G.R. No.
L-2068 October 20, 1948 which case the respondent justice of the peace had allowed the accused,
DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO G. LUCERO, Judge of First Instance of Pampanga, respondent.
TUASON, J.:
The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga after he had been bound over to
that court for trial, praying that the record of the case be remanded to
the justice of the peace court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order
that the petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and her
witnesses in connection with their testimony, on the strength of which
warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused. The motion was denied
and that denial is the subject matter of this proceeding.
According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioner's attorney to
the Court of First Instance in support of his motion, the accused, assisted
by counsel, appeared at the preliminary investigation. In that
investigation, the justice of the peace informed him of the charges and
asked him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered the
plea of not guilty. "Then his counsel moved that the complainant present
her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be examined and
cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law." The fiscal and
the private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the
objection was sustained. "In view thereof, the accused's counsel
announced his intention to renounce his right to present evidence," and
the justice of the peace forwarded the case to the court of first instance.
Leaving aside the question whether the accused, after renouncing his
right to present evidence, and by reason of that waiver he was
committed to the corresponding court for trial, is estopped, we are of
the opinion that the respondent judge did not act in excess of his
jurisdiction or in abuse of discretion in refusing to grant the accused's
motion to return the record for the purpose set out therein. In Dequito
and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, G.R. No. L-1336, recently promulgated, in
over the complaint's objection, to recall the complainant and her
witnesses at the preliminary investigation so that they might be cross-
examined, we sustained the justice of the peace's order. We said that
section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail the sound discretion of the justice
of the peace on the matter. We said that "while section 11 of Rule 108
defines the bounds of the defendant's right in the preliminary
investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law restricting the
authority, inherent in a court of justice, to pursue a course of action
reasonably calculated to bring out the truth."
But we made it clear that the "defendant can not, as a matter of right,
compel the complaint and his witnesses to repeat in his presence what
they had said at the preliminary examination before the issuance of the
order of arrest." We called attention to the fact that "the constitutional
right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him does
not apply to preliminary hearings' nor will the absence of a preliminary
examination be an infringement of his right to confront witnesses." As a
matter of fact, preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely
without infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due
process clause to a fair trial.
The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The minority
went farther than the majority and denied even any discretion on the
part of the justice of the peace or judge holding the preliminary
investigation to compel the complainant and his witnesses to testify
anew.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition is dismissed
with costs against the petitioner.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, and Briones, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERIA, J., dissenting:
1
I am sorry to dissent from the decision.
The petitioner in the present case appeared at the preliminary
investigation before the Justice of the Peace of Masantol, Pampanga,
and after being informed of the criminal charges against him and asked if
he pleaded guilty or not guilty, pleaded not guilty. "Then the counsel for
the petitioner moved that the complainant present her evidence so that
her witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the manner and
form provided by law." The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected to
petitioner's motion invoking section 11, Rule 108, and the objection was
sustained. In view thereof, the accused refused to present his evidence,
and the case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.
The counsel for the accused petitioner filed a motion with the Court of
First Instance praying that the record of the case be remanded to the
justice of the peace of Masantol, in order that the petitioner might cross-
examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their
testimony. The motion was denied, and for that reason the present
special civil action of mandamus was instituted.
It is evident that the refusal or waiver of the petitioner to present his
evidence during the investigation in the justice of the peace, was not a
waiver of his alleged right to be confronted with and cross-examine the
witnesses for the prosecution, that is, of the preliminary investigation
provided for in General Order No. 58 and Act No. 194, to which he claims
to be entitled, as shown by the fact that, as soon as the case was
forwarded to the Court of First Instance, counsel for the petitioner filed a
motion with said court to remand the case to the Justice of the Peace of
Masantol ordering the latter to make said preliminary investigation. His
motion having been denied, the petitioner has filed the present action in
which he squarely attacks the validity of the provision of section 11, Rule
108, on the ground that it deprives him of the right to be confronted
with and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution, contrary to
the provision of section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution.
In the case of Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, No. L-1336, we did
not discuss and decide the question of validity or constitutionality of said
section 11 in connection with section 1 of Rule 108, because that
question was not raised therein, and we merely construed the provisions
on preliminary investigation or Rule 108. In said case the writer of this
dissenting opinion said:
It may not be amiss to state that, modesty aside, the writer of
this dissenting opinion, then a practising attorney, was the one
who prepared the draft of the Rules of Court relating to criminal
procedure, and the provisions on preliminary investigation in the
draft were the same as those of the old law, which gave the
defendant the right to be confronted with and to cross-examine
the witnesses for the prosecution. But the Supreme Court
approved and adopted in toto the draft, except the part referring
to preliminary investigation which it modified, by suppressing
said right and enacting, in its stead, the provisions of section 11
of Rule 108 in its present form. I prefer the old to the new
procedure. But I can not subscribe to the majority decision,
which is a judicial legislation and makes the exercise of the right
of a defendant to be confronted, with and cross-examine the
witnesses against him, to depend entirely upon the whim or
caprice of a judge or officer conducting the preliminary
investigation.
But now the question of the validity of said section 11, Rule 108, is
squarely presented to this Court for decision, we have perforce to pass
upon it.
Section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution prescribes that "the Supreme
Court shall have power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, but said rules shall not diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights." The constitution added the last
part of the above-quoted constitutional precept in order to emphasize
that the Supreme Court is not empowered, and therefore can not enact
or promulgate substantive laws or rules, for it is obvious that rules which
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights, are substantive and not
adjective laws or rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure.
2
It does not require an elaborate arguments to show that the right
granted by law upon a defendant to be confronted with and cross-
examine the witnesses for the prosecuted in preliminary investigation as
well as in the trial of the case is a substantive right. It is based on human
experience, according to which a person is not prone to tell a lie against
another in his presence, knowing fully well that the latter may easily
contradict him, and that the credibility of a person or veracity of his
testimony may be efficaciously tested by a cross-examination. It is
substantive right because by exercising it, an accused person may show,
even if he has no evidence in his favor, that the testimonies of the
witnesses for the prosecution are not sufficient to indicate that there is a
probability that a crime has been committed and he is guilty thereof, and
therefore the accused is entitled to be released and not committed to
prison, and thus avoid an open and public accusation of crime, the
trouble, expense, and anxiety of a public trial, and the corresponding
anxiety or moral suffering which a criminal prosecution always entails.
This right is not a constitutional but a statutory right granted by law to an
accused outside of the City of Manila because of the usual delay in the
final disposition of criminal cases in provinces. The law does not grant
such right to a person charged with offenses triable by the Court of First
Instance in the City of Manila, because of the promptness, actual or
presumptive, with which criminal cases are tried and disposed of in the
Court of First Instance of said city. But this right, though not a
constitutional one, can not be modified, abridged, or diminished by the
Supreme Court, by virtue of the rule making power conferred upon this
Court by the Constitution.
Since the provisions of section 11 of Rule 108 as construed by this Court
in several cases, (in which the question of constitutionality or validity of
said section had not been squarely raised) do away with the defendant's
right under discussion, it follows that said section 11 diminishes the
substantive right of the defendant in criminal case, and this Court has no
power or authority to promulgate it and therefore is null and void.
The fact that the majority of this Court has ruled in the above cited case
of Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, that the inferior or justice of
the peace courts have discretion to grant a defendant's request to have
the witnesses for the prosecution recalled to testify again in the
presence of the defendant and be cross-examined by the latter, does not
validate said provision; because to make the exercise of an absolute right
discretionary or dependent upon the will or discretion of the court or
officer making the preliminary investigation, is evidently to diminish or
modify it.
Petition is therefore granted.
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
In our concurring and dissenting opinion in the case of Dequito and
Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, No. L-1336, we said:
In our opinion, section 11 of Rule 108 must be read, interpreted,
and applied in a way that will not contravene the constitutional
provision guaranteeing to all accused the right "to meet the
witnesses face to face." (Section 1 [17], Article III.)
Consequently, at the preliminary hearing contemplated by said
reglementary section, the defendant is entitled as a matter of
fundamental right to her the testimony of the witnesses for the
prosecution and to cross-examine them.
Although in such preliminary hearing the accused cannot finally
be convicted, he is liable to endure the ordeal eloquently
depicted in the decision, and the constitutional guarantee
protects defendants, not only from the jeopardy of being finally
convicted and punished, but also from the physical, mental and
moral sufferings that may unjustly be visited upon him in any one
of the stages of the criminal process instituted against him. He
must be afforded the opportunities to have the charges against
him quashed, not only at the final hearing, but also at the
preliminary investigation, if by confronting the witnesses for the
prosecution he can convince the court that the charges are
groundless. There is no justice in compelling him to undergo the
3
 troubles of a final hearing if at the preliminary hearing the case
can be terminated in his favor. Otherwise, the preliminary
investigation or hearing will be an empty gesture that should not
have a place within the framework of dignified and solemn
judicial proceedings.
On the strength of the above quoted opinion the opinion should be
granted and so we vote.
Petition dismissed.
RESOLUTION
March 8, 1949
TUASON, J.:
This cause is now before us on a motion for reconsideration.
In the decision sought to be reconsidered, we said, citing Dequito and
Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, G.R. No. L-1336: "The constitutional right of an
accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him does not apply to
preliminary hearings; nor will the absence of a preliminary examination
be an infringement of his right to confront witness. As a matter of fact,
preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without
infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due process
clause to a fair trial." We took this ruling to be ample enough to dispose
the constitutional question pleaded in the application for certiorari.
Heeding the wishes of the petitioner, we shall enlarge upon the subject.
It is contended that section 11 of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court 1 infringes section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution. 2 It is said that
the rule in question deals with substantive matters and impairs
substantive rights.
We can not agree with this view. We are of the opinion that section 11 of
Rule 108, like its predecessors, is an adjective law and not a substantive
law or substantive right. Substantive law creates substantive rights and
the two terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous. Substantive
rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the
legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. (60 C.J., 980.)
Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and
regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise
to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to
administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes
the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion. (36
C. J., 27; 52 C. J. S., 1026.)
As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what
acts are crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing them, as
distinguished from the procedural law which provides or regulates the
steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished. (22 C. J. S.,
49.) Preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially remedial; it is
the first step taken in a criminal prosecution.
As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural. Evidence
— which is the "the mode and manner of proving the competent facts
and circumstances on which a party relies to establish the fact in dispute
in judicial proceedings" — is identified with and forms part of the
method by which, in private law, rights are enforced and redress
obtained, and, in criminal law, a law transgressor is punished. Criminal
procedure refers to pleading, evidence and practice. (State vs. Capaci,
154 So., 419; 179 La., 462.) the entire rules of evidence have been
incorporated into the Rules of Court. We can not tear down section 11 of
Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without throwing out the whole code
of evidence embodied in these Rules.
In Beazell vs. Ohio, 269 U. S., 167, 70 Law. ed., 216, the United States
Supreme Court said:
Expressions are to be found in earlier judicial opinions to the
effect that the constitutional limitation may be transgressed by
alterations in the rules of evidence or procedure. See Calder vs.
Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390, 1 L. ed., 648, 650; Cummings vs. Missouri, 4
4
 Wall. 277, 326, 18 L. ed., 356, 364; Kring vs. Missouri, 107 U. S.
221, 228, 232, 27 L. ed., 507, 508, 510, 2 Ct. Rep., 443. And there
may be procedural changes which operate to deny to the
accused a defense available under the laws in force at the time of
the commission of his offense, or which otherwise affect him in
such a harsh and arbitrary manner as to fall within the
constitutional prohibition. Kring vs. Missouri, 107 U. S., 221, 27 L.
ed., 507, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep., 443; Thompson vs. Utah, 170 U. S., 343,
42 L. ed., 1061, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 620. But it is not well settled
that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of
evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and
which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his
disadvantage, are not prohibited. A statute which, after
indictment, enlarges the class of persons who may be witnesses
at the trial, by removing the disqualification of persons convicted
of felony, is not an ex post facto law. Hopt vs. Utah, 110 U. S.,
575, 28 L. ed., 263, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep., 202, 4 Am. Crim. Rep. 417.
Nor is a statute which changes the rules of evidence after the
indictment so as to render admissible against the accused
evidence previously held inadmissible, Thompson vs. Missouri,
171 U. S., 380, 43 L. ed., 204, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 922; or which
changes the place of trial, Gut. vs. Minnesota, 9 Wall. 35, 19 L.
ed., 573; or which abolishes a court for hearing criminal appeals,
creating a new one in its stead. See Duncan vs. Missouri, 152 U.
S., 377, 382, 38 L. ed., 485, 487, 14 sup. Ct. Rep., 570.
Tested by this standard, we do not believe that the curtailment of the
right of an accused in a preliminary investigation to cross-examine the
witnesses who had given evidence for his arrest is of such importance as
to offend against the constitutional inhibition. As we have said in the
beginning, preliminary investigation is not an essential part of due
process of law. It may be suppressed entirely, and if this may be done,
mere restriction of the privilege formerly enjoyed thereunder can not be
held to fall within the constitutional prohibition.
While section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the defendant the right to cross-
examine witnesses in a preliminary investigation, his right to present his
witnesses remains unaffected, and his constitutional right to be
informed of the charges against him both at such investigation and at
the trial is unchanged. In the latter stage of the proceedings, the only
stage where the guaranty of due process comes into play, he still enjoys
to the full extent the right to be confronted by and to cross-examine the
witnesses against him. The degree of importance of a preliminary
investigation to an accused may be gauged by the fact that this formality
is frequently waived.
The distinction between "remedy" and "substantive right" is incapable of
exact definition. The difference is somewhat a question of degree.
(Dexter vs. Edmands, 89 F., 467; Beazell vs. Ohio, supra.) It is difficult to
draw a line in any particular case beyond which legislative power over
remedy and procedure can pass without touching upon the substantive
rights of parties affected, as it is impossible to fix that boundary by
general condition. (State vs. Pavelick, 279 P., 1102.) This being so, it is
inevitable that the Supreme Court in making rules should step on
substantive rights, and the Constitution must be presumed to tolerate if
not to expect such incursion as does not affect the accused in a harsh
and arbitrary manner or deprive him of a defense, but operates only in a
limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage. For the Court's
power is not merely to compile, revise or codify the rules of procedure
existing at the time of the Constitution's approval. This power is "to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts," which is a power to adopt a general, complete and
comprehensive system of procedure, adding new and different rules
without regard to their source and discarding old ones.
The motion is denied.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, and Montemayor, JJ.,
concur.
FERIA, J., dissenting:
I dissent.
5
The motion for reconsideration must be granted.
According to the resolution, the right of a defendant to be confronted
with and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution in a
preliminary investigation granted by law or provided for in General
Orders, No. 58, as amended, in force prior to the promulgation of the
Rules of Court, is not a substantive right but a mere matter of procedure,
and therefore this Court can suppress it in section 11, Rule 108, of the
Rules of Court, for the following reasons:
First. Because "preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially
remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal prosecution." . . . "As a
rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural." . . . "The
entire rules of evidence have been incorporated into the Rules of Court."
And therefore "we can not tear down section 11 of Rule 108 on
constitutional grounds without throwing out the whole Code of evidence
embodied in these rules."
Secondly. Because, "preliminary investigation is not an essential part of
due process of law. It may be suppressed entirely, and if this may be
done, mere restriction of the privilege formerly enjoyed thereunder can
not be held to fall within the constitutional prohibition."
Lastly. Because, "the distinction between remedy and 'substantive right'
is incapable of exact definition. The difference is somewhat a question of
degree" . . . It is difficult to draw a line in any particular case beyond
which legislative power over remedy and procedure can pass without
touching upon the substantive rights of parties affected, as it is
impossible to fix that boundary by general condition. . . . "This being so,
it is inevitable that the Supreme Court in making rules should step on
substantive rights, and the Constitution must be presumed to tolerate if
not to expect such incursion as does not affect the accused in a harsh
and arbitrary manner or deprive him of a defense, but operates only in a
limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage."
Before proceeding it is necessary to distinguish substantive law from
procedure, for the distinction is not always well understood. Substantive
law is that part of the law which creates, defines, and regulates rights as
opposed to objective or procedural law which prescribes the method of
enforcing rights. What constitutes practice and procedure in the law is
the mode or proceeding by which a legal right is enforced, "that which
regulates the formal steps in an action or judicial proceedings; the
course of procedure in courts; the form, manner and order in which
proceedings have been, and are accustomed to be had; the form,
manner and order of carrying on and conducting suits or prosecutions in
the courts through their various sages according to the principles of law
and the rules laid down by the respective courts." 31 Cyc. Law and
Procedure, p. 1153; id., 32, section 405; Rapalje & Lawrence's Law
Dictionary; Anderson Law Dictionary; Bouvier's Law Dictionary.
Substantive rights may be created or granted either in the Constitution
or in any branch of the law, civil, criminal, administrative or procedural
law. In our old Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, as amended, there
are provisions which create, define and regulate substantive rights, and
many of those provisions such as those relating to guardianship,
adoption, evidence and many others are incorporated in the Rules of
Court for the sake of convenience and not because this Court is
empowered to promulgate them as rules of court. And our old law of
Criminal Procedure General Orders No. 58 grants the offended party the
right to commence a criminal action or file a complaint against the
offender and to intervene in the criminal prosecution against him, and
grants the defendant in the Court of First Instance (except in the City of
Manila) the right to bail, and to a preliminary investigation including his
rights during said investigation, and the rights at the trial, which are now
reproduced or incorporated in Rules 106, 108, 110, and 111 of the Rules
of Court, except the rights now in question. And all these, and others not
necessary for us to mention, are obviously substantive rights.
(1) As to the first argument, the premise "the preliminary investigation is
eminently and essentially remedial is not correct. Undoubtedly the
majority means to say procedural, in line with the conclusion in the
resolution, because remedial law is one thing, and procedural law is
another. Obviously they are different branches of the law. "Remedial
statute" is "a statute providing a remedy for an injury as distinguished
6
from a penal statute. A statute giving a party a mode of remedy for a
wrong where he had none or a different one before. . . . Remedial
statutes are those which are made to supply such defects, and abridge
such superfluities in the common law, as arise either from the general
imperfections of all human law, from change of time and circumstances,
from the mistakes and unadvised determination of unlearned (or even
learned) judges, or from any other cause whatsoever." (Black's Law
Dictionary, third edition, pp. 1525, 1526.)
It is also not correct to affirm that section 11 of Rule 108 relating to right
of defendant after arrest "is a rule of evidence and therefore is also
procedural." In the first place, the provisions of said section to the effect
that "the defendant, after the arrest and his delivery to the court has the
right to be informed of the complaint or information filed against him,
and also to be informed of the testimony and evidence presented
against him, and may be allowed to testify and present witnesses or
evidence for him if he so desires," are not rules of evidence; and in the
second place, it is evident that most of the rules of evidence, if not all,
are substantive laws that define, create or regulate rights, and not
procedural. "Rules of evidence are substantive rights found in common
law chiefly and growing out of reasoning, experience and common sense
of lawyers and courts." (State vs. Pavelich, et al., 279 P., 1102.) "It is true
that weighing of evidence and the rules of practice with respect thereto
form part of the law of procedure, but the classification of proofs is
sometime determined by the substantive law." (U. S. vs. Genato, 15 Phil.,
170, 176.) How can the law on judicial notice, conclusive as well as juris
tantum presumption, hearsay and best evidence rule, parol evidence
rule, interpretation of documents, competency of a person to testify as a
witness be considered procedural?
Therefore, the argumentative conclusion that "we can not tear down
section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without throwing out
the whole code of evidence embodied in these Rules," is evidently
wrong, not only for the reason just stated, but because our contention
that the defendant can not be deprived of his right to be confronted with
and cross-examine the witness of the prosecution is a preliminary
investigation under consideration would not, if upheld, necessarily tear
down said section. Our theory, is that said section 11 should be so
construed as to be valid and effective, that is, that if the defendant asks
the court to recall the witness or witnesses for the prosecution to testify
again in his presence, and to allow the former to cross-examine the
latter, the court or officer making the preliminary investigation is under
obligation to grant the request. But if the defendant does not so ask the
court, he should be considered as waiving his right to be confronted with
and cross-examine the witness against him.
(2) With respect to the second argument or reason, it is true that the
preliminary investigation as provided for in the General Orders, No. 58,
as amended, is not an essential part of due process of law, because "due
process of law" is not iron clad in its meaning; its does not necessarily
mean a particular procedure. Due process of law simply requires a
procedure that fully protects the life, liberty and property. For that
reason the investigation to be made by the City Fiscal of the City of
Manila under Act No. 612, now section 2465 of the Administrative Code,
before filing an information, was considered by this Court as sufficient to
satisfy the due process of law constitutional requirement (U. S. vs.
Ocampo, 18 Phil., 1; U. S. vs. Grant and Kennedy, 18 Phil., 122). But it is
also true that we have already and correctly held that: "The law having
explicitly recognized and established that no person charged with the
commission of a crime shall be deprived of his liberty or subjected to
trial without prior preliminary investigation (provided for in General
orders, No. 58, as amended) that shall show that there are reasonable
grounds to believe him guilty, there can be no doubt that the accused
who is deprived of his liberty, tried and sentenced without the proper
preliminary investigation having been made in his regard, is convicted
without the process of law," (United States vs. Banzuela, 31 Phil., 564).
The ruling in Beazell vs. Ohio, 269 U. S. 167, 70 Law. ed., 216, quoted in
the resolution, has no application to the present case, for the question
involved therein was the power of Congress to alter the rules of
evidence and procedure without violating the constitutional precept that
prohibits the passing of ex post facto law, while the question herein
involved is the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure, which diminish the substantive right of
7
a defendant, expressly prohibited by the same provision of the
Constitution that confers upon this Court the power to promulgate said
rules.
(3) The last reason or argument premised on the conclusion that "the
distinction between remedy and 'substantive right' is incapable of exact
definition;" indeed "the difference is somewhat a question of degree,"
(Dexter vs. Edmonds, 89 F 487), is immaterial, because, as we have
already said in refuting the majority's first reason, remedy and
procedure are two completely different things.
immediately a short time after his arrest after the preliminary
investigation, would have to be held for trial and wait for a considerable
period of time until the case is tried and acquitted after trial by the
Courts of First Instance in provinces on account of the admission of such
evidence in the preliminary investigation, evidence not admissible at the
trial.
Therefore, the motion for reconsideration is granted, and after the
necessary proceedings the decision of the majority reversed or modified
in accordance with my dissenting opinion.

As above defined, substantive law is clearly differentiated from PERFECTO, J.:

procedural law and practice. But even assuming arguendo that it is
difficult to draw the line in any particular case beyond which the power
of the court over procedure can not pass without touching upon the
substantial right of the parties, what this Court should do in that case
would be to abstain from promulgating such rule of procedure which
many increase, diminish or modify substantive right in order to avoid
violating the constitutional prohibition above referred to. Because as this
Supreme Court is not empowered by the Constitution to legislate on or
abrogate substantive rights, but only to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure which "shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights," this Court can not step on them in making the rules,
and the Constitution must be presumed not to tolerate nor expect such
incursion as would affect the substantive rights of the accused in any
manner.
We dissent. Our opinion in the Dequito case still stands. The motion for
reconsideration should be granted.
Sec. 11. Rights of defendant after arrest. — After the arrest of the
defendant and the delivery to the court, he shall be informed of the
complaint or information filed against him. He shall also be informed of
the substance of the testimony and evidence presented against him, and,
he desires to testify or to present witnesses or evidence in his favor, he
may be allowed to do so. The testimony of the witnesses need not be
reduce two writing but that of the defendant shall be taken in writing and
subscribed by him.

Besides, depriving an accused of his right to be confronted and cross-

examine the witness against him in a preliminary investigation would
affect the accused not in a limited and unsubstantial but in a harsh and
arbitrary manner. The testimony of a witness given in the absence of the
defendant and without an opportunity on the part of the latter to cross-
examine him is a hearsay evidence, and it should not be admitted against
the defendant in a preliminary investigation that is granted to the latter
as a protection against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions (U.
S. vs. Grant and Kennedy, supra). Otherwise, an accused who is innocent
and should not be arrested, or if arrested should be released
8

