the footsteps of Anselmo Balagtas that in due time the duly constituted authorities
will, upon proper order, enforce the summary forfeiture of his life.
In my opinion, therefore, the appellants are not criminally liable if the person killed
by them was in fact Anselmo Balagtas for the reason that they did so in the
fulfillment of their duty and in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some
lawful purpose (Revised Penal Code, art. 11, pars. 5 and 6). They also cannot be held
criminally liable even if the person killed by them was not Anselmo Balagtas, but
Serapio Tecson, because they did so under an honest mistake of fact not due to
negligence or bad faith. (U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488).
It is true that, under article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred
by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended; but said article is clearly inapplicable since the killing of the
person who was believed to be Balagtas was, as already stated, not wrongful or
felonious.
The case of U.S. vs. Mendieta (34 Phil., 242), cited by the Solicitor-General, is not in
point, inasmuch as the defendant therein, who intended to injure Hilario Lauigan
with whom he had a quarrel, but killed another by mistake, would not be exempted
from criminal liability if he actually injured or killed Hilario Lauigan, there being a
malicious design on his part. The other case involved by the prosecution is U.S. vs.
Donoso (3 Phil., 234). This is also not in point, as it appears that the defendants
therein killed one Pedro Almasan after he had already surrendered and allowed
himself to be bound and that the said defendants did not have lawful instructions
from superior authorities to capture Almasan dead or alive.
The appealed judgment should therefore be reversed and the appellants, Antonio Z.
Oanis and Alberto Galanta, acquitted, with costs de oficio.
HONTIVEROS, J., dissenting:
According to the opinion of the majority, it is proper to follow the rule that a
notorious criminal "must be taken by storm without regard to his life which he has,
by his conduct, already forfeited," whenever said criminal offers resistance or does
something which places his captors in danger of imminent attack. Precisely, the
situation which confronted the accused-appellants Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto
Galanta in the afternoon of December 24, 1938, was very similar to this. It must be
remembered that both officers received instructions to get Balagtas "dead or alive"
and according to the attitude of not only the said appellants but also of Capt.
Monsod, constabulary provincial inspector of Nueva Ecija, it may be assumed that
said instructions gave more emphasis to the first part; namely, to take him dead. It
appears in the record that after the shooting, and having been informed of the case,
Capt. Monsod stated that Oanis and Galanta might be decorated for what they had
done. That was when all parties concerned honestly believed that the dead person
was Balagtas himself, a dangerous criminal who had escaped from his guards and
was supposedly armed with a .45 caliber pistol Brigida Mallari, the person whom
the appellants met upon arriving at the house of Irene Requinea, supposed mistress
of Balagtas, informed them that said Balagtas was upstairs. Appellants found there
asleep a man closely resembling the wanted criminal. Oanis said: If you are Balagtas
stand up," But the supposed criminal showed his intention to attack the appellants,
a conduct easily explained by the fact that he should have felt offended by the
intrusion of persons in the room where he was peacefully lying down with his
mistress. In such predicament, it was nothing but human on the part of the
appellants to employ force and to make use of their weapons in order to repel the
imminent attack by a person who, according to their belief, was Balagtas It was
unfortunate, however that an innocent man was actually killed. But taking into
consideration the facts of the case, it is, according to my humble opinion, proper to
apply herein the doctrine laid down in the case of U.S. vs. Ah Chong (15 Phil., 488).
In the instant case we have, as in the case supra, an innocent mistake of fact
committed without any fault or carelessness on the part of the accused, who having
no time to make a further inquiry, had no alternative but to take the facts as they
appeared to them and act immediately.
The decision of the majority, in recognition of the special circumstances of this case
which favored the accused-appellants, arrives at the conclusion that an incomplete
justifying circumstance may be invoked, and therefore, according to Article 69 of the
Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty should be one which is lower by one or
two degrees than that prescribed by law. This incomplete justifying circumstance is
that defined in Article 11, No. 5 of the Revised Penal Code, in favor of "a person who
acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office." I believe
that the application of this circumstance is not proper. Article 69 of the Revised
Penal Code provides as follows:
Art. 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly excusable.
— A penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be
imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the
conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the
several cases mentioned in articles 11 and 12, provided that the majority of such
conditions be present. The courts shall impose the penalty in the period which may
be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of the conditions of
exemption present or lacking.
This provision has been copied almost verbatim from Article 84 of the old Penal
Code of the Philippines, and which was also taken from Article 87 of the Spanish
Penal Code of 1870.

