Right to Confrontation, to Cross-Examine, or Meet Witness Face-to-Face

MIDSAPAK TAMPAR​ et al. v. ​ESMAEL USMAN

G.R. No. 82077 - August 16, 1991 - Gancayco, J.

The Sharia court resolved the dispute of the parties in this case using the Islamic
rule of yamin (oath). Under that principle, the plaintiff (one bringing action) has
the burden of proving his claim but if he does not have any evidence, he can
require or challenge the defendant to take an oath (yamin) to Allah that he is the
one telling the truth. If the defendant then agrees to take the oath, the case will
be decided in his favor.

A provision that effectively deprives a litigant of his constitutional right to due

process when it denies a party his right to confront the witnesses against him and
to cross-examine them. Such a provision should have no place even in the Special
Rules of Procedure of the Shari'a courts of the country.

The Petitioners in this case ​filed a complaint against respondents for "Annulment
of Sale in an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Simultaneous Sale and
Delivery of Certificates of Title and Damages" before the Shari'a District Court,
5th Shari'a District, Cotabato City.

The Petitioners claim ownership over a parcel of land which they say they
inherited from their grandfather. Their ownership is evidenced in an Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) but since the OCT was lost, they were issued another
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). They wanted to annul an “Extrajudicial
Settlement and Simultaneous Deed of Sale” (EJS) by which the petitioners
purportedly sold their land to the respondents. The Petitioners are claiming that
their signatures in the EJS were forgeries and that the sale was not approved by
the governor, as required by law.

During the trial, the Sharia Court required the petitioners to present their
evidence. Consisting of at least 2 witnesses. However, petitioners’ sole witness
backed out so they told the court that they had no witnesses.

The petitioners then challenged the respondents to yamin - this is an Islamic rule
wherein the plaintiff, not having any evidence, will challenge the defendant to
declare an oath to Allah that he is the one telling the truth. This is consistent with
the Sharia rules of procedure which states:

“The plaintiff (mudda'i) has the burden of proof, and the taking of an oath
("yamin") rests upon the defendant (mudda'aalai). If the plaintiff has no evidence
to prove his claim, the defendant shall take an oath and judgment shall be
rendered in his favor by the Court. Should the defendant refuse to take an oath,
the plaintiff shall affirm his claim under oath in which case, judgment shall be
rendered in his favor. Should the plaintiff refuse to affirm his claim under oath,
the case shall be dismissed.”
The court allowed the challenged and asked the respondents to perform the
yamin. The respondents said that the petitioners should be the first to declare
their own oath and following elementary rules of evidence, the plaintiffs should be
required some form of proof or evidence before the burden shifts to respondents.
The court, however, said that plaintiffs cannot be their own witnesses so their
oath is not allowed.

The respondents took the yamin, so the judgment was rendered in their favor.
The plaintiffs (even though they were the ones who insisted in applying yamin in
the first place), questioned the decision, saying that the yamin was unprocedural
and a deprivation of their right to be heard.

WON the Shari'a court committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
complaint of petitioners by virtue of the "yamin.” - YES AND NO - The dismissal of
the case was the proper outcome but NOT on the basis of yamin.

The basis of the dismissal should be the petitioners’ failure to prove their
own allegations because they did not have even an ounce of evidence
Under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines.1âwphi1 which
may apply in a suppletory manner in this case,each party must prove his own
affirmative allegations. When the plaintiffs (petitioners herein) failed to adduce
any evidence to support the complaint, then the complaint must be dismissed. On
this basis, the dismissal of the complaint by the Shari'a court in this case should
be upheld, but not because of the "yamin" taken by the respondent Usman.

The yamin procedure is a violation of due process because it deprives

parties of right to confront witnesses
Section 7 of the Special Rules of Procedure prescribed for Shari'a courts
aforecited provides that if the plaintiff has no evidence to prove his claim, the
defendant shall take an oath and judgment shall be rendered in his favor by the
Court. On the other hand, should defendant refuse to take an oath, plaintiff may
affirm his claim under oath, in which case judgment shall be rendered in his
favor.

