CIVIL LAW REVIEWER

Part 1
By: Boy_Tungkab

I. EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS

Arts 1-18 of the NCC

Article 1. This Act shall be known as the "Civil Code of the Philippines."

a. Publication of laws, Meaning of Newspaper of General Circulation

Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take
effect one year after such publication.

TAÑADA vs. TUVERA (1986) – The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to
the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in
any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the
law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous
publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not
apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an
intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To
be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly
applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a
whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published
as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform

the public of the content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official
Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court
is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds
it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only
the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published.
Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by the
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Internal instructions issued by an administrative agency are not covered by the rule on
prior publication. Also not covered are municipal ordinances which are governed by the
Local Government Code.—However, no publication is required of the instructions

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issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions
for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the
assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms.
Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local
Government Code.

REPUBLIC vs. PILIPINAS SHELL (2008) – Publication; Office of National

Administrative Register (ONAR); Due Process; The requirements of publication and
filing with the Office of National Administrative Register (ONAR) were put in place as
safeguards against abuses on the part of lawmakers and as guarantees to the
constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public concern and,
therefore, require strict compliance.—Under the doctrine of Tanada v. Tuvera, 146
SCRA 446 (1986), the MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, is one of those issuances
which should be published before it becomes effective since it is intended to enforce
Presidential Decree No. 1956. The said circular should also comply with the
requirement stated under Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code
of 1987—filing with the ONAR in the University of the Philippines Law Center—for
rules that are already in force at the time the Administrative Code of 1987 became
effective. These requirements of publication and filing were put in place as safeguards
against abuses on the part of lawmakers and as guarantees to the constitutional right
to due process and to information on matters of public concern and, therefore, require
strict compliance. In the present case, the Certifications dated 11 February 2004 and
9 February 2004 issued by ONAR prove that MOF Circular No. 1-85 and its
amendatory rule, DOF Circular No. 2-94, have not been filed before said office.
Moreover, petitioner was unable to controvert respondent’s allegation that neither of
the aforementioned circulars were published in the Official Gazette or in any
newspaper of general circulation. Thus, failure to comply with the requirements of
publication and filing of administrative issuances renders MOF Circular No. 1-85, as
amended, ineffective.

Strict compliance with the requirements of publication cannot be annulled by a mere

allegation that parties were notified of the existence of the implementing rules
concerned.—Petitioner also insists that the registration of MOF Circular No. 1-85, as
amended, with the ONAR is no longer necessary since the respondent knew of its
existence, despite its non-registration. This argument is seriously flawed and contrary
to jurisprudence. Strict compliance with the requirements of publication cannot be
annulled by a mere allegation that parties were notified of the existence of the
implementing rules concerned. Hence, also in National Association of Electricity
Consumers for Reforms v. Energy Regulatory Board, 481 SCRA 480 (2006), this Court
pronounced: In this case, the GRAM Implementing Rules must be declared ineffective
as the same was never published or filed with the National Administrative Register.
To show that there was compliance with the publication requirement, respondents
MERALCO and the ERC dwell lengthily on the fact that parties, particularly the
distribution utilities and consumer groups, were duly notified of the public
consultation on the ERC’s proposed implementing rules. These parties participated in
the said public consultation and even submitted their comments thereon. However,
the fact that the parties participated in the public consultation and
submitted their respective comments is not compliance with the
fundamental rule that the GRAM Implementing Rules, or any administrative
rules whose purpose is to enforce or implement existing law, must be
published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The
requirement of publication of implementing rules of statutes is mandatory and may

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 not be dispensed with altogether even if, as in this case, there was public consultation
and submission by the parties of their comments. (Emphasis provided.)

CAWAD vs. ABAD - Equality protection is equality among equals, not similarity of
treatment of persons who are classified based on substantial differences in relation to
the object to be accomplished. When things or persons are different in fact or
circumstance, they may be treated in law differently. The Constitution does not require
that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same.
The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are
different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which
it is directed. The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a
classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.
With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. Since the subject of the
law is the revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the
incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said
agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the
common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national government
through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges. Both the BIR and the
BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function of
being the instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent
functions of taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and
intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment
accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal
protection.

 What is a Newspaper of General Circulation?

A newspaper of general circulation is one which:
1. Is published for dissemination of local or national news of general information;
2. Has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; and
3. Is published at regular intervals.

b. Laws, Rules and Regulations must be published in full text

COJUANGCO, JR. VS. REPUBLIC (2012) – Section 1 of PD No. 755 incorporated,

by reference, the “Agreement for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the Benefit
of the Coconut Farmers” executed by the PCA. It bears to stress that the PCA –
Cojuangco Agreement referred to in Section 1 of PD 755 was not reproduced or
attached as an annex to the same law. And it is well-settled that laws must be
published to be valid. In fact, publication is an indispensable condition for the
effectivity of a law. The publication, as further held in Tañada, must be of the full text
of the law since the purpose of publication is to inform the public of the contents of the
law. Mere referencing the number of the presidential decree, its title or whereabouts
and its supposed date of effectivity would not satisfy the publication requirement. In
this case, while it incorporated the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement by reference, Section 1
of PD 755 did not in any way reproduce the exact terms of the contract in the decree.
Neither was a copy thereof attached to the decree when published. We cannot,
therefore, extend to the said Agreement the status of a law. Consequently, we join the
Sandiganbayan in its holding that the PCA –Cojuangco Agreement shall be treated as
an ordinary transaction between agreeing minds to be governed by contract law under
the Civil Code.

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ABAKADA GURO PARTYLIST v. PURISIMA – Publication; Subject to the
indispensable requisite of publication under the due process clause, the determination
as to when a law takes effect is wholly the prerogative of Congress—as such, it is only
upon its effectivity that a law may be executed and the executive branch acquires the
duties and powers to execute the said law.—Where Congress delegates the formulation
of rules to implement the law it has enacted pursuant to sufficient standards
established in the said law, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and
conditions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. And it may be deemed to have
left the hands of the legislature when it becomes effective because it is only upon
effectivity of the statute that legal rights and obligations become available to those
entitled by the language of the statute. Subject to the indispensable requisite of
publication under the due process clause, the determination as to when a law takes
effect is wholly the prerogative of Congress. As such, it is only upon its effectivity that
a law may be executed and the executive branch acquires the duties and powers to
execute the said law. Before that point, the role of the executive branch, particularly
of the President, is limited to approving or vetoing the law.

From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers
Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement
of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.—
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers
Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement
of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.
Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress or its members to approve the
implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be unconstitutional,
as is a provision that allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive or
ruling made by the members of the executive branch charged with the implementation
of the law.

To be effective, administrative rules and regulations must be published in full if their

purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.—To be
effective, administrative rules and regulations must be published in full if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The
IRR of RA 9335 were published on May 30, 2006 in two newspapers of general
circulation and became effective 15 days thereafter. Until and unless the contrary is
shown, the IRR are presumed valid and effective even without the approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee.

 General Rule

VILLANUEVA v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL - Publication; As a general rule,

publication is indispensable in order that all statutes, including administrative rules
that are intended to enforce or implement existing laws, attain binding force and
effect.—The assailed JBC policy requiring five years of service as judges of first-level
courts before they can qualify as applicants to second-level courts should have been
published. As a general rule, publication is indispensable in order that all statutes,
including administrative rules that are intended to enforce or implement existing laws,
attain binding force and effect. There are, however, several exceptions to the
requirement of publication, such as interpretative regulations and those merely
internal in nature, which regulate only the personnel of the administrative agency and
not the public. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions
issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by
their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

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 Exceptions to the publication requirement

ASTEC v. ERC - Exceptions to the Rule on Publication.—There are, however, several

exceptions to the requirement of publication. First, an interpretative regulation does
not require publication in order to be effective. The applicability of an interpretative
regulation “needs nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no real
consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed.” It “add[s] nothing
to the law” and “do[es] not affect the substantial rights of any person.” Second, a
regulation that is merely internal in nature does not require publication for its
effectivity. It seeks to regulate only the personnel of the administrative agency and not
the general public. Third, a letter of instruction issued by an administrative agency
concerning rules or guidelines to be followed by subordinates in the performance of
their duties does not require publication in order to be effective.

No statute, decree, ordinance, rule or regulation (or even policy) shall be given
retrospective effect unless explicitly stated so.—In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 293
SCRA 440 (1998), this Court recognized the basic rule “that no statute, decree,
ordinance, rule or regulation (or even policy) shall be given retrospective effect unless
explicitly stated so.” A law is retrospective if it “takes away or impairs vested rights
acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or
attaches a new disability, in respect of transactions or consideration already past.”

Publication; The grossed-up factor mechanism is therefore an administrative rule that

should be published and submitted to the U.P. Law Center in order to be effective.—In
light of these, the grossed-up factor mechanism does not merely interpret R.A. No.
7832 or its IRR. It is also not merely internal in nature. The grossed-up factor
mechanism amends the IRR by providing an additional numerical standard
that must be observed and applied in the implementation of the PPA.The
grossed-up factor mechanism is therefore an administrative rule that should be
published and submitted to the U.P. Law Center in order to be effective. As previously
stated, it does not appear from the records that the grossed-up factor mechanism was
published and submitted to the U.P. Law Center. Thus, it is ineffective and may not
serve as a basis for the computation of over-recoveries. The portions of the over-
recoveries arising from the application of the mechanism are therefore invalid.

 Publication in Internet is not sufficient

GARCILLANO vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et.al – Internet;

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000,
does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.—The
invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as
the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication
through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data
message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document
only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes the
admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages
and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing
laws, rules and regulations.

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c. Ignorantia Legis non Excusat

Article 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

LAPID v. LAURETA – Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure

should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to at least explain its failure
to comply with the rules.—We are not unmindful of exceptional cases where this Court has
set aside procedural defects to correct a patent injustice. However, concomitant to a liberal
application of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking
liberality to at least explain its failure to comply with the rules. In the instant case, the
petition was bereft of any persuasive explanation as to why petitioners Ramon and Gladys
Lapid failed to observe procedural rules properly. The record shows that through their
counsel they failed not only once but twice to indicate the material date required by law.
Counsel for petitioners had all the opportunity to comply with the rules, but counsel
remained obstinate in her non-observance thereof even when she sought reconsideration
of the ruling of the respondent court dismissing her clients’ petition. Such obstinacy is
inconsistent with her late plea for liberality in construing the rules on certiorari. Thus, any
further delay that would inadvertently result from the dismissal of the instant petition is
one purely of petitioners’ own making, considering that it is an elementary principle in law
that negligence of counsel binds the client.

Attorneys; Law practitioners and all lawyers, for that matter, should be fully conversant
with the requirements for the institution of certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court.—We find unsatisfactory the explanation of petitioners, through
counsel, that they have not come across said Circular No. 39-98 at the time of the filing of
the petition in the CA. On one hand, law practitioners and all lawyers, for that matter,
should be fully conversant with the requirements for the institution of certiorari
proceedings under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. On the other hand, ignorantia
legis non excusat. Ignorance in this regard encompasses not only substantive but also
procedural laws.

Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of
procedure, rather than seek exceptions as loopholes.—A final note. Members of the bar are
reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure, rather than seek
exceptions as loopholes. Technical rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends
of justice. These are provided to effect the prompt, proper and orderly disposition of cases
and thus effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets. Utter disregard of these rules
cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.

 Extent

FAJARDO v. DELA TORRE – Ignorance of the Law; Implicit with the directive that an
attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and with utmost
diligence is the command that all lawyers are duty-bound to keep abreast of the law and
legal developments as well as to participate in continuing legal education programs;
Ignorance encompasses not only substantive but also procedural laws.—It was held
in Rabanal v. Tugade that an attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best
of his ability and with utmost diligence. Implicit with this directive is the command that
all lawyers are duty-bound to keep abreast of the law and legal developments as well as to
participate in continuing legal education programs. All law practitioners should be fully
conversant of the requirements for the filing of certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. Ignorantia legis non excusat. Ignorance encompasses not only substantive
but also procedural laws.

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d. Laws have no retroactive effect, exceptions

Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.

Retroactive Application/Exceptions:

1. Tax laws;
2. Interpretative statutes;
3. Procedural or remedial in nature;
4. Curative or remedial statute;
5. Emergency laws;
6. Law creating new rights;
7. Penal laws favorable to the accused; and
8. When the law otherwise provides.

TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS NCC

Art. 2252. Changes made and new provisions and rules laid down by this Code which may
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation shall
have no retroactive effect.

For the determination of the applicable law in cases which are not specified elsewhere in
this Code, the following articles shall be observed: (Pars. 1 and 2, Transitional Provisions).

