On 22 January 1993, after due publication and notice, the mortgaged
Bank of America, NT & SA vs. American Realty Corporation 321
SCRA 659 , December 29, 1999
Facts
Petitioner Bank of America NT & SA (BANTSA) is an international
banking and financing institution duly licensed to do business in the
Philippines, organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of
the State of California, United States of America while private
respondent American Realty Corporation (ARC) is a domestic
corporation.
Bank of America International Limited (BAIL), on the other hand, is a
limited liability company organized and existing under the laws of
England.
As borne by the records, BANTSA and BAIL on several occasions
granted three major multi-million United States (US) Dollar loans to
the following corporate borrowers: (1) Liberian Transport Navigation,
S.A.; (2) El Challenger S.A. and (3) Eshley Compania Naviera S.A.
(hereinafter collectively referred to as borrowers), all of which are
existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of Panama
and are foreign affiliates of private respondent.[3]
Due to the default in the payment of the loan amortizations, BANTSA
and the corporate borrowers signed and entered into restructuring
agreements. As additional security for the restructured loans, private
respondent ARC as third party mortgagor executed two real estate
mortgages,[4] dated 17 February 1983 and 20 July 1984, over its
parcels of land including improvements thereon, located at Barrio
Sto. Cristo, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, and which are covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-78759, T-78760, T-78761, T-
78762 and T-78763.
Eventually, the corporate borrowers defaulted in the payment of the
restructured loans prompting petitioner BANTSA to file civil
actions[5] before foreign courts for the collection of the principal loan,
to wit:
a) In England, in its High Court of Justice, Queens Bench Division,
Commercial Court (1992-Folio No. 2098) against Liberian Transport
Navigation S.A., Eshley Compania Naviera S.A., El Challenger S.A.,
Espriona Shipping Company S.A., Eddie Navigation Corp., S.A.,
Eduardo Katipunan Litonjua and Aurelio Katipunan Litonjua on June
17, 1992.
b) In England, in its High Court of Justice, Queens Bench Division,
Commercial Court (1992-Folio No. 2245) against El Challenger S.A.,
Espriona Shipping Company S.A., Eduardo Katipuan Litonjua &
Aurelio Katipunan Litonjua on July 2, 1992;
c) In Hongkong, in the Supreme Court of Hongkong High Court
(Action No. 4039 of 1992) against Eshley Compania Naviera S.A., El
Challenger S.A., Espriona Shipping Company S.A. Pacific Navigators
Corporation, Eddie Navigation Corporation S.A., Litonjua Chartering
(Edyship) Co., Inc., Aurelio Katipunan Litonjua, Jr. and Eduardo
Katipunan Litonjua on November 19, 1992; and
d) In Hongkong, in the Supreme Court of Hongkong High Court
(Action No. 4040 of 1992) against Eshley Compania Naviera S.A., El
Challenger S.A., Espriona Shipping Company, S.A., Pacific
Navigators Corporation, Eddie Navigation Corporation S.A., Litonjua
Chartering (Edyship) Co., Jr. and Eduardo Katipunan Litonjua on
November 21, 1992.
In the civil suits instituted before the foreign courts, private
respondent ARC, being a third party mortgagor, was not impleaded
as party-defendant.
On 16 December 1992, petitioner BANTSA filed before the Office of
the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan, Philippines, an application for
extrajudicial foreclosure[6] of real estate mortgage.
real properties were sold at public auction in an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale, with Integrated Credit and Corporation Services Co.
(ICCS) as the highest bidder for the sum of Twenty Four Million
Pesos (P24,000,000.00).[7]
On 12 February 1993, private respondent filed before the Pasig
Regional Trial Court, Branch 159, an action for damages[8] against
the petitioner, for the latters act of foreclosing extrajudicially the real
estate mortgages despite the pendency of civil suits before foreign
courts for the collection of the principal loan.
In its answer[9] petitioner alleged that the rule prohibiting the
mortgagee from foreclosing the mortgage after an ordinary suit for
collection has been filed, is not applicable in the present case,
claiming that:
a) The plaintiff, being a mere third party mortgagor and not a party to
the principal restructuring agreements, was never made a party
defendant in the civil cases filed in Hongkong and England;
b) There is actually no civil suit for sum of money filed in the
Philippines since the civil actions were filed in Hongkong and
England. As such, any decisions (sic) which may be rendered in the
abovementioned courts are not (sic) enforceable in the Philippines
unless a separate action to enforce the foreign judgments is first filed
in the Philippines, pursuant to Rule 39, Section 50 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
c) Under English Law, which is the governing law under the principal
agreements, the mortgagee does not lose its security interest by
filing civil actions for sums of money.
On 14 December 1993, private respondent filed a motion for
suspension[10] of the redemption period on the ground that it cannot
exercise said right of redemption without at the same time waiving or
contradicting its contentions in the case that the foreclosure of the
mortgage on its properties is legally improper and therefore invalid.
In an order[11] dated 28 January 1994, the trial court granted the
private respondents motion for suspension after which a copy of said
order was duly received by the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan,
Bulacan.
On 07 February 1994, ICCS, the purchaser of the mortgaged
properties at the foreclosure sale, consolidated its ownership over
the real properties, resulting to the issuance of Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. T-18627, T-186272, T-186273, T-16471 and T-16472 in its
name.
On 18 March 1994, after the consolidation of ownership in its favor,
ICCS sold the real properties to Stateland Investment Corporation for
the amount of Thirty Nine Million Pesos
(P39,000,000.00).[12]Accordingly, Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-
187781(m), T-187782(m), T-187783(m), T-16653P(m) and T-
16652P(m) were issued in the latters name.
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision[13] in favor of private
respondent ARC
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed decision of the
lower court prompting petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration
which the appellate court denied.
Ruling
Same; Conflict of Laws; In a long line of decisions, the Court adopted
the well-imbedded principle in our jurisdiction that there is no judicial
notice of any foreign law; A foreign law must be properly pleaded and
proved as a fact.—BANTSA alleges that under English Law, which
according to petitioner is the governing law with regard to the
principal agreements, the mortgagee does not lose its security
interest by simply filing civil actions for sums of money. We rule in the
negative. This argument shows desperation on the part of petitioner
to rivet its crumbling cause. In the case at bench, Philippine law shall
apply notwithstanding the evidence presented by petitioner to prove
the English law on the matter. In a long line of decisions, this Court
adopted the well-imbedded principle in our jurisdiction that there is no
judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law must be properly
pleaded and proved as a fact. Thus, if the Bank of America foreign
law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will
presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or
internal law. This is what we refer to as the doctrine of processual
presumption.
Same; Same; When the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary
to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the said foreign
law, judgment or order shall not be applied.—In the instant case,
assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly
pleaded and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs.
Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find applicability. Thus,
when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and
established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment
or order shall not be applied. Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning
persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object
public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations
or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. The public policy
sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in
our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
Bank of America, NT & SA vs. American Realty Corporation, 321
SCRA 659, G.R. No. 133876 December 29, 1999
Saudi Arabian Airlines vs. Court of Appeals 297 SCRA 469 ,
October 08, 1998
Facts
On January 21, 1988 defendant SAUDIA hired plaintiff as a Flight
Attendant for its airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. . . .
On April 27, 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, plaintiff
went to a disco dance with fellow crew members Thamer Al-Gazzawi
and Allah Al-Gazzawi, both Saudi nationals. Because it was almost
morning when they returned to their hotels, they agreed to have
breakfast together at the room of Thamer. When they were in te (sic)
room, Allah left on some pretext. Shortly after he did, Thamer
attempted to rape plaintiff. Fortunately, a roomboy and several
security personnel heard her cries for help and rescued her. Later,
the Indonesian police came and arrested Thamer and Allah Al-
Gazzawi, the latter as an accomplice.
When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few days later, several SAUDIA
officials interrogated her about the Jakarta incident. They then
requested her to go back to Jakarta to help arrange the release of
Thamer and Allah. In Jakarta, SAUDIA Legal Officer Sirah Akkad and
base manager Baharini negotiated with the police for the immediate
release of the detained crew members but did not succeed because
plaintiff refused to cooperate. She was afraid that she might be
tricked into something she did not want because of her inability to
understand the local dialect. She also declined to sign a blank paper
and a document written in the local dialect. Eventually, SAUDIA
allowed plaintiff to return to Jeddah but barred her from the Jakarta
flights.
Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi Arabian
government, the Indonesian authorities agreed to deport Thamer and
Allah after two weeks of detention. Eventually, they were again put in
service by defendant SAUDI (sic). In September 1990, defendant
SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to Manila.
On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta
incident was already behind her, her superiors requested her to see
Mr. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA, in Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia. When she saw him, he brought her to the police station
where the police took her passport and questioned her about the
Jakarta incident. Miniewy simply stood by as the police put pressure
on her to make a statement dropping the case against Thamer and
Allah. Not until she agreed to do so did the police return her passport
and allowed her to catch the afternoon flight out of Jeddah.
One year and a half later or on lune 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia, a few minutes before the departure of her flight to Manila,
plaintiff was not allowed to board the plane and instead ordered to
take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Miniewy, the Chief Legal
Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid of the SAUDIA
office brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a
document written in Arabic. They told her that this was necessary to
close the case against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out, plaintiff
signed a notice to her to appear before the court on June 27, 1993.
Plaintiff then returned to Manila.
Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to report
to Jeddah once again and see Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for further
investigation. Plaintiff did so after receiving assurance from
SAUDIA's Manila manager, Aslam Saleemi, that the investigation
was routinary and that it posed no danger to her.
In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same Saudi
court on June 27, 1993. Nothing happened then but on June 28,
1993, a Saudi judge interrogated plaintiff through an interpreter about
the Jakarta incident. After one hour of interrogation, they let her go.
At the airport, however, just as her plane was about to take off, a
SAUDIA officer told her that the airline had forbidden her to take
flight. At the Inflight Service Office where she was told to go, the
secretary of Mr. Yahya Saddick took away her passport and told her
to remain in Jeddah, at the crew quarters, until further orders.
On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the
same court where the judge, to her astonishment and shock,
rendered a decision, translated to her in English, sentencing her to
five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only then did she
realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer and
Allah, for what happened in Jakarta. The court found plaintiff guilty of
(1) adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing and listening to the music
in violation of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the male crew, in
contravention of Islamic tradition. 10
Facing conviction, private respondent sought the help of her
employer, petitioner SAUDIA. Unfortunately, she was denied any
assistance. She then asked the Philippine Embassy in Jeddah to
help her while her case is on appeal. Meanwhile, to pay for her
upkeep, she worked on the domestic flight of SAUDIA, while Thamer
and Allah continued to serve in the international
flights. 11
Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah
dismissed the case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi
Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila, 12 she was terminated
from the service by SAUDIA, without her being informed of the
cause.
On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a Complaint 13 for damages
against SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-Balawi ("Al-Balawi"), its country
manager.
On January 19, 1994, SAUDIA filed an Omnibus Motion To
Dismiss 14 which raised the following grounds, to wit: (1) that the
Complaint states no cause of action against Saudia; (2) that
defendant Al-Balawi is not a real party in interest; (3) that the claim or
demand set forth in the Complaint has been waived, abandoned or
otherwise extinguished; and (4) that the trial court has no jurisdiction
to try the case.
On February 10, 1994, Morada filed her Opposition (To Motion to
Dismiss) 15. Saudia filed a reply 16 thereto on March 3, 1994.
On June 23, 1994, Morada filed an Amended Complaint 17 wherein
Al-Balawi was dropped as party defendant. On August 11, 1994,
Saudia filed its Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss Amended
Complaint 18.
The trial court issued an Order 19 dated August 29, 1994 denying the
Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint filed by Saudia.
From the Order of respondent Judge 20 denying the Motion to
Dismiss, SAUDIA filed on September 20, 1994, its Motion for
Reconsideration 21 of the Order dated August 29, 1994. It alleged
that the trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and try the case on the
basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code, since the proper law applicable
is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. On October 14, 1994,
Morada filed her Opposition 22(To Defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration).
In the Reply 23 filed with the trial court on October 24, 1994, SAUDIA
alleged that since its Motion for Reconsideration raised lack of
jurisdiction as its cause of action, the Omnibus Motion Rule does not
apply, even if that ground is raised for the first time on appeal.
Additionally, SAUDIA alleged that the Philippines does not have any
substantial interest in the prosecution of the instant case, and hence,
without jurisdiction to adjudicate the same.
Respondent Judge subsequently issued another Order 24 dated
February 2, 1995, denying SAUDIA's Motion for Reconsideration.
The pertinent portion of the assailed Order reads as follows:
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration of defendant Saudi Arabian
Airlines filed, thru counsel, on September 20, 1994, and the
Opposition thereto of the plaintiff filed, thru counsel, on October 14,
1994, as well as the Reply therewith of defendant Saudi Arabian
Airlines filed, thru counsel, on October 24, 1994, considering that a
perusal of the plaintiffs Amended Complaint, which is one for the
recovery of actual, moral and exemplary damages plus attorney's
fees, upon the basis of the applicable Philippine law, Article 21 of the
New Civil Code of the Philippines, is, clearly, within the jurisdiction of
this Court as regards the subject matter, and there being nothing new
of substance which might cause the reversal or modification of the
order sought to be reconsidered, the motion for reconsideration of
the defendant, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED. 25
Consequently, on February 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed its Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order 26 with the
Court of Appeals.
Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution with
Temporary Restraining Order 27 dated February 23, 1995, prohibiting
the respondent Judge from further conducting any proceeding,
unless otherwise directed, in the interim.
In another Resolution 28 promulgated on September 27, 1995, now
assailed, the appellate court denied SAUDIA's Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated February 18, 1995,
to wit:
The Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is
hereby DENIED, after considering the Answer, with Prayer to Deny
Writ of Preliminary Injunction (Rollo, p. 135) the Reply and Rejoinder,
it appearing that herein petitioner is not clearly entitled thereto
(Unciano Paramedical College, et. Al., v. Court of Appeals,
et. Al., 100335, April 7, 1993, Second Division).
SO ORDERED.
On October 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed with this Honorable Court the
instant Petition 29 for Review with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order dated October 13, 1995.
However, during the pendency of the instant Petition, respondent
Court of Appeals rendered the Decision 30dated April 10, 1996, now
also assailed. It ruled that the Philippines is an appropriate forum
considering that the Amended Complaint's basis for recovery of
damages is Article 21 of the Civil Code, and thus, clearly within the
jurisdiction of respondent Court. It further held that certiorari is not
the proper remedy in a denial of a Motion to Dismiss, inasmuch as
the petitioner should have proceeded to trial, and in case of an
adverse ruling, find recourse in an appeal.
On May 7, 1996, SAUDIA filed its Supplemental Petition for Review
with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order 31 dated April 30, 1996,
given due course by this Court. After both parties submitted their
Memoranda, 32 the instant case is now deemed submitted for
decision.
Ruling
Conflict of Laws; Actions; Where the factual antecedents
satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign element, the
problem could present a “conflicts” case.—Where the factual
antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign
element, we agree with petitioner that the problem herein could
present a “conflicts” case. A factual situation that cuts across
territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two or more
states is said to contain a “foreign element.” The presence of a
foreign element is inevitable since social and economic affairs of
individuals and associations are rarely confined to the geographic
limits of their birth or conception.
Same; Same; The forms in which a foreign element may appear are
many, such as the fact that one party is a resident Philippine
national, and that the other is a resident foreign corporation.—The
forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. The
foreign element may simply consist in the fact that one of the parties
to a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract
between nationals of one State involves properties situated in
another State. In other cases, the foreign element may assume a
complex form. In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in
the fact that private respondent Morada is a resident Philippine
national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation.
Also, by virtue of the employment of Morada with the petitioner
SAUDIA as a flight stewardess, events did transpire during her many
occasions of travel across national borders, particularly from Manila,
Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a
“conflicts” situation to arise. Saudi Arabian Airlines vs. Court of
Appeals, 297 SCRA 469, G.R. No. 122191, G.R. No. 122494
October 8, 1998
Same; Same; Damages; While Article 19 of the Civil Code merely
declares a principle of law, Article 21 gives flesh to its provisions;
Violations of Articles 19 and 21 are actionable, with judicially
enforceable remedies in the municipal forum.—Although Article 19
merely declares a principle of law, Article 21 gives flesh to its
provisions. Thus, we agree with private respondent’s assertion that
violations of Articles 19 and 21 are actionable, with judicially
enforceable remedies in the municipal forum. Based on the
allegations in the Amended Complaint, read in the light of the Rules
of Court on jurisdiction we find that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
suit. Its authority to try and hear the case is provided for under
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691. Saudi Arabian Airlines vs. Court
of Appeals, 297 SCRA 469, G.R. No. 122191, G.R. No. 122494
October 8, 1998
Same; Same; Forum Non Conveniens; Forum Shopping; Plaintiff
may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, ‘vex,’ ‘harass,’ or
‘oppress’ the defendant, e.g. by inflicting upon him needless expense
or disturbance, but unless the balance is strongly in favor of the
defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be
disturbed.—Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of
the parties, also weigh heavily in favor of the RTC Quezon City
assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is the private interest of the litigant.
Enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained is quite obvious.
Relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial are equally
important. Plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, ‘vex,’
‘harass,’ or ‘oppress’ the defendant, e.g. by inflicting upon him
needless expense or disturbance. But unless the balance is strongly
in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely
be disturbed.
Same; Same; Forcing a party to seek remedial action in a place
where she no longer maintains substantial connections would cause
a fundamental unfairness to her.—Weighing the relative claims of the
parties, the court a quo found it best to hear the case in the
Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of the case, it would
be forcing plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek remedial action
elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer
maintains substantial connections. That would have caused a
fundamental unfairness to her.
Same; Same; A party effectively submits to the trial court’s
jurisdiction by praying for the dismissal of the complaint on grounds
other than lack of jurisdiction.—The records show that petitioner
SAUDIA has filed several motions praying for the dismissal of
Morada’s Amended Complaint. SAUDIA also filed an Answer In Ex
Abundante Cautelam dated February 20, 1995. What is very patent
and explicit from the motions filed, is that SAUDIA prayed for other
reliefs under the premises. Undeniably, petitioner SAUDIA has
effectively submitted to the trial court’s jurisdiction by praying for the
dismissal of the Amended Complaint on grounds other than lack of
jurisdiction.
Same; Choice-of-law problems seek to answer two important
questions: (1) What legal system should control a given situation
where some of the significant facts occurred in two or more states;
and (2) to what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the
situation.—As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-
law problems seek to answer two important questions: (1) What legal
system should control a given situation where some of the significant
facts occurred in two or more states; and (2) to what extent should
the chosen legal system regulate the situation.
Same; Although ideally, all choice-of-law theories should intrinsically
advance both notions of justice and predictability, they do not always
do so, in which case the forum is then faced with the problem of
deciding which of these two important values should be stressed.—
Several theories have been propounded in order to identify the legal
system that should ultimately control. Although ideally, all choice-of-
law theories should intrinsically advance both notions of justice and
predictability, they do not always do so. The forum is then faced with
the problem of deciding which of these two important values should
be stressed.
Same; Characterization or Doctrine of Qualification; Words and
Phrases; Characterization is the “process of deciding whether or not
the facts relate to the kind of question specified in a conflicts rule.”—
Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine
under what category a certain set of facts or rules fall. This process is
known as “characterization,” or the “doctrine of qualification.” It is the
“process of deciding whether or not the facts relate to the kind of
question specified in a conflicts rule.” The purpose of
“characterization” is to enable the forum to select the proper law.
Same; Same; An essential element of conflict rules is the indication
of a “test” or “connecting factor” or “point of contact.”—Our starting
point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual situation,
event, or operative fact. An essential element of conflict rules is the
indication of a “test” or “connecting factor” or “point of contact.”
Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a factual relation ship (such
as property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or point of
contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the
place of performance, or the place of wrongdoing.
Same; Same; “Test Factors” or “Points of Contact” or “Connecting
Factors.”—Note that one or more circumstances may be present to
serve as the possible test for the determination of the applicable law.
These “test factors” or “points of contact” or “connecting factors”
could be any of the following: “(1) the nationality of a person, his
domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or his origin; (2) the seat
of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation; (3) the situs of a
thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be situated.
In particular, the lex situs is decisive when real rights are involved;
(4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as
the place where a contract has been made, a marriage celebrated, a
will signed or a tort committed. The lex loci actus is particularly
important in contracts and torts; (5) the place where an act is
intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of performance of
contractual duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to be
exercised; (6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law
that should govern their agreement, the lex loci intentionis; (7) the
place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or
done. The lex fori—the law of the forum—is particularly important
because, as we have seen earlier, matters of ‘procedure’ not going to
the substance of the claim involved are governed by it; and because
the lex fori applies whenever the content of the otherwise applicable
foreign law is excluded from application in a given case for the
reason that it falls under one of the exceptions to the applications of
foreign law; and (8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is
decisive of practically all legal relationships of the ship and of its
master or owner as such. It also covers contractual relationships
particularly contracts of affreightment.” (Italics ours.) Saudi Arabian
Airlines vs. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 469, G.R. No. 122191, G.R.
No. 122494 October 8, 1998
Same; Same; Same; Torts; Where the action is one involving torts,
the “connecting factor” or “point of contact” could be the place or
places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred; The
Philippines is the situs of the tort where it is in the Philippines where
the defendant allegedly deceived the plaintiff, a citizen residing and
working here, and the fact that certain acts or parts of the injury
occurred in another country is of no moment, for what is important is
the place where the over-all harm or the totality of the injury to the
person, reputation, social standing and human rights of the plaintiff
had lodged.—Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one
involving torts, the “connecting factor” or “point of contact” could be
the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus
occurred. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find
that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place
where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is
in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private
respondent, a Filipina residing and working here. According to her,
she had honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its
rights and in the performance of its duties, “act with justice, give her
her due and observe honesty and good faith.” Instead, petitioner
failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts of the
injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment. For in
our view what is important here is the place where the over-all harm
or the totality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social
standing and human rights of complainant, had lodged, according to
the plaintiff below (herein private respondent). All told, it is not
without basis to identify the Philippines as the situs of the alleged
tort.
Same; Same; Same; Same; “State of the Most Significant
Relationship” Rule; The “State of the most significant relationship”
rule is the appropriate modern theory on tort liability to apply in the
instant case.—With the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of
lex loci delicti commissi, modern theories and rules on tort liability
have been advanced to offer fresh judicial approaches to arrive at
just results. In keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort
liability, we find here an occasion to apply the “State of the most
significant relationship” rule, which in our view should be appropriate
to apply now, given the factual context of this case. In applying said
principle to determine the State which has the most significant
relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account and
evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the
particular issue: (a) the place where the injury occurred; (b) the place
where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile,
residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of
the parties; and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between
the parties is centered.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the Philippines is the situs
of the tort complained of and the place “having the most interest in
the problem,” the Philippine law on tort liability should have
paramount application to and control in the resolution of the legal
issues arising therein.—As already discussed, there is basis for the
claim that over-all injury occurred and lodged in the Philippines.
There is likewise no question that private respondent is a resident
Filipina national, working with petitioner, a resident foreign
corporation engaged here in the business of international air
carriage. Thus, the “relationship” between the parties was centered
here, although it should be stressed that this suit is not based on
mere labor law violations. From the record, the claim that the
Philippines has the most significant contact with the matter in this
dispute, raised by private respondent as plaintiff below against
defendant (herein petitioner), in our view, has been properly
established. Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the
situs of the tort complained of and the place “having the most interest
in the problem,” we find, by way of recapitulation, that the Philippine
law on tort liability should have paramount application to and control
in the resolution of the legal issues arising out of this case. Further,
we hold that the respondent Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over
the parties and the subject matter of the complaint; the appropriate
venue is in Quezon City, which could properly apply Philippine law.
Same; Pleadings and Practice; Evidence; A party whose cause of
action is based on a Philippine law has no obligation to plead and
prove the law of another State.—We find untenable petitioner’s
insistence that “[s]ince private respondent instituted this suit, she has
the burden of pleading and proving the applicable Saudi law on the
matter.” As aptly said by private respondent, she has “no obligation
to plead and prove the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since her
cause of action is based on Articles 19 and 21” of the Civil Code of
the Philippines. In her Amended Complaint and subsequent
pleadings, she never alleged that Saudi law should govern this case.
And as correctly held by the respondent appellate court, “considering
that it was the petitioner who was invoking the applicability of the law
of Saudi Arabia, then the burden was on it [petitioner] to plead and to
establish what the law of Saudi Arabia is.”
Kiobel vs. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
Facts
Petitioner Esther Kiobel, representing a group of individuals from the
Ogoni region in Nigeria, filed a class action lawsuit against
Respondents, the Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Shell Transport and
Trading Company PLC, and Shell Petroleum Development Company
of Nigeria, LTD (“Royal Dutch”) under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”).