The Court is of the opinion that said provision effectively deprives a litigant of his
constitutional right to due process. It denies a party his right to confront the
witnesses against him and to cross-examine them. It should have no place even
in the Special Rules of Procedure of the Shari'a courts of the country.

Petition dismissed.
However, the Court recommended the formation of a committee who will
study whether the yamin procedure should be deleted from the Sharia
rules of procedure. Even if the Muslim community are allowed to practice
their own court laws, the Court deems that this particular rule is
inconsistent with due process.
TRIAL IN ABSENTIA - The rIght to be present

ELIAS CARREDO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 77542 - March 19, 1990 - Gancayco, J.

The accused signed a waiver, waiving his right to be present in all of his trials and
expressly allowing the Prosecution to identify him, as the accused even in his
absence. The Court said that waiver is invalid. He is required to be present for
identification by prosecution.
The provision of the Constitution authorizing the trial in absentia of the accused in
case of his non-appearance after arraignment despite due notice simply means
that he thereby waives his right to meet the witnesses face to face among others.
An express waiver of appearance after arraignment, as in this case, is of the
same effect. However, such waiver of appearance and trial in absentia does not
mean that the prosecution is thereby deprived of its right to require the presence
of the accused for purposes of identification by its witnesses which is vital for the
conviction of the accused.

Petitioner was charged with malicious mischief. He deposited a cash bond for his
provisional liberty. Upon arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty and
thereafter filed a written waiver of appearance during the trial or at any stage
thereof. Petitioner failed to appear at a hearing where the principal witness was
recalled to identify him. The trial court ordered him arrested and his cash bond
confiscated.

Whether or not an accused may be compelled by the court to appear before the
court despite waiver in favor of trial by absentia. - YES.

Aquino, Jr​. vs.​ Military Commission No​. 2 ​- the order of the respondent military
commission requiring his presence at all times during the proceedings before it
should be modified in the sense that petitioner's presence shall be required only
in the instance just indicated.

People vs​. Presiding Judge - reiterated the rule in Aquino that the accused may
waive his presence at the trial of the case his presence may be compelled when
he is to be identified. Petitioner, however, argues that he should not be ordered
arrested for non-appearance since he filed a written waiver that "he admits that
he could be identified by witnesses who have testified at the time that said
accused was not present" following the ruling of this Court in People vs. Presiding
Judge. The aforestated statement in the waiver of appearance of petitioner that
he admits he could be identified by the witnesses for the prosecution even in his
absence is not such unqualified admission contemplated in Presiding Judge. What
is stated in Presiding Judge as an exception is when the accused "unqualifiedly
admits in open court after his arraingment the he is the person named as
defendant in the case on trial," no more no less. In the present case petitioner
only admits that he can be identified by the prosecution witnesses in his absence.
He did not admit that he is the very person named as defendant in the case on
trial. His admission is vague and far from unqualified. He cannot therefore seek
the benefit of the exception recognized in Presiding Judge.\\Trial in absentia of
the accused in case of his non-appearance after arraignment despite due notice
simply means that he waives his right to meet the witnesses face to face. An
express waiver of appearance after arraignment is of the same effect. However,
such waiver of appearance and trial in absentia does not mean that the
prosecution is deprived of its right to require the presence of the accused for
purposes of identification by its witnesses which is vital for the conviction of the
accused. Such waiver of the right of the accused does not mean a release of the
accused from his obligation under the bond to appear in court whenever so
required. The accused may waive his right but not his duty or obligation to the
court.

Petition is denied.

RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES

Mayor Jejomar Binay et al. v. Sandiganbayan

G.R. Nos. 120681-83 - October 1, 1999 - Kapunan, J.

The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is
deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious,
and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked
for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time
is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. The Court must
balance the interests in deciding whether this right was violated. A ​mere
mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient.
In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition
of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case.

