Rule 46/65 – Original Cases
The Court of Appeals then held there
1. Guy v CA
Facts: The instant controversies arose from a family
dispute. Gilbert Guy is the son of Francisco and Simny Guy.
Geraldine, Gladys and Grace are his sisters. The family feud
involves the ownership and control of 20,160 shares of
stock of Northern Islands Co., Inc. engaged in the
manufacture, distribution, and sales of various home
appliances bearing the 3-D trademark.
Northern Islands is a family-owned corporation organized
by spouses Francisco and respondent Simny Guy and
incorporated in said corporation was Lincoln Continental
Development Corporation, Inc. as a holding company of the
50% shares of stock of Northern Islands in trust for their
three (3) daughters, respondents Geraldine, Gladys and
Grace. Sometime in December 1986, upon instruction of
spouses Guy, Atty. Andres Gatmaitan, president of Lincoln
Continental, indorsed in blank Stock Certificate No. 132
(covering 8,400 shares) and Stock Certificate No. 133
(covering 11,760 shares) and delivered them to Simny.
Spouses Guys found that their son Gilbert has been
disposing of the assets of their corporations without
authority. In order to protect such assets, Sinmy
surrendered the two stock certificates to Emilia Tabugadir
and then registered it in the names of respondent sisters.
Adding insult to injury, during a special meeting of the
stockholders of Northern Islands, everybody except Gilbert
was elected as officers. This development started the
warfare between Gilbert and his sisters.
On November 18, 2004, Gilbert filed with this Court a
petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 165849,
alleging that the Court of Appeals (Eighth Division), in
granting an injunctive relief in favor of respondents,
committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or
in excess of jurisdiction. The petition also alleges that
respondents resorted to forum shopping.
Issues: (1) whether respondents are guilty of forum
shopping; and (2) whether they are entitled to the
injunctive relief granted in CA-G.R. SP No. 87104.
Held: A party is guilty of forum shopping when he
repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different
courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially
founded on the same transactions and the same essential
facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the
same issues either pending in, or already resolved
adversely by some other court.
In their petition, respondents prayed for the annulment of
the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC after
the expiration of the TRO issued by the Tenth Division of
the Court of Appeals. Evidently, this relief is not identical
with the relief sought by respondents in CA-G.R. SP No.
85069. Clearly, the second element of litis pendentia the
identity of reliefs sought - is lacking in the two petitions
filed by respondents with the appellate court. Thus, we
rule that no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction may be attributed to the Court of
Appeals for giving due course to respondent's petition in
CA-G.R. SP No. 87104.
On the second issue, for a party to be entitled to an
injunctive writ, he must show that there exists a right to be
protected and that the acts against which the injunction is
directed are violative of this right. In granting the
respondent's application for injunctive relief and making
the injunction permanent, the Court of Appeals (Seventh
Division) found that they have shown their clear and
established right to the disputed 20,160 shares of stock
because: (1) they have physical possession of the two
stock certificates equivalent to the said number of shares;
(2) Lincoln Continental is a mere trustee of the Guy family;
and (3) respondents constitute a majority of the board of
directors of Northern Islands, and accordingly have
management and control of the company.. The appellate
court then ruled that the trial court committed grave abuse
of discretion in issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction in favor of Guy. The writ actually reduced the
membership of Northern Islands board to just one
member - Gilbert Guy. Moreover, he failed to establish by
clear and convincing evidence his ownership of the shares
of stock in question.
was an urgent necessity to issue an injunctive writ in order
to prevent serious damage to the rights of respondents and
Northern Islands.
2. Molina et al v CA (GR# 143156. January 13, 2003)
3. NYK International v NLRC
Facts: Publico filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
petitioner NYK and its manager, petitioner Cathy Ng. LA
rendered decision holding the dismissal illegal, NLRC
affirmed.
petitioners impugned the NLRC decision by way of a
special civil action of certiorari filed before the Court of
Appeals ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction to public respondent NLRC
for affirming the ruling of the Labor Arbiter. the appellate
court dismissed the petition outright for non-compliance
with Section 1 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure as the petition was merely accompanied by a
certified xerox copy of the assailed NLRC decision, instead
of a certified true copy thereof as required by the Rules of
Court, as well as other pleadings and documents. MR
denied. Hence this petition for review.
ISSUE: WON CA should have given due course to the
petition
HELD:
Section 1 of Rule 65,[10] 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