Judge Guillermo Guevara, one of the members of the Committee created by
Administrative Order No. 94 of the Department of Justice for the drafting of the
Revised Penal Code, in commenting on Article 69, said that the justifying
circumstances and circumstances exempting from liability which are the subject
matter of this article are the following: self-defense, defense of relatives, defense of
strangers, state of necessity and injury caused by mere accident. Accordingly,
justifying circumstance No. 5 of Article 11 dealing with the fulfillment of a duty or
the lawful exercise of a right, calling or office, cannot be placed within its scope.
The eminent treatiser of criminal law Mr. Groizard, in his commentary of Article 87
of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870 which is the source of Article 69 of our Code says:
Ni tratandose de la imbecilidad, ni de la locura, ni de la menor edad, ni del que obra
violentado por una fuerza inrresistible o impulsado por miedo insuperable de un
mal igual o mayor, o en cumplimiento de un deber, o en el ejercito legitimo de un
derecho, oficio o cargo, o en virtud de obediencia debida, ni del que incurre en
alguna omision hallandose impedido por causa legitima o insuperable, puede tener
aplicacion al articulo que comentamos. Y la razon es obvia. En ninguna de estas
execiones hay pluralidad de requisitos. La irrespondabilidad depende de una sola
condicion. Hay o no perturbacion de la razon; el autor del hecho es o no menor de
nueve años; existe o no violencia material o moral irresistible, etc., etc.; tal es lo que
respectivamente hay que examinar y resolver para declarar la culpabilidad o
inculpabilidad. Es, por lo tanto, imposible que acontezca lo que el texto que va al
frente de estas lineas rquiere, para que se imponga al autor del hecho la penalidad
excepcional que establece; esto es, que falten algunos requisitos de los que la ley
exige para eximir de responsabilidad, y que concurran el mayor numero de ellos,
toda vez que, en los casos referidos, la ley no exige multiples condiciones.
It must be taken into account the fact according to Article 69 a penalty lower by one
or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not
wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required by the
law to justify the same or exempt from criminal liability. The word "conditions"
should not be confused with the word "requisites". In dealing with justifying
circumstance No. 5 Judge Guevara states: "There are two requisites in order that
this circumstance may be taken into account: (a) That the offender acted in the
performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) That the injury or
offense committed be the necessary consequence of the performance of a duty or
the lawful exercise of a right or office." It is evident that these two requisites concur
in the present case if we consider the intimate connection between the order given
to the appellant by Capt. Monsod, the showing to them of the telegram from Manila
to get Balagtas who was with a bailarina named Irene, the conduct of said
appellants in questioning Brigida Mallari and giving a warning to the supposed
criminal when both found him with Irene, and the statement made by Capt.
Monsod after the shooting.
If appellant Oanis is entitled to a reversal of the decision of the court below, there
are more reasons in favor of the acquittal of appellant Galanta. According to the
evidence no bullet from the gun fired by this accused ever hit Serapio Tecson.
Galanta was armed in the afternoon of December 24, 1938, with a .45 caliber
revolver (Exhibit L). He so testified and was corroborated by the unchallenged
testimony of his superior officer Sgt. Valeriano Serafica. According to this witness,
since Galanta was made a corporal of the Constabulary he was given, as part of his
equipment, revolver Exhibit L with a serial No. 37121. This gun had been constantly
used by Galanta, and, according to Sgt. Pedro Marasigan, who accompanied said
accused when he took it from his trunk in the barracks on the night of December 24,
1938, upon order of Captain Monsod, it was the same revolver which was given to
the witness with five .45 caliber bullets and one empty shell. Fourteen unused
bullets were also taken from Galanta by Sergeant Serafica, thus completing his
regular equipment of twenty bullets which he had on the morning of December 24,
1938, when Sergeant Serafica made the usual inspection of the firearms in the
possession of the non-commissioned officers and privates of the constabulary post
at Cabanatuan. Galanta stated that he had fired only one shot and missed. This
testimony is corroborated by that of a ballistic expert who testified that bullets
exhibits F and O, — the first being extracted from the head of the deceased, causing
wound No. 3 of autopsy report Exhibit C and the second found at the place of the
shooting, — had not been fired from revolver Exhibit L nor from any other revolver
of the constabulary station in Cabanatuan. It was impossible for the accused Galanta
to have substituted his revolver because when Exhibit L was taken from him nobody
in the barracks doubted that the deceased was none other than Balagtas. Moreover,
Exhibit L was not out of order and therefore there was no reason why Galanta
should carry along another gun, according to the natural course of things. On the
other hand, aside from wound No. 3 as above stated, no other wound may be said
to have been caused by a .45 caliber revolver bullet. Doctor Castro's record gives the
conclusion that wound No. 2 must have been caused by a .45 caliber revolver bullet.
Doctor Castro's record gives the conclusion that wound No. 2 must have been
caused by a .45 caliber bullet, but inasmuch as the diameter of the wound's
entrance was only 8 mm., the caliber should be .32 and not .45, because according
to the medico-legal expert who testified in this case, a bullet of a .45 caliber will
produce a wound entrance with either 11 mm. or 12 mm. diameter. All other
wounds found by the surgeon who performed the autopsy appeared to have been
caused by bullets of a lesser caliber. In consequence, it can be stated that no bullet
fired by Galanta did ever hit or kill Serapio Tecson and therefore there is no reason
why he should be declared criminally responsible for said death.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-34140 August 15, 1931
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO SARA, defendant-appellant.
Eusebio C. Encarnacion for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
STREET, J.:
This appeal has been brought to reverse a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
the Province of Cavite, finding the appellant, Francisco Sara, guilty of the offense of
homicide and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for twelve years and one
day, reclusion temporal, with the accessories prescribed by law, and requiring him to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000 and to pay the costs of
prosecution.
It appears that on August 2, 1930, the appellant, Francisco Sara, armed with a
shotgun, was out in the barrio of Caong in the municipality of Silang, Cavite, with
the design of shooting birds. At the same time one Gabriel Catapang and his wife,
Ruperta Mendoza, were out collecting bananas. The witness Fructuoso Villanueva,
who was at work building a house close to the scene of the incident with which we
are here concerned, says that Ruperta Mendoza was in a path several paces in front
of her husband, Gabriel Catapang, while the latter, in turn, was proceeding ahead of
the accused, Francisco Sara. This is corroborated by the statement of Ruperta
Mendoza that she was going along about 5 brazas in front of Gabriel. Suddenly the
report of a gun was heard, and Ruperta, hearing the discharge, turned around and
saw Gabriel stretched on the ground and Francisco Sara running away carrying a
gun. The report of the gun also attracted the attention of Fructuoso Villanueva, who
came from the house where he was working, likewise finding Gabriel lying on the
ground. When the gun went off, Fructuoso says he was unable to see clearly the two
principals in the occurrence because of intervening coconut trees. When Ruperta
and Fructuoso arrived on the scene, they found that Gabriel Catapang had been
shot in the right lower part of the abdomen. Assistance was at once called and the
injured man was carried to the house of his wife's uncle, where he was asked by his
brother-in law who had shot him. In response Catapang pointed to Francisco Sara.
Death followed as a result of the wound within a few hours. The proof shows that
no enmity existed between the accused and the deceased, who in fact were related
to each other.
The medical officer who examined the wound reports that it was of circular form,
with a diameter of 2 inches, and that in the space around the principal cavity there
were fourteen small holes produced by scattering bird shot which had entered the
body. The wound involved two of the floating ribs as well as the ascending colon
and the right kidney.
The accused, testifying in his won behalf, stated that, seeing a bird sitting on a tree,
raised his gun intending to shoot, when Gabriel Catapang approached and asked
that he be permitted to shoot the bird, at the same time seizing the barrel of the
gun and pulling it around towards his own body. As the accused at this moment had
his finger on the trigger, the weapon was discharge and Gabriel received the load in
his abdomen. Upon seeing Gabriel fall, the accused says he was seized with fright
and ran away. Testifying as a witness in rebuttal, Ruperta Mendoza stated that she
did not hear her husband ask the accused to let him shoot the bird.
Reflection on the facts thus revealed leads us to the conclusion that the accused did
not testify with truth or candor in imputing the discharge of the gun to the act of
the deceased. The wound was too large in circumference to have resulted from the
discharge of the gun if the muzzle had been in proximity to the body of the
deceased. There must have been an intervening distance of a few feet at least in
order to permit the shot to scatter to the extent shown in the medical report. The
cause of the discharge of the gun must therefore be sought in an act, or acts, of the
accused; and inasmuch as he admits that his finger was on the trigger when the gun
was discharged, the conclusion must be that the accused was the responsible
author of the homicide. The relation of the parties, however, shows, we think, that
the killing could not have been intentionally committed and the result is reached, by
exclusion of the higher degree of criminality, that the homicide should be attributed
at least to the reckless and imprudent act of the accused in handling and
discharging the weapon in his hands. We therefore consider the accused guilty of
homicide by reckless imprudence, and we impose upon him the penalty of
imprisonment for one year, prision correccional, under paragraphs 1 and 3 of article
568 of the Penal Code.
It being understood, therefore, that the period of imprisonment is reduced from
twelve years and one day, reclusion temporal, to one year, prision correccional, the
judgment is in other respects affirmed. So ordered, with costs against the appellant.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 155791. March 16, 2005
MELBA QUINTO, Petitioners,
vs.
DANTE ANDRES and RANDYVER PACHECO, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
At around 7:30 a.m. on November 13, 1995, eleven-year-old Edison Garcia, a Grade
4 elementary school pupil, and his playmate, Wilson Quinto, who was also about
eleven years old, were at Barangay San Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac. They saw respondents
Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco by the mouth of a drainage culvert. Andres
and Pacheco invited Wilson to go fishing with them inside the drainage culvert.1
Wilson assented. When Garcia saw that it was dark inside, he opted to remain
seated in a grassy area about two meters from the entrance of the drainage
system.2
Respondent Pacheco had a flashlight. He, along with respondent Andres and Wilson,
entered the drainage system which was covered by concrete culvert about a meter
high and a meter wide, with water about a foot deep.3 After a while, respondent
Pacheco, who was holding a fish, came out of the drainage system and left4 without
saying a word. Respondent Andres also came out, went back inside, and emerged
again, this time, carrying Wilson who was already dead. Respondent Andres laid the
boy’s lifeless body down in the grassy area.5 Shocked at the sudden turn of events,
Garcia fled from the scene.6 For his part, respondent Andres went to the house of
petitioner Melba Quinto, Wilson’s mother, and informed her that her son had died.
Melba Quinto rushed to the drainage culvert while respondent Andres followed
her.7
The cadaver of Wilson was buried without any autopsy thereon having been
conducted. The police authorities of Tarlac, Tarlac, did not file any criminal
complaint against the respondents for Wilson’s death.
Two weeks thereafter, or on November 28, 1995, National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) investigators took the sworn statements of respondent Pacheco, Garcia and
petitioner Quinto.8 Respondent Pacheco alleged that he had never been to the
drainage system catching fish with respondent Andres and Wilson. He also declared
that he saw Wilson already dead when he passed by the drainage system while
riding on his carabao.
On February 29, 1996, the cadaver of Wilson was exhumed. Dr. Dominic Aguda of
the NBI performed an autopsy thereon at the cemetery and submitted his autopsy
report containing the following postmortem findings:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Body in previously embalmed, early stage of decomposition, attired with white long
sleeves and dark pants and placed inside a wooden coffin in a niche-apartment
style.
Hematoma, 14.0 x 7.0 cms., scalp, occipital region.
Abrasion, 4.0 x 3.0 cms., right face, 5.0 x 3.0 cms., left forearm.
Laryngo – tracheal lumina – congested and edematous containing muddy particles
with bloody path.
Lungs – hyperinflated, heavy and readily pits on pressure; section contains bloody
froth.
Brain – autolyzed and liquefied.
Stomach – partly autolyzed.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Asphyxia by drowning; traumatic head injuries, contributory.9
The NBI filed a criminal complaint for homicide against respondents Andres and
Pacheco in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, which found probable cause for
homicide by dolo against the two.
An Information was later filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac, Tarlac,
charging the respondents with homicide. The accusatory portion reads:
That at around 8 o’clock in the morning of November 13, 1995, in the Municipality
of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco y Suliven @
Randy, conspiring, confederating, and helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, and maul Wilson Quinto inside a
culvert where the three were fishing, causing Wilson Quinto to drown and die.
CONTRARY TO LAW.10
After presenting Garcia, the prosecution presented Dr. Dominic Aguda, who testified
on direct examination that the hematoma at the back of the victim’s head and the
abrasion on the latter’s left forearm could have been caused by a strong force
coming from a blunt instrument or object. The injuries in the larynx and trachea also
indicated that the victim died of drowning, as some muddy particles were also
found on the lumina of the larynx and trachea ("Nakahigop ng putik"). Dr. Aguda
stated that such injury could be caused when a person is put under water by
pressure or by force.11 On cross-examination, Dr. Aguda declared that the
hematoma on the scalp was caused by a strong pressure or a strong force applied to
the scalp coming from a blunt instrument. He also stated that the victim could have
fallen, and that the occipital portion of his head could have hit a blunt object.
Dr. Aguda also declared that the 14x7-centimeter hematoma at the back of Wilson’s
head could have rendered the latter unconscious, and, if he was thrown in a body of
water, the boy could have died by drowning.
In answer to clarificatory questions made by the court, the doctor declared that the
4x3-centimeter abrasion on the right side of Wilson’s face could have also been
caused by rubbing against a concrete wall or pavement, or by contact with a rough
surface. He also stated that the trachea region was full of mud, but that there was
no sign of strangulation.12
After the prosecution had presented its witnesses and the respondents had
admitted the pictures showing the drainage system including the inside portions
thereof,13 the prosecution rested its case.
The respondents filed a demurer to evidence which the trial court granted on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence, per its Order dated January 28, 1998. It also
held that it could not hold the respondents liable for damages because of the
absence of preponderant evidence to prove their liability for Wilson’s death.
The petitioner appealed the order to the Court of Appeals (CA) insofar as the civil
aspect of the case was concerned. In her brief, she averred that –
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE AND IN RULING THAT NO
PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLD ACCUSED-APPELLEES CIVILLY LIABLE
FOR THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM WILSON QUINTO.14
The CA rendered judgment affirming the assailed order of the RTC on December 21,
2001. It ruled as follows:
The acquittal in this case is not merely based on reasonable doubt but rather on a
finding that the accused-appellees did not commit the criminal acts complained of.
Thus, pursuant to the above rule and settled jurisprudence, any civil action ex
delicto cannot prosper. Acquittal in a criminal action bars the civil action arising
therefrom where the judgment of acquittal holds that the accused did not commit
the criminal acts imputed to them. (Tan v. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., 91 Phil. 672)15
The petitioner filed the instant petition for review and raised the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE EXTINCTION OF RESPONDENTS’ CRIMINAL LIABILITY,
LIKEWISE, CARRIES WITH IT THE EXTINCTION OF THEIR CIVIL LIABILITY.
II
WHETHER OR NOT PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLD RESPONDENTS
CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF WILSON QUINTO.16
The petitioner avers that the trial court indulged in mere possibilities, surmises and
speculations when it held that Wilson died because (a) he could have fallen, his
head hitting the stones in the drainage system since the culvert was slippery; or (b)
he might have been bitten by a snake which he thought was the prick of a fish fin,
causing his head to hit hard on the top of the culvert; or (c) he could have lost
consciousness due to some ailment, such as epilepsy. The petitioner also alleges
that the trial court erred in ruling that the prosecution failed to prove any ill motive
on the part of the respondents to kill the victim, and in considering that respondent
Andres even informed her of Wilson’s death.
The petitioner posits that the trial court ignored the testimony of the Medico-Legal
Expert, Dr. Aguda; the nature, location and number of the injuries sustained by the
victim which caused his death; as well as the locus criminis. The petitioner insists
that the behavior of the respondents after the commission of the crime betrayed
their guilt, considering that respondent Pacheco left the scene, leaving respondent
Andres to bring out Wilson’s cadaver, while respondent Andres returned inside the
drainage system only when he saw Garcia seated in the grassy area waiting for his
friend Wilson to come out.
The petitioner contends that there is preponderant evidence on record to show that
either or both the respondents caused the death of her son and, as such, are jointly
and severally liable therefor.
In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that since the prosecution
failed to adduce any evidence to prove that they committed the crime of homicide
and caused the death of Wilson, they are not criminally and civilly liable for the
latter’s death.
The petition has no merit.
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.17 The civil liability of
such person established in Articles 100, 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code
includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for
consequential damages.18 When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.19 With the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal
action, the two actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the
criminal action predominating the civil.20
The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter
him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from
society, to reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order.21 The
sole purpose of the civil action is the restitution, reparation or indemnification of
the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the
delictual or felonious act of the accused.22 While the prosecution must prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged, it is required to
prove the cause of action of the private complainant against the accused for
damages and/or restitution.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil
action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if
there is a finding in a final judgment in the civil action that the act or omission from
where the civil liability may arise does not exist.23
Moreover, a person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural and
logical consequences resulting therefrom although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.24 "Natural" refers to an occurrence in the
ordinary course of human life or events, while "logical" means that there is a
rational connection between the act of the accused and the resulting injury or
damage. The felony committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting injury.
Proximate cause is that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by an efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred. The proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately, or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor.25
There must be a relation of "cause and effect," the cause being the felonious act of
the offender, the effect being the resultant injuries and/or death of the victim. The
"cause and effect" relationship is not altered or changed because of the pre-existing
conditions, such as the pathological condition of the victim (las condiciones
patologica del lesionado); the predisposition of the offended party (la
predisposicion del ofendido); the physical condition of the offended party (la
constitucion fisica del herido); or the concomitant or concurrent conditions, such as
the negligence or fault of the doctors (la falta de medicos para sister al herido); or
the conditions supervening the felonious act such as tetanus, pulmonary infection
or gangrene.26
The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the resulting injury when:
(a) there is an active force that intervened between the felony committed and the
resulting injury, and the active force is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from
the felonious act of the accused; or
(b) the resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the victim.27
If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in
jeopardy and death follows as a consequence of their felonious act, it does not alter
its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes cooperated in
producing the factual result. The offender is criminally liable for the death of the
victim if his delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the
victim.28 A different doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime and to take
away from human life a salutary and essential safeguard.29 This Court has
emphasized that:
… Amid the conflicting theories of medical men, and the uncertainties attendant
upon the treatment of bodily ailments and injuries, it would be easy in many cases
of homicide to raise a doubt as to the immediate cause of death, and thereby to
open a wide door by which persons guilty of the highest crime might escape
conviction and punishment. …30
In People v. Quianzon,31 the Supreme Court held:
… The Supreme Court of Spain, in a Decision of April 3, 1879, said in a case similar to
the present, the following: Inasmuch as a man is responsible for the consequences
of his act – and in this case, the physical condition and temperament of the
offended party nowise lessen the evil, the seriousness whereof is to be judged, not
by the violence of the means employed, but by the result actually produced; and as
the wound which the appellant inflicted upon the deceased was the cause which
determined his death, without his being able to counteract its effects, it is evident
that the act in question should be qualified as homicide, etc.32
In the present case, the respondents were charged with homicide by dolo. In People
v. Delim,33 the Court delineated the burden of the prosecution to prove the guilt of
the accused for homicide or murder:
In the case at bar, the prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus delicti which
consists of two things: first, the criminal act and second, defendant’s agency in the
commission of the act. Wharton says that corpus delicti includes two things: first,
the objective; second, the subjective element of crimes. In homicide (by dolo) and in
murder cases, the prosecution is burdened to prove: (a) the death of the party
alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by the criminal act of some
other than the deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause or
suicide; and (c) that defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way
criminally responsible for the act which produced the death. To prove the felony of
homicide or murder, there must be incontrovertible evidence, direct or
circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately killed (with malice); in other words,
that there was intent to kill. Such evidence may consist inter alia in the use of
weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained
by the victim and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or
immediately after the killing of the victim. If the victim dies because of a deliberate
act of the malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively presumed.34
Insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned, the prosecution or the private
complainant is burdened to adduce preponderance of evidence or superior weight
of evidence. Although the evidence adduced by the plaintiff is stronger than that
presented by the defendant, he is not entitled to a judgment if his evidence is not
sufficient to sustain his cause of action. The plaintiff must rely on the strength of his
own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of the defendants’.35
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides how preponderance
of evidence is determined:
Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. – In civil cases, the party
having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.
In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the
issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstance of the
case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts
to which they testify, the probability of their testimony, their interest or want of
interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately
appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though
the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.36