[G.R. No. 129742. September 16, 1998]
TERESITA G. FABIAN petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his
capacity as ombudsman; HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his
capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon; and NESTOR V.
AGUSTIN respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J:
Petitioner has appealed to us by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court from the "Joint Order" issued by public respondents on June 18,
1997 in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411 which granted the motion for
reconsideration of and absolved private respondents from administrative
charges for inter alia grave misconduct committed by him as then
Assistant Regional Director, Region IV-A, Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH).
I 1996, approved the aforesaid resolution with modifications, by finding
It appears from the statement and counter-statement of facts of the
parties that petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and
president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT)
which was engaged in the construction business. Private respondents
Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineering District (FMED)
when he allegedly committed the offenses for which he was
administratively charged in the Office in the office of the Ombudsman.
Promat participated in the bidding for government construction
project including those under the FMED, and private respondent,
reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled petitioner
into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the
course of which private respondents gifted PROMAT with public works
contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his
office.
Later, misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed
between the parties and when petitioner tried to terminate their
relationship, private respondent refused and resisted her attempts to do
so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and
threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case
against him in a letter-complaint dated July 24, 1995.
The said complaint sought the dismissal of private respondent for
violation of Section 19, Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989)
and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree), with
an ancillary prayer for his preventive suspension. For purposes of this
case, the charges referred to may be subsumed under the category of
oppression, misconduct, and disgraceful or immoral conduct.
On January 31, 1996, Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a
resolution finding private respondents guilty of grave misconduct and
ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits under
the law. His resolution bore the approval of Director Napoleon Baldrias
and Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera of their office.
Herein respondent Ombudsman, in an Order dated February 26,
private respondent guilty of misconduct and meting out the penalty of
suspension without pay for one year. After private respondent moved for
reconsideration, respondent Ombudsman discovered that the former's
new counsel had been his "classmate and close associate" hence he
inhibited himself. The case was transferred to respondent Deputy
Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero who, in the now challenged Joint Order of
June 18, 1997, set aside the February 26, 1997 Order of respondent
Ombudsman and exonerated private respondents from the administrative
charges.
II
In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic
Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989)[1]pertinently provides that -
1
In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by
filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the
written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion
for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
(Emphasis supplied)
However, she points out that under Section 7, Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the office of the
Ombudsman),[2] when a respondent is absolved of the charges in an
administrative proceeding decision of the ombudsman is final and
unappealable. She accordingly submits that the office of the ombudsman
has no authority under the law to restrict, in the manner provided in its
aforesaid Rules, the right of appeal allowed by Republic Act No. 6770, nor
to limit the power of review of this Court. Because of the aforecited
provision in those Rules of Procedure, she claims that she found it
"necessary to take an alternative recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, because of the doubt it creates on the availability of appeals
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Respondents filed their respective comments and rejoined that the
Office of the Ombudsman is empowered by the Constitution and the law
to promulgate its own rules of procedure. Section 13(8), Article XI of the
1987 Constitution provides, among others, that the Office of the
Ombudsman can "(p)romulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such
other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by
law."
Republic Act No. 6770 duly implements the Constitutional mandate
with these relevant provisions:
Sec. 14. Restrictions. - x x x No court shall hear any appeal or application
for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman except
the Supreme Court on pure question on law.
xxx
Sec. 18. Rules of Procedure. - (1) The Office of the Ombudsman shall
promulgate its own rules of procedure for the effective exercise or
performance of its powers, functions, and duties.
xxx
Sec. 23. Formal Investigation. - (1) Administrative investigations by the
Office of the Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules of
procedure and consistent with the due process. x x x
xxx
Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. - All provisionary orders at
the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the
Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt
of written notice shall be entertained only on any of the following
grounds:
xxx
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by
substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or
decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one month salary shall be final and
unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by
filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the
written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion
for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the
Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require.
2
 Respondents consequently contend that, on the foregoing
constitutional and statutory authority, petitioner cannot assail the validity
of the rules of procedure formulated by the Office of the Ombudsman
governing the conduct of proceeding before it, including those with
respect to the availabity or non-avalability of appeal in administrative
cases. Such as Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No.07.
Respondents also question the propriety of petitioner's proposition
that, although she definitely prefaced her petition by categorizing the
same as "an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court," she
makes the aforequoted ambivalent statement which in effect asks that,
should the remedy under Rule 45 be unavailable, her petition be treated
in the alternative as an original action for certiorari under Rule 65. The
parties thereafter engage in a discussion of the differences between a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65.
Ultimately, they also attempt to review and rationalize the decision
of this Court applying Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 vis--vis Section
7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07. As correctly pointed out by
public respondents, Ocampo IV vs. Ombudsman, et al.[3] and Young vs.
Office of the Ombudsman, et al.[4] were original actions
for certiorariunder Rule 65. Yabut vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et
al.[5] was commenced by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45. Then came Cruz, Jr. vs. People, et al.,[6] Olivas vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, et al., [7] Olivarez vs. Sandiganbayan, et al.,[8] and Jao, et al.
vs. Vasquez,[9] which were for certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus
under Rule 65. Alba vs. Nitorreda, et al.[10] was initiated by a pleading
unlikely denominated as an "Appeal/Petition for Certiorariand/or
Prohibition," with a prayer for ancillary remedies, and ultimately followed
by Constantino vs. Hon. Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, et al.[11] which was
a special civil action for certiorari.
Considering, however the view that this Court now takes of the case
at bar and the issues therein which will shortly be explained, it refrains
from preemptively resolving the controverted points raised by the parties
on the nature and propriety of application of the writ of certiorari when
used as a mode of appeal or as the basis of a special original action, and
whether or not they may be resorted to concurrently or alternatively,
obvious though the answers thereto appear to be.Besides, some
seemingly obiter statements in Yabuts and Alba could bear reexamination
and clarification. Hence, we will merely observe and lay down the rule at
this juncture that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is involved only
whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision
in an administrative diciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account
where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a
remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in a criminal action.
III
After respondents' separate comments had been filed, the Court was
intrigued by the fact, which does appear to have been seriously
considered before, that the administrative liability of a public official could
fall under the jurisdiction of both the Civil Service Commission and the
Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, the offenses imputed to herein private
respondent were based on both Section 19 of Republic Act. No. 6770 and
Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807. Yet, pursuant to the
amendment of section 9, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 by Republic Act No.
7902, all adjudications by Civil Service Commission in administrative
disciplinary cases were made appealable to the Court of Appeals effective
March 18, 1995, while those of the Office of the Ombudsman are
appealable to this Court.
It could thus be possible that in the same administrative case
involving two respondents, the proceedings against one could eventually
have been elevated to the Court of Appeals, while the other may have
found its way to the Ombudsman from which it is sought to be brought to
this Court. Yet systematic and efficient case management would dictate
the consolidation of those cases in the Court of Appeals, both for
expediency and to avoid possible conflicting decisions.
Then there is the consideration that Section 30, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution provides that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing the
appellate indiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution
without its advice and consent," and that Republic Act No. 6770, with its
challenged Section 27, took effect on November 17, 1989, obviously in
spite of that constitutional grounds must be raised by a party to the case,
3
neither of whom did so in this case, but that is not an inflexible rule, as we
shall explain.
Since the constitution is intended fort the observance of the judiciary
and other departments of the government and the judges are sworn to
support its provisions, the courts are not at liberty to overlook or
disregard its commands or countenance evasions thereof. When it is clear
that a statute trangresses the authority vested in a legislative body, it is
the duty of the courts to declare that the constitution, and not the statute,
governs in a case before them for judgement.[12]
Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional
questions which are not raised in the pleadings,[13] the rule has been
recognized to admit of certain exceptions. It does not preclude a court
from inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel it to enter a judgement
that it lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on which a court's jurisdiction
in a proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the court has no jurisdiction
in the proceeding, and since it may determine whether or not it has
jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that it may inquire into the
constitutionality of the statute.[14]
Constitutional question, not raised in the regular and orderly
procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the
court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which case it may
be raised at any time or on the court's own motion.[15] The Court ex mero
motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case
where the fact is developed.[16] The court has a clearly recognized right to
determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding.[17]
The foregoing authorities notwithstanding, the Court believed that
the parties hereto should be further heard on this constitutional
question. Correspondingly, the following resolution was issued on May
14, 1998, the material parts stating as follows:
The Court observes that the present petition, from the very allegations
thereof, is "an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
from the 'Joint Order (Re: Motion for Reconsideration)' issued in OMB-
Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411, entitled 'Teresita G. Fabian vs. Engr. Nestor V.
Agustin, Asst. Regional Director, Region IV-A, EDSA, Quezon City,' which
absolved the latter from the administrative charges for grave
misconduct, among other."
It is further averred therein that the present appeal to this Court is
allowed under Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1987 (R.A. No. 6770)
and, pursuant thereto, the Office of the Ombudsman issued its Rules of
Procedure, Section 7 whereof is assailed by petitioner in this
proceeding. It will be recalled that R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on
November 17, 1989, with Section 27 thereof pertinently providing that
all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to this Court in accordance
with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The Court notes, however, that neither the petition nor the two
comments thereon took into account or discussed the validity of the
aforestated Section 27 of R.A. No. 8770 in light of the provisions of
Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that "(n)o law shall be
passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as
provided in this Constitution without its advise and consent."
The Court also invites the attention of the parties to its relevant ruling
in First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals , et al. (G.R. No.
110571, October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA 519) and the provisions of its former
Circular No. 1-95,as now substantially reproduced in Rule 43 of the 1997
revision of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
In view of the fact that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court is invoked
and involved and in this case, and the foregoing legal consideration
appear to impugn the constitutionality and validity of the grant of said
appellate jurisdiction to it, the Court deems it necessary that the parties
be heard thereon and the issue be first resolved before conducting
further proceedings in this appellate review.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to require the parties to Submit their
position and arguments on the matter subject of this resolution by filing
their corresponding pleadings within ten (10) days from notice hereof.
4
 IV
The records do not show that the Office of the Solicitor General has
complied with such requirement, hence the Court dispenses with any
submission it should have presented. On the other hand, petitioner
espouses the theory that the provision in Section 27 of Republic Act No.
6770 which authorizes an appeal by certiorari to this Court of the
aforementioned adjudications of the Ombudsman is not violative of
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution. She claims that what is
proscribed is the passage of law "increasing" the appellate jurisdiction of
this Court "as provided in this Constitution," and such appellate
jurisdiction includes "all cases in which only an error or question of law is
involved."Since Section 5(2)(e), Article VIII of the Constitution authorizes
this Court to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal
or certiorari the aforesaid final judgement or orders "as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide," said Section 27 does not increase this Court
may provide," said section 27 does not increase this Court's appellate
jurisdiction since, by providing that the mode of appeal shall be by petition
for certiorari under Rule 45, then what may be raised therein are only
questions of law of which this Court already has of which this Court
already has jurisdiction.
We are not impressed by this discourse. It overlooks the fact that by
jurisprudential developments over the years, this Court has allowed
appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 in a substantial number of cases and
instances even if questions of fact are directly involved and have to be
resolved by the appellate court.[18] Also, the very provision cited by
petitioner specifies that the appellate jurisdiction of this Court
contemplated therein is to be exercised over "final judgements and orders
of lower courts," that is, the courts composing the integrated judicial
system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies, hence
whenever the legislature intends that the decisions or resolutions of the
quasi-judicial agency shall be reviewable by the Supreme Court or the
Court of Appeals, a specific provision to that effect is included in the law
creating that quasi-judicial agency and, for that matter, any special
statutory court. No such provision on appellate procedure is required for
the regular courts of the integrated judicial system because they are what
are referred to and already provided for in Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
Apropos to the foregoing, and as correctly observed by
private respondent, the revised Rules of Civil Procedure[19]preclude
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Supreme Court via a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45.In the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
Section 1 Rule 45, on "Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court,"
explicitly states:
SECTION 1 . Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A person desiring to
appeal by certiorari from a judgement or final order or Resolution of
the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or
other court whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme
Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise
only question of law which must be distinctly set forth. (Italics ours).
This differs from the former Rule 45 of the 1964 Rules of Court which
made mention only of the Court of Appeals, and had to be adopted in
statutes creating and providing for appeals from certain administrative or
quasi-judicial agencies, whenever the purpose was to restrict the scope of
the appeal to questions of law. That intended limitation on appellate
review, as we have just discussed, was not fully subserved by recourse to
the former Rule 45 but, then, at that time there was no uniform rule on
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies.
Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a
petition for review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders
of the courts enumerated in Section 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments
and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies[20] are now required to be
brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under
the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely
formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate
procedure for quasi-judicial agencies .[21]
It is suggested, however, that the provisions of Rule 43 should apply
only to "ordinary" quasi-judicial agencies, but not to the Office of the
Ombudsman which is a "high constitutional body." We see no reason for
5
this distinction for, if hierarchical rank should be a criterion, that
proposition thereby disregards the fact that Rule 43 even includes the
Office of the President and the Civil Service Commission, although the
latter is even an independent constitutional commission, unlike the Office
of the Ombudsman which is a constitutionally-mandated but statutorily
created body.
Regarding the misgiving that the review of the decision of the Office
of the Ombudsman by the Court of Appeals would cover questions of law,
of fact or of both, we do not perceive that as an objectionable
feature. After all, factual controversies are usually involved in
administrative disciplinary actions, just like those coming from the Civil
Service, Commission, and the Court of Appeals as a trier of fact is better
prepared than this Court to resolve the same. On the other hand, we
cannot have this situation covered by Rule 45 since it now applies only to
appeals from the regular courts.Neither can we place it under Rule 65
since the review therein is limited to jurisdictional questions.*
The submission that because this Court has taken cognizance of cases
involving Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, that fact may be viewed as
"acquiescence" or "acceptance" by it of the appellate jurisdiction
contemplated in said Section 27, is unfortunately too tenuous. The
jurisdiction of a court is not of acquiescence as a matter of fact but an
issue of conferment as a matter of law. Besides, we have already discussed
the cases referred to, including the inaccuracies of some statements
therein, and we have pointed out the instances when Rule 45 is involved,
hence covered by Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 now under
discussion, and when that provision would not apply if it is a judicial
review under Rule 65.
Private respondent invokes the rule that courts generally avoid
having to decide a constitutional question, especially when the case can
be decided on other grounds. As a general proposition that is
correct. Here, however, there is an actual case susceptible of judicial
determination. Also, the constitutional question, at the instance of this
Court, was raised by the proper parties, although there was even no need
for that because the Court can rule on the matter sua sponte when its
appellate jurisdiction is involved. The constitutional question was timely
raised, although it could even be raised any time likewise by reason of the
jurisdictional issue confronting the Court. Finally, the resolution of the
constitutional issue here is obviously necessary for the resolution of the
present case. [22]
It is, however, suggested that this case could also be decided on other
grounds, short of passing upon; the constitutional question. We
appreciate the ratiocination of private respondent but regret that we
must reject the same. That private respondent could be absolved of the
charge because the decision exonerating him is final and unappealable
assumes that Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 is valid, but
that is precisely one of the issues here. The prevailing rule that the Court
should not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting
or dismissing a complaint is not applicable in this administrative case, as
earlier explained. That two decisions rendered by this Court supposedly
imply the validity of the aforementioned Section 7 of Rule III is precisely
under review here because of some statements therein somewhat at odds
with settled rules and the decisions of this Court on the same issues, hence
to invoke the same would be to beg the question.
V
Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and
effects, therefore, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly
authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates
the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law
which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing
argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the
constitutional prohibition which, as correctly explained in First Leparto
Ceramics, Inc. vs.The Court of Appeals, el al. [23] was intended to give this
Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate
Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation
enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the
Court [24]
We perforce have to likewise reject the supposed inconsistency of
the ruling in First Lepanto Ceramics and some statements in Yabut and
Alba, not only because of the difference in the factual settings, but also
6
because those isolated cryptic statements in Yabut and Alba should best
be clarified in the adjudication on the merits of this case. By way of
anticipation, that will have to be undertaken by the proper court of
competent jurisdiction.
Furthermore in addition to our preceding discussion on whether
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 expanded the jurisdiction of this Court
without its advice and consent, private respondent's position paper
correctly yields the legislative background of Republic Act No. 6770. On
September 26, 1989, the Conference Committee Report on S.B. No. 453
and H.B. No. 13646, setting forth the new version of what would later be
Republic Act No. 6770, was approved on second reading by the House of
Representatives.[25] The Senate was informed of the approval of the final
version of the Act on October 2, 1989 [26] and the same was thereafter
enacted into law by President Aquino on November 17, 1989.
Submitted with said position paper is an excerpt showing that the
Senate, in the deliberations on the procedure for appeal from the Office
of the Ombudsman to this Court, was aware of the provisions of Section
30, Article III of the Constitution. It also reveals that Senator Edgardo
Angara, as a co-author and the principal sponsor of S.B. No. 543 admitted
that the said provision will expand this Court's jurisdiction, and that the
Committee on Justice and Human Rights had not consulted this Court on
the matter, thus:
INTERPELLATION OF SENATOR SHAHANI
xxx
Thereafter, with reference to Section 22(4) which provides that the
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the
Supreme Court, in reply to Senator Shahani's query whether the Supreme
Court would agree to such provision in the light of Section 30, Article VI of
the Constitution which requires its advice and concurrence in laws
increasing its appellate jurisdiction, Senator Angara informed that the
Committee has not yet consulted the Supreme Court regarding the
matter. He agreed that the provision will expand the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction by allowing appeals through petitions for review, adding that
they should be appeals on certiorari.[27] There is no showing that even up
to its enactment, Republic Act No. 6770 was ever referred to this Court for
its advice and consent .[28]
VI
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act
No. 6770 should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the
regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be
taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.
There is an intimation in the pleadings, however, that said Section 27
refers to appellate jurisdiction which, being substantive in nature, cannot
be disregarded by this Court under its rule-making power, especially if it
results in a diminution, increase or modification of substantive
rights. Obviously, however, where the law is procedural in essence and
purpose, the foregoing consideration would not pose a proscriptive issue
against the exercise of the rule-making power of this Court. This brings to
fore the question of whether Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is
substantive or procedural.
It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those
rules or statutes which are procedural, hence within the scope of this
Court's rule-making power, and those which are substantive. In fact, a
particular rule may be procedural in one context and substantive in
another.[29] It is admitted that what is procedural and what is substantive
is frequently a question of great difficulty.[30] It is not, however, an
insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic approach is taken
within the context of our own procedural and jurisdictional system.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for
the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or
modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates
procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and
redress for a disregard or infraction of them.[31] If the rule takes away a
vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right
7
to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are hereby declared
a means o implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with INVALID and of no further force and effect.
procedure.[32]
The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred to the Court
In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the Supreme Court, of Appeals for final disposition, with said petition to be considered by the
in the exercise of its rule-making power, of pending cases involving a Court of Appeals pro hac vice as a petition for review under Rule 43,
review of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative without prejudice to its requiring the parties to submit such amended or
disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which shall now be vested with supplemental pleadings and additional documents or records as it may
exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to procedure deem necessary and proper.
only.[33] This is so because it is not the right to appeal of an aggrieved party
SO ORDERED.
which is affected by the law. That right has been preserved. Only the
procedure by which the appeal is to be made or decided has been
changed. The rationale for this is that litigant has a vested right in a
particular remedy, which may be changed by substitution without
impairing vested rights, hence he can have none in rules of procedure
which relate to the remedy.[34]
Furthermore, it cannot be said that transfer of appellate jurisdiction
to the Court of Appeals in this case is an act of creating a new right of
appeal because such power of the Supreme Court to transfer appeals to
subordinate appellate courts is purely a procedural and not a substantive
power. Neither can we consider such transfer as impairing a vested right
because the parties have still a remedy and still a competent tribunal to
administer that remedy.[35]
Thus, it has been generally held that rules or statutes involving a
transfer of cases from one court to another, are procedural and remedial
merely and that, as such, they are applicable to actions pending at the
time the statute went into effect[36] or, in the case at bar, when its
invalidity was declared. Accordingly, even from the standpoint of
jurisdiction ex hypothesi the validity of the transfer of appeals in said cases
to the Court of Appeals can be sustained.
WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act
of 1989), together with Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07
(Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), and any other
provision of law or issuance implementing the aforesaid Act and insofar
as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the

8

G.R. No. 149453. April 1, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, DIRECTOR
GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, CHIEF STATE
PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO ZUO, STATE PROSECUTORS PETER L. ONG and
RUBEN A. ZACARIAS; 2ND ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR CONRADO M.
JAMOLIN and CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY CLARO
ARELLANO, petitioners, vs. PANFILO M. LACSON, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration1 of the
Resolution2dated May 28, 2002, remanding this case to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 81, for the determination of
several factual issues relative to the application of Section 8 of Rule 117
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the dismissal of Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 filed against the respondent and
his co-accused with the said court. In the aforesaid criminal cases, the
respondent and his co-accused were charged with multiple murder for
the shooting and killing of eleven male persons identified as Manuel
Montero, a former Corporal of the Philippine Army, Rolando Siplon,
Sherwin Abalora, who was 16 years old, Ray Abalora, who was 19 years
old, Joel Amora, Jevy Redillas, Meleubren Sorronda, who was 14 years
old,3 Pacifico Montero, Jr., of the 44th Infantry Batallion of the Philippine
Army, Welbor Elcamel, SPO1 Carlito Alap-ap of the Zamboanga PNP, and
Alex Neri, former Corporal of the 44th Infantry Batallion of the Philippine
Army, bandied as members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. The
respondent opposed petitioners motion for
reconsideration.4cräläwvirtualibräry
The Court ruled in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered that the
provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689
were with the express consent of the respondent as he himself moved
for said provisional dismissal when he filed his motion for judicial
determination of probable cause and for examination of witnesses. The
Court also held therein that although Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure could be given retroactive effect, there is
still a need to determine whether the requirements for its application
are attendant. The trial court was thus directed to resolve the following:
... (1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the express
consent of the accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the court after
notice to the offended party; (3) whether the 2-year period to revive it
has already lapsed; (4) whether there is any justification for the filing of
the cases beyond the 2-year period; (5) whether notices to the offended
parties were given before the cases of respondent Lacson were
dismissed by then Judge Agnir; (6) whether there were affidavits of
desistance executed by the relatives of the three (3) other victims; (7)
whether the multiple murder cases against respondent Lacson are being
revived within or beyond the 2-year bar.
The Court further held that the reckoning date of the two-year bar had
to be first determined whether it shall be from the date of the order of
then Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the cases, or from the dates of receipt
thereof by the various offended parties, or from the date of effectivity of
the new rule. According to the Court, if the cases were revived only after
the two-year bar, the State must be given the opportunity to justify its
failure to comply with the said time-bar. It emphasized that the new rule
fixes a time-bar to penalize the State for its inexcusable delay in
prosecuting cases already filed in court. However, the State is not
precluded from presenting compelling reasons to justify the revival of
cases beyond the two-year bar.
In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioners contend
that (a) Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is
not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689; and (b)
the time-bar in said rule should not be applied retroactively.
The Court shall resolve the issues seriatim.
1
I. SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO CRIMINAL CASES NOS. Q-99-81679
TO Q-99-81689.
The petitioners aver that Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure is not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679
to Q-99-81689 because the essential requirements for its application
were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr., issued his resolution of March
29, 1999. Disagreeing with the ruling of the Court, the petitioners
maintain that the respondent did not give his express consent to the
dismissal by Judge Agnir, Jr., of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689. The respondent allegedly admitted in his pleadings filed with the
Court of Appeals and during the hearing thereat that he did not file any
motion to dismiss said cases, or even agree to a provisional dismissal
thereof. Moreover, the heirs of the victims were allegedly not given prior
notices of the dismissal of the said cases by Judge Agnir, Jr. According to
the petitioners, the respondents express consent to the provisional
dismissal of the cases and the notice to all the heirs of the victims of the
respondents motion and the hearing thereon are conditions sine qua
non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the
new rule.
The petitioners further submit that it is not necessary that the case be
remanded to the RTC to determine whether private complainants were
notified of the March 22, 1999 hearing on the respondents motion for
judicial determination of the existence of probable cause. The records
allegedly indicate clearly that only the handling city prosecutor was
furnished a copy of the notice of hearing on said motion. There is
allegedly no evidence that private prosecutor Atty. Godwin Valdez was
properly retained and authorized by all the private complainants to
represent them at said hearing. It is their contention that Atty. Valdez
merely identified the purported affidavits of desistance and that he did
not confirm the truth of the allegations therein.
The respondent, on the other hand, insists that, as found by the Court in
its Resolution and Judge Agnir, Jr. in his resolution, the respondent
himself moved for the provisional dismissal of the criminal cases. He
cites the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. stating that the respondent and
the other accused filed separate but identical motions for the dismissal
of the criminal cases should the trial court find no probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest against them.
The respondent further asserts that the heirs of the victims, through the
public and private prosecutors, were duly notified of said motion and the
hearing thereof. He contends that it was sufficient that the public
prosecutor was present during the March 22, 1999 hearing on the
motion for judicial determination of the existence of probable cause
because criminal actions are always prosecuted in the name of the
People, and the private complainants merely prosecute the civil aspect
thereof.
The Court has reviewed the records and has found the contention of the
petitioners meritorious.
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed
except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the
offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become
permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case
having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by
imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall
become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the
case having been revived.
Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors and
before the Court of Appeals, the respondent is burdened to establish the
essential requisites of the first paragraph thereof, namely:
1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the
accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or
2
both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of
the case;
2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal
of the case;
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case
provisionally;
4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional
dismissal of the case.
The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the
application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the new rule.
The raison d etre for the requirement of the express consent of the
accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from
subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place him
in double jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense necessarily
included therein.5cräläwvirtualibräry
Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of
dismissal shall become permanent one year after the issuance thereof
without the case having been revived, the provision should be construed
to mean that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year
after service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has
control of the prosecution6 without the criminal case having been
revived. The public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the
timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal.
Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in
writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no
inference or implication to supply its meaning.7 Where the accused
writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the
case No objection or With my conformity, the writing amounts to express
consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case.8 The mere
inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for a provisional dismissal
of the case9 or his failure to object to a provisional dismissal10 does not
amount to express consent.
A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express
consent to such provisional dismissal.11 If a criminal case is provisionally
dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may be
revived only within the periods provided in the new rule. On the other
hand, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed without the express
consent of the accused or over his objection, the new rule would not
apply. The case may be revived or refiled even beyond the prescribed
periods subject to the right of the accused to oppose the same on the
ground of double jeopardy12 or that such revival or refiling is barred by
the statute of limitations.13cräläwvirtualibräry
The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the
refiling of the Information or by the filing of a new Information for the
same offense or an offense necessarily included therein. There would be
no need of a new preliminary investigation.14 However, in a case wherein
after the provisional dismissal of a criminal case, the original witnesses of
the prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies or
may have died or may no longer be available and new witnesses for the
State have emerged, a new preliminary investigation15 must be
conducted before an Information is refiled or a new Information is filed.
A new preliminary investigation is also required if aside from the original
accused, other persons are charged under a new criminal complaint for
the same offense or necessarily included therein; or if under a new
criminal complaint, the original charge has been upgraded; or if under a
new criminal complaint, the criminal liability of the accused is upgraded
from that as an accessory to that as a principal. The accused must be
accorded the right to submit counter-affidavits and evidence. After all,
the fiscal is not called by the Rules of Court to wait in ambush; the role of
a fiscal is not mainly to prosecute but essentially to do justice to every
man and to assist the court in dispensing that
justice.16cräläwvirtualibräry
In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second
requisites of the first paragraph of the new rule were present when
3
Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689. Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any motion for the
provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. For his part, the
respondent merely filed a motion for judicial determination of probable
cause and for examination of prosecution witnesses alleging that under
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and the decision of this Court
in Allado v. Diokno,17among other cases, there was a need for the trial
court to conduct a personal determination of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against respondent and to have the
prosecutions witnesses summoned before the court for its examination.
The respondent contended therein that until after the trial court shall
have personally determined the presence of probable cause, no warrant
of arrest should be issued against the respondent and if one had already
been issued, the warrant should be recalled by the trial court. He then
prayed therein that:
1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2,
Article III of the Constitution be conducted by this Honorable Court, and
for this purpose, an order be issued directing the prosecution to present
the private complainants and their witnesses at a hearing scheduled
therefor; and
2) warrants for the arrest of the accused-movants be withheld, or, if
issued, recalled in the meantime until the resolution of this incident.
Other equitable reliefs are also prayed for.18cräläwvirtualibräry
The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise,
of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Neither did he ever
agree, impliedly or expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the
cases. In fact, in his reply filed with the Court of Appeals, respondent
emphasized that:
... An examination of the Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause and for Examination of Prosecution Witnesses filed by the
petitioner and his other co-accused in the said criminal cases would
show that the petitioner did not pray for the dismissal of the case. On
the contrary, the reliefs prayed for therein by the petitioner are: (1) a
judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III
of the Constitution; and (2) that warrants for the arrest of the accused be
withheld, or if issued, recalled in the meantime until the resolution of the
motion. It cannot be said, therefore, that the dismissal of the case was
made with the consent of the petitioner. A copy of the aforesaid motion
is hereto attached and made integral part hereof as Annex
A.19cräläwvirtualibräry
During the hearing in the Court of Appeals on July 31, 2001, the
respondent, through counsel, categorically, unequivocally, and definitely
declared that he did not file any motion to dismiss the criminal cases nor
did he agree to a provisional dismissal thereof, thus:
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And it is your stand that the dismissal made by the Court was
provisional in nature?
ATTY. FORTUN:
It was in (sic) that the accused did not ask for it. What they
wanted at the onset was simply a judicial determination of
probable cause for warrants of arrest issued. Then Judge Agnir,
upon the presentation by the parties of their witnesses,
particularly those who had withdrawn their affidavits, made one
further conclusion that not only was this case lacking in probable
cause for purposes of the issuance of an arrest warrant but also it
did not justify proceeding to trial.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And it is expressly provided under Section 8 that a case shall not be
provisionally dismissed except when it is with the express
conformity of the accused.
ATTY. FORTUN:
4
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And with notice to the offended party.
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
Was there an express conformity on the part of the accused?
ATTY. FORTUN:
There was none, Your Honor. We were not asked to sign any
order, or any statement, which would normally be required by
the Court on pre-trial or on other matters, including other
provisional dismissal. My very limited practice in criminal courts,
Your Honor, had taught me that a judge must be very careful on
this matter of provisional dismissal. In fact they ask the accused to
come forward, and the judge himself or herself explains the
implications of a provisional dismissal. Pumapayag ka ba dito.
Puwede bang pumirma ka?
JUSTICE ROSARIO:
You were present during the proceedings?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE ROSARIO:
You represented the petitioner in this case?
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor. And there was nothing of that sort
which the good Judge Agnir, who is most knowledgeable in
criminal law, had done in respect of provisional dismissal or the
matter of Mr. Lacson agreeing to the provisional dismissal of the
case.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Now, you filed a motion, the other accused then filed a motion for
a judicial determination of probable cause?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Did you make any alternative prayer in your motion that if there is
no probable cause what should the Court do?
ATTY. FORTUN:
That the arrest warrants only be withheld. That was the only
prayer that we asked. In fact, I have a copy of that particular
motion, and if I may read my prayer before the Court, it said:
Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that (1) a judicial
determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III
of the Constitution be conducted, and for this purpose, an order be
issued directing the prosecution to present the private
complainants and their witnesses at the scheduled hearing for that
purpose; and (2) the warrants for the arrest of the accused be
withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the meantime until resolution of
this incident.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
5
There is no general prayer for any further relief?
ATTY. FORTUN:
There is but it simply says other equitable reliefs are prayed for.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Dont you surmise Judge Agnir, now a member of this Court,
precisely addressed your prayer for just and equitable relief to
dismiss the case because what would be the net effect of a
situation where there is no warrant of arrest being issued without
dismissing the case?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor. I will not second say (sic) yes the Good Justice,
but what is plain is we did not agree to the provisional dismissal,
neither were we asked to sign any assent to the provisional
dismissal.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
If you did not agree to the provisional dismissal did you not file any
motion for reconsideration of the order of Judge Agnir that the
case should be dismissed?
ATTY. FORTUN:
I did not, Your Honor, because I knew fully well at that time that
my client had already been arraigned, and the arraignment was
valid as far as I was concerned. So, the dismissal, Your Honor, by
Judge Agnir operated to benefit me, and therefore I did not take
any further step in addition to rocking the boat or clarifying the
matter further because it probably could prejudice the interest of
my client.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Continue.20
In his memorandum in lieu of the oral argument filed with the Court of
Appeals, the respondent declared in no uncertain terms that:
Soon thereafter, the SC in early 1999 rendered a decision declaring the
Sandiganbayan without jurisdiction over the cases. The records were
remanded to the QC RTC: Upon raffle, the case was assigned to Branch
81. Petitioner and the others promptly filed a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause (Annex B). He asked that warrants for
his arrest not be issued. He did not move for the dismissal of the
Informations, contrary to respondent OSGs claim.21cräläwvirtualibräry
The respondents admissions made in the course of the proceedings in
the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive on him. The respondent
is barred from repudiating his admissions absent evidence of palpable
mistake in making such admissions.22cräläwvirtualibräry
To apply the new rule in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689
would be to add to or make exceptions from the new rule which are not
expressly or impliedly included therein. This the Court cannot and should
not do.23cräläwvirtualibräry
The Court also agrees with the petitioners contention that no notice of
any motion for the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689 or of the hearing thereon was served on the heirs
of the victims at least three days before said hearing as mandated by
Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. It must be borne in mind that in
crimes involving private interests, the new rule requires that the
offended party or parties or the heirs of the victims must be given
adequate a priorinotice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of the
criminal case. Such notice may be served on the offended party or the
heirs of the victim through the private prosecutor, if there is one, or
through the public prosecutor who in turn must relay the notice to the
offended party or the heirs of the victim to enable them to confer with
6
him before the hearing or appear in court during the hearing. The proof
of such service must be shown during the hearing on the motion,
otherwise, the requirement of the new rule will become illusory. Such
notice will enable the offended party or the heirs of the victim the
opportunity to seasonably and effectively comment on or object to the
motion on valid grounds, including: (a) the collusion between the
prosecution and the accused for the provisional dismissal of a criminal
case thereby depriving the State of its right to due process; (b) attempts
to make witnesses unavailable; or (c) the provisional dismissal of the
case with the consequent release of the accused from detention would
enable him to threaten and kill the offended party or the other
prosecution witnesses or flee from Philippine jurisdiction, provide
opportunity for the destruction or loss of the prosecutions physical and
other evidence and prejudice the rights of the offended party to recover
on the civil liability of the accused by his concealment or furtive
disposition of his property or the consequent lifting of the writ of
preliminary attachment against his property.
In the case at bar, even if the respondents motion for a determination of
probable cause and examination of witnesses may be considered for the
nonce as his motion for a provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-
99-81679 to Q-99-81689, however, the heirs of the victims were not
notified thereof prior to the hearing on said motion on March 22, 1999.
It must be stressed that the respondent filed his motion only on March
17, 1999 and set it for hearing on March 22, 1999 or barely five days
from the filing thereof. Although the public prosecutor was served with a
copy of the motion, the records do not show that notices thereof were
separately given to the heirs of the victims or that subpoenae were
issued to and received by them, including those who executed their
affidavits of desistance who were residents of Dipolog City or Pian,
Zamboanga del Norte or Palompon, Leyte.24 There is as well no proof in
the records that the public prosecutor notified the heirs of the victims of
said motion or of the hearing thereof on March 22, 1999. Although Atty.
Valdez entered his appearance as private prosecutor,25 he did so only for
some but not all the close kins of the victims, namely, Nenita Alap-ap,
Imelda Montero, Margarita Redillas, Rufino Siplon, Carmelita Elcamel,
Myrna Abalora, and Leonora Amora who (except for Rufino
Siplon)26executed their respective affidavits of desistance.27 There was
no appearance for the heirs of Alex Neri, Pacifico Montero, Jr., and
Meleubren Sorronda. There is no proof on record that all the heirs of the
victims were served with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr.
dismissing the said cases. In fine, there never was any attempt on the
part of the trial court, the public prosecutor and/or the private
prosecutor to notify all the heirs of the victims of the respondents
motion and the hearing thereon and of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr.
dismissing said cases. The said heirs were thus deprived of their right to
be heard on the respondents motion and to protect their interests either
in the trial court or in the appellate court.
Since the conditions sine qua non for the application of the new rule
were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution, the State is
not barred by the time limit set forth in the second paragraph of Section
8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State can
thus revive or refile Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or
file new Informations for multiple murder against the respondent.
II. THE TIME-BAR IN SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY.
The petitioners contend that even on the assumption that the
respondent expressly consented to a provisional dismissal of Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 and all the heirs of the victims
were notified of the respondents motion before the hearing thereon and
were served with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing
the eleven cases, the two-year bar in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure should be applied prospectively and not
retroactively against the State. To apply the time limit retroactively to
the criminal cases against the respondent and his co-accused would
violate the right of the People to due process, and unduly impair, reduce,
and diminish the States substantive right to prosecute the accused for
multiple murder. They posit that under Article 90 of the Revised Penal
Code, the State had twenty years within which to file the criminal
complaints against the accused. However, under the new rule, the State
only had two years from notice of the public prosecutor of the order of
7
dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 within which
to revive the said cases. When the new rule took effect on December 1,
2000, the State only had one year and three months within which to
revive the cases or refile the Informations. The period for the State to
charge respondent for multiple murder under Article 90 of the Revised
Penal Code was considerably and arbitrarily reduced. They submit that in
case of conflict between the Revised Penal Code and the new rule, the
former should prevail. They also insist that the State had consistently
relied on the prescriptive periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal
Code. It was not accorded a fair warning that it would forever be barred
beyond the two-year period by a retroactive application of the new
rule.28Petitioners thus pray to the Court to set aside its Resolution of
May 28, 2002.
For his part, the respondent asserts that the new rule under Section 8 of
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure may be applied
retroactively since there is no substantive right of the State that may be
impaired by its application to the criminal cases in question since [t]he
States witnesses were ready, willing and able to provide their testimony
but the prosecution failed to act on these cases until it became politically
expedient in April 2001 for them to do so.29 According to the
respondent, penal laws, either procedural or substantive, may be
retroactively applied so long as they favor the accused.30 He asserts that
the two-year period commenced to run on March 29, 1999 and lapsed
two years thereafter was more than reasonable opportunity for the
State to fairly indict him.31 In any event, the State is given the right under
the Courts assailed Resolution to justify the filing of the Information in
Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 beyond the time-bar under
the new rule.
The respondent insists that Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure does not broaden the substantive right of double
jeopardy to the prejudice of the State because the prohibition against
the revival of the cases within the one-year or two-year periods provided
therein is a legal concept distinct from the prohibition against the revival
of a provisionally dismissed case within the periods stated in Section 8 of
Rule 117. Moreover, he claims that the effects of a provisional dismissal
under said rule do not modify or negate the operation of the prescriptive
period under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. Prescription under
the Revised Penal Code simply becomes irrelevant upon the application
of Section 8, Rule 117 because a complaint or information has already
been filed against the accused, which filing tolls the running of the
prescriptive period under Article 90.32cräläwvirtualibräry
The Court agrees with the respondent that the new rule is not a statute
of limitations. Statutes of limitations are construed as acts of grace, and
a surrender by the sovereign of its right to prosecute or of its right to
prosecute at its discretion. Such statutes are considered as equivalent to
acts of amnesty founded on the liberal theory that prosecutions should
not be allowed to ferment endlessly in the files of the government to
explode only after witnesses and proofs necessary for the protection of
the accused have by sheer lapse of time passed beyond availability.33The
periods fixed under such statutes are jurisdictional and are essential
elements of the offenses covered.34cräläwvirtualibräry
On the other hand, the time-bar under Section 8 of Rule 117 is akin to a
special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to
prosecute making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an
inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to
extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the
accused.35cräläwvirtualibräry
The time-bar under the new rule does not reduce the periods under
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, a substantive law.36 It is but a
limitation of the right of the State to revive a criminal case against the
accused after the Information had been filed but subsequently
provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused. Upon
the lapse of the timeline under the new rule, the State is presumed,
albeit disputably, to have abandoned or waived its right to revive the
case and prosecute the accused. The dismissal becomes ipso
facto permanent. He can no longer be charged anew for the same crime
or another crime necessarily included therein.37 He is spared from the
anguish and anxiety as well as the expenses in any new
indictments.38 The State may revive a criminal case beyond the one-year
8
or two-year periods provided that there is a justifiable necessity for the
delay.39 By the same token, if a criminal case is dismissed on motion of
the accused because the trial is not concluded within the period
therefor, the prescriptive periods under the Revised Penal Code are not
thereby diminished.40But whether or not the prosecution of the accused
is barred by the statute of limitations or by the lapse of the time-line
under the new rule, the effect is basically the same. As the State
Supreme Court of Illinois held:
This, in effect, enacts that when the specified period shall have arrived,
the right of the state to prosecute shall be gone, and the liability of the
offender to be punishedto be deprived of his libertyshall cease. Its terms
not only strike down the right of action which the state had acquired by
the offense, but also remove the flaw which the crime had created in the
offenders title to liberty. In this respect, its language goes deeper than
statutes barring civil remedies usually do. They expressly take away only
the remedy by suit, and that inferentially is held to abate the right which
such remedy would enforce, and perfect the title which such remedy
would invade; but this statute is aimed directly at the very right which
the state has against the offenderthe right to punish, as the only liability
which the offender has incurred, and declares that this right and this
liability are at an end. 41cräläwvirtualibräry
The Court agrees with the respondent that procedural laws may be
applied retroactively. As applied to criminal law, procedural law provides
or regulates the steps by which one who has committed a crime is to be
punished. In Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,42 this Court held that:
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants rights
may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The
retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a
person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive
application of procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The
reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise
from, procedural laws. It has been held that a person has no vested right
in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to
the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the
existing rules of procedure.
It further ruled therein that a procedural law may not be applied
retroactively if to do so would work injustice or would involve intricate
problems of due process or impair the independence of the Court. In
a per curiam decision in Cipriano v. City of Houma,43 the United States
Supreme Court ruled that where a decision of the court would produce
substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample
basis for avoiding the injustice of hardship by a holding of
nonretroactivity.44A construction of which a statute is fairly susceptible is
favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible,
wrongful, and injurious consequences.45This Court should not adopt an
interpretation of a statute which produces absurd, unreasonable, unjust,
or oppressive results if such interpretation could be avoided.46 Time and
again, this Court has decreed that statutes are to be construed in light of
the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. In
construing a statute, the reason for the enactment should be kept in
mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the
intended scope and purpose.47cräläwvirtualibräry
Remedial legislation, or procedural rule, or doctrine of the Court
designed to enhance and implement the constitutional rights of parties
in criminal proceedings may be applied retroactively or prospectively
depending upon several factors, such as the history of the new rule, its
purpose and effect, and whether the retrospective application will
further its operation, the particular conduct sought to be remedied and
the effect thereon in the administration of justice and of criminal laws in
particular.48 In a per curiam decision in Stefano v. Woods,49 the United
States Supreme Court catalogued the factors in determining whether a
new rule or doctrine enunciated by the High Court should be given
retrospective or prospective effect:
(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the
reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the
9
effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the
new standards.
In this case, the Court agrees with the petitioners that the time-bar of
two years under the new rule should not be applied retroactively against
the State.
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a
time-bar of one year or two years for the revival of criminal cases
provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused and
with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on
first impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90
of the Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court
balanced the societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly
and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the
State and the accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both
the State and of the accused to due process. The Court believed that the
time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally
dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the
offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected
unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or insufficient that
the rule becomes a denial of justice.50 The petitioners failed to show a
manifest shortness or insufficiency of the time-bar.
The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of
the Rules and approved by the Court en bancprimarily to enhance the
administration of the criminal justice system and the rights to due
process of the State and the accused by eliminating the deleterious
practice of trial courts of provisionally dismissing criminal cases on
motion of either the prosecution or the accused or jointly, either with no
time-bar for the revival thereof or with a specific or definite period for
such revival by the public prosecutor. There were times when such
criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due to causes beyond
the control of the public prosecutor or because of the indolence, apathy
or the lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to the prejudice of the
State and the accused despite the mandate to public prosecutors and
trial judges to expedite criminal proceedings.51cräläwvirtualibräry
It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it
usually operates in his favor,52 especially if he greatly fears the
consequences of his trial and conviction. He is hesitant to disturb the
hushed inaction by which dominant cases have been known to
expire.53cräläwvirtualibräry
The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair
or reduce the capacity of the State to prove its case with the
disappearance or nonavailability of its witnesses. Physical evidence may
have been lost. Memories of witnesses may have grown dim or have
faded. Passage of time makes proof of any fact more difficult.54 The
accused may become a fugitive from justice or commit another crime.
The longer the lapse of time from the dismissal of the case to the revival
thereof, the more difficult it is to prove the crime.
On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a
criminal case does not terminate a criminal case. The possibility that the
case may be revived at any time may disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the
chances of the accused for employment, curtail his association, subject
him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him and his family. He is
unable to lead a normal life because of community suspicion and his own
anxiety. He continues to suffer those penalties and disabilities
incompatible with the presumption of innocence.55 He may also lose his
witnesses or their memories may fade with the passage of time. In the
long run, it may diminish his capacity to defend himself and thus eschew
the fairness of the entire criminal justice system.56cräläwvirtualibräry
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the
malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal justice system for
the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused only.
The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar
retroactively so that the two-year period commenced to run on March
31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of the resolution
of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the
intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving the State two years to
revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than
10
two years to do so. Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 on March 29, 1999. The new rule took effect
on December 1, 2000. If the Court applied the new time-bar
retroactively, the State would have only one year and three months or
until March 31, 2001 within which to revive these criminal cases. The
period is short of the two-year period fixed under the new rule. On the
other hand, if the time limit is applied prospectively, the State would
have two years from December 1, 2000 or until December 1, 2002 within
which to revive the cases. This is in consonance with the intendment of
the new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus prevent injustice to the State
and avoid absurd, unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful
results in the administration of justice.
The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999 should be excluded
in the computation of the two-year period because the rule prescribing it
was not yet in effect at the time and the State could not be expected to
comply with the time-bar. It cannot even be argued that the State
waived its right to revive the criminal cases against respondent or that it
was negligent for not reviving them within the two-year period under
the new rule. As the United States Supreme Court said, per Justice Felix
Frankfurter, in Griffin v. People:57cräläwvirtualibräry
We should not indulge in the fiction that the law now announced has
always been the law and, therefore, that those who did not avail
themselves of it waived their rights .
The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the
State and the accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an
inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided
merely to benefit the accused. For to do so would cause an injustice of
hardship to the State and adversely affect the administration of justice in
general and of criminal laws in particular.
To require the State to give a valid justification as a condition sine qua
non to the revival of a case provisionally dismissed with the express
consent of the accused before the effective date of the new rule is to
assume that the State is obliged to comply with the time-bar under the
new rule before it took effect. This would be a rank denial of justice. The
State must be given a period of one year or two years as the case may be
from December 1, 2000 to revive the criminal case without requiring the
State to make a valid justification for not reviving the case before the
effective date of the new rule. Although in criminal cases, the accused is
entitled to justice and fairness, so is the State. As the United States
Supreme Court said, per Mr. Justice Benjamin Cardozo, in Snyder v. State
of Massachussetts,58 the concept of fairness must not be strained till it is
narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true. In Dimatulac v.
Villon,59 this Court emphasized that the judges action must not impair
the substantial rights of the accused nor the right of the State and
offended party to due process of law. This Court further said:
Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be
dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of society and the
offended parties which have been wronged must be equally considered.
Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice; and an
acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice, for, to the society
offended and the party wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice
then must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one
hand, and the State and offended party, on the other.
In this case, the eleven Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to
01-101112 were filed with the Regional Trial Court on June 6, 2001 well
within the two-year period.
In sum, this Court finds the motion for reconsideration of petitioners
meritorious.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Resolution of this Court, dated May
28, 2002, is SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
August 24, 2001, in CA-G.R. SP No. 65034 is REVERSED. The Petition of
the Respondent with the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 01-100933
is DISMISSED for being moot and academic. The Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 81, is DIRECTED to forthwith proceed with Criminal
Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 with deliberate dispatch.
11
No pronouncements as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

