Muslim Democrats in Turkey

and Egypt: Participatory Politics

as a Catalyst
İHSAN YILMAZ*

ABSTRACT
Partial and limited opening of
authoritarian political systems in
Turkey and Egypt created new
democratic opportunities for
Islamists to participate in public life.
It also fostered democratic learning
by permitting Islamists to compete
for power and popular legitimacy. In
the process of democratic opening,
Islamists have had to address
and represent the interests of a
group much larger than their own
ideological constituency. They have
also had to endure repression and
party closures in a semi-democratic
political framework. However,
the democratic learning process
coupled with the establishment’s
constraints has paved the way for
the transformation of Islamists
to Muslim democrats. While the
process in Turkey is almost complete,
in Egypt there are still heated debates
on the transformation among the
Islamists. This study highlights
the importance of the democratic
opportunities given to Turkish
Islamists and argues that if given
similar opportunities, Egyptian
Islamism will also transform to a
post-Islamist phase.
E ven though there is no simple causal
relationship between the lack of de-
mocracy and political extremism, it has been
argued that institutional exclusion from the
political process and indiscriminate repression
make extremist groups inclined to adopt revo-
lutionary1 or even worse terrorist methods.
Conversely, political participation (even in
semi-democratic autocracies) encourages rad-
ical groups to pursue their objectives through
peaceful means. Political pluralism, albeit in a
limited form, can induce radical and even an-
ti-systemic parties to moderate their political
discourses.2
This paper analyses how and to what extent
the processes of exclusion and/or inclusion
policies of the regimes, general framework
of political and legal structures, politico-legal
constraints and opportunities in Turkey and
Egypt have influenced the transformation and
moderation of Islamisms toward a pluralist
discourse in these two countries. Instead of fo-
* Assist. Prof., Public Administration Department, Fatih Univer­
sity, ihsanyilmaz@yahoo.com

Insight Turkey Vol. 11 / No. 2 / 2009

pp. 93-112 93
 İHSAN YILMAZ

cusing only on the Islamist discourse, the interaction of discourse, context, struc-
ture and practice will be examined.3

Islamist parties in Turkey were successively banned from politics, but re-
emerged after reframing their discourse in response to their perceived oppor-
tunities and constraints. The current Justice and Development Party (AK Party)
has gone a step further than its Islamist predecessors, dramatically highlighting a
process of institutional change and ideological moderation. The increasing mod-
eration of the Islamist movement is the result of several institutional factors.4 The
Turkish Islamists have been given the political freedom in a liberalized autocracy5
to make strategic choices in a political system that rewards political participation
with credible opportunities for power, while at the same time, the state and civil
society have imposed public institutional constraints on the Islamists in addi-
tion to the interactions taking place between Islamists, their constituency and the
state.6 Similar developments have also been taking place in a different context,
Egypt. After analyzing the evolution of Turkish Islamists to Muslim democrats,
the paper will look at the same issue in the Egyptian context.

Evolution of Islamism in Turkey

When the Turkish Republic decided to close down all Sufi brotherhoods and
lodges, as a result of the Sunni Hanafi understanding of preferring the worst state
to anarchy, chaos and revolution they did not challenge the state. Nevertheless,
they continued their existence invisibly and unofficially, without claiming any
public or official role. In return, the officials turned a blind eye to their existence.
Among them, the Nakhsbandi order has played an important role, for all promi-
nent Turkish Islamist parties have originated in the Nakhsbandi brotherhood.7
The Khalidi branch of the Nakhsbandi has been the most politically active broth-
erhood. Its sheikh, Mehmed Zahid Kotku (1897–1980), preached that it was the
duty of observant Muslims to take an active interest in national affairs.8 He did
not perceive the secular state as an absolute enemy. He created a new “operational
code” of the brotherhood, synchronized with the political code promoted by the
secular state, that of constitutional legitimacy. By the 1970s, Kotku started pro-
moting a second layer of legitimacy, working in tandem with Islamic legitimacy,
which was that of political institution building.9

Kotku’s disciple Professor Necmettin Erbakan and his followers have succes-
sively established the National Order (Jan. 26, 1970 to Jan. 14, 1971), National
Salvation (Oct. 11, 1972 to Sept. 12, 1980), Welfare (July 19, 1983 to Jan. 16, 1998),
Virtue (Dec. 17, 1997 to June 22, 2001) and Felicity parties (July 20, 2001 to pres-

94
 Muslim Democrats in Turkey and Egypt: Participatory Politics as a Catalyst

ent). With the exception of the existing The political attitude of

Felicity Party (SP), all the others were religious groups demonstrates
shut down by the establishment. The first
prominent Islamist party in republican that they are willing to take
Turkey, the National Order Party (MNP) part in the system rather than
and the National Salvation Party (MSP) striving for its total conversion
were established through Sheikh Kotku’s
promotion and support, and he had supervised their activities.10 Most of the found-
ers were also disciples of Kotku.11 Erbakan espoused a discourse of new economic
and social order based on “national” as opposed to Western principles. The basic
program of this party was based on the demand to disseminate traditional reli-
gious values and to achieve the unity of Muslim societies. The party was shut down
after a military intervention in 1971 on the ground that it was against the secular-
ism. The MSP was founded in October 1972 after the generals called Erbakan back
from voluntary exile in Switzerland. The MSP ideology was almost the same as that
of the closed MNP. The MSP “is usually remembered with its rigorous resistance
against Turkey’s membership of the EU together with Greece in the mid-1970s”.12

The NSP won 11.8 percent of the vote in the national elections of 1973. It
participated in a series of three coalition governments in the 1970s. After the
military coup in 1980, the NSP was also closed down, together with all other po-
litical parties. When the army returned to its barracks in 1983, Erbakan founded
a new party under a new name -- the Welfare Party (RP). The RP ideology was
not different from that of the MSP. But, in the early 1990s, the RP realized “the
need for turning the party into a mass political movement, adopting an agenda
that put stress on social problems rather than on religious themes, using modern
propaganda methods. It particularly tried to mobilize the urban poor, who suf-
fered from the liberalization policies of the 1980s”.13