In the present case, we rule that, as held by the trial court and the CA, the
prosecution failed to adduce preponderant evidence to prove the facts on which the
civil liability of the respondents rest, i.e., that the petitioner has a cause of action
against the respondents for damages.
It bears stressing that the prosecution relied solely on the collective testimonies of
Garcia, who was not an eyewitness, and Dr. Aguda.
We agree with the petitioner that, as evidenced by the Necropsy Report of Dr.
Dominic Aguda, the deceased sustained a 14x7-centimeter hematoma on the scalp.
But as to how the deceased sustained the injury, Dr. Aguda was equivocal. He
presented two possibilities: (a) that the deceased could have been hit by a blunt
object or instrument applied with full force; or (b) the deceased could have slipped,
fell hard and his head hit a hard object:
COURT:
The Court would ask questions.
Q So it is possible that the injury, that is – the hematoma, caused on the back of the
head might be due to the victim’s falling on his back and his head hitting a
pavement?
A Well, the 14x7-centimeter hematoma is quite extensive, so if the fall is strong
enough and would fall from a high place and hit a concrete pavement, then it is
possible.
Q Is it possible that if the victim slipped on a concrete pavement and the head hit
the pavement, the injury might be caused by that slipping?
A It is also possible.
Q So when the victim was submerged under water while unconscious, it is possible
that he might have taken in some mud or what?
A Yes, Sir.
Q So it is your finding that the victim was submerged while still breathing?
A Yes, Your Honor, considering that the finding on the lung also would indicate that
the victim was still alive when he was placed under water.37
The doctor also admitted that the abrasion on the right side of the victim’s face
could have been caused by rubbing against a concrete wall or pavement:
Q The abrasion 4x3 centimeters on the right [side of the] face, would it be caused by
the face rubbing against a concrete wall or pavement?
A Yes, Sir. Abrasion is usually caused by a contact of a skin to a rough surface.
Q Rough surface?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q When you say that the trachea region was full of mud, were there no signs that
the victim was strangled?
A There was no sign of strangulation, Your Honor.38
The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Dr. Aguda that the deceased might
have slipped, causing the latter to fall hard and hit his head on the pavement, thus:
Q -Could it be possible, Doctor, that this injury might have been caused when the
victim fell down and that portion of the body or occipital portion hit a blunt object
and might have been inflicted as a result of falling down?
A - If the fall … if the victim fell and he hit a hard object, well, it is also possible.39
The trial court took into account the following facts:
Again, it could be seen from the pictures presented by the prosecution that there
were stones inside the culvert. (See Exhibit "D" to "D-3"). The stones could have
caused the victim to slip and hit his head on the pavement. Since there was water
on the culvert, the portion soaked with water must be very slippery, aside from the
fact that the culvert is round. If the victim hit his head and lost consciousness, he
will naturally take in some amount of water and drown.40
The CA affirmed on appeal the findings of the trial court, as well as its conclusion
based on the said findings.
We agree with the trial and appellate courts. The general rule is that the findings of
facts of the trial court, its assessment of probative weight of the evidence of the
parties, and its conclusion anchored on such findings, affirmed no less by the CA,
are given conclusive effect by this Court, unless the trial court ignored, misapplied
or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, would change
the outcome of the case. The petitioner failed to show any justification to warrant a
reversal of the findings or conclusions of the trial and appellate courts.
That the deceased fell or slipped cannot be totally foreclosed because even Garcia
testified that the drainage culvert was dark, and that he himself was so afraid that
he refused to join respondents Andres and Pacheco inside.41 Respondent Andres
had no flashlight; only respondent Pacheco had one.
Moreover, Dr. Aguda failed to testify and explain what might have caused the
abrasion on the left forearm of the deceased. He, likewise, failed to testify whether
the abrasions on the face and left forearm of the victim were made ante mortem or
post mortem.
The petitioner even failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that either or both
the respondents hit the deceased with a blunt object or instrument, and,
consequently, any blunt object or instrument that might have been used by any or
both of the respondents in hitting the deceased.
It is of judicial notice that nowadays persons have killed or committed serious
crimes for no reason at all.42 However, the absence of any ill-motive to kill the
deceased is relevant and admissible in evidence to prove that no violence was
perpetrated on the person of the deceased. In this case, the petitioner failed to
adduce proof of any ill-motive on the part of either respondent to kill the deceased
before or after the latter was invited to join them in fishing. Indeed, the petitioner
testified that respondent Andres used to go to their house and play with her son
before the latter’s death:
Q Do you know this Dante Andres personally?
A Not much but he used to go to our house and play with my son after going from
her mother who is gambling, Sir.
Q But you are acquainted with him, you know his face?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Will you please look around this courtroom and see if he is around?
A (Witness is pointing to Dante Andres, who is inside the courtroom.)43
When the petitioner’s son died inside the drainage culvert, it was respondent
Andres who brought out the deceased. He then informed the petitioner of her son’s
death. Even after informing the petitioner of the death of her son, respondent
Andres followed the petitioner on her way to the grassy area where the deceased
was:
Q Did not Dante Andres follow you?
A He went with me, Sir.
Q So when you went to the place where your son was lying, Dante Andres was with
you?
A No, Sir. When I was informed by Dante Andres that my son was there at the
culvert, I ran immediately. He [was] just left behind and he just followed, Sir.
Q So when you reached the place where your son was lying down, Dante Andres
also came or arrived?
A It was only when we boarded the jeep that he arrived, Sir.44
In sum, the petitioner failed to adduce preponderance of evidence to prove a cause
of action for damages based on the deliberate acts alleged in the Information.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-38180 October 23, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SALVADOR CRISOSTOMO and INOCENCIO RAGSAC, accused-appellants.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
In an information dated July 9, 1973 filed with the Circuit Criminal Court, Seventh
Judicial District, Pasig, Rizal, Salvador Crisostomo and Inocencio Ragsac were
charged with murder alleged to have been committed as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of May, 1972 , in the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa,
Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused while then confined at the said institution, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, with treachery, evident premeditation and
deliberate intent to kill, each armed with improvised bladed weapon-did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and wound therewith one Antonio
Waje, No. 21909-P, a sentenced prisoner in the same institution, thereby inflicting
upon him multiple stab wounds in the different parts of his body while then
unarmed and unable to defend himself from the attack launched by the accused, as
a result of which the said Antonio Waje died instantly.
The commission of the foregoing offense is attended by the aggravating
circumstances of recidivism and quasi-recidivism based on the previous convictions
of the above-named accused as follows:
Salvador Crisostomo having been convicted of Theft by the JPC Tanauan, Batangas
on November 5, 1953; Robbery by the CFI Batangas, 18th Judicial District, Lipa City
on March 25, 1954; Illegal Possession of Firearm and ammunition by the same court
on June 16, 1955; Murder by the CFI Davao, Branch II on June 12, 1958 and Evasion
of Service of Sentence by the CFI Rizal, Branch XIII on March 4, 1970;
Inocencio Ragsac having been convicted fo Homicide by the CFI-Ilocos Sur, Branch III
on May 20, 1968 and Evasion of Service of Sentence by the CFI Rizal, Branch X on
July 20, 1971.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
The two accused, duly assisted by their counsel de officio, pleaded not guilty when
arraigned.
After trial, Judge Onofre A. Villaluz, rendered judgment on December 28, 1973, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Salvador Crisostomo and Inocencio Ragsac,
GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of Murder, as defined under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information, the Court hereby
sentences them to suffer the penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the heirs of the
offended party the amount of P10,000.00; to pay moral damages in the amount of
P5,000.00 and another P5,000.00, as exemplary damages, jointly and severally; and
to pay their proportionate share of the costs. 2
Hence, the present automatic review of the trial court's decision by this Court.
The trial court convicted the two accused Salvador Crisostomo and Inocencio Ragsac
of murder as charged in the information on the following findings of fact:
Four days prior to May 27, 1972, the accused Crisostomo gave sixty-two (P 62.00) to
the victim Maje to buy cigarettes and sugar. When Crisostomo asked for the things
he requested Waje to buy, the latter replied that the money was lost. Crisostomo
then asked Waje to repeat what he Waje said and the latter said, "Maulit ka" and
dared Crisostomo to fight it out with him. Infuriated by the actuations and remarks
of Waje and compounded by the facts that Waje killed prison guards Anselmo
Villablanca and Fortunato Villareal, of the Davao Penal Colony on November 13,
1958, who were the former supervisors of Crisostomo, the accused Salvador
Crisostomo and Inocencio Ragsac planned to kill Waje. At about 7:00 o'clock in the
morning of May 27, 1972, the two accused went out of their dormitory to carry out
their plan. Crisostomo followed the group of prisoners who were assigned to collect
garbage inside the prison compound while Ragsac proceeded to the general kitchen.
Then Crisostomo went to the general kitchen where he met Ragsac. There they
waited for the opportune time. When the accused saw the deceased walking
towards the Reception and Diagnostic Center, they followed him. Upon hearing the
victim, Crisostomo immediately stabbed Waje. The first trust did not prove fatal, so
Ragsac stabbed Waje and the two accused took turns in stabbing the victim. When
Servideo Camarillo saw Crisostomo and Ragsac stabbing the deceased, he fired
shots in the air. The two accused ran towards the direction of the general kitchen
and they lied face down. The PC and the security guards arrived. Camarillo then
went to the place where the accused ran to and there he recovered the weapons
used by the accused in the stabbing. 3
Waje was brought to the prison hospital but he died on arrival. The cause of his
death was determined to the hemorrhage secondary to stab wounds. The post-
mortem examination disclosed that Waje was stabbed seven times. 4
That same morning of May 27, 1972, Salvador Crisostomo and Inocencio Ragsac
were treated for their wounds at the prison's hospital by its resident physician, Luz
Alma Romero Santos. The accused Crisostomo was found to have sustained the
following injuries: abrasion-bridge of the nose; ecchymosis — right eye; abrasion
with contusion chin right; abrasion, right and 'left knee; lacerated wound, 1 1/2 inch
above the right ear; and contusion right index finger. The accused Ragsac was found
to have the following injuries: abrasion with contusion left wrist; abrasion with
contusion dorsal surface of left arm, proximal third; contusion left cheek-bone;
contusion dorsal surface of left hand; abrasion both knees; lacerated wound
occipital region right head. 5
After having been treated in the prison's hospital, the two accused Crisostomo and
Ragsac were investigated by prison guard Tolentino Avelina, the one assigned as
investigator for the death of Waje. 6 The investigation was conducted in Tagalog.
The accused Crisostomo was interrogated between 11:00 a.m. and 12:40 p.m. on
May 27, 1972. He executed a sworn statement (Exhibit "F") 7 wherein he related
that he had been in prison since 1953 for the crimes of theft, robbery in band,
murder and illegal possession of firearms; that about 7:00 A.M. on that day he
plotted with the accused Ragsac to kill Waje; that his reasons for wanting to kill
Waje were the following. a) because Waje killed prison guards Anselmo Villablanca
and Fortunato Villareal and wounded prison guard Predisvino Calugay who were his
supervisors and friends at the Davao Penal Colony in 1958; and b) because Waje
swindled him in 1962 of the amount of P62.00. When asked who were his
companions in stabbing the victim, he pointed at Inocencio Ragsac. 8
Likewise, the accused. Ragsac executed a sworn statement (Exhibit "G"). 9 He
admitted therein that he stabbed Waje several times. His motive was that he killed
Waje because he was asked by Crisostomo and that he cannot refuse him because
he is a friend. Moreover, the victim was a member of the Commando Gang, an
enemy of the Genuine Ilocano Gang to which he belonged. 10 He was interrogated
from 1:00 p.m. to 2:40 p.m. on the same day.
Aside from the two accused, prison guard Servideo Camarillo, who was an
eyewitness to the commission of the crime, was also investigated (Exhibit "H"). 11
He was asked by the investigator to Identify from among four weapons the two that
he had recovered from the two accused. He pointed at the weapons marked as
Exhibits "C" and "D" as the ones used by the accused Ragsac and Crisostomo
respectively. These were the very same weapons Identified by the two accused
when they were investigated by Avelina.
During the trial, the two accused gave a version of the incident which was different
from the one they related in their respective sworn statements, Exhibits "F" and
"G". According to their new version, the accused Crisostomo was the only one who
stabbed Waje. The accused Ragsac denied participation in the stabbing for he was
with the brigade of prisoners collecting garbage in the prison premises.
Furthermore, the accused Crisostomo allegedly acted in self-defense. According to
him four days prior to the incident, he requested Waje to buy him sugar and
cigarettes at the prison Post Exchange. For that purpose, he gave Waje P62.00. On
May 27, 1972, he saw Waje and asked him about his request. Waje said that he lost
the money. When asked how the money was lost Waje became irritated and
threatened to add him to the persons he had killed. At the same time, Waje struck
him with a "chaco" (a weapon made of two sharp-edged pieces of wood, connected
together with a string). Crisostomo allegedly saw Waje pulling something from his
body, so Crisostomo immediately brought out his own weapon (Exhibit "D") known
in prison parlance as "matalas" and stabbed Waje with it. 12
In their brief, the two accused assigned the following errors: 13
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
SALVADOR CRISOSTOMO AND INOCENCIO RAGSAC CONSPIRED TO KILL ANTONIO
WAJE AND THAT THE LATTER WAS KILLED WITH EVIDENT PREMEDITATION AND
TREACHERY.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT INOCENCIO
RAGSAC PARTICIPATED IN THE KILLING OF ANTONIO WAJE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT DEFENDANT- APPELLANT SALVADOR
CRISOSTOMO DID NOT ACT IN SELF- DEFENSE WHEN HE KILLED ANTONIO WAJE.
It is apparent that the trial court's finding of the existence of conspiracy to kill Waje
between the two accused and the alleged treacherous manner in which the killing
was executed is based on the sworn statements executed by Salvador Crisostomo
(Exhibit "F") and by Inocencio Ragsac (Exhibit "G").
It is, therefore, necessary to pass upon the admissibility of the confessions and their
sufficiency to sustain the conviction.
For a confession to be admissible in evidence, it is a general rule that it must have
been made without hope of benefit, without fear or duress, and without the use of
threat, torture, violence, artifice or deception. 14 Likewise, "written statements
which were made freely and voluntarily whereby they admitted participation in the
act complained of and sufficiently corroborated by other and independent evidence
introduced during the trial of the case are sufficient basis for conviction. 15
The question before the Court is whether the sworn statements made by the two
accused were freely and voluntarily given.
There is merit in the contention of the Solicitor General.16 that the injuries suffered
by the two accused (Exhibits "1" and "2") do not necessarily prove that they were
maltreated. The injuries of the two accused consisted of bruises and abrasions in
the arms and knees and ecchymosis in the right eye. Indeed, these kinds of injuries
are very likely to be sustained by one who suddenly drops prone to the ground
while in the act of running very fast as the two accused did when they heard the
shots fired by prison guard Camarillo. Likewise, if the testimony of the accused
Crisostomo that he was hit in the head with a "chaco" by Waje is to be given
credence, then his head wound was not due to maltreatment.
Moreover, as pointed out in the Appellee's Brief, 17 assuming arguendo that the
two accused were tortured, the torture was inflicted when the guards and soldiers
were trying to apprehend them following their assault on Waje, 18 and not when
their admissions were taken by Tolentino Avelina. In fact, the two accused admitted
during the trial that Avelina was good to them and that the latter did not threaten
or maltreat them. 19
Notable also is the time which lapsed between the alleged maltreatment which was
around 9:00 A.M. to 9:30 A.M. of May 27, 1972, as in fact they were treated for the
injuries sustained by reason thereof at around 9:35 A.M. of the same day, 20 and
the taking of their admissions which were from 11:00 A.M. to 12:40 P.M. for
Salvador Crisostomo and from 1:00 P.M. to 2:40 P.M. of the same days for Inocencio
Ragsac. 21 They had sufficient time to retract whatever admissions they made
during the alleged maltreatment when they were formally investigated more than
two hours later by Tolentino Avelina, who was admittedly good to them.
As regards the contention of counsel for the two accused that the admission of their
sworn statements is unconstitutional in the light of Sec. 20, Art. IV of the New
Constitution because they were not assisted by counsel, it is settled that
proscription against the admissibility of confessions obtained from the accused
during the period of custodial interrogation in violation of the procedural
safeguards, applies to confessions after the effectivity of the new charter on January
17, 1973. 22 The sworn statements of the two accused were executed before the
new constitution took effect.
The question of whether or not the two accused committed the killing in conspiracy
and with evident premeditation and treachery will now be taken up.
The conspiracy between the two accused is shown by the admitted fact that they
agreed to kill Waje two hours before he was actually killed. It is shown by the
concerted acts of the two accused of leaving their dormitory XI-B-3 at 7:00 A.M. on
the day of the killing, of meeting at the prison kitchen, of waiting for Waje to
appear, of approaching him and simultaneously stabbing him.
Because of the existence of conspiracy between the two accused the acts of one are
already considered the acts of the other. 23 Both are liable as principals.
Treachery is shown by the admission of the accused Crisostomo that he approached
Waje from behind, turned him about, then stabbed him (Exhibit "F"). The
suddenness of the attack was consciously adopted to facilitate the perpetration of
the crime without risk to themselves. 24
Evident premeditation can not be appreciated. The two accused allegedly planned
to kill Waje at 7:00 o'clock in the morning and the killing took place at 9:00 A.M.
(Exhibits "F" and "G"). The two accused did not have sufficient time to reflect during
the two hours that preceded the killing.
The final question to be resolved is whether the accused Crisostomo acted in self-
defense or not. He contends that he should not be liable for the death of Waje
because he acted in self-defense. According to the accused Crisostomo, Waje
attacked him with a "chaco" when he asked him about the P62.00 which he gave
him for the purchase of sugar and cigarettes at the prison Post Exchange.
By invoking self-defense, the accused Crisostomo admitted that he killed Antonio
Waje. With his admission, the burden is upon him to prove by sufficient and
convincing evidence that he was defending himself when he killed Waje. 25
To avail of the justifying circumstance of self-defense, the following elements must
be present — unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it, and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.
The trial court found the prosecution witnesses more credible than the defense
witnesses. This finding is entitled to great weight and should be given full faith and
credit in the absence of a showing that the trial court failed to take into account
circumstances of weight and importance in arriving at the findings.
Unlawful aggression is equivalent to assault or at least threatened assault of an
immediate and imminent kind. 26 There is unlawful aggression when the peril to
one's life, limb or right is either actual or imminent. There must be actual physical
force or actual use of weapon.
The claim of the accused Crisostomo that Waje was the one who attacked him
cannot be believed. It is contrary to common experience and to human nature to
take offense at the inquiry of the former on how the money was lost.
Although it is claimed by the accused Crisostomo that after he was struck with the
"chaco", he grabbed the same, the "chaco" was never presented to the prison
investigator. Nor was the said "chaco" ever mentioned in Exhibits "F" and "G". It was
brought up for the first time during the trial before the lower court.
There is no sufficient showing that Waje was armed at the time he was killed.
The victim not being armed, it was not reasonable for the two accused, both armed
with "matalas" to attack Waje and inflict upon him seven (7) stab wounds. The
accused Inocencio Ragsac escaped during the pendency of the review of this case.
Being a death convict, his flight from prison while his case was pending review, as
held by this Court in a similar case, 27 is evidence of his consciousness of guilt.
The two accused participated in the killing of the victim. The crime they committed
is murder qualified by treachery with the aggravating circumstance of recidivism.
Hence the trial court correctly imposed the death penalty. However, for lack of the
necessary votes, the penalty next lower in degree is imposed.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby affirmed, with the
modification that the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua and the indemnity to
be paid to the heirs of the deceased Antonio Waje is increased to the sum of
P12,000.00, with costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, CJ., Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos,
De Castro and Melencio- Herrera, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., concur in the result.
Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp, 2-3.