Art. 2253. The Civil Code of 1889 and other previous laws shall govern rights originating,
under said laws, from acts done or events which took place under their regime, even though
this Code may regulate them in a different manner, or may not recognize them. But if a
right should be declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at once, even
though the act or event which gives rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred
under prior legislation, provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or
acquired right, of the same origin. (Rule 1)

Art. 2254. No vested or acquired right can arise from acts or omissions which are against
the law or which infringe upon the rights of others. (n)

Art. 2255. The former laws shall regulate acts and contracts with a condition or period,
which were executed or entered into before the effectivity of this Code, even though the
condition or period may still be pending at the time this body of laws goes into effect. (n)

Art. 2256. Acts and contracts under the regime of the old laws, if they are valid in
accordance therewith, shall continue to be fully operative as provided in the same, with
the limitations established in these rules. But the revocation or modification of these acts
and contracts after the beginning of the effectivity of this Code, shall be subject to the
provisions of this new body of laws. (Rule 2a)

Art. 2257. Provisions of this Code which attach a civil sanction or penalty or a deprivation
of rights to acts or omissions which were not penalized by the former laws, are not
applicable to those who, when said laws were in force, may have executed the act or
incurred in the omission forbidden or condemned by this Code.

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If the fault is also punished by the previous legislation, the less severe sanction shall be
applied.

If a continuous or repeated act or omission was commenced before the beginning of the
effectivity of this Code, and the same subsists or is maintained or repeated after this body
of laws has become operative, the sanction or penalty prescribed in this Code shall be
applied, even though the previous laws may not have provided any sanction or penalty
therefor. (Rule 3a)

Art. 2258. Actions and rights which came into being but were not exercised before the
effectivity of this Code, shall remain in full force in conformity with the old legislation; but
their exercise, duration and the procedure to enforce them shall be regulated by this Code
and by the Rules of Court. If the exercise of the right or of the action was commenced under
the old laws, but is pending on the date this Code takes effect, and the procedure was
different from that established in this new body of laws, the parties concerned may choose
which method or course to pursue. (Rule 4)

Art. 2259. The capacity of a married woman to execute acts and contracts is governed by
this Code, even if her marriage was celebrated under the former laws. (n)

Art. 2260. The voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this
Code, even if the child was born before the effectivity of this body of laws. (n)

Art. 2261. The exemption prescribed in Article 302 shall also be applicable to any support,
pension or gratuity already existing or granted before this Code becomes effective. (n)

Art. 2262. Guardians of the property of minors, appointed by the courts before this Code
goes into effect, shall continue to act as such, notwithstanding the provisions of Article
320. (n)

Art. 2263. Rights to the inheritance of a person who died, with or without a will, before the
effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws,
and by the Rules of Court. The inheritance of those who, with or without a will, die after
the beginning of the effectivity of this Code, shall be adjudicated and distributed in
accordance with this new body of laws and by the Rules of Court; but the testamentary
provisions shall be carried out insofar as they may be permitted by this Code. Therefore,
legitimes, betterments, legacies and bequests shall be respected; however, their amount
shall be reduced if in no other manner can every compulsory heir be given his full share
according to this Code. (Rule 12a)

Art. 2264. The status and rights of natural children by legal fiction referred to in article
89 and illegitimate children mentioned in Article 287, shall also be acquired by children
born before the effectivity of this Code. (n)

Art. 2265. The right of retention of real or personal property arising after this Code
becomes effective, includes those things which came into the creditor's possession before
said date. (n)

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Art. 2266. The following shall have not only prospective but also retroactive effect:

(1) Article 315, whereby a descendant cannot be compelled, in a criminal case, to

testify against his parents and ascendants;

(2) Articles 101 and 88, providing against collusion in cases of legal separation and
annulment of marriage;

(3) Articles 283, 284, and 289, concerning the proof of illegitimate filiation;

(4) Article 838, authorizing the probate of a will on petition of the testator himself;

(5) Articles 1359 to 1369, relative to the reformation of instruments;

(6) Articles 476 to 481, regulating actions to quiet title;

(7) Articles 2029 to 2031, which are designed to promote compromise. (n)

PENALTIES IN GENERAL RPC

Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this
term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication
of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

CAROLINO v. SENGA - Retroactivity of Laws; Under Article 4 of the Civil Code, it is

provided that laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.—PD No.
1638 was signed by then President Ferdinand Marcos on September 10, 1979. Under
Article 4 of the Civil Code, it is provided that laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless
the contrary is provided. It is said that the law looks to the future only and has no
retroactive effect unless the legislator may have formally given that effect to some legal
provisions; that all statutes are to be construed as having only prospective operation,
unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is
expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used; and that every case
of doubt must be resolved against retrospective effect. These principles also apply to
amendments of statutes. PD No. 1638 does not contain any provision regarding its
retroactive application, nor the same may be implied from its language. In fact, Section 36
of PD No. 1638 clearly provides that the decree shall take effect upon its approval. As held
in Parreño v. COA, 523 SCRA 390 (2007), there is no question that PD No. 1638, as
amended, applies prospectively. Since PD No. 1638, as amended, is about the new system
of retirement and separation from service of military personnel, it should apply to those
who were in the service at the time of its approval. Conversely, PD No. 1638 is not
applicable to those who retired before its effectivity in 1979. The rule is familiar that after
an act is amended, the original act continues to be in force with regard to all rights that
had accrued prior to such amendment. Moreover, Section 27 of PD No. 1638 specifically
provides for the retirees to whom the law shall be applied, to wit: Section 27. Military
personnel retired under Sections 4, 5, 10, 11 and 12 shall be carried in the retired list
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The name of a retiree who loses his Filipino
citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated
upon such loss. (emphasis supplied) Notably, petitioner’s husband did not retire under
those above enumerated Sections of PD No. 1638 as he retired under RA No. 340.

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 RE: LETTER OF CA JUSTICE VELOSO FOR ENTITLEMENT TO LONGEVITY
PAY FOR HIS SERVICES AS COMMISSION MEMBER III OF NLRC – Retroactivity
of Laws; Statutes, as a rule, apply prospectively, unless the legislative intention to give them
retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used.—
Nothing in the language of RA 9347 expressly indicates the intention to give it retroactive
effect. We emphasize that statutes, as a rule, apply prospectively, unless the legislative
intention to give them retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied
from the language used. In “case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the
retroactive effect.” Nor is retroactivity discernible, even by implication, from the provisions
of RA 9347. It is not implied from the law’s legislative intent, nor from the deliberations in
Senate Bill No. 2035 (which became RA 9347).

THE NEYPES DOCTINE: THE FRESH 15 DAY PERIOD RULE

NEYPES v. CA – Appeals; The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process; It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of law.—First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither
a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who
seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules.
Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal. The period to appeal is fixed
by both statute and procedural rules.

An appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order
appealed from.—Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from
the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that
finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is
an adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence presented at the trial,
declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an
order or judgment that dismisses an action.

Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of
appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion
for a new trial or motion for reconsideration to standardize the appeal periods provided in
the Rules.—To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants
fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period
of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted
from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

e. Define MANDATORY and PROHIBITORY laws

Article 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be
void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.

Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments
shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.

When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the
Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine
laws shall be observed in their execution.

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 Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws
or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.

f. What is WAIVER?

Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by
law.

Art. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:

(1) The civil status of persons;

(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime.

 Defined

PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY v. BOLINAO SECURITY and

INVESTIGATION SERVICE, INC. – Waiver is defined as the relinquishment of a
known right with knowledge of its existence and an intention to relinquish it.
Voluntary choice is the essence of waiver. To be valid and effective, a waiver must in
the first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to
the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. It
may not causally be attributed to a person when the terms thereof do not explicitly and
clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such person.

 Requisites

VALDERAMA v. MACALDE - Essential elements for a waiver of rights to exist.—The

contention of the petitioners that the respondents had waived their right of first refusal
is not supported by the evidence. For a waiver of rights to exist, three elements are
essential: (a) existence of a right; (b) the knowledge of the evidence thereof; and (c) an
intention to relinquish such right.

 Similarities of ESTOPPEL and WAIVER

FLORDELIS v. CASTILLO - Estoppel; Estoppel indistinguishable from waiver in

double jeopardy cases.—The doctrine of estoppel is in quintessence the same as the
doctrine of waiver: the thrust of both is that a dismissal, other than on the merits,
sought by the accused in a motion to dismiss, is deemed to be with his express consent
and bars him from subsequently interposing the defense of double jeopardy on appeal
or in a new prosecution for the same offense.

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 What rights and privileges may be waived?

PEOPLE v. DONATO - What rights and privileges may be waived.––As to what rights
and privileges may be waived, the authority is settled: “x x x the doctrine of waiver
extends to rights and privileges of any character, and, since the word ‘waiver’ covers
every conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter
which affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner
or which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by contract,
conferred with statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and
privileges rest in the individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on
the rights of others, and further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not
forbidden by law, and does not contravene public policy; and the principle is recognized
that everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule
made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it
can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public right, and
without detriment to the community at large. x x x Although the general rule is that
any right or privilege conferred by statute or guaranteed by constitution may be
waived, a waiver in derogation of a statutory right is not favored, and a waiver will be
inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights of others, or would be against public
policy or morals and the public interest may be waived. While it has been stated
generally that all personal rights conferred by statute and guaranteed by
constitution may be waived, it has also been said that constitutional provisions
intended to protect property may be waived, and even some of the constitutional rights
created to secure personal liberty are subjects of waiver.”

Rights to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived.––We hereby
rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived.
It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary
to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third
person with a right recognized by law.

 Waiver of rights defined

MABUGAY-OTAMIAS v. REPUBLIC – Civil Law; Human Relations; Words and

Phrases; “Waiver of Rights,” Defined.—The concept of waiver has been defined by this
Court as: a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver
the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable
person, of a right known by him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be
surrendered and such person forever deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as
warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the intentional doing of
an act inconsistent with claiming it. In determining whether a statutory right can be
waived, this Court is guided by the following pronouncement: [T]he doctrine of waiver
extends to rights and privileges of any character, and, since the word ‘waiver’ covers
every conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter
which affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner
or which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by contract,
conferred with statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and
privileges rest in the individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not
infringe on the rights of others, and further provided the waiver of the right
or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not contravene public policy;
and the principle is recognized that everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive,
the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the

12
 individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without
infringing on any public right, and without detriment to the community at large[.]

 Mandatory Reading: Laconic Rules on Waivers and Quitclaims

Quitclaim is defined as a release or acquittance given to one man by another, in respect

of any action that he has or might have against him. (Black’s Law Dictionary,
6th edition, p. 1251)

Waiver is defined as the relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its

existence and an intention to relinquish it. Voluntary choice is the essence of waiver.
To be valid and effective, a waiver must in the first place be couched in clear and
unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a
right or benefit which legally pertains to him. It may not casually be attributed to a
person when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to
abandon a right vested in such person.

Requisites of a valid quitclaim

The requisites of a valid quitclaim are that:

1. there was no fraud or deceit on the part of any of the parties;
2. the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable; and
3. the contract is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good
customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

Standards for determining the validity of a Waiver and Quitclaim

Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement
was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on
the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is
only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or
gullible person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law
will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the
person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was
doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the
transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking.

Legitimate waivers that represent a voluntary and reasonable settlement of laborer’s

claims which should be so respected by the Court as the law between the parties.

When such quitclaim was made voluntarily and there is no evidence that the employer
was guilty of fraud or intimidation in obtaining such waiver, its validity must be
upheld.

Likewise, a quitclaim must be upheld if there is no disparity between the amount of

the quitclaim and the amount actually due the complainants under the law.

Guidelines for a valid and enforceable quitclaim

In order to prevent disputes on the validity and enforceability of quitclaims and

waivers of employees under Philippine Laws, said agreements should contain the
following:

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 1. A fixed amount as full and final compromise settlement;
2. The benefits of the employee if possible with the corresponding amounts, which the
employees are giving up in consideration of the fixed compromise amount;
3. A statement that the employer has clearly explained to the employee — that by
signing the waiver or quitclaim, they are forfeiting or relinquishing their right to
receive the benefits which are due them under the law; and

4. A statement that the employee signed and executed the document voluntarily and
had fully understood the contents of the document and that their consent was
freely given without any threat, violence, duress, intimidation or undue influence
exerted on their person. It is advisable that the stipulations be made in English
and Tagalog or in the dialect known to the employee. There should be two (2)
witnesses to the execution of the quitclaim who must also sign the quitclaim. The
document should be subscribed and sworn to under oath preferably before any
administering official of the Department of Labor and Employment or its regional
office, the Bureau of Labor Relations, the NLRC or a labor attaché in a foreign
country. Such official shall assist the parties regarding the execution of the
quitclaim and waiver. This compromise settlement becomes final and binding
under Article 227 of the Labor Code. (EDI-Staffbuilders International,Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 537 SCRA 409 [2007])

g. What is REPEAL?

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-
observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall
be void and the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are
not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.

ART. XVIII – COMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Section 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of
instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall
remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.

FAMILY CODE
Art. 254. The family council shall elect its chairman, and shall meet at the call of the latter
or upon order of the court.

Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the
marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the
spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical
impossibility of the husband's having access to his wife within the first one hundred and
twenty days of three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.

This physical impossibility may be caused:

(1) By the impotence of the husband;
(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately, in such a way that
access was not possible;
(3) By the serious illness of the husband.

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 Art. 254 of the Family Code entirely repealed Title VI of the New Civil Code:

AGABAO v. PARULAN – Civil Law; Family Code; The Family Code has expressly
repealed several titles under the Civil Code.—To start with, Article 254 the Family
Code has expressly repealed several titles under the Civil Code, among them
the entire Title VI in which the provisions on the property relations between husband
and wife, Article 173 included, are found.

