I. Family Relations – The Family Code of the Philippines (E.O.

209)
1. Articles 1 – 34 of the Family Code
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209
THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES July 6, 1987
I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and promulgate the Family
Code of the Philippines, as follows:

TITLE I
MARRIAGE
Chapter 1. Requisites of Marriage

Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and

a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal
and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this
Code. (52a)
Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female;
and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. (53a)

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this
Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration
that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than
two witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a)

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the
marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly,
criminally and administratively liable. (n)
Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under
any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may contract
marriage. (54a)
Art. 6. No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage
is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear
personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less
than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife.
This declaration shall be contained in the marriage certificate which shall be
signed by the contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by the
solemnizing officer.
In case of a marriage in articulo mortis, when the party at the point of death is
unable to sign the marriage certificate, it shall be sufficient for one of the
witnesses to the marriage to write the name of said party, which fact shall be
attested by the solemnizing officer. (55a)
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly
authorized by his church or religious sect and registered with the civil registrar
general, acting within the limits of the written authority granted by his church
or religious sect and provided that at least one of the contracting parties
belongs to the solemnizing officer's church or religious sect;
(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the case mentioned in Article 31;

(4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in the

absence of the latter, during a military operation, likewise only in the cases
mentioned in Article 32;
(5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided in Article
10. (56a)
Article. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the
judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office the
consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere,
except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote
places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both of the parties
request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be
solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to
that effect. (57a)

Art. 9. A marriage license shall be issued by the local civil registrar of the city
or municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, except in
marriages where no license is required in accordance with Chapter 2 of this
Title. (58a)
Art. 10. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by a
consul-general, consul or vice-consul of the Republic of the Philippines. The
issuance of the marriage license and the duties of the local civil registrar and of
the solemnizing officer with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be
performed by said consular official. (75a)
Art. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties
shall file separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local
civil registrar which shall specify the following:
(1) Full name of the contracting party;
(2) Place of birth;
(3) Age and date of birth;
(4) Civil status;
(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was
dissolved or annulled;
(6) Present residence and citizenship;
(7) Degree of relationship of the contracting parties;
(8) Full name, residence and citizenship of the father;
(9) Full name, residence and citizenship of the mother; and
(10) Full name, residence and citizenship of the guardian or person having
charge, in case the contracting party has neither father nor mother and is
under the age of twenty-one years.
The applicants, their parents or guardians shall not be required to exhibit their
residence certificates in any formality in connection with the securing of the
marriage license. (59a)

Art. 12. The local civil registrar, upon receiving such application, shall require
the presentation of the original birth certificates or, in default thereof, the
baptismal certificates of the contracting parties or copies of such documents
duly attested by the persons having custody of the originals. These certificates
or certified copies of the documents by this Article need not be sworn to and
shall be exempt from the documentary stamp tax. The signature and official
title of the person issuing the certificate shall be sufficient proof of its
authenticity.
If either of the contracting parties is unable to produce his birth or baptismal
certificate or a certified copy of either because of the destruction or loss of the
original or if it is shown by an affidavit of such party or of any other person that
such birth or baptismal certificate has not yet been received though the same
has been required of the person having custody thereof at least fifteen days
prior to the date of the application, such party may furnish in lieu thereof his
current residence certificate or an instrument drawn up and sworn to before the
local civil registrar concerned or any public official authorized to administer
oaths. Such instrument shall contain the sworn declaration of two witnesses of
lawful age, setting forth the full name, residence and citizenship of such
contracting party and of his or her parents, if known, and the place and date of
birth of such party. The nearest of kin of the contracting parties shall be
preferred as witnesses, or, in their default, persons of good reputation in the
province or the locality.
The presentation of birth or baptismal certificate shall not be required if the
parents of the contracting parties appear personally before the local civil
registrar concerned and swear to the correctness of the lawful age of said
parties, as stated in the application, or when the local civil registrar shall, by
merely looking at the applicants upon their personally appearing before him, be
convinced that either or both of them have the required age. (60a)
Art. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married,
the applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal
certificate required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the
deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial
decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage.
In case the death certificate cannot be secured, the party shall make an
affidavit setting forth this circumstance and his or her actual civil status and the
name and date of death of the deceased spouse. (61a)
Art. 14. In case either or both of the contracting parties, not having been
emancipated by a previous marriage, are between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-one, they shall, in addition to the requirements of the preceding
articles, exhibit to the local civil registrar, the consent to their marriage of their
father, mother, surviving parent or guardian, or persons having legal charge of
them, in the order mentioned. Such consent shall be manifested in writing by
the interested party, who personally appears before the proper local civil
registrar, or in the form of an affidavit made in the presence of two witnesses
and attested before any official authorized by law to administer oaths. The
personal manifestation shall be recorded in both applications for marriage
license, and the affidavit, if one is executed instead, shall be attached to said
applications. (61a)
Art. 15. Any contracting party between the age of twenty-one and twenty-five
shall be obliged to ask their parents or guardian for advice upon the intended
marriage. If they do not obtain such advice, or if it be unfavorable, the
marriage license shall not be issued till after three months following the
completion of the publication of the application therefor. A sworn statement by
the contracting parties to the effect that such advice has been sought, together
with the written advice given, if any, shall be attached to the application for
marriage license. Should the parents or guardian refuse to give any advice, this
fact shall be stated in the sworn statement. (62a)
Art. 16. In the cases where parental consent or parental advice is needed, the
party or parties concerned shall, in addition to the requirements of the
preceding articles, attach a certificate issued by a priest, imam or minister
authorized to solemnize marriage under Article 7 of this Code or a marriage
counselor duly accredited by the proper government agency to the effect that
the contracting parties have undergone marriage counseling. Failure to attach
said certificates of marriage counseling shall suspend the issuance of the
marriage license for a period of three months from the completion of the
publication of the application. Issuance of the marriage license within the
prohibited period shall subject the issuing officer to administrative sanctions but
shall not affect the validity of the marriage.
Should only one of the contracting parties need parental consent or parental
advice, the other party must be present at the counseling referred to in the
preceding paragraph. (n)
Art. 17. The local civil registrar shall prepare a notice which shall contain the
full names and residences of the applicants for a marriage license and other
data given in the applications. The notice shall be posted for ten consecutive
days on a bulletin board outside the office of the local civil registrar located in a
conspicuous place within the building and accessible to the general public. This
notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. The marriage license shall be
issued after the completion of the period of publication. (63a)
Art. 18. In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought
to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings
thereon in the application for marriage license, but shall nonetheless issue said
license after the completion of the period of publication, unless ordered
otherwise by a competent court at his own instance or that of any interest
party. No filing fee shall be charged for the petition nor a corresponding bond
required for the issuances of the order. (64a)
Art. 19. The local civil registrar shall require the payment of the fees prescribed
by law or regulations before the issuance of the marriage license. No other sum
shall be collected in the nature of a fee or tax of any kind for the issuance of
said license. It shall, however, be issued free of charge to indigent parties, that
is those who have no visible means of income or whose income is insufficient
for their subsistence a fact established by their affidavit, or by their oath before
the local civil registrar. (65a) chan robles virtual law library
Art. 20. The license shall be valid in any part of the Philippines for a period of
one hundred twenty days from the date of issue, and shall be deemed
automatically canceled at the expiration of the said period if the contracting
parties have not made use of it. The expiry date shall be stamped in bold
characters on the face of every license issued. (65a)
Art. 21. When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens of a foreign
country, it shall be necessary for them before a marriage license can be
obtained, to submit a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage, issued
by their respective diplomatic or consular officials.
Stateless persons or refugees from other countries shall, in lieu of the
certificate of legal capacity herein required, submit an affidavit stating the
circumstances showing such capacity to contract marriage. (66a)
Art. 22. The marriage certificate, in which the parties shall declare that they
take each other as husband and wife, shall also state:
(1) The full name, sex and age of each contracting party;
(2) Their citizenship, religion and habitual residence;
(3) The date and precise time of the celebration of the marriage;
(4) That the proper marriage license has been issued according to law, except
in marriage provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title;
(5) That either or both of the contracting parties have secured the parental
consent in appropriate cases;
(6) That either or both of the contracting parties have complied with the legal
requirement regarding parental advice in appropriate cases; and
(7) That the parties have entered into marriage settlement, if any, attaching a
copy thereof. (67a)
Art. 23. It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish
either of the contracting parties the original of the marriage certificate referred
to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate
not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the
place where the marriage was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by
the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the
marriage certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the
quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the copy of the marriage
certificate, the original of the marriage license and, in proper cases, the
affidavit of the contracting party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in
place other than those mentioned in Article 8. (68a)

