Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Term Definition
Bowtie A graphical representation of a risk assessment that identifies the
causes and consequences of a hazard including the description of
controls. See Figure 7 (p26).
Bus A motor vehicle with seating positions for 10 or more adults (including
the driver) built to comply with the requirements specified in the
Australian Design Rule for a passenger omnibus.
Bus operator The person who is responsible for controlling or directing the operations
of a bus service.
Bus safety worker A person who carries out bus safety work activities, including but not
limited to driving a bus, repairing, testing, modifying or maintaining a
bus or its equipment, and setting bus schedules and timetables.
Cause Something that may result in a hazard. That is, the way in which a
hazard occurs.
Control A process, device, practice or other action that acts to minimise risk i.e.
a way to eliminate or reduce risk.
Decision basis A rationalised basis for deciding that risks are eliminated or reduced so
far as is reasonably practible (SFAIRP).
Hazard A source of potential harm or what can go wrong. That is, events that
can affect safety and are called ‘hazards’ in this publication.
Procurer A person who charters a bus service or otherwise engages with a bus
operator for using a bus service (regardless of whether or not the bus
service is provided on a commercial basis).
SFAIRP A legal standard for ensuring safety. In this case, the Bus Safety
Act 2009 (Vic) requires risks to safety to be eliminated so far as
is reasonably practicable and, if it is not reasonably practicable
to eliminate the risk, to reduce these risks to safety so far as is
reasonably practicable.
Legislation
Why is safety important for me? Page 5
Accidents and incidents in bus operations can result in serious injuries and
fatalities to bus employees and members of the public. Risks need effective
management so, ideally, they do not occur. However, if they do occur, controls or
actions should be in place to manage these risks.
Bus operators, bus safety workers, procurers of bus servics and designers of bus
stops all have a role to play in managing these risks to safety. Importantly, this
has been legislated as ‘safety duties’ in the Bus Safety Act 2009 (Vic).
This guide aims to help you act safely in accordance with the safety duties under
the Bus Safety Act 2009 (Vic). In particular, it explains how you may ensure
safety to the standard required under safety duties i.e. ‘so far as is reasonably
practicable’ (SFAIRP). The concept of the SFAIRP standard is not new. For
example, there are similar requirements for employers to ensure the health and
safety of employees under the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic).
The consequences of not meeting your safety duties can be significant. Not only
can people suffer serious injuries or fatalities (including members of the public),
but potential compliance and enforcement actions may be taken.
Note: For a list of definitions used in these materials, refer to the Glossary.
For a list of further reading materials on risk management, see Appendix D:
Further reading for risk management.
No. 13 of 2009
BSA 14 (2) (a) (a) the likelihood of the hazard or risk concerned eventuating;
BSA 14 (2) (b) (b) the degree of harm that would result if the hazard or risk
eventuated,
BSA 14 (2) (c) (c) what the person concerned knows, or ought reasonably to know,
about the hazard or risk and any ways of eliminating or reducing
the hazard or risk;
BSA 14 (2) (d) (d) the availability and suitability of ways to eliminate or reduce the
hazard or risk;
BSA 14 (2) (e) (e) the cost of eliminating or reducing the hazard or risk.
However, the offence may be heard and determined summarily (see section 28
of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009).
Underlying purpose of Page 9
However, the offence may be heard and determined summarily (see section
28 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009).
Risk management
Risk management is the process of identifying what can go wrong (identify
the risk) and the ways in which you control it so that the risk is eliminated or
reduced.
This is useful because different events can affect our safety. It is important
to address all risks, but common sense must prevail. Also, we need a process
to measure risk so we can address the highest risk first.
Suggested framework Page 11
for risk management
Figure 2
Page 13
injuries
fatalities.
Figure 3
Figure 6
Proportional—
reasonably practical
Costs/time/effort required in averting risk
Gross disproportion
—not reasonably
practical
Risk
Risk
Things to consider Page 17
Safety steps
Step
Gather people who are
knowledgeable about the process
Step
Identify the hazards
Step
Identify the causes
Step
Identify the consequences
Step
Determine the likelihood
Ranking Likelihood
4 Definitely will occur
3 Likely to occur
2 Unlikely to occur
1 Won’t occur
Step
Determine the risk score
This allows you to: Note: There are many different types
compare hazards (if you have of risk assessment matrices available.
applied the method consistently) Some examples are in Appendix C:
identify the highest risk scores Examples of risk assessment
prioritise risk management matrices.
activities.
1 Once every 10
years Low Low Low Low Low
Step
Identify control measures
Preventative
If Control A fails there are two
others in place (B & C) to prevent
the cause from happening.
Cause A
B
C
Hazard
Mitigative
If Control D fails there are two
others in place (E & F) to manage
the consequenses.
CONSEQUENCE
F
E
D
Selection, experience,
Control the physical conditions
men
available on demand)
Cont
motivation supervision
of the work location, such as suitable to the climatic
Fit for
SAFE Safe
t
schedules, information,
Ma
loc
ge
rk sica
s che l: noise, lighting, wea tion.
dule er a
effective. For example, you may s, comm -op
unication, co
prove the reliability of controls with
maintenance records (function tests). Figure 8. Good hazard management.