Conjugal Property; Sales; It is settled that any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal

property made during the effectivity of the Family Code is governed by Article 124 of the
Family Code.—The sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the
effectivity of the Family Code. The proper law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of
the Family Code, for it is settled that any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal
property made during the effectivity of the Family Code is governed by Article 124 of
the Family Code.

 Can a Letter of Instruction repeal a law?

PEOPLE VS. GACOTT - The error committed by respondent judge in dismissing the
case is quite obvious in the light of P.D. No. 1, LOI No. 2 and P.D. No. 1275.—The error
committed by respondent judge in dismissing the case is quite obvious in the light of
P.D. No. 1, LOI No. 2 and P.D. No. 1275 aforementioned. The intent to abolish the
Anti-Dummy Board could not have been expressed more clearly than in the
aforequoted LOI. Even assuming that the City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa failed to cite
P.D. No. 1 in his opposition to the Motion to Quash, a mere perusal of the text of LOI
No. 2 would have immediately apprised the respondent judge of the fact that LOI No.
2 was issued in implementation of P.D. No. 1.

Presidential Decrees, such as P.D. No. 1, issued by former President Marcos under his
martial law powers have the same force and effect as the laws enacted by Congress.—
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, Presidential Decrees, such as P.D. No.
1, issued by the former President Marcos under his martial law powers have the same
force and effect as the laws enacted by Congress. As held by the Supreme Court in the
case of Aquino vs. Comelec, (62 SCRA 275 [1975]), all proclamations, orders, decrees,
instructions and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the former President are part of
the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective, unless
modified, revoked or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees,
instructions, or other acts of the President. LOI No. 2 is one such legal order issued by
former President Marcos in the exercise of his martial law powers to implement P.D.
No. 1. Inasmuch as neither P.D. No. 1 nor LOI No. 2 has been expressly or impliedly
revised, revoked, or repealed, both continue to have the force and effect of law.

 Repeal of arts. 158 and 160 of the New Civil Code by the Family Code does not
prejudice vested rights.

FRANCISCO v. CA – Marriage; Husband and Wife; Conjugal Partnerships;

Family Code; The repeal of Articles 158 and 160 of the New Civil Code does not operate
to prejudice or otherwise affect rights which have become vested or accrued while the
said provisions were in force.—Indeed, Articles 158 and 160 of the New Civil Code have
been repealed by the Family Code of the Philippines which took effect on August 3,
1988. The aforecited articles fall under Title VI, Book I of the New Civil Code which
was expressly repealed by Article 254 (not Article 253 as alleged by petitioner in her
petition and reply) of the Family Code. Nonetheless, we cannot invoke the new law in

15
 this case without impairing prior vested rights pursuant to Article 256 in relation to
Article 105 (second paragraph) of the Family Code. Accordingly, the repeal of Articles
158 and 160 of the New Civil Code does not operate to prejudice or otherwise affect
rights which have become vested or accrued while the said provisions were in force.
Hence, the rights accrued and vested while the cited articles were in effect survive
their repeal. We shall therefore resolve the issue of the nature of the contested
properties based on the provisions of the New Civil Code.

The party who invokes the presumption of Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides
that “all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership”
must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage—
the presumption refers only to the property acquired during the marriage and does not
operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was
acquired.—Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that “all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” However, the party who invokes
this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during
the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for
the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. The party who
asserts this presumption must first prove said time element. Needless to say, the
presumption refers only to the property acquired during the marriage and does not
operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was
acquired. Moreover, this presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only
with strong, clear and convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of exclusive
ownership of one of the spouses.

h. N/A

i. Judicial Decisions; Effects

Article 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.

SEC OF JUSTICE v. CATOLICO – Duty to apply the law as interpreted by the Supreme
Court.—Judges should be reminded of their duty to apply the law as interpreted by the
Supreme Court “as the final arbiter of any justiciable controversy” and of the great mischief
and prejudice to the administration of justice, and unnecessary inconvenience, delay and
expenses to litigants, that would needlessly caused, should judges of lower courts dispose
of cases in accordance with their personal views contrary to the final authoritative
pronouncements of the Court.

PEOPLE v. VENERACION – Courts; Judges; Judgments; Courts are not concerned with
wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws.—We are aware of the trial judge’s misgivings in
imposing the death sentence because of his religious convictions. While this Court
sympathizes with his predicament, it is its bounden duty to emphasize that a court of law
is no place for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the sentence, where the
law itself provides for the sentence of death as a penalty in specific and well-defined
instances. The discomfort faced by those forced by law to impose the death penalty is an
ancient one, but it is a matter upon which judges have no choice. Courts are not concerned
with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws.

16
The Rules of Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose
“the proper penalty and civil liability provided for by the law on the accused.”—The Rules
of Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose “the proper
penalty and civil liability provided for by the law on the accused.” This is not a case of a
magistrate ignorant of the law. This is a case in which a judge, fully aware of the
appropriate provisions of the law, refuses to impose a penalty to which he disagrees. In so
doing, respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to a lack of jurisdiction in imposing the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua where the law clearly imposes the penalty of Death.

 Stare Decisis Rule; Basis

VIRTUCIO v. ALEGARBES – Stare Decisis; The principle of stare decisis enjoins

adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by the Supreme Court in its
final decisions.―It is settled that a decision of the CA does not establish judicial
precedent. “The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal
rules established by this Courtin its final decisions. It is based on the principle that
once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and
closed to further argument.”

PEPSICO, INC. v. LACANILAO – Actions; Judgments; Stare Decisis; When a court

has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain set of facts, it will adhere to
that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the
same.—When a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain set of
facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts
are substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decision
and disturb not what is settled. It simply means that a conclusion reached in one case
should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even
though the parties may be different. It comes from the basic principle of justice that
like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same question relating to the
same event is brought by parties similarly situated as in a previous case already
litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any
attempt to relitigate the same issue.

 Weight of judicial decisions

CALTEX v. PALOMAR – Weight of judicial decisions.—In this jurisdiction, judicial

decisions assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until' authoritatively
abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria
which must control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but
also of those in duty-bound to enforce obedience thereto.

 What is the Principle of Judicial Courtesy

TRAJANO v. UNIWIDE SALES WAREHOUSE CLUB – Principle of Judicial

Courtesy; The principle of judicial courtesy applies only “if there is a strong probability
that the issues before the higher court would be rendered moot and moribund as a result
of the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court.”—Indeed, we introduced
in Eternal Gardens Memorial Park v. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 421 (1988),
the principle of judicial courtesy to justify the suspension of the proceedings
before the lower court even without an injunctive writ or order from the
higher court. In that case, we pronounced that “[d]ue respect for the Supreme Court
and practical and ethical considerations should have prompted the appellate

17
 court to wait for the final determination of the petition [for certiorari] before
taking cognizance of the case and trying to render moot exactly what was before
this [C]ourt.” We subsequently reiterated the concept of judicial courtesy in Joy Mart
Consolidated Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 746 (1992). We, however, have
qualified and limited the application of judicial courtesy in Go v. Abrogar, 398 SCRA
166 (2003) and Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 492 SCRA 747 (2006). In these cases, we
expressly delimited the application of judicial courtesy to maintain the efficacy of
Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and held that the principle of judicial courtesy
applies only “if there is a strong probability that the issues before the higher
court would be rendered moot and moribund as a result of the continuation
of the proceedings in the lower court.” Through these cases, we clarified that the
principle of judicial courtesy remains to be the exception rather than the rule.

 Nature of Precedents

ROSALES v. CFI of LANAO DEL NORTE – Precedents, nature of.—Precedents are

helpful in deciding cases when they are on all fours or at least substantially identical
with previous litigations. Argumentum a simili valet in lege. Earlier decisions are
guideposts that can lead us in the right direction as we tread the highways and by
ways s of the law in the search for truth and justice. These pronouncements represent
the wisdom of the past. They are the voice of vanished judges talking to the future,
Except where there is a need to reverse them because of an emergent viewpoint or an
altered situation, they urge us strongly that, indeed, the trodden path is best.

 Law of the Case Doctrine

YAP, SR. v. SIAO – Law of the Case; The “law of the case” doctrine applies in a
situation where an appellate court has made a ruling on a question on appeal and
thereafter remands the case to the lower court to effect the ruling; the question settled
by the appellate court becomes the law of the case at the lower court and in any
subsequent appeal.—The “law of the case” doctrine applies in a situation where an
appellate court has made a ruling on a question on appeal and thereafter remands the
case to the lower court to effect the ruling; the question settled by the appellate court
becomes the law of the case at the lower court and in any subsequent appeal. It means
that whatever is irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision
between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether
correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which the legal rule or
decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.

 Decisions of the court form part of the legal system

PELTRAN DEV’T, INC. v. CA – Decisions of the Court form part of the legal system.—
The said decisions, more importantly, “form part of the legal system,” and failure of
any court to apply them shall constitute an abdication of its duty to resolve a dispute
in accordance with law, and shall be a ground for administrative action against an
inferior court magistrate.

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j. Judicial Legislation

Article 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. (NCC)

ART.VIII – 1987 CONSTITUTION

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international
or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any
penalty imposed in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may
require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the
consent of the judge concerned.
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules
shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court.
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil
Service Law.

 Judicial Legislation Defined

RE: LETTER OF CA JUSTICE VICENTE S.E. VELOSO FOR ENTITLEMENT

TO LONGEVITY PAY FOR HIS SERVICES AS COMMISSION MEMBER III OF
NLRC – Judicial Legislation; The Supreme Court (SC) cannot and must not allow the
crediting of Justice Salazar-Fernando’s Commission on Elections (COMELEC) service
for longevity pay purposes. Acceding to her request will constitute an outright judicial
legislation that the Court cannot undertake under the Constitution.—Reduced to the
bare essentials, the issue for us is whether we should apply with liberality a ruling
that had already been very liberally interpreted by this Court, under facts that do not
entitle Justice Fernando to recognition of continuous service under the requirements
of Section 3. Our brief and direct answer is that we cannot and must not allow the
crediting of Justice Salazar-Fernando’s COMELEC service for longevity pay purposes.

19
 Acceding to her request will constitute an outright judicial legislation that the Court
cannot undertake under the Constitution. As earlier noted, Justice Salazar-Fernando’s
details do not at all approximate the factual circumstances Section 3 of B.P. Blg. 129
that speaks of, nor the factual situation in In Re: Justice Pardo. If we had been liberal
in the past and this liberal ruling is now cited, we should, at the very least, not go
beyond the facts under which our past liberality had been extended. If we further read
liberally a Court ruling that only came to being because of past liberality, we stand to
hear a reecho of the charge that this Court selectively applies its liberality in
favor of its own.(In fact, a favorable ruling in these consolidated cases may
already raise eyebrows and questions as the Court will be ruling on matters
that will directly affect some of its participating Members.) To sum up, Justice
Salazar Fernando’s services as COMELEC Commissioner cannot be included
in the computation of her longevity pay, now or upon her retirement.

FLORESCA v. PHILEX MINING CORP – Courts; Contrary to dissenting opinion,

this Court does not legislate as it is merely applying and giving effect to social
guarantees of the Constitution.—Contrary to the perception of the dissenting opinion,
the Court does not legislate in the instant case. The Court merely applies and gives
effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice then secured by Section 5 of
Article II and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, and now by Sections 6,
7, and 9 of Article II of the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, and as implemented by Articles 2176, 2177,
2178, 1173, 2201, 2216, 2231 and 2232 of the New Civil Code of 1950.

PEOPLE v. QUIJADA – Judicial Legislation; Statutory Construction; The rule laid

down in Tac-an, reiterated in Tiozon, Caling, Jumamoy, Deunida, Tiongco, Fernandez,
and Somooc is the better rule, for it applies the laws concerned according to their letter
and spirit, thereby steering the Supreme Court away from a dangerous course which
could have irretrievably led it to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of
powers through judicial legislation.—The Court en banc finds in this appeal an
opportunity to reexamine the existing conflicting doctrines applicable to prosecutions
for murder or homicide and for aggravated illegal possession of firearm in instances
where an unlicensed firearm is used in the killing of a person. After a lengthy
deliberation thereon, the Court en banc arrived at the conclusion that the rule laid
down in Tac-an, reiterated in Tiozon, Caling, Jumamoy, Deunida, Tiongco,
Fernandez,and Somooc is the better rule, for it applies the laws concerned according
to their letter and spirit, thereby steering this Court away from a dangerous course
which could have irretrievably led it to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of
separation of powers through judicial legislation. That rule upholds and enhances the
lawmaker’s intent or purpose in aggravating the crime of illegal possession of firearm
when an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of murder or homicide.

 Dissenting opinion is not enforceable

TOLENTINO v. ONGSIAKO – Dissenting opinions not enforceable.—A dissenting

opinion cannot be enforced because it affirms or overrules no claim, right, or obligation,
and neither disposes of, nor awards, anything; it merely expresses the view of the
dissenter.