Art. 24. It shall be the duty of the local civil registrar to prepare the documents
required by this Title, and to administer oaths to all interested parties without
any charge in both cases. The documents and affidavits filed in connection with
applications for marriage licenses shall be exempt from documentary stamp
tax. (n)
Art. 25. The local civil registrar concerned shall enter all applications for
marriage licenses filed with him in a registry book strictly in the order in which
the same are received. He shall record in said book the names of the
applicants, the date on which the marriage license was issued, and such other
data as may be necessary. (n)
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

Chapter 2. Marriages Exempted from License Requirement

Art. 27. In case either or both of the contracting parties are at the point of
death, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license
and shall remain valid even if the ailing party subsequently survives. (72a)

Art. 28. If the residence of either party is so located that there is no means of
transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil
registrar, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage
license. (72a)
Art. 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding articles, the solemnizing
officer shall state in an affidavit executed before the local civil registrar or any
other person legally authorized to administer oaths that the marriage was
performed in articulo mortis or that the residence of either party, specifying the
barrio or barangay, is so located that there is no means of transportation to
enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar and that
the officer took the necessary steps to ascertain the ages and relationship of
the contracting parties and the absence of legal impediment to the
marriage. (72a)
Art. 30. The original of the affidavit required in the last preceding article,
together with the legible copy of the marriage contract, shall be sent by the
person solemnizing the marriage to the local civil registrar of the municipality
where it was performed within the period of thirty days after the performance
of the marriage. (75a)
Art. 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members
may also be solemnized by a ship captain or by an airplane pilot not only while
the ship is at sea or the plane is in flight, but also during stopovers at ports of
call. (74a)
Art. 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall
likewise have authority to solemnize marriages in articulo mortis between
persons within the zone of military operation, whether members of the armed
forces or civilians. (74a)
Art. 33. Marriages among Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural
communities may be performed validly without the necessity of marriage
license, provided they are solemnized in accordance with their customs, rites or
practices. (78a)
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman
who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without
any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state
the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal
impediment to the marriage. (76a)

Chapter 3. Void and Voidable Marriages

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the
consent of parents or guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform
marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties
believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do
so;
(3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered the preceding
Chapter;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41;
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the
identity of the other; and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the
beginning, whether relationship between the parties be legitimate or
illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood. (81a)

Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of
public policy:

(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to

the fourth civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed
that other person's spouse, or his or her own spouse. (82)

Art. 39. The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a
marriage shall not prescribe. (As amended by Executive Order 227 and Republic Act No. 8533; The
phrase"However, in case of marriage celebrated before the effectivity of this Code and falling under Article 36, such action or

defense shall prescribe in ten years after this Code shall taken effect"has been deleted by Republic Act No. 8533 [Approved

February 23, 1998]).

 2. Article 15 of the 1987 Constitution

ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.

Section 3. The State shall defend:

(1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the
demands of responsible parenthood;

(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection
from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development;

(3) The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and

(4) The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of
policies and programs that affect them.

Section 4. The family has the duty to care for its elderly members but the State may also do so
through just programs of social security.

3. Sec 12 Article 2 of the 1987 Constitution

SECTION 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and
the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government.
 4. Article 27 of the Muslim Code, PD 1083
Article 27. By a husband. Notwithstanding the rule of Islamic law permitting a Muslim to have more than one
wife but one wife unless he can deal with them with equal companionship and just treatment as enjoined by
Islamic law and only in exceptional cases.

Article 28. By widow. No widow shall contract a subsequent marriage unless she has observed an 'idda of four
months and ten days counted from the date of the death of her husband. If at that time the widow is pregnant,
she may remarry within a reasonable time after delivery. In such case, she shall produce the corresponding
death certificate.

Article 29. By divorcee.

(1) No woman shall contract a subsequent marriage unless she has observed an 'idda of three monthly
courses counted from the date of divorce. However, if she is pregnant at the time of the divorce, she may
remarry only after delivery.

(2) Should a repudiated woman and her husband reconcile during her 'idda, he shall have a better right
to take her back without need of a new marriage contract.

(3) Where it is indubitable that the marriage has not been consummated when the divorce was affected,
no 'idda shall be required.

PT & T vs NLRC
272 SCRA 596

FACTS:

PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman specifically as
“Supernumerary Project Worker”, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as reliever
for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She was again invited for employment as replacement of
Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991 to
August 8, 1991.

On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee where
probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion of the job application form under civil
status that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier. When petitioner
learned later about the marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a memorandum
requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the memorandum, was a reminder about the
company’s policy of not accepting married women for employment. She was dismissed from the company
effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed down decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that
petitioner illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already gained the status of a regular employee.
Furthermore, it was apparent that she had been discriminated on account of her having contracted
marriage in violation of company policies.
ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the services of an
employee.

HELD:

Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits discrimination
merely by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that company is free to regulate
manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to their discretion and best business judgment,
except in those cases of unlawful discrimination or those provided by law.

PT&T’s policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts marriage is
afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor laws and by our
Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de Guzman’s ties with PT&T were dissolved principally
because of the company’s policy that married women are not qualified for employment in the company,
and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.

The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted by PT&T. As stated in the labor
code:

“ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. — It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of
employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly
or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to
actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of
marriage.”

The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on the right of a
woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment and it
likewise is contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving a woman of her freedom to choose her
status, a privilege that is inherent in an individual as an intangible and inalienable right. The kind of policy
followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social
institution and ultimately, family as the foundation of the nation. Such policy must be prohibited in all its
indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not
only for order but also imperatively required.

5. Article 266-C of the RPC as amended by RA 8353

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8353

AN ACT EXPANDING THE DEFINITION OF THE CRIME OF RAPE, RECLASSIFYING THE SAME AS A CRIME
AGAINST PERSONS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ACT NO. 3815, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997."

Sec. 2. Rape as a Crime Against Persons. - The crime of rape shall hereafter be classified as a Crime Against
Persons under Title Eight of Act No. 3815, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code.
Accordingly, there shall be incorporated into Title Eight of the same Code a new chapter to be known as
Chapter Three on Rape, to read as follows:
"Chapter Three
"Rape
"Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:

"1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
"a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

"b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

"c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

"d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
"2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an
act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

"Article 266-B. Penalty. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua.

"Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall become
reclusion perpetua to death.