The ATS grants jurisdiction to some federal courts for certain
violations of international law. Petitioners allege that Royal Dutch
aided the Nigerian government in committing various acts of violence
against protestors of the oil exploration projects in the Ogoni
region. Petitioners claim that they have standing to sue under the
ATS because the history, text, and purpose of the statute support the
application of the ATS to actions in foreign countries. Petitioner also
contends that previous court decisions interpreted the ATS to extend
beyond U.S. territory. In response, Royal Dutch argues that the ATS
is not an exception to the presumption that U.S. law does not apply
extraterritorially, and should not be applicable to actions outside of
the U.S. The Court's decision in this case will clarify the reach of the
U.S. federal courts' jurisdiction over certain extraterritorial tort
claims.
Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties
Whether the issue of corporate civil tort liability under the Alien Tort
Statute ("ATS"), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, is a merits question, as it has
been treated by all courts prior to the decision below, or an issue of
subject matter jurisdiction, as the court of appeals held for the first
time.
Issue(s)
Whether an American federal court can hear a claim under the Alien
Tort statute, when that claim arose out of conduct in a foreign
country.
Facts
Esther Kiobel represents a class of citizens from the Ogoni region
in Nigeria who filed a class action suit against the respondents Royal
Dutch Petroleum, Shell Transport and Trading Company and Shell
Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (“Royal Dutch
Petroleum”) in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York in 2002. Respondent corporations are
incorporated in the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and Nigeria,
respectively. Respondents are companies that have been engaged in
oil exploration and production in the Ogoni region of Nigeria since
1958. In response to Royal Dutch Petroleum’s exploration efforts, a
group of Ogoni citizens formed the “Movement for the Survival of
Ogoni People” which protested the detrimental environmental effects
that Royal Dutch’s oil exploration has on the region.
Petitioners in this case (“Kiobel”) allege that Royal Dutch Petroleum
partnered with the Nigerian government in 1993 to stop the Ogoni
from protesting the oil exploration projects. Petitioners allege that
Nigerian military forces committed atrocities against the Ogoni
people including raping, murdering, beating, and making unlawful
arrests to further the government’s efforts to stop the protesting,
which would allow Royal Dutch to continue oil exploration in the
region. Petitioners claim that Royal Dutch Petroleum provided the
Nigerian soldiers with transportation, food, compensation and staging
areas for carrying out attacks against the Ogoni.
Kiobel brings the claim under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), which
allows foreign citizens to bring suits in U.S. federal courts for certain
violations of the law of nations. Kiobel brought suit arguing that Royal
Dutch Petroleum had aided and abetted the Nigerian government, or
was otherwise complicit, in the atrocities committed against the
people. In 2006, the District Court dismissed some of the claims of
aiding and abetting but allowed claims of aiding and abetting arbitrary
arrest and detention; crimes against humanity; and torture or cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment to stand. The District Court
recognized the importance of interpreting the law properly and thus
certified the whole case for interlocutory appeal by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit ruled
that the ATS had never served as a basis for liability on the part of
corporations. The court dismissed all of Kiobel’s claims for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. This case was the first time that the
Second Circuit directly addressed whether its jurisdiction under ATS
extends to civil actions involving corporations.
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments for the case on February
28, 2012 and on March 5, 2012 ordered re-arguments. The re-
arguments will be on the question of under what circumstances the
Alien Tort Statute allows American courts to litigate tort claims that
are based on actions that did not occur within the territory of the
United States.
Discussion
Petitioners argue that the text, history, and purpose of the Alien Tort
Statute (“ATS”) support their contention that the ATS was applicable
in foreign nations. However, Respondents argue that the ATS is not
an exception to the presumption that U.S. law does not apply
extraterritorially, and should not be applicable to actions outside of
the U.S.
Business Implications
BP America and others (“BP America”) point out that the U.S
corporations often have contacts with foreign military and
government entities when the corporations conduct foreign
business. BP America maintains that if ATS liability for aiding and
abetting is extended in this case, many corporations conducting
business in developing countries will be at risk of billion-dollar claims
based solely on their incidental contacts with the governing regimes
in these countries. The Chamber of Commerce further argues that if
ATS is extended to cases involving U.S. corporations’ conduct in
foreign countries, the ATS could effectively act as embargos or
international sanctions. Moreover, the Chamber of Commerce
contends that the ATS will impose additional risks to corporations
and discourage corporations from investing overseas. Furthermore,
the Chamber of Commerce argues that the decrease in investment in
developing nations will not only harm corporations but also the
developing nations themselves, as well as negatively affect U.S.
foreign policy. The Chamber of Commerce also contends that the
United States has often encouraged investment in developing
nations to further political policies, and the ATS will serve as a barrier
to those policies.
Ambassador David J. Scheffer (“Scheffer”) contends that if the ATS
has extraterritorial reach, it will enforce the global trend that is
moving towards applying more civil liability for corporations that
violate international human rights, and as a permanent member of
the United Nations Security Council, the. U.S. should support the
trend and hold corporations accountable for their human rights
violations. Scheffer also argues that if the ATS has foreign reach, it
will signal to other countries America’s commitment to justice, and
promote international justice. The members of the Parliament of the
Federal Republic of Germany (“German Parliament”) also maintain
that the ATS would support notions of international justice, and
provide a remedy to victims of human rights violations. The German
Parliament contends that the ATS does not act as a barrier to
international corporations, since the number of human rights claims
that are brought against multinational corporations are very small due
to the high cost of bringing a class action lawsuit. Petitioners further
state that the settlements in these types of human rights cases are
so minor for large corporations that they will not greatly hamper
income so drastically as to prevent a corporation from considering
foreign investment.
Sovereign Power vs. Protection of Human Rights
The Cato Institute states that a sovereign should limit its punishment
of crimes to those crimes that occur within the sovereign’s
jurisdiction, independent of the nature of the crime. The Cato Institute
argues that allowing the Petitioners to continue to litigate the case
would greatly expand the boundaries of the reach of American courts
in cases dealing with international law. The Cato Institute maintains
that this will create an overreach of U.S. power, which will undermine
U.S. foreign policy by allowing U.S. courts to decide disputes in
foreign countries. The Federal Republic of Germany believes that if
the Court finds for Petitioners, the sovereign judicial powers of
foreign nations will be reduced even though they have stronger
interests in cases that concern their own corporations.
Navi Pillay, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
(“Pillay”), believes that victims of human rights violations are entitled
to compensation for the atrocities committed against them and this
compensation is necessary because often human rights violations
create an inability to support a family or make a livelihood. Pillay also
states that often there are no avenues in the domestic judicial
systems to recover for human rights violations and if Petitioners are
unsuccessful in this instance, a potential avenue for recovery will be
lost to victims of human rights violations. Petitioners also state that
the need for a forum to hear the human rights violations far
outweighs any infraction on the sovereignty of a nation.
Analysis
Application of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain to International Torts
Petitioner argues that the seminal case, Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, already resolved the question of whether the ATS allows
U.S. courts to recognize a cause of action for international
law violations that occur outside the United States. Petitioner
contends that Sosa, a case in which plaintiffs sued the defendants for
kidnapping under the ATS, held that ATS jurisdiction extends to a
small subset of common law tort cases derived from international
law. Petitioner points out that the Sosa court held that the plaintiffs
were not entitled to damages under the ATS, since the ATS was a
jurisdictional statute that was intended to regulate common law
causes of actions for a small number of international law violations,
including crimes against ambassadors, breaches of safe conducts,
and piracy. Petitioner argues that Sosa authorized ATS jurisdiction to
include human rights violations by foreign nationals in its discussion
of remedies. Petitioner further argues that international law prohibits
any government from committing human rights violations against
their citizens, especially within their own sovereignty. Moreover,
Petitioner states that no court since Sosa has held that ATS
jurisdiction is limited to conduct occurring within the U.S. or on
the high seas.
Respondent argues that Sosa stands for the proposition that to apply
the ATS and federal common law is to recognize U.S. law in a
foreign country. Respondent asserts that, under the ATS, courts
apply federal common law to a violation of an international law
“norm,” therefore applying U.S. law to foreign nations. Thus,
respondent argues, that while these causes of action do look partially
to international law for substantive content, because it is based on a
violation of an international law custom, it is nonetheless an
application of U.S. federal common law. Respondent argues that to
find otherwise would likely be a violation of international law, which
prohibits universal civil jurisdiction. Respondent further argues that
even if it would not be a clear violation of international law, it would
be an arguable violation. In support of this, Respondent cites Sosa ,
which lists the potential violation of international law as a
consideration a court should use when determining whether or not to
extend jurisdiction to international tort cases under the
ATS. Respondent further contends that there is no acceptable
circumstance where it would be appropriate for the U.S. to apply its
own laws to a case such as this one.
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
Petitioner argues that the presumption against extraterritoriality is not
applicable to the ATS because it is a jurisdictional statute and that
the presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply to
jurisdictional statutes. Petitioner also asserts that the ATS does not
have any geographic limitations on the scope of its
jurisdiction.Moreover, Petitioner compares the ATS to U.S.
adjudication of international tort claims (also known as Transitory
Tort claims), where both parties are based outside of the United
States. Petitioner states that international tort claims may
be adjudicated in the U.S. regardless of where the cause of
action arose, so long as the plaintiffs can satisfy personal
jurisdiction requirements. Petitioner argues that both the ATS and the
Transitory Tort doctrine derive their power from customary
international law and not the substantive law of any particular
nation. Petitioner notes that although the ATS uses some federal
common law to provide rules, this is consistent with international law
principles, which dictate that each state may enforce international law
through their own legal system. Thus, petitioner contends that
adjudication of this case would not apply U.S. law extraterritoriality.
Respondent contends that the ATS and federal common law should
not be interpreted to apply to conduct on foreign soil because U.S.
law is presumed not to apply extraterritorially. Respondent thus
argues that, by extending ATS and federal common law to suits
involving foreign territories and parties, the Court would extend U.S.
law outside of its borders. Respondent contends that this
presumption against extraterritoriality applies to the ATS despite the
fact that it is a jurisdictional statute. In support of this claim,
Respondent cites the Sosadecision, in which the Court determined
that the decision to create a private right of action is usually best left
to the legislature. Respondent continues by stating that the Court
intended for the extraterritoriality presumption to also apply to the
ATS. Respondent argues that, although several lower courts have
permitted suits arising from incidents in foreign nations, the Court
should explicitly foreclose such suits because they cause
international friction. In response to Petitioner’s comparison of
international tort cases and ATS claims, Respondent replies that ATS
cases and international tort claims require entirely different
procedural rules: while international tort cases are adjudicated in a
U.S. forum, the law of wherever the violation occurred supplies the
choice of law. Respondent argues that in contrast, ATS cases require
application of U.S. federal common law—meaning the law of the
nation where the incident occurred has no impact.
History, Text, and Purpose of the ATS
Petitioner contends that maintaining federal jurisdiction over these
types of alien tort cases is appropriate and has been assumed since
the formation of the United States. Petitioner argues that the ATS
was enacted to adjudicate treaty violations and therefore
extends territorial jurisdiction everywhere international
law reaches. Moreover, Petitioner argues that even if the
presumption against extraterritoriality does apply, it is rebutted by the
text, history, and purpose of the statute. Petitioner states that the
ATS has long been understood to include violations committed in
foreign nations by foreign actors. In support of this, Petitioner points
to the fact that Congress has long supported international human
rights compliance and accountability and that, by restricting the
jurisdiction of ATS claims, U.S. foreign policy would be
compromised. Petitioner additionally argues that the founders did not
apply a territorial limitation to the scope of the ATS.
Respondent supports its ATS interpretation by claiming that, where
Congress has intended for an Act to include violations that occur on
foreign soil, it has explicitly said so. Respondent cites the Torture
Victim Protection Act(“TVPA”) as an example of this. The TVPA
explicitly extends jurisdiction to acts occurring in foreign nations
regardless of the actors. Respondent further contends that
application of the ATS has historically involved incidents occurring on
U.S. soil. Respondent thus concludes that only Congress may outline
territorial jurisdiction of the ATS and, if it intends for jurisdiction to
include acts committed on foreign soil by foreign nations, it must
explicitly say so. Respondent argues that to conclude otherwise
would be to establish absolute U.S. jurisdiction over all international
matters.
Application of U.S. Law to International Claims
Petitioner argues that U.S. law is not applied here because the ATS
and federal common law call for the application of international law to
any disputes filed under the statute. Petitioner states that these laws
are utilized worldwide and are easily applied by the federal courts to
ATS disputes. In this way, Petitioner argues that it is not U.S. law that
applies extraterritorially but rather international law that applies
universally. Petitioner argues that the history of the ATS
demonstrates that Congress intended it to provide federal courts with
extraterritorial reach, a prospect shown by the many
foreign tort cases litigated in U.S. federal courts. Petitioner also notes
that adjudication of foreign violations does not violate the prohibition
on universal civil jurisdiction because there are restrictions on ATS
jurisdiction, such as where defendant is not sufficiently connected to
the forum nation to satisfy due process requirements. Petitioner
concludes that these jurisdictional limitations are sufficient to prevent
U.S. courts from unilaterally exercising universal civil jurisdiction.
Respondent responds first by pointing to the fact that the case before
the Court is especially sensitive because it involves passing
judgment on the commercial conduct of a foreign government, not
just a non-government actor. Respondent additionally argues that the
ATS was enacted as a means of preventing international conflict and
was not intended to include violations committed by alien actors in
foreign nations. Respondent states that the alleged conduct occurred
entirely in Nigeria and Nigeria objects to U.S. adjudication of the
matter because they believe it will jeopardize their ability to reconcile
the country with the Ogoni people. Respondent argues that foreign
nations often object to the application of laws outside the construct of
their own sovereignty because they choose their own means of
dealing with internal conflict. Respondent points to South Africa as an
example of a country that took an alternative route—by creating
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (“TRC”)—to address the
disputes that arose in the aftermath of apartheid. Respondent argues
that this as an example of a situation where imposition of foreign
jurisdiction would have been a serious disruption of South Africa’s
autonomy.
Conclusion
The re-arguments in this case will focus on the interpretation of the
Alien Tort Statute as it relates to the ability for an American court to
have jurisdiction on civil cases that would otherwise be outside their
reach. The Court’s decision will greatly affect corporate investment in
emerging markets and international human rights law. Petitioners will
argue that they must be allowed to bring their claim in a United
States court in order to allow for justice for human rights cases, while
Respondents will urge to the Court that there is no jurisdiction on the
part of the United States and the case would be better served in a
jurisdiction that has greater ties to the underlying action.
St. Aviation Services Co., Pte., Ltd. vs. Grand International
Airways, Inc. 505 SCRA 30 , October 23, 2006
Facts
St. Aviation Services Co., Pte., Ltd., petitioner, is a foreign
corporation based in Singapore. It is engaged in the manufacture,
repair, and maintenance of airplanes and aircrafts. Grand
International Airways, Inc., respondent, is a domestic corporation
engaged in airline operations.
Sometime in January 1996, petitioner and respondent executed an
Agreement for the Maintenance and Modification of Airbus A 300 B4-
103 Aircraft Registration No. RP-C8882 (First Agreement). Under this
stipulation, petitioner agreed to undertake maintenance and
modification works on respondents aircraft. The parties agreed on
the mode and manner of payment by respondent of the contract
price, including interest in case of default. They also agreed that the
construction, validity and performance thereof shall be governed by
the laws of Singapore. They further agreed to submit any suit arising
from their agreement to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of
the Singapore courts.
At about the same time, or on January 12, 1996, the parties verbally
agreed that petitioner will repair and undertake maintenance works
on respondents other aircraft, Aircraft No. RP-C8881; and that the
works shall be based on a General Terms of Agreement (GTA). The
GTA terms are similar to those of their First Agreement.
Petitioner undertook the contracted works and thereafter promptly
delivered the aircrafts to respondent. During the period from March
1996 to October 1997, petitioner billed respondent in the total
amount of US$303,731.67 or S$452,560.18. But despite petitioners
repeated demands, respondent failed to pay, in violation of the terms
agreed upon.
On December 12, 1997, petitioner filed with the High Court of
the Republic of Singapore an action for the sum of S$452,560.18,
including interest and costs, against respondent, docketed as Suit
No. 2101. Upon petitioners motion, the court issued a Writ of
Summons to be served extraterritorially or outside Singapore upon
respondent. The court sought the assistance of the sheriff
of Pasay City to effect service of the summons upon
respondent. However, despite receipt of summons, respondent failed
to answer the claim.
On February 17, 1998, on motion of petitioner, the Singapore High
Court rendered a judgment by default against respondent.
On August 4, 1998, petitioner filed with the RTC, Branch
117, Pasay City, a Petition for Enforcement of Judgment, docketed
as Civil Case No. 98-1389.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on two grounds: (1)
the Singapore High Court did not acquire jurisdiction over its person;
and (2) the foreign judgment sought to be enforced is void for having
been rendered in violation of its right to due process.
On October 30, 1998, the RTC denied respondents motion to
dismiss, holding that neither one of the two grounds (of Grand) is
among the grounds for a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the
RTC in its Order dated December 16, 1998.
On February 15, 1999, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Certiorari assailing the RTC Order denying its motion to
dismiss. Respondent alleged that the extraterritorial service of
summons on its office in the Philippines is defective and that
the Singapore court did not acquire jurisdiction over its person. Thus,
its judgment sought to be enforced is void. Petitioner, in its comment,
moved to dismiss the petition for being unmeritorious.
On July 30, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued its Decision granting
the petition and setting aside the Orders dated October 30,
1998 and December 16, 1998 of the RTC without prejudice to the
right of private respondent to initiate another proceeding before the
proper court to enforce its claim. It found:
In the case at bar, the complaint does not involve the personal status
of plaintiff, nor any property in which the defendant has a claim or
interest, or which the private respondent has attached but purely an
action for collection of debt. It is a personal action as well as an
action in personam, not an action in rem or quasi in rem. As a
personal action, the service of summons should be personal or
substituted, not extraterritorial, in order to confer jurisdiction on the
court.
Petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration but it was
denied on September 29, 1999.
Issues
1) whether the Singapore High Court has acquired jurisdiction over
the person of respondent by the service of summons upon its office
in the Philippines; and
(2) whether the judgment by default in Suit No. 2101 by the
Singapore High Court is enforceable in the Philippines.
Ruling
Judgments; Jurisdictions; Contracts; In the absence of a special
contract, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country; however, under
the rules of comity, utility and convenience, nations have established
a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign
courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and
rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in
different countries.—In the absence of a special contract, no
sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment
rendered by a tribunal of another country; however, under the rules
of comity, utility and convenience, nations have established a usage
among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of
competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered
efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different
countries. Certainly, the Philippine legal system has long ago
accepted into its jurisprudence and procedural rules the viability of an
action for enforcement of foreign judgment, as well as the requisites
for such valid enforcement, as derived from internationally accepted
doctrines.
Same; Same; Parties; A foreign judgment or order against a person
is merely presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties. It
may be repelled, among others, by want of jurisdiction of the issuing
authority or by want of notice to the party against whom it is
enforced. The party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of
overcoming the presumption of its validity.—A foreign judgment or
order against a person is merely presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties. It may be repelled, among others, by want of
jurisdiction of the issuing authority or by want of notice to the party
against whom it is enforced. The party attacking a foreign judgment
has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity.
Summons; Pleadings and Practice; Matters of remedy and procedure
such as those relating to the service of process upon a defendant are
governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum, which in this
case is the law of Singapore.—Matters of remedy and procedure
such as those relating to the service of process upon a defendant are
governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum, which in this
case is the law of Singapore. Here, petitioner moved for leave of
court to serve a copy of the Writ of Summons outside Singapore. In
an Order dated December 24, 1997, the Singapore High Court
granted “leave to serve a copy of the Writ of Summons on the
Defendant by a method of service authorized by the law of the
Philippines for service of any originating process issued by the
Philippines at ground floor, APMC Building, 136 Amorsolo corner
Gamboa Street, 1229 Makati City, or elsewhere in the Philippines.”
Same; Same; Jurisdictions; Jurisdiction over a party is acquired by
service of summons by the sheriff, his deputy or other proper court
officer either personally by handing a copy thereof to the defendant
or by substituted service.—In the Philippines, jurisdiction over a party
is acquired by service of summons by the sheriff, his deputy or other
proper court officer either personally by handing a copy thereof to the
defendant or by substituted service.
Same; Same; Same; Considering that the Writ of Summons was
served upon respondent in accordance with our Rules, jurisdiction
was acquired by the Singapore High Court over its person.—
Considering that the Writ of Summons was served upon respondent
in accordance with our Rules, jurisdiction was acquired by the
Singapore High Court over its person. Clearly, the judgment of
default rendered by that court against respondent is valid. St.
Aviation Services Co., Pte., Ltd. vs. Grand International Airways, Inc.,
505 SCRA 30, G.R. No. 140288 October 23, 2006
Fujiki vs. Marinay 700 SCRA 69 , June 26, 2013
Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married
respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the
Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with
petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan
where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara
(Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and
Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines.
Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly
suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started
to contact Fujiki.3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish
their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment
from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January
2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition
of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)."
Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be
recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara be declared void ab initiounder Articles 35(4) and 41 of the
Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family
Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and
Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics
Office (NSO).6
Ruling
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Foreign Judgments; Conflict of Law;
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a
fact under the Rules of Court.—For Philippine courts to recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to
prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be
more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in
evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25,
in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. Petitioner
may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an
official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer
who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in
a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign
service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A foreign judgment relating to the status
of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of
its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic.
To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines,
Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent
with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.—A foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status,
condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a
foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the
foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other
mandatory laws. Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that “[l]aws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad.” This is the rule of lex nationalii in private
international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for
effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a
foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises
personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal
capacity of such citizen.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A petition to recognize a foreign
judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation
under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage.—A petition to recognize a foreign
judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation
under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to
know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was
rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status,
condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the
jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only
recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of
evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Once a foreign judgment is admitted and
proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds
external to its merits, i.e., “want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.”—Section
48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment
or final order against a person creates a “presumptive evidence of a
right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.” Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states
that “the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.” Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited
review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the
merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted
and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds
external to its merits, i.e., “want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.” The rule on
limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of
party expectations, as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other
states.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Civil Law; Divorce; While the Philippines
does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however,
recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to
remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree
abroad.—Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43
(1922), Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees
between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully
proven under the rules of evidence. Divorce involves the dissolution
of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does
not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or
the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a
divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign
divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or
her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Since the recognition of a foreign
judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made
in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3
of the Rules of Court provides that “[a] special proceeding is a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact.”—Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only
requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules
of Court provides that “[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a
party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.” Rule
108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are
recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No.
3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or
marriage, which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by
the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, 628 SCRA 266
(2010), this Court declared that “[t]he recognition of the foreign
divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the
object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact.”
Civil Law; Marriages; Parties; When Section 2(a) states that “[a]
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife” — it refers to the husband or
the wife of the subsisting marriage; The husband or the wife of the
prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.—Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to
question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of
bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that “[a] petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife” — it refers to the husband or the wife of
the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code,
bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in
a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the
law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the
one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC.
Civil Law; Conflict of Law; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage;
Foreign Judgments; Divorce; Article 26 of the Family Code confers
jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.—Article 26
of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend
the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the
marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provides that “[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.” In Republic v. Orbecido, 472 SCRA 114 (2005), this
Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of
Article 26 which is “to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse” under the laws of
his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a
foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not
allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
Same; Same; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage; Divorce; Foreign
Judgments; The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a
marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a
foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy; If
the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino
spouse will be discriminated — the foreign spouse can remarry while
the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.—The principle in Article 26 of the
Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign
citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the
ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to
declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies
because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the
marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her
country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines,
the Filipino spouse will be discriminated — the foreign spouse can
remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry. Fujiki vs. Marinay,
700 SCRA 69, G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Conflict of Law; Philippine
courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2)
whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to
repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.—Philippine
courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2)
whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to
repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is
neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel
the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the
foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule
39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already
“presumptive evidence of a right between the parties.” Upon
recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive
and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or
cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that
establishes a new status, right and fact that needs to be reflected in
the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between
the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the
public records in the Philippines. Fujiki vs. Marinay, 700 SCRA 69,
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
PHILIPPINE ALUMINUM WHEELS, INC., petitioner, vs. FASGI
ENTERPRISES, INC., respondent. [G.R. No. 137378. October 12,
2000]
Facts
In 1978, FASGI Enterprises Inc. (FASGI), a foreign corporation
organized under the laws of California, USA, entered into a contract
with Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. (PAWI), a Philippine
corporation, whereby the latter agrees to deliver 8,594 wheels to
FASGI. FASGI received the wheels and so it paid PAWI
$216,444.30. Later however, FASGI found out that the wheels are
defective and did not comply with certain US standards. So in 1979,
FASGI sued PAWI in a California court. In 1980, a settlement was
reached but PAWI failed to comply with the terms of the agreement.
A second agreement was made but PAWI was again remiss in its
obligation. The agreement basically provides that PAWI shall return
the purchase price in installment and conversely, FASGI shall return
the wheel in installment. PAWI was only able to make two
installments (which were actually made beyond the scheduled date).
FASGI also returned the corresponding number of wheels.
