Legal Ethics Loanzon 2016 PDF

ChanRobles Internet Bar Review : ChanRobles Professional Review, Inc.
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POINTERS IN LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS
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PART A: THE VELASCO CASES
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THE LAWYER AS A MEMBER OF SOCIETY
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CORAZON T. NEVADA v. ATTY. RODOLFO D. CASUGA (A.C. No. 7591, March 20,
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2012)
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Question: Can a lawyer who entered into a contract of lease with a third person be held liable for
representing himself as the Administrator of his client’s hotel without having a Special Power of
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Attorney executed in his favor?
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Answer: Yes. The lawyer can be held liable for gross misconduct. Gross misconduct is a
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transgression of some established or definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior
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or gross negligence, or the corrupt or persistent violation of the law or disregard of well-known
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legal rules.
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The acts of misrepresenting himself to be authorized to enter into a contract of lease, and even
be found liable.
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receiving the benefits of the said contract constitute gross misconduct. Therefore, the lawyer can
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FIDUCIARY DUTY UNDER CANON 16, CPR
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Question: Ms. Corazon Nevada delivered to Atty. Casuga pieces of jewelries worth more than
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P300,000.00 in the course of her dealings with him. She asked him to sell them on her behalf.
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However, despite repeated demands, Atty. Casuga failed to deliver back to Ms. Nevada the
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jewelries or the proceeds of the sale.
relationship between them?

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Can Ms. Nevada file a disbarment case against her Atty. Casuga even if there is no lawyer-client
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Answer: Yes. Rule 16.03 of the CPR demands that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
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properties of his client that may come into his possession. The lawyer was duty-bound to return
them upon demand. The absence of a lawyer-client relationship between Atty. Casuga and
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Corazon does not exonerate the former. Both the CPR and case law penalize not only
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malpractice and dishonesty in the profession, but also gross misconduct not connected with the
professional duties of the lawyer.
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Therefore, Atty. Casuga can be held accountable for breach of his fiduciary duty.
UPHOLDING THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION

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VICTORIA C. HEENAN v. ATTY. ERLINA ESPEJO (A.C. NO. 10050, December 3, 2013)
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Question: Can a lawyer be held administratively liable for issuing worthless checks?
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Answer: Yes. Lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to
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the courts and to their clients. The fact that the lawyer obtained the loan and issued the worthless
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checks in her private capacity and not as an attorney of the complainant is of no moment.
Therefore, for issuing worthless checks, the lawyer may be held administratively accountable.
(Lawyer was suspended for three years. She died while serving her suspension.)
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www.chanroblesbar.com : www.chanroblesbar.com.ph
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Question: Can a lawyer borrow money from his client without crossing ethical boundaries?
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Answer: No. As a general rule, a lawyer should not borrow money from his client. Canon 16.04
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of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s
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interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
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Reason: The lawyer’s duty to society demands his uprightness in his dealings with third persons.
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non-professional or private capacity, the Court may be justified in suspending or removing him
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as an attorney where his misconduct outside of the lawyer’s professional dealings is so gross in
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character as to show him morally unfit and unworthy of the privilege which his license and the
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law confer.
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Question: What circumstances may warrant a more severe penalty upon a lawyer in disbarment
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proceedings where the complaint includes a criminal offense committed by the lawyer against
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the complainant?
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Answer: The following circumstances may warrant a severe penalty in disbarment proceeding:
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1. unjustified refusal to obey the orders of the IBP directing the lawyer to file an answer to
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the complaint;
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2. failure to appear at the scheduled mandatory conference before the Investigating
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3. blatant refusal to heed the directives of the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office for her to file
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her counter-affidavit in a criminal case.
The above acts violate Canon 10.03: Failure to observe rules of procedure.
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DISBARMENT PROCEEDING IS SUI GENERIS
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Question: Can a disbarment case be filed against the lawyer while a criminal case remains
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pending which arose from the same commission of a deplorable act by the lawyer?
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Answer: Yes. A disbarment case is sui generis in nature. Thus, a disbarment case can proceed
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simultaneously with the criminal case instituted against the lawyer. To sustain a conviction in a
criminal case, the prosecution must establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt while in a
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disbarment case, only preponderance of evidence is required.
LAWYER SHOULD NOT BORROW MONEY FROM HIS CLIENT (CANON 16.04)
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SPS. AMADOR and ROSITA TEJADA v. ATTY. ANTONIUTTI K. PALAA (A.C. No.
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7434, August 23, 2007)
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Question: Atty. Palaa borrowed from Sps. Tejada the amount of P100K with interest of P70K
payable in three months to allow him to reconstitute the title of his real property.
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After the lapse of three months without fulfilling his promise to pay the principal of his loan and
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its interest, Sps. Amador asked Atty. Palaa to settle his obligation. The demands remain
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unheeded. Can Atty. Palaa be held administratively liable for not settling his loan despite
persistent demand from the creditor-spouses?
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Answer: Yes. The complainants could not have been defrauded without the representations of
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respondent. A promise of a high interest convinced the complainants to give a loan of P100K to
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respondent lawyer. He knew that his representations were false since the filing fee for a petition
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for reconstitution and other expenses including the publication of the filing of the petition could
not have cost more than P20,000. It is clear that he employed deceit in convincing complainants
to part with their hard earned money; and the latter could not have been easily swayed to lend the
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money were it not for his misrepresentations and failed promises as a member of the bar.
Therefore, Atty. Palaa is liable for not paying his just obligation.
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COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARDS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES
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Question: Can a Senator who is also a lawyer in her privilege speech refer to the justices of the
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Supreme Court as a court of idiots without incurring any administrative liability?
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Answer: Yes. Senator Santiago’s privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a
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disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. She is covered by her parliamentary immunity
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but the Court reminded the Senator that as a member of the bar, she is sworn to give respect to
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the Court.
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Question: Is a member of Congress bound the Canons of Professional Responsibility?
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(N.B. Please refer to Canon 6, Code of Professional Responsibility)
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Answer: Yes. Lawyers in public service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with the
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higher degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice.
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Thus, a member of Congress can be found guilty of violating Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11
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of the Code of Professional Responsibility if a disrespectful utterance is made against the court.
As a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, a member of Congress is duty-
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bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the Court and to maintain the respect due to the
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bench.
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CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TOWARDS THE COURTS
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ANTONIO CONLU v. ATTY. IRENEO AREDONIA, JR. (A.C. No. 4955, September 12,
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2011)
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Question: Can a client file an administrative complaint against a lawyer after the former
discovered that the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for non-filing of the appellant’s brief
within the reglamentary period?
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DUTY TO SERVE CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE
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Answer: Yes. The Court said that it must be remembered that a retained counsel is expected to
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serve the client with competence and diligence. This duty includes not merely reviewing the
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cases entrusted to the counsel’s care and giving the client sound legal advice, but also properly
representing the client in court, attending scheduled hearings, preparing and filing required
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pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination
without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so. The lawyer should not be
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sitting idly by and leave the rights of the client in a state of uncertainty. The failure to file a
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brief resulting in the dismissal of an appeal constitutes inexcusable negligence. This default
translates to a violation of the injunction of Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
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Professional Responsibility.
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CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TOWARDS THE COURTS
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Question: What is the liability of a lawyer who tried to mislead the court as to the date of actual
receipt of the decision?
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Answer: By his act, the lawyer had indulged in deliberate falsehood, contrary to the self-
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explanatory prescriptions of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01.
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The lawyer should be penalized for his lack of candor to the court when he tried to mislead the
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appellate court about the receipt of a copy of its decision. (The act was done to make it appear
that a timely appeal was filed.)
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Question: What is the remedy of the Supreme Court when a lawyer continues to refuse its order
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for him to comment on the disbarment case filed against him?
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Answer: The Supreme Court may order the National Bureau of Investigation to arrest the defiant
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lawyer at his last known address or in any other place where he may be found.
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EVERY CASE MUST RISE AND FALL ON ITS MERITS
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ERLINDA I. BILDNER and MAXIMO K. ILUSORIO v. ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO,
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RAMON K. ILUSORIO, MARIETTA K. ILUSORIO, SHEREEN K. ILUSORIO, CECILIA A.
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BISUA, and ATTY. MANUEL R. SINGSON (G.R. No. 157384, June 5, 2009)
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Question: Can a lawyer be a subject of a disbarment proceeding for attempting to bribe a judge
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to secure a favorable judgment?
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refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence or gives the appearance of
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influencing the court. The possibility of an attempted bribery is not far from reality considering
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lawyer’s persistent phone calls to the judge.
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EVERY CASE MUST RISE AND FALL ON ITS MERITS
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Question: What would be an appropriate remedy upon a lawyer who attempted to bribe a judge
in order to secure a favorable ruling?
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Answer: Heeding the injunction against decreeing disbarment where a lesser sanction would
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suffice to accomplish the desired end, a suspension for one year from the practice of law was
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found to be appropriate in a case when the lawyer attempted to bribe a judge.
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DUTY OF SHERIFF WHEN COURT ISSUES AN ORDER OF ATTACHMENT
September 12, 2008)

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ATTY. RICARDO M. SALOMON, JR. v. ATTY. JOSELITO FRIAL (A.C. No. 7820,
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Question: Atty. Frial was the counsel of Lucy Lo (complainant) in a case against Atty.
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Salomon (defendant). A writ of attachment was issued in favor of Lo for Salomon’s Volvo and
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Nissan Sentra. In a complaint for disbarment, Atty. Salomon alleged that the attaching sheriff of
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Manila turned over the attached vehicles to Atty. Frial without any authority from the court.
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Was the action of the sheriff proper?
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DUTY OF SHERIFF WHEN COURT ISSUES AN ORDER OF ATTACHMENT
Answer: No. The sheriff’s action was not proper. The sheriff must deposit any object which has
been ordered attached to the premises of the court.
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Therefore, the sheriff can be a subject of an administrative case for violation of his duty.
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LAWYER’S DUTY AS CUSTODIAN OF ATTACHED ITEMS
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Question: A lawyer assumed responsibility to take custody of two vehicles which were covered
by a court order. Unfortunately, one of the vehicles caught fire. The lawyer never informed the
this unfortunate incident?

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court that one of the attached vehicles was now a total wreck. Can the lawyer be held liable for
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Answer: Yes. He is guilty of grave misconduct arising from his violation of Canon 16 of the
CPR which provides that “money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property
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coming into the profession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and
should not under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him.”
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Therefore, he is guilty of violating his fiduciary duty. Fiduciary duty includes the task of
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ensuring any property held in favor the client is adequately preserved.
Reason: A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. As such, he is expected to respect
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the court’s order and processes. He miserably fell short of his duties as such officer. He trifled
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with the writ of attachment the court issued. He was remiss in his obligation of taking good care
of the attached cars. He also allowed the use of the Nissan Sentra car by persons who had no
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business using it. He did not inform the court or at least the sheriff of the destruction of the
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Volvo car. What is worse is that he took custody of the attached vehicles without so much as
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informing the court, let alone securing, its authority.
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THE LAWYER AS A NOTARY PUBLIC
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CORAZON T. NEVADA v. ATTY. RODOLFO D. CASUGA (A.C. No. 7591, March 20,
2012)
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the company which entered into a contract of lease with a tenant with the same company?
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Answer: No. The notarial law disqualifies a notary public from performing a notarial act if he or
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she is a party to the instrument or document. When he notarized the same contract without
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qualification that he signed it as a stockholder of the company, he went against the function of a
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Notary Public to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangement.
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Therefore, the lawyer violated his commission as a Notary Public.
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DOLORES L. DELA CRUZ, MILAGROS L. PRINCIPE, NARCISA L. FAUSTINO,
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JORGE V. LEGASPI and JUANITO V. LEGASPI v. ATTY. JOSE R. DIMAANO, JR.
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(A.C. No. 7781, September 12, 2008)
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Question: Atty. Dimaano notarized an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of
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Rights where the complainants’ signatures were forged; they did not appear nor acknowledged
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the same before Atty. Dimaano as notarizing officer; and the community tax certificates in the
document were not theirs. Can Atty. Dimaano be subjected to disciplinary action for his lapses
as a Notary Public?
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Answer: Yes. Atty. Dimaano violated the 2004 Notarial Law. A Notary Public should refrain
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from affixing his signature and notarial seal on a document unless the persons who signed it
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are the same individuals who executed and personally appeared before the notary public to
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attest to the truth of what are stated therein. Without the appearance of the person who actually
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executed the document in question, a notary public would be unable to verify the genuineness of
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the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party’s free
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act or deed. The document requires that proper formalities be strictly observed.
Question: What are the formalities required before a Notary Public can affix his signature to a
notarial deed which requires acknowledgment?
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Answer: The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice now requires a party to the instrument to present
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(a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the
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photograph and signature of the individual; and
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(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document
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or transaction who is personally known to the notary public; and who personally knows
the individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument,
notary public competent proof of identity.

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document or transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows to the
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The Notary Public must ascertain the identities of the affiant(s) and the witnesses to the
document. He must also ensure that all parties must sign on the left side margin of each and
every page of the document.
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The details of the notarized document must be recorded in the notarial register (Notarial Book)
of the commissioned lawyer.
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DISCIPLINE OF JUDGES: QUALITIES OF COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE
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RICKY GARAY, et al. v. JUDGE NICASIO BARTOLOME (A.M. No. MTJ-08-1703,
June 17, 2008)
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Question: Complainants are the accused in a criminal case wherein they were charged with
qualified theft of bus starters and different tools amounting to P187,000. Judge Nicasio
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Bartolome, the MTC judge presiding over the case, issued a warrant of arrest against them and
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detained them in the provincial jail. Was the judge correct in assuming jurisdiction of the case?
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DISCIPLINE OF JUDGES
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Answer: No. The respondent judge should have not assumed jurisdiction because at the time
the case was instituted the amount involved is P187,000 which is beyond the jurisdiction of
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a first level court. The respondent judge exhibited his unfamiliarity with the Rules on Criminal
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Procedure. He is guilty of violating Sections 3 and 5, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
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Procedure. He also betrayed his lack of competence which is a constitutional qualification for a
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member of the judiciary. He likewise violated Canon 6 of the Code of Judicial Conduct on
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Competence and Diligence.
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Question: Respondent judge took more than three (3) months to issue the Joint Resolution
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ordering the return of the cases to the provincial prosecutor for further preliminary investigation.
The rule mandates that he should resolve this issue within a period of ten (10) days. Was the
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action of the judge proper?
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Answer: No. The Rules on Criminal Procedure requires a judge to submit his resolution of the
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case within ten (10) days after the preliminary investigation and transmit the resolution of the
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case to the provincial or city prosecutor. There is no question that the judge took inordinate delay
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of three (3) months in submitting his resolution of the preliminary investigation. He violated
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Canon 6 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which requires the qualities of competence and
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diligence.
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Question: Under the foregoing facts, what liability did the respondent judge incur?
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Answer: The judge betrayed his gross ignorance of the law. When a judge shows utter
unfamiliarity with fundamental rules and procedures, he contributes to the erosion of public
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confidence in the judicial system. Ignorance of the law is a mainspring of injustice.
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When judges show professional incompetence, and are ignorant of basic and fundamental rules,
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they are guilty of gross ignorance of the law and procedures. This is a serious charge under Sec.
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8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
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Sec. 11(A) of Rule 140 punishes the offense. He also violated Canon 6 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct on competence and diligence.
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JOSEFINA NAGUIAT v. JUDGE MARIO B. CAPELLAN, PRESIDING JUDGE, MTCC,
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BR. 1, MALOLOS CITY, BULACAN (A.M. No. MTJ-11-1782 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-
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1807-MTJ], March 23, 2011)
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Question: An ejectment case was filed before the MTC. On its face, the allegations do not
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constitute any ground for the court to take jurisdiction. What action must the judge take under
the premises?
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Answer: The judge must dismiss the case. In ejectment cases, the first duty of a judge is to
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examine the allegations in the complaint and the evidence appended to it, and to dismiss the case
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outright on any of the grounds apparent in the allegations and order the dismissal of a civil
action.
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If there is a ground for dismissal existing and apparent upon the filing of the complaint, and yet
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the judge allowed the case to unnecessarily drag on, the judge is guilty of undue delay in
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rendering a decision. (Canon 6 on Competence and Diligence, Code of Judicial Conduct)
Question: What would constitute undue delay in rendering a decision or order?
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Answer: Undue delay in rendering a judgment exists where a ground for dismissing the civil
case was patent on the face of the allegations and yet the judge did not dismiss the case
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outright. Also, when the representative’s lack of personality was reflected in the corporate
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secretary's certificate appended to the complaint and yet, respondent judge allowed the case to
unnecessarily drag on for more than five years.
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QUESTION: What would be a reasonable penalty for the administrative offense of undue delay
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in rendering judgment?
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ANSWER: A judge who allowed several and doubtless unnecessary postponements which
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contributed to the delay in the resolution of what was otherwise a simple case may be subjected
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to a monetary fine. The Court held that undue delay in rendering a decision or order constitutes a
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less serious offense for which respondent judge is subjected to a fine. (Violation of Canon 6,
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Competence and Diligence, Code of Judicial Conduct)
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RE: LETTER-COMPLAINT OF ATTY. ARIEL SAMSON C. CAYETUNA, ET AL., ALL
EMPLOYEES OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MICHAEL P. ELBINIAS against
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ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MICHAEL P. ELBINIAS, CA - Mindanao Station (A.M. OCA IPI
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No. 08-127-CA-J, January 11, 2011) REMINDER: VERY IMPORTANT CASE PLEASE
READ CAREFULLY ALL RELATED QUESTIONS
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*Question: How may an administrative complaint be initiated against a judge?
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Answer: Sec. 1 Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides for the ways on how to institute
administrative proceedings against judges. Under this rule, the three ways to initiate the
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complaint are:
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First, motu proprio by the Supreme Court;
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Second, upon verified complaint with affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the
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facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said allegations; or
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Third, upon an anonymous complaint supported by public records of indubitable integrity.
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*Question: Certain employees of the Court of Appeals filed a letter-complaint against a justice
of the court for: Gross Inefficiency; Bribe Solicitation; Drinking Liquor in Office Premises;
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Personal Use of Government Property and Resources; Falsification of a Favored Employee’s
Daily Time Record; Disrespect Towards fellow Justices; Oppression through Intemperate,
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Oppressive and Threatening Language; and Grave Abuse of Authority.
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The letter-complaint was signed by all the complaining employees but was not verified. Will
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the case prosper?
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Answer: No. An unverified letter-complaint cannot be a basis of an administrative complaint
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against a judge. Under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, an administrative case against a
judge must be verified.
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A complainant must attest to his personal knowledge of the allegations embodied in his verified
letter-complaint.
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*Question: Can the Court take cognizance of an anonymous letter-complaint against a judge?
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Answer: Yes. In Sinsuat v. Hidalgo, the Court took cognizance of the unverified motion and
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subsequent letters of complainants submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator since the
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unverified complaint was properly considered as an anonymous complaint and the
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material allegations were not only admitted by respondent judge but are also verifiable
from public records of indubitable integrity, i.e., records of the trial court, as aptly found by
the CA.
PROSECUTOR JORGE D. BACULI v. JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN, RTC, BR.
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36, CALAMBA CITY, LAGUNA (A.M. No. RTJ-09-2179, September 24, 2012)
Question: Prosecutor Baculi filed information for qualified theft against Capacete but Judge
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Belen dismissed the case. In the Motion for Reconsideration, Prosecutor Baculi stated: “The
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dismissal of the information by the court was motivated by hatred, ill-will, and prejudice
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against Asst. State Prosecutor II Jorge Baculi, the Investigating Prosecutor at the
Preliminary Investigation.”
Judge Belen found Baculi guilty of direct contempt and indirect contempt for the contemptuous
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nature of the pleadings he filed.
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Baculi filed an administrative case against Judge Belen because the judge did not allow him to
air his side for his alleged contemptuous conduct. Will the case prosper?
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Answer: NO, Judge Belen is not administratively liable. The complainant has not presented any
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credible evidence to support his allegations. The fact that Judge Belen had initiated contempt
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proceedings against him, and in fact convicted him in such contempt proceedings, does not by
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itself amount to ill motives on the part of Judge Belen.
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*N.B. The primary responsibility of a prosecutor is not to convict but to serve the ends of
justice.
R o GEOFFREY BECKETT v. JUDGE OLEGARIO R. SARMIENTO, JR., Regional Trial