12

August 15, 2017
G.R. No. 226679
SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition1 is the
constitutionality of Section 23 of Republic Act (R.A.)No. 9165, or
the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, "2 which provides:
SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under any
provision of this Act regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be
allowed to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining.3
The facts are not in dispute.
Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in Criminal
Case No. 13586 for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No.
9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs). The Information alleged:
That on or about the 21st day of March, 2016, in the City of Legazpi,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess or
otherwise use any regulated drug and without the corresponding license
or prescription, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have, in his possession and under his control and custody, one (1) piece
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet marked as VOP 03/21/16- l G
containing 0.084 [gram] of white crystalline substance, which when
examined were found to be positive for Methamphetamine
Hydrocloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter
into a Plea Bargaining Agreement,5 praying to withdraw his not guilty
plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument,
Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty
of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the
minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession. He
argued that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1) the intent of the law
expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; (2) the rule-making
authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution; and (3) the principle of separation of powers among
the three equal branches of the government.
In its Comment or Opposition6 dated June 27, 2016, the prosecution
moved for the denial of the motion for being contrary to Section 23 of
R.A. No. 9165, which is said to be justified by the Congress' prerogative
to choose which offense it would allow plea bargaining. Later, in a
Comment or Opposition7 dated June 29, 2016, it manifested that it "is
open to the Motion of the accused to enter into plea bargaining to give
life to the intent of the law as provided in paragraph 3, Section 2 of [R.A.
No.] 9165, however, with the express mandate of Section 23 of [R.A. No.]
9165 prohibiting plea bargaining, [it] is left without any choice but to
reject the proposal of the accused."
On July 12, 2016, respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, issued an Order denying
Estipona's motion. It was opined:
The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165, which
prohibits plea bargaining, encroaches on the exclusive constitutional
power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure because
plea bargaining is a "rule of procedure." Indeed, plea bargaining forms
1
part of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly under Rule 118, the
rule on pre-trial conference. It is only the Rules of Court promulgated by
the Supreme Court pursuant to its constitutional rule-making power that
breathes life to plea bargaining. It cannot be found in any statute.
Without saying so, the accused implies that Sec. 23 of Republic Act No.
9165 is unconstitutional because it, in effect, suspends the operation of
Rule 118 of the Rules of Court insofar as it allows plea bargaining as part
of the mandatory pre-trial conference in criminal cases.
The Court sees merit in the argument of the accused that it is also the
intendment of the law, R.A. No. 9165, to rehabilitate an accused of a
drug offense. Rehabilitation is thus only possible in cases of use of illegal
drugs because plea bargaining is disallowed. However, by case law, the
Supreme Court allowed rehabilitation for accused charged with
possession of paraphernalia with traces of dangerous drugs, as held
in People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, 13 December 2010. The ruling of
the Supreme Court in this case manifested the relaxation of an otherwise
stringent application of Republic Act No. 9165 in order to serve an intent
for the enactment of the law, that is, to rehabilitate the offender.
Within the spirit of the disquisition in People v. Martinez, there might be
plausible basis for the declaration of Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which bars
plea bargaining as unconstitutional because indeed the inclusion of the
provision in the law encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power of
the Supreme Court.
While basic is the precept that lower courts are not precluded from
resolving, whenever warranted, constitutional questions, the Court is not
unaware of the admonition of the Supreme Court that lower courts must
observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions.
Upon which admonition, it is thus not for this lower court to declare Sec.
23 of R.A. No. 9165 unconstitutional given the potential ramifications
that such declaration might have on the prosecution of illegal drug cases
pending before this judicial station.8
Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in an
Order9 dated July 26, 2016; hence, this petition raising the issues as
follows:
I.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHICH PROHIBITS
PLEA BARGAINING IN ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE SAID LAW, IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
II.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT ENCROACHED UPON THE POWER OF THE
SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE RULES OF PROCEDURE.
III.
WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS PRESIDED BY HON. FRANK E.
LOBRIGO, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO DECLARE
SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.10
We grant the petition.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), contends that the petition should be dismissed outright
for being procedurally defective on the grounds that: (1) the Congress
should have been impleaded as an indispensable party; (2) the
constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 cannot be attacked
collaterally; and (3) the proper recourse should have been a petition for
declaratory relief before this Court or a petition for certiorari before the
RTC. Moreover, the OSG argues that the petition fails to satisfy the
requisites of judicial review because: (1) Estipona lacks legal standing to
2
sue for failure to show direct injury; (2) there is no actual case or
controversy; and (3) the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165
is not the lis mota of the case.
On matters of technicality, some points raised by the OSG maybe
correct.1âwphi1 Nonetheless, without much further ado, it must be
underscored that it is within this Court's power to make exceptions to
the rules of court. Under proper conditions, We may permit the full and
exhaustive ventilation of the parties' arguments and positions despite
the supposed technical infirmities of a petition or its alleged procedural
flaws. In discharging its solemn duty as the final arbiter of constitutional
issues, the Court shall not shirk from its obligation to determine novel
issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications.11
Likewise, matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a
backseat when issues of substantial and transcendental importance are
present.12 We have acknowledged that the Philippines' problem on
illegal drugs has reached "epidemic," "monstrous," and "harrowing"
proportions,13 and that its disastrously harmful social, economic, and
spiritual effects have broken the lives, shattered the hopes, and
destroyed the future of thousands especially our young citizens.14 At the
same time, We have equally noted that "as urgent as the campaign
against the drug problem must be, so must we as urgently, if not more
so, be vigilant in the protection of the rights of the accused as mandated
by the Constitution x x x who, because of excessive zeal on the part of
the law enforcers, may be unjustly accused and convicted."15 Fully aware
of the gravity of the drug menace that has beset our country and its
direct link to certain crimes, the Court, within its sphere, must do its part
to assist in the all-out effort to lessen, if not totally eradicate, the
continued presence of drug lords, pushers and users.16
Bearing in mind the very important and pivotal issues raised in this
petition, technical matters should not deter Us from having to make the
final and definitive pronouncement that everyone else depends for
enlightenment and guidance.17 When public interest requires, the Court
may brush aside procedural rules in order to resolve a constitutional
issue.18
x x x [T]he Court is invested with the power to suspend the application of
the rules of procedure as a necessary complement of its power to
promulgate the same. Barnes v. Hon. Quijano Padilla discussed the
rationale for this tenet, viz. :
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as
mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict
and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to
suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to
alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final, x x
x.
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party
litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of
his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this
Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as
not to override substantial justice. 19
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Rule-making power of the Supreme
Court under the 1987 Constitution
Section 5(5), A1iicle VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance
to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase,
3
or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court.
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is
now Our exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and
Legislative departments.20 In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 21 then
Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced the history
of the Court's rule-making power and highlighted its evolution and
development.
x x x It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this Court to
enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz
"without independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust
so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice."
Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for
it enhances its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of
this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative
power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or
supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:
"Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the
power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress
shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines."
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear
on its surface. In In re: Cunanan Congress in the exercise of its power to
amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of
law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which considered as a passing
grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up
to August 1951 and 71 % in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck
down the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno
held that "x x x the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment - a
judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years
affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly
can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no
less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive
department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these
departments would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case
with the law in question." The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is
obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the
practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by
Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities
say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license." By its ruling,
this Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to
"repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973
Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court
"to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts, x x x which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented
by the Batasang Pambansa x x x." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its
Article X provided:
xxxx
"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the
Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the
Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
4
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase,
or modify substantive rights."
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the
independence of the judiciary by giving to it the additional power to
promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar.
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent
judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this
Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
xxxx
"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance
to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase,
or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court. "
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for
the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also
granted for the .first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987
Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine,
the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no
longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. x
x x.22
Just recently, Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)23 further
elucidated:
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of
the various courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the
power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts belongs exclusively to this Court.Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution reads:
xxxx
In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice (Echegaray), the Court traced the
evolution of its rule-making authority, which, under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, had been priorly subjected to a power-sharing scheme
with Congress. As it now stands, the 1987 Constitution textually altered
the old provisions by deleting the concurrent power of Congress to
amend the rules, thus solidifying in one body the Court's rule-making
powers, in line with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a " [
s] tronger and more independent judiciary."
The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would
show that the Framers debated on whether or not the Court's
rulemaking powers should be shared with Congress. There was an initial
suggestion to insert the sentence "The National Assembly may repeal,
alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of
the Supreme Court," right after the phrase "Promulgate rules concerning
the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of
law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged[,]" in
the enumeration of powers of the Supreme Court. Later, Commissioner
Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete the former sentence and, instead,
after the word "[under]privileged," place a comma(,) to be followed by
"the phrase with the concurrence of the National Assembly." Eventually,
5
a compromise formulation was reached wherein (a) the Committee
members agreed to Commissioner Aquino's proposal to delete the
phrase "the National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said
rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court" and (b) in
turn, Commissioner Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal to add "the
phrase with the concurrence of the National Assembly." The changes
were approved, thereby leading to the present lack of textual reference
to any form of Congressional participation in Section 5 (5), Article
VIII, supra. Theprevailing consideration was that "both bodies, the
Supreme Court and the Legislature, have their inherent powers."
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure.x x x.24
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our
government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole
province of this Court.25 The other branches trespass upon this
prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal,
alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the
Court.26 Viewed from this perspective, We have rejected previous
attempts on the part of the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative
power, to amend the Rules of Court (Rules), to wit:
1. Fabian v. Desierto27 -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman in an administrative disciplinary case should be taken to the
Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rulesinstead of
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as provided in Section 27 of R.A. No.
6770.
2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative,
Inc. 28 - The Cooperative Code provisions on notices cannot replace the
rules on summons under Rule 14 of the Rules.
3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from
Payment of Legal Fees; 29 Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose
Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes;30 In Re:
Exemption of the National Power Corporation from Payment of
Filing/Docket Fees; 31 and Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al. 32 -
Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not
exempt from the payment of legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of
the Rules.
4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)33 - The first
paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits courts except
the Supreme Court from issuing temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction to enjoin an investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.
Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this
Court asserted its discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new
rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive
branches of government. To reiterate, the Court's authority to
promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and
one of the safeguards of Our institutional independence.34
Plea bargaining in criminal cases
Plea bargaining, as a rule and a practice, has been existing in our
jurisdiction since July 1, 1940, when the 1940 Rules took effect. Section
4, Rule 114 (Pleas) of which stated:
SEC. 4. Plea of guilty of lesser offense. - The defendant, with the consent
of the court and of the fiscal, may plead guilty of any lesser offense than
that charged which is necessarily included in the offense charged in the
complaint or information.
When the 1964 Rules became effective on January 1, 1964, the same
provision was retained under Rule 118 (Pleas).1âwphi1 Subsequently,
with the effectivity of the 1985 Rules on January 1, 1985, the provision
on plea of guilty to a lesser offense was amended. Section 2, Rule 116
provided:
6
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - The accused with the consent
of the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to
plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is
necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of
lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint
or information is necessary. (4a, R-118)
As well, the term "plea bargaining" was first mentioned and expressly
required during pre-trial. Section 2, Rule 118 mandated:
SEC. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects. - The pre-trial conference shall
consider the following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of facts;
(c) Marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. (n)
The 1985 Rules was later amended. While the wordings of Section 2,
Rule 118 was retained, Section 2, Rule 116 was modified in 1987. A
second paragraph was added, stating that "[a] conviction under this plea
shall be equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for purposes of
double jeopardy."
35
When R.A. No. 8493 ("Speedy Trial Act of 1998 ') was enacted, Section
2, Rule 118 of the Rules was substantially adopted. Section 2 of the law
required that plea bargaining and other matters36 that will promote a fair
and expeditious trial are to be considered during pre-trial conference in
all criminal cases cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and the
Sandiganbayan.
Currently, the pertinent rules on plea bargaining under the
2000 Rules37 are quoted below:
RULE 116 (Arraignment and Plea):
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused,
with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be
allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is
necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but
before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser
offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary. (Sec. 4, Cir. 38-98)
RULE 118 (Pre-trial):
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. - In all criminal cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan,Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment and within thirty
(30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of
the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or
circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider
the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but
interposes a lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the
criminal and civil aspects of the case. (Sec. 2 & 3, Cir. 38-98)
7
Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure
The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal
procedural rules is limited to the preservation of substantive
rights, i.e., the former should not diminish, increase or modify the
latter.38 "Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines
and regulates rights, or which regulates the right and duties which give
rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are
established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law,
which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for
their invasions."39 Fabian v. Hon. Desierto40 laid down the test for
determining whether a rule is substantive or procedural in nature.
It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules
or statutes which are procedural, hence within the scope of this Court's
rule-making power, and those which are substantive. In fact, a particular
rule may be procedural in one context and substantive in another. It is
admitted that what is procedural and what is substantive is frequently a
question of great difficulty. It is not, however, an insurmountable
problem if a rational and pragmatic approach is taken within the context
of our own procedural and jurisdictional system.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the
practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or
modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really
regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and
duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy
and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a
vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the
right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it
operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals
merely with procedure.41
In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule
violates substantive rights. For example, in People v. Lacson, 42 Section 8,
Rule 117 of the Rules on provisional dismissal was held as a special
procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute,
making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part
thereof, so that its expiration operates to extinguish the right of the
State to prosecute the accused.43Speaking through then Associate Justice
Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., the Court opined:
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a
time-bar of one year or two years for the revival of criminal cases
provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused and
with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on
first impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90
of the Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court
balanced the societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly
and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the
State and the accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both
the State and of the accused to due process. The Court believed that the
time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally
dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the
offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected
unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or insufficient that
the rule becomes a denial of justice. The petitioners failed to show a
manifest shortness or insufficiency of the time-bar.
The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of
the Rules and approved by the Court en banc primarily to enhance the
administration of the criminal justice system and the rights to due
process of the State and the accused by eliminating the deleterious
practice of trial courts of provisionally dismissing criminal cases on
motion of either the prosecution or the accused or jointly, either with no
time-bar for the revival thereof or with a specific or definite period for
such revival by the public prosecutor. There were times when such
criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due to causes beyond
the control of the public prosecutor or because of the indolence, apathy
or the lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to the prejudice of the
State and the accused despite the mandate to public prosecutors and
trial judges to expedite criminal proceedings.
8
It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it
usually operates in his favor, especially if he greatly fears the
consequences of his trial and conviction. He is hesitant to disturb the
hushed inaction by which dominant cases have been known to expire.
The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair
or reduce the capacity of the State to prove its case with the
disappearance or nonavailability of its witnesses. Physical evidence may
have been lost. Memories of witnesses may have grown dim or have
faded. Passage of time makes proof of any fact more difficult. The
accused may become a fugitive from justice or commit another crime.
The longer the lapse of time from the dismissal of the case to the revival
thereof, the more difficult it is to prove the crime.
On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a
criminal case does not terminate a criminal case. The possibility that the
case may be revived at any time may disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the
chances of the accused for employment, curtail his association, subject
him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him and his family. He is
unable to lead a normal life because of community suspicion and his own
anxiety. He continues to suffer those penalties and disabilities
incompatible with the presumption of innocence. He may also lose his
witnesses or their memories may fade with the passage of time. In the
long run, it may diminish his capacity to defend himself and thus eschew
the fairness of the entire criminal justice system.
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the
malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal justice system for
the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused only.44
Also, We said in Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al. 45 that Section 6,
Rule 120 of the Rules, which provides that an accused who failed to
appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the
remedies available against the judgment, does not take away substantive
rights but merely provides the manner through which an existing right
may be implemented.
Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the
right of the convicted accused to avail of the remedies under the Rules. It
is the failure of the accused to appear without justifiable cause on the
scheduled date of promulgation of the judgment of conviction that
forfeits their right to avail themselves of the remedies against the
judgment.
It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court
diminishes or modifies the substantive rights of petitioners. It only works
in pursuance of the power of the Supreme Court to "provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases." This
provision protects the courts from delay in the speedy disposition of
criminal cases - delay arising from the simple expediency of
nonappearance of the accused on the scheduled promulgation of the
judgment of conviction.46
By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases in all
courts47 that the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a way of
disposing criminal charges by agreement of the parties, plea bargaining
is considered to be an "important," "essential," "highly desirable," and
"legitimate" component of the administration of justice.48 Some of its
salutary effects include:
x x x For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the
advantages of pleading guilty and limiting the probable penalty are
obvious - his exposure is reduced, the correctional processes can begin
immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial are eliminated. For the
State there are also advantages - the more promptly imposed
punishment after an admission of guilt may more effectively attain the
objectives of punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial
and prosecutorial resources are conserved for those cases in which there
is a substantial issue of the defendant's guilt or in which there is
substantial doubt that the State can sustain its burden of proof. (Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 [1970])
9
Disposition of charges after plea discussions x x x leads to prompt and
largely final disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much of the
corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pretrial confinement for
those who are denied release pending trial; it protects the public from
those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal conduct even
while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between charge
and disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative
prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned. (Santobello
v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 [1971])
The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anxieties
and uncertainties of a trial; he gains a speedy disposition of his case, the
chance to acknowledge his guilt, and a prompt start in realizing whatever
potential there may be for rehabilitation. Judges and prosecutors
conserve vital and scarce resources. The public is protected from the
risks posed by those charged with criminal offenses who are at large on
bail while awaiting completion of criminal proceedings. (Blackledge v.
Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 [1977])
In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process
whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval."49 There is
give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining.50 The essence of
the agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make
concessions to avoid potential losses.51 Properly administered, plea
bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of the system -
speed, economy, and finality - can benefit the accused, the offended
party, the prosecution, and the court.52
Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage,53 the rules on plea
bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it
operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the
judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive
law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or
infraction of them.
The decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by the
defendant's appraisal of the prosecution's case against him and by the
apparent likelihood of securing leniency should a guilty plea be offered
and accepted.54 In any case, whether it be to the offense charged or to a
lesser crime, a guilty plea is a "serious and sobering occasion" inasmuch
as it constitutes a waiver of the fundamental rights to be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, to be heard by himself and
counsel, to meet the witnesses face to face, to bail (except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence
of guilt is strong), to be convicted by proof beyond reasonable doubt,
and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself.55
Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic
rights are infringed by trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty;
the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial.56 Under the
present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a
demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended
party57and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea
of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense
charged.58 The reason for this is that the prosecutor has full control of
the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the
proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the
evidence on hand can sustain.59
[Courts] normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to
prosecute. The reasons for judicial deference are well known.
Prosecutorial charging decisions are rarely simple. In addition to
assessing the strength and importance of a case, prosecutors also must
consider other tangible and intangible factors, such as government
enforcement priorities. Finally, they also must decide how best to
allocate the scarce resources of a criminal justice system that simply
cannot accommodate the litigation of every serious criminal charge.
Because these decisions "are not readily susceptible to the kind of
analysis the courts are competent to undertake," we have been
"properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute. "60
10
The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, On whether Section 23 of R.A. No.
which may allow the accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is 9165 violates the equal protection
necessarily included in the offense charged. The word may denotes an clause
exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the
accused to make such plea.61 Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A.
that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not No. 9165 is contrary to the constitutional right to equal protection of the
supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the law in order not to preempt any future discussion by the Court on the
convenience of the accused.62 policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165. Pending
deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in
Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even toto or a qualified version thereof, We deem it proper to declare as
up to the point when the prosecution already rested its case.63 As invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and
regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court's unless it is made part of the rules of procedure through an
exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.
thereof.64 "Grave abuse of discretion" is a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED.
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is declared unconstitutional for
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner being contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under
because of passion or hostility; it arises when a court or tribunal violates Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.65
SO ORDERED.
If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a
bail hearing or after the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such
a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to
establish the guilt of the crime charged.66 The only basis on which the
prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in allowing change in the
former plea of not guilty could be nothing more and nothing less than
the evidence on record. As soon as the prosecutor has submitted a
comment whether for or against said motion, it behooves the trial court
to assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well as all the
circumstances upon which the accused made his change of plea to the
end that the interests of justice and of the public will be served.67 The
ruling on the motion must disclose the strength or weakness of the
prosecution's evidence.68 Absent any finding on the weight of the
evidence on hand, the judge's acceptance of the defendant's change of
plea is improper and irregular.69