Eventually in 1982, FASGI sought the enforcement of the agreement
and it received a favorable judgment from the California court. PAWI
is then ordered to pay an equivalent of P252k plus damages but
FASGI was not ordered to return the remaining wheels. PAWI was
not able to comply with the court order in the US. So in 1983, FASGI
filed a complaint for the enforcement of a foreign judgment with RTC-
Makati. Hearings were made and in 1990, the trial judge ruled
against FASGI on the ground that the foreign judgment is tainted
with fraud because FASGI was not ordered to return the remaining
wheels (unjust enrichment) and that PAWI’s American lawyer
entered into the agreements without the consent of PAWI. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign judgment may be enforced here in
the Philippines.
HELD: YES
Conflict of Laws; Judgments; Enforcement of Foreign Judgments;
Comity; The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have
established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments
of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected
and rendered efficacious.—Generally, in the absence of a special
compact, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country; however, the
rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a
usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign
courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and
rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in
different countries. In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a
foreign tribunal may be recognized insofar as the immediate parties
and the underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is
convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a full and
fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction; that trial upon
regular proceedings has been conducted, following due citation or
voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of
jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice;
and that there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court and in
the system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the
judgment. A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in
the country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the
basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of
due notice in the foreign forum. Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. vs.
FASGI Enterprises, Inc., 342 SCRA 722, G.R. No. 137378 October
12, 2000
Conflict of Laws; Judgments; Comity; There is a principle of
international comity that a court of another jurisdiction should refrain,
as a matter of propriety and fairness, from so assuming the power of
passing judgment on the correctness of the application of law and the
evaluation of the facts of the judgment issued by another tribunal.—
PAWI assailed not only Mr. Ready’s authority to sign on its behalf the
Supplemental Settlement Agreement but denounced likewise his
authority to enter into a stipulation for judgment before the California
court on 06 August 1982 on the ground that it had by then already
terminated the former’s services. For his part, Mr. Ready admitted
that while he did receive a request from Manuel Singson of PAWI to
withdraw from the motion of judgment, the request unfortunately
came too late. In an explanatory telex, Mr. Ready told Mr. Singson
that under American Judicial Procedures when a motion for judgment
had already been filed a counsel would not be permitted to withdraw
unilaterally without a court order. From the time the stipulation for
judgment was entered into on 26 April 1982 until the certificate of
finality of judgment was issued by the California court on 07
September 1982, no notification was issued by PAWI to FASGI
regarding its termination of Mr. Ready’s services. If PAWI were
indeed hoodwinked by Mr. Ready who purportedly acted in collusion
with FASGI, it should have aptly raised the issue before the forum
which issued the judgment in line with the principle of international
comity that a court of another jurisdiction should refrain, as a matter
of propriety and fairness, from so assuming the power of passing
judgment on the correctness of the application of law and the
evaluation of the facts of the judgment issued by another tribunal.
Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. vs. FASGI Enterprises, Inc., 342
SCRA 722, G.R. No. 137378 October 12, 2000
Rayray vs. Chae Kyung Lee 18 SCRA 450 , October 26, 1966
Facts
Rayray married Lee in 1952 in Pusan, Korea. Before the marriage,
Lee was able to secure a marriage license which is a requirement in
Korea prior to marrying. They lived together until 1955. Rayray
however later found out that Lee had previously lived with 2
Americans and a Korean. Lee answered by saying that it is not
unusual in Korea for a woman to have more than one partner and
that it is legally permissive for them to do so and that there is no legal
impediment to her marriage with Rayray. Eventually they pursued
their separate ways. Rayray later filed before lower court of Manila
for an action to annul his marriage with Lee because Lee’s
whereabouts cannot be determined and that his consent in marrying
Lee would have not been for the marriage had he known prior that
Lee had been living with other men. His action for annulment had
been duly published and summons were made known to Lee but due
to her absence Rayray moved to have Lee be declared in default.
The lower court denied Rayray’s action stating that since the
marriage was celebrated in Korea the court cannot take cognizance
of the case and that the facts presented by Rayray is not sufficient to
debunk his marriage with Lee.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rayray’s marriage with Lee is null and void.
Ruling
The lower court erred in ruling that Philippine courts do not have
jurisdiction over the case. As far as marriage status is concerned, the
nationality principle is controlling NOT lex loci celebracionis. The
lower court is however correct in ruling that Rayray’s evidence is not
sufficient to render his marriage with Lee null and void. Rayray said
that the police clearance secured by Lee is meant to allow her to
marry after her subsequent cohabitation/s with the other men – which
is considered bigamous in Philippine law. The SC ruled that the
police clearance is wanting for it lacks the signature of the person
who prepared it and there is no competent document to establish the
identity of the same. Also, through Rayray himself, Lee averred that it
is ok in Korea for a person who cohabited with other men before to
marry another man. This is an indication that Lee herself is aware
that if it were a previous marriage that is concerned then that could
be a legal impediment to any subsequent marriage. Rayray cannot
be given credence in claiming that his consent could have been
otherwise altered had he known all these facts prior to the marriage
because he would lie to every opportunity given him by the Court so
as to suit his case.
Courts; Marriage, Jurisdiction to annul marriage.—An action for
annulment of marriage is within the jurisdiction of our Courts of First
Instance, and, in Manila, of its Court of Juvenile and Domestic
Relations. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff is acquired by his submission
thereto in consequence of the 'f iling of the complaint. Jurisdiction
over a defendant, whose whereabouts are unknown, is acquired
upon summons by publication. Rayray vs. Chae Kyung Lee, 18
SCRA 450, No. L-18176 October 26, 1966
Actions; Marriage; Nature of action to annul marriage.— Annulment
of marriage is an action in rem, for it concerns the status of the
parties, and status affects or binds the whole world. The res is the
relation between said parties, or their marriage tie. Jurisdiction over
the same depends upon the nationality or domicile of the parties, not
the place of celebration of marriage, or the locus celebrationis.
Same; When court has jurisdiction over the res.—Marriage is one of
the cases of double status, in that the status therein involves and
affects two persons. One is married, never in abstract or in a
vacuum, but, always to somebody else. Hence, a judicial decree on
the marriage status of a person necessarily reflects upon the status
of another and the relation between them. The prevailing rule is,
accordingly, that a court has jurisdiction over the res, in an action for
annulment of marriage, provided, at least, one of the parties is
domiciled in, or a national of, the forum. Where the plaintiff, a Filipino,
is domiciled in the Philippines, the lower court had jurisdiction to
annul his marriage to a Korean girl contracted by him in Korea.
Marriage; Conflict of laws; Where action for annulment was
dismissed because prior marriage of defendant was not proven.—
The presumption is that the Korea law, like the lex fori, or the
Philippine Law, does not permit bigamy. Where there was no
competent proof that the defendant was married to another person
prior to her marriage to the plaintiff, there can be no doubt as to the
validity of the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant.
Plaintiff's action for annulment on the ground of the supposed prior
marriage of the defendant must be dismissed. Rayray vs. Chae
Kyung Lee, 18 SCRA 450, No. L-18176 October 26, 1966
Raytheon International, Inc. vs. Rouzie, Jr. 546 SCRA 555 ,
February 26, 2008
Facts
Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation
duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of
Connecticut, United States of America, and respondent Stockton W.
Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract whereby
BMSI hired respondent as its representative to negotiate the sale of
services in several government projects in the Philippines for an
agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts. On 11 March
1992, respondent secured a service contract with the Republic of the
Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers affected by
the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows.3
On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a suit against
BMSI and Rust International, Inc. (RUST), Rodney C. Gilbert and
Walter G. Browning for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal
termination and breach of employment contract.4 On 28 September
1995, Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. rendered judgment ordering
BMSI and RUST to pay respondent’s money claims.5 Upon appeal by
BMSI, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and
dismissed respondent’s complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.6 Respondent elevated the case to this Court but was
dismissed in a Resolution dated 26 November 1997. The Resolution
became final and executory on 09 November 1998.
On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union,
instituted an action for damages before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bauang, La Union. The Complaint,7 docketed as Civil Case
No. 1192-BG, named as defendants herein petitioner Raytheon
International, Inc. as well as BMSI and RUST, the two corporations
impleaded in the earlier labor case. The complaint essentially
reiterated the allegations in the labor case that BMSI verbally
employed respondent to negotiate the sale of services in government
projects and that respondent was not paid the commissions due him
from the Pinatubo dredging project which he secured on behalf of
BMSI. The complaint also averred that BMSI and RUST as well as
petitioner itself had combined and functioned as one company.
In its Answer,8 petitioner alleged that contrary to respondent’s claim,
it was a foreign corporation duly licensed to do business in the
Philippines and denied entering into any arrangement with
respondent or paying the latter any sum of money. Petitioner also
denied combining with BMSI and RUST for the purpose of assuming
the alleged obligation of the said companies.9 Petitioner also referred
to the NLRC decision which disclosed that per the written agreement
between respondent and BMSI and RUST, denominated as "Special
Sales Representative Agreement," the rights and obligations of the
parties shall be governed by the laws of the State of
Connecticut.10 Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint on
grounds of failure to state a cause of action and forum non
conveniens and prayed for damages by way of compulsory
counterclaim.11
On 18 May 1999, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Preliminary
Hearing Based on Affirmative Defenses and for Summary
Judgment12 seeking the dismissal of the complaint on grounds
of forum non conveniens and failure to state a cause of action.
Respondent opposed the same. Pending the resolution of the
omnibus motion, the deposition of Walter Browning was taken before
the Philippine Consulate General in Chicago.13
In an Order14 dated 13 September 2000, the RTC denied petitioner’s
omnibus motion. The trial court held that the factual allegations in the
complaint, assuming the same to be admitted, were sufficient for the
trial court to render a valid judgment thereon. It also ruled that the
principle of forum non conveniens was inapplicable because the trial
court could enforce judgment on petitioner, it being a foreign
corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines.15
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration16 of the order, which
motion was opposed by respondent.17 In an Order dated 31 July
2001,18 the trial court denied petitioner’s motion. Thus, it filed a Rule
65 Petition19 with the Court of Appeals praying for the issuance of a
writ of certiorari and a writ of injunction to set aside the twin orders of
the trial court dated 13 September 2000 and 31 July 2001 and to
enjoin the trial court from conducting further proceedings.20
On 28 August 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
Decision21 denying the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. It also
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in the assailed
Resolution issued on 10 March 2004.22
The appellate court held that although the trial court should not have
confined itself to the allegations in the complaint and should have
also considered evidence aliunde in resolving petitioner’s omnibus
motion, it found the evidence presented by petitioner, that is, the
deposition of Walter Browning, insufficient for purposes of
determining whether the complaint failed to state a cause of action.
The appellate court also stated that it could not rule one way or the
other on the issue of whether the corporations, including petitioner,
named as defendants in the case had indeed merged together based
solely on the evidence presented by respondent. Thus, it held that
the issue should be threshed out during trial.23 Moreover, the
appellate court deferred to the discretion of the trial court when the
latter decided not to desist from assuming jurisdiction on the ground
of the inapplicability of the principle of forum non conveniens.
Ruling
Conflict of Laws; Phases in Judicial Resolution of Conflict-of-Laws
Problems.—Recently in Hasegawa v. Kitamura, 538 SCRA 261
(2007), the Court outlined three consecutive phases involved in
judicial resolution of conflicts-of-laws problems, namely: jurisdiction,
choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Thus,
in the instances where the Court held that the local judicial machinery
was adequate to resolve controversies with a foreign element, the
following requisites had to be proved: (1) that the Philippine Court is
one to which the parties may conveniently resort; (2) that the
Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to
the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely
to have the power to enforce its decision. Raytheon International, Inc.
vs. Rouzie, Jr., 546 SCRA 555, G.R. No. 162894 February 26, 2008
Same; Jurisdictions; Pleadings and Practice; Where the case is filed
in a Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the parties and the res, it may or can proceed to try
the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the
parties point to a foreign forum; Jurisdiction over the nature and
subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the
law and by the material allegations in the complaint, irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the
claims or reliefs sought therein.—On the matter of jurisdiction over a
conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a Philippine court
and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
parties and the res, it may or can proceed to try the case even if the
rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a
foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the
country where the case is filed. Jurisdiction over the nature and
subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the
law and by the material allegations in the complaint, irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the
claims or reliefs sought therein. Civil Case No. 1192-BG is an action
for damages arising from an alleged breach of contract. Undoubtedly,
the nature of the action and the amount of damages prayed are
within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Same; Same; Choice of Law; Words and Phrases; While jurisdiction
considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state,
choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a
substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to
both parties—the choice of law stipulation will become relevant only
when the substantive issues develop, that is, after hearing on the
merits proceeds before the trial court.—That the subject contract
included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by the laws of
the State of Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts,
or any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded from
hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct
concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a
defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further
question whether the application of a substantive law which will
determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The choice of
law stipulation will become relevant only when the substantive issues
of the instant case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits
proceeds before the trial court.
Same; Same; Forum Non Conveniens; The propriety of dismissing a
case based on the principle of forum non conveniens requires a
factual determination—it is more properly considered as a matter of
defense.—Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in
conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction
where it is not the most “convenient” or available forum and the
parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.
Petitioner’s averments of the foreign elements in the instant case are
not sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over Civil Case
No. No. 1192-BG and the parties involved. Moreover, the propriety of
dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non conveniens
requires a factual determination; hence, it is more properly
considered as a matter of defense. While it is within the discretion of
the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it
should do so only after vital facts are established, to determine
whether special circumstances require the court’s desistance.
Raytheon International, Inc. vs. Rouzie, Jr., 546 SCRA 555, G.R. No.
162894 February 26, 2008
Hasegawa vs. Kitamura 538 SCRA 261 , November 23, 2007
Facts
In March 1999, Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd, a
Japanese firm, was contracted by the Department of Public Works
and Highways (DPWH) to supervise the construction of the Southern
Tagalog Access Road. In April 1999, Nippon entered into an
independent contractor agreement (ICA) with Minoru Kitamura for the
latter to head the said project. The ICA was entered into in Japan
and is effective for a period of 1 year (so until April 2000). In January
2000, DPWH awarded the Bongabon-Baler Road project to Nippon.
Nippon subsequently assigned Kitamura to head the road project.
But in February 2000, Kazuhiro Hasegawa, the general manager of
Nippon informed Kitamura that they are pre-terminating his contract.
Kitamura sought Nippon to reconsider but Nippon refused to
negotiate. Kitamura then filed a complaint for specific performance
and damages against Nippon in the RTC of Lipa.
Hasegawa filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the contract
was entered in Japan hence, applying the principle of lex loci
celebracionis, cases arising from the contract should be cognizable
only by Japanese courts. The trial court denied the motion.
Eventually, Nippon filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court.
Hasegawa, on appeal significantly changed its theory, this time
invoking forum non conveniens; that the RTC is an inconvenient
forum because the parties are Japanese nationals who entered into a
contract in Japan. Kitamura on the other hand invokes the trial
court’s ruling which states that matters connected with the
performance of contracts are regulated by the law prevailing at the
place of performance, so since the obligations in the ICA are
executed in the Philippines, courts here have jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint against Nippon should be
dismissed.
Ruling
In the first place, the case filed by Kitamura is a complaint for specific
performance and damages. Such case is incapable of pecuniary
estimation; such cases are within the jurisdiction of the regional trial
court.
Hasegawa filed his motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non
conveniens. However, such ground is not one of those provided for
by the Rules as a ground for dismissing a civil case.
The Supreme Court also emphasized that the contention that
Japanese laws should apply is premature. In conflicts cases, there
are three phases and each next phase commences when one is
settled, to wit:
1. Jurisdiction – Where should litigation be initiated? Court
must have jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties,
the issues, the property, the res. Also considers, whether it
is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of
law asks the further question whether the application of a
substantive law which will determine the merits of the case
is fair to both parties.
2. Choice of Law – Which law will the court apply? Once a
local court takes cognizance, it does not mean that the
local laws must automatically apply. The court must
determine which substantive law when applied to the
merits will be fair to both parties.
3. Recognition and Enforcement of Judgment – Where
can the resulting judgment be enforced?
This case is not yet in the second phase because upon the RTC’s
taking cognizance of the case, Hasegawa immediately filed a motion
to dismiss, which was denied. He filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was also denied. Then he bypassed the proper procedure by
immediately filing a petition for certiorari. The question of which law
should be applied should have been settled in the trial court had
Hasegawa not improperly appealed the interlocutory order denying
his MFR.
Civil Law; Conflict of Laws; In the judicial resolution of conflicts
problems, three consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice
of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments.—To
elucidate, in the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, three
consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and
recognition and enforcement of judgments. Corresponding to these
phases are the following questions: (1) Where can or should litigation
be initiated? (2) Which law will the court apply? and (3) Where can
the resulting judgment be enforced?
Same; Same; Jurisdictions; Jurisdiction and choice of law are two
distinct concepts—jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a
defendant to travel to this state, choice of law asks the further
question whether the application of a substantive law which will
determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties—the power to
exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional
authority to apply forum law.—Analytically, jurisdiction and choice of
law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair
to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the
further question whether the application of a substantive law which
will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The power
to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a state
constitutional authority to apply forum law. While jurisdiction and the
choice of the lex fori will often coincide, the “minimum contacts” for
one do not always provide the necessary “significant contacts” for the
other. The question of whether the law of a state can be applied to a
transaction is different from the question of whether the courts of that
state have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.
Same; Same; Same; It should be noted that when a conflicts case,
one involving a foreign element, is brought before a court or
administrative agency, there are three alternatives open to the latter
in disposing it: (1) dismiss the case, either for lack of jurisdiction or
refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume jurisdiction
over the case and apply the internal law of the forum; (3) assume
jurisdiction over the case and take into account or apply the law of
some other State or States.—It should be noted that when a conflicts
case, one involving a foreign element, is brought before a court or
administrative agency, there are three alternatives open to the latter
in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because of lack of
jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2)
assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal law of the
forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take into account
or apply the law of some other State or States. The court’s power to
hear cases and controversies is derived from the Constitution and
the laws. While it may choose to recognize laws of foreign nations,
the court is not limited by foreign sovereign law short of treaties or
other formal agreements, even in matters regarding rights provided
by foreign sovereigns. Hasegawa vs. Kitamura, 538 SCRA 261, G.R.
No. 149177 November 23, 2007
Garcia vs. Recio 366 SCRA 437 , October 02, 2001
Facts
The respondent, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an
Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987. They lived together as husband
and wife in Australia. In 1989, the Australian family court issued a
decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the marriage. In 1992,
respondent acquired Australian citizenship. In 1994, he married
Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, in Cabanatuan City. In
their application for marriage license, respondent was declared as
“single” and “Filipino”. Since October 1995, they lived separately; and
in 1996 while in Autralia, their conjugal assets were divided. In 1998,
petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the
ground of bigamy, claiming that she learned of the respondent’s
former marriage only in November. On the other hand, respondent
claims that he told petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993, before
they were married. Respondent also contended that his first marriage
was dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989 and
hence, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The
trial court declared that the first marriage was dissolved on the
ground of the divorce issued in Australia as valid and recognized in
the Philippines. Hence, this petition was forwarded before the
Supreme Court.
Ruling
Marriages; Husband and Wife; Divorce; Conflict of Laws; Philippine
law does not provide for absolute divorce, hence, our courts cannot
grant it, and a marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved
even by a divorce obtained abroad.—At the outset, we lay the
following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our
discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce;
hence, our courts cannot grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos
cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of
Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. In mixed marriages involving a
Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the
former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is
“validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry.” A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both
aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent
with their respective national laws.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Before a foreign divorce
decree can be recognized, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.—A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as
pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. decrees that “aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law.” Therefore, before a foreign divorce
decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient. Garcia vs. Recio, 366 SCRA 437, G.R. No. 138322
October 2, 2001
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Before a foreign judgment is
given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be
presented and admitted in evidence.—Respondent, on the other
hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public
document—a written official act of an Australian family court.
Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due
execution. Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign
judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must
first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained
abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best
evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to
be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a
foreign country.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Proof of Foreign Public or Official
Records; Requisites.—Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the
other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication,
or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of
the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office. The divorce decree between
respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one
issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence
must be demonstrated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A party’s failure to object properly
renders a foreign divorce decree admissible as a written act of the
court of another State.—Fortunately for respondent’s cause, when
the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence,
counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the
fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of
Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject
to petitioner’s qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and
accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner’s failure to object
properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of
the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Citizenship; A former Filipino is
no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquires
another State’s citizenship.—Compliance with the quoted articles
(11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary, respondent was
no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired
Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of
adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights
belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective
cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries.
By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the
Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine
personal laws.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The burden of proof lies with the
party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action; Where a divorce decree is a
defense raised by a party, the burden of proving the pertinent foreign
law validating it falls squarely upon him.—The burden of proof lies
with “the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary
in the prosecution or defense of an action.” In civil cases, plaintiffs
have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint
when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the
burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they
introduce new matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by
respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law
validating it falls squarely upon him.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Judicial Notice; Our courts do not
take judicial notice of foreign laws—like any other facts, they must be
alleged and proved.—It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our
courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts,
they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not
among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of
their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised
with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be
resolved in the negative.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; In its strict legal
sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a
cause arising after marriage; A decree nisi or an interlocutory order—
a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce—is in effect the
same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute
divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during
which no reconciliation is effected.—Respondent’s contention is
untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal
dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But
divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute
divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et
thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second
suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. There is no showing in
the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree—a
conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same
as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce
may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no
reconciliation is effected. Even after the divorce becomes absolute,
the court may under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict
remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be
limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was
granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from marrying
again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good
behavior.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Presumptions; A divorce decree does
not raise a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to the
civil status of the person presenting it where no proof has been
presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under
the foreign law.—We also reject the claim of respondent that the
divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive
evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been
presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under
Australian laws.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Certificate of Legal Capacity; The legal
capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the
party concerned; The certificate of legal capacity mentioned in Article
21 of the Family Code is sufficient to establish the legal capacity of a
foreign national—a duly authenticated and admitted certificate is
prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the
alien applicant for a marriage license.—Petitioner argues that the
certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code
was not submitted together with the application for a marriage
license. According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not
have legal capacity to remarry. We clarify. To repeat, the legal
capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the
party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family
Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of
respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated
and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to
marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The absence of a certificate of
legal capacity is merely an irregularity in complying with the formal
requirements for procuring a marriage license, an irregularity which
will not affect the validity of a marriage celebrated on the basis of a
marriage license issued without that certificate.—In passing, we note
that the absence of the said certificate is merely an irregularity in
complying with the formal requirement for procuring a marriage
license. Under Article 4 of the Family Code, an irregularity will not
affect the validity of a marriage celebrated on the basis of a marriage
license issued without that certificate. (Vitug, Compendium, pp. 120-
126; Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines,
1997 reprint, p. 17; Rufus Rodriguez, The Family Code of the
Philippines Annotated, 1990 ed., p. 42; Melencio Sta. Maria, Jr.,
Persons and Family Relations Law, 1999 ed., p. 146.).
Same; Same; Same; Same; A divorce decree does not ipso facto
clothed a divorcee with the legal capacity to remarry—he must still
adduce sufficient evidence to show the foreign State’s personal law
governing his status, or at the very least, he should still prove his
legal capacity to contract the second marriage.—Based on the above
records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a
naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry
petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioner’s contention
that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto
clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without
requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian
personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his
legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court may not declare the second
marriage of a divorcee null and void on the ground of bigamy where
there is a possibility that, under the foreign law, the divorcee was
really capacitated to remarry as a result of the divorce decree—the
most judicious course is to remand the case to the trial court to
receive evidence, if any, which show the divorcee’s legal capacity to
remarry.—Neither can we grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her
marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After
all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really
capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce
decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to
remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which
show petitioner’s legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that,
then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties’ marriage on
the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing
marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines,
one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in
Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994. Garcia vs. Recio, 366
SCRA 437, G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001
Republic vs. Orbecido III 472 SCRA 114 , October 05, 2005
Facts
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M.
Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-
an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a
daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V.
Orbecido.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their
son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife
had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had
obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent
Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A.
Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to
remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No
opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted
the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
Ruling
Family Code; Marriages; Divorce; The Supreme Court holds that
paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized
as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.—This case
concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage
between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien
citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the
U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner
representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of
marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration
of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal
interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial
determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation
ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage. x x
x We hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to
include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of
the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as
if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of
the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and
injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact
and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the
clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to
its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the
law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the
literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or
intent.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court is unanimous in holding
that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as
amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino
citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired
foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.—We are
unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be
interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a
spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to
remarry.
Same; Same; Same; The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the
parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.—We state the twin
elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and 2. A valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The
reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter
to remarry. In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an
American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the
naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce
capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case.
Thus Cipriano, the “divorced” Filipino spouse, should be allowed to
remarry. Republic vs. Orbecido III, 472 SCRA 114, G.R. No. 154380
October 5, 2005
Republic of the Philippines Vs. Marelyn Tanedo Manalo
G.R. No. 221029. April 24, 2018
Facts
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was previously married in the Philippines to
a Japanese national named Yoshino Minoro. A case for divorce
was filed by the petitioner Manalo in Japan and after
due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was
rendered by the Japanese Court.