Cases were filed by the Ombudsman in the Sandiganbayan (SB for brevity)
against Mayor Binay of Makati for ‘Illegal Use of Public Funds’(RPC A220) and
‘Violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act’(RA 3019) on September 1994.
The informations filed constituted crimes which were committed by the petitioner
in his incumbency in the year 1987.The petitioner filed a motion to quash alleging
that the delay of more than 6 years constituted a violation of his constitutional
right of due process. His arraignment therefore was held in abeyance pending the
resolution of the motions. Subsequently, the SB issued a resolution denying
petitioner’s motion to quash and further the latter’s motion for reconsideration. In
the meantime, the prosecution filed a motion to suspend the accused ‘pendente
lite’ (benefits) which was later granted and ordered for a 90-day suspension.
Petition for certiorari was filed by Mayor Binay in the SC praying that the
resolution denying his motion for reconsideration be set aside and claimed that he
was denied of his rights when the suspension was ordered even before he could
file his reply to the petitioner’s opposition. SC then, directed the SB to permit
petitioner to file said reply. The SB nonetheless reiterated its previous resolutions
and order after the submission of the reply. Meanwhile, RA 7975 redefining the
jurisdiction of SB took effect on May 1995 so much so that the petitioner filed
before SB a motion to refer his cases to the RTC of Makati alleging that the SB
has no jurisdiction over said cases when it issued its resolutions and suspension
order on June 1995. The SB in a follow-up resolution denied the petitioner’s
motion. Hence this present petition, prohibition and mandamus questioning the
jurisdiction of SB over the criminal cases.

Whether or not the petitioner’s right to speedy disposition has been violated –
NO.

The Court finds that there was ​no undue delay in the disposition of the subject
cases.

The prosecution is not bound by the findings of the Commission on Audit (COA);
it must rely on its own independent judgment in the determination of probable
cause. Accordingly, the prosecution had to conduct its own review of the COA
findings. Judging from said findings, we find that the cases were sufficiently
complex, thus justifying the length of time for their resolution.

Whether or not there is probable cause to warrant the filing of the subject cases
is a question best left to the discretion of the Ombudsman. Absent any grave
abuse of such discretion, the Court will not interfere in the exercise thereof.
Petitioner in this case has failed to establish any such abuse on the part of the
Ombudsman.

The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is
deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by ​vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays​; or when ​unjustified ​postponements of
the trial are asked for and secured​, or when without cause or justifiable
motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party
having his case tried​. Equally applicable is the balancing test ​used to
determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a

speedy disposition of a case for that matter, ​in which the conduct of both the
prosecution and the ​defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length
of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert
such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay​. The
concept of speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible
concept.

A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be

sufficient. In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy
disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case.

RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION

THE UNITED STATES​ v. ​BALDOMERO NAVARRO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 1272 - January 11, 1904 0 Mcdonough, J.

Principle of rright against self-incrimination ​was established on the grounds of

public policy and humanity — of policy, because if the party were required to
testify, it would place the witness under the strongest temptation to commit the
crime of perjury, and of humanity, because it would prevent the extorting of
confessions by duress.

The defendants, Baldomero Navarro, Marcelo de Leon, and Fidel Feliciano are
convicted of the crime of illegal detention under Article 481 and of 483 of the
Penal Code. They were sentenced to life imprisonment.

Article 481 of the Penal Code provides that a private person who shall lock up or
detain another, or in any way deprive him of his liberty shall be punished with the
penalty of prision mayor.

The second paragraph of article 483 provides that one who illegally detains
another and fails to give information concerning his whereabouts, or does not
prove that he set him at liberty, shall be punished with cadena temporal in its
maximum degree to life imprisonment.

The punishment for the crime mentioned in article 483 of the Penal Code is the
penalty of cadena temporal in its maximum degree to cadena perpetua, or in
other words one convicted of simply depriving a person of his liberty may be
imprisoned for a term of from six to twelve years and one convicted of depriving a
person of his liberty and who shall not state his whereabouts or prove that he had
set said person at liberty may be punished by imprisonment for a term of
seventeen years four months and one day, to life, as in this case. In other words,
for failure on the part of the defendant to testify regarding the whereabouts of the
person deprived of his liberty, or to prove that he was set at liberty, the
punishment may be increased from imprisonment for a term of six years to life
imprisonment.