2 Rollo, p. 39.
3 Rollo, pp. 33-34.
4 Exhibit "A ", p. 16, Records.
5 Exhibits "I" and "2", pp, 40-41; Records, pp. 4-7, p. 15; TSN, Nov. 12, 1973, pp. 9-1
1; TSN, Nov. 17, 1973.
6 TSN, pp. 14-15, Nov. 5, 1973.
7 Records, p. 23.
8 Exhibit "4", Records, p. 23.
9 Records, p. 24.
10 Records, backpage of p. 25.
11 Records, p. 25.
12 TSN, pp. 7-10, Nov. 9,1973.
13 Brief for Defendants-Appellants, p. 4-, Rollo, p. 79,
14 U.S. vs. Agatea 40 Phil. 596,600.
15 People vs. Tolentino, 82 Phil. 808.
16 Brief for the Appellee, p. 13, Rollo, p. 91.
17 Brief for the Appellee, p. 14, Rollo, p. 91.
18 TSN, pp. 15-16, Nov. 9, 1973;
19 TSN, pp. 3.4, Nov. 14,1973. TSN, pp. 65-66, Nov. 12, 1973; TSN, pp, 38-40,
Nov. 13, 1973.
20 Exhibit "2", p. 41, Records; TSN, p. 11, Nov. 17, 1973.
21 Exhibits "F" and "G". Records, pp. 23-24.
22 Magtoto Manguera, 63 SCRA 4.
23 People vs. Sumayo 70 SCRA 488.
24 People vs. Lim, 71 SCRA 249.
25 People vs. Padiernos, 69 SCRA 484.
26 People vs. Alconga, 78 Phil. 366,