Court, Branch 24, Cebu City (A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326, January 30, 2013)
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Question: Despite the approval of a compromise agreement in the annulment of marriage
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between spouses Beckett, the presiding judge in a subsequent habeas corpus proceeding, ordered
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provisional custody of the minor child to the mother when the agreement awarded custody to the
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father. Was the judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law?
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Answer: No. Gross ignorance of the law on the part of a judge presupposes an appalling lack of
familiarity with simple rules of law or procedures and well-established jurisprudence which
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tends to erode the public trust in the competence and fairness of the court which he
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Not to know the law as basic, almost elementary, as the Rules of Court, or acting in disregard of
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established rule of law as if he were not aware of the same constitutes gross ignorance whence
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no one is excused, especially an RTC judge.
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However, the respondent judge, in granting provisional custody over Geoffrey, Jr. in favor of his
mother, Eltesa, did not disregard the res judicata rule nor was he impartial.
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OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. HON. LEODEGARIO C. QUILATAN
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(A.M. No. MTJ-09-1745, September 27, 2010)
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Question: Prior to his retirement, the OCA found Judge Quilatan liable for gross inefficiency for
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failure to decide the 34 cases submitted for decision within the required period. The OCA
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recommended that the erring judge be fined fifty thousand pesos (PhP 50,000). Is Judge
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Quilatan is guilty of gross inefficiency?
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Answer: Yes. The Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for judges to resolve their cases
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with dispatch. Delay does not only constitute a serious violation of the parties’ constitutional
right to speedy disposition of cases, it also erodes the faith and confidence of the people in
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the judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it into disrepute. Without doubt, Judge
Quilatan violated his mandate when he failed to decide 34 cases within three (3) months from
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their submission, for which he should be administratively sanctioned. (Violation of Canon 6,
Competence and Diligence)
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DISQUALIFICATION/INHIBITION OF JUDGES
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JIMMY T. GO v. ALBERTO T. LOOYUKO (G.R. No. 147923, October 26, 2007)
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Question: During the pendency of the criminal case, the prosecution on behalf of Go, wanted to
present certain witnesses to strengthen the case of the prosecution. However, the trial court felt
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no need for the testimonies of the aforementioned witnesses. This prompted Go to file an
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administrative complaint against Judge Nemesio Felix for partiality.
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The CA dismissed the complaint of Go. Go failed to establish the partiality of the presiding
judge when it limited the number witnesses. It rationalized that Judge Felix had the discretion to
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inhibit himself from the case unless the ground for his inhibition is that which calls for
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mandatory inhibition of the same and in this case no such ground exists. Go insists that there is a
valid ground to inhibit the judge. Is his contention tenable?
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Answer: None. There is no valid ground to inhibit the judge as there was no manifest partiality. o
an
Indeed, the adverse rulings on the denial of the proposed testimonies of the prosecution’s
witnesses are judicial in nature. Absent proof that the trial court judge had acted in a wanton,
whimsical or oppressive manner or for an illegal consideration, and similar reasons, in
on the case.
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giving undue advantage to respondent, inhibition is not a remedy to oust the judge from sitting
8|Page
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Second, the other two (2) grounds raised by petitioner are also baseless. It is an age old rule in
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civil cases that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not
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evidence.
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JOHNWELL W. TIGGANGAY v. JUDGE MARCELINO K. WACAS, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 25, Tabuk City, Kalinga (A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3243-RTJ, April 1, 2013)
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Question: Complainant charged Judge Wacas of Impropriety and Partiality for not inhibiting
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himself in the case alleging that he is Dagadag’s second cousin by affinity, the former’s aunt is
married to an uncle of Dagadag.
n a r
Tiggangay made the allegation on the basis of "some reliable sources," not from his personal
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knowledge. Judge Wacas maintained that Tiggangay never moved for his inhibition during the
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entire proceedings. Should the judge inhibit himself under the foregoing facts cited by
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complainant?
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Answer: No. In administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that respondent committed the
acts complained of rests on the complainant. In the instant case, Tiggangay failed to present
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substantial evidence to prove his allegations. One who alleges a fact has the burden of proof and
mere allegation is not evidence.
an a r
N.B. As a general rule, the objection for the judge to inhibit himself must be raised during the
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trial and not after the judge had rendered an adverse ruling against the complainant.
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Reason: Granting arguendo that the aunt of Judge Wacas is married to the uncle of respondent
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Dagadag, such reality is not a ground for the mandatory inhibition of a Judge as required under
Sec. 1of Rule 137, Revised Rules of Procedure, since there is actually no relation of affinity
o b
between Judge Wacas and Dagadag. Indeed, "there is no affinity between the blood relatives of
one spouse and the blood relatives of the other. A husband is related by affinity to his wife’s
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brother, but not to the wife of his wife’s brother. There is no affinity between the husband’s
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brother and the wife’s sister.
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Ch s
POWERS AND DUTIES OF JUDICIAL OFFICERS
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ATTY. VIRGILIO P. ALCONERA v. ALFREDO T. PALLANAN (A.M. No. P-12-3069,
e
b
January 20, 2014)
o
Question: Complainant asked respondent sheriff not to execute an adverse decision since he has
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not yet received a copy of the denial of the motion from the adverse judgment
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Despite his plea, respondent sheriff still pushed through with the execution of the judgment and
in enforcing, allegedly uttered words degrading to the reputation of the complainant. The lawyer
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filed a Complaint-Affidavit against the respondent sheriff for grave misconduct. Is the
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respondent sheriff guilty of grave misconduct?
Answer: Yes, the respondent should be penalized for discourtesy in the performance of his
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official duties. As a public officer and a trustee for the public, it is the ever existing responsibility
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of respondent to demonstrate courtesy and civility in his official actuations with the public.
R
Public service requires integrity and discipline. At all times, employees of the judiciary are
n
expected to accord respect to the person and the rights of another, even a co-employee. Their
a
every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy and dignity.
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JUDGE PELAGIA DALMACIO-JOAQUIN v. NICOMEDES C. DELA CRUZ, Process
Server, MTCC, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan (A.M. No. P-07-2321, April 24, 2009)
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Question: After complainant judge left her office a few minutes before 5:00 p.m., security guard
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reported to her that process server Dela Cruz allegedly arrived in the office, apparently drunk,
and hurled invectives while pointing his fingers at other employees present. Afterwards,
o b
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respondent process server attempted to punch one of them. Can the judge institute an
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administrative complaint against Dela Cruz?
Answer: Yes. However, respondent’s act can only be regarded as simple misconduct since it
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has no direct relation to the performance of his official duties. Respondent committed
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misconduct when he verbally abused his co-employees and appeared at his place of work drunk.
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Drinking during office hours may constitute misconduct and is prohibited under the Civil Service
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Rules. Drinking undermines efficiency and is counter-productive. It generates an unwholesome
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consequence on a public servant. And when the culprit is an employee of the court, the image of
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the judiciary as a whole cannot but be affected.
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o
RETIREMENT OF A HIGH RANKING EMPLOYEE OF THE JUDICIARY
R In Re: Expiration of Fixed Term of Office of Atty. Saaduddin A. Alauya, Office of the
n r
Jurisconsult, Zamboanga City (A.M. No. 11238-Ret, August 18, 2015)
B a
Question: In a Resolution, the Court denied Atty. Alauya’s request for a lifetime monthly
pension enjoyed by RTC judges. Alauya moved for reconsideration and argued that the Court en
s
banc conferred upon him the rank and privileges of a Regional Trial Court (RTC) judge effective
e
l
October 1996. Armed with this resolution, he claimed that he should enjoy the same retirement
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benefits extended to judges. Is the legal argument of Alauya tenable?
o
Answer: Yes. Time and again, the Court has followed the practice of liberal treatment in passing
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upon retirement issues and claims, particularly of judges and justices, obviously in keeping with
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the beneficial intendment of retirement laws which is to reward satisfactory past services. At the
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same time, these measures provide the retiree with the means to support himself and his family
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in his remaining years. On several occasions, the Court has liberally interpreted retirement laws
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in keeping with its purpose.
s
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Reason: In Government Service Insurance System v. De Leon: The Court held that retirement
laws, in particular, are liberally construed in favor of the retiree because their objective is to
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provide for the retiree’s sustenance and, hopefully, even comfort, when he no longer has the
capability to earn a livelihood. The liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes
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of the law in order that efficiency, security, and well-being of government employees may be
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enhanced.
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Reason: Indeed, retirement laws are liberally construed and administered in favor of the
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persons intended to be benefited, and all doubts are resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve
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their humanitarian purpose. Upon the foregoing perspective, the term “privileges of an RTC
e
l
judge” and the conferment thereof must be considered as covering the retirement benefits under
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RA 910, meaning a lump-sum payment of five years’ salary and a monthly pension until death
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after the 5-year period.
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PART B: CONCEPTS, BASIC PRINCIPLES AND OTHER LEADING
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JURISPRUDENCE
PART ONE – LEGAL ETHICS
B a
C hI –The Attorney’s Oath
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e
Q. Write the Attorney’s Oath
b l
A. “I, ________________ do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines;
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I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein;
I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court;
a n
h
I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, neither
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give aid nor consent to the same;
I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the
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best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients;
and
I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion. So help me God.” (Rules of Court, Form 28)
R o
an
Q. What are the sources of ethical standards for the members of the bench and bar?
h
A. (1) Constitution Article VIII – The Judicial Department, Sec. 5(5),
Article VI – The Legislative Department, Sec.14,
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Article VII – The Executive Department, Sec. 13,
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Article IX – Constitutional Commissions, IX-A, Sec. 2;
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(2) The Attorney’s Oath;
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(3) The Code of Professional Responsibility;
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(4) The Code of Judicial Ethics;
(5) The Rules of Court; (6) 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice;
R
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(7) MCLE Rules;
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(8) JBC Rules;
(9) Issuances of the Supreme Court;
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(10) Legislations from Congress (creation and jurisdiction of appellate and other lower courts,
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also the Lapid Law on legal aid service of lawyers);
o b
(11) Jurisprudence; and
(12) Scholarly Writings on Legal and Judicial Ethics.
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Q. What is the four-fold duty of a lawyer?
an a r
A. The Four-fold duty of a lawyer - to Society, the Legal Profession, the Courts and Clients.
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Q. What is the practice of law?
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C e s
A. The practice of law is performing “any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
l
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.” Paguia v. Office of the
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President, 621 SCRA 600
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Q. What is the privilege of the practice of law?
R
A. The practice of law is a mere privilege and not a right. The admission of lawyers and the rules
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governing the practice of law is a constitutional mandate given to the Supreme Court. Elements
a
of the legal profession are: organization, learning, and the spirit of public service. (Section 5 (5),
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Article VIII, Constitution)
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Cayetano v. Monsod (G. R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991, 201 SCRA 210): The practice of
preparation of documents and the giving of legal advice.

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law is not limited to appearances in court as a litigator but also the work of a corporate lawyer in
o b
Paguia v. Office of the President (621 SCRA 600): A lawyer suspended from the practice of law
is precluded from applying his knowledge of law in and out of court while undergoing his
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suspension. A suspended lawyer cannot even appear on behalf of a relative as a “friend” because
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he would inevitably apply his knowledge of the law.
Q. What is included in the practice of law?
B a
h
A. The practice of law includes: the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to
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actions and special proceedings; conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds;
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and the giving of all legal advice to clients.
o b
Q. A group of businessmen decided to incorporate a stock corporation with the primary
objective of giving legal guidance to their clients who regularly invest in publicly listed
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companies. They intend to hire at least 25 lawyers who will perform the work. If you were the
n
Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, will you approve the registration of
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the subject company?
A. No. The practice of law is not a business and lawyers cannot form stock corporations to
C h
practice the profession. It is also prohibited for lawyers to allow non-lawyers to practice law nor
are lawyers allowed to share their legal fees with non-lawyers. Ulep v. The Legal Clinic, Inc.,
s
(Bar Matter No. 550, June 17, 1993)
l e
Q. How may one pursue the practice of law?
A. The practice of law as a profession may only be exercised by natural persons, who are
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lawyers, either as solo practitioners or in partnership with other lawyers.
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Q. What are the primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business?
A. 1. The practice of law involves a duty of public service of which the emolument is a by-
product and one may obtain eminence without making much money.
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11 | P a g e
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2. The practice of law creates a relation as an officer of the court whose primary role is to assist
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in the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability.
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3. The practice of law creates a relation with clients with the highest fiduciary degree.
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4. The practice of law creates a relation which other lawyers which requires candor, fairness and
l
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decency avoiding any kind of encroachment upon other’s practice.
R o Q. What is the nature of a law partnership?

A. A partnership in the practice of law is a mere relationship or association of lawyers with the
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sole purpose of rendering legal services. It is not a legal entity and is not even a taxpayer and any
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lawyer in the partnership is considered a solo practitioner who is the tax payer. (Tan v. Del
B
Rosario, Jr., 237 SCRA324)
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Q. What is the rule of use of Firm Name?
b l
A. Petition For Authority To Continue Use Of The Firm Name "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano,
HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO" AND IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
o
AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "OZAETA, ROMULO, DE
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LEON, MABANTA & REYES." [G.R. NO. X92-1. JULY 30, 1979.]The Court held that: ". . . It
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is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a spirit of public service.’ A trade’ . .
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.’aims primarily at personal gain; a profession at the exercise of powers beneficial to mankind.’
x x x. But the member of a profession does not regard himself as in competition with his
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professional brethren. He is not bartering his services as is the artisan nor exchanging the
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products of his skill and learning as the farmer sells wheat or corn. x x x The best service of the
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professional man is often rendered for no equivalent or for a trifling equivalent and it is his
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pride to do what he does in a way worthy of his profession even if done with no expectation of
reward. This spirit of public service in which the profession of law is and ought to be exercised is
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a prerequisite of sound administration of justice according to law. The other two elements of a
profession, namely, organization and pursuit of a learned art have their justification in that they
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secure and maintain that spirit.”
ADRIANO E. DACANAY v. BAKER & MCKENZIE, ADM. CASE NO. 2131 MAY 10, 1985.
B a
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The S.C. held that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the
s
Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). As pointed out by the Solicitor General,
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respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that being
associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality to multinational
o b
business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment"
Q. A disbarment case was filed against Atty. Balauitan. The basis of the complaint was a Deed
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of Sale executed between the lawyer and the complainant. Atty. Balauitan moved for the
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dismissal of the case arguing that the matter does involve any lawyer-client relationship. Is his
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legal argument tenable?
h
A. A lawyer cannot have a dichotomy between his private life and his professional responsibility
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C s
as a lawyer. He can be disbarred even if there is no lawyer-client relationship between him and a
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complainant in a disbarment case and if the transaction involves his sale of a portion of his real
property. Gacias v. Balauitan (507 SCRA 8, 2006)
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Q. Can an individual practicing before the Shai’ra court affix the prefix “ATTY.” before his
name?
R
n
A. No. While the Supreme Court administers the examinations for one to practice before the
a
Shari’ a courts, any one admitted is not allowed to use the prefix “ATTY.” unless he is also a
member of the Philippine bar. Shari’ a courts have limited jurisdiction particularly on matters
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related to personal, family and property law consistent with the provisions of the Constitution
and national laws. Alawi v. Alauya, A.M. SDC-97-2-P, February 24, 1997
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II. Qualifications for Admission to the Practice of Law
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Q. What are the requirements for admission to the practice of law?
A. Sec. 2, Rule138 of the Rules of Court provides for the following qualifications: One must be
o b
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a citizen of the Philippines, at least 21 years of age, must be a resident of the Philippines, must
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have obtained his law degree in a local school (Sections 5 & 6, Rules of Court), possesses Good
Moral Character (presentation of proof of good moral character, certification that one does not
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have any pending charges or have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude)
12 | P a g e
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Q. Mr. Roberto Lo was born in Australia of Filipino parents. After he completed his college
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degree in Business Administration in Sydney, Australia, he enrolled in one of the universities
in Metro Manila to obtain his law degree. He successfully graduated with a Bachelor of Laws
e s
degree and is now processing his documents to be able to take his bar examinations. Can he
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qualify to take the bar examinations? Justify your answer.
o b
A. Yes. Under the 1987 Constitution, Roberto Lo is considered a natural-born Filipino since both
his parents remain Filipino citizens at the time of his birth. He also completed his law degree
R from a local school in Metro Manila.
n a r
Q. Can a Filipino citizen be allowed to take the bar when he obtained his law degree from
B
Columbia University in New York?
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A. No. Every person intending to be admitted to the practice of law in the Philippines must meet
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all the qualifications under Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138. (In Re: Application of Adriano M.
l
Hernandez, July 27, 1993)
o b
Q. Christian San Juan passed the bar with a passing grade of 80.50%. He was not allowed to
take his oath because Cristina Garcia, his childhood sweetheart with whom he has a child
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without benefit of marriage, filed a timely motion to exclude him from the oath taking
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ceremonies. Was Cristina justified in preventing San Juan from taking his Attorney’s Oath?
a
Why?
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A. Yes, because San Juan does not possess good moral character which is a requirement for
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admission to the bar.
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Barba v. Pedro (61SCRA 484, 1974): A bar passer who sired a child with a public school
l
b
teacher was not allowed to take his oath for lack of good moral character but was allowed to do
so after 18 years based on testimonials of his reformation when he worked as a community social
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development worker after passing the bar.
Q. Santiago Go was conditionally allowed to take the bar examinations because he indicated
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in his application for admission that there are only two pending civil cases against him at that
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time and no criminal charges were filed against him at the time of his application for
B
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admission to the practice of law. Santiago Go successfully passed the bar examinations and
s
landed 5th in said examinations. Before taking his oath, Leticia Sia asked the Supreme Court
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not to allow Go to take his oath because she actually filed a rape case against him which case
remains pending but which information Go withheld in his application. Will her request be
given due course?
o b
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A. Yes. If it can be established that the bar passer does not possess good moral character, he will
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not be allowed to take his oath.
Zaguirre v. Castillo, (A.C. No. 4921, March 6, 2003): Good moral character is required for
B a
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admission to law and misrepresentation about his true legal status will be a ground for a bar
passer was suspended indefinitely upon passing the bar.
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Q. Is possession of good moral character required only for admission to the practice of law?
o b
A. Maintenance of good moral character is required to retain continued membership in the bar.
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Mecaral v. Velasquez (A.C. No 8392 June 29, 2010): The Supreme Court disbarred a lawyer
n
who founded a religious cult and made his secretary a sex slave.
a
Cordon v. Balicanta (Adm. Case No. 2797, October 4, 2002, 390 SCRA 299 (2002): The S.C.
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disbarred a lawyer who used his knowledge of the law to commit fraud against his client by
forming a corporation out of the estate of the deceased husband of the complainant. The lawyer
s
made himself the sole signatory of said company which allowed him to mortgage several
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properties of the corporation which were eventually foreclosed by the creditor bank.
Arellano University, Inc. v. Mijares III, 605 SCRA 93, 2009: The S.C. disbarred a lawyer who
R
admitted in his Affidavit in the disbarment case against him that he asked for “facilitation fee” to o
an
bribe the Vice Mayor of Manila in the course of his engagement as counsel. The S.C. referred the
case to the Ombudsman against the Vice Mayor and the lawyer for the crime of bribery. The
h
Court held that a lawyer’s professional fee does not include “facilitation fee.”
13 | P a g e
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a r
Q. What is the coverage of the annual bar examinations?
B
A. Bar Subjects under Sec. 9, Rule 138, Rules of Court include: Political Law, Labor and Social
s
Legislation, Civil Law, Taxation, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law and Legal and
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Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises.
b l
Q. What is the essence of bar examinations?
o
A. Public policy demands that any person seeking admission to the bar in the Philippines be
R
required to furnish satisfactory proof of his knowledge of the law and ethical standards and of his
possession of such degree of learning and proficiency in law as may be deemed necessary for the
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due performance of the duties of lawyer.
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B
Q. Candido completed his law degree in October 2015. He wanted to become a lawyer but he
realized that it was too late for him to take the November 2015 bar examinations. Can he file a
e s
petition to the Supreme Court to be allowed to take his special bar examinations?
b l
A. No. The Supreme Court administers the bar examinations only once a year.
Q. Fernando, a Filipino citizen, completed his study of law in Spain and was allowed to
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practice law in Spain. He sought permission from the Supreme Court that he be allowed to be
admitted to Philippine bar. In his petition he invoked the provisions of the Treaty on
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Academic Degrees and Professions between the Philippines and Spain. How will you rule on
a
the petition of Fernando?
h B
A. I will deny Fernando’s petition. Fernando has remained a Filipino citizen and he cannot
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invoke the provisions of the treaty which is founded on reciprocity of the nationals of each
Re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 985

