G.R. No.

L-2990 December 17, 1951

OSCAR ESPUELAS Y MENDOZA, petitioner,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Petition:

The appellant Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza was, after trial, convicted in the Court of First Instance of Bohol
of a violation of the above article. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, because
according to said court.

Facts:

"About the time compromised between June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the town of
Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were
hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended form the limb of the tree, when in truth and in
fact, he was merely standing on a barrel). After securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies
of same to several newspapers and weeklies of general circulation , not only in the Province of Bohol but
also throughout the Philippines and abroad, for their publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein
he made to appear that it was written by a fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the
latter's supposed wife

Suicide letter:

“Dearest wife and children, bury me five meters deep. Over my grave don't plant a cross or put floral
wreaths, for I don't need them.

Please don't bury me in the lonely place. Bury me in the Catholic cemetery. Although I have committed
suicide, I still have the right to burried among Christians.

But don't pray for me. Don't remember me, and don't feel sorry. Wipe me out of your lives.

My dear wife, if someone asks to you why I committed suicide, tell them I did it because I was not
pleased with the administration of Roxas. Tell the whole world about this.

And if they ask why I did not like the administration of Roxas, point out to them the situation in Central
Luzon, the Leyte.

Dear wife, write to President Truman and Churchill. Tell them that here in the Philippines our government
is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis. Teach our children to burn pictures of Roxas if and when
they come across one.

I committed suicide because I am ashamed of our government under Roxas. I cannot hold high my brows
to the world with this dirty government.

I committed suicide because I have no power to put under Juez de Cuchillo all the Roxas people now in
power. So, I sacrificed my own self.”

Issue:
Whether or not the article published is a valid exercise of the right of freedom of speech.

Held:

the attack on the President passes the furthest bounds of free speech and common decency. More than
a figure of speech was intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily
produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain
loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws."

Ratio:

the freedom of speech secured by the Constitution "does not confer an absolute right to speak or
publish without responsibility whatever one may choose." It is not "unbridled license that gives
immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this
freedom. 4"

the freedom of speech secured by the Constitution "does not confer an absolute right to speak or
publish without responsibility whatever one may choose." It is not "unbridled license that gives
immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this
freedom. 4"

Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences the article cannot fail to impress thinking
persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of sedition and strife. The infuriating language is not a sincere
effort to persuade, what with the writer's simulated suicide and false claim to martyrdom and what with
is failure to particularize. When the use irritating language centers not on persuading the readers but on
creating disturbances, the rationable of free speech cannot apply and the speaker or writer is removed
from the protection of the constitutional guaranty.

the freedom of speech secured by the Constitution "does not confer an absolute right to speak or
publish without responsibility whatever one may choose." It is not "unbridled license that gives
immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this
freedom. 4"

1. G.R. No. L-12592 March 8, 1918

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FELIPE BUSTOS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Petition:

Appeal for the decision convicting the accused for libel.

Facts:

In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, and prepared and
signed a petition to the Executive Secretary charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe
and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. they submitted this
petition and these affidavits with a complaint to the Executive Secretary.

1. That Francisca Polintan, desiring to make complaint against Mariano de los Reyes, visited the justice
of the peace, who first told her that he would draw up complaint for P5; afterwards he said he would
take P3 which she paid; also kept her in the house for four days as a servant and took from her two
chickens and twelve "gandus;"

2. That Valentin Sunga being interested in a case regarding land which was on trial before the justice of
the peace, went to see the justice of the peace to ascertain the result of the trial, and was told by the
justice of the peace that if he wished to win he must give him P50. Not having this amount, Sunga gave
the justice nothing, and a few days later was informed that he had lost the case. Returning again to the
office of the justice of the peace in order to appeal, the justice told him that he could still win if he would
pay P50;

3. That Leoncio Quiambao, having filed a complaint for assault against four persons, on the day of the
trial the justice called him over to his house, where he secretly gave him (Quiambao) P30; and the
complaint was thereupon shelved.

The judge of first instance found the first count not proved and counts 2 and 3 established. And
acquitted Punsalan.

Later the justice of the peace filled a motion for a new trial; the judge of first instance granted the
motion and reopened the hearing. The judge of first instance ordered a suppression of the charges
against Punsalan and acquitted him the same.