11

[G.R. No. 132601. January 19, 1999]
LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET
AL., respondents.
SYNOPSIS
This is the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplement
thereto of the Resolution of the Supreme Court dated January 4, 1999
temporarily restraining the execution of the death convict Leo Echegaray
by lethal injection. It is the main submission of public respondents that
the Decision of the case having become final and executory, its execution
enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive authority.
The Court ruled that the power to control the execution of its decision
is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial
subtraction for our Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. To
be sure, the most important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal,
is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may
change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and
adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these
unforeseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded
the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to
make them conformable to law and justice. For this purpose, Section 6 of
Rule 135 provides that when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or
judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to
carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer and if the
procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not
specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or
mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to the
spirit of said law or rules. It bears repeating that what the Court restrained
temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to give it reasonable time
to check its fairness in light of supervening events in Congress as alleged
by petitioner. The Court, contrary to popular misimpression, did not
restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by Congress.
Moreover, the temporary restraining order of this Court has produced
its desired result, i.e., the crystallization of the issue whether Congress is
disposed to review capital punishment. The public respondents, thru the
Solicitor General, cite posterior events that negate beyond doubt the
possibility that Congress will repeal or amend the death penalty law. In
light of these developments, the Courts TRO should now be lifted as it has
served its legal and humanitarian purpose.
The instant motion is GRANTED.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; RULE ON FINALITY OF JUDGMENT;
CANNOT DIVEST COURT OF ITS JURISDICTION. The rule on finality of
judgment cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction to execute and
enforce the same judgment. Retired Justice Camilo Quiason
synthesized the well established jurisprudence on this issue as
follows: x x x the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court
has lost all its powers nor the case. By the finality of the judgment,
what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the
same. Even after the judgment has become final the court retains its
jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. There is a difference between
the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction
to amend, modify or alter the same. The former continues even after
the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of
judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. x
x x For after the judgment has become final facts and circumstances
may transpire which can render the execution unjust or impossible.
2. ID.; SUPREME COURT; FINALITY OF DECISION IN CRIMINAL CASES;
PARTICULAR OF EXECUTION ITSELF STILL UNDER CONTROL OF
JUDICIAL AUTHORITY. In criminal cases, after the sentence has been
pronounced and the period for reopening the same has elapsed, the
court cannot change or alter its judgment, as its jurisdiction has
terminated. . . When in cases of appeal or review the cause has been
1
 returned thereto for execution, in the event that the judgment has
been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper
order. But it does not follow from this cessation of functions on the
part of the court with reference to the ending of the cause that the
judicial authority terminates by having then passed completely to the
Executive. The particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly
not always included in the judgment and writ of execution, in any
event are absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while
the executive has no power over the person of the convict except to
provide for carrying out of the penalty and to pardon. (Director of
Prisons v. Judge of First Instance, 26 Phil. 267[1915])
3. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; EXECUTION OF SENTENCE; GROUNDS FOR
POSTPONEMENT. Notwithstanding the order of execution and the
executory nature thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the
date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under
the common law this postponement can be ordered in three ways:
(1) By command of the King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court;
and (3) by mandate of the law. It is sufficient to state this principle of
the common law to render impossible that assertion in absolute
terms that after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial court
can not reopen the case to investigate the facts that show the need
for postponement.
4. ID.; ACTIONS; JURISDICTION; POWER TO CONTROL EXECUTION OF
DECISION, AN ESSENTIAL ASPECT THEREOF.The power to control the
execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot
be the subject of substantial subtraction for our Constitution vests
the entirely of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be estabished by law. To be sure, the most important
part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of
execution of decisions where supervening events may change the
circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust
the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these
unforseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been
conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes
and orders to make them conformable to law and justice.
5. ID.; SUPREME COURT; JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT DOES NOT
DEPEND ON CONVENIUENCE OF LITIGANTS. The same motion to
compel Judge Ponferrada to reveal the date of execution of petitioner
Echegaray was filed by his counsel, Atty. Theodore Te, on December
7, 1998. He invoked his clients right to due process and the publics
right to information. The Solicitor General, as counsel for public
respondents, did not oppose petitioners motion on the ground that
this Court has no more jurisdiction over the process of execution of
Echegaray. This Court granted the relief prayed for by the Secretary
of Justice and by the counsel of the petitioner in its Resolution of
December 15, 1998. There was not a whimper of protest from the
public respondents and they are now estopped from contending that
this Court has lost its jurisdiction to grant said relief. The jurisdiction
of this Court does not depend on the convenience of litigants.
6. ID.; ID.; POWER TO SUSPEND EXECUTION OF CONVICTS DOES NOT
VIOLATE CO-EQUAL AND COORDINATE POWERS OF BRANCHES OF
GOVERNMENT. The text and tone of this provision will not yield to
the interpretation suggested by the public respondents. The
provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and
forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It also provides the
authority for the President to grant amnesty with the concurrence of
a majority of all the members of the Congress. The provision,
however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to
control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth,
an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses
collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate
courts. For instance, a death convict who becomes insane after his
final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. As
observed by Antieau, today, it is generally assumed that due process
of law will prevent the government from executing the death
sentence upon a person who is insane at the time of execution. The
suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an exercise of
judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of
reprieve though its effect is the same the temporary suspension of
the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be
2
 denied that Congress can at any time amend R. A. No. 7659 by
reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such
an amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But by no
stretch of the imagination can the exercise by Congress of its plenary
power to amend laws be considered as a violation of the power of
the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers
of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a
death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that
there is no higher right than the right to life. Indeed, in various States
in the United States, laws have even been enacted expressly granting
courts the power to suspend execution of convicts and their
constitutionality has been upheld over arguments that they infringe
upon the power of the President to grant reprieves. For the public
respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect
the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the
principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of
our government.
VITUG, J., separate opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; R.A. NO. 7659, UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Let me
state at the outset that I have humbly maintained that Republic Act
No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, falls short of the
strict norm set forth by the Constitution. I and some of my brethren
on the Court, who hold similarly, have consistently expressed this
stand in the affirmance by the Court of death sentences imposed by
Regional Trial Courts. Until the exacting standards of the Constitution
are clearly met as so hereinabove expressed, I will have to disagree,
most respectfully, with my colleagues in the majority who continue
to hold the presently structured Republic Act. No. 7659 to be in
accord with the Constitution, an issue that is fundamental, constant
and inextricably linked to the imposition each time of the death
penalty and, like the instant petition, to the legal incidents pertinent
thereto.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; WITH JURISDICTION TO ISSUE
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER ON. EXECUTION OF DEATH
PENALTY. In its resolution of 04 January 1999, the Court resolved to
issue in the above-numbered petition a temporary restraining order
(TRO) because, among other things, of what had been stated to be
indications that Congress would re-examine the death penalty
law. The Court, it must be stressed, did not, by issuing the TRO,
thereby reconsider its judgment convicting the accused or recall the
imposition of the death penalty. The doctrine has almost invariably
been that after a decision becomes final and executory, nothing else
is further done except to see to its compliance since for the Court to
adopt otherwise would be to put no end to litigations. The rule
notwithstanding, the Court retains control over the case until the full
satisfaction of the final judgment conformably with established legal
processes. Hence, the Court has taken cognizance of the petition
assailing before it the use of lethal injection by the State to carry out
the death sentence. In fine, the authority of the Court to see to the
proper execution of its final judgment, the power of the President to
grant pardon, commutation or reprieve, and the prerogative of
Congress to repeal or modify the law that could benefit the convicted
accused are not essentially preclusive of one another nor
constitutionally incompatible and may each be exercised within their
respective spheres and confines. Thus, the stay of execution issued
by the Court would not prevent either the President from exercising
his pardoning power or Congress from enacting a measure that may
be advantageous to the adjudged offender.
3. ID.; ACTIONS; JUDGMENT; IMMUTABILITY OF FINAL AND EXECUTORY
JUDGMENTS; EXCEPTIONS. In any event, jurisprudence teaches
that the rule of immutability of final and executory judgments admits
of settled exceptions. Concededly, the Court may, for instance,
suspend the execution of a final judgment when it becomes
imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events
warrant it. Certainly, this extraordinary relief cannot be denied any
man, whatever might be his station, whose right to life is the issue at
stake.
PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion:
3
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; R.A. NO. 7659 (DEATH PENALTY LAW),
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. R.A. 7659 (the Death Penalty Law) is
unconstitutional insofar as some parts thereof prescribing the capital
penalty fail to comply with the requirements of heinousness and
compelling reasons prescribed by the Constitution of the Philippines.
2. ID.; R.A. NO. 8177 (LETHAL INJECTION LAW),
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. R.A. 8177 (the Lethal Injection Law) is likewise
unconstitutional since it merely prescribes the manner in which R.A.
7659 (the Death Penalty Law) is to be implemented.

4
 RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of this Court dated January 4, 1999
temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner and Supplemental
Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. It is the submission of
public respondents that:
"(1) The Decision in this case having become final and executory, its
execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive
authority. The issuance of the TRO may be construed as trenching on
that sphere of executive authority;
(2) The issuance of the temporary restraining order x x x creates
dangerous precedent as there will never be an end to litigation because
there is always a possibility that Congress may repeal a law.
(3) Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the death penalty
bill. To be certain, whatever question may now be raised on the Death
Penalty Law before the present Congress within the 6-month period
given by this Honorable Court had in all probability been fully debated
upon x x x.
(4) Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito, the law
looks forward while the judge looks at the past, x x x the Honorable
Court in issuing the TRO has transcended its power of judicial review.
(5) At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening events transpired
to the effect that the repeal or modification of the law imposing death
penalty has become nil, to wit:
a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will
veto any law imposing the death penalty involving
heinous crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the
repeal of the law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only
bears his signature and that of Senator Pimentel."
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,
public respondents attached a copy of House Resolution No. 629
introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the
sense of the House of Representative to reject any move to review
Republic Act No. 7659 which provided for the re-imposition of death
penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department
of the position of the House of Representatives on this matter, and urging
the President to exhaust all means under the law to immediately
implement the death penalty law." The Resolution was concurred in by
one hundred thirteen (113) congressmen.
In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1) the stay
order x x x is within the scope of judicial power and duty and does not
trench on executive powers nor on congressional prerogatives; (2) the
exercise by this Court of its power to stay execution was
reasonable; (3) the Court did not lose jurisdiction to
address incidental matters involved or arising from the petition; (4) public
respondents are estopped from challenging the Court's jurisdiction; and
(5) there is no certainty that the law on capital punishment will not be
repealed or modified until Congress convenes and considers all the
various resolutions and bills filed before it.
Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions
concern matters that are not incidents in G.R. No. 117472, where the
death penalty was imposed on petitioner on automatic review of his
conviction by this Court. The instant motions were filed in this case, G.R.
No. 132601, where the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8177 (Lethal Injection
Law) and its implementing rules and regulations was assailed by
petitioner. For this reason, the Court in its Resolution of January 4, 1999
merely noted the Motion to Set Aside of Rodessa "Baby" R. Echegaray
dated January 7, 1999 and Entry of Appearance of her counsel dated
January 5, 1999. Clearly, she has no legal standing to intervene in the case
5
at bar, let alone the fact that the interest of the State is properly Act No. 8177 are appropriately amended, revised and/or corrected in
represented by the Solicitor General. accordance with this Decision.
We shall now resolve the basic issues raised by the public
SO ORDERED.'
respondents.
I and that the same has, on November 6, 1998 become final and
executory and is hereby recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment.
First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public
respondents that this Court lost its jurisdiction over the case at bar and
Manila, Philippines.
hence can no longer restrain the execution of the petitioner. Obviously,
public respondents are invoking the rule that final judgments can no
Clerk of
longer be altered in accord with the principle that "it is just as important
Court
that there should be a place to end as there should be a place to begin
litigation."[1] To start with, the Court is not changing even a comma of
By: (SGD) TERESITA
its final Decision. It is appropriate to examine with precision the metes
G. DIMAISIP
and bounds of the Decision of this Court that became final. These metes
Acting Chief
and bounds are clearly spelled out in the Entry of Judgment in this
Judicial
case, viz:
Records Office"
"ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
The records will show that before the Entry of Judgment, the Secretary of
Justice, the Honorable Serafin Cuevas, filed with this Court on October 21,
This is to certify that on October 12, 1998 a decision rendered in the
1998 a Compliance where he submitted the Amended Rules and
above-entitled case was filed in this Office, the dispositive part of which
Regulations implementing R.A. No. 8177 in compliance with
reads as follows:
our Decision. On October 28, 1998, Secretary Cuevas submitted a
Manifestation informing the Court that he has caused the publication of
`WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks to
the said Amended Rules and Regulations as required by the Administrative
declare the assailed statute (Republic Act No. 8177) as unconstitutional;
Code. It is crystalline that the Decision of this Court that became final
but GRANTED insofar as Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations
and unalterable mandated: (1) that R.A. No. 8177 is not unconstitutional;
to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are concerned, which are hereby
(2) that sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A.
declared INVALID because (a) Section 17 contravenes Article 83 of the
No. 8177 are invalid, and (3) R.A. No. 8177 cannot be enforced and
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659;
implemented until sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to
and (b) Section 19 fails to provide for review and approval of the Lethal
Implement R.A. No. 8177 are amended. It is also daylight clear that this
Injection Manual by the Secretary of Justice, and unjustifiably makes the
Decision was not altered a whit by this Court. Contrary to the submission
manual confidential, hence unavailable to interested parties including
of the Solicitor General, the rule on finality of judgment cannot divest
the accused/convict and counsel. Respondents are hereby enjoined from
this Court of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same
enforcing and implementing Republic Act No. 8177 until the aforesaid
judgment. Retired Justice Camilo Quiason synthesized the well
Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic
established jurisprudence on this issue as follows:[2]
6
 xxx
"the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its
powers nor the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the court
loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the
judgment has become final the court retains its jurisdiction to execute
and enforce it.[3] There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the
court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or
alter the same. The former continues even after the judgment has
become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter
terminates when the judgment becomes final.[4] x x x For after the
judgment has become final facts and circumstances may transpire which
can render the execution unjust or impossible.[5]
In truth, the argument of the Solicitor General has long been rejected
by this Court. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, as early as 1915, this
Court has unequivocably ruled in the case of Director of Prisons v. Judge
of First Instance,[6] viz:
"This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which
constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases, after the
sentence has been pronounced and the period for reopening the same
has elapsed, the court cannot change or alter its judgment, as its
jurisdiction has terminated . . . When in cases of appeal or review the
cause has been returned thereto for execution, in the event that the
judgment has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the
proper order. But it does not follow from this cessation of functions on
the part of the court with reference to the ending of the cause that the
judicial authority terminates by having then passed completely to the
Executive. The particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly not
always included in the judgment and writ of execution, in any event are
absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while the executive
has no power over the person of the convict except to provide for
carrying out of the penalty and to pardon.
Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is
that of execution of a capital sentence, it must be accepted as a
hypothesis that postponement of the date can be requested. There can
be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle that
notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature
thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the date therefor can be
postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the common law this
postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the
King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3)by mandate of the
law. It is sufficient to state this principle of the common law to render
impossible that assertion in absolute terms that after the convict has
once been placed in jail the trial court can not reopen the case to
investigate the facts that show the need for postponement. If one of the
ways is by direction of the court, it is acknowledged that even after the
date of the execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the general
rule that after the (court) has performed its ministerial duty of ordering
the execution . . . and its part is ended, if however a circumstance
arises that ought to delay the execution, and there is an imperative
duty to investigate the emergency and to order a postponement. Then
the question arises as to whom the application for postponing the
execution ought to be addressed while the circumstances is under
investigation and as to who has jurisdiction to make the investigation."
The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential
aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject ofsubstantial subtraction
for our Constitution[7] vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be estabished by law. To be sure,
the most important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is
the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may
change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene
and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because
of these unforseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been
conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes
and orders to make them conformable to law and justice.[8] For this
purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135 provides that "when by law jurisdiction is
conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and
other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such
court or officer and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of
such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules,
7
any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the
appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules." It bears repeating power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress
that what the Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its own shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules
Decision to give it reasonble time to check its fairness in light of concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the
supervening events in Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court, practice of law in the Philippines."
contrary to popular misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law
enacted by Congress. The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may
appear on its surface. In In re Cunanan[10]Congress in the exercise of its
The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public
power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the
respondents that this Court has no jurisdiction to restrain the execution
practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953[11] which considered
of petitioner is that it can diminish the independence of the
as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July
judiciary. Since the implant of republicanism in our soil, our courts have
4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations. This
been conceded the jurisdiction to enforce their final decisions. In accord
Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr.
with this unquestioned jurisdiction, this Court promulgated rules
Justice Diokno held that "x x x the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a
concerning pleading, practice and procedure which, among
judgment - a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited
others, spelled out the rules on execution of judgments. These rules are
years affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court
all predicated on the assumption that courts have the inherent,
certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it
necessary and incidental power to control and supervise the process of
is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive
execution of their decisions. Rule 39 governs execution, satisfaction and
department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these
effects of judgments in civil cases. Rule 120 governs judgments in criminal
departments would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case
cases. It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of
with the law in question."[12] The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is
pleading, practice and procedure was granted by our Constitutions to
obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the
this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani
practice of law belongs exclusivelyto this Court, and the law passed by
Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular
Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities
trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of
say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license." By its ruling,
justice."[9] Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this power to this
this Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to
Court for it enhances its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the
"repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and
power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative
power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973
supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides: Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this
Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure
"Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules in all courts, x x x which, however, may be repealed, altered or
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa x x x." More completely,
admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:
of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
xxxxxxxxx
rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby

8
"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
xxxxxxxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the
Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the
Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase,
or modify substantive rights."
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further
strengthened the independence of the judiciary by giving to it
the additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the
Bar.[13]
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more
independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making
power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
xxxxxxxxx
"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxxxxxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance
to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase,
or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court."
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for
the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also
granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987
Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine,
the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no
longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the
Executive. If the manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is to strengthen
the independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as public
respondents do, that this Court has no jurisdiction to control the process
of execution of its decisions, a power conceded to it and which it has
exercised since time immemorial.
To be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail
the jurisdiction of this Court to control and supervise the implementation
of its decision in the case at bar. As aforestated, our Decision became final
and executory on November 6, 1998. The records reveal that after
November 6, 1998, or on December 8, 1998, no less than the Secretary of
Justice recognized the jurisdiction of this Court by filing a Manifestation
and Urgent Motion to compel the trial judge, the Honorable Thelma A.
Ponferrada, RTC, Br. 104, Quezon City to provide him "x x x a certified true
copy of the Warrant of Execution dated November 17, 1998 bearing the
designated execution day of death convict Leo Echegaray and allow (him)
to reveal or announce the contents thereof, particularly the execution
date fixed by such trial court to the public when requested." The relevant
portions of the Manifestation and Urgent Motion filed by the Secretary of
Justice beseeching this Court "to provide the appropriate relief" state:
xxxxxxxxx
5. Instead of filing a comment on Judge Ponferrada's Manifestation
however, herein respondent is submitting the instant Manifestation and
Motion (a) to stress, inter alia, that the non-disclosure of the date of
execution deprives herein respondent of vital information necessary for
the exercise of his statutory powers, as well as renders nugatory the
constitutional guarantee that recognizes the people's right to
9
information of public concern, and (b) to ask this Honorable Court to
provide the appropriate relief.
6. The non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein
respondent of vital information necessary for the exercise of his power
of supervision and control over the Bureau of Corrections pursuant to
Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, in
relation to Title III, Book IV of such Administrative Code, insofar as the
enforcement of Republic Act No. 8177 and the Amended Rules and
Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 is concerned and for
the discharge of the mandate of seeing to it that laws and rules relative
to the execution of sentence are faithfully observed.
7. On the other hand, the willful omission to reveal the information
about the precise day of execution limits the exercise by the President of
executive clemency powers pursuant to Section 19, Article VII (Executive
Department) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Article 81 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, which provides that the death
sentence shall be carried out `without prejudice to the exercise by the
President of his executive clemency powers at all times."(Underscoring
supplied) For instance, the President cannot grant
reprieve, i.e., postpone the execution of a sentence to a day certain
(People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 110 [1937]) in the absence of a precise date
to reckon with. The exercise of such clemency power, at this time, might
even work to the prejudice of the convict and defeat the purpose of the
Constitution and the applicable statute as when the date of execution
set by the President would be earlier than that designated by the court.
8. Moreover, the deliberate non-disclosure of information about the
date of execution to herein respondent and the public violates Section 7,
Article III (Bill of Rights) and Section 28, Article II (Declaration of
Principles and State Policies) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which
read:
SEC. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well
as to government research data used as basis for policy development,
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
SEC. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.
9. The `right to information' provision is self-executing. It supplies 'the
rules by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed
(Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations, 167 [1972]) by
guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to
sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized
may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the Constitution
without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature (Id., at p. 165) What
may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and
limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be
consistent with the declared State policy of full public disclosure of all
transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. II, Sec.
28). However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation
may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art.
III, Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the
adoption of the New Charter." (Decision of the Supreme Court En
Banc in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530, 534-535
[1987]."
The same motion to compel Judge Ponferrada to reveal the date of
execution of petitioner Echegaray was filed by his counsel, Atty. Theodore
Te, on December 7, 1998. He invoked his client's right to due process and
the public's right to information. The Solicitor General, as counsel for
public respondents, did not oppose petitioner's motion on the ground
that this Court has no more jurisdiction over the process of execution of
Echegaray. This Court granted the relief prayed for by the Secretary of
Justice and by the counsel of the petitioner in its Resolution of December
15, 1998. There was not a whimper of protest from the public respondents
and they are now estopped from contending that this Court has lost its
10
jurisdiction to grant said relief. The jurisdiction of this Court does not
depend on the convenience of litigants.
II
Second. We likewise reject the public respondents' contention that
the "decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution
enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive department x x
x. By granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted
reprieve which is an executive function."[14] Public respondents cite as
their authority for this proposition, Section 19, Article VII of the
Constitution which reads:
"Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final
judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress."
The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation
suggested by the public respondents. The provision is simply the source
of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons
and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It also
provides the authority for the President to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The
provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts
to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth,
an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still
possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the
appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who becomes insane
after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of
insanity.[15] As observed by Antieau, "today, it is generally assumed that
due process of law will prevent the government from executing the death
sentence upon a person who is insane at the time of execution."[16] The
suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an exercise of judicial
power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though
its effect is the same -- the temporary suspension of the execution of the
death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at
any time amend R.A. No. 7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life
imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of
commutation of sentence. But by no stretch of the imagination can the
exercise by Congress of its plenary power to amend laws be considered as
a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of
conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary
to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the
simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. Indeed,
in various States in the United States, laws have even been enacted
expressly granting courts the power to suspend execution of convicts and
their constitutionality has been upheld over arguments that they infringe
upon the power of the President to grant reprieves. For the public
respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the
right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the
principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our
government.
III
Third. The Court's resolution temporarily restraining the execution of
petitioner must be put in its proper perspective as it has been grievously
distorted especially by those who make a living by vilifying
courts. Petitioner filed his Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO
on December 28, 1998 at about 11:30 p.m. He invoked several grounds,
viz: (1) that his execution has been set on January 4, the first working day
of 1999; (b) that members of Congress had either sought for his executive
clemency and/or review or repeal of the law authorizing capital
punishment; (b.1) that Senator Aquilino Pimentel's resolution asking that
clemency be granted to the petitioner and that capital punishment be
reviewed has been concurred by thirteen (13) other senators; (b.2) Senate
President Marcelo Fernan and Senator Miriam S. Defensor have publicly
declared they would seek a review of the death penalty law; (b.3) Senator
Raul Roco has also sought the repeal of capital punishment, and
(b.4) Congressman Salacrib Baterina, Jr., and thirty five (35) other
congressmen are demanding review of the same law.
When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the Court was already in its
traditional recess and would only resume session on January 18, 1999.
11
Even then, Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. called the Court to a Special disposed to review capital punishment. The public respondents, thru the
Session on January 4, 1999[17] at 10. a.m. to deliberate on petitioner's Very Solicitor General, cite posterior events that negate beyond doubt the
Urgent Motion. The Court hardly had five (5) hours to resolve petitioner's possibility that Congress will repeal or amend the death penalty law. He
motion as he was due to be executed at 3 p.m. Thus, the Court had the names these supervening events as follows:
difficult problem of resolving whether petitioner's allegations about the
xxx
moves in Congress to repeal or amend the Death Penalty Law are
mere speculations or not. To the Court's majority, there were good
"a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any
reasons why the Court should not immediately dismiss petitioner's
law repealing the death penalty involving heinous crimes.
allegations as mere speculations and surmises. They noted
that petitioner's allegations were made in a pleading under oath and
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the
were widely publicized in the print and broadcast media. It was also of
repeal of the law;
judicial notice that the 11th Congress is a new Congress and has no less
than one hundred thirty (130) new members whose views on capital
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his
punishment are still unexpressed. The present Congress is therefore
signature and that of Senator Pimentel."[18]
different from the Congress that enacted the Death Penalty Law (R.A. No.
7659) and the Lethal Injection Law (R.A. No. 8177). In contrast, the Court's
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,
minority felt that petitioner's allegations lacked clear factual bases. There
the Solicitor General cited House Resolution No. 629 introduced by
was hardly a time to verify petitioner's allegations as his execution was set
Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the
at 3 p.m. And verification from Congress was impossible as Congress was
House of Representatives to reject any move to review R.A. No. 7659
not in session. Given these constraints, the Court's majority did not rush
which provided for the reimposition of death penalty, notifying the
to judgment but took an extremely cautious stance by temporarily
Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the
restraining the execution of petitioner. The suspension was temporary - -
House of Representatives on this matter and urging the President to
- "until June 15, 1999, coeval with the constitutional duration of the
exhaust all means under the law to immediately implement the death
present regular session of Congress, unless it sooner becomes certain
penalty law." The Golez resolution was signed by 113 congressmen as of
that no repeal or modification of the law is going to be made." The
January 11, 1999. In a marathon session yesterday that extended up to 3
extreme caution taken by the Court was compelled, among others, by the
o'clock in the morning, the House of Representatives with minor
fear that any error of the Court in not stopping the execution of the
amendments formally adopted the Golez resolution by an overwhelming
petitioner will preclude any further relief for all rights stop at the
vote. House Resolution No. 25 expressed the sentiment that the House "x
graveyard. As life was at stake, the Court refused to constitutionalize
x x does not desire at this time to review Republic Act 7659." In addition,
haste and the hysteria of some partisans. The Court's majority felt it
the President has stated that he will not request Congress to ratify the
needed the certainty that the legislature will not change the circumstance
Second Protocol in view of the prevalence of heinous crimes in the
of petitioner as alleged by his counsel. It was believed that law and
country. In light of these developments, the Court's TRO should now be
equitable considerations demand no less before allowing the State to take
lifted as it has served its legal and humanitarian purpose.
the life of one its citizens.
A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that "x x
The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its
x the question of capital punishment has been the subject of endless
desired result, i.e., the crystallization of the issue whether Congress is
discussion and will probably never be settled so long as men believe in
12
punishment."[19] In our clime and time when heinous crimes continue to
be unchecked, the debate on the legal and moral predicates of capital
punishment has been regrettably blurred by emotionalism because of the
unfaltering faith of the pro and anti-death partisans on the right
and righteousness of their postulates. To be sure, any debate, even if it is
no more than an exchange of epithets is healthy in a democracy. But
when the debate deteriorates to discord due to the overuse of words
that wound, when anger threatens to turn the majority rule to tyranny,
it is the especial duty of this Court to assure that the guarantees of the
Bill of Rights to the minority fully hold. As Justice Brennan reminds us "x
x x it is the very purpose of the Constitution - - - and particularly the Bill of
Rights - - - to declare certain values transcendent, beyond the reach of
temporary political majorities."[20] Man has yet to invent a better
hatchery of justice than the courts. It is a hatchery where justice will
bloom only when we can prevent the roots of reason to be blown away
by the winds of rage. The flame of the rule of law cannot be ignited by
rage, especially the rage of the mob which is the mother of
unfairness. The business of courts in rendering justice is to be fair and
they can pass their litmus test only when they can be fair to him who is
momentarily the most hated by society.[21]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the public respondents' Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion
for Reconsideration and lifts the Temporary Restraining Order issued in its
Resolution of January 4, 1999.
The Court also orders respondent trial court judge (Hon. Thelma A.
Ponferrada, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 104) to set anew
the date for execution of the convict/petitioner in accordance with
applicable provisions of law and the Rules of Court, without further delay.
SO ORDERED.