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  American decisions are not per se controlling

ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP v. FEATI BANK AND TRUST CO.
– Foreign Jurisprudence; American decisions and authorities are not per se controlling
in the Philippines.—In the first place, the views set forth in American decisions and
authorities are not per se controlling in the Philippines, the laws of which must
necessarily be construed in accordance with the intention of its own lawmakers and
such intent may be deduced from the language of each law and the context of other
local legislation related thereto.

k. Define CUSTOMS; how to prove it.

Article 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be
countenanced.

 Definition

YAO KEE v. SY-GONZALES – Civil Law; Custom; Definition of Custom; Custom

must be proved as a fact according to the rules on evidence.—Custom is defined as "a
rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social
rule, legally binding and obligatory." The law requires that "a custom must be proved
as a fact, according to the rules of evidence" [Article 12, Civil Code.] On this score the
Court had occasion to state that "a local custom as a source of right cannot be
considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by
competent evidence like any other fact" [Patriarca v. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907).]
The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom.

 Other cases:

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE

OF THE FIRM NAME “OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA &
REYES.” – Custom; Continued use of a deceased or former partner’s name in the firm
names of law partnerships not sanctioned by local custom; Reason; Possibility of
deception upon the public where the name of a deceased partner continues to be used.—
It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name
of a deceased or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when such a
practice is permissible by local custom but the Canon warns that care should be taken
that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use. It must be conceded that
in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the continued use of a deceased
or former partner’s name in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm names, under
our custom, identify the more active and/or more senior members or partners of the law
firm. A glimpse at the history of the firms of petitioners and of other law firms in this
country would show how their firm names have evolved and changed from time to time
as the composition of the partnership changed. The possibility of deception upon the
public, real or consequential, where the name of a deceased partner continues to be
used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel might be guided by the
familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title.

Concept of Customs; To be admissible custom must be proved as a fact; Distinctions

between juridical custom and social custom.—Not so in this jurisdiction where there is
no local custom that sanctions the practice. Custom has been defined as a rule of
conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule,
legally binding and obligatory. Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A custom must

21
be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. A local custom as a source of
right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly
established by competent evidence like any other fact. We find such proof of the
existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute the same,
wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of practice does not
mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical
custom. Juridical custom must be differentiated from social custom. The former can
supplement statutory law or be applied in the absence of such statute. Not so with the
latter.

PAG-ASA STEEL WORKS, INC. v. CA – Evidence; Customs; Like any other fact,
habits, customs, usage or patterns of conduct must be proved.—However, just like any
other fact, habits, customs, usage or patterns of conduct must be proved. Thus was the
ruling of the Court in Boston Bank of the Philippines v. Manalo, et al., 482 SCRA 108
(2006): Habit, custom, usage or pattern of conduct must be proved like any other facts.
Courts must contend with the caveat that, before they admit evidence of usage, of habit
or pattern of conduct, the offering party must establish the degree of specificity and
frequency of uniform response that ensures more than a mere tendency to act in a
given manner but rather, conduct that is semi-automatic in nature. The offering party
must allege and prove specific, repetitive conduct that might constitute evidence of
habit. The examples offered in evidence to prove habit, or pattern of evidence must be
numerous enough to base on inference of systematic conduct. Mere similarity of
contracts does not present the kind of sufficiently similar circumstances to outweigh
the danger of prejudice and confusion.

Benefits; To ripen into a company practice that is demandable as a matter of right, the
giving of the increase should not be by reason of a strict legal or contractual obligation,
but by reason of an act of liberality on the part of the employer.—To ripen into a
company practice that is demandable as a matter of right, the giving of the increase
should not be by reason of a strict legal or contractual obligation, but by reason of an
act of liberality on the part of the employer. Hence, even if the company continuously
grants a wage increase as mandated by a wage order or pursuant to a CBA, the same
would not automatically ripen into a company practice. In this case, petitioner granted
the increase under Wage Order No. NCR-07 on its belief that it was obliged to do so
under the CBA.

MARTINEZ v. VAN BUSKIRK - MASTER AND SERVANT; DRIVERS OF

HORSES; CUSTOM AND USAGE; NEGLIGENCE.—A coachman or driver, who had
driven the horses composing his team for a considerable time, during which the
animals had shown no disposition to become unruly, left his team as usual and was
assisting in unloading the wagon when the horses bolted and running into the
plaintiffs' carriage caused personal injuries to the plaintiff and damage to the vehicle.
It was further shown that, to leave teams under like circumstances and to assist in
unloading the wagon, is the custom of drivers in the city and that the custom is
sanctioned by employers. Held: That acts, the performance of which has not proven
destructive or injurious and which have been generally acquiesced in by society for so
long a time as to have ripened into a custom, cannot be held to be unreasonable or
imprudent and that, under the circumstances, the driver was not guilty of negligence
in so leaving his team while assisting in unloading his wagon.

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l. Meaning of YEARS, MONTHS, DAYS and NIGHTS in law

Article 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood
that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of
twenty-four hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise.

If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days
which they respectively have.

In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included.

GAVINA v. SALES – One born on the first day of the year is deemed to be one year old on
the 365th day after his birth.—The provision that an elective official of the SK should not
be more than 21 years of age on the day of his election is very clear. The Local Government
Code speaks of years, not months nor days. When the law speaks of years, it is understood
that years are of 365 days each. One born on the first day of the year is consequently
deemed to be one year old on the 365th day after his birth—the last day of the year. In
computing years, the first year is reached after completing the first 365 days. After the
first 365th day, the first day of the second 365-day cycle begins. On the 365th day of the
second cycle, the person turns two years old. This cycle goes on and on in a lifetime. A
person turns 21 years old on the 365th day of his 21st 365-day cycle. This means on his
21st birthday, he has completed the entire span of 21 365-day cycles. After this birthday,
the 365-day cycle for his 22nd year begins. The day after the 365th day is the first day of
the next 365-day cycle and he turns 22 years old on the 365th day.

NATIONAL MARKETING CORP v. TECSON – Civil law; Application of laws; Article

18 of Civil Code explained; Term "year" as used in our laws is limited to 365 days.—Prior
to the approval of the Civil Code of Spain, the Supreme Court thereof held, on March 80,
1887, that, when the law spoke of months, it meant a "'natural" month or "solar" month,
in the absence of 'express provision to the contrary. Such provision was incorporated into
the Civil Code of Spain, subsequently promulgated. Hence, the same Supreme Court
declared that, pursuant to Article 7 of said Code, "whenever months are referred to in the
law, it shall be understood that the months are of 30 days," not the "'natural," "solar" or
"calendar" months, unless they are "designated by name," in which case "they shall be
computed by the actual number of days they have." This concept was, later, modified in
the Philippines, by Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code, pursuant to which,
"month shall be understood to refer to a calendar month." With the approval of the Civil
Code of the Philippines (RA 386) we have reverted to the provisions of the Spanish Civil
Code in accordance with which a month is to be considered as the regular 30-day month
and not the solar or civil month with the particularity that, whereas the Spanish Civil
Code merely mentioned "months, days or nights," ours has added thereto the term "years"
and explicitly ordains in Article 13 that it shall be understood that years are of three
hundred sixty-five days."

Article 18 defining "years" to mean 365 days is unrealistic; Remedy is not judicial
legislation.—Although some justices of the Supreme Court are inclined to think that
Article 13 of the Civil Code defining "years" to mean 365 days is not realistic, the remedy
is not judicial legislation. If public interest demands a reversion to the policy embodied in
the Revised Administrative Code, this may be done through legislative process, not by
judicial decree.

23
 PEOPLE v. PAREDES – Words and Phrases; A whole day is a period of twenty-four (24)
hours while “maghapon” is a much shorter period—starting from sometime in the afternoon
and ending at sometime around sunset; Besides, “maghapon” is a loose subjective term with
different meanings to different persons.—Regrettably, the RTC and the CA were imprecise
in placing English words into the “Grade 4” mouth of the accused. For, if we are to chain
him to what was written in the Sinumpaang Salaysay, then he was not in his house the
“whole day” but only for a “maghapon” as written in Paragraph 2 thereof, to wit: 2. Noong
araw naman ng Linggo, July 29, 2001, maghapon po akong nasa bahay kasama ng aking
asawa at dalawang (2) anak at naging panauhin or bisita pa namin ang aming
Founder/President ng PVAP-NGO at JESUS-PVAP si Engr. Bienvenido O. Onayan, at
iyong binibintang sa aking ni [MMM] na ni rape ko raw ang kanyang anak na si [XXX]
noong July 29, 2001, araw ng Linggo, umaga, sa bahay daw namin wala pong katotohanan,
dahil paano po mangyayari iyong mga bagay na iyon na kanilang ibinibintang sa akin,
samantalang ang bahay naming ay butas-butas at takpi-takpi at ang dingding ay mga
sirang plastic at ang bubong ay mga plastic na itim at napakaliit ng aming bahay at dikit-
dikit pa ang mga bahay at halos iisa lamang ang dingding ng aming mga kapitbahay. A
whole day is a period of twenty-four (24) hours while “maghapon” is a much shorter
period—starting from sometime in the afternoon and ending at sometime around sunset.
Besides, “maghapon” is a loose subjective term with different meanings to different
persons. A person in a hurry may grumble as “maghapon” a short moment of delay in the
afternoon when in a rush to finish some task that same afternoon, while another person
who was just relaxing may use also the same word “maghapon” when describing the long
lazy Sunday afternoon mood.

m. Lex Loci Celebrationis

Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments
shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.

When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the
Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine
laws shall be observed in their execution.

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws
or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.

TENCHAVES v. ESCANO – Husband and wife; Foreign divorce between Filipino citizens
decreed after the effectivity of the new Civil Code; Remarriage of divorced consort.—
A foreign divorce between Filipino citizens,, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the
new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in the
Philippines; and neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced
consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in this country.

FUJIKI v. MARINAY – Civil Law; Conflict of Law; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage;

Foreign Judgments; Divorce; Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on
Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.—Article 26 of
the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of
the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provides that “[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

24
 celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.” In Republic v. Orbecido, 472 SCRA 114 (2005), this Court
recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is “to avoid
the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse” under the laws of his
or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes
Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the
Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.

n. Special Laws

Article 18. In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws, their
deficiency shall be supplied by the provisions of this Code.

JULIANA LLAVE v. REPUBLIC – Civil Law; Marriages; The Civil Code governs their
personal status since this was in effect at the time of the celebration of their marriage.—
Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the marriage to be
considered as one contracted under the Muslim law, the registration of mutual consent
between Zorayda and Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as both are Muslims whose
marriage was celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Besides, as we have already
settled, the Civil Code governs their personal status since this was in effect at the time of
the celebration of their marriage. In view of Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage which subsisted
at the time Estrellita married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by the
CA as void ab initio.

Family Code; Marriages; In a void marriage, any interested party may attack the marriage
directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of
the parties to the marriage.—While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper
party who can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC, it has been held that in a void marriage, in which no marriage has taken place and
cannot be the source of rights, any interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties
to the marriage. Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib, as one of the children of
the deceased who has property rights as an heir, is likewise considered to be the real party
in interest in the suit he and his mother had filed since both of them stand to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit.

BELGIAN OVERSEAS CHARTERING AND SHIPPING N.V. v. PHILIPPINE

FIRST INSURANCE CO. INC. – Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA); The notice of
claim required under Section 3, paragraph 6 of the COGSA need not be given if the state of
the goods, at the time of their receipt, has been the subject of a joint inspection or survey.—
Petitioners claim that pursuant to Section 3, paragraph 6 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act (COGSA), respondent should have filed its Notice of Loss within three days from
delivery. They assert that the cargo was discharged on July 31, 1990, but that respondent
filed its Notice of Claim only on September 18, 1990. We are not persuaded. First, the
above-cited provision of COGSA provides that the notice of claim need not be given if the
state of the goods, at the time of their receipt, has been the subject of a joint inspection or
survey. As stated earlier, prior to unloading the cargo, an Inspection Report as to the
condition of the goods was prepared and signed by representatives of both parties.

25
II. HUMAN RELATIONS

a. Memorize

Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. (Abuse
of rights)

Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. (General sanctions – illegal acts)

Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage. (Contra Bonus Mores – legal acts)

 The Principle of Abuse of Rights; elements:

SEA COMMERCIAL CO. INC. v. CA – Human Relations; Abuse of Rights

Principle; The principle of abuse of rights stated in Article 19 of the Civil Code departs
from the classical theory that “he who uses a right injures no one”—the modern tendency
is to depart from the classical and traditional theory, and to grant indemnity for
damages in cases where there is an abuse of rights, even when the act is not illicit; The
absence of good faith is essential to abuse of right.—Both courts invoke as basis for the
award Article 19 of the Civil Code which reads as follows: “Art. 19. Every person must,
in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.” The principle of abuse of rights
stated in the above article, departs from the classical theory that “he who uses a right
injures no one.” The modern tendency is to depart from the classical and traditional
theory, and to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is an abuse of rights,
even when the act is not illicit. Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts
by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law. If mere fault or
negligence in one’s acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby,
with more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. The absence of good faith
is essential to abuse of right. Good faith is an honest intention to abstain from taking
any unconscientious advantage of another, even through the forms or technicalities of
the law, together with an absence of all information or belief of fact which would render
the transaction unconscientious. In business relations, it means good faith as
understood by men of affairs.