The RP had steadily increased its share of the vote, and after the 1994 general
local elections mayors of several major cities such as Ankara and Istanbul (cur-
rent Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became the mayor of Istanbul at that
date) were RP members. In 1996, as the bigger partner of a coalition govern-
ment (Refah-Yol) with the True Path Party (DYP), Erbakan became Turkey’s
first Islamist prime minister. The Erbakan government’s “policies, in particularly
those designed to link Turkey more closely with Islamic countries and to widen
the scope of religious freedoms, upset the civil and military bureaucracy.”14 The
establishment also pressurized Islamist and Islamic groups, companies and in-
stitutions. Several “briefings, joined by judicial personnel, journalists and other
professionals were organized by the General Staff of the Armed Forces on the

95
 İHSAN YILMAZ

danger of Islamic fundamentalism in which the ruling party was identified as a

reactionary Islamic threat.” 15 With “the support of dominant media groups and
unions, chief businessmen clubs, and of the labor unions, the opposition led by
the military managed to overthrow the Refah-Yol government”.16

In January 1998, the Constitutional Court closed down the RP and banned Er-
bakan from politics for five years. Being aware of history’s repetition, this time Er-
bakan’s new party was already ready before the closure decision. The Virtue Party
(FP) continued operating under the leadership of Erbakan’s close friend, Recai
Kutan, until it too was shut down by the Constitutional Court in June 2001.

After the RP was ousted from power, many younger members of the Islamists
also began thinking that the only way they could succeed was to avoid confronta-
tion with the Kemalist establishment and to stay away from the instrumentalist use
of religious rhetoric in politics. This started an internal debate among the Islamists.
Thus, a cleavage emerged within the movement between two different groups. The
“traditionalists” (Gelenekçiler), centered on Erbakan and party leader Kutan, op-
posed any serious change in approach or policy, while the younger group of “re-
newalists” (Yenilikçiler), led by Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül and Bülent Arınç, argued
that the party needed to revise and renew its approach to a number of fundamental
issues, especially democracy, human rights and relations with the West.

The influence of this internal debate was reflected in the platform of the FP.
The FP embraced Western political values, and anti-Westernism was not on its
agenda. Its slogans included “pluralist society,” “basic rights and liberties,” “more
democracy,” “privatization,” “decentralization” and “globalization.” 17

After the Constitutional Court closed down the FP, the old guard went on to
establish the Felicity Party (SP), but the renewalists did not join them and instead
formed the AKP, adhering to their renewalist discourse, frequently asserting uni-
versal values and value-based discourses such as human rights, democracy and
free market principles.18 They have learned to avoid confrontational rhetoric. The
emergence of the AK Party has shown that Muslim politics in Turkey is evolv-
ing from an instrumen­talist usage of Islam to a new understanding of practic-
ing Muslims who deal with daily politics.19 While acknowledging the importance
of religion as personal belief, they accommodated themselves within the secular
constitutional framework.20

After this brief historical overview of the evolution of Islamism in Turkey we

now turn our attention to analyzing the factors that brought about the above-

96
 Muslim Democrats in Turkey and Egypt: Participatory Politics as a Catalyst

summarized transformation of younger generation Islamists into Muslim demo-

crats of the AKP. Doing this will help us to see if and to what extent the Turkish
case bears similarities to the Egyptian one.

In the Turkish domestic context, there are several major factors that contrib-
uted to the transformation of Islamists. As can be understood from our histori-
cal summary above, the first is the ever-present existence of de jure and de facto
constraints imposed upon the Islamist political parties by the Kemalist establish-
ment.21 Erbakan had been naively hoping in his every new attempt that the es-
tablishment would let him run the country. As opposed to Erbakan, the younger
generations realized that they had to avoid confrontation with the aggressively
laicist establishment as this would prevent their staying in power even if they
reached it, as the RP government’s experience showed. But realizing the Kemalist
constraints is only one of the causes of transformation. As experienced politi-
cians, the founders of the AKP knew that in order to come to power they needed
the public’s support, and especially its votes. Thus it is obvious that they had to
take into account what had been happening at the grassroots level.

They first had to gauge their voters and potential voters’ reaction to the RP
experience in power, its overthrow by the generals and, in particular, Erbakan’s
record. They did not have to wait too long. At the first election in which the FP
took part in 1999, its voters penalized the Islamists and their votes decreased to
15.1 percent from 21.38 of ante-power RP. Traditionally, Turkish voters act in
almost direct opposition to the wishes of the generals, but this time they indicated
that they were not happy with Erbakan’s record in power. They would penalize
the generals and penalize them harshly later in November 2002.

In addition to election results, because the younger Islamist politicians had

been in contact with the man in the street, grassroots, Anatolian heartlands and
periphery, they also became aware of the fact that the new middle classes would
no longer vote for an Islamist party after the failure in power of the RP. More-
over, they established a think tank and
social research institution. Before the The AK Party is a successful
establishment of the AK Party, current example showing that
Interior Minister professor Beşir Atalay, political participation and the
known to be close to the current presi- opportunities available for the
dent, Gül, established and directed this
institution, the Ankara Social Studies
Islamist parties can generate
Center (ANAR), that regularly surveyed political change, resulting in
socio-political trends in society and ac- the transformation of Islamism

97
 İHSAN YILMAZ

tual demands of ordinary people. Gül is also known to have frequented the of-
fices of this institution before establishing the AK Party. This scientific, as it were,
awareness of reality should have helped the younger generation of Islamists to de-
velop a down-to-earth and realistic political discourse and party program when
establishing the AK Party.