"When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

"When by reason or on the occasion ofthe rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.

"The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

"l) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim;

"2) When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities or any law enforcement or
penal institution;

"3) When the rape is committed in full view of the spouse, parent, any of the children or other relatives
within the third civil degree of consanguinity;

"4) When the victim is a religious engaged in legitimate religious vocation or calling and is personally
known to be such by the offender before or at the time of the commission of the crime;

"5) When the victim is a child below seven (7) years old;

"6) When the offender knows that he is afflicted with the Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus (HIV)/Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) or any other sexually transmissible disease and the virus or disease is
transmitted to the victim;

"7) When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or para-military units thereof
or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency or penal institution, when the offender
took advantage of his position to facilitate the commission of the crime;

"8) When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation
or disability;

"9) When the offender knew of the pregnancy of the offended party at the time of the commission of the
crime; and

"10) When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the
offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.

"Rape under paragraph 2 of the next preceding article shall be punished by prision mayor.

"Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty
shall be prision mayor to reclusion temporal.

"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be
reclusion temporal.

"When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the
penalty shall be reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua.

"When by reason or on the occasion ofthe rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua.

"Reclusion temporal shall be imposed if the rape is committed with any of the ten aggravating/ qualifying
circumstances mentioned in this article.

"Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid marriage between the offended party shall
extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed.

"In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended
party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the crime shall not be extinguished
or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is voidab initio.

"Article 266-D. Presumptions. - Any physical overt act manifesting resistance against the act of rape in any
degree from the offended party, or where the offended party is so situated as to render her/him incapable
of giving valid consent, may be accepted as evidence in the prosecution of the acts punished under Article
266-A."

Sec. 3. Separability Clause. - If any part, Sec., or provision of this Act is declared invalid or unconstitutional,
the other parts thereof not affected thereby shall remain valid.

Sec. 4. Repealing Clause. - Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, and all laws, acts, presidential decrees,
executive orders, administrative orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with or contrary to the
provisions of this Act are deemed amended, modified or repealed accordingly.
Sec. 5. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after completion of its publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.

RULE 131

Burden of Proof and Presumptions

Section 1. Burden of proof. — Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in
issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. (1a, 2a)

Section 2. Conclusive presumptions. — The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:

(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led
to another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation
arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it:

(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of commencement of the
relation of landlord and tenant between them. (3a)

Section 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but
may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

(a) That a person is innocent of crime or wrong;

(b) That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent;

(c) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act;

(d) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns;

(e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced;

(f) That money paid by one to another was due to the latter;

(g) That a thing delivered by one to another belonged to the latter;

(h) That an obligation delivered up to the debtor has been paid;

(i) That prior rents or installments had been paid when a receipt for the later one is produced;

(j) That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the
taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possess, or exercises acts
of ownership over, are owned by him;

(k) That a person in possession of an order on himself for the payment of the money, or the delivery
of anything, has paid the money or delivered the thing accordingly;

(l) That a person acting in a public office was regularly appointed or elected to it;
 (m) That official duty has been regularly performed;

(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the
lawful exercise of jurisdiction;

(o) That all the matters within an issue raised in a case were laid before the court and passed upon
by it; and in like manner that all matters within an issue raised in a dispute submitted for arbitration
were laid before the arbitrators and passed upon by them;

(p) That private transactions have been fair and regular;

(q) That the ordinary course of business has been followed;

(r) That there was a sufficient consideration for a contract;

(s) That a negotiable instrument was given or indorsed for a sufficient consideration;

(t) That an endorsement of negotiable instrument was made before the instrument was overdue
and at the place where the instrument is dated;

(u) That a writing is truly dated;

(v) That a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular course of the mail;

(w) That after an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives,
he is considered dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.

The absentee shall not be considered dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence
of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be
sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.

The following shall be considered dead for all purposes including the division of the estate among the heirs:

(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aircraft with is missing, who
has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aircraft;

(2) A member of the armed forces who has taken part in armed hostilities, and has been
missing for four years;

(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and whose
existence has not been known for four years;

(4) If a married person has been absent for four consecutive years, the spouse present may
contract a subsequent marriage if he or she has well-founded belief that the absent spouse
is already death. In case of disappearance, where there is a danger of death the
circumstances hereinabove provided, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient for the
purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage. However, in any case, before marrying again,
the spouse present must institute a summary proceedings as provided in the Family Code
and in the rules for declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to
the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

(x) That acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the
law or fact;
(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and ordinary nature
habits of life;

(z) That persons acting as copartners have entered into a contract of copartneship;

(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage;

(bb) That property acquired by a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other and
who live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under
void marriage, has been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry.

(cc) That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each
other and who have acquire properly through their actual joint contribution of money, property or
industry, such contributions and their corresponding shares including joint deposits of money and
evidences of credit are equal.

(dd) That if the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three
hundred days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence
of proof to the contrary:

(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent
marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born
within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage.

(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent
marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born
within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage.

(ee) That a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of the nature;

(ff) That the law has been obeyed;

(gg) That a printed or published book, purporting to be printed or published by public authority, was
so printed or published;

(hh) That a printed or published book, purporting contain reports of cases adjudged in tribunals of
the country where the book is published, contains correct reports of such cases;

(ii) That a trustee or other person whose duty it was to convey real property to a particular person
has actually conveyed it to him when such presumption is necessary to perfect the title of such
person or his successor in interest;

(jj) That except for purposes of succession, when two persons perish in the same calamity, such as
wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and there are no particular
circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is determined from the probabilities
resulting from the strength and the age of the sexes, according to the following rules:

1. If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older is deemed to have survived;

2. If both were above the age sixty, the younger is deemed to have survived;

3. If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the former is deemed to have survived;
 4. If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be different, the male is deemed to
have survived, if the sex be the same, the older;

5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other between those ages, the latter is
deemed to have survived.

(kk) That if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other,
as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the
same; in the absence of proof, they shall be considered to have died at the same time. (5a)

Section 4. No presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy. — There is no presumption of legitimacy of a child

born after three hundred days following the dissolution of the marriage or the separation of the spouses.
Whoever alleges the legitimacy or illegitimacy of such child must prove his allegation. (6)
BALOGBOG VS CA

Leoncia Balogbog and Gaudioso Balogbog, petitioners, versus Honorable Court of

Appeals, Ramonito Balogbog and Generoso Balogbog, respondents.
G.R. No. 83958 March 7, 1997

Facts:

Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva
Arnibal who died inestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively. They had an older brother, Gavino, but he
died predeceasing their parents. In 1968, private respondents brought an action for partition and
accounting against petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by
Catalina Ubas and that they were entitled to the one-third share of Gavino in the estate of their
grandparents. In their answer, petitioners denied knowing private respondents. They alleged that
their brother Gavino died single and without issue in their parents’ residence at Tag-amakan,
Asturias, Cebu.

Respondents presented witnesses. One testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband
and wife and Ramonito to be their first child because they performed at his campaign rallies. The
witness also contended that he attended their wedding in which Rev. Father Emiliano Jomao-as
officiated and Egmidio Manuel, then a councilor, acted as one of the witnesses. The second witness
testified that private respondents are the children of Gavino and Catalina. He likewise attended the
wedding and was in fact accompanied Catalina and carry her wedding dress. He also said that he
was a carpenter and he was the one who had made the coffin of Gavino. He also made the coffin of
the couple’s son, Petronilo, who died when he was six. Catalina Ubas likewise testified that after
the wedding, she was handed a “receipt,” presumably a wedding certificate by Fr. Jomao-as and
was burned during the war. She said that she and Gavino lived together in Obogon and begot three
children. She stated that after the death of Gavino, she lived in common law relation with a man
for a year and then they separated. Private respondents presented certificates from the Local Civil
Registrar and by the Parish Priest of Asturias.

