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1.

ELCANO v HILL

FACTS:

Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case against
Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for “lack of intent coupled with mistake.” Elcano then filed a civil
action against Reginald and his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill
argued that the civil action is barred by his son’s acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever, his civil
liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact that his son is already an emancipated minor by
reason of his marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180.

HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of a separate civil action.

A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if accused is
actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In
other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively
to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same
act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused. Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable
by law.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil
Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place “by the marriage of the minor child”, it is,
however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full
or absolute. Thus “Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the child’s person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were
of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his
father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father,
mother or guardian.” Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill – the SC however ruled since at
the time of the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvin’s liability should be subsidiary only – as a
matter of equity.

2. CANCO v MANILA RAILROAD

FACTS:
On January 20, 1915, Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Co (MRC). He was an employee of
the latter and he was given a pass so that he could ride the train for free. When he was nearing his
destination at about 7pm, he arose from his seat even though the train was not at full stop. When he
was about to alight from the train (which was still slightly moving) he accidentally stepped on a sack of
watermelons which he failed to notice due to the fact that it was dim. This caused him to lose his
balance at the door and he fell and his arm was crushed by the train and he suffered other serious
injuries. He was dragged a few meters more as the train slowed down.
It was established that the employees of MRC were negligent in piling the sacks of watermelons. MRC
raised as a defense the fact that Cangco was also negligent as he failed to exercise diligence in alighting
from the train as he did not wait for it to stop.

ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Railroad Co is liable for damages.

HELD: Yes. Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a common practice and a lot of
people are doing so every day without suffering injury. Cangco has the vigor and agility of young
manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same
act would have been in an aged or feeble person. He was also ignorant of the fact that sacks of
watermelons were there as there were no appropriate warnings and the place was dimly lit.

The Court also elucidated on the distinction between the liability of employers under Article 2180 and
their liability for breach of contract [of carriage]:

NOTES: But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in the selection and direction
of the servant, he is not liable for the acts of the latter, whatever done within the scope of his
employment or not, if the damage done by the servant does not amount to a breach of the contract
between the master and the person injured.

The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission which,
without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another.

These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to
another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a
contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act
which constitutes the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the
parties.

Manresa: Whether negligence occurs an incident in the course of the performance of a contractual
undertaking or in itself the source of an extra-contractual undertaking obligation, its essential
characteristics are identical.

Vinculum Juris: (def) It means “an obligation of law”, or the right of the obligee to enforce a civil matter
in a court of law.

3. GREGORIO v CA

FACTS:
The case arose from the filing of an Affidavit of Complaint for violation of B.P. 22 by Emma J. Datuin
(Datuin), as Officer-in-Charge of the Accounts Receivables Department, and upon authority of Sansio
Philippines, Inc. (Sansio), against Zenaida R. Gregorio (Gregorio) and one Vito Belarmino, as proprietors
of Alvi Marketing, allegedly for delivering insufficiently funded bank checks as payment for the
numerous appliances bought by Alvi Marketing from Sansio. As the address stated in the complaint was
incorrect, Gregorio was unable to controvert the charges against her. Consequently, she was indicted for
three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

The MeTC issued a warrant for her arrest, and it was served upon her by the armed operatives of the
Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC) of the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) on October 17, 1997, Friday, at around 9:30 a.m. in Quezon City while she was
visiting her husband and their two (2) daughters at their city residence. Gregorio was brought to the
PARAC-DILG Office where she was subjected to fingerprinting and mug shots, and was detained. She
was released in the afternoon of the same day when her husband posted a bond for her temporary
liberty.

On December 5, 1997, Gregorio filed before the MeTC a Motion for Deferment of Arraignment and
Reinvestigation, alleging that she could not have issued the bounced checks, since she did not even have
a checking account with the bank on which the checks were drawn, as certified by the branch manager
of the Philippine National Bank, Sorsogon Branch. She also alleged that her signature was patently and
radically different from the signatures appearing on the bounced checks.