requires that the petition shall be accompanied by a
certified true copy of the judgment or order subject
thereof, together with copies of all pleadings and
documents relevant and pertinent thereto. the disputed
document although stamped as certified true copy is not
an authenticated original of such certified true copy, but
only a xerox copy thereof, in contravention of paragraph 3
of the above-quoted guidelines. Hence, no error may be
ascribed to the Court of Appeals in dismissing the petition
for certiorari outright. petitioners here have not shown
any compelling reason for us to relax the rule. Petitioners
are hereby reminded that the right to file a special civil
action of certiorari is neither a natural right nor a part of
due process. A writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ,
never demandable as a matter of right, never issued except
in the exercise of judicial discretion.[11] Hence, he who
seeks a writ of certiorari must apply for it only in the
manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of
the law and the Rules.
Rule 47 – Annulment of Judgment or Final Orders and
Resolutions
4. Bulawan v Aquende
5. Lopez v Esquivel
6. Alaban v CA
FACTS:
1. respondent Francisco Provido filed a petition for
the probate of the Last Will and Testament of the late
Soledad Provido Elevencionado
A. ALLEGATION: he was the heir of the decedent and
the executor of her will.
B. RTC’s RULING: allowed the probate of the will
and directed the issuance of letters testamentary to
respondent
2. Petitioners after 4 months filed a motion for the
reopening of the probate proceedings
A. CLAIMs:
1) they are the intestate heirs of the decedent.
2) RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition
due to non-payment of the correct docket fees, defective
publication, and lack of notice to the other heirs.
3) will could not have been probated because:
A) the signature of the decedent was forged;
B) the will was not executed in accordance with law,
that is, the witnesses failed to sign below the attestation
clause;
C) the decedent lacked testamentary capacity to
execute and publish a will;
D) the will was executed by force and under duress
and improper pressure;
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E) the decedent had no intention to make a will at the
time of affixing of her signature; and
F) she did not know the properties to be disposed of,
having included in the will properties which no longer
belonged to her.
B. RTC’s Ruling: denied motion
1) petitioners were deemed notified of the hearing
by publication and that the deficiency in the payment of
docket fees is not a ground for the outright dismissal of the
petition.
2) RTC’s Decision was already final and executory
even before petitioners’ filing of the motion to reopen
3. Petitioners filed a petition to annule RTC’s
decision
A. CLAIM: there was a compromise agreement
between petitioners and respondents and they learnt the
probate proceeding only in July 2001
B. CA’s RULING: petition dismissed
1) no showing that petitioners failed to avail of or
resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate
remedies through no fault of their own
ISSUE: W/N the allowance of the will to probate should be
annulled for failure to mention the petitioners as parties
HELD: No
1. Probate of a will is considered action in rem
a. Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or
legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in
the estate may, at any time after the death of the testator,
petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will
allowed.[36] Notice of the time and place for proving the
will must be published for three (3) consecutive weeks, in
a newspaper of general circulation in the province,[37] as
well as furnished to the designated or other known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator
b. Petitioners became parties due to the publication
of the notice of hearing
2. The filing of motion to reopen is similar to a
motion for new trial
a. The ruling became final and executor because the
motion was filed out of time
b. Given that they knew of the decision 4 months
after they could have filed a petition for relief from
judgment after the denial of their motion to reopen.
3. petition for annulment of judgment must still fail
for failure to comply with the substantive requisites,
a. An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy
in law independent of the case where the judgment sought
to be annulled was rendered
b. PURPOSE: to have the final and executory
judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of
litigation.
c. 2 Grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction
or denial of due process
d. An action to annul a final judgment on the ground
of fraud lies only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in
character
i. Extrinsic if it prevents a party from having a trial
or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it
operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment
itself but to the manner in which it is procured.
4. notice is required to be personally given to known
heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator
a. the will states that the respondent was instituted
as the sole heir of the decedent thus he has no legal
obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for
probate or personally notify them
Rule 56 – Original and Appealed Cases (SC)
7. Triumph International v Apostol and Opulencia
Other Cases:
8. Navarro v Executive Secretary
Facts:
In 2006, RA 9355, An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat
Islands was passed into law. Petitioners in this case, were
former political leaders in Surigao del Norte whose land
area was affected by the creation of the new province. the
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari seeking to nullify
RA 9355 for being void on the ground that the new
province did not meet the statutory requirements for
population and land area. The SC ruled in their favor and
proclaimed the said law as unconstitutional. Thereafter,
the Comelec issued Resolution 8970 w/c was about the
upcoming elections. In this resolution, they had 3
scenarios, all of w/c affect the petitioners as political
figures in the region. In 2010, the SC issued an Entry for
Judgment, stating that the decision in this case had become
final and executory. Petitioners then filed an Urgent
Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment.
Issue:
WON such Motion should be granted and RA 9355 is
constitutional.
Held:
Yes and yes. COMELEC Resolution No. 8790 spawned the
peculiar circumstance of proper party interest for
movants-intervenors only with the specter of the decision
in the main case becoming final and executory. More
importantly, if the intervention be not entertained, the
movants-intervenors would be left with no other remedy
as regards to the impending nullification of their election
to their respective positions. Thus, to the Courts mind,
there is an imperative to grant the Urgent Motion to Recall
Entry of Judgment by movants-intervenors.
Despite the new province not meeting the requirements
for land area and population, the SC held the creation of
the same as valid since the intention of the framers of the
LGC w/c provides the aforementioned requirements, the
primary consideration in the creation of a province is the
annual income. Dinagat province showed an income of at
least 4 times more than the legally required 20M. The
delivery of basic services to its constituents has been
proven possible and sustainable. Rather than looking at
the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections
as mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate
in favor of Dinagats existence as a province, they must be
seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and
capable of becoming a province. This Court should not be
instrumental in stunting such capacity.
9. Heirs of Maura so v Obliosca
FACTS:
Pantaleon Jomoc was the owner of a parcel of land in
Cagayan De Oro. The property was inherited by his heirs
including the respondents (Jomoc Heirs). Jomoc Heirs
executed a Deed of Extrajudicial settlement with Absolute
Sale of Registered Land in favor of the Petitioner (Maura
So). 3 of the respondents (Lucila, Abundia and Elvira)
failed to sign the document and the document was not
notarized but, the petitioner still made partial payment for
the property. Petitioner demanded the execution of a final
deed of conveyance but the Jomoc Heirs refused. Petitioner
then filed a Complaint for specific performance against the
Jomoc Heirs to execute and deliver the deed of sale.
FIRST CASE
- A civil case was filed against the Jomoc heirs except for
the 3 respondents who failed to sign.
- Jomoc heirs executed again a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement with Absolute Sale of Registered Land in
favor of sps. Lim and the latter intervened in the civil case.
- Trial Court ruled in favor of petitioner.
- CA affirmed RTC’s decision
- Heirs of Jomoc and Sps. Lim filed separate petitions for
review with SC
- SC ruled that the petitioner has better right over the
property and became final and executory on Nov. 25,
1991
- Petitioner filed a motion for execution.
- Respondents opposed because they did not participate in
the sale and are not parties to the case.
- Trial Court granted the motion for execution. Register of
deeds cancelled title of Jomoc Heirs and issued a
TCT in the name of the petitioner.
SECOND CASE
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- Jomoc heirs filed a petition for certiorari with the CA on
the ground that the Respondents were not parties to
the case and are being deprived of their right over the
property.
- CA dismissed on the ground that respondents were
aware of the pendency of the case but did not intervene
and that the case is barred by res judicata.
- Respondents filed a petition for review on certiorari with
the SC but was denied.
- Resolution became final and executory on June 20, 1994
- Respondents filed a complaint for legal redemption with
RTC of Misamis Oriental praying that they be allowed to
exercise their right to redeem.
- On April 27, 1994, RTC resolved the case in favor of the
respondents ordering the petitioner to allow the
respondents to exercise their substantive right of legal
redemption and shares of plaintiff’s co-heirs.
- In a resolution, RTC granted petitioner’s motion of
reconsideration. Respondent moved for MR and RTC
issued an order granting respondent’s MR reinstating
previous ruling.
THIRD CASE
- Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with
RTC
- RTC denied for failure to show that judgment is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion and for being the
wrong remedy
- Court likewise denied petitioner’s MR
- Minute Resolution became final and executory.
- Petitioner filed with CA a petition for annulment of
judgment.
- CA denied.
- CA also denied petitioner’s MR