Moreover, the younger generation Islamists knew that even though Erbakan
had employed a religious rhetoric, his parties had “never been able to gain the
support of dominant religious communities nor did it gain the support of some
prominent Sufi orders in Turkey. The dominant religious communities such as
Suleymancıs (the follower of Sufi leader Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan) and Nurcus
(the follower of Said Nursi, a commentator of Quran) and some brands of the Sufi
orders always gave support to the center-right parties. The political attitude of re-
ligious groups demonstrates that they are willing to take part in the system rather
than striving for its total conversion”.22 Several of the remaining Islamic groups
that had been supporting Erbakan had also joined other non-supportive Islamic
groups, questioning both the feasibility of Islam as a political project and the con-
formity of Islamism to Islam itself. Noticing that the social and economic net-
works of Islam had been damaged most when Islamism was at its peak in the late
1990s, these Islamic groups and businessmen started to withdraw their support
from Erbakan and the idea of a “social” rather than “political” Islam -- which has
been advocated by non-Islamist groups such as the Gülen movement for a long
time -- gained ground, opening up the way for the transformation of Islamism.23

In addition to Kemalist constraints, voters’ negative reaction to Erbakan’s

record in power and realization of socio-political and economical demands of
voters, another factor that influenced younger Islamists’ transformation is their
realization that “the existing system -- that is, the current tacit or implicit social
contract -- indeed did include sufficient possibilities for others than the political
elite to represent the national body politic of Turkey. From the Islamists’ point of
view, this realization presented some peace with the existing political apparatus
that had been injurious to them since the 1920s.”24
Erdoğan’s experiences as Erdoğan’s experiences as mayor of
mayor of Istanbul had also Istanbul had also influenced the trans-
influenced the transformation formation of the AK Party leaders from
“Islamist vanguards” into pragmatic pol-
of the AK Party leaders from iticians, “where public service provision
“Islamist vanguards” into easily trumped ideology. Local voters
pragmatic politicians want efficient road and sewer repair and

98
 Muslim Democrats in Turkey and Egypt: Participatory Politics as a Catalyst

trash collection, not utopian endeavors to transform society. The chief executive
officer of Turkey’s largest city learned this lesson well.”25

The AK Party is a successful example showing that political participation and

the opportunities available for the Islamist parties can generate political change,
resulting in the transformation of Islamism to non-Islamism in the Turkish con-
text. The AK Party has successfully analyzed, understood and responded to the
real concerns of ordinary people as it had to compete in elections to run the coun-
try. The result of the transformation and the party’s efforts were prized by the
people in the very first election in which the party competed, Nov. 3, 2002, and
the AK Party won 34 percent of the vote, enabling it to control almost two-thirds
of the parliament.26 Scholars have noted that the victory of the AKP “was the
endorsement of Erdoğan who, during the campaign, ran on the issues of human
rights, liberties, economic development and integration into the EU.”27

The AKP increased its share of the vote to 47 percent in the July 22, 2007, elec-
tions, the main opposition party receiving only 21 percent.28 This election was
primarily shaped by evaluations of performance (economic or otherwise) rather
than by ideological cleavages.29 As a matter of fact, a survey by a polling firm,
which predicted the outcome of the 2007 election with precision, “has found that
the top two concerns leading people to cast a ballot for the AKP that year were
not religious sentiments, but rather the party’s economic-policy performance and
the attempts of the military and the judiciary to prevent the AKP from electing
its candidate for the presidency.”30 In the 2007 elections, even many Turkish-
Armenians reportedly voted for the AKP Party. This is a crucial fact showing how
successfully formerly intolerant and exclusivist Islamists transformed their vision
and political ideology, became Muslim democrats and were able to convince even
non-Muslim citizens of the country of the fact. The successful transformation of
the AKP has been noted in Middle East circles.

Liberalized Autocracy and Islamism in Egypt

An authoritarian state and strong Islamist groups, among other oppositional
forces, coexist in Egypt. The communication channels between the Egyptian re-
gime and the opposition are well-established and they are never totally closed,
even for the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood (MB).31 Egyptian autocracy has sur-
vived by implementing a system of autocratic power sharing and state-managed
pluralism that gave secular, Islamist and ethnic groups opportunity to express
their views in the public sphere and even in elected, state-controlled assemblies,
but that did not allow these voices to be translated into a unified anti-systemic

99
 İHSAN YILMAZ

or even systemic but oppositional movement capable of threatening the incum-

bents.32

The liberalized autocracy in Egypt implies far more political freedoms than ex-
ist in Syria, the former Iraq, the oil-rich Gulf countries or even in Tunisia.33 Egypt
has a multi-party political system with several political parties, periodic elections,
opposition newspapers, popular criticism of the government and an independent
judiciary.34 But, the state has been employing pluralist policies not as catalysts for
pluralist political participation and demand making, but as valuable instruments
of social control.35

By allowing some public space to the Islamist opposition, the regime has also
been able to uphold fears of the “Islamist threat,” by which coercive measures can
be legitimized and thereby prolong the state of emergency and control elections.36
By arguing that democratization would enable Islamists to overturn the regime and
ultimately abolish democracy -- however limited it is -- itself, these movements
were used by the regime to justify the continuation of its repressive policies.37 The
persistence of Islamist groups also comes with some advantages for the regime: Is-
lamists are an important player in a juggling act by which opposition forces are pit-
ted against one another and struggles occur between secularist, leftist, rightist and
Islamist groups probably even more often than between regime and opposition.38

As far as the opposition groups are concerned, liberalized autocracy provides

them with two major benefits. First, it gave them space to criticize the regime and
mobilize public support, something that Islamists were particularly good at, be-
cause they control mosques and other religious institutions through which they
attract a mass following -- in contrast to their secular rivals. Second, the power-
sharing arrangement enforces a measure of peaceful coexistence by providing
state-controlled legislatures under whose roofs competing groups can raise their
respective political and cultural agendas.39

Islamism in Perspective

The Islamist revival in Egypt began in the 1920s but spread rapidly after the
early 1970s, reaching its peak in the early 1990s. It consists of several groups from
violent militants to non-violent and gradualist Islamic coalition, and from the
individualist Sufi orders to the state’s Al-Azhar, the Ministry of Awqaf and the
Supreme Islamic Council.40