The MeTC granted the Motion and a reinvestigation was conducted. In the course of the reinvestigation,
Datuin submitted an Affidavit of Desistance stating, among others, that Gregorio was not one of the
signatories of the bounced checks subject of prosecution.
On August 18, 2000, Gregorio filed a complaint for damages against Sansio and Datuin before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Ligao, Albay. Sansio and Datuin filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the complaint, being one for damages arising from malicious prosecution, failed to state a
cause of action, as the ultimate facts constituting the elements thereof were not alleged in the
complaint.

ISSUE: Whether the complaint, a civil suit filed by Gregorio, is based on quasi-delict or malicious
prosecution.

HELD: A perusal of the allegations of Gregorio’s complaint for damages readily shows that she filed a
civil suit against Sansio and Datuin for filing against her criminal charges for violation of B.P. Blg. 22; that
respondents did not exercise diligent efforts to ascertain the true identity of the person who delivered
to them insufficiently funded checks as payment for the various appliances purchased; and that
respondents never gave her the opportunity to controvert the charges against her, because they stated
an incorrect address in the criminal complaint. Gregorio claimed damages for the embarrassment and
humiliation she suffered when she was suddenly arrested at her city residence in Quezon City while
visiting her family. She was, at the time of her arrest, a respected Kagawad in Oas, Albay. Gregorio
anchored her civil complaint on Articles 26, 2176, and 2180 of the Civil Code. Noticeably, despite
alleging either fault or negligence on the part of Sansio and Datuin, Gregorio never imputed to them any
bad faith in her complaint.

Basic is the legal principle that the nature of an action is determined by the material averments in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought. Undeniably, Gregorio’s civil complaint, read in its
entirety, is a complaint based on quasi-delict under Article 2176, in relation to Article 26 of the Civil
Code, rather than on malicious prosecution.

In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff has to prove by a
preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by him; (2) the fault or negligence of the
defendant or some other person to whose act he must respond; (3) the connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred; and (4) that there must be no preexisting
contractual relation between the parties.

On the other hand, Article 26 of the Civil Code grants a cause of action for damages, prevention, and
other relief in cases of breach, though not necessarily constituting a criminal offense, of the following
rights: (1) right to personal dignity; (2) right to personal security; (3) right to family relations; (4) right to
social intercourse; (5) right to privacy; and (6) right to peace of mind.
A scrutiny of Gregorio’s civil complaint reveals that the averments thereof, taken together, fulfill the
elements of Article 2176, in relation to Article 26 of the Civil Code. It appears that Gregorio’s rights to
personal dignity, personal security, privacy, and peace of mind were infringed by Sansio and Datuin
when they failed to exercise the requisite diligence in determining the identity of the person they should
rightfully accuse of tendering insufficiently funded checks. This fault was compounded when they failed
to ascertain the correct address of petitioner, thus depriving her of the opportunity to controvert the
charges, because she was not given proper notice. Because she was not able to refute the charges
against her, petitioner was falsely indicted for three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Although she
was never found at No. 76 Peñaranda St., Legaspi City, the office address of Alvi Marketing as stated in
the criminal complaint, Gregorio was conveniently arrested by armed operatives of the PARAC-DILG at
her city residence at 78 K-2 St., Kamuning, Quezon City, while visiting her family. She suffered
embarrassment and humiliation over her sudden arrest and detention and she had to spend time,
effort, and money to clear her tarnished name and reputation, considering that she had held several
honorable positions in different organizations and offices in the public service, particularly her being a
Kagawad in Oas, Albay at the time of her arrest. There exists no contractual relation between Gregorio
and Sansio. On the other hand, Gregorio is prosecuting Sansio, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, for
its vicarious liability, as employer, arising from the act or omission of its employee Datuin.

These allegations, assuming them to be true, sufficiently constituted a cause of action against Sansio and
Datuin. Thus, the RTC was correct when it denied respondents’ motion to dismiss.

4. AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL v CORDERO

Factsof the Case:

American Express International was a foreign corporation that issued charge cards used to purchase
goods and services at accredited merchants worldwide to its customers. Nilda Cordero, wife of
respondent Noel Cordero, was issued an American Express charge card. An extension charge card, was
likewise issued to respondent Noel Cordero which he also signed. Respondent, together with his family
went on a three-day holiday trip to Hong Kong. The group went to the Watson’s Chemist Shop. While
there, Noel picked up chocolate candies and handed his American Express extension charge card to the
sales clerk to pay for his purchases. Susan Chong, the store manager, informed respondent that she had
to confiscate the card. Thereupon, she cut respondent’s American Express card in half with a pair of
scissors. This, according to respondent, caused him embarrassment and humiliation. Hence, Nilda had to
pay for the purchases using her own American Express charge card.

The card was placed in the Inspect Airwarn Support System, asystem utilized by petitioner as a
protection both for the company and the cardholders against the fraudulent use of their charge cards.
Once a card suspected of unauthorized use is placed in the system, the person to whom the card is
tendered must verify the identity of the holder. If the true identity of the card owner is established, the
card is honored and the charges are approved. Otherwise, the card is revoked or confiscated.

Respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for damages against petitioner. He prayed for
the award of moral damages and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees as a result of the
humiliation he suffered. According to the trial court, petitioner should have informed respondent that
on November 1, 1991, a person in Hong Kong attempted to use a charge card bearing similar number to
that of respondent’s card and that petitioner’s inexcusable failure to do so is the proximate cause of the
“confiscation and cutting of respondent’s extension card which exposed the latter to public humiliation
for which the petitioner should be held liable. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s decision.

Issue:

Whether the lower courts gravely erred in awarding moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees to Cordero.

Ruling of the Court:

YES. The Court ruled that petitioner can revoke respondent’s card without notice, as was done. The
subject card would not have been confiscated and cut had respondent talked to petitioner’s
representative and identified himself as the genuine cardholder. As explained by respondent himself, he
could have used his card upon verification by the sales clerk of Watson that indeed he is the authorized
cardholder. That could have been accomplished had respondent talked to petitioner’s representative,
enabling the latter to determine that respondent was indeed the true holder of the card. Clearly, no
negligence which breached the contract could have been attributed to petitioner. If at all, the cause of
respondent’s humiliation and embarrassment was his refusal to talk to petitioner’s representative. It
was thus safe to conclude that there was no negligence on the part of petitioner and that, therefore, it
cannot be held liable to respondent for damages.

The petition was granted.

5. AIR FRANCE v CARRASCOS0

FACTS

In March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos were tourists en route to Rome from
Manila. Carrascoso was issued a first class round trip ticket by Air France. But during a stop-over in
Bangkok, he was asked by the plane manager of Air France to vacate his seat because a white man
allegedly has a “better right” than him. Carrascoso protested but when things got heated and upon
advise of other Filipinos on board, Carrascoso gave up his seat and was transferred to the plane’s tourist
class.

After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the Philippines, he sued Air France for damages
for the embarrassment he suffered during his trip. In court, Carrascoso testified, among others, that he
when he was forced to take the tourist class, he went to the plane’s pantry where he was approached by
a plane purser who told him that he noted in the plane’s journal the following:

First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to
intervene

The said testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The trial court eventually awarded damages in
favor of Carrascoso. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the CA. It avers that the issuance of a first class
ticket to Carrascoso was not an assurance that he will be seated in first class because allegedly in truth
and in fact, that was not the true intent between the parties.

Air France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascoso’s testimony regarding the note made by the
purser because the said note was never presented in court.

ISSUE 1: Whether or not Air France is liable for damages and on what basis.

ISSUE 2: Whether or not the testimony of Carrasoso regarding the note which was not presented in
court is admissible in evidence.

HELD 1: Yes. It appears that Air France’s liability is based on culpa-contractual and on culpa aquiliana.

Culpa Contractual

There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. There was a contract to furnish
Carrasocoso a first class passage; Second, That said contract was breached when Air France failed to
furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when Air France’s
employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth “after he was already,
seated” and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience,
embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded
feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages.

The Supreme Court did not give credence to Air France’s claim that the issuance of a first class ticket to a
passenger is not an assurance that he will be given a first class seat. Such claim is simply incredible.

Culpa Aquiliana

Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso, there
is also a tortuous act based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation.
They have a right to be treated by the carrier’s employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language,
indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part
of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. Air France’s
contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso’s action is placed
upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the Air France — a case of quasi-delict.
Damages are proper.