Manalo filed a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the civil
registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce
rendered by a Japanese court and that she be allowed to return and
use her maiden surname, Manalo.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE
OF THE PHILIPPINES A FILIPINO CITIZEN HAS THE CAPACITY T
O REMARRYAFTER INITIATING A DIVORCE PROCEEDING
ABROAD AND OBTAINING AFAVORABLE JUDGMENT AGAINST
HIS OR HER ALIEN SPOUSE.
Ruling
Yes, the filipina spouse who initiated the divorce and has
successfully obtained divorce decree against an alien spouse may
remarry under Art. 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Laws should be construed as not to defeat but to carry out its intent
and purposes
The Purpose of Article 26 (2) of the Family code of the Philippines is
to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is
effective in the country where it was rendered is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse. Even if the word obtained should be interpreted
to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the
alien spouse, still the court will not follow the letter of the statute
when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or
would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general
purpose of the act. Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute
according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous
results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be
construed according to the spirit and reason, disregarding as far as
necessary the letter of the law. A statute may, therefore be extended
to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they
come within its spirt or intent. Whether the filipino spouse initiated the
foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the
marriage bond and capacitating his orher alien spouse to remarry
will have the same result. Therefore, the subject provision shall not
make a distinction.
The Nationality Principle is not absolute and unbending rule
The existence of Article 26 (2) of the Family Code of the
Philippines is a testament that the state may provide for an exception
thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must
be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression
to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by
law. The courts have the duty to enforce th elaws of divorce as
written by the Legislature only if they are constitutional.
Article 26(2) of the Family Code violates one of the essential
requisites of the equal protection
The limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree
initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on
superficial, arbitrary and whimsical
classification. There is no real and substantial difference between a fi
lipino whoinitiated a foreign divorce proceedings and a filipino who
obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien
spouse. To make a distinction between them based merely on
superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce
proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives
undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.
Further, the differentiation is arbitrary. There is inequality in treatment
because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by
a filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse would not be
recognized even if based on grounds similar to Articles 35,36, 37 and
38 of the family court.
A prohibited view of Article 26(2) would do more harm than good
The state cannot effectively enforce its obligation to protect and
defend among others the right of the children from all forms of
neglect, abuse,
cruelty,exploitation and other conditi ons prejudicial to their developm
ent if thecourt will limit the application of the subject provision only to
those foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. Moreover, the
court must not lose sight of the constitutional mandate to value the
dignity of every human person, guarantee full respect for human
rights and ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women
and men.
Philsec Investment Corporation vs. Court of Appeals 274 SCRA
102 , June 19, 1997
Facts
On January 15, 1983, private respondent Ventura O. Ducat obtained
separate loans from petitioners Ayala International Finance Limited
(hereafter called AYALA)[1] and Philsec Investment Corporation
(hereafter called PHILSEC) in the sum of US$2,500,000.00, secured
by shares of stock owned by Ducat with a market value
of P14,088,995.00. In order to facilitate the payment of the loans,
private respondent 1488, Inc., through its president, private
respondent Drago Daic, assumed Ducats obligation under an
Agreement, dated January 27, 1983, whereby 1488, Inc. executed a
Warranty Deed with Vendors Lien by which it sold to petitioner
Athona Holdings, N.V. (hereafter called ATHONA) a parcel of land in
Harris County, Texas, U.S.A., for US$2,807,209.02, while PHILSEC
and AYALA extended a loan to ATHONA in the amount of
US$2,500,000.00 as initial payment of the purchase price. The
balance of US$307,209.02 was to be paid by means of a promissory
note executed by ATHONA in favor of 1488, Inc. Subsequently, upon
their receipt of the US$2,500,000.00 from 1488, Inc., PHILSEC and
AYALA released Ducat from his indebtedness and delivered to 1488,
Inc. all the shares of stock in their possession belonging to Ducat.
As ATHONA failed to pay the interest on the balance of
US$307,209.02, the entire amount covered by the note became due
and demandable. Accordingly, on October 17, 1985, private
respondent 1488, Inc. sued petitioners PHILSEC, AYALA, and
ATHONA in the United States for payment of the balance of
US$307,209.02 and for damages for breach of contract and for fraud
allegedly perpetrated by petitioners in misrepresenting the
marketability of the shares of stock delivered to 1488, Inc. under the
Agreement. Originally instituted in the United States District Court of
Texas, 165th Judicial District, where it was docketed as Case No. 85-
57746, the venue of the action was later transferred to the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, where 1488,
Inc. filed an amended complaint, reiterating its allegations in the
original complaint. ATHONA filed an answer with counterclaim,
impleading private respondents herein as counterdefendants, for
allegedly conspiring in selling the property at a price over its market
value. Private respondent Perlas, who had allegedly appraised the
property, was later dropped as counterdefendant. ATHONA sought
the recovery of damages and excess payment allegedly made to
1488, Inc. and, in the alternative, the rescission of sale of the
property. For their part, PHILSEC and AYALA filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over their person, but, as
their motion was denied, they later filed a joint answer with
counterclaim against private respondents and Edgardo V. Guevarra,
PHILSECs own former president, for the rescission of the sale on the
ground that the property had been overvalued. On March 13, 1990,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
dismissed the counterclaim against Edgardo V. Guevarra on the
ground that it was frivolous and [was] brought against him simply to
humiliate and embarrass him. For this reason, the U.S. court
imposed so-called Rule 11 sanctions on PHILSEC and AYALA and
ordered them to pay damages to Guevarra.
On April 10, 1987, while Civil Case No. H-86-440 was pending in the
United States, petitioners filed a complaint For Sum of Money with
Damages and Writ of Preliminary Attachment against private
respondents in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. 16563. The complaint reiterated the
allegation of petitioners in their respective counterclaims in Civil
Action No. H-86-440 of the United States District Court of Southern
Texas that private respondents committed fraud by selling the
property at a price 400 percent more than its true value of
US$800,000.00. Petitioners claimed that, as a result of private
respondents fraudulent misrepresentations, ATHONA, PHILSEC,
and AYALA were induced to enter into the Agreement and to
purchase the Houston property. Petitioners prayed that private
respondents be ordered to return to ATHONA the excess payment of
US$1,700,000.00 and to pay damages. On April 20, 1987, the trial
court issued a writ of preliminary attachment against the real and
personal properties of private respondents.[2]
Private respondent Ducat moved to dismiss Civil Case No. 16563 on
the grounds of (1) litis pendentia, vis-a-vis Civil Action No. H-86-440
filed by 1488, Inc. and Daic in the U.S., (2) forum non
conveniens, and (3) failure of petitioners PHILSEC and BPI-IFL to
state a cause of action. Ducat contended that the alleged overpricing
of the property prejudiced only petitioner ATHONA, as buyer, but not
PHILSEC and BPI-IFL which were not parties to the sale and whose
only participation was to extend financial accommodation to
ATHONA under a separate loan agreement. On the other hand,
private respondents 1488, Inc. and its president Daic filed a joint
Special Appearance and Qualified Motion to Dismiss, contending that
the action being in personam, extraterritorial service of summons by
publication was ineffectual and did not vest the court with jurisdiction
over 1488, Inc., which is a non-resident foreign corporation, and
Daic, who is a non-resident alien.
On January 26, 1988, the trial court granted Ducats motion to
dismiss, stating that the evidentiary requirements of the controversy
may be more suitably tried before the forum of the litis pendentia in
the U.S., under the principle in private international law of forum non
conveniens, even as it noted that Ducat was not a party in the U.S.
case.
A separate hearing was held with regard to 1488, Inc. and Daics
motion to dismiss. On March 9, 1988, the trial court[3] granted the
motion to dismiss filed by 1488, Inc. and Daic on the ground of litis
pendentia considering that the main factual element of the cause of
action in this case which is the validity of the sale of real property in
the United States between defendant 1488 and plaintiff ATHONA is
the subject matter of the pending case in the United States District
Court which, under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, is the
better (if not exclusive) forum to litigate matters needed to determine
the assessment and/or fluctuations of the fair market value of real
estate situated in Houston, Texas, U.S.A. from the date of the
transaction in 1983 up to the present and verily, . . . (emphasis by
trial court)
The trial court also held itself without jurisdiction over 1488, Inc. and
Daic because they were non-residents and the action was not an
action in rem or quasi in rem, so that extraterritorial service of
summons was ineffective. The trial court subsequently lifted the writ
of attachment it had earlier issued against the shares of stocks of
1488, Inc. and Daic.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial
court erred in applying the principle of litis pendentia and forum non
conveniens and in ruling that it had no jurisdiction over the
defendants, despite the previous attachment of shares of stocks
belonging to 1488, Inc. and Daic.
On January 6, 1992, the Court of Appeals[4] affirmed the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 16563 against Ducat, 1488, Inc., and Daic on the
ground of litis pendentia. The Court of Appeals also held that Civil
Case No. 16563 was an action in personam for the recovery of a
sum of money for alleged tortious acts, so that service of summons
by publication did not vest the trial court with jurisdiction over 1488,
Inc. and Drago Daic. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 16563 on the
ground of forum non conveniens was likewise affirmed by the Court
of Appeals on the ground that the case can be better tried and
decided by the U.S. court
Issue:
1. WON THE DOCTRINE OF PENDENCY OF ANOTHER ACTION
BETWEEN THE SAME PARTIES FOR THE SAME CAUSE (LITIS
PENDENTIA) RELIED UPON BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IN
AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS DISMISSAL OF THE CIVIL
ACTION IS NOT APPLICABLE.
2. WON THE PRINCIPLE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS ALSO
RELIED UPON BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IN AFFIRMING THE
DISMISSAL BY THE TRIAL COURT OF THE CIVIL ACTION IS
LIKEWISE NOT APPLICABLE.
3. AS A COROLLARY TO THE FIRST TWO GROUNDS, THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
PHILIPPINE PUBLIC POLICY REQUIRED THE ASSUMPTION, NOT
THE RELINQUISHMENT, BY THE TRIAL COURT OF ITS
RIGHTFUL JURISDICTION IN THE CIVIL ACTION FOR THERE IS
EVERY REASON TO PROTECT AND VINDICATE PETITIONERS
RIGHTS FOR TORTIOUS OR WRONGFUL ACTS OR CONDUCT
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS (WHO ARE MOSTLY NON-RESIDENT
ALIENS) INFLICTED UPON THEM HERE IN THE PHILIPPINES.
Ruling
First. It is important to note in connection with the first point that while
the present case was pending in the Court of Appeals, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas rendered
judgment[5] in the case before it. The judgment, which was in favor of
private respondents, was affirmed on appeal by the Circuit Court of
Appeals.[6] Thus, the principal issue to be resolved in this case is
whether Civil Case No. 16536 is barred by the judgment of the U.S.
court.
Private respondents contend that for a foreign judgment to be
pleaded as res judicata, a judgment admitting the foreign decision is
not necessary. On the other hand, petitioners argue that the foreign
judgment cannot be given the effect of res judicata without giving
them an opportunity to impeach it on grounds stated in Rule 39, 50 of
the Rules of Court, to wit: want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Petitioners contention is meritorious. While this Court has given the
effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in several cases,[7] it was
after the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample
opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under the law. [8] It is
not necessary for this purpose to initiate a separate action or
proceeding for enforcement of the foreign judgment. What is
essential is that there is opportunity to challenge the foreign
judgment, in order for the court to properly determine its
efficacy. This is because in this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in
personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment
merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim
of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.[9] Rule 39,
50 provides:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is
conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be
repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Thus, in the case of General Corporation of the Philippines v. Union
Insurance Society of Canton, Ltd.,[10] which private respondents
invoke for claiming conclusive effect for the foreign judgment in their
favor, the foreign judgment was considered res judicata because this
Court found from the evidence as well as from appellants own
pleadings[11] that the foreign court did not make a clear mistake of law
or fact or that its judgment was void for want of jurisdiction or
because of fraud or collusion by the defendants. Trial had been
previously held in the lower court and only afterward was a decision
rendered, declaring the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State
of Washington to have the effect of res judicata in the case before
the lower court. In the same vein, in Philippine International Shipping
Corp. v. Court of Appeals,[12] this Court held that the foreign judgment
was valid and enforceable in the Philippines there being no showing
that it was vitiated by want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud or
clear mistake of law or fact. The prima facie presumption under the
Rule had not been rebutted.
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the
opportunity to challenge the judgment of the U.S. court as basis for
declaring it res judicata or conclusive of the rights of private
respondents. The proceedings in the trial court were
summary. Neither the trial court nor the appellate court was even
furnished copies of the pleadings in the U.S. court or apprised of the
evidence presented thereat, to assure a proper determination of
whether the issues then being litigated in the U.S. court were exactly
the issues raised in this case such that the judgment that might be
rendered would constitute res judicata. As the trial court stated in its
disputed order dated March 9, 1988:
On the plaintiffs claim in its Opposition that the causes of action of
this case and the pending case in the United States are not
identical, precisely the Order of January 26, 1988 never found that
the causes of action of this case and the case pending before the
USA Court, were identical. (emphasis added)
It was error therefore for the Court of Appeals to summarily rule that
petitioners action is barred by the principle of res judicata. Petitioners
in fact questioned the jurisdiction of the U.S. court over their persons,
but their claim was brushed aside by both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals.[13]
Moreover, the Court notes that on April 22, 1992, 1488, Inc. and Daic
filed a petition for the enforcement of judgment in the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 92-1070
and assigned to Branch 134, although the proceedings were
suspended because of the pendency of this case. To sustain the
appellate courts ruling that the foreign judgment constitutes res
judicata and is a bar to the claim of petitioners would effectively
preclude petitioners from repelling the judgment in the case for
enforcement. An absurdity could then arise: a foreign judgment is not
subject to challenge by the plaintiff against whom it is invoked, if it is
pleaded to resist a claim as in this case, but it may be opposed by
the defendant if the foreign judgment is sought to be enforced
against him in a separate proceeding. This is plainly untenable. It has
been held therefore that:
[A] foreign judgment may not be enforced if it is not recognized in the
jurisdiction where affirmative relief is being sought. Hence, in the
interest of justice, the complaint should be considered as a petition
for the recognition of the Hongkong judgment under Section 50 (b),
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in order that the defendant, private
respondent herein, may present evidence of lack of jurisdiction,
notice, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of fact and law, if
applicable.[14]
Accordingly, to insure the orderly administration of justice, this case
and Civil Case No. 92-1070 should be consolidated.[15] After all, the
two have been filed in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, albeit in
different salas, this case being assigned to Branch 56 (Judge
Fernando V. Gorospe), while Civil Case No. 92-1070 is pending in
Branch 134 of Judge Ignacio Capulong.In such proceedings,
petitioners should have the burden of impeaching the foreign
judgment and only in the event they succeed in doing so may they
proceed with their action against private respondents.
Second. Nor is the trial courts refusal to take cognizance of the case
justifiable under the principle of forum non conveniens. First, a
motion to dismiss is limited to the grounds under Rule 16, 1, which
does not include forum non conveniens.[16] The propriety of
dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual
determination, hence, it is more properly considered a matter of
defense. Second, while it is within the discretion of the trial court to
abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so
only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special
circumstances require the courts desistance.[17]
In this case, the trial court abstained from taking jurisdiction solely on
the basis of the pleadings filed by private respondents in connection
with the motion to dismiss. It failed to consider that one of the
plaintiffs (PHILSEC) is a domestic corporation and one of the
defendants (Ventura Ducat) is a Filipino, and that it was the
extinguishment of the latters debt which was the object of the
transaction under litigation. The trial court arbitrarily dismissed the
case even after finding that Ducat was not a party in the U.S. case.
Third. It was error we think for the Court of Appeals and the trial court
to hold that jurisdiction over 1488, Inc. and Daic could not be
obtained because this is an action in personam and summons were
served by extraterritorial service. Rule 14, 17 on extraterritorial
service provides that service of summons on a non-resident
defendant may be effected out of the Philippines by leave of Court
where, among others, the property of the defendant has been
attached within the Philippines.[18] It is not disputed that the
properties, real and personal, of the private respondents had been
attached prior to service of summons under the Order of the trial
court dated April 20, 1987.[19]
Fourth. As for the temporary restraining order issued by the Court on
June 29, 1994, to suspend the proceedings in Civil Case No. 92-
1445 filed by Edgardo V. Guevarra to enforce so-called Rule 11
sanctions imposed on the petitioners by the U.S. court, the Court
finds that the judgment sought to be enforced is severable from the
main judgment under consideration in Civil Case No. 16563. The
separability of Guevarras claim is not only admitted by
petitioners,[20] it appears from the pleadings that petitioners only
belatedly impleaded Guevarra as defendant in Civil Case No.
16563.[21] Hence, the TRO should be lifted and Civil Case No. 92-
1445 allowed to proceed.
G.R. No. 182153 April 7, 2014
TUNG HO STEEL ENTERPRISES CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
TING GUAN TRADING CORPORATION, Respondent.
Facts
Tung Ho is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Taiwan,
Republic of China.4 On the other hand, respondent Ting Guan
Trading Corp. (Ting Guan) is a domestic corporation organized under
the laws of the Philippines.5
On January 9, 2002, Ting Guan obligated itself under a contract of
sale to deliver heavy metal scrap iron and steel to Tung Ho.
Subsequently, Tung Ho filed a request for arbitration before the ICC
International Court of Arbitration (ICC) in Singapore after Ting Guan
failed to deliver the full quantity of the promised heavy metal scrap
iron and steel.6
The ICC ruled in favor of Tung Ho on June 18, 2004 and ordered
Ting Guan to pay Tung Ho the following: (1) actual damages in the
amount of US$ 659,646.15 with interest of 6% per annum from
December 4, 2002 until final payment; (2) cost of arbitration in the
amount of US $ 47,000.00; and (3) legal costs and expenses in the
amount of NT $ 761,448.00 and US $ 34,552.83.7
On October 24, 2004, Tung Ho filed an action against Ting Guan for
the recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 145. Ting Guan moved
to dismiss the case based on Tung Ho’s lack of capacity to sue and
for prematurity. Ting Guan subsequently filed a supplemental motion
to dismiss based on improper venue. Ting Guan argued that the
complaint should have been filed in Cebu where its principal place of
business was located.8
Issues
1) Whether the present petition is barred by res judicata; and
2) Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Ting
Guan, specifically:
a) Whether Tejero was the proper person to receive the summons;
and
b) Whether Ting Guan made a voluntary appearance before the trial
court.
Ruling
I. The Court is not precluded from ruling on the jurisdictional issue
raised in the petition
A. The petition is not barred by res judicata
Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the
merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive on the rights
of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters
determined in the former suit.19 For res judicata to apply, the final
judgment must be on the merits of the case which means that the
court has unequivocally determined the parties’ rights and obligations
with respect to the causes of action and the subject matter of the
case.20
Contrary to Ting Guan’s position, our ruling in G.R. No. 176110 does
not operate as res judicata on Tung Ho’s appeal; G.R. No. 176110
did not conclusively rule on all issues raised by the parties in this
case so that this Court would now be barred from taking cognizance
of Tung Ho’s petition. Our disposition in G.R. No. 176110 only dwelt
on technical or collateral aspects of the case, and not on its merits.
Specifically, we did not rule on whether Tung Ho may enforce the
foreign arbitral award against Ting Guan in that case.
B. The appellate court cannot be ousted of jurisdiction until it finally
disposes of the case
The court’s jurisdiction, once attached, cannot be ousted until it
finally disposes of the case. When a court has already obtained and
is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed
to the final determination of the case is retained.21 A judge is
competent to act on the case while its incidents remain pending for
his disposition.
The CA was not ousted of its jurisdiction with the promulgation of
G.R. No. 176110. The July 5, 2006 decision has not yet become final
and executory for the reason that there remained a pending incident
before the CA – the resolution of Tung Ho’s motion for
reconsideration – when this Court promulgated G.R. No. 176110. In
this latter case, on the other hand, we only resolved procedural
issues that are divorced from the present jurisdictional question
before us. Thus, what became immutable in G.R. No. 176110 was
the ruling that Tung Ho’s complaint is not dismissible on grounds of
prematurity, nullity of the foreign arbitral award, improper venue, and
the foreign arbitral award’s repugnance to local public policy. This
leads us to the conclusion that in the absence of any ruling on the
merits on the issue of jurisdiction, res judicata on this point could not
have set in.
C. Tung Ho’s timely filing of a motion for reconsideration and of a
petition for review on certiorari prevented the July 5, 2006 decision
from attaining finality
Furthermore, under Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Tung
Ho may file a petition for review on certiorari before the Court within
(15) days from the denial of its motion for reconsideration filed in due
time after notice of the judgment. Tung Ho’s timely filing of a motion
for reconsideration before the CA and of a Rule 45 petition before
this Court prevented the July 5, 2006 CA decision from attaining
finality. For this Court to deny Tung Ho’s petition would result in an
anomalous situation where a party litigant is penalized and deprived
of his fair opportunity to appeal the case by faithfully complying with
the Rules of Court.
II. The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Ting Guan
A. Tejero was not the proper person to receive the summons
Nonetheless, we see no reason to disturb the lower courts’ finding
that Tejero was not a corporate secretary and, therefore, was not the
proper person to receive the summons under Section 11, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court. This Court is not a trier of facts; we cannot re-
examine, review or re-evaluate the evidence and the factual review
made by the lower courts. In the absence of compelling reasons, we
will not deviate from the rule that factual findings of the lower courts
are final and binding on this Court.22
B. Ting Guan voluntarily appeared before the trial court
However, we cannot agree with the legal conclusion that the
appellate court reached, given the established facts.23To our mind,
Ting Guan voluntarily appeared before the trial court in view of the
procedural recourse that it took before that court. Its voluntary
appearance is equivalent to service of summons.24
As a basic principle, courts look with disfavor on piecemeal
arguments in motions filed by the parties. Under the omnibus motion
rule, a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or proceeding
shall include all objections then available.25 The purpose of this rule
is to obviate multiplicity of motions and to discourage dilatory motions
and pleadings. Party litigants should not be allowed to reiterate
identical motions, speculating on the possible change of opinion of
the courts or of the judges thereof.
In this respect, Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court requires the
defendant to file a motion to dismiss within the time for, but before
filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim.
Section 1, Rule 11 of the Rules of Court, on the other hand,
commands the defendant to file his answer within fifteen (15) days
after service of summons, unless a different period is fixed by the trial
court. Once the trial court denies the motion, the defendant should
file his answer within the balance of fifteen (15) days to which he was
entitled at the time of serving his motion, but the remaining period
cannot be less than five (5) days computed from his receipt of the
notice of the denial.26
Instead of filing an answer, the defendant may opt to file a motion for
reconsideration. Only after the trial court shall have denied the
motion for reconsideration does the defendant become bound to file
his answer.27 If the defendant fails to file an answer within the
reglementary period, the plaintiff may file a motion to declare the
defendant in default. This motion shall be with notice to the
defendant and shall be supported by proof of the failure.28
The trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss is not a license for the
defendant to file a Rule 65 petition before the CA. An order denying a
motion to dismiss cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari as
the defendant still has an adequate remedy before the trial court –
i.e., to file an answer and to subsequently appeal the case if he loses
the case.29 As exceptions, the defendant may avail of a petition for
certiorari if the ground raised in the motion to dismiss is lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant30 or over the subject
matter.31
We cannot allow and simply passively look at Ting Guan’s blatant
disregard of the rules of procedure in the present case. The Rules of
Court only allows the filing of a motion to dismiss once.32 Ting Guan’s
filing of successive motions to dismiss, under the guise of
"supplemental motion to dismiss" or "motion for reconsideration", is
not only improper but also dilatory.33 Ting Guan’s belated reliance on
the improper service of summons was a mere afterthought, if not a
bad faith ploy to avoid the foreign arbitral award’s enforcement which
is still at its preliminary stage after the lapse of almost a decade since
the filing of the complaint.
Furthermore, Ting Guan’s failure to raise the alleged lack of
jurisdiction over its person in the first motion to dismiss is fatal to its
cause. Ting Guan voluntarily appeared before the RTC when it filed a
motion to dismiss and a "supplemental motion to dismiss" without
raising the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction over its person. In Anunciacion
v. Bocanegra,34 we categorically stated that the defendant should
raise the affirmative defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person in
the very first motion to dismiss. Failure to raise the issue of improper
service of summons in the first motion to dismiss is a waiver of this
defense and cannot be belatedly raised in succeeding motions and
pleadings.
Even assuming that Ting Guan did not voluntarily appear before the
RTC, the CA should have ordered the RTC to issue an alias
summons instead. In Lingner & Fisher GMBH vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court35, we enunciated the policy that the courts should not
dismiss a case simply because there was an improper service of
summons. The lower courts should be cautious in haphazardly
dismissing complaints on this ground alone considering that the trial
court can cure this defect and order the issuance of alias summons
on the proper person in the interest of substantial justice and to
expedite the proceedings.
III. A Final Note
As a final note, we are not unaware that the present case has been
complicated by its unique development. The complication arose
when the CA, instead of resolving the parties’ separate partial
motions for reconsideration in one resolution, proceeded to first
resolve and to deny Ting Guan’s partial motion. Ting Guan,
therefore, went to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari
while Tung Ho’s partial motion for reconsideration was still
unresolved.