Elements of Abuse of Rights.—While Article 19 may have been intended as a mere

declaration of principle, the “cardinal law on human conduct” expressed in said article
has given rise to certain rules, e.g. that where a person exercises his rights but does so
arbitrarily or unjustly or performs his duties in a manner that is not in keeping with
honesty and good faith, he opens himself to liability. The elements of an abuse of rights
under Article 19 are: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad
faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

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 What is CONRA BONUS MORES?

GARCIANO v. CA – Civil Law; Damages; Liability for damages under Articles 19, 20
and 21 of the Civil Code arises only from unlawful, willful or negligent acts that are
contrary to law, or morals, good customs or public policy.—Liability for damages under
Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code arises only from unlawful, willful or negligent
acts that are contrary to law, or morals, good customs or public policy.

Article 21 should be construed as granting the right to recover damages to injured

persons who are not themselves at fault.—With respect to petitioner’s claim for moral
damages, the right to recover them under Article 21 is based on equity, and he who
comes to court to demand equity, must come with clean hands. Article 21 should be
construed as granting the right to recover damages to injured persons who are not
themselves at fault (Mabutas vs. Calapan Electric Co. [CA] 50 OG 5828, cited in
Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, Vol. 1, 1975 Ed., p. 87). Moral damages are recoverable
only if the case falls under Article 2219 in relation to Article 21 (Flordelis vs. Mar, 114
SCRA 41). In the case at bar, petitioner is not without fault.

 Damnum Absque Injuria

AMONOY v. GUTIERREZ – Damages; Human Relations; Well settled is the maxim

that damage resulting from the legitimate exercise of a person’s rights is a loss without
injury—damnum absque injuria—for which the law gives no remedy.— Well-settled is
the maxim that damage resulting from the legitimate exercise of a person’s rights is a
loss without injury—damnum absque injuria—for which the law gives no remedy. In
other words, one who merely exercises one’s rights does no actionable injury and
cannot be held liable for damages.

(STANFILCO) DOLE PHIL. V. RODRIGUEZ – Civil Law; Damages; Damnum

Absque Injuria; Under the principle of damnum absque injuria, the legitimate exercise
of a person’s rights, even if it causes loss to another, does not automatically result in an
actionable injury.—Under the principle of damnum absque injuria, the legitimate
exercise of a person’s rights, even if it causes loss to another, does not automatically
result in an actionable injury. The law does not prescribe a remedy for the loss. This
principle, however, does not apply when there is an abuse of a person’s right as in this
case. While we recognize petitioner’s right to remove the improvements on the subject
plantation, it, however, exercised such right arbitrarily, unjustly and excessively
resulting in damage to respondents’ plantation. The exercise of a right, though legal
by itself, must nonetheless be in accordance with the proper norm. When the right is
exercised arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.

Human Relations; In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful
act or omission, whether done willfully or negligently, is not left without any remedy or
recourse to obtain relief for the damage or injury he sustained.—In the sphere of our
law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful act or omission, whether done
willfully or negligently, is not left without any remedy or recourse to obtain relief for
the damage or injury he sustained. Incorporated into our civil law are not only
principles of equity but also universal moral precepts which are designed to indicate
certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience and which are meant
to serve as guides for human conduct.

27
b. Articles 22 and 23 (Read it together)

Article 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other
means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without
just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.

Article 23. Even when an act or event causing damage to another's property was not due
to the fault or negligence of the defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through
the act or event he was benefited.

OBANA v. CA – Equity; Inasmuch as Chan Lin had repaid Obaña the sum of P5,600.00
regarding the rice sold by the former to the latter but which Chan Lin had not yet returned
to Sandoval the original seller, Obaña cannot be permitted to unjustly enriched himself by
keeping that money and the rice too.—Having been repaid the purchase price by Chan Lin,
the sale, as between them, had been voluntarily rescinded, and petitioner-defendant was
thereby divested. of any claim to the rice. Technically, therefore, he should return the rice
to Chan Lin, but since even the latter, again from petitioner-defendant’s own testimony
above-quoted, was ready to return the rice to SANDO VAL, and the latter’s driver denies
that the rice had been returned by petitioner-defendant either to him or to Chan Lin, it
follows that petitioner-defendant should return the rice to SANDOVAL. Petitioner-
defendant cannot be allowed to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another by
holding on to property no longer belonging to him. In law and in equity, therefore,
SANDOVAL is entitled to recover the rice, or the value thereof since he was not paid the
price therefor.

PACIFIC MERCHANDISING CORP. v. CONSOLACION INSURANCE & SURETY

CO. INC – Unjust enrichment; Where a receiver of the properties of a corporation executed,
without the approval of the receivership court, a surety agreement with a bonding company
to secure payment of construction materials owed by the firm under receivership, and said
receiver subsequently was awarded the possession and ownership of the properties of the
firm under receivership, the principle of unjust enrichment requires that said receiver pay
for the cost of said construction materials under the terms of the surety agreement.—
Moreover, it will be recalled that the obligation due to Pacific Merchandising Corporation
represented the cost of materials used in the construction of the Paris Theatre. There can
not be ant question that such improvements, in the final analysis, redounded to the
advantage and personal profit of appellant Pajarillo because the judgment in Civil Case
No. 50201, which was in substance affirmed by the Appellate Court, ordered that the
“possession of the lands, building, equipment, furniture, and accessories x x x” of the
theatre be transferred to said appellant as owner thereof. As the trial court aptly observed
“x x x it is only simple justice that Pajarillo should pay for the said claim, otherwise he
would be enriching himself without paying plaintiff for the cost of certain materials that
went into its construction. x x x. It is argued, however, that he did so only as a receiver of
Leo Enterprises, Inc. This may be so, but it is equally true that x x x all of the properties
of Leo Enterprises, Inc. passed on to Pajarillo by virtue of the judgment in Civil Case No.
50201 x x x” This Roman Law principle of “Nemo cum alterisus detrimento locupletari
protest” is embodied in Article 22 (Human Relations), and Articles 2142 to 2175 (Quasi-
Contracts) of the New Civil Code. Long before the enactment of this Code, however, the
principle of unjust enrichment which is basic in every legal system, was already expressly
recognized in this jurisdiction. x x x The foregoing equitable principles which springs from
the fountain of good conscience is applicable to the case at bar.

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c. Court Vigilance and Judicial Activism

DELIMA v. LAGUNA TAYABAS COMPANY – Attorney & fees, award of, proper.—AIso
noteworthy is the case ofFores v. Miranda where this Court upheld the granting by the
Court of Appeals of attorney’s fees even if the respondent, a jeepney passenger injured in
a vehicular accident, did not appeal from the decision of the trial court. The Appellate
Court found the award to be justified because the respondent asked for damages in his
answer and the said court considered the attorney’s fees as included in the concept of
damages which can be awarded whenever the court deems it just and equitable (Art. 2208,
Civil Code of the Philippines).

Judgments; Litigations should as much as possible be decided on their merits and not on
technicality.— At any rate, this Court is inclined to adopt a liberal stance in this case as
We have done in previous decisions where We have held that litigation should, as much as
possible be decided on their merits and not on technicality.

BARCENA v. HUMAN DIGNITY – Judges; Judicial Ethics; While judges should not be
held to answer criminally, civilly or administratively for every erroneous decision rendered
by him in good faith, it is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles.—
While judges should not be held to answer criminally, civilly or administratively for every
erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith, it is imperative that they be conversant
with basic legal principles. Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires
them to be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence.

Gross Ignorance of the Law; Respondent manifested gross ignorance of the law when he
issued an order giving due course to the prosecution’s notice of appeal despite earlier
dismissal of the case on demurrer to evidence.—Respondent manifested gross ignorance of
the law when he issued an order giving due course to the prosecution’s notice of appeal. If
a demurrer to evidence is sustained, such dismissal being on the merits, is equivalent to
an acquittal. This is basic. Hence, the prosecution cannot appeal as it would place the
accused in double jeopardy. No person shall be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense.

d. Protection of Human dignity

Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind
of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not
constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and
other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;

(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in
life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.

R.A. No. 9745 – an Act Penalizing Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and degrading
treatment (2009)

29
e. Relief Against Public Officials (Art.27 hand in hand with Art.34, NCC)

Article 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or
employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an
action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary
administrative action that may be taken.

Article 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid
or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be
primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible
therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal
proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.

f. Just read Articles 28 to 31 of NCC

Article 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in

labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust,
oppressive or highhanded method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who
thereby suffers damage.

Article 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his
guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same
act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence.
Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer
for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.

If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court
shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from
the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.

Article 30. When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a
criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the
civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act
complained of.

Article 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

g. Separate Civil Action for Violation of Constitutional Rights (Articles 32 and 33 must be
read together)

Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:

(1) Freedom of religion;

(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

30
 (7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not
contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for
redress of grievances;
(14) The right to be a free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being
forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or
reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a
State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the
same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been
judicially declared unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission
constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely
separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be
proved by a preponderance of evidence.

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.

The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or
omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.

h. Prejudicial Question

Article 36. Pre-judicial questions, which must be decided before any criminal prosecution
may be instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the Supreme
Court shall promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of this Code.

 Mandatory reading
 The Nettlesome Rules on Prejudicial Question – 727 SCRA 649

Prejudicial question is found both in the New Civil Code and the Revised Rules of
Court. Thus:

31
Prejudicial questions, which must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be
instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by the Rules of Court which the Supreme
Court shall promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of this
Code. (Art. 36, New Civil Code)

Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.—A petition for the suspension

of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil case,
may only be presented by any party before or during the trial of the criminal action.
(Rule 111, Revised Rules of Court, cited in Flordelis v. Castillo, 58 SCRA 301 [1974])

Definition

A civil case, to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension

of the latter, pending its (civil case) determination, must not only involve the same
facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution
of the issue or issues in said civil case would necessarily be determinative of the guilt
or innocence of the accused.

A prejudicial question is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but
so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused,
and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that the said civil
case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil
case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.

Prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which must precede the criminal
action, that which requires a decision before a final judgment is rendered in the
principal action with which said question is closely connected. Not all previous
questions are prejudicial, although all prejudicial questions are necessarily previous.

Source of the rule

The compilation of the laws of criminal procedure of Spain as amended in 1880 did not
have any provisions concerning questions requiring judicial decision before the
institution of a criminal prosecution. Wherefore, in order to decide said questions, in
case they are raised before the Courts of these Islands, it would be necessary to look
for the Law of Criminal Procedure of 1882, which has repealed the former procedural
laws and is the only law in force in Spain in 1884 when the Penal Code was made
applicable to these Islands. Said procedural law of 1882 is therefore clothed with the
character of supplementary law containing respectable doctrine, inasmuch as there is
no law in this country on said prejudicial question. In case a question is raised as to
which of the two actions, criminal and civil, closely connected with each other and
pending for decisions before the courts, shall be suspended (whether the criminal
action should be suspended or the civil) said question must be decided according to the
doctrine laid down in the case of Alemida Chan Tanco vs. Abaroa, 8 Phil. 178 (1907),
a case affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States.

xxx xxx xxx

Our concept of prejudicial question was lifted from Spain where civil cases are tried
exclusively by civil courts, while criminal cases are tried exclusively in criminal courts.
Each kind of court is jurisdictionally distinct from and independent of the other. In the
Philippines, however, courts are invariably tribunals of general jurisdiction. This

32
means that courts here exercise jurisdiction over both civil and criminal cases. Thus,
it is not impossible that the criminal case, as well as the civil case in which a prejudicial
question may rise, may be both pending in the same court.

Requisites

For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the

suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil, the
following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related
to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of
the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in
another tribunal.

Elements

The elements of the doctrine are as follows:

1. The civil case involves fact intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based;
2. In the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and
3. Jurisdiction to try the question must be lodged in another tribunal.

To properly appreciate if there is a prejudicial question to warrant the suspension of

the criminal actions, reference is made to the elements of the crimes charged. Thus, in
one case, it was held that a criminal proceedings for the violation of Batas
Pambansa 22 could proceed despite the pendency of a civil action for rescission of a
conditional sale. An obligation to fund a check or to make arrangements for them with
the drawee bank should not be tied up to the future event of extinguishment of an
obligation under the contract of sale through rescission.

Rationale behind the rule; illustration

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions.

Likewise, the rationale for the principle of prejudicial question is that although it does
not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused, it tests the sufficiency of
the allegations in the complaint or information in order to sustain the further
prosecution of the criminal case. Hence, the need for its prior resolution before further
proceedings in the criminal action may be had.