On the other hand, petitioner testified that Gavino died single. She denied that her brother had any
legitimate children and stated that she did not know private respondents. The petitioner likewise
presented a witness stating that Gavino died single and that Catalina lived with a certain Eleuterio
Keriado after the war. He added that Catalina had children by a man she married before the war.

Issue:

Whether or not private respondents are legitimate children of the deceased Gavino Balogbog.

Held:

Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as
husband and wife are legally married. This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to
the contrary. In this case, petitioners claim that the certification presented by private respondents
was belied by the production of the Book of Marriages by the assistant municipal treasurer of
Asturias. Petitioners argue that this book does not contain an entry pertaining to the alleged
marriage of private respondents’ parents. This contention has no merit. Private respondents
proved, through testimonial evidence. The law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is
interested in the preservation of the family and the sanctity of the family s a matter of
constitutional concern. What is in issue, however, is not the marriage of Gavino and Catalina but
the filiations of private respondents as their children. Moreover, the evidence in the record shows
that petitioner Gaudioso Balogbog admitted that Ramonito is his nephew. This admission of
relationship is admissible against Gaudioso although made in another case. It is considered as a
reliable declaration against interest.

HERMOSISIMA VS CA
FACTS:
In 1950, Soledad Cagigas, 33 years old (then a school teacher, later she became an
insurance underwriter), and Francisco Hermosisima, 23 years old (apprentice ship
pilot), fell in love with each other. Since 1953, both had a refular intimate and sexual
affair with each other. In 1954, Soledad got pregnant. Francisco then promised to
marry Soledad. In June 1954, Soledad gave birth to a baby girl. The next month,
Francisco got married but with a different woman named Romanita Perez.
Subsequently, Soledad filed an action against Francisco for the latter to recognize
his daughter with Soledad and for damages due to Francisco’s breach of his
promise to marry Soledad. The trial court ruled in favor of Soledad. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and even increased the award of
damages. The Court of Appeals reasoned that Francisco is liable for damages
because he seduced Soledad. He exploited the love of Soledad for him in order to
satisfy his sexual desires – that being, the award of moral damages is proper.

ISSUE: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach of
promise to marry.

HELD: No. Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. The Court
of Appeals based its award of damages on Article 2219 of the Civil Code which says
in part that “Moral damages may be recovered from… (3) Seduction, xxx…”
However, it must be noted that the “Seduction” being contemplated in the said Civil
Code provision is the same “Seduction” being contemplated in Article 337 and 338
of the Revised Penal Code. Such “seduction” is not present in this case.
Further, it cannot be said that Francisco morally seduced (in lieu of criminal
seduction) Soledad given the circumstances of this case. Soledad was 10 years
older than Francisco. Soledad had a better job experience and a better job overall
than Francisco who was a mere apprentice. Further still, it was admitted by Soledad
herself that she surrendered herself to Francisco and that she wanted to bind “by
having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.”
WASMERR VS VELEZ

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appeallant
No. L-20089. December 26, 1964

FACTS:

Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned to get married. However, Velez went
away and Beatriz did not hear from him again. Beatriz sued Francisco and asked the
latter to pay her moral damages. Velez contended that there is no provision of the
law authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry. However, the court did not
find this defense meritorious because even though it is true that there is no law for
breach of promise to marry, Wassmer still suffered frustration and public
humiliation.

ISSUE:

Did the court err in ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff moral damages?

RULING:

The case at bar is not a mere breach of promise to marry because it is not considered
an actionable wrong. The mere fact the couple have already filed a marriage license
and already spent for invitations, wedding apparels, gives the plaintiff reason to
demand for payment of damages. The court affirmed the previous judgment and
ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff moral damages for the humiliation she
suffered; actual damages for the expenses incurred and exemplary damages because
the defendant acted fraudulently in making the plaintiff believe that he will come
back and the wedding will push through.
MARTINEZ VS TAN

Martinez v. Tan, 12 Phil 731

FACTS: There was received in evidence at the trial what is called Rosalia Martinez and Angel
Tan were married before a justice of the peace in Leyte. They executed an expediente de
matrimonio civil. It is written in Spanish and consists, first, of a petition directed to the
justice of the peace, dated on the 25th of September, 1907, signed both by Martinez and
Tan, in which they state that they have mutually agreed to enter into a contract of marriage
before the justice of the peace, and ask that the justice solemnize the marriage. Marriage
was solemnized with two witnesses. The couple did not live together and when Martinez
went home to Ormoc, her relatives convinced her to file charges claiming that the marriage
was not valid since she signed the document in her own home thinking that it was a paper
authorizing Tan to ask the consent of her parents to the marriage.

ISSUE: WON the marriage is valid.

HELD: Yes. They were married since there was an expression of mutual consent and both of
them appeared before the justice of the peace. They both understood Spanish thus they
knew the contents of the document they were signing.

COSCA VS PALAYPAYON
FACTS: The following are the complainants: Juvy N. Cosca (Stenographer 1), Edmundo B. Peralta
(Interpreter 1), Ramon C. Sambo (Clerk II) and Apollo Villamora (Process Server). Respondents are Judge
Lucio Palaypayon Jr., the presiding judge, and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy, clerk of court II. All work in MTC-
Tinambac, Camarines Sur.

Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without the requisite of a marriage
license. Hence, the following couples were able to get married just by paying the marriage fees to
respondent Baroy: Alano P. Abellano & Nelly Edralin; Francisco Selpo & Julieta Carrido; Eddie Terrobias &
Maria Gacer; Renato Gamay & Maricris Belga; Arsenio Sabater & Margarita Nacario; Sammy Bocaya & Gina
Bismonte. As a consequence, the marriage contracts of the following couples did not reflect any marriage
license number. In addition, Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts and did not indicate the date
of solemnization reasoning out that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by
the parties which happens usually several days after the marriage ceremony.

Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code thus
exempted from the marriage license requirement. According to him, he gave strict instructions to
complainant Sambo to furnish the couple copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with the civil
registrar but the latter failed to do so. In order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized
the marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was
then filed with the civil registrar. The other five marriages were not illegally solemnized because
Palaypayon did not sign their marriage contracts and the date and place of marriage are not included. It
was alleged that copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo. The alleged
marriage of Selpo & Carrido, Terrobias & Gacer, Gamay & Belga, Sabater & Nacario were not celebrated by
him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license and that the marriage of
Bocaya & Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties to
avoid embarrassment with the guests which he again did not sign the marriage contract. An illegal
solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondents.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid.

HELD: Bocaya & Besmonte’s marriage was solemnized without a marriage license along with the other
couples. The testimonies of Bocay and Pompeo Ariola including the photographs taken showed that it was
really Judge Palaypayon who solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that they were advised by judge
to return after 10 days after the solemnization and bring with them their marriage license. They already
started living together as husband and wife even without the formal requisite. With respect to the
photographs, judge explained that it was a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real one.
However, considering that there were pictures from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of
the marriage certificates in front of him. The court held that it is hard to believe that it was simulated.