HELD: 2: Yes. The testimony of Carrascoso must be admitted based on res gestae. The subject of inquiry
is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the proscription
of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. Besides, when the dialogue between Carrascoso
and the purser happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt.
The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part
of the res gestae. The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and
related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It thus
escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
6. FAR EAST BANK v CA

Facts:
Luis Luna applied for a far east card issued by far east bank at its Pasig branch. Upon his request, the
bank also issued a supplemental card to private respondent Clarita Luna. Then Clarita lost her credit card
and submitted an affidavit of loss. Later on October 6, 1988 in a restaurant, Luis' credit card was not
honored.

Luis thru a counsel then demanded from far east to pay damages for the humiliation he felt. The vice-
president of the bank expressed bank's apologies to Luis.

Still evidently feeling aggrieved, private respondents, on 05 December 1988, filed a complaint for
damages with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Pasig against FEBTC.
On 30 March 1990, the RTC of Pasig, given the foregoing factual settings, rendered a decision ordering
FEBTC to pay private respondents (a) P300,000.00 moral damages; (b) P50,000.00 exemplary damages;
and (c) P20,000.00 attorney's fees.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, FEBTC has come to this Court
with this petition for review.

There is merit in this appeal.


In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in
bad faith or with malice in the breach of the contract. The Civil Code provides:
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court
should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to
breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence. Exceptionally, in a contract of
carriage, moral damages are also allowed in case of death of a passenger attributable to the fault (which
is presumed) of the common carrier.

Held:
The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can be the cause for
breaching a contract that might thereby permit the application of applicable principles on tort 9 even
where there is a pre-existing contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. This doctrine,
unfortunately, cannot improve private respondents' case for it can aptly govern only where the act or
omission complained of would constitute an actionable tort independently of the contract. The test
(whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated thusly:
Where, without a pre-existing contract between two parties, an act or omission can nonetheless
amount to an actionable tort by itself, the fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the
application of quasi-delict provisions to the case. Here, private respondents' damage claim is predicated
solely on their contractual relationship; without such agreement, the act or omission complained of
cannot by itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an independent actionable tort.

7. EQUITTABLE LEASING v SUYOM

Facts:
On July 17, 1994, a Fuso Road Tractor driven by Raul Tutor rammed into the house cum store of Myrna
Tamayo in Tondo, Manila. A portion of the house was destroyed which caused death and injury. Tutor
was charged with and later convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and multiple
physical injuries.

Upon verification with the Land Transportation Office, it was known that the registered owner of the
tractor was Equitable Leasing Corporation/leased to Edwin Lim. On April 15, 1995, respondents filed
against Raul Tutor, Ecatine Corporation (Ecatine) and Equitable Leasing Corporation (Equitable) a
Complaint for damages.

The petitioner alleged that the vehicle had already been sold to Ecatine and that the former was no
longer in possession and control thereof at the time of the incident. It also claimed that Tutor was an
employee, not of Equitable, but of Ecatine.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner was liable for damages based on quasi delict for the negligent acts.

Held:
The Lease Agreement between petitioner and Edwin Lim stipulated that it is the intention of the parties
to enter into a finance lease agreement. Ownership of the subject tractor was to be registered in the
name of petitioner, until the value of the vehicle has been fully paid by Edwin Lim.

Lim completed the payments to cover the full price of the tractor. Thus, a Deed of Sale over the tractor
was executed by petitioner in favor of Ecatine represented by Edwin Lim. However, the Deed was not
registered with the LTO.

Petitioner is liable for the deaths and the injuries complained of, because it was the registered owner of
the tractor at the time of the accident.The Court has consistently ruled that, regardless of sales made of
a motor vehicle, the registered owner is the lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons are
concerned.

Since Equitable remained the registered owner of the tractor, it could not escape primary liability for the
deaths and the injuries arising from the negligence of the driver.

8. PICART v SMITH

FACTS

On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten
half way across, Smith approached from the opposite direction in an automobile. As the defendant
neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He
continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it
appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.

Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed by the
novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the
railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this was
that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side. As the automobile
approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so
doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. Seeing that the pony
was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or
slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he
had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the
defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the
automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body
across the bridge, got hit by the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off
with some violenceAs a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which
caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.

From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith from liability Picart has appealed.

ISSUE: WON Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage
done

HELD: the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and judgment is here rendered that the Picart
recover of Smith damages

YES

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The existence of negligence in a given case is not
determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law
considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and
prudence and determines liability by that. The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a
prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience
and in view of the facts involved in the particular case.

Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually
pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable
foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary
before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the
existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the
position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently
probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences.

Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that negligence is clearly
established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have
recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have
foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these
circumstances the law imposed on the Smith the duty to guard against the threatened harm.

It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent
negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, Smith was
also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and
directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not
contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an
appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance
to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference
to the prior negligence of the other party.

9. BARREDO v GARCIA and ALMARIO

FACTS

At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanilla’s taxi collided with a “kalesa” thereby killing the 16 year old
Faustino Garcia. Faustino’s parents filed a criminal suit against Fontanilla and reserved their right to file
a separate civil suit. Fontanilla was eventually convicted. After the criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit
against Barredo – the owner of the taxi (employer of Fontanilla). The suit was based on Article 1903 of
the civil code (negligence of employers in the selection of their employees). Barredo assailed the suit
arguing that his liability is only subsidiary and that the separate civil suit should have been filed against
Fontanilla primarily and not him.

ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily liable.

HELD: No. He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate civil action against negligent
employers. Garcia is well within his rights in suing Barredo. He reserved his right to file a separate civil
action and this is more expeditious because by the time of the SC judgment Fontanilla is already serving
his sentence and has no property. It was also proven that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees
because it was shown that Fontanilla had had multiple traffic infractions already before he hired him –
something he failed to overcome during hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a separate civil
action, Barredo would have only been subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not being sued for damages
arising from a criminal act (his driver’s negligence) but rather for his own negligence in selecting his
employee (Article 1903).

10. CORLISS v MANILA RAILROAD

FACTS:
Feb 21, 1957 near midnight: although the conductor applied the brakes Ralph W. Corliss' jeep collided
with a locomotive of Manila Railroad Company
in his eagerness to beat, despite the tooting of the horn and the oncoming locomotive, took the risk and
attempted to reach the other side, but unfortunately he became the victim of his own miscalculation
Case was filed by Preciolita V. Corliss, 21 year old widow

ISSUE: W/N the Manila Railroad Co. is negligent

HELD: NO. Decision is affirmed


negligence - The failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of
care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstance justly demand whereby such other person suffers
injury.
Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an
absolute term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and
vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of care
is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances.
The weight of authorities is to the effect that a railroad track is in itself a warning or a signal of danger to
those who go upon it, and that those who, for reasons of their own, ignore such warning, do so at their
own risk and responsibility
Corliss Jr., who undoubtedly had crossed the checkpoint frequently, if not daily, must have known that
locomotive engines and trains usually pass at that particular crossing where the accident had taken
place
it was incumbent upon him to avoid a possible accident — and this consisted simply in stopping his
vehicle before the crossing and allowing the train to move on. A prudent man under similar
circumstances would have acted in this manner

11. PEOPLE v RAMIREZ

FACTS:

In the evening of May 23, 1993, in Ormoc City, Montano Banez invited the private offended party,
Jonathan ‘Jojo´ Alkuino to a drinking session at a nearby sari-sari store. While the two were in the
middle of their drinking spree, the accused/appellant, Pedro Ramirez calmly approached the two, and
suddenly and without any warning, stabbed Alkuino on the right side of his body just below his ribs.

Alkuino was immediately brought to the hospital but died eventually died the next day due to massive
blood loss. While on the throes of death, Alkuino related to his father the identity of his assailant. This,
in turn, was presented as testimonial evidence during trial as a dying declaration of the victim.