Hence this petition.
ISSUE/S:
WON annulment of judgment is the proper remedy -- NO
HELD:
The annulment of judgment is only allowed in exceptional
cases and may not be invoked where (1) where the party
has availed himself of the remedy of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedy and lost OR
(2) where he has failed to avail of himself of those
remedies through his own fault or negligence. Since the
petitioner availed of a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45, the remedy of annulment of judgment is no
longer available.
The present case is peculiar in the sense that it involves 3
final and executory judgments.
1. This Court's Decision in which upheld the sale of the
whole property by the Jomoc heirs, including the herein
respondents, to petitioner Maura So.
2. The Court's Resolution in which sustained the order of
execution of the said decision against the herein
respondents despite the fact that they were not party-
defendants in the first case.
3. The Court's Minute Resolution which denied Maura So's
petition for review of the RTC Decision granting
respondents' right to redeem the property.
3rd judgment is in conflict with the 2 previous judgments.
The ruling that the respondents remained owners to the
land is patently erroneous because this SC had already
pronounced in the first 2 cases that the whole property
had already been sold to Maura So. RTC was barred from
holding otherwise under the doctrine of conclusiveness of
judgment which precludes the re-litigation of a particular
fact already passed upon by a court.
It behooves the court to set things right in order to prevent
a grave injustice from being committed against Maura So
who had, for 15 years since the first decision was executed,
already considered herself to be the owner of the property.
The Court is not precluded from rectifying errors of
judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to the doctrine
of immutability of final judgments would involve the
sacrifice of justice for technicality.
Petition is granted.
Rule 57 – Preliminary Attachment
10. Magaling v Ong
11. Davao Light and Power Co v CA
RECIT READY:
Davao light filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money
and damages against the Queensland and Adarna with ex
parte application for a writ of preliminary attachment and
was granted. Queensland and Adarna then filed a motion
to discharge the attachment for lack of jurisdiction. Trial
Court denied the motion but CA annulled such order and
the attachment was discharged. ISSUE/S: WON writ of
preliminary attachment may be issued ex parte before
acquisition of the jurisdiction of the respondents person –
YES HELD: A preliminary attachment is a purely statutory
remedy in which the law requires a strict construction of
the provisions granting it. Having NO principle, statutory
or jurisprudential prohibiting its issuance by any court
BEFORE ACQUISITION OF JURISDICTION OVER THE
PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT, Lack of jurisdiction as
grounds for discharge is of no moment. Hence a writ of
preliminary attachment may be issued ex parte upon
fulfillment of the pertinent requisites laid down by law and
the plaintiff may do so at any time before or after the
service of summons on the defendant.
FACTS: Davao Light filed a verified complaint for recovery
of a sum of money and damages against private
respondents (Queensland and Adarna). Said complaint
contained an ex parte application for a writ of preliminary
attachment. An order was issued granting the ex parte
application and fixing the attachment bond. After
submitting attachment bond, the writ of attachment was
issued. Summons, copy of the complaint, writ of
attachment, and a copy of the attachment bond were
served to respondents. The sheriff seized the latters
properties.
Respondents filed a motion to discharge the attachment
for lack of jurisdiction because at the time the order of
attachment was promulgated, the trial court had not yet
acquired jurisdiction over the cause and the respondents.
Davao Light filed an opposition. Trial Court DENIED the
motion to discharge. However, upon appeal of the
respondents CA annulled the order of Trial court and
declared null and void and the attachment discharged.
HENCE THIS PETITION.
ISSUE/S: WON writ of preliminary attachment may be
issued ex parte before acquisition of the jurisdiction of the
respondents person -- YES
HELD: A preliminary attachment is a purely statutory
remedy in which the law requires a strict construction of
the provisions granting it. Having NO principle, statutory
or jurisprudential prohibiting its issuance by any court
BEFORE ACQUISITION OF JURISDICTION OVER THE
PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT, Lack of jurisdiction as
grounds for discharge is of no moment. Hence a writ of
preliminary attachment may be issued ex parte upon
fulfillment of the pertinent requisites laid down by law and
the plaintiff may do so at any time before or after the
service of summons on the defendant.
The only pre-requisite is that the Court be satisfied, upon
consideration of "the affidavit of the applicant or of some
other person who personally knows the facts:
1. that a sufficient cause of action exists,
2. that the case is one of those mentioned in Sec. 1
Rule 57,
3. that there is no other sufficient security for the
claim sought to be enforced by the action, and