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 117954. April 27, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ORLANDO ACURAM, accused-
appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision rendered on August 24, 1994, by the Regional Trial Court
of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 22, in Criminal Case No. 91-1161, finding accused-
appellant Orlando Acuram guilty of murder. Supreme
On September 30, 1991, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Benber Apepe charged
appellant with the crime of murder, allegedly committed as follows: Sjcj
"On June 29, 1991, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, at Poblacion, El Salvador,
Misamis Oriental, which is within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with intent to kill and treachery did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and with the use of his armalite rifle, shoot at one
Orlando[1] Manabat who was just standing on the highway waiting for a ride
towards home, thus, hitting and wounding the latter on the right leg or thigh, which
caused his death the following day.
CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 248, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal
Code.[2]
Upon arraignment appellant, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty to the
charge.[3] Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. Subsequently, the trial court
rendered judgment, disposing as follows: Scjj
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing facts, convincingly proved by the
prosecution, the accused, ORLANDO ACURAM, is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, of the crime of MURDER, qualified by treachery, and is meted the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased ROLANDO
MANABAT the jurisprudential sum of fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED."[4]
The records disclose that on June 29, 1991, at around seven o'clock in the evening,
Rolando Manabat, Oscar Manabat, Bartolome Nabe, and Peterson Valendres, after
the day's work, proceeded to the market in El Salvador, Misamis Oriental, to buy
fish. Since no fish was available at that time, they decided to head for home instead.
They went to the national highway, stood at the right side facing east towards the
direction of Cagayan de Oro City and waited for a ride there. They flagged down an
approaching passenger jeepney which, however, swerved dangerously towards
them. At this juncture, Rolando Manabat shouted at the jeep "Pesteng yawa-a
kamo, Manligis man kamo " (You devils, why did you try to run over us?). A
passenger inside the jeepney shouted back, "Noano man diay, isog mo?" (Why? Are
you brave?). Immediately thereafter, two gunshots rang out in the air, accompanied
by sparks coming from the front right side of the jeepney. Then Rolando shouted,
"Agay. I was shot." The vehicle did not stop but instead speeded towards the
direction of Cagayan de Oro City. Wounded on the right knee, Rolando was brought
by his companions to the Cagayan de Oro Medical Center. Later on, they were
informed that Rolando needed blood transfusion and so they transferred him at
around 11:25 P.M. to the Northern Mindanao Regional Hospital in the same city. Jjsc
Upon arrival at the hospital, Rolando was examined by Dr. Ismael Naypa, Jr. The
doctor found the victim's blood pressure to be just forty over zero (40/0) and the
victim's right leg was heavily bandaged. He decided to operate on the victim when
the latter's blood pressure stabilized. At about 5:00 A.M. the following day, the
victim underwent surgery. Unfortunately, the victim died at around 11:00 A.M. Dr.
Naypa later testified that the cause of Rolando's death was "secondary to huddle
respiratory syndrome secondary to blood loss, secondary to gunshot wounds", or
briefly, massive loss of blood due to gunshot wound. He stated that under normal
circumstances, the wound would not necessarily cause death but in this case where
the wound transected the major part of the leg, the wound was fatal. He clarified
that the victim sustained only one gunshot wound which entered at the front
portion of the right knee and exited at the back of the right knee, causing two
wounds.[5]
The El Salvador police conducted investigation on the incident. It was discovered
that appellant Orlando Acuram, a policeman assigned with the 421st PNP Company
based at San Martin, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental, was among the passengers of the
errant jeepney. He was seated at the front, right side of the jeepney and was the
only one among its passengers who was carrying a firearm. Pending investigation,
he was restricted to the camp effective July 1, 1991, upon orders of his commanding
officer, Major Rodolfo De La Piedra.[6] Appellant was later surrendered by his
commanding officer to the custody of the court on the basis of the warrant of arrest
issued by MCTC Judge Evelyn Nery.[7] On motion by the prosecution and without
objection from the defense, the trial court suspended appellant from the service
and ordered his detention at the provincial jail.[8]
During the trial, appellant admitted that he was on board the mentioned jeepney
and had a gun at that time but denied firing it. He claimed that it was impossible for
him to fire his rifle during that time since he was sitting at the front seat of the
jeepney, sandwiched between the driver and the latter's father-in-law. Moreover, he
said that the rifle was locked and wrapped by his jacket and its barrel was even
pointed towards the driver.[9]
The trial court found the version of the defense weak, self-serving and unreliable.
On the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution, the court found
appellant guilty as charged. Insisting on his innocence, appellant readily filed his
notice of appeal.[10] In his brief, appellant raises the following errors allegedly
committed by the trial court: Edpmis
"I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT ACCUSED APPELLANT
TOOK FLIGHT OR ESCAPED AFTER THE NIGHT OF THE INCIDENT OR IN FAILING TO
CONSIDER THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE KILLING WAS ATTENDED BY THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY, GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT THE
ACCUSED APPELLANT IS GUILTY.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS THE
PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIME CHARGED, DESPITE THE FACT THAT ACCUSED WAS
NOT PROPERLY AND CONCLUSIVELY IDENTIFIED, AND THE ALLEGED WEAPON NOT
POSITIVELY TESTED.
IV
THAT THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING EVIDENCE POINTING TO
THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, THAT IS, THE EXISTENCE OF
EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE, WHICH IS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DEATH
OF THE VICTIM."[11]
We shall take up in seriatim the challenges posed by appellant to the credibility and
sufficiency of the evidence for the prosecution. We shall also consider the weight
and credibility of his defense.
To begin with, while appellant denies that he fled and hid after the shooting
incident, we find that his behavior proves otherwise. Appellant admits that he was
at the scene of the crime at the time the shooting happened. Considering that he is
a law enforcement officer, the unusual incident should have at least elicited his
curiosity and he should have inquired about it. However, he chose to ignore the
incident and go his way.[12] That a policeman could display such indifference to a
crime committed in his presence is highly incredible. While it was true that he
reported for duty the day after the incident, the following day, he was ordered by
his commanding officer restricted within the camp pending investigation of the
case. By this time, appellant must have learned that his commanding officer had
received a radio message and that he was already a suspect. As the trial court
noted, no superior officer will hold back from any of his men involved, such a grave
charge. Despite these, appellant did not present himself before the police in El
Salvador, Misamis Oriental. Instead, he was conveniently nowhere to be found.
Misoedp
Thus, appellant's first contention that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender, in our view, is quite untenable. The essence of voluntary
surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit
himself unconditionally to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt
or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his
search and capture.[13] In this case, it was appellant's commanding officer who
surrendered him to the custody of the court. Being restrained by one's superiors to
stay within the camp without submitting to the investigating authorities concerned,
is not tantamount to voluntary surrender as contemplated by law. The trial court is
correct in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in
appellant's favor. Misedp
On his second assignment of error, however, we find convincing merit. Appellant
asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that the killing was qualified by
treachery. On this point, we agree. For treachery to be considered an aggravating
circumstance, there must be proof that the accused consciously adopted a mode of
attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself.[14] In this
case, the shooting was done at the spur of the moment. As observed by the trial
court, the victim had shouted damning curses at the driver and the passengers of
the jeepney. The shooting was on instantaneous response to the cursing, as
appellant correctly claimed.[15] Treachery cannot be appreciated where the
accused shot the victim as a result of a rash and impetuous impulse rather than
from a deliberate act of the will.[16]
Thirdly, appellant contends that the trial court erred in ruling that he was the
perpetrator of the crime. He claims he was not conclusively identified and the
alleged fatal weapon was not positively tested. True, prosecution witnesses did not
positively identify appellant as the one who fired the gun at the victim.
Nevertheless, direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix
where the trial court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt.[17] It is settled
that conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence provided that the
following requisites must concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of
all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
[18] Circumstantial evidence could be of similar weight and probative value as direct
evidence. From direct evidence of a minor fact or facts, by a chain of circumstances
the mind is led intuitively, or by a conscious process of reasoning, towards a
conviction that from said fact or facts some other facts may be validly inferred.[19]
No greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than
when it is direct. In either case, what is required is that there be proof beyond
reasonable doubt that the crime was committed and that the accused committed
the crime.[20]
As noted by the trial court and the Solicitor General, the evidence for the
prosecution is replete with details, duly proven by the prosecution and to some
extent by admissions of the defense, enough to sustain the guilt of appellant. These
are: (1) The appellant was a former member of the Philippine Constabulary and,
during the incident, was a member of the Philippine National Police. He was skilled
in handling firearms. (2) The appellant was issued a firearm (armalite rifle) by his
command, which he was then carrying with him before, during and after the
incident. (3) At the particular date, time and place of the incident, appellant was
carrying his duly issued armalite rifle inside the jeepney from where the gunfire
came from. (4) The appellant was sitting on the extreme front-right-side of the
jeepney where the sparks of the gunbursts were seen and heard by the witnesses.
(5) There were no other persons with a rifle inside the jeepney except the appellant.
(6) The empty shells of an armalite rifle were recovered at the place where the fatal
shooting occurred. (7) The appellant did not go forward to the authorities to present
himself until after a warrant of arrest was issued and, in fact, until his actual arrest.
[21]
The aforecited circumstances taken together constitute an unbroken chain leading
to a reasonable conclusion that appellant, to the exclusion of others, was
responsible for the victim's death. They constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt
that appellant was the perpetrator of the offense. It is the height of desperation on
appellant's part to insist that there should be an eyewitness to the precise moment
the shot was fired considering the sudden and completely unexpected shooting of
the victim.[22] Here, circumstantial evidence suffices. Edp
Appellant's insistence on his innocence in view of the absence of paraffin and
ballistic tests, in our view, is far from convincing. Suffice it to state that even
negative findings of the paraffin test do not conclusively show that a person did not
fire a gun. The absence of nitrates could be explained if a person discharged a
firearm with gloves on, or if he thoroughly washed his hands thereafter.[23]
Lastly, in his attempt to exculpate himself, appellant blames the death of the victim
on the lack of prompt and proper medical attention given. He insists that the delay
in giving proper medical attendance to the victim constitutes an efficient intervening
cause which exempts him from criminal responsibility. This assertion is
disingenuous, to say the least. Appellant never introduced proof to support his
allegation that the attending doctors in this case were negligent in treating the
victim. On the contrary, Dr. Ismael Naypa, Jr., testified that the attending doctor at
the Cagayan de Oro Medical Center tried his best in treating the victim by applying
bandage on the injured leg to prevent hemorrhage. He added that the victim was
immediately given blood transfusion at the Northern Mindanao Regional Hospital
when the doctor found out that the victim had a very low blood pressure.
Thereafter, the victim's blood pressure stabilized. Then, the doctor operated the
victim as the main blood vessel of the victim's right leg was cut, thereby causing
massive loss of blood. The surgery was finished in three hours. Unfortunately, the
victim died hours later. We cannot hold the attending doctors liable for the death of
the victim. The perceived delay in giving medical treatment to the victim does not
break at all the causal connection between the wrongful act of the appellant and
the injuries sustained by the victim. It does not constitute efficient intervening
cause. The proximate cause of the death of the deceased is the shooting by the
appellant. It is settled that anyone inflicting injuries is responsible for all the
consequences of his criminal act such as death that supervenes in consequence of
the injuries. The fact that the injured did not receive proper medical attendance
would not affect appellant's criminal responsibility. The rule is founded on the
practical policy of closing to the wrongdoer a convenient avenue of escape from the
just consequences of his wrongful act. If the rule were otherwise, many criminals
could avoid just accounting for their acts by merely establishing a doubt as to the
immediate cause of death.[24]
To conclude, since the qualifying circumstance was not proved in this case, the
crime committed is only homicide, not murder. Under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code, the applicable penalty for homicide is only reclusion temporal. As there
is neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance found by the trial court or shown
after a review of the records, the penalty in this case shall be fixed in its medium
period of reclusion temporal, which ranges from a minimum of 14 years, 8 months
and 1 day to a maximum of 17 years and 4 months. Further applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty shall be within the range of
prision mayor as a minimum to reclusion temporal in its medium period as the
maximum. The range of prision mayor is from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years. The
span of reclusion temporal, medium, is from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17
years and 4 months. Edpsc
WHEREFORE, the assailed DECISION of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro
City, Branch 22, in Criminal Case No. 91-1161, is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant
Orlando Acuram is hereby found GUILTY of HOMICIDE and sentenced to suffer a
prison term of 10 years of the medium period of prision mayor, as minimum, to 15
years and 10 months and 1 day of the medium period of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, with accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Rolando Manabat in the amount of P50,000.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] Corrected by witness as "Rolando" Manabat, TSN, January 13, 1992, p. 14.
[2] Rollo, p. 9.
[3] Records, pp. 29-30.
[4] Rollo, p. 56.
[5] TSN, March 4, 1992, pp. 4-15.
[6] Records, p. 13.
[7] TSN, December 29, 1992, p. 30; Records, p. 15.
[8] Records, p. 52.
[9] TSN, December 29, 1992, pp. 5-24.
[10] Rollo, p. 57.
[11] Rollo, p. 87.
[12] TSN, December 29, 1992, pp. 13-14.
[13] People vs. Ramos, 296 SCRA 559, 572-573 (1998).
[14] People vs. Quitlong, 292 SCRA 360, 382 (1998).
[15] Rollo, p. 95.
[16] People vs. Navarro, 295 SCRA 139, 146 (1998).
[17] People vs. Bermas, G.R. Nos. 76416 and 94312, July 5, 1999, p. 21.
[18] Section 4, Rule 133, Rules of Court.
[19] R.J. Francisco. Basic Evidence, p. 190 (1991).
[20] People vs. Mangat, G.R. No. 131618, July 6, 1999, pp. 7-8.
[21] Rollo, pp. 43-44.
[22] People vs. Fuertes, 229 SCRA 289, 300 (1994).
[23] People vs. Oliano, 287 SCRA 158, 177 (1998).
[24] R. and C. Aquino. I The Revised Penal Code 74, 76-77, 84 (1997).
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-39207 September 25, 1975
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERMIN PADIRAYON and JAIME VICENTE, defendants, FERMIN PADIRAYON,
defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Jose F.
Racela, Jr. and Solicitor Carlos N. Ortega for plaintiff-appellee.
Guillermo B. Fuertes for defendant-appellant.
FERNANDO, J.:
It is not too often that the Solicitor General accords acceptance to the basic premise
of the defense in seeking acquittal that there was failure to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence.1 It is even rarer for the pleadings
submitted by both panels, in this case instead of a brief, the Solicitor General having
filed a manifestation and motion joining appellant Fermin Padirayon in his prayer
that the lower court decision finding him guilty of murder be reversed and that he
be acquitted, to carry the impress of a thorough and comprehensive scrutiny of the
evidence and thereafter a logical and persuasive appraisal thereof. It has happened
in this case. Both Attorney Guillermo B. Fuertes in the brief and Solicitor General
Estelito P. Mendoza2 in the aforesaid motion and manifestation are to be
commended for the clarity with which the applicable law and legal doctrines were
set forth in language of accuracy and of vigor. An examination of the records of the
case confirms their submission that viewed from the lack of the credibility of the
testimony offered by the sole eyewitness whose bias and prejudice would diminish
the reliability of his testimony as he would benefit thereby, being the other logical
suspect, and with the absence of any motive on the part of appellant, the appealed
judgment cannot be sustained. We reverse.
As set forth in the appealed decision, the facts as testified by the prosecution may
be summarized thus: "Jaime Vicente was employed as driver of a dump truck owned
by the Northern Luzon Super Sawmill with place of business at Nagbaranganan,
Sanchez Mira, Cagayan. Aside from driving the dump truck, his duty was also to
conduct home the employees to Pata and Namuac, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan. In the
afternoon of March 28, 1972, he conducted the workers of the company to Namuac,
Sanchez Mira. After conducting the workers, Jaime Vicente proceeded home,
passing by the house of Fermin Padirayon at Namuac. He was flagged down. He
slowed his vehicle and Fermin Padirayon boarded his truck and seated himself at the
left of the driver. He was very close to the driver and was in fact rubbing elbows
with him. They drove eastward. Suddenly, Fermin Padirayon grabbed the wheels.
Before Jaime Vicente could do anything, the truck was already going towards
another direction and a man was run over. Thereafter, Fermin Padirayon made the
remark, 'that was the man who hacked me.' Thereafter, Fermin Padirayon continued
to drive the truck towards their house. Reaching their house, Fermin Padirayon
alighted. Jaime Vicente told him that it would not be possible that he should not go
to town. He pulled Fermin Padirayon who struggled and was able to free himself,
and ran away. From then on, he did not see Fermin Padirayon anymore. Jaime
Vicente boarded his truck and proceeded to the municipal building of Sanchez Mira,
Cagayan. He reported the incident. He was interrogated by the Mayor and the Chief
of Police and several soldiers. After his investigation, he was sent home. Fermin
Padirayon, the accused in this case, is a cousin-in-law of Jaime Vicente because he is
married to a first-degree cousin. When Fermin Padirayon flagged him down to board
his truck, he did not know where he was going. From the place where he boarded
up to the place where he saw a person bumped by Fermin Padirayon when he
grabbed the wheel, was a distance of about 40 meters. It turned out later that the
victim was Dionisio Lacuata. The following morning, March 29, 1972, the matter was
relayed to the family of the victim. It was also reported to the barrio captain of
Namuac, Mr. Dominador Macatuggal. The information relayed to the barrio captain
was the presence of a dead person on a road in Namuac. He went immediately to
the vicinity and found the cadaver lying and occupying about 1/3 of the road on the
left side. It turned out that the dead person was a son of Emilio Lacuata, whose
name he can no longer remember. Describing the deceased, he calculated his age to
be between 20 to 23. Immediately, the barrio captain sent somebody to call for the
Mayor. To his call the Mayor responded. Together, they looked over the cadaver
which was then lying flat with his head towards the southern part of the road. The
mayor sent for Dr. Ambrocio Ramiro, a resident physician of the nearby Northern
Cagayan Hospital. Dr. Ramiro examined the body and reduced into writing his
findings. As the person was already dead, the doctor merely conducted a
postmortem examination. From the postmortem examination report, submitted by
the doctor, the following were the injuries found: 1. The body is in a state of rigor
mortis withserosanguinous discharge from the mouth and nose. 2. Abrasion, right
side of the head and cheek. 3. Abrasion with hematoma with crepitus anterior chest
wall. 4. Simple fracture of sternum and ribs of the upper half, anterior chest. 5.
Abrasion with hematoma, right side posterior surface of abdomen and thorax. From
the above findings, the doctor stated that the victim could have died between 3 to
24 hours before examination. Judged from the appearance of the injuries described
in the postmortem examination certificate, the doctor concluded that the injuries
could have been caused by a hard, blunt object with face sliding with a bumper of a
6 x 6 truck or caused by a tire of a 6 x 6 truck. The second injury was characterized
as serious. The fracture of the upper sternum was caused probably by a 6 x 6 truck
running over the body lying with face upwards. Again, the fourth injury was
characterized as fatal because of the fracture of the sternum and ribs which
impaired the movement of the heart. In addition to the postmortem examination
certificate, the doctor likewise issued a death certificate, .... In this death certificate,
the cause of death has been stated as crushed-injury chest."3
It is easily understandable why the brief for appellant did call attention to the
paucity of proof that could meet the test of demonstrating guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. The presumption of innocence as decreed by the Constitution could thus be
the basis of a plea for reversal. From the opening paragraph of the manifestation
and motion for Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza where the acquittal of appellant
is sought, the acceptance of appellants version is rather evident. Thus: "In convicting
the appellant, the trial court relied mainly on the testimony of Jaime Vicente, driver
of the 6 x 6 dump truck that bumped and ran over Dionisio Lacuata, the victim in
this case. Jaime Vicente, who turned state witness, declared in essence that while
driving on the night in question along the narrow barrio road of Namuac, Sanchez
Mira, Cagayan, the appellant boarded his truck and not long thereafter suddenly
grabbed the steering wheel from him and maneuvered the truck towards the victim
who was walking on the left side of the road ... . It is not disputed that Jaime Vicente
was the driver of the dump truck and was actually driving it when the appellant
boarded until the incident occurred. Under such circumstances the presumption
should be that Jaime Vicente was driving the truck when the vehicle bumped and
ran over the deceased ... . Consequently, the prosecution's evidence must overcome
this presumption."4
That is to recall the aforesaid constitutional provision on guilt having to be
demonstrated as an accused is assumed to be innocent, on which reliance was
placed by appellant. The Solicitor General, fully cognizant of its mandatory
character, did, as was made clear, give his full support to the plea for acquittal. So it
must be, for the evidence for the prosecution on which conviction was predicated
by the lower court, to repeat, is vitiated by lack of credibility, not to mention its
proceeding from a source whose bias was a strong, perhaps irresistible, factor, for
incriminating somebody else to whom no motive could legitimately be ascribed and
thus exculpating himself as a logical suspect, being the driver of the vehicle of
death.
1. The failure of the testimony of Vicente to inspire credence was emphasized
by appellant's counsel. That was to be expected. What strengthens his stand is the
appraisal thereof in the Manifestation and Motion of the Solicitor General in terms
of "its contrariness to common experience."5 Thus: "Before and during the incident:
a) Jaime Vicente claims that while driving his dump truck eastward, appellant,
standing on the left side of the road opposite his house, flagged him down ... .
Appellant was going to the house of his father-in-law, also towards the east ... .
Jaime Vicente also claims that upon boarding the vehicle, appellant seated himself
at his left, that appellant's right foot was inside the truck even as his left foot was
suspended and that appellant's right elbow was rubbing his left elbow and that he
was in this position when he was in this position when he grabbed the steering
wheel. ... . On the other hand, appellant declared that he was standing on the right
side of the road just outside the gate of the yard of his house when he saw the
dump truck. It was drizzling then. He flagged the truck to stop and although the
truck stopped, it passed him, so that he boarded the truck from the rear ... . But
whether appellant boarded from the left side, or from the right side or from the rear
of the truck is belaboring an inconsequential point. Common experience tells us
that one boarding a vehicle would look for, and stay at, the most comfortable place
in the vehicle. If Jaime Vicente's version is to believed, it would be that appellant
chose a most uncomfortable place in the vehicle. This, we submit, is improbable. b)
The road was admittedly a narrow barrio road on which two 6 x 6 dump trucks could
hardly meet without one stopping to allow the other to pass .... It was a dark night
and raining that ... . Yet, Jaime Vicente admits he was driving at the truck 'quite
fast' ... . Given these circumstances and assuming that appellant did grab the
steering wheel, Jaime Vicente's reflex action would have been to execute a counter-
maneuver to prevent his vehicle from hitting the victim. Just as appellant had easily
grabbed the steering wheel, Jaime Vicente could have also easily steered it away
from the victim to avoid the incident. Assuming again that appellant did what Jaime
Vicente claims he did, the truck would have veered to the very edge of the narrow
road after it hit Dionisio Lacuata considering its speed. Since there is no showing
that this occurred, the probability is that Jaime Vicente had full and complete
control of the truck all along. And, more importantly, we can not ignore the
possibility, perhaps probability, that he did not drive the vehicle with requisite
care."6 After which, it proceeded to appraise, Vicente's testimony insofar as it
related what occurred next. As set forth therein: "After the incident: a) Jaime
Vicente admits that after seeing the victim run over, he did not stop the truck, much
less alight and check on what happened to the victim. Nor did he tell the appellant
to go down and see what happened ... . Instead, Jaime Vicente continued to move
his truck ... . To this effect, we quote the appellant's brief at pages 12 to 13 thereof,
to wit: 'Under the circumstances, the only tenable reaction of a man in his position
would have been to react with righteous indignation against appelant and also to
render assistance to the victim of the latter's alleged misdeed. He did neither the
one nor the other.' b) We doubt that Jaime Vicente reported the incident to the
authorities immediately that very night. For if he made an immediate report, the PC
or police authorities would not have delayed their investigation that night. They
could have used the dump truck Vicente was then driving to go to the place of the
incident. However, the records show that the police went to the scene of the
incident only on the following day, March 29, 1972 ... . The prosecution failed to
present Sgt. Sarandi to whom Vicente allegedly first made the report ... . Again, if
Vicente's pretense were true, what he reported to Sgt. Sarandi was only that a
person was run over at Namuac. He did not inform who the victim was, or who was
responsible, and what vehicle was used ... . This despite the fact that he allegedly
spent the night in the Municipal Building ... . c) The truth of the matter is that
Vicente reported to Chief of Police Juanita Buentipo at the Municipal Building only
the following morning. He informed about a man who died in the middle of the road
... . This witness did not state then that appellant was the one responsible for the
victim's death. Even in his report to the police as reflected in the Police Blotter ...
which was entered on March 29, 1972 ..., Jaime Vicente did not mention the
appellant as the culprit. d) The foregoing actuations of Jaime Vicente do not speak
well of his credibility. His story is too unnatural to deserve any credence. But the
trial reasoned out that he did not immediately point the appellant to the authorities
because he wanted to protect the latter, being the husband of his first cousin ... . It
should be stresses however that his relationship with the appellant is only by affinity
... . In the situation that Vicente was in, he would not sacrifice his own self-
preservation because of his relationship to the appellant."7
2. Counsel for appellant in his brief laid considerable stress on the bias of
Jaime Vicente, who, as the driver, "is necessarily the primary suspect."8 He was, as
therein pointed out, "actually included in the charge but had to be discharged only
because the People needed him as a State witness. " 9 The Solicitor General viewed
the matter similarly. Thus: "there should be no doubt that Jaime Vicente is a biased
and interested witness. Being the authorized driver of the truck that admittedly ran
over the deceased Dionisio Lacuata, he became the primary suspect. This was even
the impression of Emilio Lacuata, father of the deceased .... Jaime Vicente was in
fact originally included in the indictment but subsequently discharged as a State
witness on September 8, 1972 ... . Since, as earlier stated, there were only two of
them in the dump truck in the time of the incident, it is no cause for wonder that
Jaime Vicente would seize the opportunity to throw the whole blame on the
appellant. As observed by appellant's counsel, "in a conflict between self-
preservation and truth, the latter invariably comes out second-best. Jaime Vicente's
testimony, motivated as it is by the overwhelming desire to save his own neck,
cannot be accorded credence." .... Indeed, the testimony of Jaime Vicente can not
be considered as adequate basis for appellant's conviction." 10
3. The submission of appellant is further strengthened by the contention that
he could not possibly have any motive for perpetrating the act ascribed to him.
There was, of course, the imputation that he entertained a grudge against the victim
for having previously hacked him. As clarified in his brief, there was no basis for such
assumption. Thus: "Unfortunately for the prosecution, it was not the deceased but
one Teddy Almazan who hacked appellant in 1970 — not the deceased Dionisio
Lacuata. And it is admitted in the evidence that the incident had since been settled,
as, in fact, the case filed against said Teddy Almazan was withdrawn. The most that
the prosecution would thus hope to accomplish with its evidence on this point is,
obviously, that appellant may have mistaken the deceased for Teddy Almazan. But
this is pure speculation. Considering that the headlights of the truck should have
been focused on the road on which the victim was before the incident, it is not likely
that appellant — assuming he had any bent to kill Teddy Almazan — would have
mistaken the deceased for him." 11 The Solicitor General expressed his concurrence
to such a submission in this manner: "The trial court, however, appears to have
inferred the presence of motive from appellant's alleged statement to Jaime Vicente
right after the deceased was run over that 'that is the person who hacked me' ....
We doubt, however, the merit of this inference for several reasons. Firstly, it was not
Dionisio Lacuata but one Teddy Almazan who hacked appellant in 1970. The case of
hacking never reached the court, much less the police authorities. It was settled
amicably by the Municipal Mayor of Sanchez Mira, Cagayan. These facts are evident
from the testimony of Teddy Almazan himself who was a witness for the
prosecution .... Secondly, it can safely be assumed that on the night in question the
headlights of the dump truck were on and focused on the road where the victim
was. Assuming that appellant had still an axe to grind against Teddy Almazan,
appellant could not have mistaken Dionisio Lacuata for said Teddy Almazan because
he knew Dionisio very well as they are neighbors .... Thirdly, no competent proof
was presented to show the physical similarities of Teddy Almazan and the deceased
which could have led appellant to mistake one for the other. And fourthly, given the
situation that, as declared by Teddy Almazan, appellant had been hatching a
revenge scheme since 1970, it is improbable that appellant would have chosen the
place, the time, the means and the night in question to accomplish his evil design.
For it must be noted that there is no showing that appellant knew that the truck
would pass by the place where appellant was at that particular time, or that
appellant knew that the victim would be in that particular vicinity on or about the
time alluded to." 12
4. The marked deficiency in the appraisal by the lower court of the evidence
would thus appear to be rather obvious. It cannot be said that the stage of moral
certainty as to the guilt of appellant was reached. The liberty of a citizen would be
rendered insecure if on proof tainted by ambiguity and capable of a less sinister
connotation, he could be held culpable. There is the traditional respect for the
finding of facts of the judge who presided at the trial, but certainly it cannot be
invoked where, as is quite apparent, circumstances of weight and influence have
either been overlooked or misinterpreted. 13 What is more, the acceptance usually
accorded to the conclusion reached by the court below inasmuch as it heard and
observed the witnessess testify cannot negate the constitutional presumption of
innocence. 14 The relevance of this excerpt from People v. Dramayo 15 is thus
undoubted: "Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with
guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies.
Appellants were not then even called upon to offer evidence on their behalf. Their
freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be
in existence. Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a
standard, this Court has always been committed. There is need, therefore, for the
most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both oral and documentary,
independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge
below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had
been committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should
the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance
favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must
survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway
judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the
responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but
moral certainty." 16 It is by virtue of the above formulation that in at least five cases
decided the past two years, the appellants were set free. 17
WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of July 23, 1972 finding appellant Fermin
Padirayon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and imposing on
him the penalty of reclusion perpetua with indemnification in the amount of
P12,000.00 to the family of the deceased Dionisio Lacuata with the further sum of
P600.00 as reimbursement for funeral expenses, is nullified and set aside and the
aforesaid appellant acquitted of such crime, his guilt not having been shown beyond
reasonable doubt. Costs de oficio.
Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1 According to Article IV, Section 19 of the Constitution: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, ... ."
2 The Solicitor General was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Jose F.
Racela, Jr. and Solicitor Carlos N. Ortega.
3 Decision dated July 23, 1974, 3-6.
4 Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Appellee's Brief, 1-2.
5 Ibid, 6.
6 Ibid, 6-8.
7 Ibid, 8-10.
8 Brief for Defendant-Appellant, 17.