The best illustration of the rationale behind the rule is the case of Abacan, Jr. v.
Northwestern University, Inc., 455 SCRA 136 (2005). The Supreme Court held:
Technically, there would be no prejudicial question to speak of in this case, if we are to
consider the general rule that a prejudicial question comes into play in a situation
where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the
former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may
proceed, because howsoever the issue is in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case. However, considering the rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question,
being to avoid two conflicting decisions, prudence dictates that we apply the principle
underlying the doctrine to the case at bar. x x x

33
In the present case, the question of which between the Castro and the Nicolas factions
are the de jure board of directors of NUI is lodged before the SEC. the complaint before
the RTC of Laoag meanwhile alleges that petitioners, together with their co-
defendants, comprised of the “Castro faction,” wrongfully withdrew the amount of
P1.4M from the account of NUI with Metrobank. Moreover, whether or not Roy Nicolas
of the “Nicolas faction” is a duly elected member of the Board of NUI and thus with
capacity to institute the herein complaint in behalf of the NUI depends on the findings
of the SEC in the case pending before it. It would finally determine whether Castro, et
al. legally withdrew the subject amount from the bank and whether Nicolas lawfully
initiated the complaint in behalf of herein respondent NUI. It is petitioners’ claim and
we agree that the presence or absence of their liability for allowing the withdrawal of
P1.4M from the account of NUI with Metrobank in favor of the “Castro faction” is
reliant on the findings of the SEC as to which of the two factions is the de jure board.
Since the determination of the SEC as to which of the two factions is the de jure board
of NUI is crucial to the resolution of the case before the RTC, we find that the trial
court should suspend its proceedings until the SEC comes out with its findings. (also
cited in Trinidad v. Office of the Ombudsman, 539 SCRA 415 [2007]) x x x

Besides, the power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every
court to control the disposition of the cases on its dockets, considering its time and
effort, those of counsel and the litigants. But if proceedings must be stayed, it must be
done in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious litigations, conflicting
judgments, confusion between litigants and courts. (Magestrado v. People, 527 SCRA
125 [2007])

Nature of a prejudicial question

The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play generally in a situation where a
civil and a criminal action both pend and there exists in the former an issue which
must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris
et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.

A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent to the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal; that is, it is determinative of the case before the court and
jurisdiction to pass upon the same is lodged in another tribunal.

It is the issue in the civil action that is prejudicial to the continuation of the criminal
action, not the criminal action that is prejudicial to the civil action. (Yap v. Paras, 205
SCRA 625 [1992])

Prejudicial Question explained

If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues, or the issue in one is intimately
related to the issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist,
provided the other element or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not only that
the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would be
necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If the resolution of
the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused
in the criminal action based on the same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil

34
case be determined first before taking up the criminal case, the civil case does not
involve a prejudicial question. Neither is there a prejudicial question of the civil and
the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.

Effect of filing a motion for suspension due to the existence of a prejudicial

question

A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted

that all the essential elements of a crime have been adequately alleged in the
information, considering that the prosecution has not yet presented a single evidence
on the indictment or may not yet have rested its case.

A challenge of the allegations in the information on the ground of prejudicial question

is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a noncriminal suit.

A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the
accused but simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order
to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. (Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, 336
SCRA 747 [2000])

Rules of Procedure including the rule on prejudicial question was conceived

for just and speedy disposition of cases

The Rules of Procedure, including the rule on prejudicial questions, were conceived to
afford parties an expeditious and just disposition of cases and the Supreme Court will
not countenance their misuse and abuse to frustrate or delay the delivery of justice
and to allow in the instant case the civil action raising the alleged prejudicial question
may give rise to
the evils of forum shopping.

The doctrine is waivable

Since the suspension of the criminal case due to a prejudicial question is only a
procedural matter, the same is subject to a waiver by virtue of the prior acts of the
accused. After all, the doctrine of waiver is made solely for the benefit and protection
of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished
without infringing on any public right and without detriment to the community at
large.

When a prejudicial question is found, the case should be suspended not

dismissed

When, in the course of actions taken by those to whom the complaint is endorsed or
forwarded, a prejudicial question is found to be pending, Section 6, Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court should be applied in a suppletory character. The rule directs that the
proceedings may only be suspended not dismissed, and that it may be made only upon
petition and not at the instance of the judge alone or the investigating officer.

When must the motion for suspension be raised or filed, old and new
jurisprudence

Old jurisprudence:

35
The time to file a motion to suspend on the ground that the case constitutes a
prejudicial question is not during the preliminary investigation but after the filing of
an information if warranted.
xxx xxx xxx

While Article 36 does not provide logically that a prejudicial question should be decided
before the criminal case proceeds, it does not fix at what precise stage the criminal
prosecution should be suspended to await resolution of the prejudicial question.
Precisely, Article 36 leaves the procedure for invoking, considering and deciding
prejudicial questions to the rules of court promulgated by the Supreme Court. In
Section 5, Rule 111 and Dasalla and Estrella, the Court has provided and ruled that
the question of whether or not a criminal action shall be suspended because of a
prejudicial question may not be raised during the stage of preliminary investigation
but only after a finding of probable cause and the case is already in the court of proper
jurisdiction for trial. (Isip v. Gonzales, 39 SCRA 255 [1971], underlining supplied)

New jurisprudence:

Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are susceptible of
an interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of law. The phrase “previously
instituted civil action” in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded and is not susceptible of
alternative interpretations. The clause “before any criminal prosecution may be
instituted or may proceed” in Art. 36 of the Civil Code may, however, be interpreted to
mean that the motion to suspend the criminal action may be filed during the
preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor or court conducting the
investigation, or during the trial with the court hearing the case.

This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36 of the Civil Code with Sec. 7 of Rule 111
of the Rules of Court but also with Sec. 6 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which
provides for the situations when the motion to suspend the criminal action during the
preliminary investigation or during the trial may be filed. Sec. 6 provides:

“Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.—A petition for suspension of

the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil
action661may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the
preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial,
the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the
prosecution rests.” (Dreamwork Construction, Inc. v. Janiola, 591 SCRA 466 [2009],
underlining supplied)

The aggrieved party must file the motion for suspension of proceedings and
not at the instance of the judge
Under the Rules, the existence of a prejudicial question is a ground in a petition to
suspend proceedings in a criminal action. Since the suspension of the proceedings in
the criminal action may be made only upon petition and not at the instance of the judge
or the investigating prosecutor, the latter cannot take cognizance of a claim of a
prejudicial question without a petition to suspend being filed. Since a petition to
suspend can be filed only in the criminal action, the determination of the pendency of
a prejudicial question should be made at the first instance in the criminal action and
not before the Supreme Court in an appeal from the civil action.

A civil action must be instituted prior to a criminal action in order to invoke

the existence of a prejudicial question

36
A prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal
action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the
criminal action with which said question is closely connected. The civil action must be
instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action.

What must be alleged in order to justify the suspension of the proceedings

A prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal
action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the
criminal action with which said question is closely connected. Not every defense raised
in a civil action will raise a prejudicial question to justify suspension of the criminal
action.

The defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue
raised in the criminal case and its resolution should determine whether or not the
latter action may proceed. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not
determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on
the same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before
taking up the criminal case, this civil case does not involve a criminal question.

Administrative liability of a judge for an erroneous order granting the

suspension of a case based on a prejudicial question

A municipal trial court judge was reprimanded when he suspended the hearing of a
case allegedly due to the existence of a prejudicial question, even if no motion was filed
and just because the private respondent’s counsel is the son of the judge. (Yap v. Paras,
205 SCRA 625 [1992])
Another Metropolitan Trial Court judge was suspended from office for six months for
partiality and grave abuse of discretion for granting a motion to suspend a criminal
case until the civil case is resolved, when in fact the doctrine is not applicable.

A criminal case for falsification of evidence against a lawyer is not a bar to

the resolution of the issue in his disbarment case

It is not sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before a
disbarment case against a lawyer may be acted upon. Otherwise, the Supreme Court
as well as the trial courts will be effectively rendered helpless from vigorously applying
the rules on admission to and continuing membership in the legal profession during
the whole period that the criminal case is pending final disposition when the objectives
of the two proceedings are vastly disparate.

The trial court may exercise sound discretion in applying the doctrine even if
two civil cases pend

There is no prejudicial question to speak of when two cases are civil in nature.
However, a trial court may stay the proceedings before it in the exercise of its sound
discretion. The court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of a sound
discretion, upon proper application for a stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance
to abide the outcome of another pending in another court, especially where the parties
and the issues are the same, for there is power inherent in every court to control the
disposition of cases on its dockets with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel,
and for litigants.

37
Prejudicial Question is different from res judicata

A prejudicial question is different from the concept of res judicata. There is no identity
of parties between the civil case and the criminal case does not abate the application
of a prejudicial question.

The issue of annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to a

criminal case of parricide

Annulment of marriage is not a prejudicial question in a criminal case for parricide.

The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of
parricide which punishes any person who shall kill his father, mother or child whether
legitimate or illegitimate or any of his ascendants or descendants or his spouse. The
relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide
from murder or homicide. However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not
similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further,
the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt
or innocence of the accused. (Pimentel v. Pimentel, 630 SCRA 436 [2010])

Instances where the prejudicial doctrine was not applied

1. An action for annulment of marriage brought by the wife in the second marriage
is not a prejudicial question. The mere fact that there are actions to annul the
marriages entered into by the accused does not mean that “prejudicial questions”
are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the
criminal case. In order that the case of annulment of marriage be considered a
prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown
that the petitioner’s consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained
by means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in the second
marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the
crime of bigamy. (Landicho v. Relova, 22 SCRA 731 [1968])

2. The validity of a receipt in a civil case is not a prejudicial question in a criminal

case of estafa. The alleged prejudicial question is not determinative of the guilt
or innocence of the parties charged with estafa could still be established by other
evidence. If this were not so, there would hardly be a case for estafa that could
be prosecuted. (Jimenez v. Averia, 22 SCRA 1380 [1968])

3. An electoral protest does not constitute a prejudicial question to a criminal

action. (Isip v. Gonzales, 39 SCRA 255 [1971])

4. Where one case is administrative and the other is a civil case, there can be no
prejudicial question. The filing of an action for damages based on an alleged
malicious filing of an administrative complaint is premature. (Ocampo v.
Buenaventura, 55 SCRA 267 [1974])

5. The pendency of an intestate case does not constitute a prejudicial action in a

criminal case for theft of standing crops filed by a person claiming to have a valid
contract by lease on the property from its legal owner against a person claiming
co-ownership of the leased land. Likewise, the pendency of an ejectment case
does not constitute a prejudicial question to the charge of theft. (Librodo v.
Coscoluella, Jr., 116 SCRA 303 [1982])

38
6. The issue in a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus does
not constitute a prejudicial question in a criminal case of graft and corruption.
The guilt or innocence of an accused does not depend on the outcome of the
special civil action. (People v. Ofiana, 135 SCRA 372 [1985])

7. In view of the amendment under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a civil
action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or
simultaneously with a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action
is not one “to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense,” even if both the
civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such civil
action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the legal
consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
gains, custody of offsprings, support and disqualification from inheriting from
the innocent spouse, among others. (Gandionco v. Peñaranda, 155 SCRA 725
[1987])

8. The issue of a nullity of the second marriage filed by the second wife is not
determinative of the husband’s guilt or innocence in a crime of bigamy. (Donato
v. Luna, 160 SCRA 441 [1988])

9. A pending case for the annulment of the sale of a car (Civil Case No. 5307) is not
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the petitioners for acts allegedly
committed by them in seizing the car. (Balgos, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 176 SCRA
287 [1989])

10. Where the cases involves two civil cases, one for an action for ejectment and the
other is for the enforcement of a “right of first refusal” or redemption rights. The
latter action was filed as a canny and preemptive maneuver in order to block the
ejectment case. (Carlos v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 25 [1997]. See
alsoStrategic Alliance Development Corporation v. Star Infrastructure
Development Corporation, 647 SCRA 545 [2011])

11. A civil action for declaration of nullity of documents and for damages does not
constitute a prejudicial question to a criminal case of estafa since the alleged
prejudicial question in the civil case does not determine the guilt or innocence of
the accused in the criminal action. (Ching v. Court of Appeals, 331 SCRA 16
[2000])

12. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial
question to the concubinage case. Assuming that the first marriage was null and
void, the fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties
to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for
the same must be submitted to the judgment of a competent court and only when
the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as
there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy
(Beltran v. People, 334 SCRA 106 [2000]). A plain reading of Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the
mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence
of a valid marriage. (Jarillo v. People, 601 SCRA 236 [2009])

39
13. Where what is pending is a case of extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings and the
other case is the issuance of writ of possession, both cases can proceed
independently of each other and the prejudicial question doctrine does not apply.
(Manalo v. Court of Appeals, 366 SCRA 752 [2001];Yulienco v. Court of Appeals,
393 SCRA 143 [2002]; Yu v. Philippine Commercial International Bank, 485
SCRA 56 [2006])

14. If a criminal case is filed ahead of the civil case, no prejudicial question exists.
(Torres v. Garchitorena, 394 SCRA 494 [2002])

15. If the civil and criminal cases can proceed independently with each other,
however, the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action. (People v. Consing, Jr., 395 SCRA 366
[2003])

16. An action for unfair competition is an independent civil action and it does not
operate to suspend a criminal case involving fraud. (Samson v. Daway, 434 SCRA
612 [2004])

17. Where what is pending is a criminal case for estafa and another case for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment in a regular court and alleged illegal
election of officers of a corporation pending before the Securities and Exchange
Commission. (People v. Delizo, 436 SCRA 615 [2004])

18. There is no prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according
to law, proceed independently of each other. (Magestrado v. People, 527 SCRA
125 [2007])

19. There is no prejudicial question where what is involved is the alleged

unconstitutionality of Sec. 2, RA 9164 which reckons the three-term limit rule.
To suspend the disqualification action while the issue of unconstitutionality of
the law was still pending, would be to contravene the established doctrine that
laws are presumptively constitutional. (Monreal v. Commission on Elections, 608
SCRA 717 [2009])

Instances where the prejudicial question doctrine was applied

1. On the basis of the issues raised in both the criminal and civil cases against
petitioner and in the light of the foregoing concepts of a prejudicial question, there
indeed appears to be a prejudicial question in the case at bar, considering that
petitioner Alejandro Ras’ defense (as defendant) in Civil Case No. 73 of the nullity
and forgery of the alleged prior deed of sale in favor of Luis Pichel (plaintiff in the
civil case and complaining witness in the criminal case) is based on the very same
facts which would be necessarily determinative of petitioner Ras’ guilt or innocence
as accused in the criminal case. If the first alleged sale in favor of Pichel is void or
fictitious, then there would be no double sale and petitioner would be innocent of
the offense charged. A conviction in the criminal case (if it were allowed to proceed
ahead) would be a gross injustice and would have to be set aside if it were finally
decided in the civil action that indeed the alleged prior deed of sale was a forgery
and spurious. (Ras v. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125 [1980]. See alsoBalgos, Jr. v.