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country and the grant of the privilege is always subject to the domestic laws of both countries. In
Q. Define the following:
o b
R
1. Attorneys-at Law: the class of persons who are by license, officers of the court, empowered to
appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are
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developed by law as a consequence. Cul v. Cul, 120 Phil. 729
B a
Ch
2. Attorney-in-Fact: an agent whose authority is strictly limited by the instrument appointing
s
him. His authority is provided in a special power of attorney or a general power of attorney or
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letter of authority. An attorney-in-fact is not necessarily a lawyer.
b l
3. Counsel de oficio: a counsel, appointed or assigned by the court, from among such members
of the bar in good standing who, by reason of their experience and ability may adequately defend
o
the accused. The person need not be a member of the bar if no lawyer is available in a given
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locality. (Sec. 7, Rule 116, Rules of Court)
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A counsel de oficio is appointed to defend an indigent in a criminal action (Sections 3, 4, and 5,
Rule 116; Sec. 32, Rule 138); or to represent a destitute party in a case (Sec.31, Rule 138).
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4. Attorney Ad Hoc: a person named and appointed by the court to defend an absentee defendant
in a suit in which the appointment is made.
s
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5. Attorney of Record: a member of the bar appointed by a client to represent in cause of a court
b
and upon whom service of papers may be made.
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6. Of Counsel: a member of the bar who is associated with a law office but does not normally
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appear as counsel of record of cases handled by the law office.
n
7. Lead Counsel: a member of the bar who charged with the principal management and direction
of a party-litigant.
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8. House Counsel: a member of the bar who acts as attorney for a business company as an
employee of such company and renders legal advice on matters necessary in the ordinary course
s
of its business.
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9. Amicus Curiae: a friend of the court. A person with strong interest in or views on the subject
o
matter of the action. One who is considered as an experience and impartial attorney to help in the
disposition of issues submitted to the Court. (Sec. 36, Rule 138)
R
an
10. Amicus Curiae par Excellence: bar associations who appear in court as amici curiae or
friends of the court. Like an individual amicus curiae, amicus curiae par excellence do not
represent any party to the case but act as consultant in a doubtful issue for resolution of the court.
They do not receive any compensation for their legal services to the court.
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14 | P a g e
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11. Counsel de parte: a lawyer retained by a party litigant, usually, for a fee, to prosecute or
B
defend his cause in court. The term implies freedom of choice either on the part of the lawyer to
accept the employment or on the part of the litigant to continue or terminate the retainer at any
time.
e s
b l
12. Pro bono Counsel: a lawyer who renders legal services without charging any professional
fees but does not shoulder the costs of litigation on behalf of his client.
R o 13. Advocate: a lawyer who pleads on behalf of a third party.

14. Barrister: In England, a person entitled to practice law as an advocate or counsel in superior
n courts.
a r
B
15. Solicitor: In England, a person prosecuting or defending suits in a Court of Chancery. A
Court of Chancery is a court which administers equity and proceeding according to the forms
and principles of equity.
e s
b l
16. Proctor: In England , an attorney in in the admiralty and ecclesiastical courts whose duties
and business correspond exactly to those of an attorney-at-law or solicitor in a Chancery.
R o
Q. What is barratry?
A. It is the offense of frequently exciting and stirring up quarrels in suits. It is frowned upon as it
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is against public policy.
Q. What is ambulance chasing?
B a
C h s
A. This practice originated in New York, where through a lawyer or his agent, cases are literally
e
solicited in hospitals or in police precincts. The evils sought to be prevented by this practice are:
b
causes of action; defrauding injured parties.l
fomenting litigation; subornation of perjury; mulcting of innocent persons upon manufactured
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III. Appearance of Non-Lawyers
Q. What is the Student Practice Rule?
an a r
A. Law Student Practice Rule: Rule 138-A of the Rules of court allows a law student to
B
represent indigent clients provided one has successfully completed the 3rd year of a prescribed
Ch
four-year curriculum and enrolled in a recognized law school’s clinical legal education program
e s
> In Bar Matter No.730 dated June 10, 1998, the Supreme Court required that law student
of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

b l
practice before the Regional Trial Court must be under the direct supervision and control
R o
> Under Section 34 of the Rules of Court, a law student may appear before the first level
court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a member of the bar.
an r
Q. Under what circumstances can non-lawyers represent parties?
A. Non-lawyers may appear in the following:
B a
C h
1. Non-lawyers in first level courts: small claims cases
s
2. Non-lawyers in administrative tribunals: HLURB, DENR, DAR, NLRC, etc.
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b
3. Proceedings where lawyers are prohibited from appearing: proceedings before the Lupong
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Tagapamayapa,
4. Non-lawyers in court ordered mediation
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1. Lawyers without authority: Contempt of Court (Sec. 1, Rule 71)
a n
Q. What are the sanctions for practice or appearance without authority?
C h
Acts constituting contempt: Misbehavior as an officer of the court, disobedience or resistance
s
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to a lawful order of the court, abuse or unlawful interference with judicial proceedings,
obstruction in the administration of justice, misleading the court or making false allegations,
criticisms, insults or veiled threats against the court, aiding in the unauthorized practice of
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law, unlawful retention of clients, advising a client to commit a contemptuous act,
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publications which tend to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence courts may degrade the
court; disrespectful pleadings.
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2. Persons who are not lawyers: Indirect Contempt (Sec. 3 (e), Rule 71)
h
Ciocon-Reer v. Lubao (674 SCRA 13): Karaan would always appear in court and he even files
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pleadings without indicating any Roll of Attorney No., PTR, MCLE and IBP O.R.No. After
15 | P a g e
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investigation, OCA found out that the 71 year old Karaan was not in fact a lawyer. He was found
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guilty of indirect contempt of court and fined P10,000.00 without imprisonment.
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IV. Public Officials and Practice of Law
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Q. Are government lawyers covered by the Code of Professional Responsibility (“CPR”)?
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A. Yes. CANON 6 of the CPR provides: “These Canons shall apply to lawyers in
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government service in the discharge of their tasks.”(Rules 6.01-6.03, Code of Professional
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Responsibility).
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Q. What is the one-year ban rule on government lawyers?
B a
A. Former government attorneys are prohibited or disqualified from the representing any interest
adverse to the government within the one-year period when they were separated from service.
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Q. Who are the public officials not allowed to practice law?
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l
A. Under the Constitution: The President, Vice President, members of the Constitutional
b
Commissions, members of the judiciary, members of the cabinet, their deputies and assistants
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Under Civil Service Rules: government lawyers in government departments/offices/bureaus, in
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government owned and controlled corporations, government financial institutions and those with
local government units
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Under Special Laws: Governors and Mayors (Local Government Code); Solicitors and trial
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lawyers of the Office of the Solicitor General, lawyers of the Office of the Government
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Corporate Counsel, Government prosecutors under the DOJ and the Office of the Ombudsman
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Q. What is the concept of limited practice of law among public officers?
o b
A. With prior written authorization of the heads of office, some government lawyers may be
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authorized to practice law provided they will not represent any party who has an adverse claim
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against the government.
a
Lorenzana v. Fajardo ( 462 SCRA 1 (2005)): A lawyer is guilty of violating the Civil Service
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rule on double compensation when he accepted an appointment as a lawyer of the Urban Affairs
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Office of the City of Manila and a member of the PLEB of Quezon City.
Q. Who are the lawyers who represent the government?
l e
b
A. The lawyers tasked to represent government: OSG, OGCC, lawyers in regular departments,
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bureaus, offices, lawyers in the government financial institutions, lawyers in government owned
and controlled corporations, lawyers who serve the government’s interest under special
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contracts/or engagements, lawyers under the local government units.
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Q. Who are the lawyers who represent the interest of the state in criminal cases?
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A. Government lawyers tasked to prosecute and represent the interest of the state are the Public
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Prosecutors from the DOJ and Office of the Ombudsman.
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Q. Who are the government lawyers who represent indigent litigants?
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b l
A. Lawyers who work with the Public Attorneys’ Office represent the indigent litigants.
Q. Can the Supreme Court motu propio discipline lawyers?
A. Yes.
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a n
People of the Philippines v. The Hon. Juanito C. Castaneda, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 208290,
December 11, 2013.CTA in conformity with the Run After the Smugglers (RATS) Group of the
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Revenue Collection Monitoring Group (RCMG) of the BOC tried the private respondents for
violation of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended. S.C. said that it could
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not countenance the following patent violations of the government prosecutors: failure of the
prosecution failed to present certified true copies of the documentary evidence under Section 7,
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Rule 130 and Section 127, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the petition for certiorari was filed
beyond the reglamentary period. This stance taken by the lawyers in government service rouses
o b
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the Court’s vigilance against inefficiency in the administration of justice and the presumption
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that the case was doomed by design from the start was doomed by design from the start. Verily,
the lawyers representing the offices under the executive branch should be reminded that they still
remain as officers of the court from whom a high sense of competence and fervor is expected.
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The Court reminded the lawyers in the BOC that the canons embodied in the Code of
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16 | P a g e
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Professional Responsibility equally apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of
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their official tasks.
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Q. May a labor arbiter apply a principle in Corporation Law to support his decision in a labor
e
dispute?
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A. Yes. YOLANDA A. ANDRES, MINETTE A. MERCADO, AND ELITO P. ANDRES v.
ATTY. SALIMATHAR V. NAMBI, A.C. No. 7158, March 09, 2015, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
R o This is a Complaint for Disbarment filed against then Labor Arbiter Salimathar v. Nambi
(respondent) on the ground of gross ignorance of the law in issuing an Amended Alias Writ of
n r
Execution against M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. and its incorporators, the herein complainants, who
a
are not parties to the case. The Court held that the labor arbiter had legal basis to pierce the
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corporate veil to serve the ends of justice but he was reprimanded for not complying with the
lawful orders of the IBP and the Court.
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VI. Suspension, disbarment and discipline of lawyers (Rule 139-B, Rule of Court)
b l
Q. What is the nature and characteristics of disciplinary actions against lawyers?
o
A. Disbarment or disciplinary actions against lawyers are sui generis. It is c class of its own and
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does not need proof beyond reasonable doubt. A disbarment proceeding is imprescriptible; all
proceedings are strictly confidential; may proceed despite withdrawal of the complaint.
an a r
Bengco v. Bernardo, 672 SCRA 352 (2012): S.C. said that administrative cases against lawyers
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do not prescribe. Despite the considerable lapse of time between the commission of the
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infraction and the time of filing, there is need to determine the administrative liability of lawyers.
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Catalan, Jr. v. Silvosa, 677 SCRA 352(2012): A lawyer cannot escape “the disciplining arm of
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the Court” despite any delay in the filing of an administrative case against a lawyer.
Rules on Disbarment (Rule 139-B)
Initiation of a Complaint
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By the Supreme Court motu proprio
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By the IBP Board of Governors motu proprio
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Upon referral by the S.C.
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Upon referral by the IBP Chapter Board
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Upon verified complaint by any person
IBP Board of
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Board of Governors Chairman, CBD
Governors
R
an B a r
C h REPORT
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May uphold the findings
Commissioner
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May reverse the findings
May amend the findings
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No motion for Reconsideration before the Commissioner.
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Motion for Reconsideration before the Board of Governor is allowed.
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Decision of IBP Board of Governors is reviewed by the Supreme Court.
Q. Describe the proceedings before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines.
bl
A. Proceedings before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines
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The complaint is referred to the Investigating Commissioner.
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The Investigating Commissioner presides over the disbarment proceedings allowing
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complainant to prove his allegations and for the lawyer to establish his defense.
17 | P a g e
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After evaluation, the Investigating Commissioner submits his findings and
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recommendation to the Chairman of the Commission on Bar Discipline (“CBD”).
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No Motion for Reconsideration is allowed before the Investigating Commissioner
l e The Chairman of the CBD submits the report of the Investigating Commissioner to the
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Board of Governors.
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In a meeting called for the purpose, the Board of Governors evaluates the report and
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renders its own resolution.
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Motion for Reconsideration before the Board of Governors is allowed.
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The decision of the Board of Governors (reviewed by SC) must be in writing supported
by facts and evidence presented during the hearing and the applicable provision of the
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Code of Professional Responsibility.
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Q. Who may initiate disbarment proceedings?
b
A. NESTOR FIGUERAS AND BIENVENIDO VICTORIA, JR. v. ATTY. DIOSDADO B.
o
JIMENEZ, A.C. No. 9116, March 12, 2014. The S.C. held that the complainants have
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personality to file the disbarment case. In Heck v. Judge Santos, the Court held that “[a]ny
interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings.” The right to
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institute disbarment proceedings is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person
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complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings being sui
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generis, the procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real
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party-in-interest must initiate the suit will not apply.
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Q. Can a disbarment case be dismissed upon motion of the complainant?
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A. No. SPOUSES ROGELIO AMATORIO AND AIDA AMATORIO v. ATTY. FRANCISCO
DY YAP AND ATTY. WHELMA F. SITON-YAP, A.C. No. 5914, March 11, 2015, Reyes, J.:
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The Court said that it cannot simply yield to complainants’ change of heart by refuting their own
statements against the respondents and praying that the complaint for disbarment they filed be
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dismissed. It bears emphasizing that any misconduct on the part of the lawyer not only hurts the
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client’s cause but is even more disparaging on the integrity of the legal profession itself. Thus,
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for tarnishing the reputation of the profession, a lawyer may still be disciplined notwithstanding
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the complainant’s pardon or withdrawal from the case for as long as there is evidence to support
any finding of culpability. A case for suspension or disbarment may proceed “regardless of
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interest or lack of interest of the complainants, if the facts proven so warrant.” It follows that the
withdrawal of the complainant from the case, or even the filing of an affidavit of desistance, does
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not conclude the administrative case against an erring lawyer.
Q. Can a lawyer move for dismissal of the disbarment case against him based on prejudicial
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question?
A. No. A disbarment proceeding being sui generis can proceed independently of any criminal
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action instituted against the lawyer.
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ANTONINA S. SOSA v. ATTY. MANUEL V. MENDOZA, A.C. No. 8776, March 22, 2015, Brion,
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J. This is a complaint for the disbarment/suspension of Atty. Manuel V. Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza)
Professional Responsibility arising from non-payment of debt.

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filed on October 22, 2010 by Antonina S. Sosa (Ms. Sosa), for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
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n
A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a
a
plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private
interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted
practice of law for one year.

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solely for the public welfare. For violation of Rule 1.01, the lawyer was suspended from the
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Q. Can a lawyer set up the defense of double jeopardy in a disbarment case against him?
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A. No. The defense of double jeopardy cannot be invoked in a disbarment proceeding.
Garrido v. Garrido, 611 SCRA 508 (21010): S.C. reiterated the rule that “laws dealing with
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double jeopardy or with procedure . . . do not apply in the determination of lawyer’s
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qualifications or fitness for membership in the Bar. . .” The S.C. said first, that for admission a
candidate must meet all the requirements because the practice of law is a component of the
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administration of justice and involves service to the public; and second, admission qualifications
18 | P a g e
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are also required for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice and lack of
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qualifications is a matter of public concern and S.C. may inquire into them.
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Q. Can a lawyer move for dismissal of a disciplinary case against him on the ground that the
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complainants are not the injured party to the case?
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A. No because the practice of law is imbued with public interest and institution of complaints
against lawyers is not predicated on a lawyer-client relationship.
R o Nestor Figueras and Bienvenido Victoria, Jr. v. Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez, A.C. No. 9116,
March 12, 2014.The S.C. held that the complainants have personality to file the disbarment case.
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In Heck v. Judge Santos, the Court held that “[a]ny interested person or the court motu
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proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings.” The right to institute disbarment proceedings is
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not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the
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alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings being sui generis, the procedural requirement
will not apply.