On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized marriage between Abellano & Edralin
and claimed it was under Article 34 of the Civil Code so the marriage license was dispensed with
considering that the contracting parties executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as
husband and wife for almost 6 years already. However, it was shown in the marriage contract that Abellano
was only 18 yrs 2months and 7 days old. If he and Edralin had been living together for 6 years already
before they got married as what is stated in the joint affidavit, Abellano must have been less than 13 years
old when they started living together which is hard to believe. Palaypayon should have been aware, as it is
his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might have executed a false joint
affidavit in order to avoid the marriage license requirement.

Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that “in the absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio whereas an irregularity in the formal requisite shall not
affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly,
criminally, and administratively liable.
 6. CHAPTER 3 ART 1 SECTION 444 OF THE 1991
LGC

CHAPTER III
Officials and Offices Common to All Municipalities

ARTICLE I
The Municipal Mayor

Section 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. -

(a) The municipal mayor, as the chief executive of the municipal government, shall exercise such powers
and performs such duties and functions as provided by this Code and other laws.

(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the
municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the municipal mayor shall:

(1) Exercise general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services, and activities
of the municipal government, and in this connection, shall:

(i) Determine the guidelines of municipal policies and be responsible to the sangguniang
bayan for the program of government;

(ii) Direct the formulation of the municipal development plan, with the assistance of the
municipal development council, and upon approval thereof by the sangguniang bayan,
implement the same;

(iii) At the opening of the regular session of the sangguniang bayan for every calendar
year and, as may be deemed necessary, present the program of government and
propose policies and projects for the consideration of the sangguniang bayan as the
general welfare of the inhabitants and the needs of the municipal government may
require;

(iv) Initiate and propose legislative measures to the sangguniang bayan and, from time to
time as the situation may require, provide such information and data needed or
requested by said sanggunian in the performance of its legislative functions;

(v) Appoint all officials and employees whose salaries and wages are wholly or mainly
paid out of municipal funds and whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in
this Code, as well as those he may be authorized by law to appoint;

(vi) Upon authorization by the sangguniang bayan, represent the municipality in all its
business transactions and sign on its behalf all bonds, contracts, and obligations, and
such other documents made pursuant to law or ordinance;

(vii) Carry out such emergency measures as may be necessary during and in the
aftermath of man-made and natural disasters and calamities;

(viii) Determine, according to law or ordinance, the time, manner and place of payment of
salaries or wages of the officials and employees of the municipality;
(ix) Allocate and assign office space to municipal and other officials and employees who,
by law or ordinance, are entitled to such space in the municipal hall and other buildings
owned or leased by the municipal government;

(x) Ensure that all executive officials and employees of the municipality faithfully
discharge their duties and functions as provided by law and this Code, and cause to be
instituted administrative or judicial proceedings against any official or employee of the
municipality who may have committed as offense in the performance of his official duties;

(xi) Examine the books, records and other documents of all offices, officials, agents or
employees of the municipality and in aid of his executive powers and authority, require all
national officials and employees stationed in or assigned to the municipality to make
available to him such books, records, and other documents in their custody, except those
classified by law as confidential;

(xii) Furnish copies of executive orders issued by him to the provincial governor within
seventy-two (72) hours after their issuance: Provided, That municipalities of Metropolitan
Manila Area and that of any metropolitan political subdivision shall furnish copies of said
executive orders to the metropolitan authority council chairman and to the Office of the
President;

(xiii) Visit component barangays of the municipality at least once every six (6) months to
deepen his understanding of problems and conditions therein, listen and give appropriate
counsel to local officials and inhabitants, inform the component barangay officials and
inhabitants of general laws and ordinances which especially concern them, and
otherwise conduct visits and inspections to the end that the governance of the
municipality will improve the quality of life of the inhabitants;

(xiv) Act on leave applications of officials and employees appointed by him and the
commutation of the monetary value of leave credits according to law;

(xv) Authorize official trips outside of the municipality of municipal officials and employees
for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days;

(xvi) Call upon any national official or employee stationed in or assigned to the
municipality to advise him on matters affecting the municipality and to make
recommendations thereon, or to coordinate in the formulation and implementation of
plans, programs and projects, and when appropriate, initiate an administrative or judicial
action against a national government official or employee who may have committed an
offense in the performance of his official duties while stationed in or assigned to the local
government unit concerned;

(xvii) Subject to availability of funds, authorize payment of medical care, necessary

transportation, subsistence, hospital or medical fees of municipal officials and employees
who are injured while in the performance of their official duties and functions;

(xviii) Solemnize marriages, any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding;

(xix) Conduct a palarong bayan, in coordination with the Department of Education,

Culture and Sports, as an annual activity which shall feature traditional sports and
disciplines included in national and international games; and

(xx) Submit to the provincial governor the following reports: an annual report containing a
summary of all matters pertaining to the management, administration and development of
the municipality and all information and data relative to its political, social and economic
conditions; and supplemental reports when unexpected events and situations arise at
any time during the year, particularly when man-made or natural disasters or calamities
affect the general welfare of the municipality, province, region or country. mayors of
municipalities of the Metropolitan Manila Area and other metropolitan political
subdivisions shall submit said reports to their respective metropolitan council chairmen
and to the Office of the President;
(2) Enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the municipality and the
exercise of its corporate powers provided for under Section 22 of this Code implement all
approved policies, programs, projects, services and activities of the municipality and, in addition
to the foregoing, shall:

(i) Ensure that the acts of the municipality's component barangays and of its officials and
employees are within the scope of their prescribed powers, functions, duties and
responsibilities;

(ii) Call conventions, conferences, seminars or meetings of any elective and appointive
officials of the municipality, including provincial officials and national officials and
employees stationed in or assigned to the municipality at such time and place and on
such subject as he may deem important for the promotion of the general welfare of the
local government unit and its inhabitants;

(iii) Issue such executive orders as are necessary for the proper enforcement and
execution of laws and ordinances;

(iv) Be entitled to carry the necessary firearm within his territorial jurisdiction;

(v) Act as the deputized representative of the National Police Commission, formulate the
peace and order plan of the municipality and upon its approval implement the same and
exercise general and operational control and supervision over the local police in the
municipality in accordance with R.A. No 6975;

(vi) Call upon the appropriate law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder, riot,
lawless violence, rebellion or sedition or to apprehend violators of the law when public
interest so requires and the municipal police forces are inadequate to cope with the
situation or the violators;

(3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply the same to the
implementation of development plans, program objectives and priorities as provided for under
Section 18 of this Code, particularly those resources and revenues programmed for gro-industrial
development and country-wide growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall:

(i) Require each head of an office or department to prepare and submit an estimate of
appropriations for the ensuing calendar year, in accordance with the budget preparation
process under Title Five, Book II of this Code;

(ii) Prepare and submit to the sanggunian for approval the executive and supplemental
budgets of the municipality for the ensuing calendar year in the manner provided for
under Title Five, Book II of this Code;

(iii) Ensure that all taxes and other revenues of the municipality are collected and that
municipal funds are applied in accordance with law or ordinance to the payment of
expenses and settlement of obligations of the municipality;

(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the
conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or
ordinance;

(v) Issue permits, without need of approval therefor from any national agency, for the
holding of activities for any charitable or welfare purpose, excluding prohibited games of
chance or shows contrary to law, public policy and public morals;

(vi) Require owners of illegally constructed houses, buildings or other structures to obtain
the necessary permit, subject to such fines and penalties as may be imposed by law or
ordinance, or to make necessary changes in the construction of the same when said
construction violates any law or ordinance, or to order the demolition or removal of said
house, building or structure within the period prescribed by law or ordinance;
 (vii) Adopt adequate measures to safeguard and conserve land, mineral, marine, forest,
and other resources of the municipality; provide efficient and effective property and
supply management in the municipality; and protect the funds, credits, rights and other
properties of the municipality; and

(viii) Institute or cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings for violation

of ordinances in the collection of taxes, fees or charges, and for the recovery of funds
and property; and cause the municipality to be defended against all suits to ensure that
its interests, resources and rights shall be adequately protected;

(4) Ensure the delivery of basic services and the provision of adequate facilities as provided for
under Section 17 of this Code and, in addition thereto, shall:

(i) Ensure that the construction and repair of roads and highways funded by the national
government shall be, as far as practicable, carried out in a spatially contiguous manner
and in coordination with the construction and repair of the roads and bridges of the
municipality and the province; and

(ii) Coordinate the implementation of technical services rendered by national and

provincial offices, including public works and infrastructure programs in the municipality;
and

(5) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be
prescribed by law or ordinance.