Criminal action against the petitioners, now become the defendants, was instituted on October 12,
1916, by virtue of the following information:

That on or about the month of December, 1915, in the municipality of Macabebe, Pampanga, P. I., the
said accused, voluntarily, illegally, and criminally and with malicious intent to prejudice and defame Mr.
Roman Punsalan Serrano who was at said time and place justice of the peace of Macabebe and
Masantol of this province, wrote, signed, and published a writing which was false, scandalous, malicious,
defamatory, and libelous against the justice of the peace Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano (according to the
petitioner the petition executed was libelous)

Issue:

Whether or Not accused is entitled to constitutional protection by virtue of his right to free speech and
free press.

Held:
defendants and appellants entitled to the protection of the rules concerning qualified privilege, growing
out of constitutional guaranties in our bill of rights. Instead of punishing citizens for an honest endeavor
to improve the public service, we should rather commend them for their good citizenship.

Ratio:

It is to the credit of the Supreme Court of the Philippines that such a ruling antedated by thirty-
six years, a similar doctrine announced by the United States Supreme Court, 5 to the effect that a libel
prosecution must likewise survive the test of whether or not the offending publication is within the
guarantees of free speech and free press. To keep such guarantees, if not inviolate, at the very least
truly meaningful, certainly calls for such an approach. The judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing
and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been before. It should continue to be so.

The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The
administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced
is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a
judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively suppressed. It is a duty
which everyone owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It
is further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful
act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and
punish them.

The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and
the complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of
persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a
redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for
the charges made. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of
public affairs.

Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have
demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the
development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege. All persons have an interest in the pure and
efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is
sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he is acting in
pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. Although the charges are probably not true as to the
justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their
action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is
apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens— to secure the removal from office of a person
thought to be venal — were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege.

In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that presumption.
A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of
malice or falsity.
 2. G.R. No. L-21049 December 22, 1923

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ISAAC PEREZ, defendant-appellant.

Petition:

Appeal.

Facts:

Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, and Fortunato Lodovice, a citizen of that
municipality, happening to meet on the morning of April 1, 1992, in the presidencia of Pilar, they
became engaged in a discussion regarding the administration of Governor-General Wood, which
resulted in Perez shouting a number of times: "The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off
Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our
independence."

He was Charged in the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon with a violation of article 256 of the
Penal Code having to do with contempt of ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority. The trial
judge found as a fact, and we think with abundant reason, that it had been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that the accused made use of the language stated in the beginning of this decision and set out in
the information and he was convicted thereof.

Perez has appealed the case to this court.

Issue:

Whether or not the words uttered by Perez is protected by the freedom of speech and the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances.

Held:

The words uttered is is not protected because there is a seditious tendency in the words used,
which could easily produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a
disposition to remain loyal to the Government and

Ratio:

Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of Government. Criticism, no matter how
severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of
speech, unless the intention and effect be seditious. But when the intention and effect of the act is
seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition
must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the
supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and the existence of the State.

Here, the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of the Philippine Islands. His official
position, like the Presidency of the United States and other high offices, under a democratic form of
government, instead, of affording immunity from promiscuous comment, seems rather to invite abusive
attacks. But in this instance, the attack on the Governor-General passes the furthest bounds of free
speech was intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily produce
disaffection among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to
the Government and obedient to the laws.

3. G.R. No. L-38753 August 25, 1982

RAFAEL S. MERCADO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH V, CITY FISCAL OF QUEZON CITY and VIRGINIA M.
MERCADO, respondents.

Petition:

certiorari, mandamus and prohibition proceeding to quash an information for libel quoted in full the
alleged offensive telegram.

Facts:

On October 14, 1972, petitioner (Rafael) filed a letter-complaint with the Chairman of
the Board of Transportation, against the private respondent (VIRGINIA), for alleged grave violations of
the Rep. Act No. 2260 and civil service rules. Fourteen (14) days after the filing of the aforementioned
administrative complaint by petitioner against the private respondent, the said petitioner sent the
subject libelous telegram or communication to the Secretary of Public Works and Communication, which
reads as:

“Secretary David Consunji Department of Public Works and [Communications] Manila

In line with President Marcos appeal to give information on undesirable employees in the government
service to achieve the objectives of the New Society request that investigation image of the activities of
Mrs. Virginia Mercado of Public Service Commission as we have reason to believe that she has enriched
herself thru corrupt practices considering that she has properties and spending above what her salary
can afford with the husband jobless stop If investigation confirms this we trust you take necessary action
stop In case you need further details wire me at 101 Mariano Cuenco Quezon City and I will give further
details stop Expecting prompt action on this matter. “

Rafael Mercado

The telegram or communication was indorsed for investigation to the Board of Transportation on
October 31, 1972, by first endorsement of the said Department Secretary, dated Oct. 31, 1972 to the
Chairman of the Board of Transportation.