4. that the amount due to the applicant, or the value
of the property the possession of which he is entitled to
recover, is as much as the sum for which the order (of
attachment) is granted above all legal counterclaims."
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If the court be so satisfied, the "order of attachment shall
be granted," and the writ shall issue upon the applicant's
posting of a bond executed to the adverse party in an
amount to be fixed by the judge, not exceeding the
plaintiff's claim, conditioned that the latter will pay all the
costs which may be adjudged to the adverse party and all
damages which he may sustain by reason of the
attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge that the
applicant was not entitled thereto."
In the previous case Mindanao Savings & Loan Association,
Inc. v. CA (1989) the court held that no hearing is required
on an application for preliminary attachment, with notice
to the defendant, for the reason that this “ would defeat the
objective of the remedy since the time which a hearing
would take could be enough to enable the defendant to
abscond or dispose of his property before the writ of
attachment issues. In effect it would serve as a warning to
the absconding debtors-defendants.
There are 2 ways of discharging an attachment:
1. Posting of a counterbond
a. Speedier way of discharge
b. The submission of a counterbond is an efficacious
mode of lifting an attachment already enforced against
property, or even of preventing its enforcement altogether.
When property has already been seized under attachment,
the attachment may be discharged upon counterbond in
accordance with Section 12 of Rule 57. But even before
actual levy on property, seizure under attachment may be
prevented also upon counterbond. The defendant need not
wait until his property is seized before seeking the
discharge of the attachment by a counterbond. This is
made possible by Section 5 of Rule 57.
2. Showing of its improper or irregular issuance -
Aside from the filing of a counterbond, a preliminary
attachment may also be lifted or discharged on the ground
that it has been irregularly or improperly issued, in
accordance with Section 13 of Rule 57. Like the first, this
second mode of lifting an attachment may be resorted to
even before any property has beer levied on. Indeed, it
may be availed of after property has been released from a
levy on attachment, as is made clear by said Section 13.
In this case, the respondent used the second way
when it filed for a motion to discharge for lack of
jurisdiction. As discussed in the case of Mindanao Savings
& Loans Assoc. Inc. v. CA, “(W)hen the preliminary
attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the same
time the applicant's cause of action e.g., 'an action for
money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied
or converted to his own use by a public officer, or an
officer of a corporation, or an attorney, factor, broker,
agent, or clerk, in the course of his employment as such, or
by any other person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful
violation of duty.' (Sec. 1 [b], Rule 57), or 'an action against
a party who has been guilty of fraud in contracting the
debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is
brought' (Sec. 1 [d], Rule 57), the defendant is not allowed
to file a motion to dissolve the attachment under Section
13 of Rule 57 by offering to show the falsity of the factual
averments in the plaintiff's application and affidavits on
which the writ was based — and consequently that the
writ based thereon had been improperly or irregularly
issued (SEE Benitez v. I.A.C., 154 SCRA 41) — the reason
being that the hearing on such a motion for dissolution of
the writ would be tantamount to a trial of the merits of the
action. In other words, the merits of the action would be
ventilated at a mere hearing of a motion, instead of at the
regular trial. Therefore, when the writ of attachment is of
this nature, the only way it can be dissolved is by a
counterbond (G.B. Inc. v. Sanchez, 98 Phil. 886)."
NOTE: Dissolution of preliminary attachment DOES NOT
DISCHARGE sureties on bond because bond is 'executed to
the adverse party, . . . conditioned that the . . . (applicant)
will pay all the costs which may be adjudged to the adverse
party and all damages which he may sustain by reason of
the attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge that the
applicant was not entitled thereto' (SEC. 4, Rule 57).
Hence, until that determination is made, as to the
applicant's entitlement to the attachment, his bond must
stand and cannot be withdrawn."
12. Olib v Pastoral
Facts: Corazon M. Navia sued the spouses Oscar and
Roberta Olib, petitioner herein, for dissolution of their
partnership and other reliefs, with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of a preliminary attachment. it was
granted on November 10, 1983, resulting in the
attachment of six parcels of land belonging to the
petitioners, along with stocks of merchandise in their
bodega. The writ was amended on December 14, 1983, to
release the merchandise. Two years later, on May 16,
1985, the petitioners filed a motion to discharge the
preliminary attachment on the ground that the attachment
bond executed for one year from November 1983 had
already lapsed. On February 25,1986, Judge Miguel S.