(c) During his incumbency, the municipal mayor shall hold office in the municipal hall.

(d) The municipal mayor shall receive a minimum monthly compensation corresponding to Salary Grade
twenty-seven (27) as prescribed under R.A. No. 6758 and the implementing guidelines issued pursuant
thereto.
NAVARRO VS DOMAGTOY
Navarro vs. Domagtoy
AM No. MTJ 96-1088, July 19, 1996

FACTS:

Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint on two specific acts
committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy on the grounds of gross
misconduct, ineffiency in offce and ignorance of the law.

It was alleged that Domagtoy solemnized marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja on September 27,
1994 despite the knowledge that the groom has a subsisting marriage with Ida Penaranda and that they are
merely separated. It was told that Ida left their conjugal home in Bukidnon and has not returned and been
heard for almost seven years. The said judge likewise solemnize marriage of Floriano Dadoy Sumaylo and
Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court’s jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. The judge holds his office and
has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte but he
solemnized the said wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa located 40 to 50 km away.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriages solemnized were void.

HELD:

The court held that the marriage between Tagadan and Borja was void and bigamous there being a
subsisting marriage between Tagadan and Penaranda. Albeit, the latter was gone for seven years and the
spouse had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was dead, Tagadan did not institute a summary
proceeding as provided in the Civil Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

With regard to the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario, the latter only made the written request where it
should have been both parties as stated in Article 8 of the Family Code. Their non-compliance did not
invalidate their marriage however, Domagtoy may be held administratively liable.
 PEOPLE VS BUSTAMANTE
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

January 27, 1959

G.R. No. L-11598
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelee,
vs.
FEDERIC BUSTAMANTE, defendant-appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Atty. Eduardo C. Abaya for appellee.
Ramon S. Milo for appellant.

FACTS:
1. Federico Bustamante was charged and convicted of the crime of bigamy in the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan.
2. The records disclose that defendant-appellant Bustamante was united in wedlock to one Maria
Perez on August 9, 1954, before the Justice of Peace of Binaloan, Pangasinan, a little over a year
late, or on September 16, 195, he contracted a second marriage with Demetria I. Tibayan,
solemnized before Vice-Mayor Francisco B. Nato of Mapandan, Pangasinan, who was then acting
as mayor of the said municipality, while the first marriage was still subsisting.
3. The defendant contended that there could not have been a second marriage to speak of, as
Nato was merely acting as mayor when he celebrated the same, hence, without authority of law to
do so. He lays stress on the distinction between “Acting Mayor” and “Vice Mayor acting as Mayor”,
urging that while the former may solemnize marriages, the latter could not.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the second marriage was valid.
2. Whether or not the Vice Mayor has the authority to solemnize the second marriage.

HELD:

Yes, the marriage was valid and Vice Mayor Federico Nato, acting as mayor, has the authority to
solemnize the marriage. As acting mayor, he discharges all duties and wields the power
appurtenant to said office. This instance does not involve a question of title to the office, but the
performance of the functions thereunto appertaining by one who is admitted to be temporarily
vested with it. The case even concedes and recognizes the powers and duties of the Mayor to
devolve upon the Vice Mayor whenever the latter is in an acting capacity. The word “acting,” when
preceding the title of an office connotes merely the temporary character as nature of the same.
ALCANTARA VS ALCANTARA
Alcantara vs Alcantara G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Restituto M. Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage against respondent
Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and Rosita, without securing the required
marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could
arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a
certain priest. They got married on the same day. They went through another marriage ceremony
in a church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the
parties securing a marriage license. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. In her
Answer, Rosita asserted the validity of their marriage and maintained that there was a marriage
license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona,
Cavite. She alleged that Restituto has a mistress with whom he has three children and that
Restituto only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. After
hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The CA affirmed the decision.

Restituto appealed. He submitted that at the precise time that his marriage with the Rosita was
celebrated, there was no marriage license because he and respondent just went to the Manila City
Hall and dealt with a “fixer” who arranged everything for them.

He and Rosita did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license. Assuming a marriage
license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the Rosita was a resident of the
place.

The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight
because the certification states that “Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr.
Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario” but their marriage contract bears the number
7054033 for their marriage license number.

ISSUE:

Was the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio?

HELD:
No. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage
void ab initio. To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law
requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or
at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage
license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and
respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the
local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically
identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and
Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.
This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the
issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business. Hence,
petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage.

Issuance of a marriage license despite the fact that the fact that neither of the parties are residents
of the city or municipality which issued the same is a mere irregularity that does not affect
the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does
not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity
are civilly,criminally and administratively liable.

As to the discrepancy in the marriage license number, the court held that it is not
impossible to assume that the same is a mere a typographical error. It does not detract
from the conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license to the parties.

Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands, petitioner
cannot pretend that he was not responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he now
insists took place without the requisite marriage license. Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily
went to the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and voluntarily, went through a marriage
ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to extricate himself from the marriage
bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste or suited to his
lifestyle
MALLION VS ALCANTARA

OSCAR P. MALLION, petitioner, v. EDITHA ALCANTARA, respondent.

G.R. No. 141528. October 31, 2006.

Facts:

On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar Mallion filed with the regional trial court seeking a
declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

The trial court denied the petition. Likewise, it was dismissed in the Court of Appeals.

After such decision, petitioner filed another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with the
regional trial court alleging that his marriage with respondent was null and void due to the fact
that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license.

Respondent filed an answer with motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata and forum
shopping.
The trial court grated her petition.

Issue:

Is the action of the husband tenable?

Ruling:

No. Section 47(b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court pertains as “bar by prior judgment” or “estoppels
by verdict,” which is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of the second action upon
the same claim, demand or cause of action. In Section 47(c) of the same rule, it pertains to res
judicata in its concept as “conclusiveness of judgment” or the rule of auter action pendant which
ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any
future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action. Therefore, having
expressly and impliedly concealed the validity of their marriage celebration, petitioner is now
deemed to have waived any defects therein. The Court finds then that the present action for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license is barred. The petition
is denied for lack of merit.
GO-BANGAYAN VS BANGAYAN

In September 1979, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. married Azucena Alegre. In 1982, while Alegre was
outside the Philippines, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally Go. Sally’s father was
against this. In order to appease her father, Sally convinced Benjamin to sign a purported marriage
contract in March 1982.
In 1994, the relationship between Sally and Benjamin soured. Sally filed a bigamy case against
Benjamin. Benjamin on the other hand filed an action to declare his alleged marriage to Sally as non-
existent. To prove the existence of their marriage, Sally presented a marriage license allegedly issued
to Benjamin.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Sally and Benjamin is bigamous.