On appeal, counsel for the defendants argued that the provisions of the law has
the effect of forcing a defendant to become a witness in his own behalf or to take
a much severer punishment. The burden is put upon him of giving evidence if he
desires to lessen the penalty, or, in other words, of incriminating himself, for the
very statement of the whereabouts of the victim or the proof that the defendant
set him at liberty amounts to a confession that the defendant unlawfully detained
the person. So the evidence necessary to clear the defendant, under article 483
of the Penal Code, would have the effect of convincing him under article 481. It is
claimed that such practice is illegal, since section 5 of the Philippine Bill provides
that ". . . no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself."

Whether or not the defendants' rights against self-incrimination were violated.

- YES.

The right against self-incrimination was established on the grounds of public

policy and humanity - of policy, because if the party were required to testify, it
would place the witness under the strongest temptation to commit the crime of
perjury, and of humanity, because it would prevent the extorting of confessions
by duress.

Under the present system, the information must charge the accused with acts
committed by him prior to the filing of the information and which of themselves
constitute an offense against the law. The Government can not charge a man with
one of the necessary elements of an offense and trust to his making out the rest
by availing himself of his right to leave the entire burden of prosecuting on the
prosecution from beginning to end.

If the disclosure thus made would be capable of being used against him as a
confession of crime, or an admission of facts tending to prove the commission of
an offense, such disclosure would be an accusation against himself.

In the present case, if the defendant disclosed the whereabouts of the person
taken, or shows that he was given his liberty, this disclosure may be used to
obtain a conviction under article 481 of the Penal Code.

It is the duty of the prosecution, in order to convict one of a crime, to produce

evidence showing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and the accused can not be
called upon either by express words or acts to assist in the production of such
evidence; nor should his silence be taken as proof against him. He has a right to
rely on the presumption of innocence until the prosecution proves him guilty of
every element of the crime with which he is charged.

The judgment of the Court of First Instance is reversed and the defendants are
found guilty of the crime defined and punished by article 482 of the Penal Code.

THE UNITED STATES v. TAN TENG,

G.R. No. 7081 - September 7, 1912 0 Johnson, J.,

DNA samples/bodily substances were taken from accused’s body, he invoked right
against self-incrimination which the Court said was inapplicable. The prohibition of
self-incrimination in the Bill of Rights is a prohibition of the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communications from him, and not an exclusion of his
body as evidence, when it may be material. It would be the same as if the
offender apprehended was a thief and the object stolen by him may be used as
evidence against him.

Oliva Pacomio, a girl 7 years of age, was, on 15 September 1910, staying in the
house of her sister, located on Ilang-Ilang Street, in the city of Manila. On said
day, a number of Chinamen were gambling in or near the said house. Some of
said Chinamen had been in the habit of visiting the house of Oliva's sister. Oliva
Pacomio, on said day, after having taken a bath, returned to her room. Tan Teng
followed her into her room and asked her for some face powder, which she gave
him. After using some of the face powder upon his private parts, he threw Oliva
upon the floor, placing his private parts upon hers, and remained in the position
for some little time. Several days later, perhaps a week or two, the sister of Oliva
Pacomio discovered that the latter was suffering from a venereal disease known
as gonorrhea. It was at the time of this discovery that Oliva related to her sister
what had happened upon the morning of September 15. The sister at once put on
foot an investigation to find the Chinaman. A number of Chinamen were collected
together. Oliva was called upon to identify the one who had abused her. The
defendant was not present at first. Later he arrived and Oliva identified him at
once as the one who had attempted to violate her. Upon this information, Tan
Teng was arrested and taken to the police station and stripped of his clothing and
examined. The policeman who examined Tan Teng swore that his body bore every
sign of the fact that he was suffering from the venereal disease known as
gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the body
of Tan Teng and turned it over to the Bureau of Science for the purpose of having
a scientific analysis made of the same. The result of the examination showed that
Tan Teng was suffering from gonorrhea. Tan Teng was charged with the crime of
rape. During trial, Tan Teng contended, among others, that the result of the
scientific examination made by the Bureau of Science of the substance taken from
his body, at or about the time he was arrested, was not admissible in evidence as
proof of the fact that he was suffering from gonorrhea; as that to admit such
evidence was to compel the defendant to testify against himself. After hearing the
evidence, the Honorable Charles S. Lobingier, judge, found Tan Teng guilty of the
offense of abusos deshonestos, as defined and punished under article 439 of the
Penal Code, and sentenced him to be imprisoned for a period of 4 years 6 months
and 11 days of prison correccional, and to pay the costs. Tan Teng appealed.