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observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-interest must initiate the suit
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Q. What is the effect of conviction upon the practice of law of a lawyer?
o
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A. Catalan, Jr. v. Silvosa, 677 SCRA 352 (2012): A lawyer convicted of direct bribery can be a
subject of disbarment proceedings. Direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. The
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defense that his conviction was not in his capacity as a lawyer but as a public officer betrays the
unmistakable lack of integrity in his character.
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C h s
In Re: Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin, 670 SCRA 366(2112): The conviction of Atty. Pactolin before
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the Sandiganbayan for the crime of Falsification of Public Document is contrary to justice,
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honesty and good morals. This is a crime involving moral turpitude. Even if the IBP
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recommended dismissal of the case, S.C. disbarred him because “disbarment is the appropriate
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penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude.”
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Q. Can a judge who has been dismissed from the judiciary still be a subject of a disbarment
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proceeding?
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A. Yes. OCA v. Liangco, 662 SCRA 103 (2011): The dismissal of a judge from service will not
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preclude the filing of a disbarment case against him before the IBP. The disbarment was based
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on the same grounds for his dismissal: gross misconduct and inexcusable ignorance. He failed to
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make a distinction between a Resolution and an Ordinance and that as judge, he cannot render
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an Opinion but rather he must receive evidence and make a decision after termination of trial. It
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will be the IBP who will investigate a judge who has retired from the judiciary and not the
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Supreme Court.
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Q. What is the proof required to establish the culpability of a lawyer in a disbarment
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proceeding?
A. PO1 JOSE B. CASPE v. ATTY. AQUILINO A. MEJICA, A.C. No. 10679, March 10,
B a
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2015, Villarama, J.: In disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar, only clear
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preponderance of evidence is required to establish liability. As long as the evidence presented
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by complainant or that taken judicial notice of by the Court is more convincing and worthy of
justified.
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belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto, the imposition of disciplinary sanction is
Q. Does the lawyer have the burden of proof in a disbarment case?
R o
A. No. Joven and Reynaldo C. Rasing v. Atty. Pablo R. Cruz and Frankie O. Magsalin
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III, A.C. No. 7686, July 31, 2013. The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension
proceedings always rests on the shoulders of the complainant. The Court exercises its
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disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes the complaint by clearly preponderant
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evidence that warrants the imposition of the harsh penalty.
Atty. Alan F. Paguia v. Atty. Manuel T. Molina, A.C. No. 9881, June 4, 2014.The S.C. said in
l e
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when it comes to administrative cases against lawyers, two things are to be considered: quantum
of proof, which requires clearly preponderant evidence; and burden of proof, which is on the
complainant. Here, the complaint was without factual basis. Even if Atty. Molina did provide his
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clients legal advice, he still cannot be held administratively liable without any showing that his o
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act was attended with bad faith or malice. The default rule is presumption of good faith.
Q. What is the effect of the withdrawal of a disbarment case?
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A. Adelia V. Quiachon v. Atty. Joseph Ador A. Ramos, A.C. No. 9317, June 4, 2014. The S.C.
held that the withdrawal of a disbarment case against a lawyer does not terminate or abate the
19 | P a g e
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jurisdiction of the IBP and of the Court to continue an administrative proceeding against a
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lawyer-respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar. The complainant in a disbarment case is
not a direct party to the case, but a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court.
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Q. What are the grounds for suspension (Disbarment)?
b l
A. Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court provides the following grounds: deceit or any gross
misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, conviction of crime involving moral turpitude, violation
R o of lawyer’s Oath, willful disobedience of any lawful order, or corruptly or willfully appearing as
an attorney for a party in a case without authority, malpractice which includes practice of
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soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers..
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Rose Bunagan-Bansig v. Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera, A.C. No. 5581, January 14, 2014. The
Court ordered Celera disbarred for contracting a second marriage when his first marriage with
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Complainant was still subsisting. The Supreme Court held that for purposes of the disbarment
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proceeding, the Marriage Certificates bearing the name of Atty. Celera are competent and
convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a
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member of the Bar. Atty. Celera exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required
of him as a member of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding
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respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is
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subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section
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27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
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Edgardo Areola v. Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza, A.C. No. 10135, January 15, 2014. This case
s
involves a PAO who advised her clients – “Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain
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na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon.”Thus, a complaint was lodged against her for violation of
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the attorney’s oath, deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under Section 27,
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Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. S. C. held that Atty. Mendoza made irresponsible
o
advices to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional
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Responsibility. It is the mandate of Rule 1.02 that “a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.” Rule 15.07 states
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that “a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of
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fairness.” However, while her remark was inappropriate and unbecoming, her comment was not
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disparaging and reproachful so as to cause dishonor and disgrace to the Judiciary. Thus, she
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was only reprimanded and sternly warned.
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DR. DOMICIANO F. VILLAHERMOSA, SR. v. ATTY. ISIDRO L.CARACOL, A.C. No.
b
7325, January 21, 2015, VILLARAMA, JR., J.: The Rules of Court under Rule 138, Section 21
provides for a presumption of a lawyer’s appearance on behalf of his client, hence: “SEC. 21.
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Authority of attorney to appear. – An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent
any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to
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appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on
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reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the right to appear
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in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever
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pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who employed him, and may thereupon make such
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order as justice requires. An attorney willfully appearing in court for a person without being
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employed, unless by leave of the court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court
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who has misbehaved in his official transactions.”
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An attorney-client relationship terminates upon death of either client or the lawyer. Thus, a
lawyer must be more circumspect in his demeanor and attitude towards the public in general
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as agents of the judicial system.
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TERESITA B. ENRIQUEZ, v. ATTY. TRINA DE VERA, A.C. No. 8330, March 16, 2015,
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Leonen, J. An administrative complaint for disbarment or suspension was filed by complainant
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Teresita B. Enriquez against Atty. Trina De Vera. The Court found Atty. Trina De Vera
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committed serious misconduct and should be held administratively liable for the issuance and
dishonor of several post-dated checks. She was suspended from the practice of law for one year
Q. What are the guidelines in lifting of the order of suspension of the lawyer?
bl
A. MANIEGO v. DE DIOS, 617 SCRA 142 (2010). The Court held that after the period of
suspension, the resumption to practice is not automatic. The Court issued the following
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guidelines:
1. After a finding that the respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law, the
Court shall render a decision rendering the penalty.
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20 | P a g e
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2. Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory upon receipt
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thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The
denial of said motion shall render the decision final and executory.
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3. Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with
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the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant that he or she has desisted from the practice
of law and has not appeared in any court during the period of his or her suspension;
R o 4. Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the local chapter of the IBP and to the
Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her, and
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where he or she has appeared as counsel;
of suspension; and
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5. The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondent’s compliance with the order
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6. Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the respondent under oath shall be a
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ground for imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.
To summarize:
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(i) File a Sworn Statement with the Office of the Bar confidant that the respondent lawyer has
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served the period of suspension stating that he/she desisted from the practice of law and never
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appeared in any court during the period of suspension.
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(ii) Copies of the Sworn Statement must be furnished the chapter of which the respondent lawyer
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is a member and the Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Courts and first level courts where
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respondent lawyer has pending cases.
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(iii) If satisfied, the Court will lift the order of suspension and reinstate the erring lawyer
lawyer?
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Q. What is the effect of an adverse disciplinary action instituted abroad against a Filipino
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A. A decision in a disciplinary action against a Filipino lawyer practicing abroad may also be a
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basis for a disbarment proceeding against the same lawyer in the Philippines.
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Velez v. De Vera, 496 SCRA 345 (2006): A finding of fact by the California State Bar can be a
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basis of an administrative complaint against a Filipino lawyer before the IBP.
Q. Can the penalty of a lawyer be mitigated by virtue of relationship?
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A. Yes. ALVIN S. FELICIANO v. ATTY. CARMELITA BAUTISTA-LOZADA, A.C. No.
7593, March 11, 2015. On December 13, 2005, the Court en banc promulgated a Resolution in
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A.C. No. 6656 entitled “Bobie Rose V. Frias vs. Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada”3 suspending
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Atty. Lozada for two years for violation of Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
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During her period of suspension she represented her husband where complainant Feliciano was
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a party. The Supreme Court said it recognizes the fact that it is part of the Filipino culture that
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amid an adversity, families will always look out and extend a helping hand to a family member,
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more so, in this case, to a spouse. Thus, considering that Atty. Lozada's actuation was prompted
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by her affection to her husband and that in essence, she was not representing a client but rather
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a spouse, we deem it proper to mitigate the severeness of her penalty.
Reinstatement after Disbarment
Readmission to the Bar and Resumption to Practice Law
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Q. Can a bar passer convicted of a homicide still be admitted to the practice of law?
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A. Yes. IN RE: OATH TAKING OF ARGOSINO, B.M. 712, July 13, 1995 and En Banc
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Resolution dated March 19, 1997. A lawyer who was involved in the fatal death of a neophyte in
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the initiation rites of his fraternity was finally allowed to take his oath after he showed several
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proofs of testimonial of good character.
Q. Can a disbarred lawyer be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys?
A. Yes. RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS (ATTY. DANILO DE GUZMAN), 586 SCRA 372 A
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lawyer who leaked the bar questions in Mercantile Law prepared by a founding partner in his
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law firm was reinstated upon proof of good moral character during his period of suspension.
MACARUBBO v. MACARUBBO, A.M. 6148, January 22, 2013. Macarubbo was disbarred for
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contracting three marriages. While the disbarment case was pending, Macarrubo resorted to
filing separate civil actions to annul two of said marriages. Eight years after his disbarment, he
21 | P a g e
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filed a Petition for Extraordinary Mercy for reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys. In granting
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his Petition, the Court considered the following guidelines set forth in Re: Letter of Augustus C.
Diaz, MTC Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency (533 SCRA 534, 2010):
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1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited
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to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the IBP, judges or judges’
associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A
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subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give
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rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.
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2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of penalty to ensure a period of reform.
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3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he has still productive years ahead
of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.
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4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen
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or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative
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and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.
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5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency
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The Court concluded with a reminder that to enjoy continued member in the legal profession,
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one must be a person of good moral character.
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Resumption to Practice of a Balikbayan Lawyer
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Requisites - Updating and full payment of all IBP membership dues; Payment of Professional
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Tax; Completion of MCLE credit units; and Retaking of the Lawyer’s Oath
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Q. Can a former Filipino resume his practice of law in the Philippines?
A. Yes. IN RE: PETITION TO RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN
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THE PHILIPPINES (EPIFANIO B. MUNESES), 677 SCRA 364 (2012). The S.C. said that a
Filipino lawyer who has been naturalized in another country does not automatically enjoy the
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right to resume his practice of law when returns to the Philippines. It held that under the Rules
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of Admission to the Philippine bar, one must be a Filipino citizen. Thus, when he assumed
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another citizenship, he ipso facto lost his Filipino citizenship. The returning Filipino lawyer
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must repatriate himself under the provisions of R.A. 9225. Said law says that “all Philippine
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citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
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Philippine citizenship under the conditions of (R.A. 9225).”
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R.A. 9225 provides that if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and
he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions’ (he shall apply with the proper
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authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.”
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Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law of Benjamin M. Dacanay, 540 SCRA 424: To
reacquire, the authority to resume his practice of law, the repatriated Filipino must:
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1. Update and pay in full his annual membership dues in the IBP;
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2. Pay his professional tax;
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3. Complete his 36 credit hours of MCLE to refresh him of his knowledge of Philippine laws,
rules of practice, recent jurisprudence and update him of recent legal developments (MCLE will
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be from the time he was absent in the Philippines up to the time he resumes his practice);and
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4. Retake his oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer
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and as an officer of the Court, but also to renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines.
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VII. Duties and Responsibilities of a Lawyer
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A. Duty to Society
1. Respect for law and legal processes
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
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respect for law and legal processes. (Rules 1.01-1.04)
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Q. What does respect for rule of law include?
A. The lawyer must at all times in the protection of the rights of client ensure compliance with
h
the law governing the issues of the pending case. FERNANDO W. CHU v. ATTY. JOSE C.
GUICO, JR., A.C. No. 10573, January 13, 2015, PER CURIAM: Fernando W. Chu invokes the
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Court’s disciplinary authority in resolving this disbarment complaint against his former lawyer,
22 | P a g e
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respondent Atty. Jose C. Guico, Jr., whom he has accused of gross misconduct. Atty. Guico was
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disbarred for having had violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for demanding and receiving P580,000.00 from Chu which constituted an act of
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extortion and misrepresentation that caused dishonor to and contempt for the legal profession.
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Q. What are the standards of morality required of a lawyer?
A. MELVYN G. GARCIA v. ATTY. RAUL H. SESBREÑO, A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No.
R o 10457, February 03, 2015, PER CURIAM: Two complaints for disbarment were filed by Dr.
Melvyn G. Garcia (Garcia) against Atty. Raul H. Sesbreño. The two cases, docketed as A.C. No.
n r
7973 and A.C. No. 10457, were consolidated in the Court’s Resolution dated 30 September
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2014. The IBP-CBD consolidated A.C. No. 7973 with CBD Case No. 08-2273. The parties
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agreed on the sole issue to be resolved: whether moral turpitude is involved in a conviction for
homicide. The Court held in the affirmative and ordered Sesbreno disbarred.
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DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ v. ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG AND ATTY. KAREN E. BAYDO,
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A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015, PER CURIAM. Complainant charged the two lawyers with
gross immoral conduct. Atty. Catindig was disbarred for contracting a second marriage with the
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complainant while his first marriage was still subsisting. The charge against Atty. Baydo was
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dismissed for lack of evidence.
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Tiong v. Florendo, 662 SCR A 1 (2011): The S.C. held that a lawyer’s “act of having an affair
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with his client’s wife manifested his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his
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own marital vow of fidelity.” His illicit relationship with the wife of his client showed that he
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violated Canon 17 of the CPR for abuse of the trust and confidence reposed in him. An Affidavit
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of Desistance or any other sworn statement with the same effect will not excuse the lawyer
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because any disciplinary proceeding is clothed with public interest.
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Garrido v. Garrido, 611 SCRA 508 (2010): A charge of immorality was brought before the
lawyer for having contracted three marriages. He left his first wife to pursue his study of law. He
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contracted his second marriage upon misrepresentation that he is single. He engaged in an extra
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marital affair with a lawyer whom he eventually married in Hongkong while his second
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marriage was subsisting. Such conduct betrayed his moral depravity for which he was disbarred.
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The lady lawyer was eventually disbarred for knowing that Garrido had other two subsisting
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marriages when she had her romantic relationship with him even before she became a lawyer.
Q. What constitutes deceitful conduct on the part of the lawyer?
e s
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A. Brennisen v. Contawi, 670 SCRA 358(2012): The S.C. disbarred a lawyer who acted “with
deceit when, through the use of a falsified document, he effected the unauthorized mortgage and
sale of his client’s property for his personal benefit.
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Bueno v. Raneses, 687 SCRA 711(2012): The S.C. disbarred a lawyer who practically asked the
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client to sell everything for the sake of winning the case, only to end up not really doing
anything. By asking money from his client for a purportedly bribery to the judge to win a case,
B a
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the lawyer tarnished the image of the judiciary and put a black mark in the legal profession as
C s
well.
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Natividad P. Navarro and Hilda S. Presbitero v. Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr., A.C. No. 9872,
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January 28, 2014.The Court held that Atty. Solidum, Jr. violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Conduct, as used in the Rule, is not confined to the performance of a
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lawyer’s professional duties. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue
n
as an officer of the court. Atty. Solidum, Jr. was held guilty of engaging in dishonest and
a
deceitful conduct, both in his professional capacity with respect to his client. The fiduciary
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nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the duty to
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account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client. Atty. Solidum, Jr.
failed to fulfill this duty.
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2. Efficient and convenient legal services
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CANON 2 - A lawyer shall make his legal services available in an efficient and convenient
manner compatible with the independence, integrity and effectiveness of the profession.
(Rules 2.01-2.04
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Q. When is a lawyer guilty of encroaching on another lawyer’s practice?
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A. Lisangan v. Tolentino, A.C. No. 6672, September 4, 2009: A lawyer who allowed his
paralegal/secretary to solicit the clients of a fellow lawyer with a promise of financial assistance
23 | P a g e
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was suspended by the S.C. and reminded lawyers that their calling cards must only contain their
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name, fields of practice, contact details and nothing more. The prohibition applies to the non-
legal staff in order to curb any abuse of the privilege of the law.
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3. True, honest, fair, dignified and objective information on legal services
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CANON 3 – A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only the true, honest, fair,
dignified and objective information or statement of facts. (Rules 3.01-3.04)
R o 4. Participation in the improvement and reforms in the legal system
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CANON 4 – A lawyer shall participate in the development of the legal system by initiating or
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supporting efforts in law reforms and in the improvement of the administration of justice.
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A lawyer is encouraged to participate in the formulation of amendments in the Rules of Court to
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improve the administration of justice.
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A lawyer may attend congressional hearings involving changes in substantive laws; creation of
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new courts; and redefining jurisdiction of trial and appellate courts.
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5. Participation in legal education program and other related activities
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CANON 5 – A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal
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education programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the
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practical training of law students and assist in disseminating the law and jurisprudence.
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A lawyer is expected to comply with the requirements of the Mandatory Continuing Legal
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Education and to participate in the activities of the IBP and other legal professional
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organizations.
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Purpose: MCLE, what it is; who enforces the MCLE
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Q. What is the composition of constitution of the MCLE Board?
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A. The MCLE Board is composed of a retired justice of the Supreme Court is the Chairman, with
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the following as members: an incumbent dean of a recognized law school, a representative from
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a designated law center, the Chancellor of the Philippine Judicial Academy and the President of
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the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Ch s
Q. What are the requirements to complete the MCLE?
l e
A. Coverage of the MCLE 36-unit requirement ( corresponding units: 6 for Legal Ethics; 6 for
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prescribed courses as approved by the MCLE Board, 4 for trail and pre-trial techniques, 4 for
legal writing and oral advocacy, 5 for alternative dispute resolution, 2 for international law and
Q. What is the period of compliance for one’s MCLE?

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conventions and 9 for updates on substantive and procedural laws)
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A. A lawyer has 3-year completion period.
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Q. Who are exempted from the MCLE requirement?
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C s
A. President, Vice President, Members of the Senate and House of Representatives, Members of
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the Constitutional Commissions, Governors, Mayors, incumbent and retired members of the
b
judiciary, Cabinet Secretaries and their undersecretaries, OSG lawyers, OGCC lawyers,
Ombudsman and all Deputies of the Ombudsman, Professor and Reviewers of law for a period of
ten years.
Q. What are the penalties for non-compliance?
R o
a n
A. Imposition of fines, pleadings may be expunge from records of the court, lawyer be can a
subject of suspension or disbarment.
B. Duty to the Legal Profession
C h s
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Rule 139-A): A lawyer cannot be a full-fledged
l e
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member of the bar, he has not signed the Roll of Attorneys after taking his Oath as a
lawyer.
Q. When does one become a full-fledged attorney?
R o
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A. In re: Petition of Atty. Medado to sign Roll of Attorneys, B.M. No. 2540, September 24,
2013: Petitioner Medado passed the bar examinations in 1979. He took the Attorney’s Oath
thereafter, and was scheduled to sign the Roll of Attorneys, but failed to do so. It was only in
C h
2005 that he realized that he did not sign the Roll after being asked his Roll number when he
attended his MCLE. Thirty (30) years after passing the bar, Medado filed a Petition to allow him
24 | P a g e
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to sign in the Roll of Attorneys. The Supreme Court held that while an honest mistake of fact
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could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of his acts as it negates malice or
evil motive, a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is
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presumed to know the law and its consequences. Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice
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of law transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Such Canon also applies
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to law students and bar candidates. Medado was imposed a penalty akin to suspension by
allowing him to sign one (1) year after receipt of the Court’s Resolution.
R o Q. What is the Integrated Bar of the Philippines?
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A. Purposes of the IBP: To elevate the standards of the legal profession, improve the
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administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
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effectively.
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Elective Officers: President, Executive Vice President and concurrently a Governor of a Region
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(chosen by the Board of Governors who will succeed the national President), Board of
Governors from: Northern Luzon, Central Luzon, Greater Manila, Southern Luzon, Bicolandia,
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Eastern Visayas, Western Visayas, Eastern Mindanao and Western Mindanao.
Other officers: The IBP shall have a Secretary, Treasurer and such other officers as well as
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employees the President may appoint with the consent of the Board of Governors under such
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terms and conditions specified in the appointment of each officer and/or employee.
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Membership and Dues: Non-payment of dues may subject the lawyer to disciplinary action
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including removal of the name of the delinquent lawyer from the Roll of Attorneys. (Sec. 9, Rule
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139-A)LIFETIME DUE: P12, 500 and ANNUAL DUE: P1, 000
l e
In the Matter of Brewing Controversies in the IBP Elections (A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC, A.C. No.
b
8292, April 2013): Lawyers seeking positions in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines must
o
respect the rotational rule. The rotational rule is adopted to allow equal opportunity for all
lawyers in different regions to have access to positions of leadership in the IBP. The S.C. also
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reminded IBP officers that they should not use the Court as “referee” for their intramurals.
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NOTE: THIS HAS NEVER BEEN A SUBJECT OF A BAR QUESTION
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Republic Act No. 9999: FREE LEGAL ASSISTANCE ACT OF 2010
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Legal services- any activity which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experiences which shall include, among others, legal advice and counsel, and the
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preparation of instruments and contracts, including appearance before the administrative and
quasi-judicial offices, bodies and tribunals handling cases in court, and other similar services as
may be defined by the Supreme Court.
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Section 4. Requirements for Availment. - For purposes of availing of the benefits and services as
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envisioned in this Act, a lawyer or professional partnership shall secure a certification from the
Public Attorney's Office (PAO), the Department of Justice (DOJ) or accredited association of the
B a
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Supreme Court indicating that the said legal services to be provided are within the services
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defined by the Supreme Court, and that the agencies cannot provide the legal services to be
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provided by the private counsel.
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For purpose of determining the number of hours actually provided by the lawyer and/or
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professional firm in the provision of legal services, the association and/or organization duly
were actually undertaken.