HELD:
No. The elements of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
In this case, the fourth element is not present. The marriage license presented by Sally was not
authentic as in fact, no marriage license was ever issued to both parties in view of the alleged
marriage. The marriage between them was merely in jest and never complied with the essential
requisites of marriage. Hence, there is no bigamous marriage to speak of.
TUPAL VS ROJO
REX M. TUPAL, vs. JUDGE REMEGIO V. ROJO,
Branch 5, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Bacolod City, Negros Occidental,

A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842

February 24, 2014

FACTS:
Rex M. Tupal filed a complaint against Judge Remegio V. Rojo for violating the
Code of Judicial Conduct and for gross ignorance of the law. Judge Rojo
allegedly solemnized marriages without the required marriage license. He instead
notarized affidavits of cohabitation and issued them to the contracting parties.

ISSUE:
WON Judge Rojo is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

HELD:
YES. Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must personally
interview the contracting parties and examine the requirements they submitted.
The parties must have complied with all the essential and formal requisites of
marriage. Among these formal requisites is a marriage license. A marriage license
is issued by the local civil registrar to parties who have all the qualifications and
none of the legal disqualifications to contract marriage. Before performing the
marriage ceremony, the judge must personally examine the marriage license
presented. If the contracting parties have cohabited as husband and wife for at
least 5 years and have no legal impediment to marry, they are exempt from the
marriage license requirement. Instead, the parties must present an affidavit of
cohabitation sworn to before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.
The judge, as solemnizing officer, must personally examine the affidavit of
cohabitation as to the parties having lived together as husband and wife for at
least 5 years and the absence of any legal impediment to marry each other. The
judge must also execute a sworn statement that he personally ascertained the
parties’ qualifications to marry and found no legal impediment to the marriage.

VDA DE CHUA VS CA

FACTS:

Roberto Lim Chua, during his lifetime, lived out of wedlock with private respondent Florita
A. Vallejo from 1970-1981. The couple had two illegitimate children, Roberto Rafson Alonzo
and Rudyard Pride Alonzo, all surnamed Chua. Roberto died intestate in Davao City on May
28, 1992. Vallejo filed on July 2, 1992 with RTC-Cotabato a petition for declaration of
guardianship of the two child and their properties worth P5,000,000.00.

Antonietta Garcia Vda De Chua, the petitioner, filed a motion alleging that she was the true
wife of Roberto. However, according to Vallejo, she is not the surviving spouse of the latter
but a pretender to the estate since the deceased never contracted marriage with any
woman and died a bachelor.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner is indeed the true wife of Roberto Chua.

HELD:

The court ruled that petitioner was not able to prove her status as wife of the decedent.
She could not produce the original copy or authenticated copy of their marriage certificate.
Furthermore, a certification from the Local Civil Registrar was presented that no such
marriage contract between petitioner and Roberto Chua was ever registered with them,
attested by Judge Augusto Banzali, the alleged person to have solemnized the alleged
marriage, that he has not solemnized such alleged marriage.

Hence, it is clear that petitioner failed to establish the truth of her allegation that she was
the lawful wife of the decedent. The best evidence is a valid marriage contract which she
failed to produce.
SY VS CA
FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000.

Facts:

On November 15, 1973 Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy got married at the Church of Our Lady
of Lourdes in Quezon City. After some time, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Two children
were born out of the marriage. Frederick, their son went to his father’s residence. Filipina filed for
legal separation.

The Trial Court dissolved their conjugal partnership of gains and granted the custody of their
children to her.

Later on, Filipina was punched at the different parts of her body and was even choked by him
when she started spanking their son when the latter ignored her while she was talking to him.

The Trial Court convicted him for slight physical injuries only. A new action for legal separation
was granted by repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity. Filipina then filed for the
declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage citing psychological incapacity.

The Trial Court and Appellate Court denied her petition. On her petition to this Court, she assailed
for the first time that there was no marriage license during their marriage.

Issues:

1) Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from
the beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and

2) Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said marriage
celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity.

Ruling:

The date of celebration of their marriage on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and
private respondent. The pieces of evidence on record showed that on the day of the marriage
ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence
renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows that the marriage
license, numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private
respondent ever resided in Carmona.

The marriage license was issued on September 17,1974, almost one year after the ceremony took
place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted
without a marriage license. Under Article 80 of the Civil Code. those solemnized without a
marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character, are void ab initio. This is
clearly applicable in this case.

The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need no longer detain
the Court. It is mooted by the conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab
initio for lack of a marriage license at the time their marriage was solemnized.

TRINIDAD VS CA
ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
G.R. No. 118904 April 20, 1998

Facts:

Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of three (3) children, namely, Inocentes,
Lourdes and Felix. When Patricio died in 1940, survived by the above named children, he left four
(4) parcels of land, all situated at Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo Aklan.

Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate son of the late Inocentes
Trinidad. Sometime after the marriage, he demanded from the defendants to partition the land
into three equal shares and to give him the (1/3) individual share of his late father, but the
defendants refused.

Arturio Trinidad filed, an action for partition of four parcels of land. Defendants denied that
plaintiff was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants contended that Inocentes was
single when he died in 1941, before plaintiff’s birth. Defendants also denied that plaintiff had lived
with them, and claimed that the parcels of land described in the complaint had been in their
possession since the death of their father in 1940 and that they had not given plaintiff a share in
the produce of the land.

Arturio presented witnesses to prove his position. Jovita Gerardo testified that Inocentes Trinidad
and Felicidad Molato are the parents of Arturio; that Felix and Lourdes as the uncle and aunt of
Arturio; and also identified pictures where the respondents were with Arturio and his family.(At
this stage of the trial, Felix Trinidad [died] without issue and he was survived by his only sister,
Lourdes Trinidad.) Another witness, ISABEL MEREN, 72 years old and a widow testified that she
knows Inocentes Trinidad as the father of Arturio Trinidad; that she knew Inocentes Trinidad and
Felicidad Molato as the parents of Arturio and that she was present when they were married in
New Washington, Aklan, by a protestant pastor by the name of Lauriano Lajaylajay. She further
testified that upon the death of Inocentes, Lourdes took Arturio and cared for him. ARTURIO
TRINIDAD, himself, was presented as witness. As proof that he is the son of Inocentes Trinidad
and Felicidad Molato, he showed a certificate of baptism, and a certificate of loss issued by the LCR
that his birth certificate was burned during World War 2. He also testified that he lived with Felix
and Lourdes and provided for his needs.

On the other hand, defendants presented Pedro Briones who testified that Inocentes was not
married when he died in 1940s. Lourdes Trinidad also testified that she was not aware that his
brother married anybody and denied that Arturio lived with them. Beatriz Sayon also testified that
Inocentes died in 1941, and that Felicidad Molato had never been married to Inocentes. The trial
court rendered a twenty-page decision in favor of Arturio. The CA reversed the decision.
Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner presented sufficient evidence of his parent’s marriage and his
filation.

Ruling:

The partition of the late Patricios real properties requires preponderant proof that petitioner is a
co-owner or co-heir of the decedent’s estate. His right as a co-owner would, in turn, depend
on whether he was born during the existence of a valid and subsisting marriage between his
mother (Felicidad) and his putative father (Inocentes).

When the question of whether a marriage has been contracted arises in litigation, said marriage
may be proven by relevant evidence. To prove the fact of marriage, the following would constitute
competent evidence: the testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the couple’s public and open
cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the birth and the baptismal certificates
of children born during such union, and the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents.