Expectedly, Ting Guan did not question the portions of the CA
decision favorable to it when it filed its petition with this Court.
Instead, Ting Guan reiterated that the CA should have included
additional grounds to justify the dismissal of Tung Ho’s complaint
with the RTC. The Court denied Ting Guan’s petition, leading to the
entry of judgment that improvidently followed. Later, the CA denied
Tung Ho’s partial motion for reconsideration, prompting Tung Ho’s
own petition with this Court, which is the present G.R. No. 182153.
Under the Rules of Court, entry of judgment may only be made if no
appeal or motion for reconsideration was timely filed.36 In the
proceedings before the CA, if a motion for reconsideration (including
a partial motion for reconsideration37) is timely filed by the proper
party, execution of the CA’s judgment or final resolution shall be
stayed.38 This rule is applicable even to proceedings before the
Supreme Court, as provided in Section 4, Rule 56 of the Rules of
Court.39
In the present case, Tung Ho timely filed its motion for
reconsideration with the CA and seasonably appealed the CA’s
rulings with the Court through the present petition (G.R. No. 182153).
To now recognize the finality of the Resolution of Ting Guan petition
(G.R. No. 176110) based on its entry of judgment and to allow it to
foreclose the present meritorious petition of Tung Ho, would of
course cause unfair and unjustified injury to Tung Ho. First, as
previously mentioned, the Ting Guan petition did not question or
assail the full merits of the CA decision. It was Tung Ho, the party
aggrieved by the CA decision, who substantially questioned the
merits of the CA decision in its petition; this petition showed that the
CA indeed committed error and Tung Ho’s complaint before the RTC
should properly proceed. Second, the present case is for the
enforcement of an arbitral award involving millions of pesos. Tung Ho
already won in the foreign arbitration and the present case is simply
for the enforcement of this arbitral award in our jurisdiction. Third,
and most importantly, Tung Ho properly and timely availed of the
remedies available to it under the Rules of Court, which provide that
filing and pendency of a motion for reconsideration stays the
execution of the CA judgment. Therefore, at the time of the entry of
judgment in G.R. No. 176110 in the Supreme Court on January 8,
2008, the CA decision which the Court affirmed was effectively not
yet be final.
Significantly, the rule that a timely motion for reconsideration stays
the execution of the assailed judgment is in accordance with Rule 51,
Section 10 (Rules governing the CA proceedings) which provides
that "entry of judgments may only be had if there is no appeal or
motion for reconsideration timely filed. The date when the judgment
or final resolution becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of
its entry." Incidentally, this procedure also governs before Supreme
Court proceedings.40 Following these rules, therefore, the pendency
of Tung Ho’s MR with the CA made the entry of the judgment of the
Court in the Ting Guan petition premature and inefficacious for not
being final and executory.
Based on the above considerations, the Court would not be in error if
it applies its ruling in the case of Realty Sales Enterprises, Inc. and
Macondray Farms, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et
al.41 where the Court, in a per curiam resolution, ruled that an entry of
judgment may be recalled or lifted motu proprio when it is clear that
the decision assailed of has not yet become final under the rules:
The March 6, 1985 resolution denying reconsideration of the January
30, 1985 resolution was, to repeat, not served on the petitioners until
March 20, 1985 - and therefore the Jan. 30, 1985 resolution could
not be deemed final and executory until one (1) full day (March 21)
had elapsed, or on March 22, 1985 (assuming inaction on petitioners'
part.) The entry of judgment relative to the January 30, 1985
resolution, made on March 18, 1985, was therefore premature and
inefficacious. An entry of judgment does not make the judgment so
entered final and execution when it is not so in truth. An entry of
judgment merely records the fact that a judgment, order or resolution
has become final and executory; but it is not the operative act that
make the judgment, order or resolution final and executory. In the
case at bar, the entry of judgment on March 18, 1985 did not make
the January 30, 1985 resolution subject of the entry, final and
executory, As of the date of entry, March 18, 1985, notice of the
resolution denying reconsideration of the January 30, 1985 resolution
had not yet been served on the petitioners or any of the parties, since
March 18, 1985 was also the date of the notice (and release) of the
March 6, 1985 resolution denying reconsideration.1âwphi1
According to this ruling, the motu proprio recall or setting aside of the
entry of final judgment was proper and "entirely consistent with the
inherent power of every court inter alia to amend and control its
process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and
justice [Sec. 5(g), Rule 135, Rules of Court,]. That the recall has in
fact served to achieve a verdict consistent with law and justice is
clear from the judgment subsequently rendered on the merits." This
course of action is effectively what the Court undertook today,
adapted of course to the circumstances of the present case.
G.R. No. 112573 February 9, 1995
NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, INC. petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and C.F. SHARP & COMPANY
INC., respondents.
Facts
 Northwest Airlines (Northwest) and C.F. Sharp & Company
(C.F.), through its Japan branch, entered into an
International Passenger Sales Agency Agreement,
whereby the Northwest authorized the C.F. to sell its air
transportation tickets
 March 25, 1980: Unable to remit the proceeds of the ticket
sales, Northwest sued C.F. in Tokyo, Japan, for collection
of the unremitted proceeds of the ticket sales, with claim for
damages
 April 11, 1980: writ of summons was issued by the 36th
Civil Department, Tokyo District Court of Japan
 The attempt to serve the summons was
unsuccessful because Mr. Dinozo was in Manila
and would be back on April 24, 1980
 April 24, 1980: Mr. Dinozo returned to C.F. Office to serve
the summons but he refused to receive claiming that he no
longer an employee
 After the 2 attempts of service were
unsuccessful, Supreme Court of Japan sent the summons
together with the other legal documents to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Japan> Japanese Embassy in
Manila>Ministry (now Department) of Foreign Affairs of the
Philippines>Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of Manila who ordered Deputy
Sheriff Rolando Balingit>C.F. Main Office
 August 28, 1980: C.F. received from Deputy Sheriff
Rolando Balingit the writ of summons but failed to appear
at the scheduled hearing.
 January 29, 1981: Tokyo Court rendered judgment
ordering the C.F. to pay 83,158,195 Yen and damages for
delay at the rate of 6% per annum from August 28, 1980 up
to and until payment is completed
 March 24, 1981: C.F. received from Deputy Sheriff Balingit
copy of the judgment. C.F. did not appeal so it became
final and executory
 May 20, 1983: Northwest filed a suit for enforcement of the
judgment a RTC
 July 16, 1983: C.F. averred that the Japanese Court sought
to be enforced is null and void and unenforceable in this
jurisdiction having been rendered without due and proper
notice and/or with collusion or fraud and/or upon a clear
mistake of law and fact. The foreign judgment in the
Japanese Court sought in this action is null and void for
want of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
considering that this is an action in personam. The
process of the Court in Japan sent to the Philippines which
is outside Japanese jurisdiction cannot confer jurisdiction
over the defendant in the case before the Japanese Court
of the case at bar
 CA sustained RTC: Court agrees that if the C.F. in a
foreign court is a resident in the court of that foreign court
such court could acquire jurisdiction over the person
of C.F. but it must be served in the territorial jurisdiction of
the foreign court
Issue: W/N the Japanese Court has jurisdiction over C.F. Sharp &
Company. YES
Ruling
Courts; Judgments; Jurisdiction; A foreign judgment is presumed to
be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until the
contrary is shown.—A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and
binding in the country from which it comes, until the contrary is
shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the proceedings
and the giving of due notice therein.
Same; Same; Same; A court, whether of the Philippines or
elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful
exercise of jurisdiction and has regularly performed its official duty.—
Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment in an
action in personam of a tribunal of a foreign country having
jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right
as between the parties and their successors-in-interest by a
subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by
evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Also, under Section 3 of Rule
131, a court, whether of the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the
presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction
and has regularly performed its official duty.
Same; Same; Same; The party attacking a foreign judgment has the
burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity.—Consequently,
the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming
the presumption of its validity. Being the party challenging the
judgment rendered by the Japanese court, SHARP had the duty to
demonstrate the invalidity of such judgment. In an attempt to
discharge that burden, it contends that the extraterritorial service of
summons effected at its home office in the Philippines was not only
ineffectual but also void, and the Japanese Court did not, therefore,
acquire jurisdiction over it.
Same; Same; Same; It is settled that matters of remedy and
procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon a
defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the
forum.—It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as
those relating to the service of process upon a defendant are
governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. In this case,
it is the procedural law of Japan where the judgment was rendered
that determines the validity of the extraterritorial service of process
on SHARP.
Same; Same; Same; It was then incumbent upon SHARP to present
evidence as to what that Japanese procedural law is and to show
that under it, the assailed extraterritorial service is invalid.—As to
what this law is is a question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken
judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any other fact.
Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provide that it
may be evidenced by an official publication or by a duly attested or
authenticated copy thereof. It was then incumbent upon SHARP to
present evidence as to what that Japanese procedural law is and to
show that under it, the assailed extraterritorial service is invalid. It did
not. Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of the
service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the
Japanese court must stand.
Same; Same; Same; In the light of the absence of proof regarding
Japanese law, the presumption of identity or similarity or the so-
called processual presumption may be invoked.—Alternatively, in the
light of the absence of proof regarding Japanese law, the
presumption of identity or similarity or the so-called processual
presumption may be invoked. Applying it, the Japanese law on the
matter is presumed to be similar with the Philippine law on service of
summons on a private foreign corporation doing business in the
Philippines.
Same; Same; Same; The extraterritorial service of summons on it by
the Japanese Court was valid not only under the processual
presumption but also because of the presumption of regularity of
performance of official duty.—Inasmuch as SHARP was admittedly
doing business in Japan through its four duly registered branches at
the time the collection suit against it was filed, then in the light of the
processual presumption, SHARP may be deemed a resident of
Japan, and, as such, was amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts
therein and may be deemed to have assented to the said courts'
lawful methods of serving process. Accordingly, the extraterritorial
service of summons on it by the Japanese Court was valid not only
under the processual presumption but also because of the
presumption of regularity of performance of official duty. Northwest
Orient Airlines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 192, G.R. No.
112573 February 9, 1995
Hang Lung Bank, Ltd. vs. Saulog 201 SCRA 137 , August 26,
1991
Facts
on July 18, 1979, petitioner Hang Lung Bank, Ltd., which was not
doing business in the Philippines, entered into two (2) continuing
guarantee agreements with Cordova Chin San in Hongkong whereby
the latter agreed to pay on demand all sums of money which may be
due the bank from Worlder Enterprises to the extent of the total
amount of two hundred fifty thousand Hongkong dollars (HK
$250,000).1
Worlder Enterprises having defaulted in its payment, petitioner filed
in the Supreme Court of Hongkong a collection suit against Worlder
Enterprises and Chin San. Summonses were allegedly served upon
Worlder Enterprises and Chin San at their addresses in Hongkong
but they failed to respond thereto. Consequently, the Supreme Court
of Hongkong issued the following:
JUDGMENT
THE 14th DAY OF JUNE, 1984
No notice of intention to defend having been given by the 1st and
2nd Defendants herein, IT IS THIS DAY ADJUDGED that: —
(1) the 1st Defendant (Ko Ching Chong Trading otherwise known as
the Worlder Enterprises) do pay the Plaintiff the sum of
HK$1,117,968.36 together with interest on the respective principal
sums of HK$196,591.38, HK$200,216.29, HK$526,557.63,
HK$49,350.00 and HK$3,965.50 at the rates of 1.7% per month (or
HK$111.40 per day), 18.5% per annum (or HK$101.48 per day),
1.85% per month (or HK$324.71 per day), 1.55% per month (or
HK$25.50 per day) and 1.7% per month (or HK$2.25 per day)
respectively from 4th May 1984 up to the date of payment; and
(2) the 2nd Defendant (Cordova Chin San) do pay the Plaintiff the
sum of HK$279,325.00 together with interest on the principal sum of
HK$250,000.00 at the rate of 1.7% per month (or HK$141.67 per
day) from 4th May 1984 up to the date of payment.
AND IT IS ADJUDGED that the 1st and 2nd Defendants do pay the
Plaintiff the sum of HK$970.00 fixed costs.
N.J. BARNETT
Registrar
Thereafter, petitioner through counsel sent a demand letter to Chin
San at his Philippine address but again, no response was made
thereto. Hence, on October 18, 1984, petitioner instituted in the court
below an action seeking "the enforcement of its just and valid claims
against private respondent, who is a local resident, for a sum of
money based on a transaction which was perfected, executed and
consummated abroad."2
In his answer to the complaint, Chin San raised as affirmative
defenses: lack of cause of action, incapacity to sue and improper
venue.3
Pre-trial of the case was set for June 17, 1985 but it was postponed
to July 12, 1985. However, a day before the latter pre-trial date, Chin
San filed a motion to dismiss the case and to set the same for
hearing the next day. The motion to dismiss was based on the
grounds that petitioner had no legal capacity to sue and that venue
was improperly laid.
Acting on said motion to dismiss, on December 20, 1985, the lower
court4 issued the following order:
On defendant Chin San Cordova's motion to dismiss, dated July 10,
1985; plaintiff's opposition, dated July 12, 1985; defendant's reply,
dated July 22, 1985; plaintiff's supplemental opposition, dated
September 13, 1985, and defendant's rejoinder filed on September
23, 1985, said motion to dismiss is granted.
Petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of said order but it
was denied for lack of merit.6 Hence, the instant petition
for certiorari seeking the reversal of said orders "so as to allow
petitioner to enforce through the court below its claims against
private respondent as recognized by the Supreme Court of
Hongkong."
Issue: WON petitioner foreign Banking Corporation has the capacity
to file the action below. YES
Ruling
Private respondent correctly contends that since petitioner is a bank,
its capacity to file an action in this jurisdiction is governed by the
General Banking Act (Republic Act No. 337), particularly Section 14
thereof which provides:
SEC. 14. No foreign bank or banking corporation formed, organized
or existing under any laws other than those of the Republic of the
Philippines shall be permitted to transact business in the Philippines,
or maintain by itself or assignee any suit for the recovery of any debt,
claims, or demand whatsoever, until after it shall have obtained, upon
order of the Monetary Board, a license for that purpose from the
Securities and Exchange Commissioner. Any officer, director or
agent of any such corporation who transacts business in the
Philippines without the said license shall be punished by
imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years and
by a fine of not less than one thousand pesos nor more than ten
thousand pesos. (45 O.G. No. 4, 1647, 1649-1650)
In construing this provision, we adhere to the interpretation given by
this Court to the almost identical Section 69 of the old Corporation
Law (Act No. 1459) which reads:
SEC. 69. No foreign corporation or corporation formed, organized, or
existing under any laws other than those of the Philippines shall be
permitted to transact business in the Philippines or maintain by itself
or assignee any suit for the recovery of any debt, claim, or demand
whatever, unless it shall have the license prescribed in the section
immediately preceding. Any officer, director or agent of the
corporation or any person transacting business for any foreign
corporation not having the license prescribed shall be punished by
imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than two years or
by a fine of not less than two hundred pesos nor more than one
thousand pesos, or by both such imprisonment and fine, in the
discretion of the Court.
In a long line of cases, this Court has interpreted this last quoted
provision as not altogether prohibiting a foreign corporation not
licensed to do business in the Philippines from suing or maintaining
an action in Philippine courts.9What it seeks to prevent is a foreign
corporation doing business in the Philippines without a license from
gaining access to Philippine courts. As elucidated in Marshall-Wells
Co. vs. Elser & Co., 46 Phil. 70:
The object of the statute was to subject the foreign corporation doing
business in the Philippines to the jurisdiction of its courts. The object
of the statute was not to prevent it from performing single acts but to
prevent it from acquiring a domicile for the purpose of business
without taking the steps necessary to render it amenable to suit in the
local courts. The implication of the law is that it was never the
purpose of the Legislature to exclude a foreign corporation which
happens to obtain an isolated order for business from the Philippines
from securing redress from Philippine courts, and thus, in effect, to
permit persons to avoid their contract made with such foreign
corporation. The effect of the statute preventing foreign corporations
from doing business and from bringing actions in the local courts,
except on compliance with elaborate requirements, must not be
unduly extended or improperly applied. It should not be construed to
extend beyond the plain meaning of its terms, considered in
connection with its object, and in connection with the spirit of the
entire law.
The fairly recent case of Universal Shipping Lines vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court,10 although dealing with the amended version of
Section 69 of the old Corporation Law, Section 133 of the
Corporation Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 68), but which is
nonetheless apropos, states the rule succinctly: "it is not the lack of
the prescribed license (to do business in the Philippines) but doing
business without license, which bars a foreign corporation from
access to our courts."
Thus, we have ruled that a foreign corporation not licensed to do
business in the Philippines may file a suit in this country due to the
collision of two vessels at the harbor of Manila11 and for the loss of
goods bound for Hongkong but erroneously discharged in Manila.12
Indeed, the phraseologies of Section 14 of the General Banking Act
and its almost identical counterpart Section 69 of the old Corporation
Law are misleading in that they seem to require a foreign
corporation, including a foreign bank or banking corporation, not
licensed to do business and not doing business in the Philippines to
secure a license from the Securities and Exchange Commission
before it can bring or maintain an action in Philippine courts. To avert
such misimpression, Section 133 of the Corporation Code is now
more plainly worded thus:
No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without
a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain
or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or
administrative agency of the Philippines.
Under this provision, we have ruled that a foreign corporation may
sue in this jurisdiction for infringement of trademark and unfair
competition although it is not doing business in the
Philippines13 because the Philippines was a party to the Convention
of the Union of Paris for the Protection of IndustrialProperty.14
We even went further to say that a foreign corporation not licensed to
do business in the Philippines may not be denied the right to file an
action in our courts for an isolated transaction in this country.15
Since petitioner foreign banking corporation was not doing business
in the Philippines, it may not be denied the privilege of pursuing its
claims against private respondent for a contract which was entered
into and consummated outside the Philippines. Otherwise we will be
hampering the growth and development of business relations
between Filipino citizens and foreign nationals. Worse, we will be
allowing the law to serve as a protective shield for unscrupulous
Filipino citizens who have business relationships abroad.
In its pleadings before the court, petitioner appears to be in a
quandary as to whether the suit below is one for enforcement or
recognition of the Hongkong judgment. Its complaint states:
COMES NOW Plaintiff, by undersigned counsel, and to this
Honorable Court, most respectfully alleges that:
1. Plaintiff is a corporation duly organized and existing under and by
virtue of the laws of Hongkong with business and postal address at
the 3rd Floor, United Centre, 95 Queensway, Hongkong, not doing
business in the Philippines, but is suing for this isolated transaction,
but for purposes of this complaint may be served with summons and
legal processes of this Honorable Court, at the 6th Floor, Cibeles
Building, 6780 Ayala Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila, while defendant
Cordova Chin San, may be served with summons and other legal
processes of this Honorable Court at the Municipality of Moncada,
Province of Tarlac, Philippines;
2. On July 18, 1979 and July 25, 1980, the defendant executed
Continuing Guarantees, in consideration of plaintiff's from time to
time making advances, or coming to liability or discounting bills or
otherwise giving credit or granting banking facilities from time to time
to, or on account of the Wolder Enterprises (sic), photocopies of the
Contract of Continuing Guarantees are hereto attached as Annexes
"A" and "B", respectively, and made parts hereof;
3. In June 1984, a complaint was filed by plaintiff against the Wolder
Enterprises (sic) and defendant Cordova Chin San, in The Supreme
Court of Hongkong, under Case No. 3176, and pursuant to which
complaint, a judgment dated 14th day of July, 1984 was rendered by
The Supreme Court of Hongkong ordering to (sic) defendant
Cordova Chin San to pay the plaintiff the sum of HK$279,325.00
together with interest on the principal sum of HK$250,000.00 at the
rate of HK$1.7% per month or (HK$141.67) per day from 4th May,
1984 up to the date the said amount is paid in full, and to pay the
sum of HK$970.00 as fixed cost, a photocopy of the Judgment
rendered by The Supreme Court of Hongkong is hereto attached as
Annex "C" and made an integral part hereof.
4. Plaintiff has made demands upon the defendant in this case to pay
the aforesaid amount the last of which is by letter dated July 16, 1984
sent by undersigned counsel, a photocopy of the letter of demand is
hereto attached as Annex "D" and the Registry Return Card hereto
attached as Annex "E", respectively, and made parts hereof.
However, this notwithstanding, defendant failed and refused and still
continue to fail and refuse to make any payment to plaintiff on the
aforesaid amount of HK$279,325.00 plus interest on the principal
sum of HK$250,000.00 at the rate of (HK$141.67) per day from May
4, 1984 up to the date of payment;
5. In order to protect and safeguard the rights and interests of herein
plaintiff, it has engaged the services of undersigned counsel, to file
the suit at bar, and for whose services it has agreed to pay an
amount equivalent to 25% of the total amount due and owing, as of
and by way of attorney's fees plus costs of suit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of
this Honorable Court that judgment be rendered ordering the
defendant:
a) To pay plaintiff the sum of HK$279,325.00 together with interest
on the principal sum of HK$260,000.00 at the rate of HK$1.7% (sic)
per month (or HK$141.67 per day) from May 4, 1984 until the
aforesaid amount is paid in full;
b) To pay an amount equivalent to 25% of the total amount due and
demandable as of and by way of attorney's fees; and
c) To pay costs of suit, and
Plaintiff prays for such other and further reliefs, to which it may by
law and equity, be entitled.16
The complaint therefore appears to be one of the enforcement of the
Hongkong judgment because it prays for the grant of the affirmative
relief given by said foreign judgment.17 Although petitioner asserts
that it is merely seeking the recognition of its claims based on the
contract sued upon and not the enforcement of the Hongkong
judgment18it should be noted that in the prayer of the complaint,
petitioner simply copied the Hongkong judgment with respect to
private respondent's liability.
However, a foreign judgment may not be enforced if it is not
recognized in the jurisdiction where affirmative relief is being
sought.1âwphi1 Hence, in the interest of justice, the complaint should
be considered as a petition for the recognition of the Hongkong
judgment under Section 50 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in order
that the defendant, private respondent herein, may present evidence
of lack of jurisdiction, notice, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of fact
and law, if applicable.
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders of the lower court are hereby
set aside. Civil Case No. 8762 is reinstated and the lower court is
directed to proceed with dispatch in the disposition of said case. This
decision is immediately executory. No costs.
G.R. No. L-23678, June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased. PEOPLE’S
BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor. MARIA CRISTINA
BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Facts
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was “a citizen of the State of Texas
and of the United States.” By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he
divorced, he had five legitimate children, by his second wife, Violet
Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children, and
finally, he had three illegitimate children.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines,
in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of
administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided,
in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first
wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate
children or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items
have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving
children by his first and second wives in equal shares.
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of
San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the
Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People’s Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid
all the bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the
form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3)
illegitimate children, various amounts totaling P40,000.00 each in
satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00,
which it released from time to time according as the lower court
approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the
latter three requesting partial advances on account of their respective
legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the
executor submitted and filed its “Executor’s Final Account, Report of
Administration and Project of Partition” wherein it reported, inter alia,
the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her
of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of
Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the
amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project
of partition, the executor — pursuant to the “Twelfth” clause of the
testator’s Last Will and Testament — divided the residuary estate
into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator’s seven
legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis
filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the
ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate
children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof
of service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on
April 27, 1964 by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent
pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order
overruling the oppositions and approving the executor’s final account,
report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art.
16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent,
which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by
the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to
this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply — Texas law or
Philippine law.
Issue: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should
determine the successional rights of the illegitimate children. NO
Ruling
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even
discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v.
Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is
usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country,
and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that
the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at
the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of
law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile)
should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi)
to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if
Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae)
calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties
are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved
are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to
the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different
from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine
of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their
arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in
relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable
the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary
successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession;
(b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide
that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the
law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect
to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights
and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation
of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of
the Civil Code, stating that —
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order, public policy and good
customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-
quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase,
"notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article"
when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the
new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the
second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the
new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph
of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate
and intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative
intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which
decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national
law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs
may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not
intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals.
For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of
successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific
provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills
— one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate
— arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his
Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in
executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as
this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in
a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal
and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those
matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states
said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of
the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there
are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional
rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Miciano vs. Brimo 50 Phil. 867 , November 01, 1924
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in
question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition.
Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The
court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his
participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion for
reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval
of the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the deceased's business
and the deed of transfer of said business; and (5) the declaration that
the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to
postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of
the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the
depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in
question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will
which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality,
for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the
Civil Code which, among other things, provides the following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the
order of succession as well as to the amount of the successional
rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is in question,
whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it
may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary
dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch
as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws
are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they
are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and
Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws
are. He, himself, acknowledges it when he desires to be given an
opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he
assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval of
the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony
requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such
laws does not constitute an error. It is discretionary with the trial
court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted
ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no
abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this particular. There is,
therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the
testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary
dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force,
must be complied with and executed. lawphil.net
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was
not erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the
exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he is one
of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into
consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the
second clause of the will, which says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish
citizen, this citizenship having been conferred upon me by conquest
and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand,
having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine
Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now
possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property and
everything in connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of
in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands,
requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul
and cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will
favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with this
request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition
is that the instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to
distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his
nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee
who fails to comply with it, as the herein oppositor who, by his
attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the
testator, as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to
law, for article 792 of the civil Code provides the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall
be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or
legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator
otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the
testator's national law when, according to article 10 of the civil Code
above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern
his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is
considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is
unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the
herein oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the
law which shall govern it, and to the condition imposed upon the
legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and
requests are perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that said
clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed
that the distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to
include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and
the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is
approved in all other respects, without any pronouncement as to
costs. So ordered.