13

[G.R. Nos. 140619-24. March 9, 2001]
BENEDICTO E. KUIZON, JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN AND ROSALINA T.
TOLIBAS, petitioners, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his
capacity as OMBUDSMAN and the HON. SANDIGANBAYAN
(FOURTH DIVISION), respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed
by incumbent Municipal Mayor of Bato, Leyte, Benedicto E. Kuizon,
Joselito Raniero J. Daan and Rosalina T. Tolibas to set aside the approval
by the respondent Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto of the Memorandum
dated May 17, 1999 of Paul Elmer M. Clemente of the Office of the Chief
Legal Counsel, Office of the Ombudsman, recommending the prosecution
of herein petitioners.
The cases subject of this petition emanated from a complaint[1] filed
on December 8, 1995 by one Melanio Saporaswith the Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas (OMB-Visayas) against petitioner Benedicto Kuizon
for Nepotism and Malversation Thru Falsification of Public Documents in
connection with the forging of signatures of some casual laborers of Bato,
Leyte in the payroll slips of the municipality and the drawing of their
salaries on different dates. The case was docketed as OMB-VIS-CRIM-95-
0646.
Attached to Saporas' complaint is the affidavit of one Zacarias Kuizon
who claimed to have been formerly hired by petitioner Kuizon as a laborer
at Bato, Leyte. Petitioner Kuizon allegedly had already dispensed with the
services of Zacarias for the month of February, 1995 but the latter's
signature was forged in the payroll for the said month and somebody took
his salary in the amount of P890.00 for that period.[2]
In an Evaluation Report dated December 19, 1995, June L. Iway, Graft
Investigation Officer I of the OMB-Visayas, recommended that petitioners
Rosalina T. Tolibas and Joselito Raniero J. Daan, Paymaster/Municipal
Treasurer and Timekeeper, respectively, should be included in the
complaint as respondents.
In an Order dated December 19, 1995, petitioners were ordered to
file their counter-affidavits. On February 20, 1996, petitioners submitted
their Answer with Special Affirmative Defenses,[3] attaching therewith the
counter-affidavits of petitioners Daan and Tolibas[4] as well as the
affidavits of several witnesses[5] to rebut the accusations of Saporas and
Zacarias Kuizon.
Meanwhile on November 15, 1995, Saporas filed another complaint
against petitioners with the Office of the Ombudsman, Manila docketed
as OMB-2-96-0049. The complaint was referred to the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas in an Indorsement dated January 29,
1996. On March 21, 1996, petitioners were required to file their
respective counter-affidavits. On April 22, 1996, petitioner Kuizon,
assisted by Atty. Leo Giron, filed his counter-affidavit,[6] attaching
therewith the counter-affidavits of petitioners Tolibas and Daan. OMB-
Visayas granted petitioners' Motion for Consolidation of Cases and Setting
of Hearing of the two (2) complaints.
On May 28, 1996, complainant Saporas submitted the affidavits of
Ceferino Cedejana[7] and Concordio Cedejana[8]in support of his
allegations in OMB-2-96-0049. Both Ceferino and Concordio made
virtually similar allegations as those made by Zacarias except the amounts
representing their salaries for the month of February, 1995 which are
P2,136.00 and P1,157.00, respectively.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Exclude the Affidavits of Ceferino and
Concordio[9] which was denied in an Order dated July 8, 1996. They filed
their supplemental counter-affidavit on July 26, 1996 in compliance with
the order requiring them to do so. On separate dates, petitioners filed
their Joint Position Paper[10] and Joint Supplemental Memorandum.[11]
On June 20, 1997, OMB-Visayas thru Graft Investigation Officer I
Samuel Malazarte issued a Resolution[12] in OMB-VIS-CRIM-95-0646 and
1
OMB-2-96-0049 recommending the filing of the Informations for
Malversation and Falsification of Public/Official Document on two (2)
counts each against all the petitioners before the Sandiganbayan.GIO
Malazarte recommended however the dismissal of the complaint for
nepotism against petitioner Kuizon. The pertinent portion of the said
Resolution states:
"While complainant's witnesses, Zacarias Kuizon, is shown to have used
two different signatures in signing documents, such as those found on a
Joint Affidavit and an Affidavit (Annexes "1" and "2", respectively, of
respondent Mayor's Counter-Affidavit), yet there is no proof shown that
the aforesaid witness has affixed on any other document a signature
similar, if not exactly the same, as the questioned signature purportedly
that of the same witness appearing on the above-mentioned Time Book
and Payroll for the period February 16 to 28, 1995. It is likewise not
shown that complainants' two other witnesses, Ceferino Cedejana and
Concordio Cedejana, has [sic] signed on any other document signatures
similar, if not the same, as the questioned signature(s) appearing on the
Time Book and payroll for the periods February 1 to 15, 1995 and
February 16 to 28, 1995, in the case of Ceferino Cedejana, and February
1 to 15, 1995, in the case of Concordio Cedejana. Indeed, a person may
use two or more signatures. But in a case as this, where the complainant,
or his witnesses, specifically denied the particular signatures in question
and imputed authorship of the falsifications thereof against the
respondents, who otherwise claimed that said questioned signatures
belong to the complainant's witnesses, it is incumbent upon the latter to
disprove the denial by solid evidence, such as a finding of a handwriting
examiner/expert - considering that they (respondents) are in possession
of the original documents bearing the allegedly falsified/forged
signatures. No such kind of evidence, however, was adduced.
The respondents relied heavily for corroboration on the testimonies of
witnesses who, at one time or another, were co-workers/laborers of
complainant's witnesses in the above-mentioned construction of [a] new
Municipal Hall Building of Bato, Leyte. But owing to a high possibility that
said respondents' witnesses were coaxed, influenced, or pressured into
signing the affidavits and to so testify, considering the circumstances of
their work and place of residence, the undersigned cannot give full
credence to the testimonies of said respondents' witnesses as against
the complainant's witnesses' specific denial of ownership of the
questioned signatures, for the purpose of this preliminary investigation.
From the claims of respondents Joselito Raniero J. Daan and Rosalina T.
Tolibas that they personally know the aforenamed complainant's
witnesses and had called their names, made them sign on the payroll[s]
in question in their (respondents') presence and gave them their
corresponding salaries, a clear inference can be drawn that there was
collusion or connivance of the aforesaid respondents which is made
more manifest by their respective certifications on the questioned Time
Book and Payrolls for the periods February 1 to 15, 1995, and February
16 to 28, 1995. And the respondent Mayor Benedicto E. Kuizon's
certification on the same questioned payrolls and his statement that he
knows for a fact that the complainant's witnesses have actually worked
during the questioned period of February 1995 serve to complete the
conspiracy."[13]
The Resolution was approved by the respondent Ombudsman Aniano
A. Desierto on September 5, 1997.
Petitioners learned that four (4) Informations dated June 20, 1997
were filed against them on September 16, 1997 with the
Sandiganbayan[14] by the Office of the Ombudsman.[15] The cases were
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 24167[16] and 24169[17] for Falsification of
Public/Official Document and Criminal Case Nos. 24168[18] and
24170[19]for Malversation of Public Funds.
On October 22, 1996, Saporas filed with the OMB-Visayas another
Affidavit-Complaint[20] for Malversation of Public Funds Thru Falsification
of Public Documents and violation of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against herein petitioners and
three others, namely, Municipal Treasurer Lolita S. Regana, Municipal
Accountant Ofelia F. Boroy and Budget Officer Glafica R. Suico for alleged
connivance in including in the payrolls for the construction of the
municipal building of Bato, Leyte, names of workers whose services were
already terminated, making it appear that they still worked and received
2
salaries even after their termination from service. The affidavits of Andres
Soso Pague[21] and Danilo Cortes[22] were attached to the said complaint
which was docketed as OMB-VIS-CRIM-96-1173 and OMB-VIS-ADM-96-
0474.
Only petitioner Daan filed his counter-affidavit in OMB-VIS-CRIM-96-
1173.[23] Petitioners Kuizon and Tolibas as well as the three (3) other
respondents therein, namely, Regana, Boroy and Suico filed an
Answer/Counter-Affidavits/Manifestation in OMB-VIS-ADM-96-
0474[24] as shown in the caption of their pleading. Attached therewith
were the affidavits of petitioners' witnesses Felipe Cortez[25], Melquiades
Jupista, Alberto Gerongco, Noel Umapas,[26]Jhonny Mario, Ricardo Garao,
Savino Kuizon,[27] Domingo Echevarre,[28] Alfonso Tabale, Alberto
Gerongco, Romeo Marino, Vicente Marino[29] and Marciano Bohol.[30]
On July 28, 1997, OMB-Visayas thru Graft Investigation Officer I
Venerando Ralph P. Santiago, Jr. issued a Resolution[31] in OMB-VIS-CRIM-
96-1173 finding sufficient grounds to hold petitioners for trial for
Malversation of Public Funds and Falsification of Public Documents. The
Resolution reads in part, thus:
"Joselito Rainero (sic) K. (sic) Daan, the lone respondent who filed his
counter-affidavit, claimed that Danilo S. Cortez and Andres S. Pague,
personally signed the payrolls. If these were true, then Messrs. Cortez
and Pague must have worked during those times indicated in the
payrolls when their names appeared. But according to them they worked
only for less than one month, and this allegation was not controverted
by the respondents - even by the answering respondent. How could they
have claimed their salaries without working for these?
The claim of respondent Daan is even belied by the copies of the payrolls
attached to the complaint. A scrutiny between the signatures of Danilo S.
Cortez and Andres S. Pague in their affidavits and those in the payrolls
reveals a striking difference, especially that of Danilo S. Cortez in the
payrolls for the months of November and December, 1995 (pp. 22, 24 &
28, record). This dissimilarity of signatures of Messrs. Cortez and Pague
in their affidavits and in the payrolls is sufficient to form a well founded
belief that the latter documents had been forged and their salaries were
maliciously appropriated by the respondents for their personal use. And
the Forgery and Malversation could only be committed by the persons
who prepared and approved the payrolls, namely: Benedicto E. Kuizon,
Joselito Rainero (sic) K. (sic) Daan and Rosalinda T. Tolibas. This is not a
farfetched conclusion because respondents Kuizon and Daan certified
that the persons whose names appeared in the payrolls had rendered
their services, while respondent Tolibas certified that he had paid in cash
to the persons whose names appeared on the payrolls, the amount set
opposite their names, they having presented themselves, established
their identity and affixed their signatures or thumb marks on the space
provided therefor.
This Office also finds that the falsification was committed to conceal the
malversation, the payrolls having been used by the above-named
respondents as supporting documents to liquidate the cash advances
they had received for the payment of the salaries of the workers."[32]
The Resolution was approved by the respondent Ombudsman Aniano
A. Desierto on September 19, 1997.
Upon verification, the petitioners learned that two (2)
Informations[33] both dated July 28, 1997 were filed against them in
September, 1997 by the Office of the Ombudsman with the
Sandiganbayan.[34] The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 24195
for Malversation of Public Funds and 24196 for Falsification of Public
Documents.
Petitioners filed two (2) separate Motions for Reinvestigation[35] both
dated October 4, 1997 in Criminal Case Nos. 24167 to 24170 and Criminal
Case Nos. 24195 to 24196. Petitioners likewise filed a Motion for
Consolidation of Criminal Case Nos. 24195 and 24196 with the four (4)
other cases which was granted by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in
its Order[36] dated October 30, 1997.
In an Order dated November 24, 1997,[37] the Sandiganbayan (Fourth
Division) granted the two (2) Motions for Reinvestigation filed by the
petitioners. On June 10, 1999, Special Prosecution Officer II Lemuel M. De
3
Guzman filed a Manifestation[38] with the Sandiganbayan which reads as
follows:
"1. In a Memorandum dated August 19, 1998, a certified true copy of
which is hereto attached and made an integral part hereof as Annex "A",
the undersigned terminated action on the two (2) Motions for
Reconsideration dated October 4, 1997 filed by all the accused as well as
the Counter-Affidavit dated February 7, 1998 filed by accused Benedicto
E. Kuizon in the above-captioned cases and recommended the exclusion
of accused Mayor Benedicto E. Kuizon as party-accused therein and to
remand the case to the regular court for the prosecution of accused
Joselito Ramiero (sic) K. (sic) Daan and Rosalina T. Tolibas.
2. On September 8, 1998, the Honorable Special Prosecutor Leonardo P.
Tamayo required Special Prosecution Officer Norberto B. Ruiz to take a
second look into the undersigned's memorandum. In another
Memorandum dated November 16, 1998, a certified true copy of which
is hereto attached and made [an] integral part hereof as Annex "B",
Prosecutor Ruiz recommended the affirmation of the previous
memorandum, which the Honorable Special Prosecutor concurred in.
3. On May 7, 1999, before acting on the cases, the Honorable
Ombudsman referred the records thereof to the Office of the Chief Legal
Counsel (OCLC) '(F)or review considering that OSP seeks to reverse the
Ombudsman's findings.'
4. In a Memorandum dated May 17, 1999, a certified true copy of which
is hereto attached and made [an] integral part hereof as Annex "C",
OCLC recommended the continued prosecution of all the accused 'there
being no cogent grounds to warrant a reversal of the finding of probable
cause by OMB-Visayas.' This memorandum was approved by the
Honorable Ombudsman on June 1, 1999 and, accordingly, the
undersigned's memorandum was disapproved with the following
marginal note: 'Prosecution of all the accused shall proceed as
recommended by OCLC.'"[39]
Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan set the criminal cases for hearing on
August 16, 18 to 20, 1999. Petitioner Daan filed with the Sandiganbayan
an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation and to Defer Arraignment[40] dated
August 12, 1999. In an Order dated August 16, 1999, the motion was
denied by the Sandiganbayan.[41] Petitioners were arraigned on the same
date and they all pleaded "not guilty" to the crimes charged.[42] The pre-
trial and the trial on the merits were then set upon agreement of the
parties.
On September 6, 1999, petitioners filed a petition before the Court
of Appeals captioned "Benedicto E. Kuizon, et al. vs. Hon. Aniano A.
Desierto, et al." and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54898, assailing the
approval by the respondent Aniano A. Desierto of the Memorandum of
his Legal Counsel which recommended the continued prosecution of the
petitioners. The Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order in
a Resolution dated September 17, 1999. On even date, petitioners filed a
Motion for Suspension of Proceedings and/or Postponement with the
Sandiganbayan.
On October 19, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated a
Resolution[43] which states:
"Per the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Teresita G. Fabian
vs. Aniano A. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998, the
jurisdiction of this Court extends only to decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases. The cases involved in the instant
petition are criminal cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DENIED DUE COURSE and
accordingly DISMISSED, for lack of jurisdiction."[44]
On November 4, 1999, petitioners filed the instant petition based on
the following grounds:
"A. The Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it deprived herein petitioners of
the opportunity to file motions for reconsideration of the resolutions of
the Office of Ombudsman-Visayas (Annexes "G" and "M" hereof);[45]
4
B. The Honorable Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he approved
the Memorandum of Legal Counsel Paul Elmer M. Clemente (Annex "C",
Manifestation of Special Prosecution Officer Lemuel De Guzman) despite
the fact that no reinvestigation was conducted with respect to herein
petitioners Joselito Raniero J. Daan and Rosalina T. Tolibas;[46]
C. The Honorable Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he approved
the Memorandum of Legal Counsel Paul Elmer M. Clemente (Annex "C",
Manifestation of Special (sic) Prosecution Lemuel De Guzman to the
Sandiganbayan) reinstating the prosecution of the criminal cases as
against petitioner Benedicto Kuizon;[47] and
D. The Honorable Sandiganbayan, with due respect, also committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in proceeding
with the trial of the cases against herein petitioners."[48]
On December 1, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo Order.
We will first dispose of the procedural issues raised by the
parties. Respondent alleges that the petition was filed out of time
considering that more than sixty (60) days had elapsed from the time
respondent Sandiganbayan's Order dated August 16, 1999 denying
petitioners' Motion to Defer Arraignment and petitioner Daan's Urgent
Motion for Reinvestigation and to Defer Arraignment was rendered. The
erroneous filing by the petitioners of their petition with the Court of
Appeals did not allegedly toll the running of the period to file the same
with this Court.[49] In reply thereto, petitioners submit that the 60-day
period should not be strictly applied to them considering that they
originally filed their petition with the Court of Appeals within the
prescribed period. They maintain that the Court of Appeals has
concurrent jurisdiction with this Court on special civil actions for certiorari
under Rule 65 applying the doctrine in St. Martin Funeral Homes vs.
National Labor Relations Commission.[50] Petitioners now raise the issue
as to which court has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari under Rule
65 questioning resolutions or orders of the Office of the Ombudsman in
criminal cases.[51]
In dismissing petitioners' petition for lack of jurisdiction, the Court of
Appeals cited the case of Fabian vs. Desierto.[52] The appellate court
correctly ruled that its jurisdiction extends only to decisions of the Office
of the Ombudsman in administrative cases.[53] In the Fabian case, we
ruled that appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of
Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It bears
stressing that when we declared Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770[54] as
unconstitutional, we categorically stated that said provision is involved
only whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a
decision in an administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into
account where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted
to as a remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in a criminal
action.[55] In fine, we hold that the present petition should have been filed
with this Court.
It follows that the instant petition was filed late. A petition for
certiorari should be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed.[56] The present
petition was filed with this Court only on November 24, 1999 which is
more than sixty (60) days from the time petitioners were notified of the
adverse resolutions issued by the Office of the Ombudsman. The
erroneous filing of the petition with the Court of Appeals did not toll the
running of the period.
But even on its merit, the petition cannot succeed. Petitioners
primarily invoke denial of due process. They contend that they were not
accorded the opportunity to file a Motion for Reconsideration since they
were not furnished copies of the adverse Resolutions issued by the OMB-
Visayas prior to their approval by the respondent Ombudsman
Desierto. The Office of the Ombudsman allegedly railroaded the
preliminary investigation of the cases in violation of Sections 6 and 7 of
Administrative Order No. 07, as amended by Administrative Order No. 09
which provides that:
5
"Sec. 6. Notice to parties. - The parties shall be served with a copy of the
resolution as finally approved by the Ombudsman or by the proper
Deputy Ombudsman.
Sec. 7. Motion for Reconsideration. -
(a) Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an
approved order or resolution shall be allowed, the same to be filed
within five (5) days from notice thereof with the Office of the
Ombudsman, or the Deputy Ombudsman as the case may be.
(b) x x x x x x x x x."
Section 6 of the aforequoted provision speaks of two (2) approving
authorities with respect to resolutions issued by the Office of the
Ombudsman. Hence, the phrase "as finally approved by the Ombudsman
or by the proper Deputy Ombudsman."
As succinctly discussed in the respondent's Comment, it is the
procedure in the Office of the Ombudsman that any Memorandum and/or
Resolution of any criminal case pending before its Office which involves
high ranking officials under R.A. 8249[57] should have the approval of the
Ombudsman before the same may be released and considered the official
action of the Office of the Ombudsman. Since petitioner Kuizon falls under
the category of high ranking officials under R. A. 8249 who is charged with
conspiracy with the other two (2) petitioners, the Resolutions dated June
20, 1997 and July 28, 1997 need the approval of the Honorable
Ombudsman.[58] This finds support in Sec. 4 (g), Rule II of Administrative
Order No. 07 which provides:
"Sec. 4. Procedure. - The preliminary investigations of cases falling under
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts shall be
conducted in the manner prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court, subject to the following provisions:
xxxxxxxxx
(g) Upon the termination of the preliminary investigation, the
investigation officer shall forward the records of the case together with
his resolution to the designated authorities for their appropriate action
thereon.
No information may be filed and no complaint may be dismissed
without the written authority or approval of the Ombudsman in cases
falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, or of the proper
Deputy Ombudsman in all other cases." (emphasis supplied)
Prescinding from the foregoing discussions, the resolutions which
must be furnished to the petitioners refer to those approved by the
respondent Ombudsman. Respondent alleges that copies of the
challenged Resolutions as approved by the Honorable Ombudsman on
different dates[59] were sent to the parties by registered mail on
September 12, 1997 and September 24, 1997, respectively.[60] Petitioners
deny having received copies of these resolutions.
The issue is not of momentous legal significance for non-compliance
with Sections 6 and 7 of Administrative Order No. 7 does not affect the
validity of the Informations filed with the Sandiganbayan. In the case
of Pecho vs. Sandiganbayan,[61] we held:
"Equally devoid of merit is the alleged non-compliance with Sections 6
and 7, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman. The presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty on the part of the investigating Prosecutor was not
rebutted. Moreover, the failure to furnish the respondent with a copy
of an adverse resolution pursuant to Section 6 which reads:
'SEC. 6. Notice to parties. - The parties shall be served with a copy of
the resolution as finally approved by the Ombudsman or by the proper
Deputy Ombudsman.'
does not affect the validity of an information thereafter filed even if a
copy of the resolution upon which the information is based was not
served upon the respondent. The contention that the provision is
6
mandatory in order to allow the respondent to avail of the 15-day
period to file a motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation is not
persuasive for under Section 7 of the said Rule, such motion may,
nevertheless, be filed and acted upon by the Ombudsman if so directed
by the court where the information was filed. Finally, just as in the case
of lack of or irregularity in the conduct of the preliminary investigation, a
party, like the petitioner herein, should have seasonably questioned the
procedural error at any time before he entered his plea to the charge.
His failure to do so amounted to a waiver or abandonment of what he
believed was his right under Sections 6 and 7, Rule II of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman."[62] (emphasis supplied)
Petitioners further allege that the OMB-Visayas resolved the case in
OMB-CRIM-96-1173 solely on the basis of the complaint of Saporas and
the affidavits of Cortes and Pague. Petitioners' Answer/ Counter-
Affidavits/ Manifestation were allegedly ignored.[63] The contention is
belied by the records of the case. Petitioners were all required to file their
counter-affidavits but only petitioner Daan complied. Petitioners (except
Daan) must perforce suffer the consequences of their inaction.
Petitioners also claim that their Answer/Counter-
Affidavits/Manifestation was intended for both the administrative as well
as the criminal complaints. The records reveal otherwise. The docket
number in the said pleading's caption which states "OMB-VIS-ADM-96-
0474" indicates that it is for the administrative case only. The fault lies
with the petitioners when they indicated therein an incomplete docket
number. It is their duty to see to it that all the entries in their pleading
including its caption are accurate. If indeed the petitioners committed an
oversight in placing the wrong or incomplete docket number in their
pleading, they should have filed the proper motion or manifestation to
correct the purported inaccuracies. It is not the obligation of the Office of
the Ombudsman to supply or supplant any deficiency found in the
litigants' pleadings.
The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and
submit evidence in support of one's defense.[64]What the law proscribes is
lack of opportunity to be heard.[65] The facts show that preliminary
investigations were conducted prior to the filing of the Informations.
Petitioners filed their Answer with Special Affirmative Defenses in OMB-
VIS-CRIM-95-0646. Petitioner Kuizon filed his Counter-Affidavit together
with the attached affidavits of petitioners Tolibas and Daan in OMB-2-96-
0049. When petitioners learned that four (4) Informations were filed
against them, they filed a Motion for Reinvestigation which the
Sandiganbayan granted. It is clear therefore that petitioners were not
deprived of due process.
We now come to the issue raised by petitioners Daan and Tolibas that
there was no reinvestigation conducted on them. It appears from the
records that the Office of the Special Prosecutor who was authorized to
conduct the reinvestigation of the cases did not notify petitioners Daan
and Tolibas of the proceedings. Only petitioner Kuizon filed his counter-
affidavit which was solely considered by Special Prosecutor Lemuel de
Guzman in his Memorandum.[66] Be that as it may, we rule against the
petitioners. The procedural defect was waived by petitioners when they
entered their plea of "not guilty" to the informations. The settled rule is
that when an accused pleads to the charge, he is deemed to have waived
the right to preliminary investigation and the right to question any
irregularity that surrounds it.[67] The invalidity or absence of a preliminary
investigation does not affect the jurisdiction of the court which may have
taken cognizance of the information nor impair the validity of the
information or otherwise render it defective.[68]
The petitioners further asseverate that respondent Desierto gravely
abused his discretion when he simply approved the recommendation of
the Legal Counsel recommending the filing of informations in court
despite the clear absence of reasonable justification.[69] We reject
petitioners' claim. What is involved is merely a review and affirmation by
the respondent Ombudsman of the findings made by the investigating
prosecutor. He need not restate the facts and elaborate on the applicable
law. In Cruz, Jr. vs. People,[70] we held:
"It may seem that the ratio decidendi of the Ombudsman's order may be
wanting but this is not a case of a total absence of factual and legal bases
nor a failure to appreciate the evidence presented. What is actually
involved here is merely a review of the conclusion arrived at by the
investigating prosecutor as a result of his study and analysis of the
7
complaint, counter-affidavits, and the evidence submitted by the parties the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an
during the preliminiary investigation. The Ombudsman here is not information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant."[75]
conducting anew another investigation but is merely determining the
propriety and correctness of the recommendation given by the Equally unmeritorious is the petitioners' claim that the
investigating prosecutor, that is, whether probable cause actually exists Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in proceeding with
or not, on the basis of the findings of the latter. Verily, it is discretionary the trial of their cases. The Sandiganbayan granted petitioners' motion for
upon the Ombudsman if he will rely mainly on the findings of fact of the reinvestigation. It correctly denied petitioner Daan's subsequent Motion
investigating prosecutor in making a review of the latter's report and for Reinvestigation and to Defer Arraignment in view of the respondent
recommendation, as the Ombudsman can very well make his own Ombudsman's final action to proceed with the prosecution of the
findings of fact. There is nothing to prevent him from acting one way or cases. Jurisdiction has been acquired by the Sandiganbayan over the
the other. x x x"[71] person of the petitioners as they appeared at the arraignment and
pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.
In case of conflict in the conclusions of the Ombudsman and the
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the Sandiganbayan is
special prosecutor, it is self-evident that the former's decision shall prevail
hereby ORDERED to proceed with the trial of the cases at bar with
since the Office of the Special Prosecutor is under the supervision and
dispatch. Costs against petitioners.
control of the Ombudsman.[72] The action of the respondent Ombudsman
in disapproving the findings of Special Prosecutor De Guzman and SO ORDERED.
approving that of Legal Counsel Clemente does not per se constitute grave
abuse of discretion.
Petitioners Daan and Tolibas also claim that their evidence consisting
of the affidavit of Pague will show that there is no probable cause to indict
them. The contention lacks merit. We reiterate the rule of long standing
that in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, this Court will not
interfere with the exercise by the Ombudsman of his constitutionally
mandated investigatory and prosecutory powers.[73] His findings of
probable cause are entitled to great respect. The rationale behind the said
rule has been aptly discussed in Ocampo, IV vs. Ombudsman,[74] thus:

"The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and
prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the
Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of
the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions
assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the
Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in
much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they
could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of

8
DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO
VICTORIANO, JACOB
OBANIA AND DOMINGO CABACUNGAN,
Petitioners,
-versus–
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRSOF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO,
namely: FE, CORAZON, JOSEFA, SALVADOR and CARMEN, all surnamed DEL
MUNDO, LAND BANK
OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. ANTONIO N. ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Branch
43, Regional Trial Court, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino,
Lolito Victoriano, Jacob Obania and Domingo Cabacungan filed an action
for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or
reversion with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 43, of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of Forest
Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs
of Bernardo del Mundo, namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and
Carmen.
In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both petitioners and
respondents) filed various motions with the trial court. Among these
were: (1) the motion filed by petitioners to declare the respondent heirs,
the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest Development in default and
(2) the motions to dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and the Land Bank
of the Philippines, respectively.
In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by public
respondent Judge Antonio N. Rosales, resolved the foregoing motions as
follows: (1) the petitioners motion to declare respondents Bureau of
Lands and Bureau of Forest Development in default was granted for their
failure to file an answer, but denied as against the respondent heirs of del
Mundo because the substituted service of summons on them was
improper; (2) the Land Banks motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action
was denied because there were hypothetical admissions and matters that
could be determined only after trial, and (3) the motion to dismiss filed by
respondent heirs of del Mundo, based on prescription, was also denied
because there were factual matters that could be determined only after
trial.[1]
The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order denying their motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court
could very well resolve the issue of prescription from the bare allegations
of the complaint itself without waiting for the trial proper.
1
 In an order[2] dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal

petitioners complaint on the ground that the action had already on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the

prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal reglementary period for appeal.[7]

on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998,
On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the
filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued
petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been
another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration[3] which
reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12,
petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998,
1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court,
petitioners filed a notice of appeal[4] and paid the appeal fees on August
the order was the final order appealable under the Rules. It held further:
3, 1998.
Perforce the petitioners tardy appeal was correctly
dismissed for the (P)erfection of an appeal within the
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal,
reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law
holding that it was filed eight days late.[5] This was received by petitioners is jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal
requirement is fatal and effectively renders the judgment
on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too final and executory.[8]
was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998.[6]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned

Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the
decision. This was denied by the Court of Appeals on January 6, 2000.
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the

notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals.