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accredited by the Supreme Court shall issue the necessary certification that said legal services
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Section 5. Incentives to Lawyers. - For purposes of this Act, a lawyer or professional partnerships
rendering actual free legal services, as defined by the Supreme Court, shall be entitled to an
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allowable deduction from the gross income, the amount that could have been collected for the
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actual free legal services rendered or up to ten percent (10%) of the gross income derived from
the actual performance of the legal profession, whichever is lower: Provided, That the actual free
legal services herein contemplated shall be exclusive of the minimum sixty (60)-hour mandatory
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legal aid services rendered to indigent litigants as required under the Rule on Mandatory Legal
Aid Services for Practicing Lawyers, under Bar Matter No. 2012, issued by the Supreme Court
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2. THE LAWYER AS A NOTARY PUBLIC (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, effective August 1,
R
an
2004, as amended)
Q. What are the purposes of the Notarial Rules?
C h
A. Promote, serve and protect public interest; to simplify, clarify and modernize the rules
governing notaries public; and to foster ethical conduct among notaries public.
25 | P a g e
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Please take note the relevant provisions of the 2004 Notarial Rules: (Take particular
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attention of the date when a document was notarized. A document notarized before the
effectivity of the 2004 Notarial Rules will be governed by the relevant provisions of the
e s
Revised Administrative Code where the “cedula” will suffice as proof of identity.)
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HEIRS OF PEDRO ALILANO REPRESENTED BY DAVID ALILANO v. ATTY. ROBERTO
E. EXAMEN, A.C. No. 10132, March 24, 2015. The complainants charged Atty. Examen of
o
notarizing Deeds of Sale where his brother was the vendee. In his defense, Atty. Examen said
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that at the time of the execution of the subject Deeds of Sale the Notarial Rules of 2004 were not
yet in effect. Under the Revised Administrative Code which governed the notarial practice there
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was no prohibition on notarizing documents of relatives up to the fourth civil degree of
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consanguinity and affinity. The Court, however, held Atty. Examen liable for not ascertaining the
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details of the “cedulas” of the affiants. He relied on the entries made by his secretary. The Court
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suspended Atty. Roberto E. Examen from the practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS. In addition,
his present notarial commission, if any, was likewise REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED
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from reappointment as a notary public for a period of two (2) years from finality of this decision.
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(1). Commissioning of a Notary Public
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WILBERTO C. TALISIC v. ATTY. PRIMO R. RINEN, A.C. No. 8761, February 12, 2014: A
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lawyer’s notarial commission was revoked and he was not allowed to renew the same for one
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year for failure to ascertain the identities of the parties who executed an Extra Judicial Partition
with Sale which allowed the transfer to Spouses Durante of a parcel of land. Notarization is not
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an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that
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only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.
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(2). Qualifications (Section 1, Rule III)
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(3). Manner of Obtaining a Commission (Sections 2, 3, 4, 5,6,7,8, 9 and 10 Rule III); and
Renewal of Commission (Sections 13 and 14, Rule III)
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(4). Powers and Limitations
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Powers (Section 1, Rule IV; Sections 1-4, Rule VII)
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Prohibitions (Section 2, Rule IV; Section 1, Rule XII)
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Disqualifications (Section 4, Rule IV)
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(5). Instances when a Notary Public may refuse to notarize, issue certification (Sections 4, 5
& 6, Rule IV)
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(6). Jurisdiction and Period of Validity of Commission (Section 11, Rule III; Section9, Rule
b
IX)
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RE: VIOLATION OF RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE A.M. No. 09-6-1-SC,
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January 21, 2015, MENDOZA, J.: A review of the records and evidence presented by
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complainants shows that Atty. Siapno indeed maintained a law office in Lingayen, Pangasinan,
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just beside the law office of one of the complainants, Atty. Elizabeth Tugade. It was also proven
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that Atty. Siapno notarized several instruments with an expired notarial commission outside the
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territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court. Section 11, Rule III of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice provides:
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“Jurisdiction and Term – A person commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in
any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of two (2)
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years commencing the first day of January of the year in which the commissioning is made,
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unless earlier revoked or the notary public has resigned under these Rules and the Rules of
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Court.”
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(7). Reportorial Requirement (Section 12, Rule III; Sections 1-6, Rule VI; and Sections 1-2,
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Rule VIII)
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CRESCENCIANO M. PITOGO v. ATTY. JOSELITO TROY SUELLO, A.C. No. 10695,
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March 18, 2015, Leonen, J: For not faithfully reflecting the notarial deeds in his registration
b
book, Atty. Joselito Troy Suello was found GUILTY of violating Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the
o
Code of Professional Responsibility and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Accordingly, he
R
was SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months; his notarial commission was
immediately revoked; and was DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as notary public for
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one (1) year
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26 | P a g e
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(8). Disciplinary Sanctions/Death of a Notary Public
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Revocation of commission ((Section 1, Rule XI)
Suspension from practice as a lawyer
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Death of a Notary Public (Section 4, Rule XI)
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Q. Can a notary public dissolve marriage?
R o A. No. Espinosa v. Atty. Julieta A.Omana, A.C. No. 9081, October 12, 2011: The S.C. revoked
the notarial commission of a lawyer and she was likewise suspended from the practice of law for
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notarizing a document which effectively dissolved the marriage of the complainants.
B a
Q. Is a lawyer required to recall the identity of the affiants after a lapse of five years?
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A. No. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Arguelles, 679 SCRA 348 (2012): The S.C.
l
held that it is sufficient for the Notary Public to ascertain the identities of the affiants and the
b
witnesses at the time of the execution of the document. The Notary Public must rely on the
o
presumption that the proofs of identity of the parties were issued by the public agencies in the
R
regular course of the discharge of their responsibilities. It is also not practical for a notary
public to recall the affiants 12 years after they personally appeared before him.
an a r
Q. Can a lawyer continue to notarize documents with an expired commission?
B
C h s
A. No. Tenoso v. Echanez, A.C. No. 8384, 11 April 2013: By performing his duties without
e
renewing his notarial commission, the S.C. said that he committed acts of falsehood and must be
punished.
b l
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Q. Can a lawyer notarize the statement executed by his sister-in-law?
R
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A. No. Jandoquile v. Revilla, A.C. No.9514, 10 April 2013: The Notarial Rules of 2004
a
disqualifies lawyers from notarizing documents of relatives up to the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity. The defense of Atty. Revilla that he notarized the Affidavit-Complaint
B
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of his relative by his virtue of the fact that he was the counsel in the criminal case is not availing
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according to the Court. The S.C. held that since he signed it with the details of his notarial
commission leads to no other conclusion that he signed it as a Notary Public and not as counsel.
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The S.C. reiterated the rule that where the affiants are personally known to the Notary Public,
the jurat must state so, otherwise, parties must show proof of competent identity.
R o
Q. Can VIOLATION of one’s notarial commission be included in the conduct of the
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disbarment of the lawyer although the same was not raised in the complaint?
A. Yes. Virtusio v. Virtusio, 680 SCRA 1(2012): The IBP Investigating Commissioner
B a
C h
discovered in the course of the disciplinary proceeding against Virtusio that she failed to renew
s
e
her notarial commission in 2006 and 2007. While it was not a subject of the complaint, the S.C.
l
held that the infraction can be scrutinized in the investigation. The S.C. revoked the notarial
b
commission of the lawyer, did not allow her to renew the same and suspended her from the
practice of law for deliberate falsehood for holding out to the public that she has been properly
commissioned to notarized documents.
R o
n
Q. What is the culpability of a lawyer for failure to ascertain the identity of an affiant?
a
h
A. Wilberto C. Talisic v. Atty. Primo R. Rinen, A.C. No. 8761, February 12, 2014: A lawyer’s
C s
notarial commission was revoked and he was not allowed to renew the same for one year for
e
failure to ascertain the identities of the parties who executed an Extra Judicial Partition with
l
Sale which allowed the transfer to Spouses Durante of a parcel of land. Notarization is not an
empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only
those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.
o b
Carlito Ang v. Atty. James Joseph Gupana, A.C. No. 4545. February 5, 2014: The Supreme
R
an
Court held that Atty. Gupana’s revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from
being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years and suspension from the
practice of law for one year are in order for failure to require the personal presence of the
affiant in an Affidavit of Loss purportedly executed in 1994.
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27 | P a g e
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Licerio Dizon v. Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr., A.C. No. 10185, March 12, 2014 . The S.C.
s
held that as a notary public, Atty. Cabucana, Jr. should not notarize a document unless the
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person who signs it is the same person executing it and personally appearing before him to attest
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to the truth of its contents. This is to enable him to verify the genuineness of the signature of the
acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party’s free and voluntary act and
o
deed. Thus, Atty. Cabucana, Jr. was found violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
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Professional Responsibility and suspended from the practice of law for three months. His
notarial commission was revoked and he was prohibited from being commissioned as a notary
n public for two years.
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Q. What is the liability of a lawyer for notarizing a document when the affiant is already
s
dead?
l e
A. Atty.Florita S. Linco v. Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebral, A.C. No. 7241, October 17, 2011: A notary
public who notarized a Deed of Donation of another lawyer one day after his death to the
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detriment of the interests of the surviving lawyer-spouse, was suspended by the S.C.
Important matters to consider:
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Jurat (Section 6, Rule II) and Acknowledgment (Section1, Rule II), distinguished
an a r
Competent Evidence of Identity (Section 12, Rule 2)
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JIMMY ANUDON AND JUANITA ANUDON v. ATTY. ARTURO B. CEFRA, A.C. No. 5482.
C s
February 10, 2015, Leonen, J. Without the ascertaining the personal presence of the affiants,
l e
the Court imposed upon the errant lawyer the perpetual disqualification for notarial
commission, revocation of notarial commission and suspension from the practice of law. The
abroad.
o b
lawyer was found to have notarized a Deed of Sale of a property while the complainants were
R
Q. Can a notary public delegate his duties as a notary public?
an r
A. No. MELANIO S. SALITA, v. ATTY. REYNALDO T. SALVE. A.C. No. 8101, February 04,
a
2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: A notary public should not notarize a document unless the
B
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persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared
e s
before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein. These acts of the
affiants cannot be delegated because what are stated therein are facts they have personal
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knowledge of and are personally sworn to. Otherwise, their representative’s names should
appear in the said documents as the ones who executed the same. As a lawyer commissioned to
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be a notary public, Atty. Salve is mandated to discharge his sacred duties with faithful
observance and utmost respect for the legal solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment or jurat.
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Affirmation or Oath (Section 2, Rule II) and Signature Witnessing (Section 14, Rule II),
distinguished
B a
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3. Upholding the dignity of the legal profession
s
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CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
l
and support the activities of the integrated bar. (Rules 7.01-7.03)
o b
Q. What is the liability of a lawyer for failure to uphold the dignity of the legal profession?
A. The lawyer may be disbarred by the Supreme Court which he tarnishes the image of the legal
R
profession which tends to erode public trust in the administration of justice.
a n
Keld Stemmerik v. Atty. Leonuel N. Mas, A.C. 8010, June 16, 2009: A lawyer was disbarred by
taking advantage of the lack of knowledge of Philippine laws by a foreigner. Atty. Mas drew up a
commerce of man.
C h
Deed of Sale of a property in Subic which is part of public domain and therefore outside the
s
OCA v. Liangco, supra: S.C. said: “We are appalled by the respondent’s ignorance of the basic
l e
b
rules of procedure. His wanton use of court processes in this case without regard for the
o
repercussions on the rights and property of others clearly shows his unfitness to remain a
R
member of the bar.”
an
In Re: Pactolin, supra: The S.C. ruled: “As a rule, this Court exercises the power to disbar with
caution. x x yet this Court has also consistently pronounced that disbarment is the appropriate
penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. x xx His conduct
him as a vanguard of the legal profession.”

C h
only exacerbates his offense and shows that he falls short of the exacting standards expected of
28 | P a g e
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4. Courtesy, fairness and candor towards professional colleagues
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CANON 8 – A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his
8.02)
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professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. (Rules 8.01-
b l
Q. Can a lawyer share his professional fees with a non-lawyer?
R o A. No. As a general rule a lawyer is not allowed to his professional fees with a non-lawyer.
Villatuya v. Tabalingcos, 676 SCRA 37(2012): This disbarment case is hinged on the
n r
complainant’s demand from respondent lawyer to settle money obligations out of their business
a
transactions. The first ground he raised involves non-payment of agreed fees for every Stay
B
Order obtained from the court and 10% commission from every referral; the second is that the
s
lawyer set up two financial companies as fronts to solicit legal services and committing two
e
counts of bigamy for having married two other women while his first marriage was still
subsisting.
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On the first issue, the Court said that there is violation where a lawyer shares his fees with a
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non-lawyer. In this case, complainant failed to proffer evidence. On the issue of solicitation, the
Court held that it would appear that there was an attempt to circumvent the prohibition on
an r
advertising one’s services, reprimand is the proper penalty because there is no evidence on the
a
prevalence to use the two financial companies to solicit. The Court reminded lawyer to be clear
h B
as to what services they are rendering if they have multiple professions. On the issue of gross
s
immorality, the belated move of the lawyer to institute civil actions to annul his marriages will
C e
not exculpate him. The Court held: “ x x x respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree
l
of morality required of him x x x. He made a mockery of marriage, x x x. His acts of committing
b
bigamy twice constituted gross immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section
o
27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of court.”
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5. No assistance in the unauthorized practice of law
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CANON 9 – A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
a
(Rules 9.01-9.02)
B
Ch
Q. What constitutes unauthorized practice of law?
e s
A. Tapay et al v. Attys. Charlie L. Bancolo et al, A. C. No. 9604, March 20, 2013: A lawyer who
l
allowed his secretary to sign his pleading in the Office of the Ombudsman is guilty of violation of
b
Canon 9.Only lawyers are allowed to sign pleadings and the same cannot be delegated.
o
Atty. Edita Noe – Lacsamana v. Atty. Yolando F. Bustamente (A.C. No. 7269, November
R
23, 2011: A lawyer who allowed a paralegal to attend court hearings on his behalf has violated
an r
Canon 9 because only lawyers are allowed to undertake representation clients before the
regional trial courts.
B a
C h
TUMBOKON v. PEFIANCO, 678 SCRA 60 (2012): This case also deals with the lawyer’s
s
commitment to share a portion of his legal fees with a non-lawyer in a case for partition of estate
l e
which complainant referred to Pefianco. The lawyer was found guilty of this violation by his
admission in a letter he wrote to the parties in the partition case. On the second charge of
o b
abandoning his legal wife to cohabit with his mistress with whom he has four children, the Court
that it was a clear “betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual relations outside marriage”
R
and is “considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity
n
of marriage and marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.”
C. Duty to the Courts
a
1. Candor, fairness and good faith towards the courts
C h s
e
CANON 10 – A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. (Rules 10.01-10.02)
Read also Rule 138, Section 20(c) and (d), Rules of Court, Duties of Attorneys
bl
o
Q. Can a Senator be exonerated from any liability for calling the Supreme Court as a “court
of idiots”?
R
an
A. Antero J. Pobre v. Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009. S.C.
exonerated the respondent for calling the S.C. justices as a “court of idiots”. She invoked
parliamentary immunity.
C h
29 | P a g e
a r
Q. Is a lawyer liable for resorting to a fraudulent order of the court to gain custody of his
B
minor children?
s
A. Yes. Natasha Hueysuwan-Florido v. Atty. James Benedict C. Florido, A.C. No. 5624,
e
Jan.20, 2004). S.C. suspended lawyer for resorting to a fraudulent order purportedly issued by
b l
the Court of Appeals awarding custody of his children pending the annulment case filed by his
complainant-wife.
R o 2. Respect for courts and judicial officers