Aznar vs. Garcia 7 SCRA 95 , January 31, 1963
Facts
Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to
California where he resided for a period of 9 years. In 1913, he came
to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his death. In
his will, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy
Christensen (legitimate), as his only heir, but left a legacy sum of
money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia (illegitimate). Adolfo
Aznar was the executor of the estate. Counsel for Helen claims that
under Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, California law should
be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to
the law of the domicile. On the other hand, counsel for Maria, averred
that the national law of the deceased must apply, illegitimate children
not being entitled to anything under California law.
Issue Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be
applied in determining the successional rights of his heirs.
Ruling
Private International Law; Determination of citizenship; U.S.
citizenship not lost by stay in Philippines before independence.—The
citizenship that the deceased acquired in California when he resided
there from 1904 to 1913 was never lost by his stay in the Philippines,
for the latter was a territory of the United States until 1946, and the
deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of
California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he
declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never
to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring
another.
Same; Validity of testamentary provisions; Meaning of “national law”
in Article 16, Civil Code; Conflict of law rules in California to be
applied in case at bar.—The “national law” indicated in Article 16 of
the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to any general American Law,
because there is no such law governing the validity of testamentary
provisions in the United States, each state of the union having its
own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within
the state. It can therefore refer to no other than the private law of the
state of which the decedent was a citizen. In the case at bar, the
State of California prescribes two sets of laws for its citizens, an
internal law for its citizens residing therein and a conflict of law rules
for its citizens domiciled in other jurisdictions. Hence, reason
demands that the California con-flict of law rules should be applied in
this jurisdiction in the case at bar. Aznar vs. Garcia, 7 SCRA 95, No.
L-16749 January 31, 1963
Same; Same; Domicile; Factors considered in determining aliens’
domicile in the Philippines.—An American citizen who was born in
New York, migrated to California, resided there for nine years, came
to the Philippines in 1913, and very rarely re-turned to California and
only for short visits, and who appears to have never owned or
acquired a home or properties in that state, shall be considered to
have his domicile in the Philip-pines.
Same; Same; Same; Rule of resorting to the law of the domicile in
determining matters with foreign element involved.—The rule laid
down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of
matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general
principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in
most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court of domicile bound to ap-ply its
own law as directed in the conflict of law rule of dece-dents state;
Application of the renvoi doctrine.—The conflict of law rule in
California, Article 946 Civil Code, refers back the case, when a
decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
Philippines in the case at bar. The court of domicile can not and
should not refer the case back to California, as such action would
leave the issue incapable of determination, because the case will
then be tossed back and forth between the two states. If the question
has to be decided, the Philippine court must apply its own law as the
Philippines was the domicile of the decedent, as directed in the
conflict of law rule of the state of the decedent, California, and
especially because the internal law of California provides no legitime
for natural children, while the Philippine law (Articles 887(4) and 894,
Civil Code of the Philippines makes natural children legally
acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recog-nizing them).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Philippine law to be
applied in case at bar.—As the domicile of the deceased, who was a
citizen of California, was the Philippines, the validity of the provisions
of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child of the latter’s
legacy, should be governed by the Philippine law, pursuant to Article
946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of
California. Aznar vs. Garcia, 7 SCRA 95, No. L-16749 January 31,
1963
Testate Estate of Bohanan vs. Bohanan, et al. 106 Phil. 997 ,
January 30, 1960
On April 24, 195 0, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Rafael
Amparo, presiding, admitted to probate a last will and testament of C.
O. Bohanan, executed by him on April 23, 1944 in Manila. In the said
order, the court made the following findings:
According to the evidence of the opponents the testator was born in
Nebraska and therefore a citizen of that state, or at least a citizen of
California where some of his properties are located. This contention
in untenable. Notwithstanding the long residence of the decedent in
the Philippines, his stay here was merely temporary, and he
continued and remained to be a citizen of the United States and of
the state of his pertinent residence to spend the rest of his days in
that state. His permanent residence or domicile in the United States
depended upon his personal intent or desire, and he selected
Nevada as his homicide and therefore at the time of his death, he
was a citizen of that state. Nobody can choose his domicile or
permanent residence for him. That is his exclusive personal right.
Wherefore, the court finds that the testator C. O. Bohanan was at the
time of his death a citizen of the United States and of the State of
Nevada and declares that his will and testament, Exhibit A, is fully in
accordance with the laws of the state of Nevada and admits the
same to probate. Accordingly, the Philippine Trust Company, named
as the executor of the will, is hereby appointed to such executor and
upon the filing of a bond in the sum of P10,000.00, let letters
testamentary be issued and after taking the prescribed oath, it may
enter upon the execution and performance of its trust. (pp. 26-27,
R.O.A.).
It does not appear that the order granting probate was ever questions
on appeal. The executor filed a project of partition dated January 24,
1956, making, in accordance with the provisions of the will, the
following adjudications: (1) one-half of the residuary estate, to the
Farmers and Merchants National Bank of Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A. in trust only for the benefit of testator's grandson Edward
George Bohanan, which consists of several mining companies; (2)
the other half of the residuary estate to the testator's brother, F.L.
Bohanan, and his sister, Mrs. M. B. Galbraith, share and share alike.
This consist in the same amount of cash and of shares of mining
stock similar to those given to testator's grandson; (3) legacies of
P6,000 each to his (testator) son, Edward Gilbert Bohana, and his
daughter, Mary Lydia Bohanan, to be paid in three yearly
installments; (4) legacies to Clara Daen, in the amount of
P10,000.00; Katherine Woodward, P2,000; Beulah Fox, P4,000; and
Elizabeth Hastings, P2,000;
It will be seen from the above that out of the total estate (after
deducting administration expenses) of P211,639.33 in cash, the
testator gave his grandson P90,819.67 and one-half of all shares of
stock of several mining companies and to his brother and sister the
same amount. To his children he gave a legacy of only P6,000 each,
or a total of P12,000.
The wife Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children question the
validity of the testamentary provisions disposing of the estate in the
manner above indicated, claiming that they have been deprived of
the legitimate that the laws of the form concede to them.
The first question refers to the share that the wife of the testator,
Magdalena C. Bohanan, should be entitled to received. The will has
not given her any share in the estate left by the testator. It is argued
that it was error for the trial court to have recognized the Reno
divorce secured by the testator from his Filipino wife Magdalena C.
Bohanan, and that said divorce should be declared a nullity in this
jurisdiction, citing the case of Querubin vs.Querubin, 87 Phil., 124, 47
Off. Gaz., (Sup, 12) 315, Cousins Hiz vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 852,
Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855 and Gorayeb vs. Hashim, 50 Phil.,
22. The court below refused to recognize the claim of the widow on
the ground that the laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a
citizen, allow him to dispose of all of his properties without requiring
him to leave any portion of his estate to his wife. Section 9905 of
Nevada Compiled Laws of 1925 provides:
Every person over the age of eighteen years, of sound mind, may, by
last will, dispose of all his or her estate, real and personal, the same
being chargeable with the payment of the testator's debts.
Besides, the right of the former wife of the testator, Magdalena C.
Bohanan, to a share in the testator's estafa had already been passed
upon adversely against her in an order dated June 19, 1955, (pp.
155-159, Vol II Records, Court of First Instance), which had become
final, as Magdalena C. Bohanan does not appear to have appealed
therefrom to question its validity. On December 16, 1953, the said
former wife filed a motion to withdraw the sum of P20,000 from the
funds of the estate, chargeable against her share in the conjugal
property, (See pp. 294-297, Vol. I, Record, Court of First Instance),
and the court in its said error found that there exists no community
property owned by the decedent and his former wife at the time the
decree of divorce was issued. As already and Magdalena C.
Bohanan may no longer question the fact contained therein, i.e. that
there was no community property acquired by the testator and
Magdalena C. Bohanan during their converture.
Moreover, the court below had found that the testator and Magdalena
C. Bohanan were married on January 30, 1909, and that divorce was
granted to him on May 20, 1922; that sometime in 1925, Magdalena
C. Bohanan married Carl Aaron and this marriage was subsisting at
the time of the death of the testator. Since no right to share in the
inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists in the State of Nevada
and since the court below had already found that there was no
conjugal property between the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan,
the latter can now have no longer claim to pay portion of the estate
left by the testator.
The most important issue is the claim of the testator's children,
Edward and Mary Lydia, who had received legacies in the amount of
P6,000 each only, and, therefore, have not been given their shares in
the estate which, in accordance with the laws of the forum, should be
two-thirds of the estate left by the testator. Is the failure old the
testator to give his children two-thirds of the estate left by him at the
time of his death, in accordance with the laws of the forum valid?
The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the
testator died in 1944, expressly provides that successional rights to
personal property are to be earned by the national law of the person
whose succession is in question. Says the law on this point:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the
order of succession as well as to the extent of the successional rights
and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever
may be the nature of the property and the country in which it is found.
(par. 2, Art. 10, old Civil Code, which is the same as par. 2 Art. 16,
new Civil Code.)
In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was found out and it
was decided that the testator was a citizen of the State of Nevada
because he had selected this as his domicile and his permanent
residence. (See Decision dated April 24, 1950, supra). So the
question at issue is whether the estementary dispositions, especially
hose for the children which are short of the legitime given them by
the Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid. It is not disputed that the
laws of Nevada allow a testator to dispose of all his properties by will
(Sec. 9905, Complied Nevada Laws of 1925, supra). It does not
appear that at time of the hearing of the project of partition, the
above-quoted provision was introduced in evidence, as it was the
executor's duly to do. The law of Nevada, being a foreign law can
only be proved in our courts in the form and manner provided for by
our Rules, which are as follows:
SEC. 41. Proof of public or official record. — An official record or an
entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced
by an official publication thereof or by a copy tested by the officer
having the legal custody of he record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. . . . (Rule 123).
We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court
below and we have found that during the hearing on October 4, 1954
of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for withdrawal of P20,000 as
her share, the foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled
Nevada Laws. was introduced in evidence by appellant's (herein)
counsel as Exhibits "2" (See pp. 77-79, VOL. II, and t.s.n. pp. 24-44,
Records, Court of First Instance). Again said laws presented by the
counsel for the executor and admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B"
during the hearing of the case on January 23, 1950 before Judge
Rafael Amparo (se Records, Court of First Instance, Vol. 1).
In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not
dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws of the State of
Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are constrained to
hold that the pertinent law of Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the
Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of by
us, without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of
the project of partition.
As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of
testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national law of
the testator, and as it has been decided and it is not disputed that the
national law of the testator is that of the State of Nevada, already
indicated above, which allows a testator to dispose of all his property
according to his will, as in the case at bar, the order of the court
approving the project of partition made in accordance with the
testamentary provisions, must be, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs
against appellants.
Cadalin vs. POEA's Administrator 238 SCRA 721 , December 05,
1994
Facts
This is a consolidation of 3 cases of SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the
Supreme Court for Certiorari.
On June 6, 1984, Cadalin, Amul and Evangelista, in their own behalf
and on behalf of 728 other OCWs instituted a class suit by filing an
“Amended Complaint” with the POEA for money claims arising from
their recruitment by ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS
CORPORATION (AIBC) and employment by BROWN & ROOT
INTERNATIONAL, INC (BRI) which is a foreign corporation with
headquarters in Houston, Texas, and is engaged in construction;
while AIBC is a domestic corporation licensed as a service contractor
to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers for overseas
employment on behalf of its foreign principals.
The amended complaint sought the payment of the unexpired portion
of the employment contracts, which was terminated prematurely, and
secondarily, the payment of the interest of the earnings of the Travel
and Reserved Fund; interest on all the unpaid benefits; area wage
and salary differential pay; fringe benefits; reimbursement of SSS
and premium not remitted to the SSS; refund of withholding tax not
remitted to the BIR; penalties for committing prohibited practices; as
well as the suspension of the license of AIBC and the accreditation of
BRII
On October 2, 1984, the POEA Administrator denied the “Motion to
Strike Out of the Records” filed by AIBC but required the claimants to
correct the deficiencies in the complaint pointed out.
AIB and BRII kept on filing Motion for Extension of Time to file their
answer. The POEA kept on granting such motions.
On November 14, 1984, claimants filed an opposition to the motions
for extension of time and asked that AIBC and BRII declared in
default for failure to file their answers.
On December 27, 1984, the POEA Administrator issued an order
directing AIBC and BRII to file their answers within ten days from
receipt of the order.
(at madami pang motions ang na-file, new complainants joined the
case, ang daming inavail na remedies ng both parties)
On June 19, 1987, AIBC finally submitted its answer to the complaint.
At the same hearing, the parties were given a period of 15 days from
said date within which to submit their respective position papers. On
February 24, 1988, AIBC and BRII submitted position paper. On
October 27, 1988, AIBC and BRII filed a “Consolidated Reply,” POEA
Adminitartor rendered his decision which awarded the amount of
$824, 652.44 in favor of only 324 complainants. Claimants submitted
their “Appeal Memorandum For Partial Appeal” from the decision of
the POEA. AIBC also filed its MR and/or appeal in addition to the
“Notice of Appeal” filed earlier.
NLRC promulgated its Resolution, modifying the decision of the
POEA. The resolution removed some of the benefits awarded in
favor of the claimants. NLRC denied all the MRs. Hence, these
petitions filed by the claimants and by AlBC and BRII.
The case rooted from the Labor Law enacted by Bahrain where most
of the complainants were deployed. His Majesty Ise Bin Selman Al
Kaifa, Amir of Bahrain, issued his Amiri Decree No. 23 on June 16,
1176, otherwise known re the Labour Law for the Private Sector.
Some of the provision of Amiri Decree No. 23 that are relevant to the
claims of the complainants-appellants are as follows:
“Art. 79: x x x A worker shall receive payment for each extra hour
equivalent to his wage entitlement increased by a minimum of
twenty-rive per centurn thereof for hours worked during the day; and
by a minimum off fifty per centurn thereof for hours worked during the
night which shall be deemed to being from seven o’clock in the
evening until seven o’clock in the morning .”
Art. 80: Friday shall be deemed to be a weekly day of rest on full pay.
If employee worked, 150% of his normal wage shall be paid to him x
x x.”
Art. 81; x x x When conditions of work require the worker to work on
any official holiday, he shall be paid an additional sum equivalent to
150% of his normal wage.”
Art. 84: Every worker who has completed one year’s continuous
service with his employer shall be entitled to Laos on full pay for a
period of not less than 21 days for each year increased to a period
not less than 28 days after five continuous years of service.”
A worker shall be entitled to such leave upon a quantum meruit in
respect of the proportion of his service in that year.”
Art. 107: A contract of employment made for a period of indefinite
duration may be terminated by either party thereto after giving the
other party prior notice before such termination, in writing, in respect
of monthly paid workers and fifteen days’ notice in respect of other
workers. The party terminating a contract without the required notice
shall pay to the other party compensation equivalent to the amount of
wages payable to the worker for the period of such notice or the
unexpired portion thereof.”
Art. Ill: x x x the employer concerned shall pay to such worker, upon
termination of employment, a leaving indemnity for the period of his
employment calculated on the basis of fifteen days’ wages for each
year of the first three years of service and of one month’s wages for
each year of service thereafter. Such worker shall be entitled to
payment of leaving indemnity upon a quantum meruit in proportion to
the period of his service completed within a year.”
Ruling
Conflict of Laws; As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not
be applied in the forum.—As a general rule, a foreign procedural law
will not be applied in the forum. Procedural matters, such as service
of process, joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and
so forth, are governed by the laws of the forum. This is true even if
the action is based upon a foreign substantive law (Restatement of
the Conflict of Laws, Sec. 685; Salonga, Private International Law,
131 [1979]).
Same; Prescription; A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in
Conflict of Laws.—A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in
Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed either as
procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization given
such a law. Thus in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company, supra,
the American court applied the statute of limitations of New York,
instead of the Panamanian law, after finding that there was no
showing that the Panamanian law on prescription was intended to be
substantive. Being considered merely a procedural law even in
Panama, it has to give way to the law of the forum on prescription of
actions. Cadalin vs. POEA's Administrator, 238 SCRA 721, G.R. No.
104776, G.R. Nos. 104911-14, G.R. Nos. 105029-32 December 5,
1994
Same; Same; Actions; Words and Phrases; “Borrowing Statute,”
Explained; One form of “borrowing statutes” provides that an action
barred by the laws of the place where it accrued, will not be enforced
in the forum even though the local statute has not run against it.—
However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or
substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum
has a “borrowing statute.” Said statute has the practical effect of
treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance
(Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 152-153 [1938]). A “borrowing statute”
directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of limitations
to the pending claims based on a foreign law (Siegel, Conflicts 183
[1975]). While there are several kinds of “borrowing statutes,” one
form provides that an action barred by the laws of the place where it
accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even though the local
statute has not run against it (Goodrich and Scoles, Conflict of Laws,
152-153 [1938]). Section 48 of our Code of Civil Procedure is of this
kind. Said Section provides: “If by the laws of the state or country
where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred
in the Philippine Islands.”
Same; Same; Same; Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure has
not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code.—Section 48 has
not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Article 2270 of said Code repealed only those provisions of the Code
of Civil Procedure as to which were inconsistent with it. There is no
provision in the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is inconsistent
with or contradictory to Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(Paras, Philippine Conflict of Laws, 104 [7th ed.]). Cadalin vs.
POEA's Administrator, 238 SCRA 721, G.R. No. 104776, G.R. Nos.
104911-14, G.R. Nos. 105029-32 December 5, 1994
Same; Same; Labor Law; The courts of the forum will not enforce
any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy.—In the light
of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex
proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the application in this jurisdiction
of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976. The courts of the
forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’s
public policy (Canadian Northern Railway Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S.
553, 40 S. Ct. 402, 64 L. ed. 713 [1920]). To enforce the one-year
prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the
claims in question would contravene the public policy on the
protection to labor.
Evidence; Conflict of Laws; Administrative Law; An official document
from a foreign government can be admitted in evidence in
proceedings before an administrative body even without observing
the rule provided in Section 24, Rule 132 of the 1989 Revised Rules
on Evidence.—Claimants presented a Memorandum of the Ministry
of Labor of Bahrain dated April 16, 1983. While said document was
presented to the POEA without observing the rule on presenting
official documents of a foreign government as provided in Section 24,
Rule 132 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence, it can be admitted
in evidence in proceedings before an administrative body. The
opposing parties have a copy of the said memorandum, and they
could easily verify its authenticity and accuracy. Cadalin vs. POEA's
Administrator, 238 SCRA 721, G.R. No. 104776, G.R. Nos. 104911-
14, G.R. Nos. 105029-32 December 5, 1994
Same; Conflict of Laws; Parties to a contract may select the law by
which it is to be governed, and instead of adopting the entire mass of
the foreign law, the parties may just agree that specific provisions of
a foreign statute shall be deemed incorporated into their contract “as
a set of terms.”—The parties to a contract may select the law by
which it is to be governed (Cheshire, Private International Law, 187
[7th ed.]). In such a case, the foreign law is adopted as a “system” to
regulate the relations of the parties, including questions of their
capacity to enter into the contract, the formalities to be observed by
them, matters of performance, and so forth (16 Am Jur 2d, 150-161).
Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the parties
may just agree that specific provisions of a foreign statute shall be
deemed incorporated into their contract “as a set of terms.” By such
reference to the provisions of the foreign law, the contract does not
become a foreign contract to be governed by the foreign law. The
said law does not operate as a statute but as a set of contractual
terms deemed written in the contract (Anton, Private International
Law, 197 [1967]; Dicey and Morris, The Conflict of Laws, 702-703,
[8th ed.]).
Same; Same; The choice of law must, however, bear some
relationship to the parties or their transaction.—A basic policy of
contract is to protect the expectation of the parties (Reese, Choice of
Law in Torts and Contracts, 16 Columbia Journal of Transnational
Law 1, 21 [1977]). Such party expectation is protected by giving
effect to the parties’ own choice of the applicable law (Fricke v.
Isbrandtsen Co. Inc., 151 F. Supp. 465, 467 [1957]). The choice of
law must, however, bear some relationship to the parties or their
transaction (Scoles and Hayes, Conflict of Law, 644-647 [1982]).
There is no question that the contracts sought to be enforced by
claimants have a direct connection with the Bahrain law because the
services were rendered in that country. Cadalin vs. POEA's
Administrator, 238 SCRA 721, G.R. No. 104776, G.R. Nos. 104911-
14, G.R. Nos. 105029-32 December 5, 1994
Dacasin vs. Dacasin 611 SCRA 657 , February 05, 2010
Facts
Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and respondent
Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin (respondent), Filipino, were married in
Manila in April 1994. They have one daughter, Stephanie, born on 21
September 1995. In June 1999, respondent sought and obtained
from the Circuit Court, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois
(Illinois court) a divorce decree against petitioner.[3] In its ruling, the
Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent,
awarded to respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained
jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.
On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a
contract (Agreement[4]) for the joint custody of Stephanie. The parties
chose Philippine courts as exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes
arising from the Agreement. Respondent undertook to obtain from
the Illinois court an order relinquishing jurisdiction to Philippine
courts.
In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 60 (trial court) to enforce the Agreement.
Petitioner alleged that in violation of the Agreement, respondent
exercised sole custody over Stephanie.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for, among others,
lack of jurisdiction because of the Illinois courts retention of
jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree.
Issue: WON the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of
petitioners suit and enforce the Agreement on the joint custody of the
parties child.
Ruling
he trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioners suit but not to
enforce the Agreement which is void. However, factual and equity
considerations militate against the dismissal of petitioners suit and
call for the remand of the case to settle the question of Stephanies
custody.
Regional Trial Courts Vested With Jurisdiction
to Enforce Contracts
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner
filed his suit in the trial court, statutory law vests on Regional Trial
Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of
pecuniary estimation.[9]An action for specific performance, such as
petitioners suit to enforce the Agreement on joint child custody,
belongs to this species of actions.[10]Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner
went to the right court.
Indeed, the trial courts refusal to entertain petitioners suit was
grounded not on its lack of power to do so but on its thinking that the
Illinois courts divorce decree stripped it of jurisdiction. This
conclusion is unfounded. What the Illinois court retained was
jurisdiction x x x for the purpose of enforcing all and sundry the
various provisions of [its] Judgment for Dissolution.[11]Petitioners
suit seeks the enforcement not of the various provisions of the
divorce decree but of the post-divorce Agreement on joint child
custody. Thus, the action lies beyond the zone of the Illinois courts
so-called retained jurisdiction.
Petitioners Suit Lacks Cause of Action
The foregoing notwithstanding, the trial court cannot enforce the
Agreement which is contrary to law.
In this jurisdiction, parties to a contract are free to stipulate the terms
of agreement subject to the minimum ban on stipulations contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy.[12]Otherwise, the contract is denied legal existence, deemed
inexistent and void from the beginning.[13]For lack of relevant
stipulation in the Agreement, these and other ancillary Philippine
substantive law serve as default parameters to test the validity of the
Agreements joint child custody stipulations.[14]
At the time the parties executed the Agreement on 28 January 2002,
two facts are undisputed: (1) Stephanie was under seven years old
(having been born on 21 September 1995); and (2) petitioner and
respondent were no longer married under the laws of the United
States because of the divorce decree. The relevant Philippine law on
child custody for spouses separated in fact or in law[15] (under the
second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code) is also
undisputed: no child under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother x x x.[16] (This statutory awarding of sole parental
custody[17]to the mother is mandatory,[18]grounded on sound policy
consideration,[19]subject only to a narrow exception not alleged to
obtain here.[20]) Clearly then, the Agreements object to establish a
post-divorce joint custody regime between respondent and petitioner
over their child under seven years old contravenes Philippine law.
The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to law, it
has also been repudiated by the mother when she refused to allow
joint custody by the father. The Agreement would be valid if the
spouses have not divorced or separated because the law provides
for joint parental authority when spouses live together.[21]However,
upon separation of the spouses, the mother takes sole custody under
the law if the child is below seven years old and any agreement to
the contrary is void. Thus, the law suspends the joint custody regime
for (1) children under seven of (2) separated or divorced spouses.