In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan
that all records of births, deaths and marriages were lost, burned or destroyed during the Japanese
occupation of said municipality. Although the marriage contract is considered the primary
evidence of the marital union, petitioner’s failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took
place, as other forms of relevant evidence may take its place. In place of a marriage contract, two
witnesses were presented by petitioner: Isabel Meren and Jovita Gerardo. It further gives rise to
the disputable presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Petitioner also presented his baptismal certificate
in which Inocentes and Felicidad were named as the child’s father and mother, and family
pictures.

The totality of petitioner’s positive evidence clearly preponderates over private respondent’s self-
serving negations.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial courts decision is REINSTATED.
REPUBLIC VS CA AND CASTRO
FACTS:

Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin Cardenas. They did not
immediately live together and it was only upon Castro found out that she was pregnant that they decided
to live together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for only 4 months. Thereafter, they parted ways and
Castro gave birth that was adopted by her brother with the consent of Cardenas.

The baby was brought in the US and in Castro’s earnest desire to follow her daughter wanted to put in
order her marital status before leaving for US. She filed a petition seeking a declaration for the nullity of
her marriage. Her lawyer then found out that there was no marriage license issued prior to the celebration
of their marriage proven by the certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig.

ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by Castro is sufficient to
establish that no marriage license was issued to the parties prior to the solemnization of their marriage.

HELD:

The court affirmed the decision of CA that the certification issued by the Civil Registrar unaccompanied by
any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that the office did not issue a marriage license to the
contracting parties. Albeit the fact that the testimony of Castro is not supported by any other witnesses is
not a ground to deny her petition because of the peculiar circumstances of her case. Furthermore,
Cardenas was duly served with notice of the proceedings, which he chose to ignore.

Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private
respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.
VILLANUEVA VS CA

FACTS: In April 1988, Orly married Lilia before a trial court judge in Puerto Princesa.
In November 1992, Orly filed to annul the marriage. He claimed that threats of
violence and duress forced him to marry Lilia. He said that he had been receiving
phone calls threatening him and that Lilia even hired the service of a certain Ka
Celso, a member of the NPA, to threaten him. Orly also said he was defrauded by
Lilia by claiming that she was pregnant hence he married her but he now raises that
he never impregnated Lilia prior to the marriage. Lilia on the other hand denied
Orly’s allegations and she said that Orly freely cohabited with her after the marriage
and she showed 14 letters that shows Orly’s affection and care towards her.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is duress and fraud attendant in the case at bar.

HELD: The SC ruled that Orly’s allegation of fraud and intimidation is untenable. On
its face, it is obvious that Orly is only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so as to
have the pending appealed bigamy case [filed against him by Lilia] to be dismissed.
On the merits of the case, Orly’s allegation of fear was not concretely established.
He was not able to prove that there was a reasonable and well grounded reason for
fear to be created in his mind by the alleged intimidation being done against him by
Lilia and her party. Orly is a security guard who is well abreast with self-defense and
that the threat he so described done against him is not sufficient enough to vitiate
him from freely marrying Lilia. Fraud cannot be raised as a ground as well. His
allegation that he never had an erection during their sexual intercourse is incredible
and is an outright lie. Also, there is a prolonged inaction on the part of Orly to attack
the marriage. It took him 4 and a half years to file an action which brings merit to
Lilia’s contention that Orly freely cohabited with her after the marriage.

VILLANUEVA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 132955 October 27, 2006
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the January 26,
1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832, affirming with
modification the Decision dated January 12, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 (a) dismissing
petitioner’s petition for the annulment of his marriage to private respondent and
(b) ordering him to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs.
Also assailed is the March 5, 1998 Resolution denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.

FACTS:
In April 1988, Orlando Villanueva married Lilia Canalita- Villanueva before a trial
court judge in Puerto Princesa. In November 1992, Orlando filed before the trial
court a petition for annulment of his marriage. He claimed that threats of violence
and duress forced him to marry Lilia who was then pregnant. Orlando anchored his
prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not freely
consent to be married to Lilia. He cited several incidents that created on his mind
a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life
and safety, to wit: the harassing phone calls from Lilia and strangers as well as the
unwanted visits by three men at the premises of the University of the East after
his classes thereat, and the threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a
supposed member of the New People’s Army whom appellant claimed to have been
hired by Lilia and who accompanied him in going to her home province of Palawan
to marry her. On the other hand Lilia denied Orlando’s allegations and she said that
Orlando freely cohabited with her after the marriage and she showed 14 letters
that shows Orlando’s affection and care towards her.

ISSUE:
(a) Whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated
consent under Article 45 of the Family Code; and

ANSWER:
No. The court ruled that vitiation of consent is not attendant in this
case.Therefore, the petition for annulment, which is anchored to his allegation that
he did not freely give his consent, should be dismissed.

REASONING:
The SC ruled that Orlando’s allegation of fraud and intimidation is untenable. On
its face, it is obvious that Orlando is only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia
so as to have the pending appealed bigamy case [filed against him by Lilia] to be
dismissed.
On the merits of the case, Orlando’s allegation of fear was not concretely
established. The Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to
his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a
contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he was allegedly being
harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given his employment at
that time, it is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the rudiments of self-
defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm’s way. For
sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear upon appellant, what
with the fact that he never sought the assistance of the security personnel of his
school nor the police regarding the activities of those who were threatening him.
And neither did he inform the judge about his predicament prior to solemnizing
their marriage. Fraud cannot be raised as a ground as well. His allegation that he
never had an erection during their sexual intercourse is incredible and is an
outright lie. His counsel also conceded before the lower court that his client had a
sexual relationship with Lilia.

HOLDING:
Thus, the petition for annulment was granted, but the award of moral and
exemplary damages is deleted for lack of basis.
AILEEN A. FERANCULLO vs ATTY. SANCHO M. FERANCULLO
A.C. No. 7214, November 30, 2006
Facts:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Aileen Ferancullo (petitioner) against
Atty. Sancho M. Ferancullo, Jr. (respondent) grounded on his alleged commission of estafa, bigamy and violation of
the lawyers oath. Complainant narrated how respondent allegedly took advantage of their attorney-client relationship
to extort money from her in consideration of the out-of-court settlement of her criminal cases and deceived her into
marrying him by concealing his previous marriage. Complainant averred that respondent would send her breakfast
and flowers. When asked about his personal circumstances, respondent supposedly told complainant that he was still
single although he had a child out of wedlock. Complainant also maintained that she saw no apparent indications
suggesting that respondent was married. As indicative of their romantic relationship, respondent and complainant
allegedly traveled to different places. Complainant found out that she was pregnant sometime in June 2004.
Respondent likewise denied courting complainant asserting that the latter had already known since February 2004
that he was married.[21] He claimed to be happily married to his legal wife. He denied living in together with
complainant or providing a residence for complainant. Despite the numerous factual allegations presented by both
parties and the affidavits and documents to support them, the IBP made only a general conclusion that complainant
must be motivated by greed in filing the instant administrative complaint. Thus, the Court reviewed the records.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Sancho M. Ferancullo is found guilty of gross immorality with regard to engaging in illicit
relationships and abandoning his family?
Ruling:
Respondents intimate relationship with a woman other than his wife shows his moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. ]It is a time-honored rule that good moral character
is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law. Its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law. However, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a
clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and
as a member of the bar. Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such as temporary
suspension, could accomplish the end desired. Atty. Sancho M. Ferancullo, Jr. is found guilty of gross immorality and
is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years effective upon notice with the specific
warning that a more severe penalty shall be imposed should he commit the same or a similar offense hereafter.