Islamism emerged as a reaction to the perceived causes of such a state of de-

privation-economic dependency, cultural sellout, and national humiliation and

100
 Muslim Democrats in Turkey and Egypt: Participatory Politics as a Catalyst

in view of all the failed ideologies and of Conforming to its strategy

the western cultural, political and eco- of working within the official
nomic onslaught, Islam was seen as the
only doctrine that could bring about a institutions, the MB made use
change.41 The MB emerged in 1928 when of the professional syndicates
the secular-nationalist Wafdist Party and as a ground to expand its ranks
the royal family ruled the country. The and develop a white-collar base
MB was founded by Hassan al-Banna, in
whose view the MB had to be organized as a “movement” rather than a “party” as
Al-Banna espoused a bottom-up approach and did not believe in the forceful trans-
formation of society using state power. Al-Banna’s explicit rejection of the notion
of party appealed in part to the unattractive experience of party politics in Egypt
during the decades following World War I. Al-Banna’s rejection ran deeper, how-
ever, for in fact he condemned not only parties but the modern nation-state and all
its institutions as fundamentally un-Islamic. The nation-state was a Western inno-
vation that contradicted the transnational character of the umma by breaking it up
into smaller units. In addition, parties as political organizations were, in al-Banna’s
opinion, nothing but forms of institutionalized disunity, disrupting by their very
nature the inner harmony which was an essential feature of any Islamic polity.42 In
addition to Al-Banna’s advice not to establish a political party, maybe a more cru-
cial factor was the regime’s harsh treatment of the MB. An MB political party would
never been allowed by the regime as it would be a credible oppositional force in
the political arena against the autocratic establishment’s parties. It is only in recent
years that opposition to the notion of a legitimate Islamist party has been overcome
among the MB circles and they even prepared a political party program.43

Al-Banna was assassinated by the state in 1949 and was replaced by Hassan al-
Hudaybi as the spiritual guide. Despite its close connection with the state, the MB
faced harsh suppression after the 1952 revolution by secular nationalist Gamal
Abdel Nasser. MB figures such as Sayyed Qutb were sent to jail and executed, and
the state outlawed the organization.

After Nasser, a split divided the movement between revolutionary views like
those of Qutb and the gradualist views of al-Hudaybi. Both sides agreed that
Egyptian society and polity was one of Jahili, which was characterized by the wor-
ship of man by man, and the sovereignty of man over man. While both strived for
an alternative Islamic state and society, they differed on the ways to achieve such
order. Hudaybi called for preaching for the Islamic cause. Both wings shared an
opposition to Zionism, crusaders, communism, secularism and Nasserism.44 The
MB did not publicly denounce the state as an enemy to Islam and did not call for a

101
 İHSAN YILMAZ

political revolt against it.45 Several pro-violence individuals and groups split from
the MB, as the MB remained loyal to its non-violent and bottom-up approach.
The pro-violent militants declare society to be jahiliyya (the state of ignorance be-
fore Islam) and consider the state as infidel. The moderates and conservatives like
MB followers and members avoid blanket condemnation, while being critical of
the state for not implementing Islamic laws.46 Moderate groups like the MB work
within institutional channels, such as running candidates within the professional
syndicates and in parliamentary elections.47 Conforming to its strategy of working
within the official institutions, the MB made use of the professional syndicates as
a ground to expand its ranks and develop a white-collar base.48 Moreover, private
charity and aid organizations, usually connected to mosques, were established
by both the MB and other Islamist groups.49 At the same time, the MB engaged
in political mobilization.50 As a result, the MB established a very powerful social
base, with important ramifications in the political sphere.

Participating at the Elections and the Emergence of Muslim Democrats

Since the MB did (could) not establish its own party, because of both state re-
pression and al-Banna’s advice, it entered into electoral alliances with secular par-
ties. The MB guaranteed support from its religious social base, presenting voting
as a religious obligation, and these secular opposition parties, in return, supplied
the MB a legal venue for participating in elections and running its own candi-
dates. The first of these alliances was between the MB and the liberal al-Wafd in
the 1984 elections. Despite al-Wafd’s strong secular roots, the MB insisted that it
declare its commitment to considering Shari‘a in legislative activities. The MB ne-
gotiated a similar deal with the socialist party al-‘Amal in the 1987 elections, but
instead of a temporary alliance, al-‘Amal agreed to an MB takeover. This alliance
attracted another party: the liberal al-Ahrar. This new alliance won 17 percent of
the vote and 60 seats and led opposition in the parliament.51 In the meantime,
the pro-violence groups directed their harshest criticism against the MB for its
participation in the democratic process as a means to advance their own political
agenda.52 Even its alliances with the secular parties shows that the MB could work
with secular groups and institutions.

Since the early 1990s, Egypt has experienced a substantial degree of political
deliberalization. Repressive amendments to the penal code and to legislation gov-
erning professional syndicates and trade unions, as well as unprecedented electoral
fraud are only some of the indicators.53 Since 1998, the Political Parties Commit-
tee (PPC) has closed seven of the 16 legal opposition parties. The government is
not only preventing group and party development, but also preventing prominent

102
 Muslim Democrats in Turkey and Egypt: Participatory Politics as a Catalyst

CİHAN
The emergence of the AK Party has shown that Muslim politics in Turkey is evolving from an instrumen­
talist usage of Islam to a new understanding of practicing Muslims who deal with daily politics.

independent individuals from using already existing parties to run in the parlia-
mentary elections.54 The parliamentary elections of 1990 were marked by fraud,
intimidation and a previously unseen level of violence.55 In the 1995 elections, Is-
lamist candidates were detained so that they could not ­participate in the elections.
The Islamists’ main collaborator, Al-‘Amal, was suspended from operating.56 In
June 1995 the government started a series of detentions and military trials of lead-
ing MB members. The organization’s headquarters and over 5,000 offices were
shut down. From 1993 to 1995 more than 1,000 MB activists were detained.57 In
the 2000 elections, they ran as independents and won 17 seats -- more than the to-
tal number of seats won by all opposition parties combined -- again becoming the
largest opposition block in parliament.58 A more striking victory occurred in the
2005 elections, when the MB secured 88 seats, more seats than those won by any
opposition party since the 1952 revolution. But this success gave way to a regime
clampdown on Islamists. The MB’s countermove was to use its presence in parlia-
ment to draw public attention to the regime’s use of suppression and intimidation
in a bid to make a national cause out of the matter. Members of parliament from
the MB (they sit as nominal independents) raised questions about transparency,
corruption, the role of Shari‘a in public life, and democratic reform -- all issues
that were and are of great significance to the Islamists’ popular base.59