Simply put, for a child within this age bracket (and for
commonsensical reasons), the law decides for the separated or
divorced parents how best to take care of the child and that is to give
custody to the separated mother. Indeed, the separated parents
cannot contract away the provision in the Family Code on the
maternal custody of children below seven years anymore than they
can privately agree that a mother who is unemployed, immoral,
habitually drunk, drug addict, insane or afflicted with a communicable
disease will have sole custody of a child under seven as these are
reasons deemed compelling to precludethe application of the
exclusive maternal custody regime under the second paragraph of
Article 213.[22]
It will not do to argue that the second paragraph of Article 213 of the
Family Code applies only to judicial custodial agreements based on
its text that No child under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise. To limit this provisions enforceability to court sanctioned
agreements while placing private agreements beyond its reach is to
sanction a double standard in custody regulation of children under
seven years old of separated parents. This effectively empowers
separated parents, by the simple expedient of avoiding the courts, to
subvert a legislative policy vesting to the separated mother sole
custody of her children under seven years of age to avoid a tragedy
where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her.[23]This
ignores the legislative basis that [n]o man can sound the deep
sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age.[24]
It could very well be that Article 213s bias favoring one separated
parent (mother) over the other (father) encourages paternal neglect,
presumes incapacity for joint parental custody, robs the parents of
custodial options, or hijacks decision-making between the separated
parents.[25]However, these are objections which question the laws
wisdom not its validity or uniform enforceability. The forum to air and
remedy these grievances is the legislature, not this Court. At any
rate, the rules seeming harshness or undesirability is tempered by
ancillary agreements the separated parents may wish to enter such
as granting the father visitation and other privileges. These
arrangements are not inconsistent with the regime of sole maternal
custody under the second paragraph of Article 213 which merely
grants to the mother final authority on the care and custody of the
minor under seven years of age, in case of disagreements.
Further, the imposed custodial regime under the second paragraph
of Article 213 is limited in duration, lasting only until the childs
seventh year. From the eighth year until the childs emancipation, the
law gives the separated parents freedom, subject to the usual
contractual limitations, to agree on custody regimes they see fit to
adopt. Lastly, even supposing that petitioner and respondent are not
barred from entering into the Agreement for the joint custody of
Stephanie, respondent repudiated the Agreement by asserting sole
custody over Stephanie. Respondents act effectively brought the
parties back to ambit of the default custodial regime in the second
paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code vesting on respondent
sole custody of Stephanie.
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decrees alleged invalidity - not
because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorce
decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by
his Filipino spouse[26]- to support the Agreements enforceability. The
argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign
divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dorn v. Romillo[27]settled the
matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a
divorce decree obtained abroad.[28]There, we dismissed the alien
divorcees Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce
conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign
divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this
jurisdiction in this wise:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada
divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is
binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For
instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband,
in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is
that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the
same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15
of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. In this
case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from
the marriage from the standards of American law, under which
divorce dissolves the marriage.
xxxx
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer
the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the
case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own countrys
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property. (Emphasis supplied)
We reiterated Van Dorn in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera[29]to dismiss
criminal complaints for adultery filed by the alien divorcee (who
obtained the foreign divorce decree) against his former Filipino
spouse because he no longer qualified as offended spouse entitled
to file the complaints under Philippine procedural rules. Thus, it
should be clear by now that a foreign divorce decree carries as much
validity against the alien divorcee in this jurisdiction as it does in the
jurisdiction of the aliens nationality, irrespective of who obtained the
divorce.
The Facts of the Case and Nature of Proceeding
Justify Remand
Instead of ordering the dismissal of petitioners suit, the logical end to
its lack of cause of action, we remand the case for the trial court to
settle the question of Stephanies custody. Stephanie is now nearly
15 years old, thus removing the case outside of the ambit of the
mandatory maternal custody regime under Article 213 and bringing it
within coverage of the default standard on child custody proceedings
the best interest of the child.[30]As the question of custody is already
before the trial court and the childs parents, by executing the
Agreement, initially showed inclination to share custody, it is in the
interest of swift and efficient rendition of justice to allow the parties to
take advantage of the courts jurisdiction, submit evidence on the
custodial arrangement best serving Stephanies interest, and let the
trial court render judgment. This disposition is consistent with the
settled doctrine that in child custody proceedings, equity may be
invoked to serve the childs best interest.[31]
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the Orders dated 1 March 2005 and
23 June 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60.
The case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this
ruling.
WILD VALLEY SHIPPING CO. vs. CA 342 SCRA 213 October 6,
2000
Facts
Sometime in February 1988, the Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned
by Philippine President Lines, Inc., private respondent herein, arrived
in Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, to load iron ore.Upon the completion of
the loading and when the vessel was ready to leave port, Mr. Ezzar
del Valle Solarzano Vasquez, an official pilot of Venezuela, was
designated by the harbour authorities in Puerto Ordaz to navigate the
Philippine Roxas through the Orinoco River.[1] He was asked to pilot
the said vessel on February 11, 1988[2] boarding it that night at 11:00
p.m.[3]
The master (captain) of the Philippine Roxas, Captain Nicandro
Colon, was at the bridge together with the pilot (Vasquez), the
vessel's third mate (then the officer on watch), and a helmsman when
the vessel left the port[4] at 1:40 a.m. on February 12, 1988.[5] Captain
Colon left the bridge when the vessel was under way.[6]
The Philippine Roxas experienced some vibrations when it entered
the San Roque Channel at mile 172.[7] The vessel proceeded on its
way, with the pilot assuring the watch officer that the vibration was a
result of the shallowness of the channel.[8]
Between mile 158 and 157, the vessel again experienced some
vibrations.[9] These occurred at 4:12 a.m.[10] It was then that the
watch officer called the master to the bridge.[11]
The master (captain) checked the position of the vessel [12] and
verified that it was in the centre of the channel.[13] He then went to
confirm, or set down, the position of the vessel on the chart.[14] He
ordered Simplicio A. Monis, Chief Officer of the President Roxas, to
check all the double bottom tanks.[15]
At around 4:35 a.m., the Philippine Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco
River,[16] thus obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels.
As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel owned by
herein petitioner Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd., was unable to
sail out of Puerto Ordaz on that day.
Subsequently, Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd. filed a suit with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch III against Philippine President
Lines, Inc. and Pioneer Insurance Company (the underwriter/insurer
of Philippine Roxas) for damages in the form of unearned profits, and
interest thereon amounting to US $400,000.00 plus attorney's fees,
costs, and expenses of litigation. The complaint against Pioneer
Insurance Company was dismissed in an Order dated November 7,
1988.
The trial court rendered its decision on October 16, 1991 in favor of
the petitioner, Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd.
Issue: whether or not Venezuelan law is applicable to the case at
bar.
Ruling
It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of
them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.[24]
A distinction is to be made as to the manner of proving a written and
an unwritten law. The former falls under Section 24, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, the entire provision of which is quoted
hereunder. Where the foreign law sought to be proved is "unwritten,"
the oral testimony of expert witnesses is admissible, as are printed
and published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the
country concerned if proved to be commonly admitted in such
courts.[25]
Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:
"Sec. 24. Proof of official record. -- The record of public documents
referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or
by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If
the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of
his office." (Underscoring supplied)
The court has interpreted Section 25 (now Section 24) to include
competent evidence like the testimony of a witness to prove the
existence of a written foreign law.
We do not dispute the competency of Capt. Oscar Leon Monzon, the
Assistant Harbor Master and Chief of Pilots at Puerto Ordaz,
Venezuela,[28] to testify on the existence of the Reglamento General
de la Ley de Pilotaje (pilotage law of Venezuela)[29] and
the Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco (rules
governing the navigation of the Orinoco River). Captain Monzon has
held the aforementioned posts for eight years.[30] As such he is in
charge of designating the pilots for maneuvering and navigating the
Orinoco River. He is also in charge of the documents that come into
the office of the harbour masters.[31]
Nevertheless, we take note that these written laws were not proven
in the manner provided by Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court.
The Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje was published in
the Gaceta Oficial[32]of the Republic of Venezuela. A photocopy of
the Gaceta Oficial was presented in evidence as an official
publication of the Republic of Venezuela.
The Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco is
published in a book issued by the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of
Venezuela.[33] Only a photocopy of the said rules was likewise
presented as evidence.
Both of these documents are considered in Philippine jurisprudence
to be public documents for they are the written official acts, or
records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies
and tribunals, and public officers of Venezuela.[34]
For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the
following requisites are mandatory: (1) It must be attested by the
officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and (2) It
must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy
or legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or consular agent
or foreign service officer, and with the seal of his office. [35] The latter
requirement is not a mere technicality but is intended to justify the
giving of full faith and credit to the genuineness of a document in a
foreign country.[36]
It is not enough that the Gaceta Oficial, or a book published by
the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela, was presented as
evidence with Captain Monzon attesting it. It is also required by
Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court that a certificate that
Captain Monzon, who attested the documents, is the officer who had
legal custody of those records made by a secretary of the embassy
or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul or consular agent or
by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in
Venezuela, and authenticated by the seal of his office accompanying
the copy of the public document. No such certificate could be found
in the records of the case.
With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is objectionable, for
the written law itself is the best evidence. According to the weight of
authority, when a foreign statute is involved, the best evidence rule
requires that it be proved by a duly authenticated copy of the
statute.[37]
At this juncture, we have to point out that the Venezuelan law was
not pleaded before the lower court.
A foreign law is considered to be pleaded if there is an allegation in
the pleading about the existence of the foreign law, its import and
legal consequence on the event or transaction in issue.[38]
A review of the Complaint[39] revealed that it was never alleged or
invoked despite the fact that the grounding of the M/V Philippine
Roxas occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of Venezuela.
We reiterate that under the rules of private international law, a foreign
law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. In the absence of
pleading and proof, the laws of a foreign country, or state, will be
presumed to be the same as our own local or domestic law and this
is known as processual presumption.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. vs. Guerrero G.R. No.
136804. February 19, 2003
Facts
On May 17, 1994, respondent Rafael Ma. Guerrero (Guerrero for
brevity) filed a complaint for damages against petitioner
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and/or Chemical Bank (the Bank
for brevity) with the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC for
brevity). Guerrero sought payment of damages allegedly for (1)
illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking
account with the Bank; (2) a returned check worth US$18,000.00 due
to signature verification problems; and (3) unauthorized conversion of
his account. Guerrero amended his complaint on April 18, 1995.
On September 1, 1995, the Bank filed its Answer alleging, inter
alia, that by stipulation Guerreros account is governed by New York
law and this law does not permit any of Guerreros claims except
actual damages. Subsequently, the Bank filed a Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment seeking the dismissal of Guerreros claims for
consequential, nominal, temperate, moral and exemplary damages
as well as attorneys fees on the same ground alleged in its Answer.
The Bank contended that the trial should be limited to the issue of
actual damages.Guerrero opposed the motion.
The affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a New York attorney, supported the
Banks Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Alyssa Waldens
affidavit (Walden affidavit for brevity) stated that Guerreros New York
bank account stipulated that the governing law is New York law and
that this law bars all of Guerreros claims except actual damages. The
Philippine Consular Office in New York authenticated the Walden
affidavit.
The RTC denied the Banks Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
and its motion for reconsideration on March 6, 1996 and July 17,
1996, respectively. The Bank filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the Court of Appeals assailing the RTC Orders. In its
Decision dated August 24, 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition. On December 14, 1998, the Court of Appeals denied the
Banks motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition.
Issue
The Bank contends that the Court of Appeals committed reversible
error in -
x x x HOLDING THAT [THE BANKS] PROOF OF FACTS TO
SUPPORT ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MAY NOT
BE GIVEN BY AFFIDAVIT;
x x x HOLDING THAT [THE BANKS] AFFIDAVIT, WHICH PROVES
FOREIGN LAW AS A FACT, IS HEARSAY AND THEREBY
CANNOT SERVE AS PROOF OF THE NEW YORK LAW RELIED
UPON BY PETITIONERS IN THEIR MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT x x x.[3]
Ruling
The petition is devoid of merit.
The Bank filed its motion for partial summary judgment pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 34 of the old Rules of Court which reads:
Section 2. Summary judgment for defending party. A party against
whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a
declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part
thereof.
A court may grant a summary judgment to settle expeditiously a case
if, on motion of either party, there appears from the pleadings,
depositions, admissions, and affidavits that no important issues of
fact are involved, except the amount of damages. In such event, the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.[4]
In a motion for summary judgment, the crucial question is: are the
issues raised in the pleadings genuine, sham or fictitious, as
shown by affidavits, depositions or admissions accompanying the
motion?[5]
A genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the
presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which
is fictitious or contrived so as not to constitute a genuine issue for
trial.[6]
A perusal of the parties respective pleadings would show that there
are genuine issues of fact that necessitate formal trial. Guerreros
complaint before the RTC contains a statement of the ultimate facts
on which he relies for his claim for damages. He is seeking damages
for what he asserts as illegally withheld taxes charged against
interests on his checking account with the Bank, a returned check
worth US$18,000.00 due to signature verification problems, and
unauthorized conversion of his account. In its Answer, the Bank set
up its defense that the agreed foreign law to govern their contractual
relation bars the recovery of damages other than actual. Apparently,
facts are asserted in Guerreros complaint while specific denials and
affirmative defenses are set out in the Banks answer.
True, the court can determine whether there are genuine issues in a
case based merely on the affidavits or counter-affidavits submitted by
the parties to the court. However, as correctly ruled by the Court of
Appeals, the Banks motion for partial summary judgment as
supported by the Walden affidavit does not demonstrate that
Guerreros claims are sham, fictitious or contrived. On the contrary,
the Walden affidavit shows that the facts and material allegations as
pleaded by the parties are disputed and there are substantial triable
issues necessitating a formal trial.
There can be no summary judgment where questions of fact are in
issue or where material allegations of the pleadings are in
dispute.[7] The resolution of whether a foreign law allows only the
recovery of actual damages is a question of fact as far as the trial
court is concerned since foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
courts.[8] Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice.[9] Like any
other fact, they must be alleged and proven. Certainly, the conflicting
allegations as to whether New York law or Philippine law applies to
Guerreros claims present a clear dispute on material allegations
which can be resolved only by a trial on the merits.
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a
sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by (1) an official
publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody thereof. Such official publication or copy must be
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof. The
certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine
embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of
the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be, and must
be under the official seal of the attesting officer.
Certain exceptions to this rule were recognized in Asiavest Limited
v. Court of Appeals[10] which held that:
x x x:
Although it is desirable that foreign law be proved in accordance with
the above rule, however, the Supreme Court held in the case
of Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, that Section 41, Rule
123 (Section 25, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court) does not
exclude the presentation of other competent evidence to prove the
existence of a foreign law. In that case, the Supreme Court
considered the testimony under oath of an attorney-at-law of San
Francisco, California, who quoted verbatim a section of California
Civil Code and who stated that the same was in force at the time the
obligations were contracted, as sufficient evidence to establish the
existence of said law. Accordingly, in line with this view, the Supreme
Court in the Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher et al., upheld the
Tax Court in considering the pertinent law of California as proved by
the respondents witness. In that case, the counsel for respondent
testified that as an active member of the California Bar since 1951,
he is familiar with the revenue and taxation laws of the State of
California. When asked by the lower court to state the pertinent
California law as regards exemption of intangible personal properties,
the witness cited Article 4, Sec. 13851 (a) & (b) of the California
Internal and Revenue Code as published in Derrings California Code,
a publication of Bancroft-Whitney Co., Inc. And as part of his
testimony, a full quotation of the cited section was offered in
evidence by respondents. Likewise, in several naturalization cases, it
was held by the Court that evidence of the law of a foreign country on
reciprocity regarding the acquisition of citizenship, although not
meeting the prescribed rule of practice, may be allowed and used as
basis for favorable action, if, in the light of all the circumstances, the
Court is satisfied of the authenticity of the written proof offered. Thus,
in a number of decisions, mere authentication of the Chinese
Naturalization Law by the Chinese Consulate General of Manila was
held to be competent proof of that law. (Emphasis supplied)
The Bank, however, cannot rely on Willamette Iron and
Steel Works v. Muzzal or Collector of Internal Revenue v.
Fisher to support its cause. These cases involved attorneys
testifying in open court during the trial in the Philippines and quoting
the particular foreign laws sought to be established. On the other
hand, the Walden affidavit was taken abroad ex parteand the affiant
never testified in open court. The Walden affidavit cannot be
considered as proof of New York law on damages not only because it
is self-serving but also because it does not state the specific New
York law on damages.
The Walden affidavit states conclusions from the affiants personal
interpretation and opinion of the facts of the case vis a vis the alleged
laws and jurisprudence without citing any law in particular. The
citations in the Walden affidavit of various U.S. court decisions do not
constitute proof of the official records or decisions of the U.S.
courts. While the Bank attached copies of some of the U.S. court
decisions cited in the Walden affidavit, these copies do not comply
with Section 24 of Rule 132 on proof of official records or decisions of
foreign courts.
The Banks intention in presenting the Walden affidavit is to prove
New York law and jurisprudence. However, because of the failure to
comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on how to prove a foreign law
and decisions of foreign courts, the Walden affidavit did not prove the
current state of New York law and jurisprudence. Thus, the Bank has
only alleged, but has not proved, what New York law and
jurisprudence are on the matters at issue.
Next, the Bank makes much of Guerreros failure to submit an
opposing affidavit to the Walden affidavit. However, the pertinent
provision of Section 3, Rule 35 of the old Rules of Court did not make
the submission of an opposing affidavit mandatory, thus:
SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served
at least ten (10) days before the time specified for the hearing. The
adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing
affidavits. After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, show that, except as to the amount of
damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. (Emphasis supplied)
It is axiomatic that the term may as used in remedial law, is only
permissive and not mandatory.[13]
Guerrero cannot be said to have admitted the averments in the
Banks motion for partial summary judgment and the Walden affidavit
just because he failed to file an opposing affidavit.Guerrero opposed
the motion for partial summary judgment, although he did not present
an opposing affidavit. Guerrero may not have presented an opposing
affidavit, as there was no need for one, because the Walden affidavit
did not establish what the Bank intended to prove. Certainly,
Guerrero did not admit, expressly or impliedly, the veracity of the
statements in the Walden affidavit. The Bank still had the burden of
proving New York law and jurisprudence even if Guerrero did not
present an opposing affidavit. As the party moving for summary
judgment, the Bank has the burden of clearly demonstrating the
absence of any genuine issue of fact and that any doubt as to the
existence of such issue is resolved against the movant.[14]
Moreover, it would have been redundant and pointless for Guerrero
to submit an opposing affidavit considering that what the Bank seeks
to be opposed is the very subject matter of the complaint. Guerrero
need not file an opposing affidavit to the Walden affidavit because his
complaint itself controverts the matters set forth in the Banks motion
and the Walden affidavit. A party should not be made to deny matters
already averred in his complaint.
There being substantial triable issues between the parties, the
courts a quo correctly denied the Banks motion for partial summary
judgment. There is a need to determine by presentation of evidence
in a regular trial if the Bank is guilty of any wrongdoing and if it is
liable for damages under the applicable laws.
This case has been delayed long enough by the Banks resort to a
motion for partial summary judgment. Ironically, the Bank has
successfully defeated the very purpose for which summary
judgments were devised in our rules, which is, to aid parties in
avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial.
Edi-Staff builders International vs. NLRC G.R. No. 145587
October 26, 2007
Facts
Petitioner EDI is a corporation engaged in recruitment and placement
of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs).5 ESI is another recruitment
agency which collaborated with EDI to process the documentation
and deployment of private respondent to Saudi Arabia.
Private respondent Gran was an OFW recruited by EDI, and
deployed by ESI to work for OAB, in Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia.6
It appears that OAB asked EDI through its October 3, 1993 letter
for curricula vitae of qualified applicants for the position of "Computer
Specialist."7 In a facsimile transmission dated November 29, 1993,
OAB informed EDI that, from the applicants' curricula vitae submitted
to it for evaluation, it selected Gran for the position of "Computer
Specialist." The faxed letter also stated that if Gran agrees to the
terms and conditions of employment contained in it, one of which
was a monthly salary of SR (Saudi Riyal) 2,250.00 (USD 600.00),
EDI may arrange for Gran's immediate dispatch.8
After accepting OAB's offer of employment, Gran signed an
employment contract9 that granted him a monthly salary of USD
850.00 for a period of two years. Gran was then deployed to Riyadh,
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on February 7, 1994.
Upon arrival in Riyadh, Gran questioned the discrepancy in his
monthly salary—his employment contract stated USD 850.00; while
his Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) Information
Sheet indicated USD 600.00 only. However, through the assistance
of the EDI office in Riyadh, OAB agreed to pay Gran USD 850.00 a
month.10
After Gran had been working for about five months for OAB, his
employment was terminated through OAB's July 9, 1994 letter,11 on
the following grounds:
1. Non-compliance to contract requirements by the recruitment
agency primarily on your salary and contract duration.
2. Non-compliance to pre-qualification requirements by the
recruitment agency[,] vide OAB letter ref. F-5751-93, dated October
3, 1993.12
3. Insubordination or disobedience to Top Management Order and/or
instructions (non-submittal of daily activity reports despite several
instructions).
On July 11, 1994, Gran received from OAB the total amount of SR
2,948.00 representing his final pay, and on the same day, he
executed a Declaration13 releasing OAB from any financial obligation
or otherwise, towards him.
After his arrival in the Philippines, Gran instituted a complaint, on July
21, 1994, against ESI/EDI, OAB, Country Bankers Insurance
Corporation, and Western Guaranty Corporation with the NLRC,
National Capital Region, Quezon City, which was docketed as POEA
ADJ (L) 94-06-2194 for underpayment of wages/salaries and illegal
dismissal.
Issue WHETHER THE FAILURE OF GRAN TO FURNISH A COPY
OF HIS APPEAL MEMORANDUM TO PETITIONER EDI WOULD
CONSTITUTE A JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT AND A DEPRIVATION
OF PETITIONER EDI'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AS WOULD
JUSTIFY THE DISMISSAL OF GRAN'S APPEAL.
Ruling
The petition lacks merit except with respect to Gran's failure to
furnish EDI with his Appeal Memorandum filed with the NLRC.
Petitioner EDI claims that Gran's failure to furnish it a copy of the
Appeal Memorandum constitutes a jurisdictional defect and a
deprivation of due process that would warrant a rejection of the
appeal.
This position is devoid of merit.
In a catena of cases, it was ruled that failure of appellant to furnish
a copy of the appeal to the adverse party is not fatal to the
appeal.
In Estrada v. National Labor Relations Commission,24 this Court set
aside the order of the NLRC which dismissed an appeal on the sole
ground that the appellant did not furnish the appellee a memorandum
of appeal contrary to the requirements of Article 223 of the New
Labor Code and Section 9, Rule XIII of its Implementing Rules and
Regulations.
Also, in J.D. Magpayo Customs Brokerage Corp. v. NLRC, the order
of dismissal of an appeal to the NLRC based on the ground that
"there is no showing whatsoever that a copy of the appeal was
served by the appellant on the appellee"25was annulled. The Court
ratiocinated as follows:
The failure to give a copy of the appeal to the adverse party was a
mere formal lapse, an excusable neglect. Time and again We have
acted on petitions to review decisions of the Court of Appeals even in
the absence of proof of service of a copy thereof to the Court of
Appeals as required by Section 1 of Rule 45, Rules of Court. We act
on the petitions and simply require the petitioners to comply
with the rule.26 (Emphasis supplied.)
The J.D. Magpayo ruling was reiterated in Carnation Philippines
Employees Labor Union-FFW v. National Labor Relations
Commission,27 Pagdonsalan v. NLRC,28 and in Sunrise Manning
Agency, Inc. v. NLRC.29
Thus, the doctrine that evolved from these cases is that failure to
furnish the adverse party with a copy of the appeal is treated only as
a formal lapse, an excusable neglect, and hence, not a jurisdictional
defect. Accordingly, in such a situation, the appeal should not be
dismissed; however, it should not be given due course either. As
enunciated in J.D. Magpayo, the duty that is imposed on the
NLRC, in such a case, is to require the appellant to comply with
the rule that the opposing party should be provided with a copy
of the appeal memorandum.
While Gran's failure to furnish EDI with a copy of the Appeal
Memorandum is excusable, the abject failure of the NLRC to order
Gran to furnish EDI with the Appeal Memorandum constitutes grave
abuse of discretion.
The records reveal that the NLRC discovered that Gran failed to
furnish EDI a copy of the Appeal Memorandum. The NLRC then
ordered Gran to present proof of service. In compliance with the
order, Gran submitted a copy of Camp Crame Post Office's list of
mail/parcels sent on April 7, 1998.30 The post office's list shows that
private respondent Gran sent two pieces of mail on the same date:
one addressed to a certain Dan O. de Guzman of Legaspi Village,
Makati; and the other appears to be addressed to Neil B. Garcia (or
Gran),31 of Ermita, Manila—both of whom are not connected with
petitioner.
This mailing list, however, is not a conclusive proof that EDI indeed
received a copy of the Appeal Memorandum.
Sec. 5 of the NLRC Rules of Procedure (1990) provides for the proof
and completeness of service in proceedings before the NLRC:
Section 5.32 Proof and completeness of service.—The return is prima
facie proof of the facts indicated therein. Service by registered mail
is complete upon receipt by the addressee or his agent; but if the
addressee fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5)
days from the date of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take
effect after such time. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, if the service is done through registered mail, it is only
deemed complete when the addressee or his agent received the mail
or after five (5) days from the date of first notice of the postmaster.
However, the NLRC Rules do not state what would constitute proper
proof of service.
Sec. 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, provides for proofs of service:
Section 13. Proof of service.—Proof of personal service shall consist
of a written admission of the party served or the official return of the
server, or the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement
of the date, place and manner of service. If the service is by ordinary
mail, proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person mailing of
facts showing compliance with section 7 of this Rule. If service is
made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit
and registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry
return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the
sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the
certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to
the addressee (emphasis supplied).