40
 Sandiganbayan, 176 SCRA 287 [1989]; Que v. Court of Appeals, 339 SCRA 505
[2000])
2. Under settled jurisprudence, the pendency of a formal charge of company
domination is a prejudicial question that, until decided, bars proceedings for a
certification election, the reason being that the votes of the members of the
dominated union could not be free. The ULP case herein was filed on August 31,
1978, or anterior to the Certification Case, which was presented on September 5,
1978. The pendency of the charge was known to respondent public official by virtue
of the Motion to Dismiss filed by petitioner as intervenor in the Certification Case.
The rationale for the suspension of the election proceedings x x x is that if it were
a labor organization objecting to the participation in a certification election of a
company-dominated union, as a result of which a complaint for an unfair labor
practice case against the employer was filed, the status of the latter union must be
first cleared in such a proceeding before such voting could take place. (United CMC
Textile Workers Union v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 128 SCRA 316 [1984])
3. A pending civil suit for annulment of marriage constitutes a prejudicial question
in a bigamy case. (Prado v. People, 133 SCRA 602 [1984])
4. The resolution of the question of ownership would be determinative of petitioners
criminal liability for squatting. (Apa v. Fernandez, 242 SCRA 509 [1995])
5. A civil action instituted to resolve whether the designation of certain persons as
sectoral representatives were in accordance with law, constitutes a prejudicial
question vis-à-vis a criminal case. (Tuanda v. Sandiganbayan [Third Division],
249 SCRA 342 [1995])
6. Pending determination of the falsity of the subject testimonies of private
respondents in the civil case, the criminal action for false testimony must perforce
be suspended. (Ark Travel Express, Inc. v. Abrogar, 410 SCRA 148 [2003])
7. The crime of estafa is not committed by the failure to return the things received for
sale on commission, or to deliver their value, but, as this class of crime is defined
by law, by misappropriating or converting the money or goods received on
commission. Delay in the fulfillment of a commission or in the delivery of the sum
on such account received only involves civil liability. So long as the money that a
person is under obligation to deliver is not demanded of him, and he fails to deliver
it for having wrongfully disposed of it, there is no estafa, whatever be the cause of
the debt. (Omictin v. Court of Appeals, 512 SCRA 70, 81 [2007])
8. A complaint for unfair labor practice may be considered a prejudicial question in a
proceeding for certification election when it is charged therein that one or more
labor unions participating in the election are being aided, or are controlled, by the
company or employer. (The Standard Cigarette Workers’ Union [PLUM] v. C.I.R.,
et al., 101 Phil. 126 [1957])
9. Pending the petition for review which an accused filed for a case of falsification of
public document, the trial should be suspended in the court below. The Department
of Justice should not be deprived of its right to review the case. (Tolentino v.
Bonifacio, 139 SCRA 347 [1985])

41
 Analogous cases or exceptions where the prejudicial question doctrine was
applied even if there is no existence between a criminal and a civil action

As a general rule, a prejudicial question contemplates the existence of a criminal and

a civil action.

By way of an exception, there are some cases where the prejudicial doctrine was
applied in an analogous manner even if there is no existence between a criminal and
a civil action. They are as follows:
1. The ejectment proceedings should be held in abeyance until after its determination
made in the administrative case. While this rule is properly applicable to instances
involving two (2) court actions, the existence in the instant case of the same
considerations of identity of parties and issues, economy of time and effort for the
court, the counsels and the parties as well as the need to resolve the parties’ right
of possession before the ejectment case may be properly determined, justifies the
rule’s analogous application to this case. (Quiambao v. Osorio, 158 SCRA 674
[1988])
2. A case involving a boundary dispute between local government units presents a
prejudicial question which must first be decided before a plebiscite may be
conducted for the creation of the proposed barangays. The reason for this is “in the
interest of good order.”

III. PERSONS AND PERSONALITY

A. The concept of a PERSON and PERSONALITY

Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is
inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is
the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost. (n)

Art. 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and
civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the
incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or
from property relations, such as easements. (32a)

Art. 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to act: age,
insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family relations,
alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The consequences of these circumstances
are governed in this Code, other codes, the Rules of Court, and in special laws. Capacity to
act is not limited on account of religious belief or political opinion.

A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is qualified for all acts of civil life,
except in cases specified by law.

42
B. Commencement and Termination of Personality

1. Natural Person

(a) Birth

Art. 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered
born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the
conditions specified in the following article. (29a)

Art. 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is
completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-
uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-
four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.

ART.II OF THE CONSTITUTION

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally
protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.

PD 603 CHILD AND YOUTH WELFARE CODE

Article 5. Commencement of Civil Personality. - The civil personality of the child

shall commence from the time of his conception, for all purposes favorable to him,
subject to the requirements of Article 41 of the Civil Code.

REVISED PENAL CODE

Art. 256. Intentional abortion. — Any person who shall intentionally cause an
abortion shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion temporal, if he shall use any violence upon the
person of the pregnant woman.
2. The penalty of prision mayor if, without using violence, he shall act without
the consent of the woman.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if
the woman shall have consented.

Art. 257. Unintentional abortion. — The penalty of prision correccional in its

minimum and medium period shall be imposed upon any person who shall cause
an abortion by violence, but unintentionally.

Art. 258. Abortion practiced by the woman herself of by her parents. — The penalty
of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon
a woman who shall practice abortion upon herself or shall consent that any other
person should do so.

43
Any woman who shall commit this offense to conceal her dishonor, shall suffer the
penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.

If this crime be committed by the parents of the pregnant woman or either of them,
and they act with the consent of said woman for the purpose of concealing her
dishonor, the offenders shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods.

Art. 259. Abortion practiced by a physician or midwife and dispensing of abortives.

— The penalties provided in Article 256 shall be imposed in its maximum period,
respectively, upon any physician or midwife who, taking advantage of their
scientific knowledge or skill, shall cause an abortion or assist in causing the same.

Any pharmacist who, without the proper prescription from a physician, shall
dispense any abortive shall suffer arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000
pesos.

GELUZ v. CA – Unborn foetus without personality; Award for death of a person

does not cover unborn foetus.—The minimum award for the death of a person does
not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality and
incapable of having rights and obligations.

Parents of unborn foetus cannot sue for damages on its behalf.—Since an action for
pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to
the injured, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to the parents or heirs
of an unborn child.

Nature of damages recoverable by parents of unborn child.—The damages which

the parents of an unborn child can recover are limited to the moral damages for
the illegal arrest of the normal development of the foetus, i.e., on account of distress
and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental
expectations, as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should
warrant them (Art. 2230, New Civil Code).

QUIMIGING v. ICAO –

44
 IMBONG v. OCHOA – Life begins at fertilization.—The ponente, is of the strong
view that life begins at fertilization. In answering the question of when life begins,
focus should be made on the particular phrase of Section 12 which reads: Section
12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect
the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government. Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from
conception. This is undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn to
speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any
proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen
because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the
scientific fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the
view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins. In a
nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with
“fertilization” of the female ovum by the male sperm. On the other side of the
spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the “implantation” of the
fertilized ovum in the uterus.

(b) Death

Art. 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death.

The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined
by law, by contract and by will.

o No definition of death in the NCC

CONTINENTAL MANUFACTURING CORP. v. MONTANO –

o Summons on a dead person is void

DUMLAO v. QUALITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, INC. – Summons; Service

of summons on a dead person is void.—There is no difficulty in resolving that
issue. Since no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, the judgment against him
is a patent nullity. As far as Oria was concerned, the lower court’s judgment
against him in Civil Case No. T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over his
person. He was not, and he could not have been, validly served with summons.
He had no more civil personality. His juridical capacity, which is the fitness to
be the subject of legal relations, was lost through death.

Voluntary appearance of person who was already dead when summons was
served cannot be implied from appearance of an attorney who appeared on the
decedent’s behalf as counsel together with another defendant. Said counsel
could not have appeared for a dead man.—The lower court erred in ruling that
since Soliven’s counsel also appeared as counsel for Oria, there was a voluntary
appearance which enabled the court to acquire jurisdiction over Oria, as

45
 contemplated in section 23, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. Soliven’s
counsel could not have validly appeared for a dead co-defendant. Estoppel has
no application to this case.

o Right to bury dead does not included a common-law husband

EUGENIO, SR. v. VELEZ – Words and Phrases; Husband and

Wife; Burials; Under the Civil Code, the term “spouse” refers to “married”
couples, not common-law ones.—Petitioner claims he is the spouse
contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the term spouse used therein
not being preceded by any qualification; hence, in the absence of such
qualification, he is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana’s body. Vitaliana’s
brothers and sisters contend otherwise. Indeed, Philippine Law does not
recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who
cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the
public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in
the community where they live may be considered legally “married” in common
law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.

Burials; Right to bury a dead person does not include a commonlaw husband
who is still married.—Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly
awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters (the Vargases).

o State’s right to bar the return of the corpse of former President Marcos and
certain rights of the dead.

MARCOS v. MANGLAPUS – Death of Mr. Marcos has not changed the

factual scenario under which the Court’s decision was rendered.—The death of
Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed as a supervening event, has not
changed the factual scenario under which the Court’s decision was rendered.
The threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been
viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have ceased. On
the contrary, instead of erasing fears as to the destabilization that will be
caused by the return of the Marcoses, Mrs. Marcos reinforced the bases for the
decision to bar their return when she called President Aquino “illegal,”
claiming that it is Mr. Marcos, not Mrs. Aquino, who is the “legal” President of
the Philippines, and declared that the matter “should be brought to all the
courts of the world.”

Constitutional Law; The President has unstated residual powers which are
necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution.—Contrary
to petitioners’ view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom
executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied
from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply
with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not
limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive
Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so,
notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the
abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of
specific powers of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-
in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power.

46
 Court cannot subscribe to the view that a recognition of the President’s implied
or residual powers is tantamount to setting the stage for another dictatorship.—
And neither can we subscribe to the view that a recognition of the President’s
implied or residual powers is tantamount to setting the stage for another
dictatorship. Despite petitioners’ strained analogy, the residual powers of the
President under the Constitution should not be confused with the power of the
President under the 1973 Constitution to legislate pursuant to Amendment
No. 6.

No similarity between the residual powers of the President under the 1987
Constitution and the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution
pursuant to Amendment No. 6.—There is no similarity between the residual
powers of the President under the 1987 Constitution and the power of the
President under the 1973 Constitution pursuant to Amendment No. 6. First of
all, Amendment No. 6 refers to an express grant of power. It is not implied.
Then, Amendment No. 6 refers to a grant to the President of the specific power
of legislation.

The President has the duty to protect and promote the interest and welfare of
the people.—Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in
compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest
and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and,
subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present
circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence of a
clear showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of
discretion in arriving at this decision, the Court will not enjoin the
implementation of this decision.

o Common law partner has no right to make funeral arrangements

VALINO v. ADRIANO – Civil Law; Persons and Family Relations; Funerals;

It is undeniable that the law simply confines the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements to the members of the family to the exclusion of one’s common law
partner.—It is undeniable that the law simply confines the right and duty to
make funeral arrangements to the members of the family to the exclusion of
one’s common law partner. In Tomas Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez, 185 SCRA 425
(1990), a petition for habeas corpus was filed by the brothers and sisters of the
late Vitaliana Vargas against her lover, Tomas Eugenio, Sr., alleging that the
latter forcibly took her and confined her in his residence. It appearing that she
already died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy, Tomas Eugenio, Sr.
sought the dismissal of the petition for lack of jurisdiction and claimed the
right to bury the deceased, as the common-law husband.