Whether the substance taken from Tan Teng, which indicates that he has
gonorrhea, cannot be used as evidence against Tan Teng on the ground that it is
violative of the constitutional injunction against self-incrimination. - NO.

As held in Holt vs. US (218 US 245), the prohibition of compelling a man in a

criminal court to be a witness against himself, is a prohibition of the use of
physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him, not an
exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. The objection, in
principle, would forbid a court to look at a person and compare his features with a
photograph in proof. Moreover the Court is not considering how far a court would
go in compelling a man to exhibit himself, for when he is exhibited, whether
voluntarily or by order, even if the order goes too far, the evidence if material, is
competent. Verily, the prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill that
a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself, is simply a
prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against
his will, an admission of his guilt. The main purpose of the provision of the
Philippine Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral examination of prisoners before trial,
or upon trial, for the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or declarations
implicating them in the commission of a crime. Herein, the substance was taken
from the body of Tan Teng without his objection, the examination was made by
competent medical authority and the result showed that Tan Teng was suffering
from said disease. As was suggested by Judge Lobingier, had Tan Teng been
found with stolen property upon his person, there certainly could have been no
question had the stolen property been taken for the purpose of using the same as
evidence against him. So also if the clothing which he wore, by reason of blood
stains or otherwise, had furnished evidence of the commission of a crime, there
certainly could have been no objection to taking such for the purpose of using the
same as proof. No one would think of even suggesting that stolen property and
the clothing in the case indicated, taken from Tan Teng, could not be used against
him as evidence, without violating the rule that a person shall not be required to
give testimony against himself.

Upheld conviction but modified penalty.

United States vs. Ong Siu Hong

GR 12778 - 3 August 1917 - Malcolm

Same doctrine as above was applied for a person who was forced to spit out
morphine which was a prohibited drug.

Ong Siu Hong was forced to discharge the morphine from his mouth. Ong Siu
Hong appears to have been convicted by the lower court, based on the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses, who were members of the Secret Service.
Ong Siu Hong's counsel raised the constitutional question that the accused was
compelled to be a witness against himself.

Whether Ong Siu Hong was compelled to be a witness against himself when the
morphine was forced from his mouth. - NO.

By analogy, the decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands in U. S.

vs. Tan Teng (23 Phil. 145[1912]), following leading authorities, and the
persuasive decisions of other courts of last resort, are conclusive. To force a
prohibited drug from the person of an accused is along the same line as requiring
him to exhibit himself before the court; or putting in evidence papers and other
articles taken from the room of an accused in his absence; or, as in the Tan Teng
case, taking a substance from the body of the accused to be used in proving his
guilt. It would be a forced construction of the paragraph of the Philippine Bill of
Rights in question to hold that any article, substance, or thing taken from a
person accused of crime could not be given in evidence. ​The main purpose of
this constitutional provision is to prohibit testimonial compulsion by oral
examination in order to extort unwilling confessions from prisoners
implicating them in the commission of a crime.

The judgment of the lower court is modified by imposing the minimum penalty
provided by law, i. e., three months imprisonment and a fine of P300 or, in case
of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment, with costs.

EMETERIA VILLAFLOR v. RICARDO SUMMERS

G.R. No. 16444 - September 8, 1920 - Malcolm, J.

The constitutional guaranty that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself is limited to a prohibition against compulsory
testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular
inspection of the body of the accused is permissible.