Based on the foregoing provision, it is obvious that the list submitted
by Gran is not conclusive proof that he had served a copy of his
appeal memorandum to EDI, nor is it conclusive proof that EDI
received its copy of the Appeal Memorandum. He should have
submitted an affidavit proving that he mailed the Appeal
Memorandum together with the registry receipt issued by the post
office; afterwards, Gran should have immediately filed the registry
return card.
Hence, after seeing that Gran failed to attach the proof of service, the
NLRC should not have simply accepted the post office's list of mail
and parcels sent; but it should have required Gran to properly
furnish the opposing parties with copies of his Appeal
Memorandum as prescribed in J.D. Magpayo and the other
cases. The NLRC should not have proceeded with the adjudication
of the case, as this constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The glaring failure of NLRC to ensure that Gran should have
furnished petitioner EDI a copy of the Appeal Memorandum before
rendering judgment reversing the dismissal of Gran's complaint
constitutes an evasion of the pertinent NLRC Rules and established
jurisprudence. Worse, this failure deprived EDI of procedural due
process guaranteed by the Constitution which can serve as basis for
the nullification of proceedings in the appeal before the NLRC. One
can only surmise the shock and dismay that OAB, EDI, and ESI
experienced when they thought that the dismissal of Gran's
complaint became final, only to receive a copy of Gran's Motion for
Execution of Judgment which also informed them that Gran had
obtained a favorable NLRC Decision. This is not level playing field
and absolutely unfair and discriminatory against the employer and
the job recruiters. The rights of the employers to procedural due
process cannot be cavalierly disregarded for they too have rights
assured under the Constitution.
However, instead of annulling the dispositions of the NLRC and
remanding the case for further proceedings we will resolve the
petition based on the records before us to avoid a protracted
litigation.33
Norse Management Co. (PTE) vs. National Seamen Board 117
SCRA 486 , September 30, 1982
Napoleon B. Abordo, the deceased husband of private respondent
Restituta C. Abordo, was the Second Engineer of M.T. "Cherry Earl"
when he died from an apoplectic stroke in the course of his
employment with petitioner NORSE MANAGEMENT COMPANY
(PTE). The M.T. "Cherry Earl" is a vessel of Singaporean Registry.
The late Napoleon B. Abordo at the time of his death was receiving a
monthly salary of US$850.00 (Petition, page 5).
In her complaint for "death compensation benefits, accrued leave pay
and time-off allowances, funeral expenses, attorney's fees and other
benefits and reliefs available in connection with the death of
Napoleon B. Abordo," filed before the National Seamen Board,
Restituta C. Abordo alleged that the amount of compensation due
her from petitioners Norse Management Co. (PTE) and Pacific
Seamen Services, Inc., principal and agent, respectively, should be
based on the law where the vessel is registered. On the other hand,
petitioners contend that the law of Singapore should not be applied in
this case because the National Seamen Board cannot take judicial
notice of the Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore. As an
alternative, they offered to pay private respondent Restituta C.
Abordo the sum of P30,000.00 as death benefits based on the
Board's Memorandum Circular No. 25 which they claim should apply
in this case.
The Hearing Officer III, Rebene C. Carrera of the Ministry of Labor
and Employment, after hearing the case, rendered judgment on June
20, 1979, ordering herein petitioners "to pay jointly and severally the
following:
I. US$30,600 (the 36-month salary of the decreased)) or its
equivalent in Philippine currency as death compensation benefits;
II. US$500.00 or its equivalent in Philippine currency as funeral
expenses;
III. US$3,110 or 10% of the total amount recovered as attorney's
fees.
It is also ordered that payment must be made thru the National
Seamen Board within ten (10) days from receipt of this decision.
Petitioners appealed to the Ministry of Labor. On December 11,
1979, the Ministry rendered its decision in this case as follows:
Motion for reconsideration filed by respondents from the Order of this
Board dated 20 June 1979 requiring them to pay complainant, jointly
and severally, the amount of Thirty-four thousand and two hundred
ten dollars ($34,210.00) representing death benefits, funeral
expenses and attorney's fees.
The facts in the main are not disputed. The deceased, husband of
complainant herein, was employed as a Second Engineer by
respondents and served as such in the vessel "M.T. Cherry Earl" until
that fatal day in May 1978 when, while at sea, he suffered an
apoplectic stroke and died four days later or on 29 May 1978. In her
complaint filed before this Board, Abordo argued that the amount of
compensation due her should be based on the law where the vessel
is registered, which is Singapore law. Agreeing with said argument,
this Board issued the questioned Order. Hence this Motion for
Reconsideration.
In their motion for reconsideration, respondents strongly argue that
the law of Singapore should not be applied in the case considering
that their responsibility was not alleged in the complaint that no proof
of the existence of the Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore was
ever presented and that the Board cannot take judicial notice of the
Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore. As an alternative, they
offered to pay complainant the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00) as death benefits based on this Board's Memorandum
Circular No. 25 which, they maintained, should apply in this case.
The only issue we are called upon to rule is whether or not the law of
Singapore ought to be applied in this case.
After an exhaustive study of jurisprudence on the matter. we rule in
the affirmative. Respondents came out with a well-prepared motion
which, to our mind, is more appropriate and perhaps acceptable in
the regular court of justice. Nothing is raised in their motion but
question of evidence. But evidence is usually a matter of procedure
of which this Board, being merely a quasi-judicial body, is not strict
about.
It is true that the law of Singapore was not alleged and proved in the
course of the hearing. And following Supreme Court decisions in a
long line of cases that a foreign law, being a matter of evidence, must
be alleged and proved, the law of Singapore ought not to be
recognized in this case. But it is our considered opinion that the
jurisprudence on this matter was never meant to apply to cases
before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies such as the National
Seamen Board. For well-settled also is the rule that administrative
and quasi-judicial bodies are not bound strictly by technical rules. It
has always been the policy of this Board, as enunciated in a long line
of cases, that in cases of valid claims for benefits on account of injury
or death while in the course of employment, the law of the country in
which the vessel is registered shall be considered. We see no reason
to deviate from this well-considered policy. Certainly not on technical
grounds as movants herein would like us to.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied and
the Order of tills Board dated 20 June 1979 affirmed. Let execution
issue immediately.
In Section 5(B) of the "Employment Agreement" between Norse
Management Co. (PTE) and the late Napoleon B. Abordo, which is
Annex "C" of the Supplemental Complaint, it was stipulated that:
In the event of illness or injury to Employee arising out of and in the
course of his employment and not due to his own willful misconduct
and occurring whilst on board any vessel to which he may be
assigned, but not any other time, the EMPLOYER win provide
employee with free medical attention, including hospital treatment,
also essential medical treatment in the course of repatriation and
until EMPLOYEE's arrival at his point of origin. If such illness or injury
incapacitates the EMPLOYEE to the extent the EMPLOYEE's
services must be terminated as determined by a qualified physician
designated by the EMPLOYER and provided such illness or injury
was not due in part or whole to his willful act, neglect or
misconduct compensation shall be paid to employee in accordance
with and subject to the limitations of the Workmen's Compensation
Act of the Republic of the Philippines or the Workmen's Insurance
Law of registry of the vessel whichever is greater. (Emphasis
supplied)
In the aforementioned "Employment Agreement" between petitioners
and the late Napoleon B. Abordo, it is clear that compensation shall
be paid under Philippine Law or the law of registry of petitioners'
vessel, whichever is greater. Since private respondent Restituta C.
Abordo was offered P30,000.00 only by the petitioners, Singapore
law was properly applied in this case.
The "Employment Agreement" is attached to the Supplemental
Complaint of Restituta C. Abordo and, therefore, it forms part thereof.
As it is familiar with Singapore Law, the National Seamen Board is
justified in taking judicial notice of and in applying that law. In the
case of VirJen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. vs. National
Seamen Board, et al (L41297), the respondent Board promulgated a
decision, as follows:
The facts established and/or admitted by the parties are the
following: that the late Remigio Roldan was hired by the respondent
as Ordinary Seamen on board the M/V "Singapura Pertama," a
vessel of Singapore Registry; that on September 27, 1973, the
deceased Remigio Roldan met an accident resulting in his death
while on board the said M/V "Singapura Pertama" during the
performance of his duties; that on December 3, 1973, the respondent
Virjen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. paid the complainant
Natividad Roldan the amount of P6,000.00 representing Workmen's
Compensation benefits and donations of the company; that the
amount of P4,870 was spent by the respondent company as burial
expenses of the deceased Remegio Roldan.
The only issue therefore remaining to be resolved by the Board in
connection with the particular case, is whether or not under the
existing laws (Philippine and foreign), the complainant Natividad
Roldan is entitled to additional benefits other than those mentioned
earlier. The Board takes judicial notice, (as a matter of fact, the
respondent having admitted in its memorandum) of the fact that
"Singapura Pertama" is a foreign vessel of Singapore Registry and it
is the policy of this Board that in case of award of benefits to seamen
who were either injured in the performance of its duties or who died
while in the course of employment is to consider the benefits allowed
by the country where the vessel is registered. Likewise, the Board
takes notice that Singapore maritime laws relating to workmen's
compensation benefits are similar to that of the Hongkong maritime
laws which provides that in case of death, the heirs of the deceased
seaman should receive the equivalent of 36 months wages of the
deceased seaman; in other words, 36 months multiplied by the basic
monthly wages. In the employment contract submitted with this
Board, the terms of which have never been at issue, is shown that
the monthly salary of the deceased Remigio Roldan at the time of his
death was US$80.00; such that, 36 months multiplied by $80 would
come up to US$2,880 and at the rate of P7.00 to $1.00, the benefits
due the claimant would be P20,160. However, since there was
voluntary payment made in the amount of P6,000 and funeral
expenses which under the Workmen's Compensation Law had a
maximum of P200.00, the amount of P6,200.00 should be deducted
from P20,160 and the difference would be P13,960.00.
WHEREFORE, the Board orders the respondent Virjen Shipping and
Marine Services, Inc. to pay the complainant Natividad Roldan the
amount of P13,960.00 within ten (10) days from receipt of this
Decision. The Board also orders the respondent that payment should
be made through the National Seamen Board.
The foregoing decision was assailed as null and void for allegedly
having been rendered without jurisdiction and for awarding
compensation benefits beyond the maximum allowable and on the
ground of res judicata. This Court in its resolution dated October 27,
1975 and December 12, 1975, respectively dismissed for lack of
merit the petition as well as the motion for reconsideration in said
G.R. No. L- 41297.
Furthermore, Article 20, Labor Code of the Philippines, provides that
the National Seamen Board has original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all matters or cases including money claims, involving employer-
employee relations, arising out of or by virtue of any law or contracts
involving Filipino seamen for overseas employment. Thus, it is safe
to assume that the Board is familiar with pertinent Singapore
maritime laws relative to workmen's compensation. Moreover, the
Board may apply the rule on judicial notice and, "in administrative
proceedings, the technical rules of procedure — particularly of
evidence — applied in judicial trials, do not strictly apply." (Oromeca
Lumber Co. Inc. vs. Social Security Commission, 4 SCRA 1188).
Finally, Article IV of the Labor Code provides that "all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this code,
including its implementing rules and resolved in favor of labor.
HSBC vs SHERMAN G.R. No. 72494 August 11, 1989
Facts
In 1981, Eastern Book Supply Service PTE, Ltd., (Eastern) a
company incorporated in Singapore applied w/, & was granted by the
Singapore branch of HSBC an overdraft facility in the max amount of
Singapore $200,000 (w/c amount was subsequently increased to
Singapore $375,000) w/ interest at 3% over HSBC prime rate,
payable monthly, on amounts due under said overdraft facility. As a
security for the repayment by Eastern of sums advanced by HSBC to
it through the aforesaid overdraft facility, in 1982, Jack Sherman,
Dodato Reloj, and a Robin de Clive Lowe, all of whom were directors
of Eastern at such time, executed a Joint and Several Guarantee in
favor of HSBC whereby Sherman, Reloj and Lowe agreed to pay,
jointly and severally, on demand all sums owed by Eastern to HSBC
under the aforestated overdraft facility.
The Joint and Several Guarantee provides that: “This guarantee and
all rights, obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall be
construed and determined under and may be enforced in accordance
with the laws of the Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree that the
Courts of Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes arising
under this guarantee.”
Eastern failed to pay its obligation. Thus, HSBC demanded payment
of the obligation from Sherman & Reloj, conformably w/ the
provisions of the Joint and Several Guarantee. Inasmuch as
Sherman & Reloj still failed to pay, HSBC filed a complaint for
collection of a sum of money against them. Sherman & Reloj filed a
motion to dismiss on the grounds that (1) the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the complaint, and (2) the court has no
jurisdiction over the person of the defendants.
Issue W/N Philippine courts should have jurisdiction over the suit.
YES
Ruling
Remedial Law; Jurisdiction; A state does not have jurisdiction in the
absence of some reasonable basis for exercising it whether the
proceedings are in rem, quasi in rem or in personam.—While it is
true that “the transaction took place in Singaporean setting” and that
the Joint and Several Guarantee contains a choice-of-forum clause,
the very essence of due process dictates that the stipulation that
“[t]his guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising
hereunder shall be construed and determined under and may be
enforced in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore.
We hereby agree that the Courts in Singapore shall have jurisdiction
over all disputes arising under this guarantee” be liberally construed.
One basic principle underlies all rules of jurisdiction in International
Law: a State does not have jurisdiction in the absence of some
reasonable basis for exercising it, whether the proceedings are in
rem, quasi in rem or in personam. To be reasonable, the jurisdiction
must be based on some minimum contacts that will not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Same; Same; Same; Defense of private respondents that the
complaint should have been filed in Singapore is based merely on
technicality.—The defense of private respondents that the complaint
should have been filed in Singapore is based merely on technicality.
They did not even claim, much less prove, that the filing of the action
here will cause them any unnecessary trouble, damage, or expense.
On the other hand, there is no showing that petitioner BANK filed the
action here just to harass private respondents.
Same; Same; Venue; A stipulation that the parties agree to sue and
be sued in the courts of Manila does not preclude the filing of suits in
the residence of plaintiff or defendant.—In the case of Polytrade
Corporation vs. Blanco, G.R. No. L-27033, October 31, 1969, 30
SCRA 187, it was ruled: “x x x. An accurate reading, however, of the
stipulation, ‘The parties agree to sue and be sued in the Courts of
Manila,’ does not preclude the filing of suits in the residence of
plaintiff or defendant. The plain meaning is that the parties merely
consented to be sued in Manila. Qualifying or restrictive words which
would indicate that Manila and Manila alone is the venue are totally
absent therefrom. We cannot read into that clause that plaintiff and
defendant bound themselves to file suits with respect to the last two
transactions in question only or exclusively in Manila. For, that
agreement did not change or transfer venue. It simply is permissive.
The parties solely agreed to add the courts of Manila sa tribunals to
which they may resort. They did not waive their right to pursue
remedy in the courts specifically mentioned in Section 2(b) of Rule 4.
Renuntiatio non praesumitur.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; In the case at bar, the parties did not
stipulate that only the courts of Singapore to the exclusion of all the
rest has jurisdiction; Jurisdiction defined.—Applying the foregoing to
the case at bar, the parties did not thereby stipulate that only the
courts of Singapore, to the exclusion of all the rest, has jurisdiction.
Neither did the clause in question operate to divest Philippine courts
of jurisdiction. In International Law, jurisdiction is often defined as the
right of a State to exercise authority over persons and things within
its boundaries subject to certain exceptions. Hongkong Shanghai
Banking Corporation vs. Sherman, 176 SCRA 331, G.R. No. 72494
August 11, 1989
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991)
Syllabus
After the respondents Shute, a Washington State couple, purchased
passage on a ship owned by petitioner, a Florida-based cruise line,
petitioner sent them tickets containing a clause designating courts in
Florida as the agreed-upon fora for the resolution of disputes. The
Shutes boarded the ship in Los Angeles, and, while in international
waters off the Mexican coast, Mrs. Shute suffered injuries when she
slipped on a deck mat. The Shutes filed suit in a Washington Federal
District Court, which granted summary judgment for petitioner. The
Court of Appeals reversed, holding, inter alia, that the forum-
selection clause should not be enforced under The Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co., 407 U. S. 1, because it was not "freely bargained for,"
and because its enforcement would operate to deprive the Shutes of
their day in court in light of evidence indicating that they were
physically and financially incapable of pursuing the litigation in
Florida.
Held: The Court of Appeals erred in refusing to enforce the forum-
selection clause. Pp. 499 U. S. 590-597.
(a) The Bremen Court's statement that a freely negotiated forum-
selection clause, such as the one there at issue, should be given full
effect, 407 U.S. at 407 U. S. 12-13, does not support the Court of
Appeals' determination that a nonnegotiated forum clause in a
passage contract is never enforceable simply because it is not the
subject of bargaining. Whereas it was entirely reasonable for The
Bremen Court to have expected the parties to have negotiated with
care in selecting a forum for the resolution of disputes arising from
their complicated international agreement, it would be entirely
unreasonable to assume that a cruise passenger would or could
negotiate the terms of a forum clause in a routine commercial cruise
ticket form. Nevertheless, including a reasonable forum clause in
such a form contract well may be permissible for several reasons.
Because it is not unlikely that a mishap in a cruise could subject a
cruise line to litigation in several different fora, the line has a special
interest in limiting such fora. Moreover, a clause establishing ex
ante the dispute resolution forum has the salutary effect of dispelling
confusion as to where suits may be brought and defended, thereby
sparing litigants time and expense and conserving judicial resources.
Furthermore, it is likely that passengers purchasing tickets
Page 499 U. S. 586
containing a forum clause like the one here at issue benefit in the
form of reduced fares reflecting the savings that the cruise line
enjoys by limiting the fora in which it may be sued. Pp. 499 U. S.
590-594.
(b) The Court of Appeals' conclusion that the clause here at issue
should not be enforced because the Shutes are incapable of
pursuing this litigation in Florida is not justified by The
Bremen Court's statement that
"the serious inconvenience of the contractual forum to one or both of
the parties might carry greater weight in determining the
reasonableness of the forum clause."
Id. at 407 U. S. 17. That statement was made in the context of a
hypothetical "agreement between two Americans to resolve their
essentially local disputes in a remote alien forum." Ibid. Here, in
contrast, Florida is not such a forum, nor -- given the location of Mrs.
Shute's accident -- is this dispute an essentially local one inherently
more suited to resolution in Washington than in Florida. In light of
these distinctions, and because the Shutes do not claim lack of
notice of the forum clause, they have not satisfied the "heavy burden
of proof," ibid. required to set aside the clause on grounds of
inconvenience. Pp. 499 U. S. 594-595.
(c) Although forum selection clauses contained in form passage
contracts are subject to judicial scrutiny for fundamental fairness,
there is no indication that petitioner selected Florida to discourage
cruise passengers from pursuing legitimate claims or obtained the
Shutes' accession to the forum clause by fraud or overreaching.
P. 499 U. S. 595.
(d) By its plain language, the forum selection clause at issue does
not violate 46 U.S.C. App. § 183c, which, inter alia, prohibits a vessel
owner from inserting in any contract a provision depriving a claimant
of a trial "by court of competent jurisdiction" for loss of life or personal
injury resulting from negligence. Pp. 499 U. S. 595-597.
SMALL V. UNITED STATES (03-750) 544 U.S. 385 (2005)
Petitioner Small was convicted in a Japanese Court of trying to
smuggle firearms and ammunition into that country. He served five
years in prison and then returned to the United States, where he
bought a gun. Federal authorities subsequently charged Small
under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which forbids “any person …convicted
in any court … of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year … to … possess … any firearm.” (Emphasis
added.) Small pleaded guilty while reserving the right to challenge his
conviction on the ground that his earlier conviction, being foreign, fell
outside §922(g)(1)’s scope. The Federal District Court and the Third
Circuit rejected this argument.
Held: Section 922(g)(1)’s phrase “convicted in any court”
encompasses only domestic, not foreign, convictions. Pp. 2—9.
(a) In considering the scope of the phrase “convicted in any court”
it is appropriate to assume that Congress had domestic concerns in
mind. This assumption is similar to the legal presumption that
Congress ordinarily intends its statutes to have domestic, not
extraterritorial, application, see, e.g., Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336
U.S. 281, 285. The phrase “convicted in any court” describes one
necessary portion of the “gun possession” activity that is prohibited
as a matter of domestic law. Moreover, because foreign convictions
may include convictions for conduct that domestic laws would
permit, e.g., for engaging in economic conduct that our society might
encourage, convictions from a legal system that are inconsistent with
American understanding of fairness, and convictions for conduct that
domestic law punishes far less severely, the key statutory phrase
“convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year” somewhat less reliably identifies
dangerous individuals for the purposes of U.S. law where foreign
convictions, rather than domestic convictions, are at issue. In
addition, it is difficult to read the statute as asking judges or
prosecutors to refine its definitional distinctions where foreign
convictions are at issue. To somehow weed out inappropriate foreign
convictions that meet the statutory definition is not consistent with the
statute’s language; it is not easy for those not versed in foreign laws
to accomplish; and it would leave those previously convicted in a
foreign court (say of economic crimes) uncertain about their legal
obligations. These considerations provide a convincing basis for
applying the ordinary assumption about the reach of domestically
oriented statutes here. Thus, the Court assumes a congressional
intent that the phrase “convicted in any court” applies domestically,
not extraterritorially, unless the statutory language, context, history,
or purpose shows the contrary. Pp. 2—5.
 (b) There is no convincing indication to the contrary here. The
statute’s language suggests no intent to reach beyond domestic
convictions. To the contrary, if read to include foreign convictions, the
statute’s language creates anomalies. For example, in creating an
exception allowing gun possession despite a conviction for an
antitrust or business regulatory crime, §921(a)(20)(A) speaks of
“Federal or State” antitrust or regulatory offenses. If the phrase
“convicted in any court” generally refers only to domestic convictions,
this language causes no problem. But if the phrase includes foreign
convictions, the words “Federal or State” prevent the exception from
applying where a foreign antitrust or regulatory conviction is at issue.
Such illustrative examples suggest that Congress did not consider
whether the generic phrase “convicted in any court” applies to foreign
convictions. Moreover, the statute’s legislative history indicates no
intent to reach beyond domestic convictions. Although the statutory
purpose of keeping guns from those likely to become a threat to
society does offer some support for reading §922(g)(1) to include
foreign convictions, the likelihood that Congress, at best, paid no
attention to the matter is reinforced by the empirical fact that,
according to the Government, since 1968, there have fewer than a
dozen instances in which such a foreign conviction has served as a
predicate for a felon-in-possession prosecution. Pp. 5—8.
WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs. MARIA CARMEN D.
RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA,
Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents.
G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003
Facts
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen, married private
respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in
Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14,
1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their union were born
Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine.
Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the
Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC). Wolfgang filed a motion to
dismiss, but it was denied.
Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of
First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese. Said decree also provides
that the parental custody of the children should be vested to
Wolfgang.
Wolfgang filed another motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as a
divorce decree had already been promulgated, and said motion was
granted by Public Respondent RTC Judge Salonga.
Carmen filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that
the case proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of
custody of children and the distribution of the properties between her
and Wolfgang. Judge Salonga partially set aside her previous order
for the purpose of tackling the issues of support and custody of their
children.
Issue Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her
discretion when she assumed and retained jurisdiction over the
present case despite the fact that petitioner has already obtained a
divorce decree from a German court.
Ruling
In Garcia v. Recio,19 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.,20 and Llorente v. Court
of Appeals,21 we consistently held that a divorce obtained abroad by
an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree
is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Relevant to the
present case is Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,22 where this Court specifically
recognized the validity of a divorce obtained by a German citizen in
his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. We held in Pilapil that
a foreign divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated
December 16, 1997 has not been challenged by either of the parties.
In fact, save for the issue of parental custody, even the trial court
recognized said decree to be valid and binding, thereby endowing
private respondent the capacity to remarry. Thus, the present
controversy mainly relates to the award of the custody of their two
children, Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner.
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other
countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects
thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still
be determined by our courts.23Before our courts can give the effect of
res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to
petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties
opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so
on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court
(now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is
conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be
repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the
foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly
determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly
provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished
from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima
facieevidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is
subject to proof to the contrary.24
In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was
given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court
so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with
regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody of their two
children. The proceedings in the German court were summary. As to
what was the extent of private respondent’s participation in the
proceedings in the German court, the records remain unclear. The
divorce decree itself states that neither has she commented on the
proceedings25 nor has she given her opinion to the Social Services
Office.26 Unlike petitioner who was represented by two lawyers,
private respondent had no counsel to assist her in said
proceedings.27 More importantly, the divorce judgment was issued to
petitioner by virtue of the German Civil Code provision to the effect
that when a couple lived separately for three years, the marriage is
deemed irrefutably dissolved. The decree did not touch on the issue
as to who the offending spouse was. Absent any finding that private
respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court
was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of
parental custody, care, support and education mindful of the best
interests of the children. This is in consonance with the provision in
the Child and Youth Welfare Code that the child’s welfare is always
the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and
custody. 28