CANON 11 – A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
n r
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others (Rules 11.01-11.05)
a
B
Q. Are professors of law considered engaged in the practice of profession and are therefore
subject to disciplinary action of the Supreme Court? De Castro, J.
e s
A. Yes. Re: Letter of the U.P. Law Faculty on Allegations of Plagiarism and
b l
Misrepresentation of the S.C., A. M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011. The S.C. reminded the
faculty members of the U.P.College of Law to be more circumscribed with the filing of similar
o
complaint against the members of the judiciary. It noted that the concerned justice already
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admitted the lapse and that it was not done with malice. His good faith relieved him from any
kind of administrative liability.
an a r
3. Assistance in the speedy and efficient administration of justice
h B
CANON 12 – A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy
C s
and efficient administration of justice. (Rules 12.01-12.08)
l e
Read also Rule 138, Section 20(g) Rules of Court – Duties of Attorneys; and
o b
Article III, Section 16, Constitution – Right to speedy disposition of cases.
4. Reliance on merits of his cause and avoidance of any impropriety which tends to
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influence the appearance of influence upon the courts
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CANON 13 – A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause refrain from any impropriety
a
which tends to influence or gives the appearance of influencing court. (Rules 13.01- 13.03)
B
Ch
Q. Can a lawyer be held liable for drafting the decision on behalf of a judge in an effort to
help declog court dockets?
e s
b l
A. Yes. Lantoria v. Bunyi, A.M. Case No. 1769, June 8, 1992. A lawyer should not take it upon
himself to prepare a draft decision on behalf of a judge. Such an action of the counsel
o
undermines the competence of the judiciary and will tend to erode confidence in the judicial
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system.
an r
Q. Is it proper for a lawyer to make pronouncements in the media regarding a pending case?
A. No. Cruz v. Salva, G. R. 12871, July 25, 1959, 105 Phil. 115. The S.C. cautioned lawyers
B a
h
from attracting media attention over a pending case.
C
Q. Are court decisions subject to criticism?
e s
b l
A. Yes. In Re: Almacen G.R. No. L-27654, Feb. 18, 1970. Lawyers as part of free speech may
criticize decisions of the Court but such post litigation utterances must never be resorted in
o
order to malign the Court.
D. Duty to Clients
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(i) Services regardless of a person’s status
a n
CANON 14 – A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy. (Rules 14.01-14.04)
C h
Read: Rule 138, Section 20, Rules of Court on Duties of Attorneys (h) and (i)
s
Rule 138, Section 31, Rules of Court on Attorneys for Destitute Litigant
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(ii) Services as counsel de oficio primarily in CRIMINAL CASES
- Appointment as Counsel de oficio (to represent accused in criminal proceedings)
o b
Read: Rule 116, Section 6, Rules of Court, Right to Counsel of an Accused
R
an
Rule 117, Section 7, Rules of Court, Appointment of Counsel de oficio during trial
C h
30 | P a g e
a r
Q. Who may be appointed as counsel de oficio?
B
A. A lawyer in good standing; or any person who reside where the case is filed, of good repute
s
for probity and ability where there is no lawyer in the jurisdiction.
l e
Q. What factors are considered in the appointment of a counsel de oficio?
b
A. The following factors are considered: gravity of the offense, difficulty of the issues involved
o
and experience and ability of the appointee.
R
Q. What is the rule of the designation of Counsel de officio before an appellate court?
n r
A. Rule 124, Section 2, Rules of Court: Conditions for appointment: accused is in prison, there is
a
no counsel de parte on appeal and accused signed notice of appeal himself.
B
s
Q. What are valid grounds for refusal to be engaged as counsel?
e
A. The following grounds may be invoked: where engagement may result into conflict of
b l
interest, when lawyer is unable to represent a party due to pressing professional matters that need
his attention, when what the client wishes the client to undertake is patently illegal, when the
o
client agrees in writing to retire his representation or where after due notice and hearing, the
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court allows the counsel to withdraw his appearance in an action or special proceeding, other
similar grounds.
an a r
2. Candor, fairness and loyalty to clients
h B
CANON 21 – A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client even after the
C s
attorney-client relation is terminated.
l e
(i) Confidentiality rule: Rule will cover partners in legal profession and non-legal staff
b
working for the lawyer.
o
(ii) Privileged communications. Sec. 21(b), Rule 130 will apply.
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(iii) Conflict of interest: Disclose matters that would give rise to representation of two
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adverse interests. Conflict of Interest, concept; when lawyer may lawyer may held
a
accountable; liability
B
Ch
Q. When can a lawyer be found liable for conflict of interest?
e s
A. Pacana v. Pascual-López, A.C. No. 8243, July 24, 2009. A lawyer who acted as a retained
l
counsel of a company was disbarred for also rendering advice to the creditors of the company.
b
The S.C. reminded lawyers to avoid at all times any occasion where they will represent two
adverse interests.
R o
Notes on Issue of Conflict of Interest: The nature of lawyer and client relationship is one of
trust and confidence of the highest degree.
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1. A lawyer would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his
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present or former clients.
C s
2. A lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same or a substantially
consents to it after consultation.

l e
related matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former client
o b
3. Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts
connected with the client’s case, including the weak and strong points of the case.
R
Knowledge and information gathered in the course of the relationship must be treated as
n
sacred and guarded with care and to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-
a
dealing, for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers,
h
which is paramount in the administration of justice.
C
3. Candid and honest advice to clients: Give a fair assessment of the case referral.
e s
l
CANON 15 – A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
b
transactions with his clients. (Rules 15.01-15.08)
When lawyer-client relationship commences: no formal contract is needed, it is sufficient that
the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any manner pertinent to his
R o
an
profession.
Ferdinand A. Samson v. Atty. Edgardo O. Era, A.C. No. 6664, July 16, 2013. S.C. said that the
h
termination of the attorney-client relationship does not justify a lawyer to represent an interest
C
adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The spirit behind this rule is that the
31 | P a g e
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client’s confidence once given should not be stripped by the mere expiration of the professional
B
employment. As a general rule, the ban on disclosure of client’s confidences is perpetual. Thus,
s
Atty. Era was found guilty of Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 and Canon 17 of the CPR and was
e
suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years
l
4. Compliance with laws: No one is above the Rule of Law
b
o
5. Concurrent practice of another profession: pay separate PTRs; one profession is
governed by the Professional Regulation Commission and the legal profession by the
R Supreme Court.
n a r
5. Dealing with Client’s monies and properties
B
CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come
s
into his profession. (Rules 16.01-16.04)
e
(i)Fiduciary relationship
l
b
(ii) Co-mingling of funds: A lawyer must not co-mingle his personal funds with those of his
o
client.
(iii) Delivery of funds: A lawyer must promptly surrender to his client and/ or account for
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any money received by way of a money judgment or proceeds from a transaction he
an r
handled in the course of his engagement.
a
(iv) Borrowing or lending: A lawyer must refrain from borrowing money from his client.
B
C h s
Please note: Article 1491(5), New Civil Code which covers the prohibition against
e
lawyers to participate in any public or judicial auction of a property or rights where his
l
professional services were engaged.
o b
Q. Is it proper for a lawyer to ask from her client for an advance for her professional fees and
thereafter not render any kind of legal service to the client? A.
R
A. No. Victoria C. Heenan v. Atty. Erlinda Espejo, A.C. No. 10050, December 3, 2013. S.C.
an r
found Atty. Espejo guilty of gross misconduct for failure pay a personal loan to her client which
a
she initially asked as an advance for her professional fees. The deliberate failure to pay just
B
Ch
debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct. A lawyer may be
s
disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession but also for gross
e
misconduct outside of his professional capacity. Thus, Atty. Espejo was suspended from the
l
practice of law for two (2) years.
o b
CECILIA AGNO VS. ATTY. MARCIANO J. CAGATAN [558 SCRA 1, December 7, 2010] A
lawyer who paid another with a personal check from a bank account which he knew has already
R
been closed exhibited an extremely low regard to his commitment to the oath he took when he
an r
joined his peers, thereby seriously tarnishing the image of the profession which he should hold in
a
high esteem.
h
Q. What instances would indicate violation of a lawyer’s fiduciary duty?
B
C s
A. Bayonla et al v. Atty. Purita A. Reyes, A. C. No. 4808, November 22, 2011. For her failure to
e
l
turn over to her clients the just compensation in an expropriation case, S.C. disbarred the
b
respondent lawyer.
o
Freeman v. Atty. Zenaida P. Reyes, A. C. No. 6246, November 15, 2011. S.C. disbarred
R
respondent-lawyer for employing deceit to personally gain from the proceeds of the insurance
claims and retirement benefits of the deceased British spouse of the complainant.
Important matters to consider on fiduciary duty:
a n
h
(1). Lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property received in the course
C s
of his engagement as counsel.
(2). Even if a lawyer has a lien for fees, he is bound to turnover any property or money
received on behalf of his client.
l e
(3). The turnover of money or property to his client is subject to lawyer’s lien.
o b
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All costs of litigation must be borne by the client.
an
5. Fidelity to client’s cause
h
CANON 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.
32 | P a g e
C
a r
Q. What is the nature of a lawyer-client relationship?
B
A. Josefina Carranza vida de Zaldívar v. Atty. Ramon SG Cabanes, Jr., A.C. No. 7749, July 8,
s
2013. S.C. suspended respondent lawyer for gross negligence in violation of Canon 17, and
l e
Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18 of the CPR. S.C. reiterated that the relationship between an
attorney and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. Whether his services are
o b
paid or rendered pro bono, a lawyer’s duty of competence and diligence includes not merely
reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsel’s care or giving sound legal advice, but also
R
consists of properly representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled
n r
hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled
a
cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the
B
court to prod him or her to do so. While such negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact
s
formulation, the Court has consistently held that the lawyer’s mere failure to perform the
e
obligations due his client is per se a violation.
b l
Notes on Issue of Conflict of Interest: The nature of lawyer and client relationship is one of
trust and confidence of the highest degree.
R o
4. A lawyer would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his
present or former clients.
an a r
5. A lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same or a substantially
B
related matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former client
C h consents to it after consultation.
s
e
6. Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts
l
connected with the client’s case, including the weak and strong points of the case.
b
Knowledge and information gathered in the course of the relationship must be treated as
o
sacred and guarded with care and to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-
R
dealing, for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers,
which is paramount in the administration of justice.
an a r
(iv) Duty to apprise client: The lawyer must inform the client of the status of the case.
B
Ch
CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. (Rules 18.01-
s
18.04)
l e
Q. What characterizes the duty of a lawyer to serve his client with competence and diligence?
o b
A. Felipe C. Dagala v. Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr. and Atty. Amado T. Adquilen, A.C. No. 5044,
December 2, 2013. S.C. reiterated the need for lawyers to be ever mindful of the cause of their
R
clients and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. For
an r
his part, the lawyer is required to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and
a
to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and
B
whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He is expected to act with honesty in all his dealings,
C h
especially with the courts. These principles are embodied in Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rule 10.01 of
s
e
Canon 10, Canon 17 and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the CPR. Atty. Quesada’s failure to attend
l
the scheduled conference hearings, despite due notice and without any proper justification,
b
exhibits his inexcusable lack of care and diligence in managing his client’s cause in violation of
o
Canon 17 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR.
R
Stephan Brunet and Virginia Romanillo Brunet v. Atty. Ronald L. Guaren, A.C. No. 10164,
n
March 10, 2014. For having violated Canons 17 and 18 of the CPR, Atty. Guaren was suspended
a
from the practice of law for six months. Despite acceptance of the amount of P7,000.00 for the
titling of complainants’ lot, he failed to perform his obligation and allowing 5 years to elapse
h
without any progress on the referral. S.C. reiterated that the practice of law is not a business and
C s
e
it reminded lawyers that the duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be
l
the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they
b
owe to themselves. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law
o
advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits
R
Julian Penilla v. Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr., A.C. No. 9149, September 4, 2013: The Court held
an
that Atty. Alcid, Jr. violated Canon 18 and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he filed a criminal case for estafa when the facts of the case would have
warranted the filing of a civil case for breach of contract; when the case was dismissed he
C h
committed another similar blunder by filing a civil case for specific performance and damages
before the RTC, when he should have filed it with the MTC; and he did not also apprise
33 | P a g e
a r
complainant of the status of the cases. Atty. Alcid, Jr. is not only guilty of incompetence in
B
handling the cases. His lack of professionalism in dealing with complainant is gross and
inexcusable. The legal profession dictates that it is not a mere duty, but an obligation, of a
s
lawyer to accord the highest degree of fidelity, zeal and fervor in the protection of the client’s
e
l
interest.
o b
Carlito P. Carandang v. Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina, A. C. No. 7813, Apr. 21, 2009.In a June 3,
2013 case, S.C. reiterated that the Attorney’s negligence to file an appellate brief and his failure
R
to inform the client that the case was dismissed because of his negligence is guilty of violating
Canon 18. Similarly, a lawyer who falsifies the date of receipt of the decision to make it appear
n r
that the time was filed within the prescriptive period is also guilty of negligence and was slapped
with a monetary fine.
a
B
s
Ermelinda Lad vda. De Dominguez, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, Vicente A. Pichon v.
e
Atty. Arnulfo M. Agleron Sr.,A.C. No. 5359, March 10, 2014.The S. C. held that once a lawyer
l
takes up the cause of his client, he is duty bound to serve his client with competence, and to
b
attend to his client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion regardless of whether he accepts it
o
for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed on him. For his failure to promptly file a pleading he already signed on the
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ground that his client did not send the filing fees and 30% of his professional fees, the S.C. was
an r
suspended for three months The Court said that this act exhibited his lack of professionalism.
To summarize:
B a
C h s
On the Duty to Serve with Competence and Diligence
e
(i) Adequate protection: A lawyer must ensure the appropriate legal reliefs for his client.
l
b
(ii) Negligence: A client is bound by the negligence of his counsel.
o
(iii) Collaborating Counsel: With the consent of the client, a collaborating counsel may
R
participate in an on-going case
an r
7. Representation with zeal within legal bounds
Q. What is the recourse of a party who has lost a case?
B a
Ch s
A. Re: Verified Complaint of Tomas S. Merdegia against Hon. Vicente S.E. Veloso, etc. /Re:
e
Resolution dated October 8, 2013 in OCA IPI No. 12-205-CA-J against Atty. Homobono
l
Adaza II, IPI No. 12-205-CA-J/A.C. No. 10300, December 10, 2013. S.C. held administrative
b
complaints against justices cannot and should not substitute for appeal and other judicial
o
remedies against an assailed decision or ruling. While a lawyer has a duty to represent his client
with zeal, he must do so within the bounds provided by law. It found Atty. Adaza guilty of
R
indirect contempt for his failure to impress upon his client the features of the Philippine
an r
adversarial system, the substance of the law on ethics and respect for the judicial system, and his
own failure to heed what his duties as a professional and as an officer of the Court demand of
B a
h
him in acting for his client before the courts.
C
(i) Use of fair and honest means: A lawyer must only employ such legal strategy allowed by
e s
l
the circumstances.
b
(ii) Client’s fraud: A lawyer must not condone any illegal acts of his client.
R o
(iii) Procedure in handling the case: The lawyer’s acceptance and the limits of the
engagement of his services must be made clear at the commencement of the lawyer-client
n
relationship.
a
CANON 19 – A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.
client with zeal within the bounds of law?

C h
Q. When will the lawyer be held accountable for violation of the responsibility to serve his
s
Dimagiba v. Montalvo, Jr. Adm. Case No. 1424, October 15, 1991. Lawyer was disbarred for
l e
b
stretching for almost 49 years a case involving a probate of a will from which more than other
o
ten criminal and civil suits were instituted.
R
Ong v. Unto, Adm. Case No. 2417, February 6, 2003. S.C. suspended a lawyer for six months for
an
using harassing tactics to harass a party from him his client wanted to obtain child support.
CANON 20 – A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.
C h
Czarina T. Malvar v. Kraft Foods Phils., Inc., et al., G.R. No. 183952, September 9, 2011: The
case stemmed from the execution of a final decision with the C.A. in a labor litigation. Petitioner
34 | P a g e
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Malvar, however, entered into a compromise agreement with the respondents pending appeal
B
without informing her counsel. Malvar’s counsel filed a Motion to Intervene to Protect
Attorney’s Rights.
e s
S.C., on considerations of equity and fairness, disapproved of the tendencies of clients
b l
compromising their cases behind the backs of their attorneys for the purpose of unreasonably
reducing or completely setting to naught the stipulated contingent fees. It said that even if the
o
compensation of the attorney is dependent only on winning the litigation, the subsequent
R
withdrawal of the case upon the client’s initiative would not deprive the attorney of the
legitimate compensation for professional services rendered.
n a r
Attorney’s fees: (i) Acceptance fees; (ii) Contingency fee arrangements; (iii) Attorney’s
B
liens; (iv) Fees and controversies with clients; (v) Concepts of attorney’s fees - (a) ordinary
e s
concept and (b) extraordinary concept.
b l
On Lawyer’s fees and other charges:
Read Rule 138, Section 24, Rules of Court on Compensation of Attorneys
R o
Rule 138, Section 12, Rules of Court on Compensation for Attorneys de officio
Rule 138, Section 37, Rules of Court on Charging Lien
an a r
Q. What is a charging lien?
h B
A. A charging lien is the right which the attorney has upon all judgments for payment of money,
s
and executions in pursuance of such judgments, obtained in favor of the client, to secure
C e
reimbursement for advances made and payment of attorney’s fees.
Q. What is a retaining fee?

b l
o
A. A retaining fee can partake of an acceptance fee and covers professional fees for services
rendered including the payment of such amount of amount as may be agreed upon by the
R
parties in the course of handling a legal matter for the client.
an r
Read Rule 20.01 of CPR and Rule 138, Section 24 on factors to consider in charging fees
a
(importance of the subject matter of controversy, extent of services rendered, professional
B
Ch
standing)
Q. What is the concept of Quantum Meruit?

e s
b l
A. A lawyer will receive such amount commensurate the services he rendered during the period
of lawyer-client relationship which may have been severed by either party during the pendency
o
of the referral. It may also collected in event of the death of counsel before the resolution of the
R
case.
an r
Q. What is champerty?
A. A champertous contract may result where a lawyer assumes all expenses for litigation and
B a
h
reimbursement is contingent on the outcome of the case. This is strictly prohibited under Rule
C s
16-04 of the CPR.
l e
Champerty is different from a contingent fee contract because in the latter the lawyer gets
b
reimbursed for the advances made for the client in the course of representation, whether he
wins the suit or not; only the amount of professional fees is contingent upon winning.
Q. May a lawyer have a lien on a judgment to protect his professional fees?
R o
n
A. Yes. Conchita Baltazar, et al. v. Atty. Juan B. Bañez, Jr., A.C. No. 9091, December 11,
a
2013.
C h
Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court allows an attorney to intervene in a case to protect his
rights concerning the payment of his compensation. The court, may at its discretion, allow the
s
lawyer to have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money rendered in a case in which
his services have been retained by the client. In this case, however, the contract for legal
l e
services is in the nature of a champertous contract – an agreement whereby an attorney
undertakes to pay the expenses of the proceedings to enforce the client’s rights in exchange for
o b
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some bargain to have a part of the thing in dispute. Such contracts are prohibited under Canon
an
16.04 of the CPR, which states that lawyers shall not lend money to a client, except when in the
interest of justice, they have to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter they are handling
for the client.
C h
35 | P a g e
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Q. What is the nature of a champertous contract?
B
A. In Re: The Conjugal Partnership of the Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy-
s
Cadavedo (both deceased), substituted by their Heirs, namely: Herminia, Pastora, Heirs of
e
Fructiosa, Heirs of Raquel, Evangeline, Vicente, Jr., and Armand, all surnamed Cadavedo,
b l
G.R. No. 173188. January 15, 2014.The Court held that the contingent fee of P2000 should
control the agreement of counsel and his clients although the same was contingent upon winning
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the case. The Court said that granting arguendo that the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya
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indeed entered into an oral contingent fee agreement securing to the latter one-half of the
subject lot, the agreement is void. The agreement is champertous and is contrary to public
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policy. Any agreement by a lawyer to “conduct the litigation in his own account, to pay the
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expenses thereof or to save his client therefrom and to receive as his fee a portion of the
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proceeds of the judgment is obnoxious to the law.”
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8. Preservation of client’s confidences: (i) Prohibited disclosures and use; (ii) Disclosures,
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when allowed: The disclosures made a client to a lawyer are covered by the privileged
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communications rule. The lawyer may, however, disclose information relayed to him by a
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client when the latter is about to commit a crime or when there is a dispute between the lawyer
and his client and the information is vital in the defense of the lawyer.
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Q. When is lawyer released from his non-disclosure duty?
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A. Palm v. Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr. A.C. No. 8243, July 24, 2009. The S.C. held that a lawyer is
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released from his non-disclosure duty when he files with a government agency a pleading or any
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document on behalf of his client. The Court said that the right to information is protected under
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the Bill of Rights.
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CANON 22 – A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice
appropriate in the circumstances.
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9. Withdrawal of Services: valid, justifiable reasons for withdrawal
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PART TWO - JUDICIAL ETHICS
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I. Sources of Judicial Ethics: 1. The Constitution; 2. The Rules of Court; 3. Statues
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creating courts; 4. The New Canons of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (took
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effect on June 1, 2004 per A.M. 03-05-01-SC) which was patterned after the Bangalore
II. Membership in the Judiciary

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Draft of Code of Judicial Conduct; and .5. Code of Judicial Conduct
Qualifying to the Bench

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1. Members of the Supreme Court and lower appellate courts: Section 7(1), Article VIII,
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1987 Constitution mandates that a Justice of the Supreme Court and all collegiate appellate
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courts must be a natural born Filipino.
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Qualifications of SC Justice: natural born Filipino, at least be 40 years old, must have been for
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15 years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
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2. Members of the lower courts (regional trial courts and first level courts): Section 7(2),
article VIII, 1987 Constitution provides that Congress shall provide for qualifications but one
must be citizen of the Philippines and member of the Philippine Bar.
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3. Common qualification for all members of the judiciary, Section 7(3), Article VIII, 1987
integrity, probity and independence.”