In this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules, petitioners

ascribe the following errors allegedly committed by the appellate court:

In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had

seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day

reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since
I
this was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying
2

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
AND MANDAMUS AND IN AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF THE
HON. JUDGE ANTONIO N. ROSALES WHICH DISMISSED THE
PETITIONERS APPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. C-36 OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43, ROXAS, ORIENTAL
MINDORO, EVEN AFTER THE PETITIONERS HAD PAID THE
APPEAL DOCKET FEES.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN
RULING AND AFFIRMING THE DECISION OR ORDER OF THE
RESPONDENT HON. ANTONIO M. ROSALES THAT
PETITIONERS APPEAL WAS FILED OUT OF TIME WHEN
PETITIONERS RECEIVED THE LAST OR FINAL ORDER OF THE
COURT ON JULY 22, 1998 AND FILED THEIR NOTICE OF
APPEAL ON JULY 27, 1998 AND PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET
FEE ON AUGUST 3, 1998.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER ERRED IN
RULING THAT THE WORDS FINAL ORDER IN SECTION 3,
RULE 41, OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WILL
REFER TO THE [FIRST] ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE
HON. ANTONIO M. MORALES DATED FEBRUARY 12, 1998
INSTEAD OF THE LAST AND FINAL ORDER DATED JULY 1,
1998 COPY OF WHICH WAS RECEIVED BY PETITIONERS
THROUGH COUNSEL ON JULY 22, 1998.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE DECISION IN THE CASE OF DENSO, INC.
V. IAC, 148 SCRA 280, IS APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE
THEREBY IGNORING THE PECULIAR FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE AND THE FACT THAT THE
SAID DECISION WAS RENDERED PRIOR TO THE
ENACTMENT OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.[9]
The foregoing issues essentially revolve around the period within which
petitioners should have filed their notice of appeal.
First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part
of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only
in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one
who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the
requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the
right to appeal.[10] The period to appeal is fixed by both statute and
procedural rules. BP 129,[11] as amended, provides:
Sec. 39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders,
resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court
in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from
the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment,
or decision appealed from. Provided, however, that in
habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48)
forty-eight hours from the notice of judgment appealed
from. x x x
Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be
taken within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the
judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record
3
 on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of
appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from
the notice of judgment or final order.
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely
motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for
extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed. (emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from
the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A final judgment or
order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the
court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which,
considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically
what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or
judgment that dismisses an action.[12]
As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998
denying their motion for reconsideration should be construed as the final
order, not the February 12, 1998 order which dismissed their complaint.
Since they received their copy of the denial of their motion for
reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day reglementary period to
appeal had not yet lapsed when they filed their notice of appeal on July
27, 1998.
What therefore should be deemed as the final order, receipt of
which triggers the start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal the
February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order
dismissing the MR?
In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc.,[13] the trial
court declared petitioner Quelnan non-suited and accordingly dismissed
his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus
motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the
15-day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received
another order, this time dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his
notice of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed ― for having been filed
out of time.
The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within
15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order
that was appealable under the Rules. We reversed the trial court and
declared that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an
order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it
was what ended the issues raised there.
This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v.
Haldeman et al.[14] where we again considered the order denying
4
petitioner Apuyans motion for reconsideration as the final order which
finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.
Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners view that the
order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was
the final order contemplated in the Rules.
We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start of
the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, did petitioners in fact file their
notice of appeal on time?
Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of
judgment or final order to appeal the decision of the trial court. On the
th
15 day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998), petitioners did not
file a notice of appeal but instead opted to file a motion for
reconsideration. According to the trial court, the MR only interrupted the
running of the 15-day appeal period.[15] It ruled that petitioners, having
filed their MR on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal,
had only one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal upon receipt of the
notice of denial of their MR. Petitioners, however, argue that they were
entitled under the Rules to a fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the
final order or the order dismissing their motion for reconsideration.
In Quelnan and Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the trial court. We ruled there that they
only had the remaining time of the 15-day appeal period to file the notice
of appeal. We consistently applied this rule in similar cases,[16] premised
on the long-settled doctrine that the perfection of an appeal in the
manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but
also jurisdictional.[17] The rule is also founded on deep-seated
considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at risk of
occasional error, the judgments and awards of courts must become final
at some definite time fixed by law.[18]
Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964
Revised Rules of Court read:
Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. Appeal maybe taken
by serving upon the adverse party and filing with the trial
court within thirty (30) days from notice of order or
judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a
record on appeal. The time during which a motion to set
aside the judgment or order or for new trial has been
pending shall be deducted, unless such motion fails to
satisfy the requirements of Rule 37.
But where such motion has been filed during office
hours of the last day of the period herein provided, the
appeal must be perfected within the day following that in
which the party appealing received notice of the denial of
said motion.[19] (emphasis supplied)
5
 under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be

According to the foregoing provision, the appeal period previously excused on grounds of substantial justice. There, we condoned the delay

consisted of 30 days. BP 129, however, reduced this appeal period to 15 incurred by the appealing party due to strong considerations of fairness

days. In the deliberations of the Committee on Judicial and justice.

Reorganization[20] that drafted BP 129, the raison d etre behind the In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course

amendment was to shorten the period of appeal[21] and enhance the to tardy appeals, we have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the

efficiency and dispensation of justice. We have since required strict extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules. In

observance of this reglementary period of appeal. Seldom have we those situations where technicalities were dispensed with, our decisions

condoned late filing of notices of appeal,[22] and only in very exceptional were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set

instances to better serve the ends of justice. by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare cases where procedural

rules were not stringently applied, there always existed a clear need to
In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v.
prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the
[23]
Municipality of Libmanan, however, we declared that appeal is an
courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict
essential part of our judicial system and the rules of procedure should not
enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be
be applied rigidly. This Court has on occasion advised the lower courts to
given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his
be cautious about not depriving a party of the right to appeal and that
cause.[25]
every party litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all
proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraint of
courts.[26] It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish
technicalities.
new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy

disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court

In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals,[24] we stated that, as a rule,
of Appeals, particularly Rules 42,[27] 43[28] and 45,[29] the Court allows
periods which require litigants to do certain acts must be followed unless,

6
extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules

parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of

more. judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word or

signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to
should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily
afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
implies.[33] Hence, the use of or in the above provision supposes that the
practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice
notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment
of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order
or within 15 days from notice of the final order, which we already
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. [30]
determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a

Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40 new trial or reconsideration.

governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39
Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to
of BP 129 which shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to
[31]
the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to
hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this case
the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the
March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still
[32]
Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal
applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a
period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the
party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In
motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial)
this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given
or any final order or resolution.
another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize
We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of
and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with
appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the
dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at some definite
date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This
time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.
7
 WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed
In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as
decision of the Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted from receipt of
let the records of this case be remanded to the Court of Appeals for
notice of judgment (March 3, 1998) or from receipt of notice of final order
further proceedings.
appealed from (July 22, 1998).

No costs.
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal

within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Courts decision or file it SO ORDERED.

within 15 days from receipt of the order (the final order) denying his

motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-

day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the

decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal

period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.

Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five

days from receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration

on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh

appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed.[34]

We deem it unnecessary to discuss the applicability of Denso (Philippines),

Inc. v. IAC[35] since the Court of Appeals never even referred to it in its

assailed decision.

8

G.R. No. 197582 June 29, 2015
JULIE S. SUMBILLA, Petitioner,
vs.
MATRIX FINANCE CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, petitioner Julie S. Sumbilla seeks the
liberal application of procedural rules to correct the penalty imposed in
the Decision1dated January 14, 2009 of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Makati City, Branch 67, in Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to
321174 which had already attained finality in view of petitioner's failure
to timely file an appeal.
The antecedent facts are not disputed.
Petitioner obtained a cash loan . from respondent Matrix Finance
Corporation. As partial payment for her loan, petitioner issued Philippine
Business Bank Check Nos. 0032863 to 0032868. The six checks have a
uniform face value of ₱6,667.00 each.
Upon maturity, the six checks were presented by respondent to the
drawee bank for payment. However, all the checks were dishonored on
the ground that they were drawn against a closed account.
Petitioner's refusal to heed the demand letter of respondent for the
payment of the face value of the dishonored checks culminated in her
indictment for six counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22).
The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174, and
were raffled off to Branch 67, MeTC of Makati.
In a Decision dated January 14, 2009, the MeTC found petitioner
criminally and civilly liable for the issuance of the six rubber checks. For
each count of violation of BP 22 involving a check with a face value of
₱6,667.00, the MeTC meted petitioner a penalty of fine amounting to
₱80,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment. Her civil liability for the six
consolidated cases was computed in the total amount of ₱40,002.00.
The fallo of the decision provides:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment finding accused Julie S.
Sumbilla GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of six counts of violation of
Batas Pambansa Big. 22. For each count, she is sentenced to pay n. fine
of ₱80,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment.
She is likewise ORDERED to indemnify private complainant Matrix
Finance Corporation the total amount of ₱40,002.00 plus 12% annual
legal interest from September 21, 2002 until full payment.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.2 (Emphasis and underscoring added.)
Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal, petitioner opted to file a Motion for
Reconsideration3 before the MeTC. The Motion was denied in the
Order4 dated April 17, 2009 being a pleading barred under the Revised
Rules on Summary Procedure. The MeTC further noted that the
prohibited motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner will not
suspend the running of the period to perfect an appeal.
Subsequently, the Notice of Appeal filed by petitioner was also denied
for having been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period.
With the denial5 of her Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying
her appeal, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari6 under Rule 65 of the
Rules which was docketed as SCA No. 09-1125 and raffled off to Branch
61, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.
Ruling that the MeTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in
denying the Notice of Appeal filed by petitioner, the RTC dismissed7 the
1
petition for certiorari. The Motion for Reconsideration8 filed by
petitioner met the same fate of dismissal.9
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition
for review10 under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. The CA, however, ruled
that an ordinary appeal under Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
is the correct remedy under the circumstances because the RTC
rendered the decision in the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.11
On July 27, 2011, after she received a copy of the June 28, 2011
Resolution12 of the CA denying her Motion for
Reconsideration,13 petitioner filed a motion for extension of time to file
the instant petition.14
On August 11, 2011, petitioner filed her Petition for Review on
Certiorari15 within the period of extension granted in our
Resolution16 dated September 7, 2011. She ascribed to the CA a sole
error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI ON TECHNICALITY AND NOT EXERCISING ITS POSITIVE
DUTY OF GIVING DUE IMPORTANCE ON THE SUBSTANTIVE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER DESPITE A CLEAR
PRESENCE OF SUCH VIOLATION OF LAW AS DEFINED BY PETITIONER IN
HER PETITION WHICH COULD HAVE MERIT A FULL DECISION BY A
HIGHER COURT.17
Petitioner acknowledged18 the procedural lapse of filing a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead of an ordinary
appeal before the CA. She also fully grasped19 the effects of her
erroneous filing of the Motion for Reconsideration to challenge the
MeTC Decision finding her guilty of six counts of violation of BP 22.
Knowing that her conviction had already attained finality, petitioner
seeks the relaxation of the rules of procedure so that the alleged
erroneous penalty imposed by the MeTC can be modified to make it in
accord with existing law and jurisprudence.
Respondent countered that the right to appeal being a mere statutory
privilege can only be exercised in accordance with the rules, and the lost
appeal cannot be resurrected through the present remedial recourse of
a petition for review on certiorari.
The main issue to be resolved is whether the penalty imposed in the
MeTC Decision dated January 14, 2009, which is already final and
executory, may still be modified.
The petition is meritorious.
Petitioner does not dispute the finality of the Decision dated January 14,
2009 in Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174 rendered by the MeTC,
finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of six counts of violation of
BP 22. For every count of violation of BP 22 involving a check with a face
value of ₱6,667.00, petitioner was meted a penalty of fine of PS0,000.00,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment. She assails the
penalty for being out of the range of the penalty prescribed in Section 1
of BP 22, and the subsidiary imprisonment to be violative of
Administrative Circular Nos. 12-2000 and 13-2001, and the holdings in
Vaca v. Court of Appeals.20 Petitioner asserted that the maximum
penalty of fine that can be imposed against her in each count of violation
of BP 22 is double the amount of the face value of the dishonored check
only or ₱13,334.00. The fine of PS0,000.00 for each count is thus
excessive. She further implied that the imposition of subsidiary
imprisonment contravened Section 20 of Article III of the Constitution
which proscribes imprisonment as a punishment for not paying a debt.
Section 1 of BP 22 provides:
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes or
draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at
the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason,
2
ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment
of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of
not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which
fine shall in no case exceed Two hundred thousand pesos, or both such
fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The court may thus impose any of the following alternative penalties
against an accused found criminally liable for violating BP 22: (1)
imprisonment of not less than 30 days, but not more than one year; or
(2) a fine of not less or more than double the amount of the check, and
shall in no case exceed ₱200,000.00; or (3) both such fine and
imprisonment. The discretion to impose a single (imprisonment or fine)
or conjunctive (fine and imprisonment) penalty pertains to the court.
If fine alone is the penalty imposed, the maximum shall be double the
amount of the face value of the rubber check which in no case should
exceed ₱200,000.00.
Here, the face value of each of the six checks that bounced is ₱6,667.00.
Under Section 1 of BP 22, the maximum penalty of fine that can be
imposed on petitioner is only 1!13,334.00, or the amount double the
face value of each check. Indubitably, the MeTC meted the petitioner a
penalty of fine way beyond the maximum limits prescribed under Section
1 of BP 22. The fine of ₱80,000.00 is more than 11 times the amount of
the face value of each check that was dishonored.
Instead of using as basis the face value of each check (₱6,667.00), the
MeTC incorrectly computed the amount of fine using the total face value
of the six checks (₱40,002.00). The same error occurred in Abarquez v.
Court of Appeals,21 where we modified the penalty of fine imposed in
one of the consolidated cases therein (Criminal Case No. D-8137) to only
double the amount of the face value of the subject check.
Unfortunately, in the present case, the MeTC Decision is already final
and executory after petitioner failed to timely file a Notice of Appeal.
Under the doctrine of finality and immutability of judgments, a decision
that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may
no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant
to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law, and whether it will be
made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the
land.22 Upon finality of the judgment, the Court loses its jurisdiction to
amend, modify or alter the same.23
Nonetheless, the immutability of final judgments is not a hard and fast
rule. The Court has the power and prerogative to suspend its own rules
and to exempt a case from their operation if and when justice requires
it.24 After all, procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of
justice. If a stringent application of the rules would hinder rather than
serve the demands of substantial justice, the former must yield to the
latter,25 as specifically mandated under Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of
Court:
SEC. 2. Construction. - These rules shall be liberally construed in order to
promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.
Consequently final and executory judgments were reversed when the
interest of substantial justice is at stake and where special and
compelling reasons called for such actions.26 In Barnes v. Judge
Padilla,27 we declared as follows:
x x x a final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by any of
the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest
court of the land.
However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial
justice considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the
case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of
the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f)
the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
3
Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed
to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of
Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard
rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this
Court itself had already declared to be final.
The judgment of conviction was already final in Rigor v. The
Superintendent, New Bilibid Prison28 when the Court corrected the
minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence imposed
on the accused which exceeded the period of the imposable penalty. The
correction was made in the interest of justice and only for the penalty
imposed against petitioner to be in accordance with law and nothing
else.29
Both People v. Gatward,30 and People v. Barro31 cited the duty and
inherent power of the Court to correct the erroneous penalties meted
on the accused in a final and executory judgments, and make it conform
to the penalty prescribed by law.
The interest of justice and the duty and inherent power of the Court
were the reasons anchored upon in Estrada v. People32 in ruling that it is
befitting to modify the penalty imposed on petitioner even though the
notice of appeal was belatedly filed.
In Almuete v. People,33 the penalty imposed upon the petitioner which is
outside the range of the penalty prescribed by law was duly corrected
even if it was already final on the ground of substantial justice, thus:
In this case, it cannot be gainsaid that what is involved is the life and
liberty of petitioner.1awp++i1 If his penalty of imprisonment remains
uncorrected, it would be not conformable with law and he would be
made to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 18 years, 2 months and
21 days of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 40 years of reclusion
perpetua, as maximum, which is outside the range of the penalty
prescribed by law. Contrast this to the proper imposable penalty the
minimum of which should only be within the range of 2 years, 4 months
and 1 day to 6 years of prision correccional, while the maximum should
only be anywhere between 11 years, 8 months and 1 day of prision
mayor to 13 years of reclusion temporal. Substantial justice demands
that we suspend our Rules in this case. "It is always within the power of
the court to suspend its own [R]ules or except a particular case from its
operation, whenever the purposes of justice require. x x x Indeed, when
there is a strong showing that a grave miscarriage of justice would result
from the strict application of the Rules, this Court will not hesitate to
relax the same in the interest of substantial justice." Suspending the
Rules is justified "where there exist strong compelling reasons, such as
serving the ends of justice and preventing a miscarriage thereof." After
all, the Court's "primordial and most important duty is to render justice x
x x."34 All the accused in Almuete v. People,35 People v. Barro,36Estrada v.
People,37 and Rigor v. The Superintendent, New Bilibid Prison,38 failed to
perfect their appeal on their respective judgments of conviction, but the
Court corrected the penalties imposed, notwithstanding the finality of
the decisions because they were outside the range of penalty prescribed
by law. There is, thus, no reason to deprive the petitioner in the present
case of the relief afforded the accused in the cited cases. Verily, a
sentence which imposes upon the defendant in a criminal prosecution a
penalty in excess of the maximum which the court is authorized by law
to impose for the offense for which the defendant was convicted, is void
for want or excess of jurisdiction as to the excess.39
Here, the penalty imposed is obviously out of range of that prescribed in
Section 1 of BP 22. Moreover, since the term of the subsidiary
imprisonment is based on the total amount of the fine or one day for
each amount equivalent to the highest minimum wage rate prevailing in
the Philippines at the time of the rendition of judgment of conviction by
the trial court,40 if petitioner is insolvent, she will suffer a longer prison
sentence. Substantial justice dictates that the penalty of fine meted on
the petitioner be accordingly corrected within the maximum limits
prescribed under Section 1 of BP 22. Hence, the penalty of fine of
₱80,000.00 meted on petitioner in Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174
for each count of violation of BP 22 is corrected to double the face value
of each rubber check involved or ₱13,334.00 only.
4
Anent the alleged violation of Vaca v. Court of Appeals,41 and
Administrative Circular No. 12-200042 that supposedly limited to fine the
imposable penalty for violation of BP 22, and without any subsidiary
imprisonment, suffice it to quote the clarifications in Administrative
Circular No. 13-2001, issued on February 14, 2001:
x x x queries have been made regarding the authority of Judges to
1. Impose the penalty of imprisonment for violations of Batas
Pambansa Big. 22; and
2. Impose subsidiary imprisonment in the event that the accused,
who is found guilty of violating the provisions of B. P Big. 2 2, is
unable to pay the fine which he is sentenced to pay considering
that Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 adopted the rulings in
Eduardo Vaca v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 131714, 16
November 1998, 298 SCRA 656) and Rosa Lim v. People of the
Philippines (G.R. No. 130038, 18 September 2000) as a policy of
the Supreme Court on the matter of the imposition of penalties
for violations of B. P Big. 22, without mentioning whether
subsidiary imprisonment could be resorted to in case of the
accused's inability to pay the fine.
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is
not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a
rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P.
Big. 22.
The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of
imprisonment for violators of B.P. Big. 22. Neither does it defeat the
legislative intent behind the law.
Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of
preference in the application of the penal provisions of B.P. Big. 22 such
that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender
clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of
negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the
more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of
whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests
solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge decide that imprisonment is the
more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not
be deemed a hindrance.
It is, therefore, understood that
1 . Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as an
alternative penalty for violations of B.P Big. 22;
xxxx
3. Should only a fine be imposed and tile accused be unable to pay the
fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal
Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.
x x x x43 (Italics in the original; emphasis added)
In like manner, the issue of whether BP 22 violates Section 20 of Article
III of the Constitution which proscribes imprisonment as a punishment
for not paying a debt was already settled in the negative in Lozano v.
Martinez.44Pertinent portions of the Decision in the Lozano case read:
Has BP 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for debt? x x x
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment.1âwphi1 It is not the non-payment of an
obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed
to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit,
under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and
putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the
public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes
the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public
order.
5
 xxxx

In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police

power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for debt.45 (Emphasis added) WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED. In the interest of justice, the Decision dated January 14, 2009
of Branch 67, Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City in Criminal Case
Nos. 321169 to 321174 is MODIFIED.

Accused Julie S. Sumbilla is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable

doubt of six counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22, and is
sentenced to pay a FINE of THIRTEEN THOUSAND AND THREE HUNDRED
THIRTY-FOUR PESOS (₱13,334.00) for each count, and to indemnify
private complainant Matrix Finance Corporation the total amount of
₱40,002.00 plus 6% interest per annum from September 21, 2002 until
full payment.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

6

[G.R. Nos. 137278-79. February 17, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRIVALDO
BESMONTE y LORENOand SONNY APUYAN y MORIN, accused-
appellants.
D E C I S I ON
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the consolidated judgment[1] of the Regional Trial Court
of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52, dated September 7, 1998, in Criminal
Cases Nos. 95-3918-19, finding herein appellants Frivaldo Besmonte y
Loreno and Sonny Apuyan y Morin guilty of rape and sentencing them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The young victim in these cases, Melanie A. Gozmo,[2] is related to the
appellants. Apuyan is the brother of her mother, while Besmonte is the
second husband of Melanies maternal grandmother. She was staying at
the house of the appellant Apuyan, where appellant Besmonte likewise
resided, at the time of the rapes complained of.
On June 6, 1995, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for Sorsogon
filed an information for rape against appellant Besmonte. Docketed as
Criminal Case No. 95-3918, the accusatory portion of the charge sheet
read as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of December, 1994, at about 12:00 oclock
noon at Barangay Hubo, Municipality of Magallanes, Province of
Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bladed instrument, with
lewd designs and by means of force, violence and/or intimidation, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of one Melanie A. Gozmo, a 15 year old minor, against her
will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
That same day, another information for the same offense was filed
against appellant Apuyan. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-3919, it
averred:
That on or about the 31st day of May 1994 at about 12:00 oclock
midnight and for several occasions and dates thereafter, at barangay
Hubo, Municipality of Magallanes, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a knife, with lewd designs and by means of force,
violence and/or intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one Melanie A. Gozmo, a 15
year old minor, against her will and consent, to the damage and
prejudice of the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
On July 27, 1995, appellant Besmonte was arraigned in Criminal Case
No. 95-3918 and with assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
charge.
Appellant Apuyan was, in turn, arraigned on September 25, 1995 and
duly assisted by counsel de officio, likewise entered a plea of not guilty.
The two cases were then consolidated and jointly tried.
The prosecution presented two witnesses: Agnes Hinanay, a paternal
first cousin of the victim, and the private complainant, Melanie A. Gozmo.
Agnes Hinanay testified that on April 17, 1995, she paid the victim a
visit at appellant Apuyans house in Hubo, Magallanes, Sorsogon.[5] Agnes
noticed that private complainant was pregnant.[6] When Agnes asked
Melanie about her pregnancy, the latter revealed that she was raped by
appellant Apuyan on May 31, 1994 and on several other occasions
1
thereafter.[7] Melanie further disclosed to her that on December 15, 1994,
appellant Besmonte also raped her.[8]
After learning about the rapes, Agnes then took Melanie and her
siblings to live with her at Binisitihan Norte, Magallanes, Sorsogon.[9]
On April 17, 1995, Agnes reported the rape of Melanie at the
Magallanes Police Station where she executed a sworn statement.[10]
Agnes likewise brought the victim to a doctor where an examination
confirmed that she was pregnant.[11]The victim gave birth to a baby boy in
1995.[12]
Private complainant testified that after the death of her father in
1992, she was brought by her mother to Hubo, Magallanes, Sorsogon to
live in the house of her uncle, appellant Apuyan.[13] At about midnight of
May 31, 1994, while complainant was sleeping in said house, Apuyan
undressed her and placed himself on top of her.[14] She was awakened and
found herself in the nude. She tried to resist appellant but she was
overpowered when he poked a knife at her neck.[15] Appellant then thrust
his phallus into her vagina[16] and let it in and let it out.[17] Melanie felt pain
and her private parts bled as a result.[18] After, Apuyan had satiated his
libidinous desires, he warned her not to tell anybody about the incident,
as otherwise, he would kill her and her siblings.[19]
Melanie also claimed that on the night of December 15, 1994, while
she was sleeping at Apuyans house, her grandmothers husband,
Besmonte, placed himself on top of her and inserted his penis inside her
vagina.[20] She was not able to resist as Besmonte threatened to kill her
and her siblings, if she would report the matter.[21] Although it was dark,
she was able to recognize Besmonte by his voice and underarm odor.[22]
Despite the threats, Melanie reported the incidents to her mother
and her grandmother. The mother did nothing while the grandmother
struck her with a piece of bamboo and told her not to make any fuss lest
the matter reach the barrio folks of Hubo, Magallanes.[23] Melanie then
revealed her plight to her cousin, prosecution witness Agnes Hinanay, and
her aunt, Elsa Mirandilla.[24] The two took her and her siblings away from
the house of appellant Apuyan, reported the matter to the police, and had
her examined by a doctor who advised her that she was pregnant. She
delivered a boy on August 25, 1995.[25] At the time she was raped, Melanie
was only 15 years old.[26]
Appellants raised the defenses of denial and alibi.
In his defense, appellant Apuyan testified that on May 31, 1994, he
was in the barangay proper of Hubo, Magallanes having a drinking spree
with his friends Rowan Perdigon, Ryan de los Santos, and Noel de los
Santos.[27] They started drinking gin from four oclock in the afternoon to
ten oclock in the evening.[28] They consumed a dozen bottles of gin. He
then staggered home and upon reaching his house, he fell into a drunken
sleep.[29] He only woke up the following morning. At that time, there were
13 persons inside his house, which had two rooms.[30] He slept alone while
the rest slept side by side.[31] He denied raping Melanie. He likewise
denied executing a counter-affidavit which stated that he was ready to
marry Melanie as she was carrying his child.[32]
For his part, appellant Besmonte declared that he could not have
raped Melanie on December 15, 1994 since on that date he was in
Sorsogon, Sorsogon buying bamboo to be used in the mussel farm
(tahungan) of a certain Zaldy.[33] He worked at said mussel farm from May
30, 1994 to January 1, 1995.[34] It was only on the latter date that he found
time to return to Hubo, Magallanes and he stayed there only for three
days. Afterwards, he returned to Sorsogon, Sorsogon. Besmonte could not
think of any reason why the victim should charge him with rape.[35] He said
he treated her like his own child and even sent her to school.[36] He was
also unaware of any bad blood between him and Agnes Hinanay.[37]
To corroborate appellant Besmontes alibi his wife, Rosalina Apuyan,
testified that from May 1994 to December 1994, he was in Sorsogon,
Sorsogon.[38] It was only on January 1995 that he visited
them.[39]According to Rosalina, her granddaughter, Melanie, could not
have been raped given the circumstance that she slept side by side with
several persons. There were 12 persons who called Apuyans house their
home. Melanie slept close to the room of the Besmontes, according to
Rosalina. She could see Melanie from their room, if any of the appellants
approached her at night,[40] said the witness.
2
 On September 7, 1998, the trial court promulgated its consolidated
decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Frivaldo
Besmonte y Loreno in Criminal Case No. 95-3918 and Sonny Apuyan y
Morin in Criminal Case No. 95-3919 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Rape under Art. 335 [of the Revised Penal Code] and hereby
sentences each of them [to] the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to
pay the sum of P50,000.00 each as civil indemnity and P10,000.00 as
moral damages to the complainant without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the cost.
In the service of their sentence, they shall be credited with the full
period of their confinement pursuant to law.
SO ORDERED.[41]
Before us, appellants now appeal their conviction, imputing to the
trial court the following errors:
I place since there were several other persons present inside the
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELYING HEAVILY ON THE INCREDIBLE
TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT MELANIE GOZMO.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS ON THE GROUND THAT HIS (sic) GUILT WAS NOT PROVED
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
FRIVALDO BESMONTE DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE WAS NOT
SUFFICIENTLY IDENTIFIED.[42]
In sum, we find the issues to be: (1) the credibility of complaining
witness; (2) the sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence; and (3) the
identification of appellant Besmonte as one of the rapists.
Appellants submit that the first and second issues are interrelated,
hence jointly discussed.
On the first and second issues, appellants assail Melanies testimony
as unworthy of belief and hence, a flimsy ground for their conviction. In
describing private complainants testimony as incredible, they ask us to
note the fact that both times when she was allegedly raped, complainant
was lying beside and very close to her siblings. Yet neither her brother nor
her sister was awakened. Appellants assert that this is very much contrary
to common knowledge and human experience. Appellants argue that it is
difficult to believe that appellants raped her at times when almost all
members of the family were present in the house.
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) points out
jurisprudence has recognized that rape can take place in circumstances of
crowding similar to that of the instant cases. Appellants cannot exonerate
themselves by claiming that the crimes charged could not possibly take
house. Precedents abound undermining appellants contention.
The presence of people nearby is no guarantee that rape will not be
committed, for lust is no respecter of time and place.[43] Rape has been
committed in places where people congregate, like parks or school
premises and even in a house where there are other occupants.[44] There
is no rule or norm that a woman can only be raped in seclusion.[45] It has
been committed in a room adjacent to where other members of the family
stay or in a room, which the victim shared with others.[46] We have more
than once observed that rape could take place in the same room where
other members of the family were sleeping.[47] In the instant cases, both
rapes complained of were committed in the middle of the night. It is of
judicial notice that it is at this time when children are in deep slumber and
could not be easily awakened.[48] The fact that Melanies siblings were not
awakened at the times she was ravished is not improbable. Hence,
appellants thesis that it was impossible for them to have committed the
3
rape in the presence of private complainants siblings who were sleeping
next to her deserves scant consideration.
Appellants ask us to discredit private complainants testimony
because she was inconsistent in her account. They point out that when
she testified as to how Apuyan raped her at knifepoint, she initially
claimed that he poked a knife at her neck using her right hand, while his
left hand was cupped over her mouth. When grilled further, she changed
her statement and said that he propped himself up on the mat with his
right hand. Moreover, they say complainant had a poor memory and could
hardly remember her birthday. Hence, they conclude that the trial court
should have taken great caution in giving credence to her testimony.
The OSG counters that the alleged inconsistency is minor or trivial. It
pertains only to peripheral matters. Hence, it cannot impair private
complainants credibility as a witness.
In ruling upon Melanies credibility, the trial court found her
testimony to be forthright, clear, and free from serious
contradictions.[49] The trial courts assessment of complainants credibility,
considering that it had the advantage of observing her demeanor as she
testified, is not easily discarded. The trial court judge is in the best position
to determine the truthfulness of the complainants testimony. Unless it is
shown that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied
some fact or circumstance of weight or substance that would otherwise
affect the result of the case, its findings will not be disturbed on
appeal.[50] We find no compelling reason now to depart from said rule. We
have carefully read the victims testimony and find that the discrepancy
harped upon by appellants focused more on her account of events
immediately preceding the rape by Apuyan. They did not zero in on her
narration of the crime itself. Complainants testimony may not be flawless,
but its substance, veracity, and weight were unaffected by the triviality of
the alleged inconsistency.
What is material here is Melanies testimony on how she was sexually
abused. She positively identified appellants in open court as her ravishers
without any hesitation. Indeed, where the accusing words come from a
girl of tender years and they are directed against her own relatives, they
are difficult to disbelieve. We further note that Melanie broke out in tears
while testifying.[51] The crying of a victim during her testimony is evidence
of the truth of the rape charges, for the display of such emotion indicates
the pain that the victim feels when asked to recount her traumatic
experience.[52] Melanie testified in a categorical, straightforward, and
frank manner, and she remained consistent under cross-examination. The
inescapable conclusion is that she is a credible witness. The sole testimony
of a rape victim, if credible, suffices to convict.[53]
On the third issue, appellant Besmonte argues that his identification
by complaining witness as her rapist on December 15, 1994 is doubtful
and cannot serve as the basis of his conviction, as it was undisputed that
the room where he supposedly raped Melanie had no illumination. Hence,
assuming arguendo, that she was indeed raped, it was improbable for her
to positively identify him as her assailant given the total darkness of the
surroundings. She only presumed that it was him on account of his
underarm odor. Besmonte contends that it would be unjust to conclude
that he was the real culprit on account of his underarm odor. After all, he
is not the only person with that smell.
The OSG, however, points out that private complainant was able to
identify Besmonte not just from his underarm smell but also from his
voice. She was familiar with both, as the two of them had been living in
the same house for at least four years prior to her rape by Besmonte. Her
identification of Besmonte must be deemed both sufficient and
indubitable, said the OSG.
Appellant Besmontes bid for exoneration on the theory of doubtful
identification, in our view, is an exercise in futility. The absence of
illumination in the place of the commission of the crime does not detract
from the positive identification by Melanie of Besmonte as her ravisher.
Although visibility is an important factor in the identification of a felon, its
relative significance depends largely on the attending circumstances and
the discretion of the trial court.[54] We have held that the sense of smell,
in the right circumstances, might be a reliable mode of identification, but
it could also prove to be tenuous if it were the sole source of identification
under circumstances that leave much room for other probabilities to
contend with.[55] In the case against Besmonte, there is not much room to
4
doubt the positive identification on account of the victims olfactory
faculties.
The prosecutions case against Besmonte is founded on Melanies
familiarity with him. If she was not at all familiar with appellant Besmonte,
the prosecutions whole case against him collapses, for such familiarity was
its very foundation. In the instant case, it was not disputed that Melanie
had lived in the same house with Besmonte for almost four years prior to
the incident. In fact, Besmonte himself testified that he had treated her
like a daughter and was even responsible for her schooling.[56] Thus, the
basis for her identification was her long familiarity with Besmonte. She
pointed to him because she knew him well prior to the sexual assault.
Melanie was familiar with his body smell. No doubt she could perceive and
recognize that smell at the time of sexual contact. At that time, private
complainant was as close to Besmonte as was physically possible, for a
man and a woman could not be physically closer to each other than during
a sexual act.[57] Moreover, the victim did not solely rely upon her sense of
smell in identifying her ravisher. She emphatically declared in open court
that she also recognized Besmonte from his voice[58] when he uttered
threatening words to her in the dark. It is highly inconceivable that
complainant would not recognize Besmontes voice, having lived with him
for quite some time. The sound of the voice of a person is an acceptable
means of identification where it is established that the witness and the
accused knew each other personally and closely for a number of years.[59]
We find no reason to doubt the accuracy of the identification of the
malefactor based on auditory and olfactory perception by the victim on
December 15, 1994. Under the circumstances, Melanie was able to
perceive who her rapist was and to make known that perception. Nor is
there any reason to doubt her sincerity to tell the truth, for there is no
showing at all by the defense that she charged Besmonte with rape due
to an evil or corrupt motive.
In sum, the defense of denial and alibi interposed by appellants
cannot prevail over their positive identification by the victim. It is a time-
honored principle that the positive and categorical assertions of a witness
generally prevail over bare denials.[60] In the case against Apuyan, greater
probative value and evidentiary weight must be accorded to Melanies
unwavering and categorical identification of appellant Apuyan as one of
her tormentors over this appellants feeble, self-serving, and
uncorroborated denial. Affirmative testimony from a credible witness is
stronger and more trustworthy than a bare negative testimony.[61]
Equally unmeritorious is appellant Besmontes alibi that he could not
have raped Melanie because he was in Sorsogon, Sorsogon from May
1994 to January 1995. For alibi to prosper, appellant must not only prove
that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed, he must also
convincingly demonstrate the physical impossibility of his presence at
the locus criminis at the time of the incident.[62] In Besmontes case, it was
not physically impossible for Besmonte to have been at the crime scene
at the time the rape was committed, in view of the trial courts observation
that:
It is of judicial notice that the poblacion of Magallanes can be reached
thru a jeep, which is the means of transportation from the town of
Sorsogon for about one (1) hour only. Accused did not even present the
person he resides with while in Sorsogon.[63]
That Besmontes wife corroborated his alibi is no moment. No other
witness unrelated to appellant Besmonte was presented to corroborate
his claim. Alibi cannot prosper if it is established mainly by the accused
and his relatives, and not by credible persons.[64] This is because alibi is
easy to contrive and difficult to disprove.[65]
Rape is committed when a man has carnal knowledge of a victim with
the use of force and intimidation.[66]In both cases, Melanie credibly
testified on the details of her harrowing experiences and positively
identified the appellants as the persons who raped her. The evidence for
the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt the elements
of carnal knowledge and force or intimidation. Hence, we must sustain the
conviction of both appellants and deny their respective appeals.
But did the trial court correctly impose the penalty of reclusion
perpetua on appellants?
The OSG disagrees only in regard to appellant Apuyan. It
recommends the imposition of the death penalty on him. The OSG argues
5
that with the amendment of the Revised Penal Code by R.A. No. appreciated in the commission of rape in Criminal Case No. 95-3919, the
8353,[67] rape was reclassified as a crime against persons. Under Article trial court did not err in applying Article 63 (2)[74] of the Revised Penal Code
266-B[68] of the Revised Penal Code, as so amended, rape is now by imposing on appellant Apuyan only the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
punishable with reclusion perpetua to death whenever the rape is
Concerning damages awarded below, we find that the trial court
committed with the use of a deadly weapon. The OSG stresses that the
awarded P50,000.00 as civil indemnity but only P10,000.00 as moral
qualifying circumstance of deadly weapon was proven with respect to
damages to the victim. The amount awarded as civil indemnity is sufficient
appellant Apuyan. Moreover, according to the OSG, the relationship of
but moral damages should be increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with
Melanie with Apuyan, while not alleged in the information, was
current jurisprudence.[75] The award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages
nonetheless proven during the trial and now should be considered as a
should be sustained, by way of public example and to prevent minors from
generic aggravating circumstance, for purposes of imposing the penalty.
being sexually abused[76] by their elders.
With the presence of the qualifying circumstance of use of a deadly
weapon in the commission of the rape coupled with the generic WHEREFORE, the consolidated judgment of the Regional Trial Court
aggravating circumstance of relationship, without any mitigating of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52, in Criminal Cases Nos. 95-3918 and 95-
circumstance, then the proper penalty for appellant Apuyan should be 3919, finding appellants Frivaldo Besmonte Loreno and Sonny Apuyan y
death, the OSG said. Morin guilty of one (1) count of rape each and sentencing them to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Each
As the OSG points out, since appellant Apuyan committed the rape
of the appellants is also sentenced to pay the victim, Melanie
with the use of knife, a deadly weapon, the crime is punishable
Gozmo, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
by reclusion perpetua to death.[69] However, the OSGs stance that the
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, as well as the costs.
relationship between Apuyan (uncle) and Melanie (niece) should be
treated as a generic aggravating circumstance to justify imposing the SO ORDERED.
death penalty is precipitate.
Under Sections 8[70] and 9[71] Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, a qualifying or aggravating circumstance must first be
specifically alleged in the information and then duly proved during the
trial. Otherwise, even if proved, such a circumstance cannot be
appreciated in determining the proper penalty.[72]
In Criminal Case No. 95-3919, the relationship between Apuyan and
his victim was not alleged in the information. Hence, for purposes of
determining the penalty to be imposed, the relationship even if proved
during the trial, should not be considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, providing
that aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, must be
so stated in the complaint or information,[73] applies to the cases against
appellants under the principle of retroactivity of procedural law because
the rules favor the accused. Since no aggravating circumstance could be