Rallos of the Regional Trial Court of Agusan del Norte and
Butuan City rendered judgment for the petitioners and
sentenced the private respondent to pay them actual,
moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees and
litigation expenses. On April 16, 1986, Navia perfected her
appeal from the challenged judgment, and the records of
the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals. Although
the trial court found in the text of the decision that the
private respondent was not entitled to the issuance of the
writ of preliminary attachment, no mention was made of
the said writ in the dispositive portion. As a result, the
annotation of the preliminary attachment on the
certificates/titles of the attached lands was maintained
and could not be canceled.
The petitioners moved for the discharge of the writ of
preliminary attachment by the respondent court on the
basis of the judgment in their favor. Navia filed an
opposition, contending that as she had perfected her
appeal to the Court of Appeals, the trial court no longer
had any jurisdiction over the case.
On August 24, 1987, Judge Edelwina C. Pastoral, who had
succeeded Judge Rallos denied the motion on the ground
invoked in the opposition and declared:
Settled is the rule that the trial court loses its jurisdiction
over the record and over the subject of the case once an
appeal in the case has been perfected. The exception to this
rule refers to the orders of the Court to protect and
preserve the rights of the parties which do not involve any
matter litigated by appeal (Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court). The writ of preliminary attachment was earlier
granted as a security for the satisfaction of the judgment,
the latter being now the subject of the appeal. To grant
defendant's motion at this juncture is to disturb and not to
preserve the rights of the parties. It is the stand of this
Court that the status quo of the parties shall be maintained
for it cannot predetermine the posture which the appellate
court will adopt, either to affirm, modify or reverse the
questioned decision of this Court.
They argued that if the court a quo could issue a writ of
attachment after the appeal had been perfected, then it
could a fortiori discharge such a writ, especially where, as
in the case at bar, the movants were the prevailing parties.
The petitioners also contended that there was really no
more need for an order discharging the attachment as this
followed by operation of Rule 57, Section 19, of the Rules
of Court. Such discharge was the immediate and automatic
effect of any judgment in favor of the party whose property
had been attached.
The motion having been denied, the petitioners sought
reconsideration a second time, insisting that (a) the
attachment had been automatically discharged under Rule
57, Section 19; and (b) the attachment bond had already
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lapsed for non-payment of the premiums. They were
rebuffed again. They then came before this Court,
contending that the respondent court committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying their motion.
Issue: W/N The attachment has been discharged?
Held: No. Attachment is defined as a provisional remedy by
which the property of an adverse party is taken into legal
custody, either at the commencement of an action or at any
time thereafter as a security for the satisfaction of any
judgment that may be recovered by the plaintiff or any
proper party. It is an auxiliary remedy and cannot have an
independent existence apart from the main suit or claim
instituted by the plaintiff against the defendant. Being
merely ancillary to a principal proceeding, the attachment
must fail if the suit itself cannot be maintained as the
purpose of the writ can no longer be justified. The
consequence is that where the main action is appealed, the
attachment which may have been issued as an incident of
that action, is also considered appealed and so also
removed from the jurisdiction of the court a quo. The
attachment itself cannot be the subject of a separate case
independent of the principal action because the
attachment was only an incident of such action.
the order of attachment is considered discharged only
where the judgment has already become final and
executory and not when it is still on appeal. The obvious
reason is that, except in a few specified cases, execution
pending appeal is not allowed. Petitioners may only lift the
writ of preliminary attachment in the Court of Appeals, to
which that ancillary remedy is deemed elevated along with
the principal action.
13. Valmonte v CA
Facts: Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a foreign resident.
Petitioners Lourdes and Alfredo are husband and wife
both residents of U.S.A. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte,
who is a member of the Philippine bar, however, practices
his profession in the Philippines, commuting for this
purpose between his residence in the state of Washington
and Manila, where he holds office at Ermita, Manila.
Private respondent Rosita Dimalanta, who is the sister of
petitioner filed an action for partition of real and property
and accounting of rentals against petitioners. She alleged
that, the plaintiff is of legal age, a widow and is at present a
resident of Missouri, U.S.A., while the defendants are