The trial court found Pedro Ramirez guilty of Murder and sentencing him to "suffer imprisonment of
forty (40) years reclusion perpetua.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Trial Court correctly sentenced the accused/appellant to "suffer imprisonment of
forty (40) years reclusion perpetua.”

HELD: NO.

RATIONALE::

The Supreme Court has held that the Trial Court erred in sentencing appellant "to suffer imprisonment
of forty (40) years reclusion perpetua", which is an indivisible penalty under the Revised Penal Code. The
Supreme Court has held in People v. Diquit that “since reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty, it has
no minimum, medium or maximum periods. It is imposed in its entirety regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the crime as provided under Art.
63, RPC.

Reclusion perpetua is imprisonment for life but the person sentenced to suffer it may be pardoned after
serving thirty (30) years imprisonment, unless by reason of his conduct or some other serious cause, he
shall be considered by the Chief Executive as unworthy of pardon Art. 27, RPC.

12. McKEE v IAC


FACTS

It was the 8th of January in 1977, at around 9:00 or 10:00 in the morning, somewhere between Angeles
City and San Fernando, Pampanga. Jose Koh was driving his daughter, Araceli Koh McKee, and her minor
children, Christopher, George, and Kim, as well as Kim’s babysitter, Loida Bondoc, from San Fernando,
Pampanga in the direction of Angeles City (northward) in a Ford Escort. Meanwhile, a cargo truck
owned by Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo, driven by Ruben Galang, was headed in the
opposite direction, from Angeles City to San Fernando (southward), going to Manila. The cargo truck
was considerable in size as it was carrying 200 hundred cavans of rice, which weighed 10 metric tons.
As the Escort approached one Pulong-Pulo Bridge from the southern portion, 2 boys suddenly ran from
the right side of the road into the Escort’s lane. As the boys were going back and forth, unsure
of whether to cross all the way or turn back, Jose blew his horn. He was then forced to swerve left
and into the lane Galang was driving in. Jose switched his headlights on, applied
his brakes, and attempted to return to his lane. However, he failed to get back into the right lane, and
collided with the cargo truck. The collision occurred on the bridge. The collision resulted in the deaths of
the driver, Jose, the one-year-old, Kim, and her babysitter, Loida, on whose lap she was sitting. Loida
was seated in the passenger seat. Araceli, Christopher, and George, who were sitting in the back of the
Escort, received physical injuries from the collision. An information was filed against Ruben Galang,
charging him for reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide, physical injuries, and damage
to property. He was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges in the information.
The conviction was affirmed by the CA and achieved finality after the denial by the CA of his
MR and the denial by the SC of his Petition for Review. Two civil cases were filed. The first one,
by the wife and children of Jose Koh, and the second one by Araceli and her husband for the
death of Kim and injuries to Araceli and her other children. The respondents were impleaded
against as the employers of Ruben Galang – Galang was not included. The cases here are based
on quasi-delict. These cases were eventually consolidated. The trial court dismissed the civil cases and
awarded the respondents damages and attorney’s fees. On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate
Court, the dismissal was reversed. This was based on its finding that it was
Galang’s inattentiveness or reckless imprudence that caused the accident. However, upon filing by the
respondents of an MR, the IAC set aside its original decision and upheld that of the trial court because
the fact that Koh’s car invaded the lane of the truck and the collision occurred while still in Galang’s lane
gave rise to the presumption that Koh was negligent.

ISSUE: Was the IAC correct in reversing their original decision?

HELD: NO. The petition has merit.

Procedural (not important): Given the circumstances, the cases (civil and criminal) should have been
consolidated to prevent separate appreciation of the evidence. To be fair, the petitioners did move to
adopt the testimonies of the witnesses in the criminal case but the motion was denied. The non-
consolidation resulted in two conflicting decisions. In any case, the guilty verdict of Galang was deemed
by the Court as irrelevant to the case at bar.