9 Ibid.

10 Manifestation and Motion, 5-6.

11 Brief for Defendant-Appellant, 19-20.

12 Manifestation and Motion, 4-5.

13 Cf. People v. Gumahin, L-22357, Oct. 31, 1967, 21 SCRA 729; People v.
Panganiban, L-22476, Feb. 27, 1968; 22 SCRA 817; People v. Pelago, L-24884, Aug.
31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1027; People v. Manos, L-277791, Dec. 24, 1970, 36 SCRA 457;
People v. Beraces, L-24016, March 27, 1971, 38 SCRA 127; People v. Sabandal, L-
31129, Sept. 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 179; People v. Dramayo, L-21325, Oct. 29, 1971, 42
SCRA 59; People v. Angcap, L-28748, Feb. 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 437; People v.
Carandang, L-31012, Aug. 15, 1973, 52 SCRA 259; People v. Macaraeg, L-32806, Oct.
23, 1973, 53 SCRA 285; People v. de la Victoria, L-30037, June 27, 1975.

14 Cf. People v. Alto, L-18660, Nov. 29, 1968, 26 SCRA 342; People v.
Pagkaliwagan, L-29948, Nov. 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 113; People v. Macaraeg, L-32806,
Oct. 23, 1973, 53 SCRA 285.

15 L-21325, October 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 59.

16 Ibid, 64.

17 Cf. People v. Zamora, L-34090, Nov. 26, 1973, 54 SCRA 47; People v. Alvarez,
L-34644, Jan. 17, 1974, 55 SCRA 81; People v. Reyes, L-36874, Sept. 30, 1974, 60
SCRA 126; People v. Roa, L-35284, Jan. 17, 1975, 62 SCRA 51; People v. Joven, L-
36022, May 22, 1975.
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988
FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court
which affirmed the decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City
finding petitioner Filomeno Urban guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide.
The records disclose the following facts of the case.
At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno
Urbano went to his ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan located
at about 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He found the
place where he stored his palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal
nearby which had overflowed. Urbano went to the elevated portion of the canal to
see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass.
He asked them who was responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal and
Javier admitted that he was the one. Urbano then got angry and demanded that
Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano
unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long, including the handle, by 2 inches wide) and
hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which was used in parrying
the bolo hack. Javier who was then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was
overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the
back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to hack
and inflict further injury, his daughter embraced and prevented him from hacking
Javier.
Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe brought Javier to
his house about 50 meters away from where the incident happened. Emilio then
went to the house of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven but not finding him there,
Emilio looked for barrio councilman Felipe Solis instead. Upon the advice of Solis,
the Erfes together with Javier went to the police station of San Fabian to report the
incident. As suggested by Corporal Torio, Javier was brought to a physician. The
group went to Dr. Guillermo Padilla, rural health physician of San Fabian, who did
not attend to Javier but instead suggested that they go to Dr. Mario Meneses
because Padilla had no available medicine.
After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions returned to Dr.
Guillermo Padilla who conducted a medico-legal examination. Dr. Padilla issued a
medico-legal certificate (Exhibit "C" dated September 28, 1981) which reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that I have examined the wound of Marcelo Javier, 20 years of age,
married, residing at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan on October 23, 1980
and found the following:
1 -Incised wound 2 inches in length at the upper portion of the lesser palmar
prominence, right.
As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9) days period. This wound was
presented to me only for medico-legal examination, as it was already treated by the
other doctor. (p. 88, Original Records)
Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their
differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for the medical expenses of Javier.
Hence, on October 27, 1980, the two accompanied by Solis appeared before the San
Fabian Police to formalize their amicable settlement. Patrolman Torio recorded the
event in the police blotter (Exhibit A), to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Entry Nr 599/27 Oct '80/103OH/ Re entry Nr 592 on page 257 both parties
appeared before this Station accompanied by brgy. councilman Felipe Solis and
settled their case amicably, for they are neighbors and close relatives to each other.
Marcelo Javier accepted and granted forgiveness to Filomeno Urbano who shoulder
(sic) all the expenses in his medical treatment, and promising to him and to this
Office that this will never be repeated anymore and not to harbour any grudge
against each other. (p. 87, Original Records.)
Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police station. On November 3, 1980, the
additional P300.00 was given to Javier at Urbano's house in the presence of
barangay captain Soliven.
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth
General Hospital in a very serious condition. When admitted to the hospital, Javier
had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who personally
attended to Javier found that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus
toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have
been infected by tetanus.
On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital. The medical
findings of Dr. Exconde are as follows:
Date Diagnosis
11-14-80 ADMITTED due to trismus
adm. at DX TETANUS
1:30 AM Still having frequent muscle spasm. With diffi-
#35, 421 culty opening his mouth. Restless at times. Febrile
11-15-80 Referred. Novaldin 1 amp. inj. IM. Sudden cessa-
tion of respiration and HR after muscular spasm.
02 inhalation administered. Ambo bag resuscita-
tion and cardiac massage done but to no avail.
Pronounced dead by Dra. Cabugao at 4:18 P.M.
PMC done and cadaver brought home by rela-
tives. (p. 100, Original Records)
In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno Urbano was charged with the
crime of homicide before the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City, Third
Judicial District.
Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After trial, the trial court found
Urbano guilty as charged. He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term
of from TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor, as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) years,
FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum, together
with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marcelo Javier,
in the amount of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs. He was ordered confined at the New Bilibid Prison, in
Muntinlupa, Rizal upon finality of the decision, in view of the nature of his penalty.
The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of Urbano on appeal
but raised the award of indemnity to the heirs of the deceased to P30,000.00 with
costs against the appellant.
The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. The motion for
new trial was based on an affidavit of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven (Annex
"A") which states:
That in 1980, I was the barrio captain of Barrio Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan,
and up to the present having been re-elected to such position in the last barangay
elections on May 17, 1982;
That sometime in the first week of November, 1980, there was a typhoon that swept
Pangasinan and other places of Central Luzon including San Fabian, a town of said
province;
That during the typhoon, the sluice or control gates of the Bued irrigation dam
which irrigates the ricefields of San Fabian were closed and/or controlled so much
so that water and its flow to the canals and ditches were regulated and reduced;
That due to the locking of the sluice or control gates of the dam leading to the
canals and ditches which will bring water to the ricefields, the water in said canals
and ditches became shallow which was suitable for catching mudfishes;
That after the storm, I conducted a personal survey in the area affected, with my
secretary Perfecto Jaravata;
That on November 5, 1980, while I was conducting survey, I saw the late Marcelo
Javier catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals with some companions;
That few days there after,or on November l5, l980, I came to know that said Marcelo
Javier died of tetanus. (p. 33, Rollo)
The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.
In a resolution dated July 16, 1986, we gave due course to the petition.
The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides that "Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a
felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended ..." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally responsible for acts
committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical
consequences resulting therefrom." (People v. Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631).
The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the petitioner who used a
bolo as a result of which Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm;
that on November 14, 1981 which was the 22nd day after the incident, Javier was
rushed to the hospital in a very serious condition and that on the following day,
November 15, 1981, he died from tetanus.
Under these circumstances, the lower courts ruled that Javier's death was the
natural and logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. Hence, he was declared
responsible for Javier's death. Thus, the appellate court said:
The claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause which supervened from the
time the deceased was wounded to the time of his death, which covers a period of
23 days does not deserve serious consideration. True, that the deceased did not die
right away from his wound, but the cause of his death was due to said wound which
was inflicted by the appellant. Said wound which was in the process of healing got
infected with tetanus which ultimately caused his death.
Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital testified that the victim
suffered lockjaw because of the infection of the wound with tetanus. And there is
no other way by which he could be infected with tetanus except through the wound
in his palm (tsn., p. 78, Oct. 5, 1981). Consequently, the proximate cause of the
victim's death was the wound which got infected with tetanus. And the settled rule
in this jurisdiction is that an accused is liable for all the consequences of his unlawful
act. (Article 4, par. 1, R.P.C. People v. Red, CA 43 O.G. 5072; People v. Cornel 78 Phil.
418).
Appellant's allegation that the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to his
own negligence in going back to work without his wound being properly healed, and
lately, that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first week of
November, 1980, is an afterthought, and a desperate attempt by appellant to wiggle
out of the predicament he found himself in. If the wound had not yet healed, it is
impossible to conceive that the deceased would be reckless enough to work with a
disabled hand. (pp. 20-21, Rollo)
The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of
Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no
tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks
he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing
the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.
The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano
was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. The evidence
merely confirms that the wound, which was already healing at the time Javier
suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus
However, as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the record.
In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181), we adopted the following
definition of proximate cause:
xxx xxx xxx
... A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696
of American Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as
follows:
... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first
and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion,
all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as
an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at
the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably
result therefrom." (at pp. 185-186)
The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient intervening
cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate
Urbano from any liability for Javier's death.
We look into the nature of tetanus-
The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the appearance
of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80 percent of
patients become symptomatic within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates
severe disease, and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality
rate approaches 100 percent.
Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and headache
are encountered occasionally, but the commonest presenting complaints are pain
and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty swallowing. As the
progresses, stiffness gives way to rigidity, and patients often complain of difficulty
opening their mouths. In fact, trismus in the commonest manifestation of tetanus
and is responsible for the familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. As more muscles are
involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and sustained contractions called risus
sardonicus. The intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable. In a
small proportion of patients, only local signs and symptoms develop in the region of
the injury. In the vast majority, however, most muscles are involved to some degree,
and the signs and symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle groups
affected.
Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptom, an interval
referred to as the onset time. As in the case of the incubation period, a short onset
time is associated with a poor prognosis. Spasms are caused by sudden
intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery, which increases rigidity
and causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles and their
antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. As the disease progresses,
minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer lasting spasms with
increasing frequency. Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic
contraction of respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may
then lead to irreversible central nervous system damage and death.
Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an
onset time of more than 6 days. Trismus is usually present, but dysphagia is absent
and generalized spasms are brief and mild. Moderately severe tetanus has a
somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time; trismus is marked, dysphagia
and generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation remains adequate even during
spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus include a short incubation time, and an onset
time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and frequent
prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of Internal
Medicine, 1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body
depends on the incubation period of the disease.
In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he
parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on
October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the
symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, November
15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by
tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have
been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus
appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the
infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six
days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more
credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant,
the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently,
Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident.
Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have
been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas,
supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the
accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable
doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the
infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or
between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause
and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus
may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had
nothing to do. As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause
did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which
the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote
cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the
injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or
occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent
cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent
act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury
because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the
proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)
It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of criminal
liability. At the very least, the records show he is guilty of inflicting slight physical
injuries. However, the petitioner's criminal liability in this respect was wiped out by
the victim's own act. After the hacking incident, Urbano and Javier used the facilities
of barangay mediators to effect a compromise agreement where Javier forgave
Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical expenses of Javier. This settlement of
minor offenses is allowed under the express provisions of Presidential Decree G.R.
No. 1508, Section 2(3). (See also People v. Caruncho, 127 SCRA 16).
We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and remote cause
is limited to the criminal aspects of this rather unusual case. It does not necessarily
follow that the petitioner is also free of civil liability. The well-settled doctrine is that
a person, while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. Thus, in the recent
case of People v. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al. (G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987), we said:
xxx xxx xxx
... While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established
beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil
action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes
the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals,
129 SCRA 559).
The reason for the provisions of article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the
acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same
act or omission, has been explained by the Code Commission as follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him
from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It
has given use to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal
was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the
accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is
derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot
be demanded.
This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and
deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation
between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result
of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One
affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or
correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by
the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different from each other that
article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a
compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action for the
imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and
proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the
offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of
indemnity the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond
reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved
only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less
private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?