spouses but, for purposes of this complaint may be served
with summons at Gedisco Center, Unit 304, 1564 A. Mabini
St., Ermita, Manila where defendant Alfredo D. Valmonte as
defendant Lourdes Arreola Valmonte’s spouse holds office
and where he can be found. He husband was also her
counsel, who has a law office in the Philippines. The
summons were served on her husband.
Petitioner in a letter, referred private respondent’s counsel
to her husband as the party to whom all communications
intended for her should be sent. Service of summons was
then made upon petitioner Alfredo at his office in Manila.
Alfredo D. Valmonte accepted his summons, but not the
one for Lourdes, on the ground that he was not authorized
to accept the process on her behalf. Accordingly the
process server left without leaving a copy of the summons
and complaint for petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte.
Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte thereafter filed his Answer
with Counterclaim. Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte,
however, did not file her Answer. For this reason private
respondent moved to declare her in default. Petitioner
Alfredo D. Valmonte entered a special appearance in behalf
of his wife and opposed the private respondent’s motion.
RTC denied the MR of respondents. CA declared petitioner
Lourdes in default. Said decision was received by Alfredo
hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was
validly served with summons.
Held: NO. There was no valid service of summons on
Lourdes. The action herein is in the nature of an action
quasi in rem. Such an action is essentially for the purpose
of affecting the defendant’s interest in a specific property
and not to render a judgment against him. As petitioner
Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found in
the Philippines, service of summons on her must be in
accordance with Rule 14, § 17. Such service, to be effective
outside the Philippines, must be made either:
(1) by personal service;
(2) by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in such places and for such time as the court
may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order
of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last
known address of the defendant; or
(3) in any other manner which the court may deem
sufficient.
In the case at bar, the service of summons upon petitioner
Lourdes A. Valmonte was not done by means of any of the
first two modes. This mode of service, like the first two,
must be made outside the Philippines, such as through the
Philippine Embassy in the foreign country where the
defendant resides. The service of summons on petitioner
Alfredo D. Valmonte was not made upon the order of the
court as required by Rule 14, § 17 and certainly was not a
mode deemed sufficient by the court which in fact refused
to consider the service to be valid and on that basis declare
petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in default for her failure to
file an answer.
Secondly, the service in the attempted manner on
petitioner was not made upon prior leave of the trial court
as required also in Rule 14, § 17. As provided in § 19, such
leave must be applied for by motion in writing, supported
by affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his behalf
and setting forth the grounds for the application.
Finally, because there was no order granting such leave,
petitioner Lourdes was not given ample time to file her
Answer which, according to the rules, shall be not less than
sixty (60) days after notice.
14. Traders Royal Bank v IAC
Facts: RTC Pasay: Traders Royal Bank Instituted a suit
against Remco Alcohol Distillery, Inc. (REMCO) for the
recovery of sum of Php 2,382,258.71 (civil case 9894)
Traders obtained a writ of preliminary attachment
directed against the assets and properties of REMCO
Pursuant to the attachment, Sheriff Santiago levied 4,600
barrels of aged alcohol found within the premises of
Remco Inc. La Tondena filed a third party claim with the
Sheriff, claiming ownership over the property. RTC Pasay:
La Tondena filed a complaint-in-intervention in civil case
9894, alleging that it made advances to REMCO amounting
to Php 3 million which remains outstanding as of date and
that the attached properties are owned by La Tondena.
Without foregoing complaint-in-intervention having
passed upon by the Pasay RTC, a “Motion to Withdraw,”
praying that it be allowed to withdraw alcohol and
molasses from REMCO plant, was granted.
Pasay RTC reconsidered its order granting “motion to
withdraw” and declared the alcohol which has not been
withdrawn remains in the ownership of REMCO and
denied La Tondena’s motion to intervene. La Tondena filed
a Motion for Reconsideration reiterating its request to
withdraw alcohol from Remco Distillery Plant and they
prayed that the portion of the order declaring REMCO as
the owner of the alcohol be reconsidered and stricken off
said order. RTC Bulacan: La Tondena instituted Civil Case
7003-M, in which it asserted its claim of ownership over
the properties attached in Civil Case 9894 and also prayed
for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction. Traders
filed a motion to dismiss or opposition to the application of
5
writ of preliminary injunction. La Tondena opposed about a harmonious and smooth functioning of their
Traders’ motion to dismiss. proceedings