103
 İHSAN YILMAZ

The younger generation MB In December 2006, Mubarak prompt-

members’ involvement in ed parliament to amend the Constitution
to ban any reference to religion in politi-
syndicates, along with cal activity, revoking judicial supervision
participation in municipal and over any elections, and replacing Emer-
national elections, has been gency Laws with a harsher Anti-Terror-
influential in the transformation ism Law, which gives security officers
and moderation of the MB carte blanche in dealing with the Isla-
mists.60 This was followed by a state-led
campaign aimed at eradicating the MB. For the first time, the MB’s assets were
confiscated, and its deputy supreme guide, along with 40 of its leadership cadres,
was referred to a military court in the summer of 2007.61

It should be noted that despite this almost constant repression and the fact that
the MB had never been legally recognized, the democratic learning experience of
electoral alliances broadened the political basis of the movement, both by attract-
ing more urbanite white-collar professionals and by providing opportunities for
experimentation with new approaches toward social reform and democracy, as
a result of physically and discursively interacting with secular, leftist and liberal
parties.62 The younger generation MB members’ involvement in syndicates, along
with participation in municipal and national elections, has been influential in the
transformation and moderation of the MB. These younger generations represent
a secular-leaning and pluralist Islamic approach towards politics and have been
influential in changing the MB along these lines.63 Thus, for instance, in 1995
the MB stated that Islam endorses political pluralism.64 Even though the use of
religious ideology in the discourse of the younger generations is still central to
mobilizing grassroots, it plays only a minimal role in their discourse, in contrast
to the elders of the MB. It seems that the younger generations of the MB, while
fighting for legality and trying to demonstrate their commitment to secular poli-
tics, are likely to go further.65

As a matter of fact, in 1996 some of these younger generation MB members

led by a rising member, Abu al-‘Ila Madi, left the MB to form an independent
political party (al-Wasat or the Center Party).66 Al Wasat has been repeatedly
denied legal status by the regime of President Hosni Mubarak. The regime and
the MB share the objective of preventing al-Wasat from legally entering the legal
political arena, for it has the potential to challenge both the regime and the MB’s
dominant role among opposition formations.67 Al-Wasat is a centrist party that
does not insist on qualifying the existing state as un-Islamic.68 Unlike Islamists,

104
 Muslim Democrats in Turkey and Egypt: Participatory Politics as a Catalyst

these Muslim democrats view political The Muslim democrats of

life with a pragmatic eye and their main al-Wasat reinterpret the
goal tends to be more mundane, such as
“crafting viable electoral platforms and
message of Islam in tune with
stable governing coalitions to serve indi- the notions of democracy and
vidual and collective interests -- Islamic political pluralism
as well as secular --within a democratic
arena whose bounds they respect, win or lose.”69 The Muslim democrats of al-
Wasat reinterpret the message of Islam in tune with the notions of democracy
and political pluralism. They distinguish between the concept of democracy as
a process that they see as potentially compatible with “Islam, and the concept of
democracy as Westernization about which they hold reservations.”70 They clearly
renounce the idea that Islamists have a monopoly on the absolute truth. They see
different interpretations of tradition as efforts at human understanding. Ques-
tioning or opposing an Islamist claim does not constitute rejection of Islam. They
favor political participation within the constitutional and legal framework.71 For
instance, Article 3 of the party program reads: “Citizenship determines the rights
and duties of all Egyptians and is the basis of the relations between all Egyptians.
There should be no discrimination between citizens on the basis of religion, gen-
der, color or ethnicity in terms of their rights, including the right to hold public
office.” Article 6 reads: “Complete equality between men and women in terms of
political and civil rights. Competency, professional background and the ability
to undertake the responsibility should be the criteria for holding of public office,
for example in the judiciary, or for the presidency,” and Article 8, “A respect
for human dignity and all human rights -- whether civil, political, social, eco-
nomic or cultural -- which are stipulated by revealed religions and international
conventions.”72

Three arguments explain the transformation of al-Wasat founders. First, Isla-

mist ideological moderation was driven in part by strategic calculation, but was
also a result of a political learning process, that is, of change in core values and
beliefs. Second, value change was facilitated by the interaction of Islamists and
secular opposition leaders in pursuit of common goals, including reforming the
authoritarian state. The state’s repression contributed to democratic learning by
creating incentives for sustained interaction and cooperation between Islamist
and secular opposition. Over time, Egyptian Marxists, Nasserists, independents
and Islamists, none of whom had previously accorded a high priority to democ-
racy, gravitated toward a democratic agenda, in part to assume the moral high
ground vis-à-vis the autocratic establishment and in part because, as victims of

105
 İHSAN YILMAZ

The state’s repression repression, they had come to value de-

contributed to democratic mocracy more than in the past, paving
the way for the emergence of a shared
learning by creating incentives democratic agenda and a more active
for sustained interaction and cross-partisan campaign for political re-
cooperation between Islamist form.73 Third, the institutional opportu-
and secular opposition nities and incentives for such interaction
were created by a mix of regime accom-
modation and repression of the country’s Islamist opposition groups.74

With the passing of the old generation of leaders, the policies of the MB would
seem to be moving ever closer to the al-Wasat platform. It is significant that the
new general guide of the MB from January 2004, Muhammad Mahdi Akif, al-
though now in his 70s, has always been close to the younger generation, and re-
portedly played a prominent role in encouraging the al-Wasat initiative of 1996
against the opposition of the top MB leadership of the time. A reform initiative
announced by Akif in the spring of 2004 places the MB very close to the principles
propounded by al-Wasat.75

These experiences influenced the MB to seriously consider the possibility of

forming their own party as a way of pursuing political participation, and the
movement prepared a draft party platform. Discussions inside the MB on the
formation of a political party go back to the 1980s and 1990s when members
started debating the importance and utility of a party, resulting in some initiatives
in that direction, such as the proposals to found a “Consultation Party” in 1986
and a “Reform Party” in the early 1990s, even though these initiatives did not
progress as far as forming a party, thus the efforts faded quickly, partly because
of the expectation that any attempt to gain legal recognition would be futile. 76 In
the 2000s, the MB wanted to reassure the broader public about its intentions, and
several MB leading figures strove during the period of political dynamism in 2004
and 2005 to suggest that the organization, while legally unrecognized, wished to
transform itself into a civil political party with a fully legal status. Thus, in late
summer 2007, the MB distributed its first draft of a party platform to a group of
intellectuals and analysts. The platform was not to serve as a document for an ex-
isting political party or even one about to be founded, as the MB remains without
legal recognition in Egypt. Yet the MB leaders wanted to signal what sort of party
they would found if allowed to do so. The most important point that the new
program underscores that the movement has changed its focus from “implemen-
tation of the Shari‘a” to “Shari‘a as an Islamic frame of reference (marja‘iyya).”77
The program endeavors to signal that the MB’s prospective party would be no