Page 29
Step
Summarise SFAIRP
with bus operations
crossing)
Poor bus fit out (e.g. driver’s vision restricted)
Bus driver does not obey signal (e.g. flashing lights)
Bus shunted into track
Driver fatigue or inattention
Driver queued over crossing
Driver error (e.g. driver does not see train)
Complacency within area (e.g. reliance on no changes to train timetable/
timetable accuracy)
Person
Hazard: Collision with other (tram, other bus, car, truck, bike, animal)
Does it apply? C L Risk = C x L Priority
Mechanical failure
Equipment
roads)
Time of day (e.g. milk trucks, peak hour)
Poor segregation (e.g. mismatch of vehicle types, road works, cycle lanes)
Cyclists/trucks/road hogging
Poor road signage
Cyclist caught in tram tracks
Loss of traction due to poor road surface
Other
Bus overloaded/mis-loaded
Strike by other vehicle or object or evasive action
Passenger interference
Bus driver incapacity (e.g. medical issues, alcohol or drugs, fatigue)
Road design/surface including roadworks
Environment
Availability of projectiles
Environment
Hazard: Fire
Does it apply? C L Risk = C x L
Flat tyre
Maintenance error
Lightning strike
Bus battery
Equipment
Leak of fuel
Hazard identification
Hazard identification techniques Page 45
There are a variety of ways to identify Combined What If/ Safety audits
hazards including: Checklist Analysis Review the information gathered
The creative, flexible, brainstorming from your audits to see if a theme is
Brainstorming—What If nature of a ‘What If’ analysis can reoccurring. It may indicate something
In a group, discuss what can go be combined with the advantage of is not working the way it should.
wrong (What If X happened and What the systematic, structured approach External assistance (for example, a
If Y happened) and how to manage of a Checklist analysis. This method risk assessment facilitator) may be
it. Remember to clearly define the makes the most of the strengths of required for this and subsequent steps
boundaries of the problem and be the two methods while compensating to identify and assess all hazards.
open to discussing all ideas. for the shortcomings of the individual
methods. The Checklist analysis,
This technique is a flexible, creative
being an experience-based technique,
examination of an operation for
may miss hazards if the checklist is
potential hazards. Team members are
not complete.
encouraged to ask ‘What-If’ questions
in a logical way. Be careful with this The ‘What If’ analysis encourages the
approach as it may miss hazards, but team to consider potential hazards
for simple systems or operations as not covered in the checklist. The
few as one or two people can conduct checklist portion of the analysis lends
the analysis. a more structured and systematic
nature to the ‘What If’ analysis.
Checklist analysis The checklists used in the What If/
Checklist analysis are somewhat more
Complete a list of hazards known
general than conventional checklists
to you and review the list in a
used in Checklist analysis. A combined
group to see if it is applicable to
What If/Checklist analysis is more
your operations. Make sure the
a powerful tool than a Checklist on
list is complete and does not miss
its own.
any hazards.
Risk assessment
Examples of risk assessment matrices Page 47
Qualitative
Examples of qualitative risk matrices
are in the Risk Management
Guidelines Companion to AS/NZS
4360:2004, and are below:
Consequence
Minor Major
Medium Risk High Risk
Probable
Likelihood
Consequence
Major Moderate Minor
Likely High High Medium
Likelihood
Consequence
Multiple major
Minor injury Major injury injuries Single fatality Multiple fatalities
1 2 3 4 5
Definitely will occur Low Medium High Extreme Extreme
4 4 8 12 16 20
Likely to occur Low Medium High High Extreme
3 3 6 9 12 15
Unlikely to occur Low Medium Medium High High
2 2 4 6 8 10
Likelihood
Semi-quantitative
Semi-quantitative assessments tend A typical semi-quantitative matrix
to suit well-understood or known may be a 3 x 3 matrix to a 6 x 6 matrix
hazards where the consequences and applies quantitative statements
may be more severe. (e.g. 1 in 10 years) with risks defined
as either qualitative statements or in
numerical form (‘high’ or 5 x 5= ‘25’).
It is more precise than a qualitative
assessment, but not as detailed as a
fully quantitative assessment.
Page 49
Consequence
Medical Lost time Disabling
No harm reportable injury injury Fatality
1 2 3 4 5
Almost 1 a day Expected in most A
certain circumstances M H H E E
Likelihood ratings
Rating
5 Almost certain Once a year or more frequently The event occurs on an annual basis
4 Likely Once every 10 years The event has occurred several times or more in this company
3 Moderate Once every 100 years The event has occurred in this company
2 Unlikely Once every 1,000 years Have heard of something like this happening elsewhere
1 Rare Once every 10,000 years Theoretically possible but not expected to occur
Consequence ratings
Rating Description
5 Fundamental Numerous fatalities and/or serious Multiple fatalities or significant irreversible effects to >50 people
injuries
4 Major A fatality and/or significant Single fatality and/or severe disability (>30%) to one or more
number of injuries requiring persons
hospitalisation
3 Moderate Considerable number of injuries Moderate irreversible disability (<30%) to one or more persons
2 Minor Number of light injuries not Reversible disability requiring hospitalisation
requiring hospitalisation
1 Insignificant Injuries or ailments not requiring No medical treatment required
medical treatment
Page 51
Quantitative
Quantitative assessment tends to Typically, quantitative assessments
suit complex or novel hazards. It use failure rate data to estimate
provides a framework/structure to frequency and modelling to
compare risk, and tests assumptions estimate consequence. Examples of
and uncertainties. While being more quantitative assessments include
rigorous, it is also a much more event tree analysis, fault tree analysis,
resource-intensive exercise. layers of protection assessments
and bowtie analysis etc. Fault trees
Quantitative assessments can
and event trees show the chain of
evaluate whether to implement
events and the impact if controls
a control measure (including
fail (escalation).
an analysis of risk benefit if the
measure is applied).
Further reading
Further reading for risk management Page 53