On November 23, 1972, the petitioner filed an amended administrative complaint against the private
respondent with the same Board of Transportation charging the private respondent with dishonesty,
pursuit of private business or corrupt practices, and misconduct or discourtesy. The private respondent,
submitted her answer to the said administrative charges, and after due hearing, the Board of
Transportation rendered a decision on June 26, 1973, finding the herein private respondent as innocent
of the charges, and dismissing the complaint filed against her.

The private respondent, submitted her answer to the said administrative charges, and after due hearing,
the Board of Transportation rendered a decision on June 26, 1973, finding the herein private respondent
as innocent of the charges, and dismissing the complaint filed against her.

On July 17, 1973 petitioner, filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Board of
Transportation, but the said Board denied said motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

While the Administrative Case No. 72-1 was pending determination before the Board of Transportation,
petitioner, to further harass and malign the good character and reputation of the private respondent,
filed a complaint accusing the private respondent and of selling a Ford Willys engine, which was
carnapped and a complaint for corrupt practices against the private respondent both complaints was
dismissed for lack of evidence.

Issue:

whether or not the telegram being qualifiedly privileged should be the basis for the special civil action
for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition.

Held:

petition is dismissed.

Ratio:

United States v. Bustos, 4 as mentioned at the outset, is a landmark decision. It is to the credit of the
Supreme Court of the Philippines that such a ruling antedated by thirty-six years, a similar doctrine
announced by the United States Supreme Court, 5 to the effect that a libel prosecution must likewise
survive the test of whether or not the offending publication is within the guarantees of free speech and
free press. To keep such guarantees, if not inviolate, at the very least truly meaningful, certainly calls for
such an approach.ït¢@lFº The judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating
constitutional rights. So it has been before. It should continue to be so.

2 . Justice Malcolm, however, is careful to point out that qualified privilege, and this is one such
instance, may be "lost by proof of malice." 6 His opinion continues: " 'A communication made bona
fide upon any subject matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which
he has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it
contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable.' 7 He
then gave what was referred to by him as a "pertinent illustration of the application of qualified
privilege, " namely, "a complaint made in good faith and without malice in regard to the character or
conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer or a board having some interest or duty in the
matter. Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their
truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of
the individual. But the statements must be made under an honest sense of duty; a self-seeking motive is
destructive. Personal injury is not necessary. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient
administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient if it
is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof
although in fact he is mistaken. The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the communication is
made in intemperate terms. A further element of the law of privilege concerns the person to whom the
complaint should be made. The rule is that if a party applies to the wrong person through some natural
and honest mistake as to the respective functions of various officials such unintentional error will not
take the case out of the privilege." 8 What casts doubt on the good faith of petitioner is a summary of his
conduct, viz a viz private respondent: a letter complaint for grave violation of Republic Act No. 2260 and
civil service rules was filed by him with the Chairman of the Board of Transportation on October 14,
1972. Fourteen days later, on October 28, 1972, the telegram subject of this litigation, was sent to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications. Then on November 23, 1972, there was an amended
complaint with the Board of Transportation to include such charges as dishonesty, pursuit of private
business or corrupt practices and misconduct. The Board of Transportation found private respondent
innocent, in an order of June 26, 1973. There was a motion for reconsideration on July 17, 1973 filed by
petitioner. It was denied on August 29, 1973 and during the pendency of such administrative case,
petitioner not content, filed with the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group a complaint against private
respondent and her husband, a relation, accusing them of selling a Ford Willys engine, which was
carnapped. After due hearing, a resolution was issued recommending that said case be closed for lack of
evidence. Again, during the pendency of such administrative complaint, petitioner filed with the
Criminal Investigation Service, a complaint for corrupt practices against private respondent, likewise
found without support in the evidence submitted. The tenacity with which petitioner had pursued a
course of conduct on its face would seem to indicate that a doubt could reasonably be entertained as to
the bona fides of petitioner.ït¢@lFº The prosecution should be given the opportunity then of proving
malice.