On the basis of this presumed negligence, the appellate court immediately concluded that it was Jose
Koh’s negligence that was the immediate and proximate cause of the collision. This is an unwarranted
deduction as the evidence for the petitioners convincingly shows that the car swerved into the truck’s
lane because as it approached the southern end of the bridge, two boys darted across the road from the
right sidewalk into the lane of the car.
Araceli’s testimony was pretty much what was stated in the facts plus the fact that when Jose swerved
to the left, the truck was immediately noticed. This is why he switched his headlights on – to warn the
truck’s driver to slow down and let the Escort return to its lane. When asked as to how she could tell
that the truck did not slow down, Araceli said that the truck just kept on coming, indicating that it didn’t
reduce its speed. She posited that if it did, there wouldn’t have been a collision. Her testimony remained
intact, even upon cross-examination – that Jose’s entry into Galang’s lane was necessary to avoid what
was, in his mind at the time, a greater peril – death or injury to the two idiots. This is hardly negligent
behavior. Her testimony was corroborated by one Eugenio Tanhueco who was an impartial eyewitness.
He said that the truck, moving at 50 to 60kph, only stopped upon collision. Also, when the police
investigated the scene of the collision, they found skidmarks under the truck instead of behind it. This
indicated that Galang only applied the brakes moments before the collision. While Galang claimed that
he had stopped when the Escort was within 10 meters of the truck but this only served to substantiate
Tanhueco’s statement that he stopped only upon collision, considering the speed at which he was going

The court said he could not be an “accommodation witness” (WUT) because he was the first to arrive at
the scene and, in fact, brought one of the injured passengers to the hospital, as opposed to a witness
presented by the respondents (Roman Dayrit – who allegedly lived across the street – but it happened
on a bridge tho…. :/) who didn’t even help and said he wanted to call the police but his phone hadn’t a
dial tone.

NOTE: None of the respondents’ witness testimonies were given credence simply because one was the
passenger of Galang (who the court expects would naturally take the side of the person she is associated
with) and the other one was an accommodation witness

He said he was going only “30” (unclear whether he meant miles or kilometers per hour) as opposed to
the 50-60kph – speed limit was 30kph. On the basis of the definition and the test of negligence, no
negligence can be imputed to Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid
running over the two boys by swerving the car away from where they were even if this would mean
entering the opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural course to take
particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane would be several meters away and could very well
slow down, move to the side of the road and give way to the oncoming car.

THE EMERGENCY RULE: “one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to
act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not
guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been
a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own
negligence.” Jose Koh adopted the best means possible in the given situation. This means he cannot be
considered negligent.

ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT JOSE WAS NEGLIGENT, THE COLLISION STILL WOULD NOT BE IMPUTED
TO HIM BECAUSE:

1. Proximate Cause: that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
• Galang’s negligent act of not slowing down or stopping and allowing the Escort to return to the right
lane was the sufficient intervening cause and the actual cause of the tragedy (failure to take the
necessary measures and the degree of care necessary to avoid the collision)
“The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the collision had the latter
heeded the emergency signals given by the former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to go
back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far right of the road, which was
the proper precautionary measure under the given circumstances, the truck driver continued at full
speed towards the car. The truck driver’s negligence becomes more apparent in view of the fact that the
road is 7.50 meters wide while the car measures 1.598 meters and the truck, 2.286 meters, in width.
This would mean that both car and truck could pass side by side with a clearance of 3.661 meters to
spare. Furthermore, the bridge has a level sidewalk, which could have partially accommodated the
truck. Any reasonable man finding himself in the given situation would have tried to avoid the car
instead of meeting it head-on.”
Negligence of Galang apparent in the records: “He himself said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48
kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge52 is only 30
kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed
negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.”

2. Last Clear Chance Doctrine: A doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory
negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant
might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the
negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear chance
to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof. A person who
has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of
his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible
for the consequences of the accident. The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was
guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for all the consequences of the accident
notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff.

• Basically, the last clear chance was with Galang, as can be gleaned from the evidence presented

Therefore, respondents are found, under Article 2180, directly and primarily responsible for the acts of
their employee. Their negligence flows from the negligence of their employee. Such presumption is juris
tantum (rebuttable) and not juris et de jure (conclusive). They did not present evidence that showed
that the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the respondent Court of 3 April
1984 is SET ASIDE while its Decision of 29 November 1983 in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040-41 is REINSTATED

13. MERALCO v REMOQUILLO

FACTS:

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