"For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under
discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible
source of injustice-a cause for disillusionment on the part of the innumerable
persons injured or wronged."

The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemnification imposed by the

trial court to P30,000.00. However, since the indemnification was based solely on
the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the homicide case, the civil liability
of the petitioner was not thoroughly examined. This aspect of the case calls for
fuller development if the heirs of the victim are so minded.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of

the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and,Cortes, JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16486 March 22, 1921
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appelle,
vs.
CALIXTO VALDEZ Y QUIRI, defendant-appellant.
Angel Roco for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Feria for appellee.
STREET, J.:
The rather singular circumstances attending the commission of the offense of
homicide which is under discussion in the present appeal are these:
At about noon, on November 29, 1919, while the interisland steamer Vigan was
anchored in the Pasig River a short distance from the lighthouse and not far from
where the river debouches into the Manila Bay, a small boat was sent out to raise
the anchor. The crew of this boat consisted of the accused, Calixto Valdez y Quiri,
and six others among whom was the deceased, Venancio Gargantel. The accused
was in charge of the men and stood at the stern of the boat, acting as helmsman,
while Venancio Gargantel was at the bow.
The work raising the anchor seems to have proceeded too slowly to satisfy the
accused, and he accordingly began to abuse the men with offensive epithets. Upon
this Venancio Gargantel remonstrated, saying that it would be better, and they
would work better, if he would not insult them. The accused took this remonstrance
as a display of insubordination; and rising in rage he moved towards Venancio, with
a big knife in hand, threatening to stab him. At the instant when the accused had
attained to within a few feet of Venancio, the latter, evidently believing himself in
great and immediate peril, threw himself into the water and disappeared beneath
its surface to be seen no more.
The boat in which this incident took place was at the time possibly 30 or 40 yards
from shore and was distant, say, 10 paces from the Vigan. Two scows were moored
to the shore, but between these and the boat intervened a space which may be
estimated at 18 or 20 yards. At it was full midday, and there was nothing to obstruct
the view of persons upon the scene, the failure of Venancio Gargantel to rise to the
surface conclusively shows that, owing to his possible inability to swim or the
strength of the current, he was borne down into the water and was drowned.
Two witnesses who were on the boat state that, immediately after Venancio leaped
into the water, the accused told the remaining members of the crew to keep quiet
or he would kill them. For this reason they made no movement looking to rescue;
but inasmuch as there witnesses are sure that Venancio did not again come to the
surface, efforts at rescue would have been fruitless. The fact that the accused at his
juncture threatened the crew with violence is, therefore, of no moment except tho
show the temporary excitement under which he was laboring.
On the next day one of the friends of Venancio Gargantel posted himself near the
lighthouse to watch for the body, in the hope that it might come to the surface and
could thus be recovered. Though his friendly vigil lasted three days nothing came of
it.
It may be added that Venancio has not returned to his lodging in Manila, where he
lived as a bachelor in the house of an acquaintance; and his personal belongings
have been delivered to a representative of his mother who lives in the Province of
Iloilo. His friends and relatives, it is needless to say, take it for granted that he is
dead.
The circumstances narrated above are such in our opinion as to exclude all
reasonable possibility that Venancio Gargantel may have survived; and we think that
the trial judge did not err in holding that he is dead and that he came to his death
by drowning under the circumstances stated. The proof is direct that he never rose
to the surface after jumping into the river, so far as the observers could see; and this
circumstance, coupled with the known fact that human life must inevitably be
extinguished by asphyxiation under water, is conclusive of his death. The possibility
that he might have swum ashore, after rising in a spot hidden from the view of his
companions, we consider too remote to be entertained for a moment.
As to the criminal responsibility of the accused for the death thus occasioned the
likewise can be no doubt; for it is obvious that the deceased, in throwing himself in
the river, acted solely in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation and was in no
sense legally responsible for his own death. As to him it was but the exercise of a
choice between two evils, and any reasonable person under the same
circumstances might have done the same. As was once said by a British court, "If a
man creates in another man's mind an immediate sense of dander which causes
such person to try to escape, and in so doing he injuries himself, the person who
creates such a state of mind is responsible for the injuries which result." (Reg. vs.
Halliday, 61 L. T. Rep. [N.S.], 701.
In this connection a pertinent decision from the Supreme Court of Spain, of July 13,
1882, is cited in the brief of The Attorney-General, as follows: It appeared that upon
a certain occasion an individual, after having inflicted sundry injuries upon another
with a cutting weapon, pointed a shotgun at the injured person and to escape the
discharge the latter had to jump into a river where he perished by drowning. The
medical authorities charged with conducting the autopsy found that only one of the
wounds caused by a cut could have resulted in the death of the injured person,
supposing that he had received no succour, and that by throwing himself in the river
he in fact died of asphyxia from submersion. Having been convicted as the author of
the homicide, the accused alleged upon appeal that he was only guilty of the
offense of inflicting serious physical injuries, or at most of frustrated homicide. The
Supreme Court, disallowing the appeal, enunciated the following doctrine: "That
even though the death of the injured person should not be considered as the
exclusive and necessary effect of the very grave wound which almost completely
severed his axillary artery, occasioning a hemorrhage impossible to stanch under the
circumstances in which that person was placed, nevertheless as the persistence of
the aggression of the accused compelled his adversary, in order to escape the
attack, to leap into the river, an act which the accused forcibly compelled the injured
person to do after having inflicted, among others, a mortal wound upon him and as
the aggressor by said attack manifested a determined resolution to cause the death
of the deceased, by depriving him of all possible help and putting him in the very
serious situation narrated in the decision appealed from, the trial court, in
qualifying the act prosecuted as consummated homicide, did not commit any error
of law, as the death of the injured person was due to the act of the accused." (II
Hidalgo, Codigo Penal, p. 183.)
The accused must, therefore, be considered the responsible author of the death of
Venancio Gargantel, and he was properly convicted of the offense of homicide. The
trial judge appreciated as an attenuating circumstance the fact that the offender
had no intention to commit so great a wrong as that committed. (Par. 3, art. 9 Penal
Code.) In accordance with this finding the judge sentenced the accused to undergo
imprisonment for twelve years and one day, reclusion temporal, to suffer the
corresponding accessories, to indemnify the family of the deceased in the sum of
P500, and to pay the costs. Said sentenced is in accordance with law; and it being
understood that the accessories appropriate to the case are those specified in
article 59 of the Penal Code, the same is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
So ordered.
Mapa, C.J., Malcolm, Avanceña and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ARAULLO, J., dissenting:
I dissent from the majority opinion in this case.
The only fact that the evidence shows in that Venancio Gargantel, one of those who
were in a boat of the steamer Vigan subject to the orders of the accused Calixto
Valdez and who at the time was engaged in the work of raising the anchor of that
vessel, which was then lying at the Pasig River, a short distance from the lighthouse
and not far from its mouth at the Manila Bay, upon seeing that the accused was
approaching him, armed with a big knife, and in the attitude of attacking him, threw
himself into the water and disappeared from the surface and had not been seen
again. This event took place at noon on November 29, 1919, the boat being then
about 30 or 40 yards from land and about 10 steps from the Vigan, there being two
lighters moored to the shore and at a distance of about 18 or 20 yards from the
boat. All of these facts are stated in the decision itself.
The original information in the present case, charging Calixto Valdez y Quiri with the
crime of homicide and alleging that as a result of his having thrown himself into the
river under the circumstances mentioned, Venancio Gargantel was drowned, was
presented on December 8, 1919, that is, nine days afterwards.
There is no evidence whatever that the corpse of Venancio Gargantel had been
found or, what is the same thing, that he had died. From November 28, the day
when the event occurred, until December 8, when the information was filed, it
cannot in any manner be maintained that the necessary time had passed for us to
properly conclude, as is alleged in the information, that said Gargantel had died by
drowning, as a consequence of his having thrown himself into the water upon
seeing himself threatened and attacked by the accused. Neither does it appear in
the evidence that all the precaution necessary for us to assure ourselves, as a sure
and proven fact, that Venancio Gargantel then died by drowning, were taken; nor is
there any evidence that it would have been impossible for him, by swimming or by
any other means to rise to the surface at a place other than the Pasig River or that
where the boat was, from which he threw himself into the river, and in that manner
save himself from death.
From the evidence of the witnesses for the prosecution which is the only evidence
in the record, for the accused di not take the stand, it only appears that Venancio
Gargantel, after having jumped from the boat, did not rise again to the surface. Such
was the statement of two of those witnesses who were members of the boat's crew
at the time. Another witness also declared that Gargantel was afterwards not again
seen at the house where he lived in this city, No. 711 San Nicolas Street, where he
kept his trunks and some effects, a fact which caused his mother, who lived in the
municipality of Guimbal, in the Province of Iloilo, upon being informed of it and
upon the failure of Venancio to appear in said place, to give special power on the
28th of that month of December, that is, one month afterwards, to a student,
Ignacio Garzon, to get the trunks and effects of Venancio from said house. Sid
Garzon himself testified, upon being asked whether Venancio Gargantel had
returned to the house of his parents since November 29, 1919, that he had no
information about it, and another witness, Pedro Garcia, of the prosecution, stated
that he had probably died, because he had not seen Venancio Gargantel.
Therefore, in short, the only fact proved is that since Venancio Gargantel threw
himself into the river, upon being threatened with a knife by the accused, his
whereabouts has remained unknown even at the moment of rendering judgment in
this case, or, February 9, 1920, that is, two and one-half months after the
occurrence of the event.
It is stated in the decision that the friend and parents of Gargantel give him up for
dead. There is nevertheless in the record no statement of any parent of Gargantel to
that effect; for his mother Maria Gatpolitan, a resident of the municipality of
Guimbal, merely stated in the power of attorney executed in favor of Ignacio Garzon
that the latter should take steps in order that the city fiscal might investigate the
death of her son which, according to information, was caused by another members,
of the crew of the steamer Vigan; and none of his friends, that is, none of the two
members of the party in the boat at that time and of the crew of the steamer Vigan,
nor Maximo Gumbog, the owner of the house in which Gargantel lived in this city,
nor Pedro Garcia, another member of the crew of that steamer, and finally, nor
Ignacio Garzon himself has stated that he gave up Gargantel for dead, for the simple
reason that this was not possible, for they only knew that he did not again rise to
the surface and was not seen again after having thrown himself into the river from
the boat.
For this reason it is stated in the decision that the circumstances therein stated are
such that they exclude all reasonable possibility that Venancio Gargantel could have
survived and that the circumstance that never rose to the surface after having
jumped into the river, as witnessed by the persons present, together with the
admitted fact that human life is necessarily asphyxiated under the water, is
conclusive that he died. Then, there is nothing more than a deduction that
Gargantel had died based upon those facts and circumstances.
In my opinion this is not sufficient to convict the accused as guilty of homicide,
because there is the possibility that Gargantel had risen to the surface at some place
away from the where he threw himself into the river and had embarked on some
other vessel in the same river or out of it in the bay and had gone abroad, or to
some province of these Islands and is found in some municipality thereof, cannot be
denied. And this is very probable inasmuch as it does not appear in the record that
the necessary investigation has been made in order to determined even with only
some measure of certainty, not to say beyond all reasonable doubt, that it was and
is impossible to find said person or determined his whereabouts.
Furthermore, there is not even a presumption juris tantum that he had died, for in
order that this presumption may exist, according to section 334 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, it is necessary that no information about him should have been received
for seven years from his disappearance upon his throwing himself into the river,
which occurred on November 29, 1919, that is, only about one year and four
months ago. And if, in order that a finding of a civil character in favor of or against
some person, may be made, by virtue of that presumption, it is necessary that
seven years should have elapsed without any notice being received of the person
whose whereabouts is unknown, it is not just, reasonable, or legal that the period of
one year and four months from his disappearance or since Venancio Gargantel
threw himself into the water should suffice for us to impose upon the accused
Calixto Valdez such a grave penalty as that of twelve years and one day of reclusion
temporal, merely assuming without declaring it, as a proven fact, that Gargantel has
died and at the same time finding said accused to be the author of that death.