Respondents have in their favor a decision of this Court supporting their stand. In People v.
Monton, 9 the question of whether or not a motion to quash based on a qualified privilege should be
upheld was decided adversely against the claim of those accused of libel, This Court made clear that
malice can be shown. It "simply puts the burden of doing so on the prosecution." 10 The ponencia of
then Justice, later Chief Justice, Makalintal distinguished the Bustos decision, thus: "That case is not here
applicable, because the acquittal of the accused therein on the ground that the defamatory imputation
was qualifiedly privileged was adjudged only after trial, wherein the prosecution tried to establish,
although unsuccessfully, the element of malice." 11 Further, the opinion stated: " It need only be added
that in the instant case the information alleges that the defendants, appellees here, wrote and sent the
subject letter to the President 'with malicious intent and evil motive of attacking, injuring and
impeaching the character, honesty, integrity, virtue and reputation of one Jose J. Monteclaro ... and with
malicious intent of exposing (him) to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, discredit and dishonor, without
any justifiable motive.' Under the foregoing allegation, the prosecution is entitled to go to trial and
present the necessary evidence to prove malice; and the denial, to it of the opportunity to do so, upon
the defendants' motion to quash, constitutes reversible error." 12

4. G.R. No. 107566. November 25, 2004]

BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER, OSEO
HAMADA AND CECILLE AFABLE, EDITOR-IN-CHIEF, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (AND
RAMON LABO, JR., respondents.

Petition:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals,
dated 07 January 1992, and the Resolution,[2] dated 29 September 1992, reversing the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), dated 14 June 1990, which dismissed herein private respondents claim for
damages.

Facts:

Before the 18 January 1988 local elections, petitioner Afable wrote in her column a series of
articles dealing with the candidates for the various elective positions in Baguio City. Quoted hereunder
are excerpts from said articles, as well as the respective dates when they were published in the Baguio
Midland Courier:

January 3, 1988

. . . Of all the candidates for mayor, Labo has the most imponderables about him, people would
ask, Can he read and write? Why is he always talking about his Japanese father-in-law? Is he
really a Japanese Senator or a barrio kapitan? Is it true that he will send P18 million aid to
Baguio? Somebody wanted to put an advertisement of Labo in the Midland Courier but was
refused because he has not yet paid his account of the last time he was a candidate for
Congress. We will accept all advertisements for him if he pays his old accounts first.[4]

January 10, 1988

 I heard that the Dumpty in the egg is campaigning for Cortes. Not fair. Some real doctors are
also busy campaigning against Labo, because he has not also paid their medical services with
them. Since he is donating millions he should settle his small debts like the reportedly
insignificant amount of P27,000 only. If he wins several teachers were signifying to resign and
leave Baguio forever, and Pangasinan will be the franca-liqua of Baguio.[5]

Claiming that the aforequoted portions of petitioner Afables column were tainted with malice, private
respondent instituted separate criminal and civil actions for libel against herein petitioners. On
December 26 1988, the Department of Justice dismissed the criminal case due to insufficiency of
evidence[6] while the civil suit was raffled off to RTC, Branch 6, Baguio City.

In the complaint for damages, private respondent alleged that in her 03 January 1988 and 10 January
1988 columns, petitioner Afable made it appear that he could not comply with his financial obligations;
that Yuko Narukawa Labo (Narukawa Labo), his co-plaintiff in the case before the trial court, was
accused of misrepresenting her social status to the general public thereby subjecting her to public
ridicule; that the subject articles were written solely for the purpose of destroying his reputation,
integrity, and personality as well as that of Ms. Narukawa Labo; and that said articles were false, untrue,
libelous, and published with evil intent.

In their answer,[12] petitioners Baguio Midland Courier and Hamada denied that petitioner Afables 03
and 10 January 1988 articles were libelous. They also claimed that per their companys records, private
respondent still owed them a certain sum of money for the political ads and campaign paraphernalia
printed by Baguio Printing and Publishing Co., Inc., during private respondents 1984 campaign, and that
the 03 January 1988 column did not accuse Ms. Narukawa Labo of misrepresenting herself before the
public. Moreover, they asserted that petitioner Afables write-ups were fair comments on facts and
reports that were of public interest as private respondent was a mayoralty candidate at that time.

In her answer,[13] petitioner Afable also denied that the quoted portions of her 03 and 10 January 1988
column were libelous, insisting that they were devoid of malice and at most contained valid and timely
doubts.[14] She also contended that the contents of her column were protected by the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press and that the same were privileged as they dealt with
a public figure.

In its decision, dated 14 June 1990, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. According
to the trial court, the article in question was privileged and constituted fair comment on matters of
public interest as it dealt with the integrity, reputation, and honesty of private respondent who was a
candidate for local elective office at that time.

This decision of the trial court was, however, reversed by the appellate court.