6

[G.R. No. 122641. January 20, 1997]
BAYANI SUBIDO, JR. and RENE PARINA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
SANDIGAN-BAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the
petitioners seek to set aside, on ground of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the following acts of the respondent
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 22825: (a) the Resolution[1] of 25
October 1995 which denied the petitioners Motion to Quash of 28 August
1995 and Supplementary Motion to Quash of 7 October 1995; (b) the
Order[2] of 10 November 1995 which denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration; and (c) the Order[3]of 10 November 1995 which entered
a plea of not guilty for the petitioners and set pre-trial on 12 January 1996.
In Criminal Case No. 22825, the petitioners were charged with
Arbitrary Detention, defined and penalized by Article 124 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), under an information dated 17 July 1995 (but filed on
28 July 1995), the accusatory portion of which reads as follows:
That on or about June 25, 1992, or sometime subsequent thereto, in
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Bayani Subido, Jr.,
being then a Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID) and accused Rene Parina, being then a BID Special
Agent, while in the performance of their official functions, and conspiring
and confederating with each other, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously cause the issuance and implementation of a
warrant of arrest dated June 25, 1992 against James J. Maksimuk, said
accused knowing fully well that the BID Decision dated June 6, 1991,
requiring Maksimuk's deportation has not as yet become final and
executory considering the pendency of a Motion for Reconsideration,
resulting in the detention of the latter for a period of forty-three (43)
days and, thus, causing him undue injury.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
The arraignment was originally set for 28 August 1995.[5]
On 28 August 1995, however, the petitioners filed a Motion to
Quash,[6] contending that in view of the effectivity of R.A. No. 7975[7] on 6
May 1995, amending 4 of P.D. No. 1606,[8] the Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction over both the offense charged and the persons of the
accused. They argued that: (1) Arbitrary Detention did not fall within
Chapter II, 2, Title VII of the RPC, but within 1, Chapter 1, Title II (Crimes
Against the Fundamental Laws of the State), hence, not covered by R.A.
No. 7975 and, therefore, the case should have been filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila; (2) R.A. No. 7975 should be given prospective
application and at the time the case was filed, petitioner Subido was
already a private person since he was separated from the service on 28
February 1995; while petitioner Parina did not hold a position
corresponding to salary grade 27; and (3) penal laws must be strictly
construed against the State.
In compliance with the order of the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution
filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash[9] on 28 September 1995. It
contended that it was clear from 4(b) of R.A. No. 7975 that the
Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over both the offense charged and the
persons of the accused considering that the basis of its jurisdiction xxx is
the position of the accused in the government service when the offense
charged was committed and not the nature of the offense charged,
provided the said offense committed by the accused was in the exercise
of his duties and in relation to his office. The fact then that accused Subido
was already a private individual was of no moment.
In a Supplement to the Motion to Quash[10] filed on 9 October 1995,
the petitioners further asserted that: (1) the allegations in the information
1
were vague; (2) under 1, Rule VIII of Memorandum Order (MO) No. 04-92
(Rules of Procedure to Govern Deportation Proceedings), the grant or
denial of bail to an alien in a deportation proceeding was discretionary
upon the Commissioner, hence could not be subject to a charge of
arbitrary detention; (3) petitioner Subido was separated from the service
before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7975, hence retroactive application
thereof would be prejudicial to him; and (4) at the time the information
was filed, petitioner Parina was not occupying a position corresponding to
salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed by R.A. No. 6758.[11]
In its Rejoinder[12] filed on 20 October 1995, the prosecution
maintained that with 4 of MO No. 04-92, Salazar v.
Achacoso,[13] and Gatchalian v. CID,[14] the only instance when an alien
facing deportation proceedings could be arrested by virtue of a warrant
of arrest was when the Commissioner issued the warrant to carry out a
final order of deportation, which was absent in this case due to the
pendency of the motion for reconsideration timely filed. It further
reiterated that the basis of the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over the case
was the position of the accused when the crime was committed, not when
the information was filed; in any event, petitioner Subidos position as a
Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration was classified even higher
than grade 27 under the Compensation and Classification Act of 1989.
In its Resolution[15] of 25 October 1995, the Sandiganbayan denied
the petitioners Motion to Quash and the Supplement thereto, ruling:
1. [T]he jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan remains not only over the
specific offenses enumerated in Sec. 4 of P.D. 1606 as Amended by R.A.
7975 but over offenses committed in relation to their office, regardless
of the penalty provided that the salary of the accused is at Grade 27
under [R.A. 6758] or that he is occupying any of the position described in
Sec. 4(a)e of the law, which includes the position of Deputy
Commissioner.
2. [A]t this time the position of the prosecution in response to this
Court's misgivings stated in its Order of August 28, 1995, appears to be
that aliens may not be arrested except upon execution of a deportation
order, a matter which can be taken up at further proceedings after the
arraignment of the accused.
It likewise set arraignment on 10 November 1995. To abort arraignment,
the petitioners filed on 9 November 1995 a motion for
reconsideration[16] and submitted that under the vast power of the
Commissioner of the Department of Immigration, he could authorize the
arrest and detention of an alien even though a deportation order had not
yet become final, in light of the preventive, not penal, nature of a
deportation order.[17]
On 10 November 1995, the Sandiganbayan issued an
Order[18] denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration, and a second
Order[19] entering a plea of not guilty in favor of the petitioners since they
objected to arraignment, setting pre-trial on 12 January 1996, and making
of record that arraignment was conducted with the reservation of the
petitioners to seek redress with this Court from the denial of their motion
for reconsideration.
Hence, this special civil action, where the parties, in the main,
reiterate the arguments they raised before the Sandiganbayan. In due
time, we resolved to give due course to the petition and required the
parties to file their respective memoranda, which they subsequently
complied with.
The petition must be dismissed.
Sections 2 and 7 of R.A. No. 7975 pertinently provide as follows:
Sec. 2. Section 4 of [P.D. No. 1606] is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following
2
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense;
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
xxx
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their
office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in said Republic
Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or
higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested
in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129.
Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has
not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.
R.A. No. 7975 took effect on 16 May 1995,[20] or one year, ten months
and twenty-one days after the alleged commission of the crime charged
in Criminal Case No. 22825 before the Sandiganbayan. The provisions of 4
of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by E.O. No. 184, but prior to their further
amendment by R.A. No. 7975, are then the applicable provisions. 4 of P.D.
No. 1606 then pertinently provided as follows:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(2) other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their office, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or
complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is
higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a
fine of P6,000.00: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies
mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does
not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment of six (6) years or a fine
of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial
Court.
In Aguinaldo v. Domagas,[21] and subsequently in Sanchez v.
Demetriou,[22] Natividad v. Felix,[23] and Republic v. Asuncion,[24] we ruled
that for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive original jurisdiction over
offenses or felonies committed by public officers or employees under the
aforementioned 4(a)(2), it was not enough that the penalty prescribed
therefor was higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six
years, or a fine of P6,000.00; it was likewise necessary that the offenses
or felonies were committed in relation to their office.[25]
The information in Criminal Case No. 22825 before the
Sandiganbayan charged the petitioners with the crime of arbitrary
detention which was committed while in the performance of their official
functions, or, evidently, in relation to their office. As the detention
allegedly lasted for a period of 43 days, the prescribed penalty is prision
3
mayor,[26] with a duration of six years and one day to twelve
years. Indisputably, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense
charged in Criminal Case No. 22825.
The petitioners, however, urge us to apply 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by R.A. No. 7975, the law in force at the time of the filing of the
information in Criminal Case No. 22825. They submit that under the new
law, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the offense charged and
their persons because at the time of the filing of the information,
petitioner Subido was already a private individual, while the classification
of petitioner Parinas position was lower than grade 27.
We are not persuaded. The petitioners overlook the fact that for
purposes of 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, the reckoning point is the
time of the commission of the crime. This is plain from the last clause of
the opening sentence of paragraph (a), 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as further
amended by R.A. No. 7975.
Petitioner Subido never denied the respondents claim that as
commissioner of Immigration and Deportation [now Bureau of
Immigration] at the time of the commission of the crime [he was]
classified as having a position even higher than grade 27.[27] Both parties
are, however, agreed that at such time petitioner Parina was holding a
position with a classification much lower than salary grade 27. There can,
therefore, be no doubt that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the
crime allegedly committed by Subido.
That petitioner Parina held a position with a salary grade of less than
27 at the time of the commission of the alleged arbitrary detention is of
no moment. He is prosecuted as a co-conspirator of petitioner Subido, a
principal accused, who held a position higher than grade 27. The following
provision of 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975, then applies:
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying the positions
corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act No. 6758 ... exclusive jurisdiction therefor shall be vested in
the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to
their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Finally, the petitioners invocation of the prohibition against the
retroactivity of penal laws is misplaced.Simply put, R.A. No. 7975 is not a
penal law. Penal laws or statutes are those acts of the Legislature which
prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violation;[28] or those
that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their
punishment.[29] R.A. No. 7975, in further amending P.D. No. 1606 as
regards the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, mode of appeal, and other
procedural matters, is clearly a procedural law, i.e., one which prescribes
rules and forms of procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for
their invasion, or those which refer to rules of procedure by which courts
applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice.[30] Moreover, the
petitioners even suggest that it is likewise a curative or remedial statute;
one which cures defects and adds to the means of enforcing existing
obligations.[31] As noted by the petitioners, previous to the enactment of
R.A. No. 7975:
As before, not [sic] matter what kind of offense, so long as it is alleged
that the crime is committed in relation to the office of the public official,
the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiciton to try and hear the case, such that in
many cases accused persons even from the far away parts of the
country, Mindanao, Visayas and the northern parts of Luzon had to come
personally to Manila to attend and appear for cases filed against them,
considering that the Sandiganbayan has its office/court in Manila.
The said R.A. No. 7975 changed this lamentable situation. For no as so
provided in the said law, there ha[s] been a modification that benefits
[the] accused xxx in the sense that now where none of the principal
accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or
higher as prescribed by Republic Act No. 6758 xxx exclusive jurisdiction
there shall be vested now in the proper Regional Trial and Metropolitan
Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be xxx. [32]
All told, as a procedural and curative statute, R.A. No. 7975 may validly be
given retroactive effect, there being no impairment of contractual or
vested rights. [33]
4
 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED, and the questioned
resolution and orders of the respondent Sandiganbayan are AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

5

G.R. No. 189081, August 10, 2016
GLORIA S. DY, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANDY
COMMODITIES CO., INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, WILLIAM
MANDY, Respondent.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
Our law states that every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable. This civil liability ex delicto may be recovered through a civil
action which, under our Rules of Court, is deemed instituted with the
criminal action. While they are actions mandatorily fused,1 they are, in
truth, separate actions whose existences are not dependent on each
other. Thus, civil liability ex delicto survives an acquittal in a criminal case
for failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, the Rules
of Court limits this mandatory fusion to a civil action for the recovery of
civil liability ex delicto. It, by no means, includes a civil liability arising
from a different source of obligation, as in the case of a contract. Where
the civil liability is ex contractu, the court hearing the criminal case has
no authority to award damages.
The Case
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. Petitioner Gloria S. Dy (petitioner) seeks the reversal of the
decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 25, 2009 (Assailed
Decision)2 ordering her to pay Mandy Commodities Company, Inc.
(MCCI) in the amount of P21,706,281.00.3chanrobleslaw
The Facts
Petitioner was the former General Manager of MCCL. In the course of
her employment, petitioner assisted MCCI in its business involving
several properties. One such business pertained to the construction of
warehouses over a property (Numancia Property) that MCCI leased from
the Philippine National Bank (PNB). Sometime in May 1996, in pursuit of
MCCI's business, petitioner proposed to William Mandy (Mandy),
President of MCCI, the purchase of a property owned by Pantranco. As
the transaction involved a large amount of money, Mandy agreed to
obtain a loan from the International China Bank of Commerce (ICBC).
Petitioner represented that she could facilitate the approval of the loan.
True enough, ICBC granted a loan to MCCI in the amount of
P20,000,000.00, evidenced by a promissory note. As security, MCCI also
executed a chattel mortgage over the warehouses in the Numancia
Property. Mandy entrusted petitioner with the obligation to manage the
payment of the loan.4chanrobleslaw
In February 1999, MCCI received a notice of foreclosure over the
mortgaged property due to its default in paying the loan obligation.5 In
order to prevent the foreclosure, Mandy instructed petitioner to
facilitate the payment of the loan. MCCI, through Mandy, issued 13
Allied Bank checks and 12 Asia Trust Bank checks in varying amounts and
in different dates covering the period from May 18, 1999 to April 4,
2000.6 The total amount of the checks, which were all payable to cash,
was P21,706,281.00. Mandy delivered the checks to petitioner. Mandy
claims that he delivered the checks with the instruction that petitioner
use the checks to pay the loan.7 Petitioner, on the other hand, testified
that she encashed the checks and returned the money to Mandy.8 ICBC
eventually foreclosed the mortgaged property as MCCI continued to
default in its obligation to pay. Mandy claims that it was only at this
point in time that he discovered that not a check was paid to
ICBC.9chanrobleslaw
Thus, on October 7, 2002, MCCI, represented by Mandy, filed a
Compiamt-Affidavit for Estafa10 before the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Manila. On March 3, 2004, an Information11 was filed against
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Manila.
After a full-blown trial, the RTC Manila rendered a decision12 dated
November 11, 2005 (RTC Decision) acquitting petitioner. The RTC Manila
found that while petitioner admitted that she received the checks, the
1
prosecution failed to establish that she was under any obligation to
deliver them to ICBC in payment of MCCFs loan. The trial court made this
finding on the strength of Mandy's admission that he gave the checks to
petitioner with the agreement that she would encash them. Petitioner
would then pay ICBC using her own checks. The trial court further made
a finding that Mandy and petitioner entered into a contract of
loan.13 Thus, it held that the prosecution failed to establish an important
element of the crime of estafa�misappropriation or conversion.
However, while the RTC Manila acquitted petitioner, it ordered her to
pay the amount of the checks. The dispositive portion of the RTC
Decision states �
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having failed to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, judgment is hereby rendered
ACQUITTING the accused of the offense charged. With costs de officio.
The accused is however civilly liable to the complainant for the amount
of P21,706,281.00.
14
SO ORDERED. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner filed an appeal15 of the civil aspect of the RTC Decision with
the CA. In the Assailed Decision,16the CA found the appeal without merit.
It held that the acquittal of petitioner does not necessarily absolve her of
civil liability. The CA said that it is settled that when an accused is
acquitted on the basis of reasonable doubt, courts may still find him or
her civilly liable if the evidence so warrant. The CA explained that the
evidence on record adequately prove that petitioner received the checks
as a loan from MCCI. Thus, preventing the latter from recovering the
amount of the checks would constitute unjust enrichment. Hence, the
Assailed Decision ruled
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is DENIED. The
Decision dated November 11, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Manila,
Branch 33 in Criminal Case No. 04-224294 which found Gloria Dy civilly
liable to William Mandy is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The CA also denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in a
resolution18 dated August 3, 2009.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari (Petition). Petitioner argues
that since she was acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove all
the elements of the crime charged, there was therefore no crime
committed.19 As there was no crime, any civil liability ex delicto cannot
be awarded.
The Issues
The central issue is the propriety of making a finding of civil liability in a
criminal case for estafa when the accused is acquitted for failure of the
prosecution to prove all the elements of the crime charged.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
Civil Liability Arising From Crime
Our laws recognize a bright line distinction between criminal and civil
liabilities. A crime is a liability against the state. It is prosecuted by and
for the state. Acts considered criminal are penalized by law as a means
to protect the society from dangerous transgressions. As criminal liability
involves a penalty affecting a person's liberty, acts are only treated
criminal when the law clearly says so. On the other hand, civil liabilities
take a less public and more private nature. Civil liabilities are claimed
through civil actions as a means to enforce or protect a right or prevent
or redress a wrong.20 They do not carry with them the imposition of
imprisonment as a penalty. Instead, civil liabilities are compensated in
the form of damages.
Nevertheless, our jurisdiction recognizes that a crime has a private civil
component. Thus, while an act considered criminal is a breach of law
against the State, our legal system allows for the recovery of civil
damages where there is a private person injured by a criminal act. It is in
recognition of this dual nature of a criminal act that our Revised Penal
Code provides that every person criminally liable is also civilly
2
liable.21 This is the concept of civil liability ex delicto.
This is echoed by the New Civil Code when it recognizes acts or
omissions punished by law as a separate source of obligation.22 This is
reinforced by Article 30 of the same code which refers to the filing of a
separate civil action to demand civil liability arising from a criminal
offense.23chanrobleslaw
The Revised Penal Code fleshes out this civil liability in Article
10424 which states that it includes restitution, reparation of damage
caused and indemnification for consequential damages.
Rules of procedure for criminal and civil actions involving the same act or
omission
The law and the rules of procedure provide for a precise mechanism in
instituting a civil action pertaining to an act or omission which is also
subject of a criminal case. Our Rules of Court prescribes a kind of fusion
such that, subject to certain defined qualifications, when a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability
arising from the offense is deemed instituted as
well.25cralawredchanrobleslaw
However, there is an important difference between civil and criminal
proceedings that require a fine distinction as to how these twin actions
shall proceed. These two proceedings involve two different standards of
proof. A criminal action requires proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
while a civil action requires a lesser quantum of proof, that of
preponderance of evidence. This distinction also agrees with the
essential principle in our legal system that while a criminal liability
carries with it a corresponding civil liability, they are nevertheless
separate and distinct. In other words, these two liabilities may co-exist
but their existence is not dependent on each other.26chanrobleslaw
The Civil Code states that when an accused in a criminal prosecution is
acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission
may be filed. In the latter case, only preponderance of evidence is
required.27 This is supported by the Rules of Court which provides that
the extinction of the criminal action does not result in the extinction of
the corresponding civil action.28 The latter may only be extinguished
when there is a "finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that
the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist."29 Consistent with this, the Rules of Court requires that in
judgments of acquittal the court must state whether "the evidence of
the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or
merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case,
the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist."30chanrobleslaw
Thus, whether an exoneration from the criminal action should affect the
corresponding civil action depends on the varying kinds of acquittal.
In Manantan v. Court of Appeals,31 we explained �
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the
civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the
accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of. This
instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been
found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can
never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict civil
liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which
may be instituted must be based on grounds other than
the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111
of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on
reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the
guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not
exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of
evidence only. This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil
Code, where the civil action for damages is "for the same act or
omission." Although the two actions have different purposes, the
matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the
criminal case. However, the judgment In the criminal proceeding cannot
be read in evidence In the civil action to establish any fact there
determined, even though both actions involve the same act or omission.
The reason for this rule is that the parties are not the same and
3
secondarily, different rules of evidence are applicable. Hence, Penal Code. In general, the elements
notwithstanding herein petitioner's acquittal, the Court of Appeals in of estafa are:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
determining whether Article 29 applied, was not precluded from looking
into the question of petitioner's negligence or reckless (1) That the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of
imprudence.32chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and
In Dayap v. Sendiong,33 we further said �
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment
against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) (2) That damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is
the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of caused to the offended party or third person.
evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the
The essence of the crime is the unlawful abuse of confidence or deceit in
accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise
order to cause damage. As this Court previously held, "the element of
from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted.
fraud or bad faith is indispensable."35 Our law abhors the act of
However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if
defrauding another person by abusing his trust or deceiving him, such
mere is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act
that, it criminalizes this kind of fraud.
or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where
the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code identifies the circumstances which
him.34chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
constitute estafa. Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) states that estafa is
Hence, a civil action filed for the purpose of enforcing civil liability ex
committed by abuse of confidence �
delicto, even if mandatorily instituted with the corresponding criminal
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa) - x x x (b) By misappropriating or converting,
action, survives an acquittal when it is based on the presence of
to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal
reasonable doubt. In these instances, while the evidence presented does
property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
not establish the fact of the crime with moral certainty, the civil action
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
still prevails for as long as the greater weight of evidence tilts in favor of
delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally
a finding of liability. This means that while the mind of the court cannot
or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such
rest easy in penalizing the accused for the commission of a crime, it
money, goods, or other property.
nevertheless finds that he or she committed or omitted to perform acts
In this kind of estafa, the fraud which the law considers as criminal is the
which serve as a separate source of obligation. There is no sufficient
act of misappropriation or conversion. When the element of
proof that the act or omission is criminal beyond reasonable doubt, but
misappropriation or conversion is missing, there can be no estafa. In
there is a preponderance of evidence to show that the act or omission
such case, applying the foregoing discussions on civil liability ex delicto,
caused injury which demands compensation.
there can be no civil liability as there is no act or omission from which
any civil liability may be sourced. However, when an accused is acquitted
Civil Liability Ex Delicto in Estafa Cases
because a reasonable doubt exists as to the existence of
misappropriation or conversion, then civil liability may still be awarded.
Our laws penalize criminal fraud which causes damage capable of
This means that, while there is evidence to prove fraud, such evidence
pecuniary estimation through estafaunder Article 315 of the Revised
does not suffice to convince the court to the point of moral certainty