106
 Muslim Democrats in Turkey and Egypt: Participatory Politics as a Catalyst

different from a European Christian Younger members of the MB

democratic party, in that it will only use also advocate a functional
its religious understanding to guide its
policy choices. Younger members of the
separation between a political
MB also advocate a functional separa- party and broader religious
tion between a political party and broad- movement, with the former
er religious movement, with the former focused mainly on political
focused mainly on political participation
participation and the latter on
and the latter on religious activism.78
religious activism
The emergence of the Egyptian Mus-
lim democrats both in al-Wasat and MB circles shows that even limited political
participation opportunities in a liberalized autocratic system can induce radical
opposition to moderate its discourse and goals. The Muslim democrats “appear
to have thought that their reorganization as an open, transparent, and democratic
party would enable them to evade state repression, expand their visibility and in-
fluence, and reduce their isolation from other groups in Egyptian civil society.”79
The transformation of Egyptian Islamism is attributable not only to the regime’s
often repressive counterattacks through legislation or in the streets, but also, sim-
ilar to the Turkish case, a decline in its popular support: the partial success of the
Islamist MB movement in “Islamizing” Egyptian society allowed many people to
believe that things could change for the better within the context of the existing
legal arrangements, without changing the constitutional framework.80

Conclusion
The Egyptian case suggests that democratic learning in nondemocratic settings
is also possible as a result of factors such as regime accommodation and repres-
sion. This case has several similarities to
the Turkish case. In both, the partial and The emergence of the
limited opening of these countries’ au-
thoritarian political systems created new
Egyptian Muslim democrats
democratic opportunities for Islamists to both in al-Wasat and MB
participate in public life and politics, fos- circles shows that even
tering democratic learning by permitting limited political participation
Islamists to compete for power and mass opportunities in a liberalized
support. In the process as elected or pro-
spective officials and ruling politicians,
autocratic system can induce
they have had to address and represent radical opposition to moderate
the interests of a group much larger than its discourse and goals

107
 İHSAN YILMAZ

their own ideological constituency. Hence the limited practice of democracy

-- regularly interrupted by the establishment, in Turkey the army and in Egypt
the Mubarak regime being the main actors -- contributed to democratic learn-
ing even within liberalized autocratic regimes. Islamists in both countries have
had to endure state repression, party closures and regime meddling with daily
democratic life (in the Turkish case actual military coups d’etat every 10 years and
in the Egyptian case a continuous ban on the MB) and in the semi-democratic
process, their opposition to the regime’s restrictions and interference paved the
way for the Islamists’ metamorphosis into a principled opposition to autocratic
restraints on freedoms. Islamists’ similar transformations in both countries sug-
gest also that these post-Islamist transformations are not accidental. These two
-- the AK Party of Turkey and Hizb al-Wasat, and also younger generation MB
members in Egypt -- post-Islamist experiences have of a lot to tell to other coun-
tries and autocratic and/or authoritarian regimes in the greater Middle East.

On a last note, while in Turkey a Nakhshi (an outlawed religious brother-

hood) sheikh (Mehmet Zahid Kotku) developed a systemic operational code for
Islamists to form Islamist parties to compete within the constitutional limits back
in the late 1960s, in Egypt the MB’s ambiguous position toward being systemic or
anti-systemic, its refusal to establish a political party but at the same time being a
political movement and the regime’s almost constant repression of the movement
and never legalizing it have delayed the post-Islamist development’s taking place
as it did in Turkey. By looking at the Turkish experience, one cannot help but
think that, if the MB could develop such an operational code allowing Egyptian
Islamists to establish an Islamist party with a pro-systemic program as opposed to
its anti-systemic discourse, the Egyptian regime would presumably find it much
more difficult to suppress the MB, possibly resulting in the post-Islamization of
the MB much earlier, and that helping the long-term stability of the country for
political integration of the socially deep-rooted and well-grounded MB would
mean the removal of a source of domestic conflict and enhance the long-term
stability of the Egyptian political system.

Endnotes
1. In Pahlavi Iran, for example, all possible channels for political expression and participation
and Islamism represented the only opening left for protest, and it was used by different groups and
powers seeking probably completely different goals, Nazih N. M. Ayubi, “The Political Revival of
Islam: The Case of Egypt”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 12, No. 4, (Winter,
1980), p. 487.