In a criminal case pending before the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila,
Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco were charged with the crime of
adultery. On trial before the Hon. Pedro Concepcion, Judge of First Instance, upon
the petition of the assistant fiscal for the city of Manila, the court ordered
Emeteria Villaflor to submit her body to the examination of one or two competent
doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. Villaflor refused to obey the
order on the ground that such examination of her person was a violation of the
constitutional provision in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to
Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical examination required by the
court. Villaflor filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

In a criminal case pending before the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila,
Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco were charged with the crime of
adultery. On trial before the Hon. Pedro Concepcion, Judge of First Instance, upon
the petition of the assistant fiscal for the city of Manila, the court ordered
Emeteria Villaflor to submit her body to the examination of one or two competent
doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. Villaflor refused to obey the
order on the ground that such examination of her person was a violation of the
constitutional provision in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to
Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical examination required by the
court. Villaflor filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. - NO.

A stirring plea can be made showing that under the due process of law clause of
the Constitution every person has a natural and inherent right to the possession
and control of his own body. ​It is extremely abhorrent to one's sense of
decency and propriety to have to decide that such inviolability of the
person, particularly of a woman, can be invaded by exposure to another's
gaze. To compel any one, and especially a woman, to lay bare the body,
or to submit to the touch of a stranger, without lawful authority, is an
indignity, an assault, and a trespass. However, between a sacrifice of the
ascertainment of truth to personal considerations, between a disregard
of the public welfare for refined notions of delicacy, law and justice
cannot hesitate. ​Fully conscious that the Court is resolving a most extreme case
in a sense, which on first impression is a shock to one's sensibilities, it must
nevertheless enforce t​he constitutional provision in this jurisdiction in
accord with the policy and reason thereof, undeterred by merely
sentimental influences. Once again the Court lays down the rule that the
constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against
compulsory testimonial selfincrimination. The corollary to the proposition
is that, on a proper showing and under an order of the trial court, an
ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. ​The proviso is
that torture or force shall be avoided. Whether facts fall within or without the rule
with its corollary and proviso must, of course, be decided as cases arise. It is a
reasonable presumption that in an examination by r​eputable and disinterested
physicians due care will be taken not to use violence and not to embarrass the
patient any more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, no objection to the
physical examination being ​made by the family doctor of the accused or by
doctor of the same sex can be seen.

Required: Doctor of the same sex, of good reputation, disinterested, will

carry out physical examination.
Although the order of the trial judge, acceding to the request of the assistant
fiscal for an examination of the person of the defendant by physicians was
phrased in absolute terms, it should, nevertheless, be understood as subject to
the limitations herein mentioned, and therefore legal. The writ of habeas corpus
prayed for is hereby denied. The costs shall be taxed against the petitioner. So
ordered.

FRANCISCO BELTRAN ​v. ​FELIX SAMSON,

G.R. No. 32025 - September 23, 1929 - Romualdez, J.

An order requiring the accused to write so that his handwriting may be validated
with the documentary evidence is covered by the constitutional proscription
against self-incrimination.

Felix Samson, Judge of the Second Judicial District ordered Francisco Beltran to
appear before the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela, Francisco Jose, to take dictations in
his own handwriting from the latter. The purpose for such was for the fiscal to
compare Beltran's handwriting and to determine if it is he who wrote certain
documents supposed to be falsified. Beltran filed a petition for a writ of
prohibition.

Whether or not an order requiring to write so that his handwriting may be

validated documentary evidence is considered a violation of right against
self-incrimination. - YES.

he fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and the proper judge,
upon motion of the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at the
investigation of any crime of misdemeanor. But this power must be exercised
without prejudice to the constitutional rights of persons cited to appear. The
privilege is found in the Jones Law, which provides that "Nor shall he be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." This text is not
limited to declaracion but says "to be a witness." As to its scope, this privilege is
not limited precisely to testimony, but extends to all giving or furnishing of
evidence. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hand, or the
fingers. Writing is not a purely mechanical and attention. Herein, writing means
that Beltran is to furnish a means to determine or not he is the falsifier, as the
petition of the provincial fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, the
present case is similar to that of producing documents of chattels in one's
possession.
And as to such production of documents or chattels, which is not so serious as
present, the same eminent Professor Wigmore, in his work cited, says (volume 4,
page 864): "2264, Production or Inspection of Documents and Chattels. — 1. It
follows that the production of documents or chattels by a person (whether
ordinary witness or party-witness) in response to a subpoena, or to a motion to
order production, or to other form of process treating him as a witness (i. e. as a
person appearing before the tribunal to furnish testimony on his moral
responsibility for truth- telling), may be refused under the protection of the
privilege; and this is universally conceded."