Lastly, the decision of the English Supreme Court or that of the Spanish Supreme
Court dated July 13, 1882, cited by the majority opinion is not applicable. The first,
is not applicable because in the present case it is not proved, beyond reasonable
doubt, that some damage resulted to Gargantel, just as it cannot be considered as
proved that he had died, or that he had been injured or that he had suffered some
injury after having thrown himself into the river as a result of the threat of the
accused. The second is not applicable because the decision of the Supreme Court of
Spain refers to a case, in which the injured party had already been wounded with a
cutting instrument by the accused before throwing himself into the river upon the
latter aiming at him with his gun, it having afterwards been proved upon his being
taken out of the river that the wound inflicted upon him by the accused was mortal;
and, consequently, it was declared by said court that, even if the death of the
deceased be considered as not having resulted exclusively and necessarily from that
most grave wound, the persistence of the aggression of the accused compelled his
adversary to escape it and threw himself into the river, by depriving him of all
possible help and placing him in the serious situation related in the judgment
appealed from -a case which, as is seen, is very different from that which took place
in the present case.

For the reasons above stated, I am of the opinion, with due respect to the opinion
of the majority, that the accused Calixto Valdez y Quiri cannot be found guilty of
homicide and should be acquitted.

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FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-74324 November 17, 1988
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, & BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA, accused-
appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellants.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
For the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate, FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA and
BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA were charged with the crime of MURDER in
Criminal Case No. L-175-82 of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)
of Cavite, under an information which reads as follows:
That on or about May 19, 1982 at the town plaza of the Municipality of Rosario,
Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and
assisting one another, with treachery and evident premeditation, taking advantage
of their superior strength, and with the decided purpose to kill, poured gasoline, a
combustible liquid to the body of Bayani Miranda and with the use of fire did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, burn the whole body of said Bayani
Miranda which caused his subsequent death, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of the aforenamed Bayani Miranda.
That the crime was committed with the qualifying circumstance of treachery and
the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and superior strength, and
the means employed was to weaken the defense; that the wrong done in the
commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing another wrong,
that is the burning of the body of Bayani Miranda.
CONTRARY TO LAW (p. 1, Records).
Upon being arraigned, both accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. After
trial, the trial court rendered a decision finding both accused guilty on the crime of
murder but crediting in favor of the accused Pugay the mitigating circumstance of
lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong, the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused Fernando Pugay y Balcita and Benjamin Samson y
Magdalena are pronounced guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals by direct
participation of the crime of murder for the death of Bayani Miranda, and
appreciating the aforestated mitigating circumstance in favor of Pugay, he is
sentenced to a prison term ranging from twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and Samson to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua together with the accessories of the law for
both of them. The accused are solidarily held liable to indemnify the heirs of the
victim in the amount of P13,940.00 plus moral damages of P10,000.00 and
exemplary damages of P5,000.00.
Let the preventive imprisonment of Pugay be deducted from the principal penalty.
Cost against both accused.
SO ORDERED (p. 248, Records).
Not satisfied with the decision, both accused interposed the present appeal and
assigned the following errors committed by the court a quo:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN UTILIZING THE STATEMENTS OF ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS IN ITS APPRECIATION OF FACTS DESPITE ITS ADMISSION THAT THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE NOT ASSISTED BY A COUNSEL DURING THE
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUPPRESSION BY THE
PROSECUTION OF SOME EVIDENCE IS FATAL TO ITS CASE.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN LENDING CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE
TESTIMONY OF EDUARDO GABION WHO WAS ONE OF THE MANY SUSPECTS
ARRESTED BY THE POLICE (Accused-appellants' Brief, p. 48, Rollo).

The antecedent facts are as follows:
The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were
friends. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and at times they slept together. On
the evening of May 19, 1982, a town fiesta fair was held in the public plaza of
Rosario, Cavite. There were different kinds of ride and one was a ferris wheel.
Sometime after midnight of the same date, Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris
wheel and reading a comic book with his friend Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and
Samson with several companions arrived. These persons appeared to be drunk as
they were all happy and noisy. As the group saw the deceased walking nearby, they
started making fun of him. They made the deceased dance by tickling him with a
piece of wood.
Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the accused Pugay
suddenly took a can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferns wheel and
poured its contents on the body of the former. Gabion told Pugay not to do so while
the latter was already in the process of pouring the gasoline. Then, the accused
Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him.
The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused with water the burning body of
the deceased. Some people around also poured sand on the burning body and
others wrapped the same with rags to extinguish the flame.
The body of the deceased was still aflame when police officer Rolando Silangcruz
and other police officers of the Rosario Police Force arrived at the scene of the
incident. Upon inquiring as to who were responsible for the dastardly act, the
persons around spontaneously pointed to Pugay and Samson as the authors thereof.
The deceased was later rushed to the Grace Hospital for treatment. In the
meantime, the police officers brought Gabion, the two accused and five other
persons to the Rosario municipal building for interrogation. Police officer Reynaldo
Canlas took the written statements of Gabion and the two accused, after which
Gabion was released. The two accused remained in custody.
After a careful review of the records, We find the grounds relied upon by the
accused-appellants for the reversal of the decision of the court a quo to be without
merit.
It bears emphasis that barely a few hours after the incident, accused-appellants
gave their written statements to the police. The accused Pugay admitted in his
statement, Exhibit F, that he poured a can of gasoline on the deceased believing that
the contents thereof was water and then the accused Samson set the deceased on
fire. The accused Samson, on the other hand, alleged in his statement that he saw
Pugay pour gasoline on Miranda but did not see the person who set him on fire.
Worthy of note is the fact that both statements did not impute any participation of
eyewitness Gabion in the commission of the offense.
While testifying on their defense, the accused-appellants repudiated their written
statements alleging that they were extracted by force. They claimed that the police
maltreated them into admitting authorship of the crime. They also engaged in a
concerted effort to lay the blame on Gabion for the commission of the offense.
Thus, while it is true that the written statements of the accused-appellants were
mentioned and discussed in the decision of the court a quo, the contents thereof
were not utilized as the sole basis for the findings of facts in the decision rendered.
The said court categorically stated that "even without Exhibits 'F' and 'G', there is
still Gabion's straightforward, positive and convincing testimony which remains
unaffected by the uncorroborated, self-serving and unrealiable testimonies of Pugay
and Samson" (p. 247, Records).
Accused-appellants next assert that the prosecution suppressed the testimonies of
other eyewitnesses to the incident. They claim that despite the fact that there were
other persons investigated by the police, only Gabion was presented as an
eyewitness during the trial of the case. They argue that the deliberate non-
presentation of these persons raises the presumption that their testimonies would
be adverse to the prosecution.
There is no dispute that there were other persons who witnessed the commission of
the crime. In fact there appears on record (pp. 16-17, Records) the written
statements of one Abelardo Reyes and one Monico Alimorong alleging the same
facts and imputing the respective acts of pouring of gasoline and setting the
deceased on fire to the accused-appellants as testified to by Gabion in open court.
They were listed as prosecution witnesses in the information filed. Considering that
their testimonies would be merely corroborative, their non-presentation does not A. When he was pouring gasoline on Bayani Miranda I was trying to prevent
give rise to the presumption that evidence wilfully suppressed would be adverse if him from doing so.
produced. This presumption does not apply to the suppression of merely
corroborative evidence (U.S. vs. Dinola, 37 Phil. 797).<äre||anº•1àw> Besides, the Q. We want to clarify. According to you a while ago you had a talk with Pugay
matter as to whom to utilize as witness is for the prosecution to decide. and as a matter of fact, you told him not to pour gasoline. That is what I want to
know from you, if that is true?
Accused-appellants also attack the credibility of the eyewitness Gabion alleging that
not only was the latter requested by the mother of the deceased to testify for the A. Yes, sir.
prosecution in exchange for his absolution from liability but also because his
testimony that he was reading a comic book during an unusual event is contrary to Q. Aside from Bayani being tickled with a stick on his ass, do you mean to say
human behavior and experience. you come to know that Pugay will pour gasoline unto him?

Gabion testified that it was his uncle and not the mother of the deceased who asked A. I do not know that would be that incident.
him to testify and state the truth about the incident. The mother of the deceased
likewise testified that she never talked to Gabion and that she saw the latter for the Q. Why did you as(k) Pugay in the first place not to pour gasoline before he
first time when the instant case was tried. Besides, the accused Pugay admitted that did that actually?
Gabion was his friend and both Pugay and the other accused Samson testified that
they had no previous misunderstanding with Gabion. Clearly, Gabion had no reason A. Because I pity Bayani, sir.
to testify falsely against them.
Q. When you saw Pugay tickling Bayani with a stick on his ass you tried
In support of their claim that the testimony of Gabion to the effect that he saw according to you to ask him not to and then later you said you asked not to pour
Pugay pour gasoline on the deceased and then Samson set him on fire is incredible, gasoline. Did Pugay tell you he was going to pour gasoline on Bayani?
the accused-appellants quote Gabion's testimony on cross-examination that, after
telling Pugay not to pour gasoline on the deceased, he (Gabion) resumed reading A. I was not told, sir.
comics; and that it was only when the victim's body was on fire that he noticed a
commotion. Q. Did you come to know..... how did you come to know he was going to pour
gasoline that is why you prevent him?
However, explaining this testimony on re-direct examination, Gabion stated:
A. Because he was holding on a container of gasoline. I thought it was water
Q. Mr. Gabion, you told the Court on cross-examination that you were reading but it was gasoline.
comics when you saw Pugay poured gasoline unto Bayani Miranda and lighted by
Samson. How could you possibly see that incident while you were reading comics? Q. It is clear that while Pugay was tickling Bayani with a stick on his ass, he
later got hold of a can of gasoline, is that correct?
A. I put down the comics which I am reading and I saw what they were doing.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. According to you also before Bayani was poured with gasoline and lighted
and burned later you had a talk with Pugay, is that correct?
Q. And when he pick up the can of gasoline, was that the time you told him
not to pour gasoline when he merely pick up the can of gasoline.
A. I saw him pouring the gasoline on the body of Joe.
Q. So, it is clear when you told Pugay not to pour gasoline he was already in
the process of pouring gasoline on the body of Bayani?
A. Yes, sir (Tsn, July 30, 1983, pp. 32-33).
It is thus clear that prior to the incident in question, Gabion was reading a comic
book; that Gabion stopped reading when the group of Pugay started to make fun of
the deceased; that Gabion saw Pugay get the can of gasoline from under the engine
of the ferris wheel; that it was while Pugay was in the process of pouring the
gasoline on the body of the deceased when Gabion warned him not to do so; and
that Gabion later saw Samson set the deceased on fire.
However, there is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy
or unity of criminal purpose and intention between the two accused-appellants
immediately before the commission of the crime. There was no animosity between
the deceased and the accused Pugay or Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the
incident was accidental. It is also clear that the accused Pugay and his group merely
wanted to make fun of the deceased. Hence, the respective criminal responsibility
of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed against the deceased is
individual and not collective, and each of them is liable only for the act committed
by him (U.S. vs. Magcomot, et. al. 13, Phil. 386; U.S. vs. Abiog, et. al. 37 Phil. 1371).
The next question to be determined is the criminal responsibility of the accused
Pugay. Having taken the can from under the engine of the ferris wheel and holding it
before pouring its contents on the body of the deceased, this accused knew that the
can contained gasoline. The stinging smell of this flammable liquid could not have
escaped his notice even before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all
the diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act
that may be committed by his companions who at the time were making fun of the
deceased. We agree with the Solicitor General that the accused is only guilty of
homicide through reckless imprudence defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. In U.S. vs. Maleza, et. al. 14 Phil. 468, 470, this Court ruled as
follows:
A man must use common sense and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his
duty to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of
incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee
and for acts which no one would have performed except through culpable abandon.
Otherwise his own person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings, would
ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury.
The proper penalty that the accused Pugay must suffer is an indeterminate one
ranging from four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. With respect to the accused
Samson, the Solicitor General in his brief contends that "his conviction of murder, is
proper considering that his act in setting the deceased on fire knowing that gasoline
had just been poured on him is characterized by treachery as the victim was left
completely helpless to defend and protect himself against such an outrage" (p. 57,
Rollo). We do not agree.
There is entire absence of proof in the record that the accused Samson had some
reason to kill the deceased before the incident. On the contrary, there is adequate
evidence showing that his act was merely a part of their fun-making that evening.
For the circumstance of treachery to exist, the attack must be deliberate and the
culprit employed means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any
defense which the offended party might make.
There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid
poured on the body of the deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance for he
would not have committed the act of setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise.
Giving him the benefit of doubt, it call be conceded that as part of their fun-making
he merely intended to set the deceased's clothes on fire. His act, however, does not
relieve him of criminal responsibility. Burning the clothes of the victim would cause
at the very least some kind of physical injuries on his person, a felony defined in the
Revised Penal Code. If his act resulted into a graver offense, as what took place in
the instant case, he must be held responsible therefor. Article 4 of the aforesaid
code provides, inter alia, that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended.
As no sufficient evidence appears in the record establishing any qualifying
circumstances, the accused Samson is only guilty of the crime of homicide defined
and penalized in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. We are
disposed to credit in his favor the ordinary mitigating circumstance of no intention
to commit so grave a wrong as that committed as there is evidence of a fact from
which such conclusion can be drawn. The eyewitness Gabion testified that the
accused Pugay and Samson were stunned when they noticed the deceased burning
(Tsn, June 1, 1983, pp. 16-17).<äre||anº•1àw>

The proper penalty that the accused Samson must suffer is an indeterminate one
ranging from eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum.

The lower court held the accused solidarily liable for P13,940.00, the amount spent
by Miranda's parents for his hospitalization, wake and interment. The indemnity for
death is P30,000.00. Hence, the indemnity to the heirs of the deceased Miranda is
increased to P43,940.00.

Both accused shall be jointly and severally liable for the aforesaid amount plus the
P10,000.00 as moral damages and P5,000.00 as exemplary damages as found by the
court a quo.

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed with the modifications above-indicated. Costs

against the accused-appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

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