108
 Muslim Democrats in Turkey and Egypt: Participatory Politics as a Catalyst

2. Carrie Wickham “The Path to Moderation. Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt’s
Wasat Party”, Comparative Politics, Vol. 36, No. 2, (Spring 2004), p. 223. See also Sheri Berman,
“Taming Extremist Parties: Lessons from Europe,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 19 (January, 2008),
pp. 5-18.
3. Asef Bayat, ‘Islamism and Social Movement Theory’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 6
(2005), p. 906.
4. R. Quinn Mecham, “From the Ashes of Virtue, A Promise of Light: The Transformation of
Political Islam in Turkey”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2, (2004), p. 339.
5. There are both de jure and de facto constraints in the name of Kemalism limiting a fully
functioning democracy in Turkey. The 1982 constitution, which was prepared after the Sept. 12,
1980 military coup, severely limits the democratic power of parliament and elected government
compared to Western democracies. Until very recently, through the National Security Council the
military had direct influence on the government. A parallel military court structure with even a
Supreme Court of Appeals which has no equivalent in the West makes even a black-letter civilian
control of the military impossible. In addition to these de jure factors, it is well known that the
military has always influenced daily politics either with almost periodical coups d’état or with a
threat of new coup’s occurrence. In the name of Kemalist principles, national security or protection
of secularism the generals interfere with many issues which in the West would normally be consid-
ered civilian concerns. But the opposite has not been possible. Civilians who question the army’s
motives, its dealings or budget have been accused of being people with bad intentions, to say the
least. Even today, very few dare to question the military. It is also a fact that there have always been
civilian supporters of such a Kemalist autocracy among elite circles such as the media, politics, busi-
ness and even judiciary. The reason I call this an autocracy is to highlight that the Turkish military
justifies its actions by constantly referring to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and sees itself as the embodi-
ment of his perceived ideals and vision. It is usual to hear statements from the generals and other
elite like, “What would Ataturk do in this situation?”, “Ataturk would be upset with this”, “Ataturk
would beat (or chase after) them with a stick” and so on. Thus, in a sense, Turkey is still a Kemalist
autocracy, as if he were still alive, thanks to his grand embodiment, the Turkish military.
6. Mecham, “From the Ashes of Virtue, A Promise of Light: The Transformation of Political
Islam in Turkey”, p. 339.
7. Serif Mardin, “Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today: Continuity, Rupture
and Reconstruction in Operational Codes”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2, (2005), p. 152.
8. Thomas W. Smith, “Between Allah and Ataturk: Liberal Islam in Turkey”, The International
Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2005), p. 316.
9. Mardin “Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today: Continuity, Rupture and Re-
construction in Operational Codes”, p. 158.
10. Rusen Çakır, Ne Seriat Ne Demokrasi: Refah Partisini Anlamak (Neither the Shari’a Nor
Democracy: To Understand the Welfare Party), (Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1994), cited in Mardin,
“Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today: Continuity, Rupture and Reconstruction in
Operational Codes”, p. 157.
11. Ergun Yildirim et al, “A Sociological Representation of the Justice and Development Party:
Is It a Political Design or a Political Becoming?”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2007), p. 6.
12. Omer Caha, “Turkish Election of November 2002 and the Rise of “Moderate” Political Is-
lam”, Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2003), pp. 103-104.
13. Ihsan Dagi, “Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking the West
and Westernization”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2005), p. 25.

109
 İHSAN YILMAZ

14. Caha, “Turkish Election of November 2002 and the Rise of “Moderate” Political Islam”, p.
104.
15. Dagi, “Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking the West and
Westernization”, p. 27.
16. Caha, “Turkish Election of November 2002 and the Rise of “Moderate” Political Islam”, p.
104.
17. Ihsan Yilmaz, “State, Law, Civil Society and Islam in Contemporary Turkey”, The Muslim
World, Vol. 95, No. 3 (2005), p. 402.
18. Yildirim et al, “A Sociological Representation of the Justice and Development Party: Is It a
Political Design or a Political Becoming?”, p. 17.
19. Ihsan Yilmaz, “Ijtihad and Tadjid by Conduct: The Gülen Movement”, in M. Hakan Yavuz
and John Esposito, Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gülen Movement, (Syracuse, New York:
Syracuse University Press, 2003), p. 227.
20. Mecham, “From the Ashes of Virtue, A Promise of Light: The Transformation of Political
Islam in Turkey”, p. 350.
21. Gamze Cavdar, “Islamist New Thinking in Turkey: A Model for Political Learning?”, Politi­
cal Science Quarterly, Vol. 121, No. 3 (2006), p. 480.
22. Caha, “Turkish Election of November 2002 and the Rise of “Moderate” Political Islam”, p.
112.
23. Ihsan Dagi, “Turkey’s AKP in Power”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2008), p. 27.
24. Yasin Aktay, “Diaspora and Stability: Constitutive Elements in a Body of Knowledge”, in M.
Hakan Yavuz and John Esposito, Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gülen Movement, (Syra-
cuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2003), p. 139.
25. Dagi, “Turkey’s AKP in Power”, p. 28.
26. See in detail, Ali Carkoglu, “Turkey’s November Elections: A New Beginning?”, Middle East
Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 4 (2002), pp. 30-41; Soli Özel “Turkey at the Polls: After
the Tsunami”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2003), pp. 80-94; Ziya Onis and E. Fuat Keyman
“Turkey at the Polls: A New Path Emerges”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, No.2 (2003), pp. 95-108.
27. Caha, “Turkish Election of November 2002 and the Rise of “Moderate” Political Islam”, p.
102.
28. See in detail, Ali Carkoglu, “A New Electoral Victory for the ‘Pro-Islamists’ or the ‘New
Centre-Right’? The Justice and Development Party Phenomenon in the July 2007 Parliamentary
Elections in Turkey”, South European Society and Politics, Vol. 12, No. 4 (2007), pp. 501-519.
29. Carkoglu, “A New Electoral Victory for the ‘Pro-Islamists’ or the ‘New Centre-Right’? The
Justice and Development Party Phenomenon in the July 2007 Parliamentary Elections in Turkey”,
p. 518.
30. Dagi, “Turkey’s AKP in Power”, pp. 29-30.
31. Holger Albrecht, “How can Opposition Support Authoritarianism? Lessons from Egypt”,
Democratization, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2005), p. 393.
32. Daniel Brumberg, “Islam is Not the Solution (or the Problem)”, The Washington Quarterly,
Vol. 29, No. 1 (2005), p. 106.
33. Albrecht, “How can Opposition Support Authoritarianism? Lessons from Egypt”, p. 389.
34. Asef Bayat, “Revolution without Movement, Movement without Revolution: Comparing
Islamic Activism in Iran and Egypt”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 40, No. 1
(1998), p. 168.