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Constitution provides: “A member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence,
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4. Term of Office: Section 11, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution provides that members of the
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judiciary “shall hold office during good behavior until they reach 70 years old or they become
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incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office.”
5. Manner of Selection and Appointment (Read Section 8, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution
for the composition, powers and term of office of members of the Judicial and Bar Council)
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Chavez v. JBC, et al., G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012: Congress is entitled only to one seat in
the JBC and not one for each house.
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Recent rulings related to the JBC:
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Villanueva v. JBC (2015): A first level trial court must await a 5-year period before he can be
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promoted as RTC judge. The Court sustained the power of the JBC to prescribe rules in the
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screening of qualified candidates to the judiciary to ensure that only men of proven competence,
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integrity, probity and independence will be appointed to the bench.
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Jardeleza vs. Chief Justice Sereno and JBC (2015): Having been denied due process, Jardeleza
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should be included in the list of nominees to be appointed as justice of the Supreme Court. An
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issue about his integrity was raised in the selection process but Jardeleza was never given the
opportunity to be heard to overturn the allegation against him.
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Appointments made by the President in the judiciary do not need any confirmation by the
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Commission on Appointments. (Section 9. Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)
Please note that:
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Any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from the occurrence
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thereof. (Section 4(1), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)
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For lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within 90 days from the
submission of the list. (Section 9, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)
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Requirements in the discharge of responsibilities of members of the judiciary:
1. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
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distinctly, the facts and law on which it is based. (Section 14, Article VIII, 1987
Constitution)
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C h 2. Dedicated service to the judiciary
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3. Members of the judiciary shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-
4. SALN Requirement
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judicial or administrative functions. (Section12, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)
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Members of the Supreme Court shall not only report all their assets, liabilities, and
net worth upon assumption to duty but they must disclose such to the PUBLIC in
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the manner provided by law. (Section 17, Article XI, 1987 Constitution)
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5. Allegiance to the Philippine Government. Any public officer owes allegiance to the
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Philippine government and its Constitution and a public officer who seeks to change
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citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his
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tenure shall be dealt with by law.(Section 18, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)
JUDICIAL CONDUCT: I.I.I. PECd):

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III. Qualities (Commit this MEMORY AS THIS REPRESENTS THE SIX CANONS OF
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Canon 1: Independence
Canon 2: Integrity
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Canon 3: Impartiality
Canon 4: Propriety
Canon 5: Equality
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Canon 6: Competence and diligence
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A. Uphold the Dignity and Independence of the Court
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CANON 1 – A judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the Judiciary. (Sections 1-
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7)
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Two aspects of independence: institutional independence and personal independence: What is
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expected of judges: to discharge their functions based solely on a fair assessment of the facts and
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invoking the appropriate provision of law in resolving issues presented before the court; and
shield themselves from any kind of influence from any party involved in the case.
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In Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, 664 SCRA 465 (2012): A complaint
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against justices of the Court of Appeals must be dismissed if the same is baseless and the
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recourse of the party is to seek judicial relief from an adverse decision.
In Re: S.C. Resolution dated 28April 2003 in G.R. Nos. 146817 and 145822, (Atty. Pena) 669
SCRA 530(2012): A motion to inhibit the ponente in a pending case before the S.C. based on
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suspicion of bribery in the form of a brand new Mercedes Benz and collusion with another senior
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associate justice of S.C. cannot be given due course. Counsel must show proof that a connection
and direct correlation exists between his failure to receive a copy of its Motion for Clarification
of the other party. He alleged that the incident did not allow him to refute the allegations therein.
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The Court said that such imputation is “completely untenable and irresponsible.”
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Talens-Dabon v. Arceo, A.M. 1. No. RTJ-96-1336, July 25, 1996: A judge was dismissed from
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service for gross misconduct for sexually harassing his Clerk of Court.
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Go v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992, 206 SCRA 165. The Court held
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that the complainant was not deprived of due process when the charge against him was
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upgraded from grave serious injuries to homicide. It said that when the death occurred after the
filing of the first information the same can be amended as a matter of course.
R o B. Avoid Impropriety: CANON 2 – A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities. (Sections 1-3)
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Rex M. Tupal v. Judge Remegio V. Rojo, etc., A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842. February 24, 2014.The
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Court held Judge Rojo guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and Circular No. 1–
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90, and of gross ignorance of the law. He was suspended for six months for having notarized
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affidavits of cohabitation, which were documents not connected with the exercise of his official
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functions and duties as solemnizing officer. He also notarized affidavits of cohabitation without
certifying that lawyers or notaries public were lacking in his court’s territorial jurisdiction. As a
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solemnizing officer, the judge’s only duty involving the affidavit of cohabitation is to examine
whether the parties have indeed lived together for at least five years without legal impediment to
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marry. The Guidelines does not state that the judge can notarize the parties’ affidavit of
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cohabitation. Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent with the duty to examine the
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parties’ requirements for marriage. Circular No. 1–90 dated February 26, 1990. Circular No.
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1–90 allows municipal trial court judges to act as notaries public ex officio and notarize
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documents only if connected with their official functions and duties.
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Samson v. Judge Caballero, A. M. No. RT J-08- 213, 595 SCRA 423. The newly appointed
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judge was not allowed to assume his post as RTC judge of Cabanatuan City for his material
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misrepresentation in his application form. Caballero did not disclose that a graft and corruption
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charge was filed against him before the Office of the Ombudsman when he served as a
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prosecutor.
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Suarez v. Judge Dilag, A. M. No. RT J-06-2014, March 4, 2009, 580 SCRA 491. A judge was
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dismissed from service due to gross misconduct. The judge was found to have officiated several
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marriage rites in a short span of time without having resolved the numerous cases pending
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before his court.
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Santos v. Judge Arcaya- Chua, A. M. No. MT J-07-20093, February 17, 2009. A judge was
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suspended by the Court for having accepted money to intercede on behalf of her husband’s
relative in a pending case before the Supreme Court where she was previously employed.
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Inonog v. Judge Ibay, A. M. No. RT J-09-2175, July 28, 2009, 594 SCRA 168. A judge was fined
by the Court for “oppressive” conduct for citing a driver in contempt of court for having parked
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the car of his employer in the parking slot assigned to the judge. The judge imposed upon the
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driver a monetary fine.
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Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Edwin C. Larida, Jr., RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay
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City, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2151, March 11, 2014. The Court held that Judge Larida, Jr. committed
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several lapses, specifically the non-submission to the Court of the required inventory of locally-
funded employees, and his allowing Marticio to draft court orders. Such lapses manifested a
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wrong attitude towards administrative rules and regulations issued for the governance and
administration of the lower courts, to the extent of disregarding them, as well as a laxity in the
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control of his Branch and in the supervision of its functioning staff. The omission to submit the
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inventory should not be blamed on Atty. Calma as the Branch Clerk of Court. Although it was
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very likely that Judge Larida, Jr. had tasked Atty. Calma to do and submit the inventory in his
behalf, Judge Larida, Jr. as the Presiding Judge himself remained to be the officer directly
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burdened with the responsibility for doing so. Further, for knowingly allowing detailed
employees to solicit commissions from bonding companies, Judge Larida, Jr. contravened the
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Code of Judicial Conduct, which imposed on him the duty to take or initiate appropriate
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disciplinary measures against court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which he would
have become aware.
Antonio M. Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br. 2, Batangas City, A.M. No.
RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014. The Court held the conduct of Judge Austria of and posting a
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picture with indecent attire for the public’s consumption in her Frendster account is
inappropriate. The Court held that she was guilty of impropriety. While judges are not
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prohibited from becoming members of and from taking part in social networking activities,
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they do not shed off their status as judges. They carry with them in cyberspace the same ethical
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responsibilities and duties that every judge is expected to follow in his/her everyday activities.
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Judge Austria was guilty of impropriety when she posted her pictures in a manner viewable by
the public. Joining Friendster per se does not violate the New Code of Judicial Conduct. The
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Court said Judge Austria disregarded the propriety and appearance of propriety required of her
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when she posted Friendster photos of herself wearing an “off-shouldered” suggestive dress and
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made this available for public viewing. .
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C. Maintain Impartiality
R CANON 3 – A judge should perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality and
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diligence. (Sections 1-6)
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Paco v. Quilala, et. Al., A. M. No. RT J-02-1699, 413 SCRA 364. A judge together with the Clerk
of Court and the court stenographer assigned to his court were also sanctioned by the S.C. The
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Court said that except for clarificatory questions, the judge may not be allowed to ask questions
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that would elicit answers to favor one of the parties to the case. It is not also proper for the judge
to allow the Clerk of Court to conduct any proceeding in the absence of the judge and for the
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stenographer to transcribe such proceedings.
Complaint against Chief Justice Corona dated Sept. 14, 2011 filed by Inter-Petal Recreational
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Corp., A.M. No. 12-6-10 SC, June 13, 2012. The complaint raised the issue on the capacity of
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then Chief Justice to decide on a pending case without any bias. The S.C. dismissed the
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complaint because the same has become moot and academic with the impeachment and eventual
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removal of Chief Justice Corona from office.
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Villaluz v. Mijares, A. M. No. RT J-98-1402, April 3, 1998, 288 SCRA 594. This case was filed
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by Justice Villaluz, the former spouse of Pasay City RTC Judge Mijares, against her. The S.C.
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called the attention of Mijares that the Rules of Court prohibit judges from hearing cases
involving relatives up to the sixth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. In the same fashion a
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degree of consanguinity or affinity.o
member of the bench may not hear cases where a counsel is a relative up to the fourth civil
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D. Duty to Improve the Law and the Administration of Justice
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CANON 4: A judge may, with due regard to official duties, engage in activities to improve the
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law, the legal system and the administration of justice. (Sections 1-15)
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Albos v. Alaba, A.M.No. MTJ-91517, March 11, 1994. A judge who failed to sign the order
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granting bail to the accused and who left for an out of town was found to have been remised of
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his responsibility as a judge.
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Danilo E. Lubaton v. Judge Mary Josephine P. Lazaro, Regional Trial Court, Br. 74,
Antipolo, Rizal, A.M. RTJ-12-2320, September 2, 2013. The S.C. held that the 90-day period
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within which a sitting trial Judge should decide a case or resolve a pending matter is mandatory.
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The rule, albeit mandatory, is to be implemented with an awareness of the limitations that may
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prevent a Judge from being efficient. Under the circumstances specific to this case, it would be
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unkind and inconsiderate on the part of the Court to disregard Judge Lazaro’s limitations and
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exact a rigid and literal compliance with the rule. With her undeniably heavy inherited docket
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and the large volume of her official workload, she most probably failed to note the need for her
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to apply for the extension of the 90-day period to resolve the Motion to Dismiss. .
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Re: Cases Submitted for Decision before Hon. Teofilo D. Baluma, Former Judge, Branch 1,
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Regional Trial Court, Tagbilaran City, Bohol, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2355, September 2, 2013.For
his failure to sufficiently explain why he failed to act on the twenty-three (23) cases submitted for
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decision/resolution, the S.C. imposed upon him administrative sanctions. Every judge should
decide cases with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and observant in the performance of
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his functions for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in
the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute.
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Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Santiago E. Soriano, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1683,
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September 11, 2013.
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The S.C. held that Judge Soriano has been remiss in the performance of his judicial duties for his
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failure to decide thirty-six (36) cases submitted for decision in MTC and MTCC, which were all
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due for decision at the time he compulsorily retired. Such unreasonable delay in deciding cases
and resolving incidents and motions, and his failure to decide the remaining cases before his
compulsory retirement constitutes gross inefficiency.
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Re: Failure of Former Judge Antonio A. Carbonell to Decide Cases Submitted for Decision
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and Resolve Pending Motions in the RTC, Branch 27, San Fernando, La Union, A.M. No. 08-
5-305-RTC, July 9, 2013.
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The S. C. said that Carbonell’s failure to decide cases within the reglamentary 90-day period
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without any justifiable and credible reasons constitutes gross inefficiency. The reiterated that as
a frontline official of the Judiciary, a trial judge should always act with efficiency and probity.
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He is duty-bound not only to be faithful to the law, but also to maintain professional competence.
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The pursuit of excellence ought always to be his guiding principle.
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E. Duty to Avoid Conflict with Judicial Responsibilities
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CANON 5: A judge should regulate extra-judicial activities to minimize the risk of conflict of
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judicial duties. (Sections 1 - 5)
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Re. Conviction of Judge Angeles, A. M. No. RT J-06-9-5215, 543 SCRA. The Court held that a
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judge cannot be suspended in the discharge of her responsibilities until after conviction of a
criminal offense she allegedly committed has become final and executory.
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Guanzon v. Judge Rufon, 537 SCRA 38. The Court reminded the family court judge to avoid
using vulgar language in the course of the trial. Use of vulgar language insults a witness and
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may also diminish the respect of the litigants towards the court because court proceedings are
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held in public.
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Sy v. Judge Fineza, A. M. RT J-03-1808, October 15, 2003, 413 SCRA 374. The Court will not
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condone the acts of judges of accepting money from a litigant with a pending case before his
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court nor should a judge be seen dining with a litigant facing a criminal case before his court.
F. Duty to Exhibit Competence and Diligence
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CANON 6: Competence and Diligence (Sections 1-7)
Narciso G. Dulalia v. Judge Afable E. Cajigal, RTC, Br. 96, Quezon City, A.M. No. OCA IPI
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No. 10-3492-RTJ, December 4, 2013. S.C. said that as a matter of public policy, a judge cannot
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be subjected to liability for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts
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in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called
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upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible
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in his judgment. The Court reminded parties that resort to judicial remedies must be exercised to
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question the decision of the trial judge. Bad faith on the part of the trial judge should never be
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imputed unless the same can be supported by evidence.
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Biggel v. Judge Pamintuan, A. M. No. RT J- 08-2101, 559 SCRA 344. The apparent bias
exhibited by the judge shown in the delay in the legal procedure cannot be condoned. S.C. held
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reminded judges of their pivotal role in the administration of justice.
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Bayaca v. Judge Ramos, A. M. No. MT J-07-1676, 577 SCRA 93. S.C. held that gross
misconduct and serious lapses in the conduct of the affairs of the court merit dismissal from the
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judiciary except for reasons of compassion, the Court awarded the retirement benefits of the
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judge who died during the pendency of this administrative case.
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Ma. Liza M. Jorda, City Prosecutor’s Office, Tacloban City v. Judge Crisologo S. Bitas, RTC,
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Branch 7, Tacloban City; Prosecutor Leo C. Tabao v. Judge Crisologo S. Bitas, RTC, Branch
7, Tacloban City,A.M. No. RTJ-14-2376/A.M. No. RTJ-14-2377. March 5, 2014. The Court held
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Judge Bitas judge liable for gross ignorance of the law when he deviated from the requirement of
a hearing where there is an application for bail and aggravated his offense when he also granted
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bail to Miralles without neither conducting a hearing nor a motion for application for bail When
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an error is so gross and patent, such error produces an inference of bad faith.
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Antonio M. Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br. 2, Batangas City, A.M. No.
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RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014. The Court reiterated the rule that in administrative cases and
disbarment proceedings, the complainant bears the onus of proving the averments of his
complaint by substantial evidence. In this case, the allegations of grave abuse of authority,
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irregularity in the performance of duty, grave bias and partiality, and lack of circumspection are
devoid of merit because the complainant failed to establish Judge Austria’s bad faith, malice or
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ill will. The complainant merely pointed to circumstances based on mere conjectures and
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suppositions. These, by themselves, however, are not sufficient to prove the accusations. Even
granting that the judge erred in the exercise of her judicial functions, these are legal errors
correctible not by a disciplinary action, but by judicial remedies that are readily available to the
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complainant. An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or
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40 | P a g e
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erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a
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motion for reconsideration or an appeal.
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Gershon N. Dulang v. Judge Mary Jocelyn G. Regencia, MCTC, Asturias-Balamban,
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Cebu, A.M. No. MTJ-14-1841, June 2, 2014. The Supreme Court held that pursuant to Rule 3.05,
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Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, prompt disposition of cases is attained basically
through the efficiency and dedication to duty of judges. In this case, the civil case was already
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submitted for resolution. Being an ejectment case, it is governed by the Rules of Summary
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Procedure which clearly sets a period of 30 days from the submission of the last affidavit or
position paper within which a decision must be issued. In violation of this rule, Judge Regencia
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rendered judgment only more than two years later the judge failed to proffer any acceptable
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reason in delaying the disposition of the ejectment case, thus, making her administratively liable
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for undue delay in rendering a decision. .
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IV. Disqualification of Justices and Judges (Rule 137)
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Prohibition on practice of profession: No member of the judiciary may practice their
profession during their incumbency.
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A. Prescriptive Duty to resolve pending matters
All matters pending with the Supreme Court must be resolved with 24 months;
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Twelve (12) months for all collegiate appellate courts; and
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Three (3) months for all other lower courts. (Section 15(1), 1987 Constitution)
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C h B. Disqualification and Inhibition of Judges: may be voluntary or involuntary: There
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are two rules governing the qualification and voluntary inhibition of judges: Section 1,
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Rule 137 of the Rules of Court; and Rule 3. 12 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary. Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides:”
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Disqualification of judges. – No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he,
or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise , or in
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which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or
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to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or
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in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which
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he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review,
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without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the
record.
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A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in
case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.” (ex. If judge served as
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wedding sponsor to one of the litigants or litigant is his “kasambahay.”)
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Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states:
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“Rule 3.12. – A Judge should take no part in proceeding where the judge’s impartially
might reasonably be questioned. These cases include, among others, proceedings
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where:
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The judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
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proceeding;
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The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustees or lawyer in the case or
matter in controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their
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association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein;
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The judge’s ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;
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The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth degree
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or to co-counsel within the fourth degree;
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The judge knows that his spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor,
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fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the
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proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of
the proceeding.”
1. Voluntary Inhibition: When voluntary inhibition be done: A judge is allowed under the
second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, supra, to voluntary
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inhibit from a case for just or valid reasons other than those grounds of disqualification.
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Re: Complaint filed by Lucena B. Rallos against Justices Gabriel T. Ingles, Pamela Ann
Maxino, and Carmelita S. Manahan, IPI No. 12-203-CA-J/A.M. No. 12-9-08-CA, December
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10, 2013. Complainant charged Justice Hernando with manifest bias because he voluntarily
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inhibited himself in CA-G.R. CEB SP. No. 06676 only after the promulgation of the March
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28, 2012 and April 13, 2012 resolutions. Complainant alleged that she should have been
informed of the voluntary inhibition. The Court, however, said that under the internal rules
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of the C.A., the same was not necessary. In the spirit of transparency, the Court held that
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henceforth all the parties in any action or proceedings should be immediately notified of any
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mandatory disqualification or voluntary inhibition of the Justice who has participated in any
action of the court, stating the reason for the mandatory disqualification or voluntary
R o inhibition. The requirement of notice is a measure to ensure that the disqualification or

inhibition has not been resorted to in order to cause injustice to or to prejudice any party or
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cause.
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How voluntary inhibition is effected: A judge may motu proprio or on motion of a party
voluntarily recluse from a case if he has good or valid reasons which render him incapable of
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acting objectively on the case.
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When a judge should not inhibit himself: Absent any ground for disqualification, a judge should
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not inhibit and if a motion to that effect is filed, he should deny it if, despite the circumstances
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cited by the movant, he honestly believes that he can act on the case objectively.
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2. Remittal of Disqualification: Nature of remittal: Remittal of disqualification is the process
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by which a judge who is disqualified to sit on a case on any of the grounds enumerated in
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Section 5, Canon 3, may purge himself of such a disqualification so that he may act upon the
case.
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How remittal is effected: This process is allowed under Section 6 of the same Canon which
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“A judge disqualified as stated above may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose
on the record the basis of disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the parties and lawyers,
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independently of the judge’s participation, all agree in writing that the reason for inhibition is
immaterial or unsubstantial; the judge may then participate in the proceeding. The Agreement,
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signed by all the parties and lawyers, shall be incorporated in the record of the proceedings.”
V. Discipline of Members of the Judiciary
B a
Ch
A. Members of the Supreme Court: Impeachment. (Section 2, Article XI, 1987
s
Constitution); Grounds; and Proceedings
l e
In re: Undated letter of Mr. Louis C. Biraogo, A.M. No. 09-2-19, S.C. The Court fined a
b
retired justice of the Supreme Court with P500, 000.00 and indefinite suspension for premature
release of a decision involving the citizenship requirement of a member of the House of
Representatives.
R o
In Re: Letter Complaint of Atty. Pena against Justices Carpio and Sereno, A.M. No. 12-6-11-
an r
SC. The Court dismissed the complaint for failure of Atty. Pena to substantiate his allegations
and that the same are purely conjectures which cannot be a subject of judicial review.
B a
C h
B. Discipline of Appellate Justices and Lower Court Judges: Read Section 11, Article VIII,
s
e
1987 Constitution
l
1. Jurisdiction over disciplinary cases: The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to
b
discipline appellate justices and lower court judges.
2. Vote required dismissing a member of the judiciary: A majority vote of all justices who
3. Grounds for disciplinary action over appellate and trial judges