RTC Bulacan: issued an order declaring La Tondena to be Rule 65

the owner of the disputed alcohol and granting their 15. Day v RTC of Zamboanga City
application for injunctive relief. RTC Pasay: issued an order 16. Romy’s Freight Service v Castro
requiring Sheriff Santiago to : (1) enforce the writ of 17. Fajardo v Bautista
preliminary attachment previously issued by the court and
(2) prevent respondent Sheriff and La Tondena from
withdrawing disputed alcohol and (3) to require them to
explain and show cause why they should not be cited for
contempt for withdrawing attached alcohol. Intermediate
Appellate Court: Traders bank filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with application for writ of preliminary
injunction to set aside the order by RTC Bulacan in Civil
Case 7003-M and to compel La Tondena to return the
alcohol to their original location.

IAC dismissed the petition for lack of legal and factual

basis, holding that the Judge did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the order and the writ of preliminary
injunction. Appeal to SC.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the Judge of RTC Bulacan acted without

jurisdiction in entertaining Civil Case 7003-M and in
authorizing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
– No

Whether or not the order of the Bulacan court constitutes

undue and illegal interference with the exercise by the
Pasay court of its coordinate and co-equal authority on
matters properly brought before it. –No

Held: The instant petition is hereby dismissed and the

decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No.
SP-01860 is affirmed, with costs against petitioner Traders
Royal Bank. The applicable provision is Section 14, Rule 57
of the Rules of Court. The foregoing rule explicitly sets
forth the remedy that may be availed of by a person who
claims to be the owner of property levied upon by
attachment which is:
(1) To lodge a third- party claim with the sheriff,
(2) And if the attaching creditor posts an indemnity
bond in favor of the sheriff, to file a separate and
independent action to vindicate his claim (Abiera vs. Court
of Appeals, 45 SCRA 314).

This precisely was the remedy resorted to by private

respondent La Tondeñ a when it filed the vindicatory
action before the Bulacan Court. The issue in this case was
already decided in Manila Herald Publishing Inc. vs Ramos
which states:

The judge trying such action may render judgment

ordering the sheriff of whoever has in possession the
attached property to deliver it to the plaintiff-claimant or
desist from seizing it. It follows further that the court may
make an interlocutory order, upon the filing of such bond
as may be necessary, to release the property pending final
adjudication of the title. Jurisdiction over an action
includes jurisdiction over an interlocutory matter
incidental to the cause and deemed necessary to preserve
the subject matter of the suit or protect the parties'
interests.

The rule that no court has the power to interfere by

injunction with the judgments or decrees of a concurrent
or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the
injunctive relief sought by injunction, is applied in cases
where no third-party claimant is involved, in order to
prevent one court from nullifying the judgment or process
of another court of the same rank or category, a power
which devolves upon the proper appellate court . The
purpose of the rule is to avoid conflict of power between
different courts of coordinate jurisdiction and to bring