110
 Muslim Democrats in Turkey and Egypt: Participatory Politics as a Catalyst

35. R. Bianchi, Unruly Corporatism: Associational Life in Twentieth-Century Egypt, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 23.
36. Albrecht, “How can Opposition Support Authoritarianism? Lessons from Egypt”, p. 390.
37. Albrecht, “How can Opposition Support Authoritarianism? Lessons from Egypt”, p. 383.
38. Holger Albrecht and Eva Wegner, “Autocrats and Islamists: Contenders and Containment
in Egypt and Morocco”, The Journal of North African Studies, Vol. 11 No. 2 (2006), p. 136.
39. Brumberg, “Islam is Not the Solution (or the Problem)”, p. 107.
40. Bayat, “Revolution without Movement, Movement without Revolution: Comparing Islamic
Activism in Iran and Egypt”, p. 155.
41. Bayat, “Revolution without Movement, Movement without Revolution: Comparing Islamic
Activism in Iran and Egypt”, p. 158.
42. Husain Haqqani and Hillel Fradkin, “Islamist Parties and Democracy: Going back to the
Origins”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 19, No. 3 (July, 2008), pp. 14-15.
43. See Nathan J. Brown and Amr Hamzawy, “The Draft Party Platform of the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood: Foray Into Political Integration or Retreat Into Old Positions?”, CSID 9th Annual Con­
ference, Political Islam and Democracy - What do Islamists and Islamic Movements want?, Washing-
ton, D.C., 2008, (CSID: Conference Proceedings, 2008), pp. 40-59.
44. Bayat, “Revolution without Movement, Movement without Revolution: Comparing Islamic
Activism in Iran and Egypt”, p. 160.
45. Hazem Kandil, “Islamization of the Egyptian Intelligentsia: Discourse and Structure in So-
cialization Strategies”, Symposium: Democracy and Its Development, University of California Irvine,
2008, (Irvine, CA: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2008), p. 3.
46. Salwa Ismail, “Religious “Orthodoxy” as Public Morality: The State, Islamism and Cultural
Politics in Egypt”, Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 8, No. 14 (1999), p. 25.
47. Ismail, “Religious “Orthodoxy” as Public Morality: The State, Islamism and Cultural Politics
in Egypt”, p. 25.
48. Salwa Ismail, “Confronting the Other: Identity, Culture, Politics, and Conservative Islamism
in Egypt”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2 (1998), p. 200.
49. Ismail, “Confronting the Other: Identity, Culture, Politics, and Conservative Islamism in
Egypt”, p. 201.
50. Salwa Ismail, “The Paradox of Islamist Politics”, Middle East Report, No. 221 (Winter, 2001),
p. 37.
51. Augustus Richard Norton, “Thwarted Politics: The Case of Egypt’s Hizb al-Wasat”, in Robert
W. Hefner, Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization, (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 136.
52. Nelly Lahoud, “Why Jihad and not Democracy”, CSID 9th Annual Conference, Political Islam
and Democracy - What do Islamists and Islamic Movements want?, Washington, D.C., 2008, (CSID:
Conference Proceedings, 2008), p. 6.
53. Eberhard Kienle, “More than a Response to Islamism: The Political Deliberalization of Egypt
in the 1990s”, Middle East Journal, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Spring, 1998), p. 219.
54. Joshua A. Stacher, “Parties Over: The Demise of Egypt’s Opposition Parties”, British Journal
of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2 (2004), p. 215.
55. Norton, “Thwarted Politics: The Case of Egypt’s Hizb al-Wasat”, pp. 136-141.
56. Asef Bayat, Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn, (Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press, 2007), p. 144.

111
 İHSAN YILMAZ

57. Bayat, Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn, p. 171.
58. Bayat, Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn, p. 138.
59. Brown and Hamzawy, “The Draft Party Platform of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood:
Foray into Political Integration or Retreat into Old Positions?”, p. 53.
60. Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC), Prisoners of Faith Campaign Pack: Muslim
Brotherhood, (London, UK: 2007), retrieved March 5, 2009, from http://www.ihrc.org.uk/file/
PF070515KhairatAlShaterFinal.pdf
61. IHRC, Prisoners of Faith Campaign Pack: Muslim Brotherhood.
62. Jan Stark, “Beyond ‘Terrorism’ and ‘State Hegemony’: Assessing the Islamist Mainstream in
Egypt and Malaysia”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 2 (2005), p. 312.
63. Mohammed Zahid and Michael Medley, “Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Sudan”, Review
of African Political Economy, Vol. 33, No. 110 (2006), p. 705.
64. Norton, “Thwarted Politics: The Case of Egypt’s Hizb al-Wasat”, p. 140.
65. Zahid and Medley, “Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Sudan”, p. 705.
66. Brown and Hamzawy, “The Draft Party Platform of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood:
Foray into Political Integration or Retreat into Old Positions?”, p. 46. See al-Wasat’s party program
in English on http://www.alwasatparty.com/htmltonuke.php?filnavn=files/Eng-program.htm
67. Muhammed Ayoob, “The Many Faces of Political Islam”, CSID 9th Annual Conference, Po­
litical Islam and Democracy - What do Islamists and Islamic Movements want? ?, Washington, D.C.,
2008, (CSID: Conference Proceedings, 2008), pp. 294-295.
68. Ismail, “The Paradox of Islamist Politics”, p. 36.
69. Vali Nasr, “The Rise of “Muslim Democracy”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 16, No. 2 (April,
2005), p. 13.
70. James G. Mellon, “Pan-Arabism, Pan-Islamism and Inter-State Relations in the Arab
World”, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 8, No. 4 (2002), pp. 12-13.
71. Ismail, “The Paradox of Islamist Politics”, p. 36.
72. Al-Wasat Party, Al-Wasat Al-Jadeed’s Party Program, retrieved on March 5, 2009, from
http://www.alwasatparty.com/htmltonuke.php?filnavn=files/Eng-program.htm
73. Wickham, “The Path to Moderation. Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt’s
Wasat Party”, p. 225.
74. Wickham, “The Path to Moderation. Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt’s
Wasat Party”, p. 207.
75. Bjørn Olav Utvik, “Hizb al-Wasat and the Potential for Change in Egyptian Islamism”, Cri­
tique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Fall, 2005), p. 305.
76. Brown and Hamzawy, “The Draft Party Platform of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood:
Foray into Political Integration or Retreat into Old Positions?”, p. 50.
77. Brown and Hamzawy, “The Draft Party Platform of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood:
Foray into Political Integration or Retreat into Old Positions?”, p. 55.
78. Brown and Hamzawy, “The Draft Party Platform of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood:
Foray into Political Integration or Retreat into Old Positions?”, p. 41.
79. Wickham, “The Path to Moderation. Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt’s
Wasat Party”, p. 223.
80. Bayat, “Islamism and Social Movement Theory”, p. 898.

112