R o
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
n
4. Sanctions: fines, suspension, dismissal from office, forfeiture of benefits and disbarment
a
Office of the Court Administrator v. Atty. Daniel R. Liangco (A.C. No.5355, December 11,
C h
2011). A trial court judge was dismissed from service for gross misconduct and gross ignorance
of the law. He allowed a local government unit to take possession and awarded ownership of a
s
private property without any expropriation proceedings having been filed by the government. As
a defense, the judge said that what he rendered was not a decision but only an opinion. After his
l e
dismissal, the Court initiated disbarment proceedings against him before the IBP. The IBP
recommended his disbarment which the Court affirmed.
o b
VI. Administrative Aspects over Court Matters, Responsibilities and Discipline of Court
R
an
Personnel
A. Powers and Duties of Courts and Judicial Officers (Rule 135)
B. Court Records and General Duties of Clerks and Stenographer (Rule 136)
C h
42 | P a g e
a r
C. Legal Fees (Rule 141): Manner of payment: legal tender; principles of Negotiable
B
Instruments Law will apply; fees in lien; and persons authorized to collect legal fees
s
D. Costs: Recovery of costs (Rule 142): a) Prevailing party; b) Dismissed appeal or action
l e
c) Frivolous appeal; d) False allegations; and e) Non-appearance of witness
o b
Survey of Recent Jurisprudence involving employees of the judiciary:
R Executive Judge Ma. Ofelia S. Contreras-Soriano v. Clerk III Liza D. Salamanca,
n r
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 55, Malabon City, A.M. No. P-13-3119. February 10, 2014.
a
The Executive Judge filed an administrative case against respondent for
B
unauthorized/unexplained absences and other infractions: (1) failure to account for and turn
s
over the partial settlement amount of a civil obligation; and (2) failure to account for and turn
e
over the payment for legal fees she received in a case. The Court held that the acts of Salamanca
b l
constitute dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Dishonesty is defined as dispositions to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud. It implies
R o
untrustworthiness, lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle on the part
of the individual who failed to exercise fairness and straightforwardness in his or her dealings.
an r
Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service, on the other hand, pertains to any conduct
a
that is detrimental or derogatory or naturally or probably bringing about a wrong result; it
h B
refers to acts or omissions that violate the norm of public accountability and diminish – or tend
s
to diminish – the people’s faith in the Judiciary.
C e
De Castro, J. Angelito R. Marquez, et al. v. Judge Venancio M. Ovejera, etc., et al., A.M. No.
b l
P-11-2903, February 5, 2014.In finding the sheriff guilty, the Court cited Section 8 of RA 6713
which requires all public officials and employees to accomplish and submit declarations under
o
oath of their assets and liabilities. The requirement of SALN submission is aimed at curtailing
R
and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption, as well as at maintaining a standard of
an r
honesty in the public service. With such disclosure, the public would, to a reasonable extent, be
a
able to monitor the affluence of public officials, and, in such manner, provides a check and
B
balance mechanism to verify their undisclosed properties and/or sources of income. S.C. held
Ch
that based on Section 8 of RA 6713, “all other assets such as investments, cash on hand or in
s
banks, stocks, bonds, and the like”, should be declared by the public official in his or her SALN.
e
l
In this case, however, it was established that she only declared the original amount of her time
b
deposits in her SALN for the years 2004 and 2005, and did not disclose the interests which had
eventually accrued on the same.
R o
Veronica F. Galindez v. Zosima Susbilla-De Vera, A.M. No. P-13-3126, February 4, 2014. The
Court found respondent guilty of grave misconduct Vera for soliciting money to supposedly
an r
facilitate a legal proceeding in court. She was dismissed from service for violating Section 2,
Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel has enjoined all court personnel from
B a
h
soliciting or accepting any gift, favor or benefit based on any or explicit understanding that such
C s
gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions.
l e
The Court further said that to deserve the trust and confidence of the people, Susbilla-De Vera
b
was expected to have her dealings with the public to be always sincere and above board. She
should not lead others to believe that despite her status as a minor court employee she had the
R
for the records unquestionably showed how she had deliberately and fraudulently o
capacity to influence the outcomes of judicial matters. Her acts did not live up to the expectation,
n
misrepresented her ability to assist the complainant in the adoption of her niece and nephew.
a
Concerned Citizen v. Nonita v. Catena, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Br. 50, Puerto Princesa,
C h
Palawan, A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1321-P, July 16, 2013.Respondent stenographer was dismissed
from service for gross dishonesty in connection with her Civil Service eligibility where she was
s
accused of causing another person to take the Civil Service Eligibility Examination in her stead.
Before the Decision was imposed, however, respondent resigned but the Court said that despite
l e
this, it did not lose jurisdiction over the complaint and that it did not warrant the dismissal of the
same. The Court emphasized that cessation from office by virtue of her intervening resignation
o b
R
did not warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint against her, for the act complained
an
of had been committed when she was still in the service. Nor did such cessation from office
render the administrative case moot and academic. Otherwise, exacting responsibility for
administrative liabilities incurred would be easily avoided or evaded. The Court therefore also
C h
ordered her eligibility to be cancelled, her retirement benefits to be forfeited, and her
disqualification from re-employment in the government service to be perpetual. Her intervening
43 | P a g e
a r
resignation necessarily means that the penalty of dismissal could no longer be implemented
B
against her. Instead, fine is imposed, the determination of the amount of which is subject to the
sound discretion of the Court.
e s
Office of the Court Administrator v. Noel R. Ong, Deputy Sheriff, Br. 49, et al., A.M. No. P-09-
b l
2690. .” The Court held that respondents” acts of using the levied car for personal errands and
losing it while under their safekeeping constitute grave misconduct and gross neglect of duty.
o
The Court said misconduct is “a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a
R
forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or
wrong behavior.” A misconduct is “grave” or gross” if it is “out of all measure; beyond
n r
allowance; flagrant; shameful” or “such conduct as is not to be excused. Such flagrant and
a
shameful acts and should not be countenanced. Respondents’ acts warrant the penalty of
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dismissal as provided in Rule 10, Section 46 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the
e s
Civil Service. As for respondent Buencamino, his death is not a ground for the dismissal of the
Complaint against him. Respondent Buencamino’s acts take away the public’s faith in the
l
judiciary, and these acts should be sanctioned despite his death.
b
o
Sheriffs are reminded that they are “repositories of public trust and are under obligation to
perform the duties of their office honestly, faithfully, and to the best of their abilities.” Being
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“frontline officials of the justice system,” sheriffs and deputy sheriffs “must always strive to
an r
maintain public trust in the performance of their duties.”
B a
h
Development Bank of the Philippines, etc. Vs. Damvin V. Famero, Sheriff IV, RTC, Br. 43,
s
Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, A.M. No. P. ___________: For the respondent’s lapses in the
C e
procedures in the implementation of the writ of execution, he was found guilty of simple neglect
l
of duty, defined as the failure of an employee to give attention to the task expected of him. Under
b
Section 52(B)(1) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, simple
o
neglect of duty is a less grave . Section 53 of the same Rules allows the disciplining authority to
R
consider mitigating circumstances in favor of the respondent. The court considered his length of
service in the Judiciary, acknowledgment of infractions, remorse and other family
an a r
circumstances, among others, in determining the proper penalty. He was also found to be
entitled to the following mitigating circumstances: (1) his more than 24 years of service in the
B
Ch
Judiciary; (2) a clear record other than for the present infraction which is his first offense, (3)
s
the resistance of the informal settlers to leave the property; (4) fear for his life; and (5) his well-
e
l
grounded recognition that he could not undertake any demolition without the appropriate court
b
order. After considering the attendant facts and the mitigating circumstances, the court also
considered that the efficiency of court operations may ensue if the respondent’s work were to be
suspension from service.

R o
left unattended by reason of his suspension. Thus, he was imposed the penalty of fine instead of
an a r
Anacleto O. Villahermosa, Sr., et al. v. Victor Sacia, Executive Assistant IV and Efren R.
B
Rivamonte, etc., A.M. No. CA-14-28-P, February 11, 2014. The Court held that the act of
C h
soliciting or receiving money from litigants constitutes grave misconduct. The S.C. reiterated
that The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel requires that court personnel avoid conflicts of
s
l e
interest in performing official duties. It mandates that court personnel should not receive tips or
b
other remunerations for assisting or attending to parties engaged in transactions or involved in
actions or proceedings with the judiciary. Further, court personnel cannot take advantage of the
R o
vulnerability of party–litigants. In this case, respondents were found guilty of grave misconduct
and thus, dismissed from service with forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual
n
disqualification from holding public office in any branch or instrumentality of the government,
a
including government–owned or controlled corporations.
h
Office of the Court Administrator v. Donabel M. Savadera, et al., A.M. No. P-04-1903,
C s
September 10, 2013. The S.C. once again called the attention of court personnel that no position
demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its holder than a judicial office.
Those connected with the dispensation of justice, from the highest official to the lowliest clerk,
l e
carry a heavy burden of responsibility. As frontliners in the administration of justice, they should
live up to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity. They must bear in mind that the image
o b
R
of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and
an
women who work there.
The respondent court employees were meted out with penalties because the audit team of the
h
Court discovered cash shortages in the books of accounts of the Office of the Clerk of Court,
C
RTC, Lipa City. As clerk of court, Atty. Apusen is primarily accountable for all funds collected
44 | P a g e
a r
for the court, whether personally received by him or by a duly appointed cashier who is under
B
his supervision and control. As custodian of court funds, revenues, records, properties and
premises, he is liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of said funds and
s
properties. Being a cash clerk, Savadera is an accountable officer entrusted with the great
e
l
responsibility of collecting money belonging to the funds of the court. Clearly, she miserably
b
failed in such responsibility upon the occurrence of the shortages.
o
Atty. Rhea R. Alcantara-Aquino v. Mylene H. Dela Cruz, etc., A.M. No. P-13-3141. January
R
21, 2014. The Court held that in this case, Dela Cruz failed to live up to these exacting
standards. The inculpatory acts committed by Dela Cruz are so grave as to call for the most
n r
severe administrative penalty. Dishonesty and grave misconduct, both being in the nature of a
a
grave offense, carry the extreme penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of retirement
B
benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the
e s
government service. This penalty is in accordance with Sections 52 and 58 of the Revised
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
b l
Office of the Court Administrator v. Atty. Mona Lisa A. Buencamino, etc., et al. /Re: Report
o
on the financial audit conducted in the Metropolitan Trial Court etc., A.M. No. P-05-
2051/A.M. No. 05-4-118-MeTC. January 21, 2014. The Supreme Court held that the admission
R
of Mapue of her liability does not exculpate Atty. Buencamino from her own negligence. A clerk
an r
of court has general administrative supervision over all the personnel of the court. The
a
administrative functions of a clerk of court are as vital to the prompt and proper administration
B
h
of justice as his judicial duties. As custodian of court funds and revenues, the clerk of court is
C s
primarily accountable for all funds that are collected for the court, whether personally received
e
by him or by a duly appointed cashier who is under his supervision and control. Atty.
b l
Buencamino was remiss in the performance of her duties as clerk of court. Atty. Buencamino
failed to supervise Mapue and to properly manage the court funds entrusted to her,
R o
Alberto Valdez v. Desiderio W. Macusi, Jr., Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 25, Tabuk, Kalinga, A.M.
No. P-13-3123, June 10, 2014. Sheriff Macusi was held to be remiss in his duties and thus liable
an r
for simple neglect of duty which is the failure to give attention to a task, or the disregard of a
a
duty due to carelessness or indifference. The Court held that the 30-day period imposed for the
B
Ch
execution of the writ after the judgment has been received by the sheriff, as well as the periodic
report every 30 days, is mandatory. A return which Macusi referred to as his Partial Report is
e s
not acceptable because the court issues a writ, it is incumbent upon the sheriff to enforce it.
b l
Office of the Court Administrator v. Sarah P. Ampong, etc., A.M. No. P-13-3132, June 4, 2014.
The Court dismissed from service Ampong for being liable for dishonesty in impersonating and
o
taking the November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination for Teachers on behalf of one
R
Decir. Under section 58(a) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
an r
(URACCS), the penalty of dismissal carries with it the following administrative disabilities: (a)
a
cancellation of civil service eligibility; (b) forfeiture of retirement benefits; and (c) perpetual
disqualification from re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality, including any
h
government-owned and controlled corporation or government financial institution. Ampong
B
C
should be made to similarly suffer the same. Every employee of the Judiciary should be an
e
example of integrity, uprightness, and honesty. Court personnel are enjoined to adhere to the s
b l
exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional and private conduct in order to
preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of justice.
R o
Atty. Virgilio P. Alconera v. Alfredo T. Pallanan, A.M. No. P-12-3069, January 20, 2014. The
Court said that absent a TRO, an order of quashal, or compliance with Sec. 19, Rule 70 of the
a n
Rules of Court, respondent sheriff has no alternative but to enforce the writ. The S.C. did not find
the sheriff guilty of the charge of grave misconduct. He did not enforce the writ of execution
h
because there was still a pending Motion for Reconsideration before the trial court. S.C. said
C s
that misconduct has been defined as “a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.” The
misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to
l e
violate the law, or to disregard established rules, all of which must be established by substantial
evidence, and must necessarily be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct. In this case, there
o b
R
was no element of misconduct established against the accused.
an
The sheriff’s duty in the execution of a writ is purely ministerial; he is to execute the order of the
court strictly to the letter. He has no discretion whether to execute the judgment or not. When the
h
writ is placed in his hands, it is his duty, in the absence of any instructions to the contrary, to
proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to implement it in accordance with its
45 | P a g e
C
a r
mandate. It is only by doing so could he ensure that the order is executed without undue delay.
B
This holds especially true herein where the nature of the case requires immediate execution.
s
Elpidio Sy, President, Systems Realty Development Corporation v. Edgar Esponilla, Legal
e
Researcher and Officer-in-Charge, et al., A.M. No. P-06-2261, December 11, 2013. Respondent
b l
Esponilla, Legal Researcher and then Officer-In-Charge of Br. 54 of RTC Manila, and Atty.
Buendia, clerk of court and ex-officio sheriff of RTC Manila were charged with Gross
o
Misconduct, Negligence and Dishonesty for the irregular withdrawal of deposits for monthly
R
rentals in a civil case based on a purported Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw Rental Deposits filed
by Atty. Bayhon in the civil case. S.C. held that Atty. Bayhon violated the Lawyer’s Oath and
n r
Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for failing to explain, in good
a
faith the circumstances surrounding the filing of the Ex-Parte Motion which he himself filed, for
B
proffering misleading claims in the course of the subject administrative investigation, and for not
e s
having shown and proved that he exerted his best efforts to secure and submit a copy of the Ex-
Parte Motion – all in violation of the resolutions issued by the Court. Atty. Bayhon was
l
suspended for six (6) months from the practice of law.
b
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C h s
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an B a r
Ch e s
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46 | P a g e

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ChanRobles Internet Bar Review : ChanRobles Professional Review, Inc.

l e 2016 BAR EXAMINATIONS

relationship between them?

UPHOLDING THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION

R Answer: Yes. Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer to

September 12, 2008)

this unfortunate incident?

notary public competent proof of identity.

R o GEOFFREY BECKETT v. JUDGE OLEGARIO R. SARMIENTO, JR., Regional Trial

preparation of documents and the giving of legal advice.

R o Q. What is the nature of a law partnership?

R from a local school in Metro Manila.

Re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 985

Q. Define the following:

R o 13. Advocate: a lawyer who pleads on behalf of a third party.

of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Professional Responsibility arising from non-payment of debt.

practice of law for one year.

will not apply.

Q. Does the lawyer have the burden of proof in a disbarment case?

R o 4. Participation in the improvement and reforms in the legal system

Q. What is the period of compliance for one’s MCLE?

R o Q. What is the Integrated Bar of the Philippines?

were actually undertaken.

n public for two years.

him as a vanguard of the legal profession.”

R o 2. Respect for courts and judicial officers

consents to it after consultation.

C h consents to it after consultation.

client with zeal within the bounds of law?

Q. What is a retaining fee?

Q. What is the concept of Quantum Meruit?

II. Membership in the Judiciary

Qualifying to the Bench

integrity, probity and independence.”

JUDICIAL CONDUCT: I.I.I. PECd):

R o inhibition. The requirement of notice is a measure to ensure that the disqualification or

3. Grounds for disciplinary action over appellate and trial judges

R Executive Judge Ma. Ofelia S. Contreras-Soriano v. Clerk III Liza D. Salamanca,

suspension from service.

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