Issue:

Whether or not the 10 January 1988 article of petitioner Afable was defamatory. Held:
we hold that petitioner Afables article constitutes a fair comment on a matter of public interest as it
dealt with the character of private respondent who was running for the top elective post in Baguio City
at the time. Considering that private respondent assured his would-be constituents that he would be
donating millions of his own money, petitioner Afables column with respect to private respondents
indebtedness provided the public with information as regards his financial status which, in all
probability, was still unbeknownst to them at that time. Indeed, the information might have dissuaded
some members of the electorate from voting in favor of private respondent but such is the inevitable
result of the application of the law. The effect would have been adverse to the private respondent but
public interest in this case far outweighs the interest of private respondent.

Ratio:

 It is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person
attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person could identify
him as the object of the libelous publication. Plainly, private respondent has the
bounden duty to present before the court evidence that a third person could easily
identify him as the person libeled. In this case, private respondent has utterly failed to
dispose of this responsibility.

 Concededly, private respondent was not yet a public official at the time the 10 January
1988 article was published. Nevertheless, this fact does not remove said article from
the mantle of protection guaranteed by the freedom of expression provision of the
Constitution. Indeed, as early as 1909, in the case of United States v. Sedano,[44] this
Court had recognized the publics right to be informed on the mental, moral, and
physical fitness of candidates for public office.

“It is of the utmost consequence that the people should discuss the character and qualifications of
candidates for their suffrages. The importance to the state and to society of such discussions is so vast,
and the advantages derived are so great, that they more than counterbalance the inconvenience of
private persons whose conduct may be involved, and occasional injury to the reputations of individuals
must yield to the public welfare, although at times such injury may be great. The public benefit from
publicity is so great, and the chance of injury to private character so small, that such discussion must be
privileged.

...

In such a case the occasion gives rise to a privilege, qualified to this extent: any one claiming to be
defamed by the communication must show actual malice or go remediless. The privilege extends to a
great variety of subjects, and includes matters of public concern, public men, and candidates for office.”

 It is of the utmost consequence that the people should discuss the character and
qualifications of candidates for their suffrages. The importance to the state and to
society of such discussions is so vast, and the advantages derived are so great, that they
 more than counterbalance the inconvenience of private persons whose conduct may be
involved, and occasional injury to the reputations of individuals must yield to the public
welfare, although at times such injury may be great. The public benefit from publicity is
so great, and the chance of injury to private character so small, that such discussion
must be privileged.

...

LOPEZ VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR 172203 ,FEB 14 2011

Petition:

Facts:

That on or about the early part of November 2002 in the City of Cadiz, Philippines the accused put up
billboards/signboards at the fence of Cadiz Hotel, Villena Street, Cadiz City and at Gustilo Boulevard,
Cadiz City, which billboards/signboards read as follows:

CADIZ FOREVER

______________ NEVER

thereby deliberately titillating the curiosity of and drawing extraordinary attention from the residents
of Cadiz City and passers-by over what would be placed before the word NEVER. Later on November 15,
2002, accused affixed the nickname of the herein private complainant BADING and the name of the City
of SAGAY before the word NEVER thus making the billboard appear as follows:

CADIZ FOREVER

BADING AND SAGAY NEVER

In the early part of November 2002, The respondent, while exercising his official duties as Mayor of
Cadiz City saw billboards with the printed phrase CADIZ FOREVER with a blank space before the word
NEVER directly under said phrase. Those billboards were posted on the corner of Gustilo and Villena
streets, in front of Cadiz Hotel and beside the old Coca-Cola warehouse in Cadiz City. He became
intrigued and wondered on what the message conveyed since it was incomplete.

Some days later, on November 15, 2002, private respondent received a phone call relating that the
blank space preceding the word NEVER was filled up with the added words BADING AND SAGAY. The
next day, he saw the billboards with the phrase CADIZ FOREVER BADING AND SAGAY NEVER printed in
full. Reacting and feeling that he was being maligned and dishonored with the printed phrase and of
being a tuta of Sagay, private respondent, after consultation with the City Legal Officer, caused the filing
of a complaint for libel against petitioner. He claimed that the incident resulted in mental anguish and
sleepless nights for him and his family.

On December 17, 2003, the RTC rendered judgment convicting petitioner. Petitioner appealed
the Decision of the RTC to the CA which, rendered judgment on August 31, 2005, affirming with
modification the Decision of the RTC.

Issue:

whether the controversial words used constituted privileged communication.

Held:

Ratio