T​hus, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity

between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is
compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the
witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. The present case
is more serious than that of compelling the production of documents or
chattels, because here the witness is compelled to write and create, by
means of the act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and which
may identify him as the falsifier. It cannot be contended that if
permission to obtain a specimen of Beltran's handwriting is not granted,
the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that
Beltran is a municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the
fiscal to obtain genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even
supposing it is impossible to obtain a specimen or specimens without
resorting to the means complained of, that is not reason for trampling
upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. ​It might be true that
in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such
cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d'etre of the privilege. This
constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons. Hence, the
Court ordered the judge and the fiscal and those under their orders desist and
abstain absolutely and forever from compelling Beltran to take down dictation in
his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison.

Wherefore, we find the present action well taken, and it is ordered that the
respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and
forever from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting
for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison.

MANUEL F. CABAL v. HON. RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR., and THE CITY FISCAL
OF MANILA

G.R. No. L-19052 - December 29, 1962 - Concepcion, J.

No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.

This prohibition against compelling a person to take the stand as a witness
against himself a
​ pplies to criminal, quasi-criminal, and penal proceedings,
including a proceeding civil in form for forfeiture of property by reason of
the commission of an offense, but not a proceeding in which the penalty
recoverable is civil or remedial in nature.

The privilege of a witness not to incriminate himself is not infringed by merely

asking the witness a question which he refuses to answer. The privilege is simply
an option of refusal, and not a prohibition of inquiry. A question is not improper
merely because the answer may tend to incriminate but, where a witness
exercises his constitutional right not to answer, a question by counsel as to
whether the reason for refusing to answer is because the answer may tend to
incriminate the witness is improper.

Col. Jose C. Maristela filed with the Secretary of National Defense a

letter-complaint charging petitioner Manuel Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the AFP,
with "graft, corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, and other equally
reprehensible acts". The President of the Philippines created a committee to
investigate the charge of unexplained wealth. The Committee ordered petitioner
herein to take the witness stand in the ​administrative proceeding and be sworn to
as witness for Maristela, in support of his aforementioned charge of unexplained
wealth. Petitioner objected to the order of the Committee, invoking his
constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Committee insisted that
petitioner take the witness stand and be sworn to, subject to his right to refuse to
answer such questions as may be incriminatory. This notwithstanding, petitioner
respectfully refused to be sworn to as a witness to take the witness stand.

The Committee referred the matter to the Fiscal of Manila, for such action as he
may deem proper. The City Fiscal filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a
"charge" of contempt for failing to obey the order of the Committee to take the
witness stand. The "charge" was assigned to the sala of respondent judge
Kapunan. Petitioner filed with respondent Judge a motion to quash, which was
denied. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Whether or not the Committee's order requiring petitioner to take the witness
stand violates his constitutional right against self-incrimination. - YES.

Although the said Committee was created to investigate the administrative charge
of unexplained wealth, it seems that the purpose of the charge against petitioner
is to apply the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to
the State of property of a public officer or employee which is manifestly out of
proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and his other lawful
income and the income from legitimately acquired property. However, such
forfeiture has been held to partake of the nature of a penalty. As a consequence,
proceedings for forfeiture of property are deemed criminal or penal, and, hence,
the exemption of defendants in criminal case from the obligation to be witnesses
against themselves are applicable thereto.

No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.

This prohibition against compelling a person to take the stand as a witness
against himself applies to criminal, quasi-criminal, and penal proceedings,
including a proceeding civil in form for forfeiture of property by reason of the
commission of an offense, but not a proceeding in which the penalty recoverable
is civil or remedial in nature.

The privilege of a witness not to incriminate himself is not infringed by merely

asking the witness a question which he refuses to answer. The privilege is simply
an option of refusal, and not a prohibition of inquiry. A question is not improper
merely because the answer may tend to incriminate but, where a witness
exercises his constitutional right not to answer, a question by counsel as to
whether the reason for refusing to answer is because the answer may tend to
incriminate the witness is improper.