The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not
be considered as having been waived or renounced, except upon clear and
satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that
end.—It is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano.
The fact that she was living separately from her husband and was in the
United States when he died has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario
had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty
to make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless.
The right and dutyto make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will

47
not be considered as having been waived or renounced, except upon
clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and
voluntary intent to that end. While there was disaffection between Atty.
Adriano and Rosario and their children when he was still alive, the Court also
recognizes that human compassion, more often than not, opens the door to
mercy and forgiveness once a family member joins his Creator. Notably, it is
an undisputed fact that the respondents wasted no time in making frantic pleas
to Valino for the delay of the interment for a few days so they could attend the
service and view the remains of the deceased. As soon as they came to know
about Atty. Adriano’s death in the morning of December 19, 1992 (December 20,
1992 in the Philippines), the respondents immediately contacted Valino and the
Arlington Memorial Chapel to express their request, but to no avail.

Considering the ambiguity as to the true wishes of the deceased, it is the law
that supplies the presumption as to his intent. No presumption can be said to
have been created inValino’s favor, solely on account of a long-time relationship
with Atty. Adriano.—Valino insists that the expressed wishes of the deceased
should nevertheless prevail pursuant to Article 307 of the Civil Code. Valino’s
own testimony that it was Atty. Adriano’s wish to be buried in their family plot
is being relied upon heavily. It should be noted, however, that other than
Valino’s claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried at the Manila Memorial
Park, no other evidence was presented to corroborate such claim. Considering
that Rosario equally claims that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried in the
Adriano family plot in Novaliches, it becomes apparent that the supposed
burial wish of Atty. Adriano was unclear and undefinite. Considering this
ambiguity as to the true wishes of the deceased, it is the law that supplies the
presumption as to his intent. No presumption can be said to have been created
in Valino’s favor, solely on account of a long-time relationship with Atty.
Adriano.

Should there be any doubt as to the true intent of the deceased, the law favors
the legitimate family.—It cannot be surmised that just because Rosario was
unavailable to bury her husband when she died, he had already renounced her
right to do so. Verily, in the same vein that the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements will not be considered as having been waived or renounced, the
right to deprive a legitimate spouse of her legal right to bury the remains of
her deceased husband should not be readily presumed to have been exercised,
except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and
voluntary intent of the deceased to that end. Should there be any doubt as
to the true intent of the deceased, the law favors the legitimate family.
Here, Rosario’s keenness to exercise the rights and obligations accorded to the
legal wife was even bolstered by the fact that she was joined by the children
in this case.

It is generally recognized that any inferences as to the wishes of the deceased

should be established by some form of testamentary disposition.—Even
assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Atty. Adriano truly wished to be buried in
the Valino family plot at the Manila Memorial Park, the result remains the
same. Article 307 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 307. The funeral shall be
in accordance with the expressed wishes of the deceased. In the absence of
such expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall determine the funeral
rites. In case of doubt, the form of the funeral shall be decided upon by the
person obliged to make arrangements for the same, after consulting the other

48
 members of the family. From its terms, it is apparent that Article 307 simply
seeks to prescribe the “form of the funeral rites” that should govern in the
burial of the deceased. As thoroughly explained earlier, the right and duty to
make funeral arrangements reside in the persons specified in Article 305 in
relation to Article 199 of the Family Code. Even if Article 307 were to be
interpreted to include the place of burial among those on which the wishes of
the deceased shall be followed, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino (Dr. Tolentino), an
eminent authority on civil law, commented that it is generally recognized
that any inferences as to the wishes of the deceased should be
established by some form of testamentary disposition. As Article 307
itself provides, the wishes of the deceased must be expressly provided. It
cannot be inferred lightly, such as from the circumstance that Atty. Adriano
spent his last remaining days with Valino. It bears stressing once more that
other than Valino’s claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried at the Valino
family plot, no other evidence was presented to corroborate it.

It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is outside the

commerce of man.—It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual
is outside the commerce of man. However, the law recognizes that a certain
right of possession over the corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent burial,
and for the exclusion of the intrusion by third persons who have no legitimate
interest in it. This quasi-property right, arising out of the duty of those
obligated by law to bury their dead, also authorizes them to take possession of
the dead body for purposes of burial to have it remain in its final resting place,
or to even transfer it to a proper place where the memory of the dead may
receive the respect of the living. This is a family right. There can be no doubt
that persons having this right may recover the corpse from third persons.

o A dead person has no legal capacity to sue –

BEROT v. SIAPNO – Civil Law; Legal Capacity; Capacity to Sue; Considering

that capacity to be sued is a correlative of the capacity to sue, to the same extent,
a decedent does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be named a party
defendant in a court action.—Petitioners were correct when they argued that
upon Macaria Berot’s death on 23 June 2003, her legal personality ceased, and
she could no longer be impleaded as respondent in the foreclosure suit. It is
also true that her death opened to her heirs the succession of her estate, which
in this case was an intestate succession. The CA, in fact, sustained petitioners’
position that a deceased person’s estate has no legal personality to be sued.
Citing the Court’s ruling in Ventura v. Militante, 316 SCRA 226 (1999), it
correctly ruled that a decedent does not have the capacity to be sued and may
not be made a defendant in a case: A deceased person does not have such legal
entity as is necessary to bring action so much so that a motion to substitute
cannot lie and should be denied by the court. An action begun by a decedent’s
estate cannot be said to have been begun by a legal person, since an estate is
not a legal entity; such an action is a nullity and a motion to amend the party
plaintiff will not, likewise, lie, there being nothing before the court to amend.
Considering that capacity to be sued is a correlative of the capacity to sue, to
the same extent, a decedent does not have the capacity to be sued and may not
be named a party defendant in a court action.

Parties; Real Party-in-Interest; As the compulsory heir of the estate of Macaria,

Rodolfo is the real party-in-interest in accordance with Section 2, Rule 3 of the

49
 Revised Rules of Court.—It should be noted that Rodolfo Berot is the son of the
deceased Macaria and as such, he is a compulsory heir of his mother. His
substitution is mandated by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Notably, there is no indication in the records of the case that he had other
siblings who would have been his coheirs. The lower and appellate courts
veered from the real issue whether the proper parties have been impleaded.
They instead focused on the issue whether there was need for a formal
substitution when the deceased Macaria, and later its estate, was impleaded.
As the compulsory heir of the estate of Macaria, Rodolfo is the real party-in-
interest in accordance with Section 2, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. At
the time of the filing of the complaint for foreclosure, as well as the time it was
amended to implead the estate of Macaria, it is Rodolfo — as heir — who is the
real party-in-interest. He stands to be benefitted or injured by the judgment in
the suit.

o Death due to suicide is not compensable

CREWLINK, INC. v. TARINGTERING – Labor Law; Seafarers; Philippine

Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Standard Employment
Contracts; No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury,
incapacity, disability or death resulting from a willful act on his own life by the
seaman, provided, however, that the employer can prove that such injury,
incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to him.—Under No. 6,
Section C, Part II of the POEA “Standard Employment Contract Governing the
Employment of All Filipino Seamen On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels” (POEA-
SEC), it is provided that: x x x x 6. No compensation shall be payable in
respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death resulting from a
willful act on his own life by the seaman, provided, however, that the
employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or death is
directly attributable to him.

Death Benefits; In order to avail of death benefits, the death of the employee
should occur during the effectivity of the employment contract; The employer
may be exempt from liability if it can successfully prove that the seaman’s death
was caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act.—
In order to avail of death benefits, the death of the employee should occur
during the effectivity of the employment contract. The death of a seaman
during the term of employment makes the employer liable to his heirs for death
compensation benefits. This rule, however, is not absolute. The employer may
be exempt from liability if it can successfully prove that the seaman’s death
was caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act.

o The Dead Man’s Statue; Requirements –

SUNGA-CHAN v. CHUA – Dead Man’s Statute; Requirements; The “Dead

Man’s Statute” provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded
from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving
party is not entitled to undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and
unexplained account of the transaction.—The “Dead Man’s Statute” provides
that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by
death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled
to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained
account of the transaction. But before this rule can be successfully invoked to

50
bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is necessary that: “1. The
witness is a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a
case is prosecuted. 2. The action is against an executor or administrator or
other representative of a deceased person or a person of unsound mind; 3. The
subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such
deceased person or against person of unsound mind; 4. His testimony refers to
any matter of fact which occurred before the death of such deceased person or
before such person became of unsound mind.”

RULE 130 EVIDENCE

SECTION 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of the adverse

party. – Parties or assignor of the parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf
a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other
representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon
a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such
person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before
the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound
mind.

Reason: if death has closed the lips of one party, the policy of the law close the
lips of the other.

Facts favorable to the deceased, to his estate or to the insane person not
prohibited.

Applicability – the rule applies only to a civil case or a special proceeding over
the estate of a deceased person or an insane person.

Requisites for dead man’s statute

(a) The witness sought to be disqualified is the plaintiff;

(b) Executor, administrator or representative of a deceased person, or the
person of unsound mind is the defendant.
(c) The case is upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased
person or against such person of unsound mind; and
(d) The testimony to be given is on a matter of fact occurring before the
death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound
mind.

How waived

(a) By not objecting to plaintiff’s testimony on prohibited matters;

(b) By not cross-examining the plaintiff on prohibited matters
(c) By calling witnesses to testify on prohibited matters;
(d) When the plaintiff’s deposition is taken by the representative of the
estate or when counsel for the representative cross-examined the
plaintiff as to matters occurring ___ the deceased’s lifetime.

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2. Juridical Personality

Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:

(1) The State and its political subdivisions;

(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose,
created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been
constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose
to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from
that of each shareholder, partner or member. (35a)

Art. 45. Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of the preceding article are
governed by the laws creating or recognizing them.

Private corporations are regulated by laws of general application on the subject.

Partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose are governed by the
provisions of this Code concerning partnerships. (36 and 37a)

Art. 46. Juridical persons may acquire and possess property of all kinds, as well as
incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and
regulations of their organization. (38a)

Art. 47. Upon the dissolution of corporations, institutions and other entities for public
interest or purpose mentioned in No. 2 of Article 44, their property and other assets
shall be disposed of in pursuance of law or the charter creating them. If nothing has
been specified on this point, the property and other assets shall be applied to similar
purposes for the benefit of the region, province, city or municipality which during the
existence of the institution derived the principal benefits from the same.

BP BLG. 68 CORPORATION CODE

Sec. 2. Corporation defined. - A corporation is an artificial being created by operation

of law, having the right of succession and the powers, attributes and properties
expressly authorized by law or incident to its existence.

Sec. 4. Corporations created by special laws or charters. - Corporations created by

special laws or charters shall be governed primarily by the provisions of the special
law or charter creating them or applicable to them, supplemented by the provisions of
this Code, insofar as they are applicable.

Sec. 17. Grounds when articles of incorporation or amendment may be rejected or

disapproved. - The Securities and Exchange Commission may reject the articles of
incorporation or disapprove any amendment thereto if the same is not in compliance
with the requirements of this Code: Provided, That the Commission shall give the
incorporators a reasonable time within which to correct or modify the objectionable
portions of the articles or amendment. The following are grounds for such rejection or
disapproval:

52
 1. That the articles of incorporation or any amendment thereto is not
substantially in accordance with the form prescribed herein;
2. That the purpose or purposes of the corporation are patently
unconstitutional, illegal, immoral, or contrary to government rules and
regulations;
3. That the Treasurer's Affidavit concerning the amount of capital stock
subscribed and/or paid if false;
4. That the percentage of ownership of the capital stock to be owned by
citizens of the Philippines has not been complied with as required by
existing laws or the Constitution.

No articles of incorporation or amendment to articles of incorporation of banks,

banking and quasi-banking institutions, building and loan associations, trust
companies and other financial intermediaries, insurance companies, public utilities,
educational institutions, and other corporations governed by special laws shall be
accepted or approved by the Commission unless accompanied by a favorable
recommendation of the appropriate government agency to the effect that such articles
or amendment is in accordance with law.

NEW CIVIL CODE

Art. 1767. By the contract of partnership two or more persons bind themselves to
contribute money, property, or industry to a common fund, with the intention of
dividing the profits among themselves.

Two or more persons may also form a partnership for the exercise of a profession.

Art. 1768. The partnership has a judicial personality separate and distinct from that
of each of the partners, even in case of failure to comply with the requirements of
Article 1772, first paragraph.

o Kinds

CORPORATION CODE

Sec. 3. Classes of corporations. - Corporations formed or organized under this

Code may be stock or non-stock corporations. Corporations which have capital
stock divided into shares and are authorized to distribute to the holders of such
shares dividends or allotments of the surplus profits on the basis of the shares
held are stock corporations. All other corporations are non-stock corporations.

o Corporation exercises its powers through the board

BERNAS v. CINCO – Board of Directors; The board of directors is the

directing and controlling body of the corporation.—The board of directors is the
directing and controlling body of the corporation. It is a creation of the
stockholders and derives its power to control and direct the affairs of the
corporation from them. The board of directors, in drawing to itself the power of
the corporation, occupies a position of trusteeship in relation to the
stockholders, in the sense that the board should exercise not only care and
diligence, but utmost good faith in the management of the corporate affairs.

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