The possibility that the examination of the witness will be pursued to the extent of
requiring self-incrimination will not justify the refusal to answer questions.
However, where the position of the witness is virtually that of an accused on trial,
it would appear that he may invoke the privilege in support of a blanket refusal to
answer any and all questions.

Note: It is not disputed that the accused in a criminal case may refuse,
not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness
stand.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted and respondent Judge hereby
enjoined permanently from proceeding further in Criminal Case No. 60111 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila. It is so ordered.

ARSENIO PASCUAL, JR. v. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS,

respondent-appellant, SALVADOR GATBONTON and ENRIQUETA
GATBONTON, intervenors-appellants.

G.R. No. L-25018 - May 26, 1969 - Fernando, J.

Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton filed an administrative case against

Arsenio Pascual Jr. for alleged immorality. At the initial hearing thereof,
Gatbonton’s counsel announced that he would present Pascual as his first witness.
Thereupon, Pascual, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the
constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. The Board
of Examiners, took note of such a plea, at the same time stating that at the next
scheduled hearing, on 12 February 1965, Pascual would be called upon to testify
as such witness, unless in the meantime he could secure a restraining order from
a competent authority. Arsenio Pascual, Jr., filed on 1 February 1965 with the
Court of First Instance of Manila February 1965, the lower court ordered that a
writ of preliminary injunction issue against the Board commanding it to refrain
from hearing or further proceeding with such an administrative case, to await the
judicial disposition of the matter upon Pascual posting a bond in the amount of
P500.00. There was a motion for intervention by Salvador Gatbonton and
Enriqueta Gatbonton, asking that they be allowed to file an answer as
intervenors. Such a motion was granted and an answer in intervention was duly
filed by them on 23 March 1965 sustaining the power of Board, which for them is
limited to compelling the witness to take the stand, to be distinguished from the
power to compel a witness to incriminate himself. A decision was rendered by the
lower court on 2 August 1965, finding the claim of Pascual to be well-founded and
prohibiting the Board "from compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a
witness for the complainant in said investigation without his consent and against
himself." Hence, the Board and the Gatbontons appealed.

Whether a medical practitioner charged with malpractice in administrative case

can avail of the constitutional guarantee not to be a witness against himself. -
YES.

The constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination is not limited to allowing a

witness to object to questions the answers to which could lead to a penal liability
being subsequently incurred. It is true that one aspect of such a right, to follow
the language of another American decision, is the protection against "any
disclosures which the witness may reasonably apprehend could be used in a
criminal prosecution or which could lead to other evidence that might be so used."
If that were all there is then it becomes diluted. The constitutional guarantee
protects as well the right to silence. As far back as 1905, the Court had occasion
to declare: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence
cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." Recently, in Chavez v. Court of
Appeals, the Court reaffirmed the doctrine anew that is the right of a defendant
"to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness
stand—with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will." The
constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a
belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be
revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to
means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human
personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference
accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given
due weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional foundation
underlying the privilege is the respect a government must accord to the dignity
and integrity of its citizens." Thus, in an administrative hearing against a medical
practitioner for alleged malpractice, the Board of Medical Examiners cannot,
consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded
against to take the witness stand without his consent

The case for malpractice and cancellation of the license to practice medicine while
administrative in character possesses a criminal or penal aspect. An unfavorable
decision would result in the revocation of the license of the respondent to practice
medicine. Consequently, he can refuse to take the witness stand.
The right against self-incrimination extends not only to right to refuse to answer
questions put to the accused while on witness stand, but also to forgo testimony,
to remain silent and refuse to take the witness stand when called by as a witness
by the prosecution. The reason is that the right against self incrimination, along
with the other rights granted to the accused, stands for a belief that while a crime
should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable
objective should not be accomplished according to means and methods offensive
to the high sense of respect accorded to the human personality.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of August 2, 1965 is affirmed.

Without pronouncement as to costs.