4
that the act of fraud amounts to estafa. As the act was nevertheless
proven, albeit without sufficient proof justifying the imposition of any
criminal penalty, civil liability exists.
In this case, the RTC Manila acquitted petitioner because the prosecution
failed to establish by sufficient evidence the element of misappropriation
or conversion. There was no adequate evidence to prove that Mandy
gave the checks to petitioner with the instruction that she will use them
to pay the ICBC loan. Citing Mandy's own testimony in open court, the
RTC Manila held that when Mandy delivered the checks to petitioner,
their agreement was that it was a "sort of loan."36 In the dispositive
portion of the RTC Decision, the RTC Manila ruled that the prosecution
"failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt."37 It then proceeded to order petitioner to pay the amount of the
loan.
The ruling of the RTC Manila was affirmed by the CA. It said that "[t]he
acquittal of Gloria Dy is anchored on the ground that her guilt was not
proved beyond reasonable doubt - not because she is not the author of
the act or omission complained of. x x x The trial court found no trickery
nor deceit in obtaining money from the private complainant; instead, it
concluded that the money obtained was undoubtedly a loan."38
Our jurisprudence on this matter diverges.
Earlier cases ordered the dismissal of the civil action for recovery of civil
liability ex delicto whenever there is a finding that there was
no estafa but rather an obligation to pay under a contract. In People v.
Pantig,39 this Court affirmed the ruling of the lower court acquitting
Pantig, but revoked the portion sentencing him to pay the offended
party the amount of money alleged to have been obtained through false
and fraudulent representations, thus �
The trial court found as a fact that the sum of P1,200, ordered to be paid
in the judgment of acquittal, was received by the defendant-appellant as
loan. This finding is inconsistent with the existence of the criminal act
charged in the information. The liability of the defendant for the return
of the amount so received arises from a civil contract, not from a
criminal act, and may not be enforced in the criminal case.
The portion of the judgment appealed from, which orders the
defendant-appellant to pay the sum of Pi ,200 to the offended party, is
hereby revoked, without prejudice to the filing of a civil action for the
recovery of the said amount.40chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This was also the import of the ruling in People v. Singson.41 In that case,
this Court found that "the evidence [was] not sufficient to establish the
existence of fraud or deceit on the part of the accused. x x x And when
there is no proven deceit or fraud, there is no crime of estafa."42 While
we also said that the established facts may prove Singson's civil liability
(obligation to pay under a contract of sale), we nevertheless made no
finding of civil liability because "our mind cannot rest easy on the
certainty of guilt"43 considering the above finding. The dispositive
portion stated that Singson is acquitted "without prejudice to any civil
liability which may be established in a civil case against
her."44chanrobleslaw
However, our jurisprudence on the matter appears to have changed in
later years.
In Eusebio-Calderon v. People,45 this Court affirmed the finding of the CA
that Calderon "did not employ trickery or deceit in obtaining money
from the private complainants, instead, it concluded that the money
obtained was undoubtedly loans for which [Calderon] paid
interest."46 Thus, this Court upheld Calderon's acquittal of estafa, but
found her civilly liable for the principal amount borrowed from the
private complainants.47chanrobleslaw
The ruling was similar in People v. Cuyugan.48 In that case, we acquitted
Cuyugan of estafa for failure of the prosecution to prove fraud. We held
that the transaction between Cuyugan and private complainants was a
loan to be used by Cuyugan in her business. Thus, this Court ruled that
Cuyugan has the obligation, which is civil in character, to pay the amount
borrowed.49chanrobleslaw
We hold that the better rule in ascertaining civil liability in estafa cases is
5
that pronounced in Pantig and Singson. The rulings in these cases are
more in accord with the relevant provisions of the Civil Code, and the
Rules of Court. They are also logically consistent with this Court's
pronouncement in Manantan.
Under Pantig and Singson, whenever the elements of estafa are not
established, and that the delivery of any personal property was made
pursuant to a contract, any civil liability arising from the estafa cannot be
awarded in the criminal case. This is because the civil liability arising
from the contract is not civil liability ex delicto, which arises from the
same act or omission constituting the crime. Civil liability ex delicto is the
liability sought to be recovered in a civil action deemed instituted with
the criminal case.
The situation envisioned in the foregoing cases, as in this case, is civil
liability ex contractu where the civil liability arises from an entirely
different source of obligation. Therefore, it is not the type of civil action
deemed instituted in the criminal case, and consequently must be filed
separately. This is necessarily so because whenever the court makes a
finding that the elements of estafa do not exist, it effectively says that
there is no crime. There is no act or omission that constitutes criminal
fraud. Civil liability ex delicto cannot be awarded as it cannot be sourced
from something that does not exist.
When the court finds that the source of obligation is in fact, a contract,
as in a contract of loan, it takes a position completely inconsistent with
the presence of estafa. In estafa, a person parts with his money because
of abuse of confidence or deceit. In a contract, a person willingly binds
himself or herself to give something or to render some
service.50 In estafa, the accused's failure to account for the property
received amounts to criminal fraud. In a contract, a party's failure to
comply with his obligation is only a contractual breach. Thus, any finding
that the source of obligation is a contract negates estafa. The finding, in
turn, means that there is no civil liability ex delicto. Thus, the rulings in
the foregoing cases are consistent with the concept of fused civil and
criminal actions, and the different sources of obligations under our laws.
We apply this doctrine to the facts of this case. Petitioner was acquitted
by the RTC Manila because of the absence of the element of
misappropriation or conversion. The RTC Manila, as affirmed by the CA,
found that Mandy delivered the checks to petitioner pursuant to a loan
agreement. Clearly, there is no crime of estafa. There is no proof of the
presence of any act or omission constituting criminal fraud. Thus, civil
liability ex delicto cannot be awarded because there is no act or omission
punished by law which can serve as the source of obligation. Any civil
liability arising from the loan takes the nature of a civil liability ex
contractu. It does not pertain to the civil action deemed instituted with
the criminal case.
In Manantan, this Court explained the effects of this result on the civil
liability deemed instituted with the criminal case. At the risk of
repetition, Manantan held that when there is no delict, "civil liability ex
delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be
instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained
of."51 In Dy's case, the civil liability arises out of contract�a different
source of obligation apart from an act or omission punished by law�and
must be claimed in a separate civil action.
Violation of Due Process
We further note that the evidence on record never fully established the
terms of this loan contract. As the trial before the RTC Manila was
focused on proving estafa, the loan contract was, as a consequence, only
tangentially considered. This provides another compelling reason why
the civil liability arising from the loan should be instituted in a separate
civil case. A civil action for collection of sum of money filed before the
proper court will provide for a better venue where the terms of the loan
and other relevant details may be received. While this may postpone a
warranted recovery of the civil liability, this Court deems it more
important to uphold the principles underlying the inherent differences in
the various sources of obligations under our law, and the rule that fused
actions only refer to criminal and civil actions involving the same act or
omission. These legal tenets play a central role in this legal system. A
confusion of these principles will ultimately jeopardize the interests of
6
the parties involved. Actions focused on proving estafa is not the proper
vehicle to thresh out civil liability arising from a contract.52 The Due
Process Clause of the Constitution dictates that a civil liability arising
from a contract must be litigated in a separate civil action.
Section 1 of the Bill of Rights states that no person shall be deprived of
property without due process of law. This provision protects a person's
right to both substantive and procedural due process. Substantive due
process looks into the validity of a law and protects against
arbitrariness.53 Procedural due process, on the other hand, guarantees
procedural fairness.54 It requires an ascertainment of "what process is
due, when it is due, and the degree of what is due."55 This aspect of due
process is at the heart of this case.
In general terms, procedural due process means the right to notice and
hearing.56 More specifically, our Rules of Court provides for a set of
procedures through which a person may be notified of the claims against
him or her as well as methods through which he or she may be given the
adequate opportunity to be heard.
The Rules of Court requires that any person invoking the power of the
judiciary to protect or enforce a right or prevent or redress a
wrong57 must file an initiatory pleading which embodies a cause of
action,58which is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates
a right of another.59 The contents of an initiatory pleading alleging a
cause of action will vary depending on the source of the obligation
involved. In the case of an obligation arising from a contract, as in this
case, the cause of action in an initiatory pleading will involve the duties
of the parties to the contract, and what particular obligation was
breached. On the other hand, when the obligation arises from an act or
omission constituting a crime, the cause of action must necessarily be
different. In such a case, the initiatory pleading will assert as a cause of
action the act or omission of respondent, and the specific criminal
statute he or she violated. Where the initiatory pleading fails to state a
cause of action, the respondent may file a motion to dismiss even before
trial.60 These rules embody the fundamental right to notice under the
Due Process Clause of the Constitution.
In a situation where a court (in a fused action for the enforcement of
criminal and civil liability) may validly order an accused-respondent to
pay an obligation arising from a contract, a person's right to be notified
of the complaint, and the right to have the complaint dismissed if there
is no cause of action, are completely defeated. In this event, the
accused-respondent is completely unaware of the nature of the liability
claimed against him or her at the onset of the case. The accused-
respondent will not have read any complaint stating the cause of action
of an obligation arising from a contract. All throughout the trial, the
accused-respondent is made to believe that should there be any civil
liability awarded against him or her, this liability is rooted from the act or
omission constituting the crime. The accused-respondent is also
deprived of the remedy of having the complaint dismissed through a
motion to dismiss before trial. In a fused action, the accused-respondent
could not have availed of this remedy because he or she was not even
given an opportunity to ascertain what cause of action to look for in the
initiatory pleading. In such a case, the accused-respondent is blindsided.
He or she could not even have prepared the appropriate defenses and
evidence to protect his or her interest. This is not the concept of fair play
embodied in the Due Process Clause. It is a clear violation of a person's
right to due process.
The Rules of Court also allows a party to a civil action certain remedies
that enable him or her to effectively present his or her case. A party may
file a cross-claim, a counterclaim or a third-party complaint.61 The Rules
of Court prohibits these remedies in a fused civil and criminal case.62 The
Rules of Court requires that any cross-claim, counterclaim or third-party
complaint must be instituted in a separate civil action.63 In a legal regime
where a court may order an accused in a fused action to pay civil liability
arising from a contract, the accused-respondent is completely deprived
of the remedy to file a cross-claim, a counterclaim or a third-party
complaint. This�coupled with an accused-respondent's inability to
adequately prepare his or her defense because of lack of adequate
notice of the claims against him or her�prevents the accused-respondent
from having any right to a meaningful hearing. The right to be heard
under the Due Process Clause requires not just any kind of an
7
opportunity to be heard. It mandates that a party to a case must have
the chance to be heard in a real and meaningful sense. It does not
require a perfunctory hearing, but a court proceeding where the party
may adequately avail of the procedural remedies granted to him or her.
A court decision resulting from this falls short of the mandate of the Due
Process Clause.
Indeed, the language of the Constitution is clear. No person shall be
deprived of property without due process of law. Due Process, in its
procedural sense, requires, in essence, the right to notice and hearing.
These rights are further fleshed out in the Rules of Court. The Rules of
Court enforces procedural due process because, to repeat the words of
this Court in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, it provides for "what process
is due, when it is due, and the degree of what is due."64 A court ordering
an accused in a fused action to pay his or her contractual liability
deprives him or her of his or her property without the right to notice and
hearing as expressed in the procedures and remedies under the Rules of
Court. Thus, any court ruling directing an accused in a fused action to pay
civil liability arising from a contract is one that completely disregards the
Due Process Clause. This ruling must be reversed and the Constitution
upheld.
Conclusion
The lower courts erred when they ordered petitioner to pay her civil
obligation arising from a contract of loan in the same criminal case
where she was acquitted on the ground that there was no crime. Any
contractual obligation she may have must be litigated in a separate civil
action involving the contract of loan. We clarify that in cases where the
accused is acquitted on the ground that there is no crime, the civil action
deemed instituted with the criminal case cannot prosper precisely
because there is no delict from which any civil obligation may be
sourced. The peculiarity of this case is the finding that petitioner, in fact,
has an obligation arising from a contract. This civil action arising from the
contract is not necessarily extinguished. It can be instituted in the proper
court through the proper civil action.
We note that while there is no written contract of loan in this case, there
is an oral contract of loan which must be brought within six
years.65 Under the facts of the case, it appears that any breach in the
obligation to pay the loan may have happened between 1996 and 1999,
or more than six years since this case has been instituted. This
notwithstanding, we find that the civil action arising from the contract of
loan has not yet prescribed. Article 1150 of the Civil Code states �
Art. 1150. The time for prescription for all kinds of actions, when there is
no special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the
day they may be brought.
We held in numerous cases that it is the legal possibility of bringing the
action that determines the starting point for the computation of the
period of prescription.67 We highlight the unique circumstances
surrounding this case. As discussed in this decision, there has been
diverse jurisprudence as to the propriety of ordering an accused to pay
an obligation arising from a contract in the criminal case where the
accused was acquitted on the ground that there is no crime. Litigants,
such as MCCI, cannot be blamed for relying on prior rulings where the
recovery on a contract of loan in a criminal case for estafawas allowed.
We have found the opportunity to clarify this matter through this
decision. As it is only now that we delineate the rules governing the
fusion of criminal and civil actions pertaining to estafa, it is only upon the
promulgation of this judgment that litigants have a clear understanding
of the proper recourse in similar cases. We therefore rule that insofar as
MCCI is concerned, the filing of an action, if any (that may be sourced
from the contract of loan), becomes a legal possibility only upon the
finality of this decision which definitively ruled upon the principles on
fused actions.
We add, however, that upon finality of this decision, prospective litigants
should become more circumspect in ascertaining their course of action
in similar cases. Whenever a litigant erroneously pursues an estafa case,
and the accused is subsequently acquitted because the obligation arose
out of a contract, the prescriptive period will still be counted from the
time the cause of action arose. In this eventuality, it is probable that the
action has already prescribed by the time the criminal case shall have
been completed. This possibility demands that prospective litigants do
8
not haphazardly pursue the filing of an estafa case in order to force an
obligor to pay his or her obligation with the threat of criminal conviction.
It compels litigants to be honest and fair in their judgment as to the
proper action to be filed. This ruling should deter litigants from turning
to criminal courts as their collection agents, and should provide a
disincentive to the practice of filing of criminal cases based on
unfounded grounds in order to provide a litigant a bargaining chip in
enforcing contracts.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is GRANTED. The

Decision of the CA dated February 25, 2009 is REVERSED. This is
however, without prejudice to any civil action which may be filed to
claim civil liability arising from the contract.

SO ORDERED.

9

G.R. No. 118127 April 12, 2005
CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of
Manila, HON. JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the
City of Manila and Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, HON.
ERNESTO A. NIEVA, HON. GONZALO P. GONZALES, HON. AVELINO S.
CAILIAN, HON. ROBERTO C. OCAMPO, HON. ALBERTO DOMINGO, HON.
HONORIO U. LOPEZ, HON. FRANCISCO G. VARONA, JR., HON.
ROMUALDO S. MARANAN, HON. NESTOR C. PONCE, JR., HON.
HUMBERTO B. BASCO, HON. FLAVIANO F. CONCEPCION, JR., HON.
ROMEO G. RIVERA, HON. MANUEL M. ZARCAL, HON. PEDRO S. DE
JESUS, HON. BERNARDITO C. ANG, HON. MANUEL L. QUIN, HON.
JHOSEP Y. LOPEZ, HON. CHIKA G. GO, HON. VICTORIANO A. MELENDEZ,
HON. ERNESTO V.P. MACEDA, JR., HON. ROLANDO P. NIETO, HON.
DANILO V. ROLEDA, HON. GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., HON. MA. PAZ E.
HERRERA, HON. JOEY D. HIZON, HON. FELIXBERTO D. ESPIRITU, HON.
KARLO Q. BUTIONG, HON. ROGELIO P. DELA PAZ, HON. BERNARDO D.
RAGAZA, HON. MA. CORAZON R. CABALLES, HON. CASIMIRO C. SISON,
HON. BIENVINIDO M. ABANTE, JR., HON. MA. LOURDES M. ISIP, HON.
ALEXANDER S. RICAFORT, HON. ERNESTO F. RIVERA, HON. LEONARDO
L. ANGAT, and HON. JOCELYN B. DAWIS, in their capacity as councilors
of the City of Manila,Petitioner,
vs.
HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and
MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
I know only that what is moral is what you feel good after and
what is immoral is what you feel bad after.
Ernest Hermingway
Death in the Afternoon, Ch. 1
It is a moral and political axiom that any dishonorable act, if
performed by oneself, is less immoral than if performed by
someone else, who would be well-intentioned in his dishonesty.
J. Christopher Gerald
Bonaparte in Egypt, Ch. I
The Court's commitment to the protection of morals is secondary to its
fealty to the fundamental law of the land. It is foremost a guardian of the
Constitution but not the conscience of individuals. And if it need be, the
Court will not hesitate to "make the hammer fall, and heavily" in the
words of Justice Laurel, and uphold the constitutional guarantees when
faced with laws that, though not lacking in zeal to promote morality,
nevertheless fail to pass the test of constitutionality.
The pivotal issue in this Petition1 under Rule 45 (then Rule 42) of the
Revised Rules on Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of the Decision2 in
Civil Case No. 93-66511 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 18 (lower court),3 is the validity of Ordinance No. 7783
(the Ordinance) of the City of Manila.4
The antecedents are as follows:
Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a
corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels
and lodging houses.5 It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which
was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of
Tourism as a hotel.6 On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order7 (RTC Petition) with the lower court
impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo
S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City
Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance,
insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited
establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.8
1
Enacted by the City Council9 on 9 March 1993 and approved by
petitioner City Mayor on 30 March 1993, the said Ordinance is entitled–
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR
OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF
AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN
THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.10
The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:
SECTION 1. Any provision of existing laws and ordinances to the
contrary notwithstanding, no person, partnership, corporation
or entity shall, in the Ermita-Malate area bounded by Teodoro
M. Kalaw Sr. Street in the North, Taft Avenue in the East, Vito
Cruz Street in the South and Roxas Boulevard in the West,
pursuant to P.D. 499 be allowed or authorized to contract and
engage in, any business providing certain forms of amusement,
entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as
tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the
community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the
social and moral welfare of the community, such as but not
limited to:
8. Discotheques
9. Cabarets
10. Dance Halls
11. Motels
12. Inns
SEC. 2 The City Mayor, the City Treasurer or any person acting in
behalf of the said officials are prohibited from issuing permits,
temporary or otherwise, or from granting licenses and
accepting payments for the operation of business enumerated
in the preceding section.
SEC. 3. Owners and/or operator of establishments engaged in,
or devoted to, the businesses enumerated in Section 1 hereof
are hereby given three (3) months from the date of approval of
this ordinance within which to wind up business operations or
to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or
convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable
within the area, such as but not limited to:

1. Sauna Parlors 1. Curio or antique shop

2. Massage Parlors 2. Souvenir Shops

3. Karaoke Bars 3. Handicrafts display centers

4. Beerhouses 4. Art galleries

5. Night Clubs 5. Records and music shops

6. Day Clubs 6. Restaurants

7. Super Clubs 7. Coffee shops

2
 8. Flower shops
9. Music lounge and sing-along restaurants, with well-
defined activities for wholesome family entertainment
that cater to both local and foreign clientele.
10. Theaters engaged in the exhibition, not only of
motion pictures but also of cultural shows, stage and
theatrical plays, art exhibitions, concerts and the like.
11. Businesses allowable within the law and medium
intensity districts as provided for in the zoning ordinances
for Metropolitan Manila, except new warehouse or open-
storage depot, dock or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline
service station, light industry with any machinery, or
funeral establishments.
SEC. 4. Any person violating any provisions of this ordinance,
shall upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment of one (1)
year or fine of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS, or both, at
the discretion of the Court, PROVIDED, that in case of juridical
person, the President, the General Manager, or person-in-charge
of operation shall be liable thereof; PROVIDED FURTHER, that in
case of subsequent violation and conviction, the premises of
the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked
permanently.
SEC. 5. This ordinance shall take effect upon approval.
Enacted by the City Council of Manila at its regular session today,
March 9, 1993.
Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on March 30, 1993.
(Emphasis supplied)
In the RTC Petition, MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and
improperly included in its enumeration of prohibited establishments,
motels and inns such as MTDC's Victoria Court considering that these
were not establishments for "amusement" or "entertainment" and they
were not "services or facilities for entertainment," nor did they use
women as "tools for entertainment," and neither did they "disturb the
community," "annoy the inhabitants" or "adversely affect the social and
moral welfare of the community."11
MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and
unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) The City Council has no
power to prohibit the operation of motels as Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)12 of
the Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code) grants to the City Council
only the power to regulate the establishment, operation and
maintenance of hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and
other similar establishments; (2) The Ordinance is void as it is violative of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 49913 which specifically declared portions
of the Ermita-Malate area as a commercial zone with certain restrictions;
(3) The Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police power
as the compulsory closure of the motel business has no reasonable
relation to the legitimate municipal interests sought to be protected; (4)
The Ordinance constitutes an ex post facto law by punishing the
operation of Victoria Court which was a legitimate business prior to its
enactment; (5) The Ordinance violates MTDC's constitutional rights in
that: (a) it is confiscatory and constitutes an invasion of plaintiff's
property rights; (b) the City Council has no power to find as a fact that a
particular thing is a nuisance per se nor does it have the power to
extrajudicially destroy it; and (6) The Ordinance constitutes a denial of
equal protection under the law as no reasonable basis exists for
prohibiting the operation of motels and inns, but not pension houses,
hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments, and for
prohibiting said business in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of
this area.14
In their Answer15 dated 23 July 1993, petitioners City of Manila and Lim
maintained that the City Council had the power to "prohibit certain
forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare
of the community" as provided for in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local
Government Code,16 which reads, thus:
3
 Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a)
The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city,
shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants
pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of
the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22
of this Code, and shall:
....
(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and
structures within the city in order to promote the general
welfare and for said purpose shall:
....
(vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and
maintenance of any entertainment or amusement
facilities, including theatrical performances, circuses,
billiard pools, public dancing schools, public dance halls,
sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for
entertainment or amusement; regulate such other events
or activities for amusement or entertainment,
particularly those which tend to disturb the community
or annoy the inhabitants, or require the suspension or
suppression of the same; or, prohibit certain forms of
amusement or entertainment in order to protect the
social and moral welfare of the community.
Citing Kwong Sing v. City of Manila,17 petitioners insisted that the power
of regulation spoken of in the above-quoted provision included the
power to control, to govern and to restrain places of exhibition and
amusement.18
Petitioners likewise asserted that the Ordinance was enacted by the City
Council of Manila to protect the social and moral welfare of the
community in conjunction with its police power as found in Article III,
Section 18(kk) of Republic Act No. 409,19 otherwise known as the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila (Revised Charter of Manila)20 which reads,
thus:
ARTICLE III
THE MUNICIPAL BOARD
. . .
Section 18. Legislative powers. – The Municipal Board shall have
the following legislative powers:
. . .
(kk) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper
for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity,
and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort,
convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants,
and such others as may be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred by this chapter; and
to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not
exceed two hundred pesos fine or six months' imprisonment, or
both such fine and imprisonment, for a single offense.
Further, the petitioners noted, the Ordinance had the presumption of
validity; hence, private respondent had the burden to prove its illegality
or unconstitutionality.21
Petitioners also maintained that there was no inconsistency between
P.D. 499 and the Ordinance as the latter simply disauthorized certain
forms of businesses and allowed the Ermita-Malate area to remain a
commercial zone.22 The Ordinance, the petitioners likewise claimed,
cannot be assailed as ex post facto as it was prospective in
operation.23 The Ordinance also did not infringe the equal protection
clause and cannot be denounced as class legislation as there existed
4
substantial and real differences between the Ermita-Malate area and
other places in the City of Manila.24
On 28 June 1993, respondent Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr. (Judge
Laguio) issued an ex-parte temporary restraining order against the
enforcement of the Ordinance.25 And on 16 July 1993, again in an
intrepid gesture, he granted the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for
by MTDC.26
After trial, on 25 November 1994, Judge Laguio rendered the
assailed Decision, enjoining the petitioners from implementing
the Ordinance. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:27
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance
No. 778[3], Series of 1993, of the City of Manila null and void,
and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction that
had been issued by this Court against the defendant. No costs.
SO ORDERED.28
Petitioners filed with the lower court a Notice of Appeal29 on 12
December 1994, manifesting that they are elevating the case to this
Court under then Rule 42 on pure questions of law.30
On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that
the following errors were committed by the lower court in its ruling: (1)
It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or
otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power;
(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinancecontravenes P.D.
49931 which allows operators of all kinds of commercial establishments,
except those specified therein; and (3) It erred in declaring
the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.32
In the Petition and in its Memorandum,33 petitioners in essence repeat
the assertions they made before the lower court. They contend that the
assailed Ordinance was enacted in the exercise of the inherent and
plenary power of the State and the general welfare clause exercised by
local government units provided for in Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised
Charter of Manila and conjunctively, Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the
Code.34 They allege that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power;
it does not contravene P.D. 499; and that it enjoys the presumption of
validity.35
In its Memorandum36 dated 27 May 1996, private respondent maintains
that the Ordinance is ultra vires and that it is void for being repugnant to
the general law. It reiterates that the questioned Ordinance is not a valid
exercise of police power; that it is violative of due process, confiscatory
and amounts to an arbitrary interference with its lawful business; that it
is violative of the equal protection clause; and that it confers on
petitioner City Mayor or any officer unregulated discretion in the
execution of the Ordinance absent rules to guide and control his actions.
This is an opportune time to express the Court's deep sentiment and
tenderness for the Ermita-Malate area being its home for several
decades. A long-time resident, the Court witnessed the area's many turn
of events. It relished its glory days and endured its days of infamy. Much
as the Court harks back to the resplendent era of the Old Manila and
yearns to restore its lost grandeur, it believes that the Ordinance is not
the fitting means to that end. The Court is of the opinion, and so holds,
that the lower court did not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra
vires and therefore null and void.
The Ordinance is so replete with constitutional infirmities that almost
every sentence thereof violates a constitutional provision. The
prohibitions and sanctions therein transgress the cardinal rights of
persons enshrined by the Constitution. The Court is called upon to
shelter these rights from attempts at rendering them worthless.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of
decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be
within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and
must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must
also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or
5
oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not
prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with
public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.37
Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when they are not
contrary to the Constitution and to the laws.38 The Ordinance must
satisfy two requirements: it must pass muster under the test of
constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing laws.
That ordinances should be constitutional uphold the principle of the
supremacy of the Constitution. The requirement that the enactment
must not violate existing law gives stress to the precept that local
government units are able to legislate only by virtue of their derivative
legislative power, a delegation of legislative power from the national
legislature. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise
powers higher than those of the latter.39
This relationship between the national legislature and the local
government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the
Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. The national
legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which
cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.40
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police
power, an enactment of the City Council acting as agent of Congress.
Local government units, as agencies of the State, are endowed with
police power in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the
declared objects of their creation.41 This delegated police power is found
in Section 16 of the Code, known as the general welfare clause, viz:
SECTION 16. General Welfare.Every local government unit shall
exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those
which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare.
Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government
units shall ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and
safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology,
encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-
reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public
morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote
full employment among their residents, maintain peace and
order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their
inhabitants.
Local government units exercise police power through their respective
legislative bodies; in this case, the sangguniang panlungsod or the city
council. The Code empowers the legislative bodies to "enact ordinances,
approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
province/city/municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of
the Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the
province/city/ municipality provided under the Code.42 The inquiry in this
Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated
power.
The Ordinance contravenes
the Constitution
The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is
subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to
the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public
good.43 In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid
exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to
general laws.
The relevant constitutional provisions are the following:
SEC. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of
life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general
welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the
blessings of democracy.44
6
 SEC. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-
building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the
law of women and men.45
SEC. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of laws.46
Sec. 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation.47
A. The Ordinance infringes
the Due Process Clause
The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the fiat "(N)o
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law. . . ."48
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes
though a standard to which governmental action should conform in
order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate
case, be valid. This standard is aptly described as a responsiveness to
the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice,49and as
such it is a limitation upon the exercise of the police power.50
The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent governmental encroachment
against the life, liberty and property of individuals; to secure the
individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the government,
unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and
distributive justice; to protect property from confiscation by legislative
enactments, from seizure, forfeiture, and destruction without a trial and
conviction by the ordinary mode of judicial procedure; and to secure to
all persons equal and impartial justice and the benefit of the general
law.51
The guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation, and
private corporations and partnerships are "persons" within the scope of
the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.52
This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on
government, usually called "procedural due process" and "substantive
due process."
Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures
that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life,
liberty, or property. Classic procedural due process issues are concerned
with what kind of notice and what form of hearing the government must
provide when it takes a particular action.53
Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the
government has an adequate reason for taking away a person's life,
liberty, or property. In other words, substantive due process looks to
whether there is a sufficient justification for the government's
action.54 Case law in the United States (U.S.) tells us that whether there is
such a justification depends very much on the level of scrutiny
used.55 For example, if a law is in an area where only rational basis
review is applied, substantive due process is met so long as the law is
rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. But if it is an area
where strict scrutiny is used, such as for protecting fundamental rights,
then the government will meet substantive due process only if it can
prove that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government
purpose.56
The police power granted to local government units must always be
exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due
process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised
whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically57 as its exercise is subject to a
qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and
regard due to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those
forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may
be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by
the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.58 Due
7
process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the
rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.59
Requisites for the valid exercise
of Police Power are not met
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for
the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of
constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals.60It must be evident that no other
alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of
private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist between the
purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public
interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not
be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.61
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall
be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights62 a violation
of the due process clause.
The Ordinance was enacted to address and arrest the social ills
purportedly spawned by the establishments in the Ermita-Malate area
which are allegedly operated under the deceptive veneer of legitimate,
licensed and tax-paying nightclubs, bars, karaoke bars, girlie houses,
cocktail lounges, hotels and motels. Petitioners insist that even the
Court in the case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila63 had already taken judicial
notice of the "alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and
fornication in Manila traceable in great part to existence of motels,
which provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence
and exit and thus become the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-
seekers."64
The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and
protection of the social and moral values of the community. Granting for
the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the
scope of the City Council's police powers, the means employed for the
accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
It is undoubtedly one of the fundamental duties of the City of Manila to
make all reasonable regulations looking to the promotion of the moral
and social values of the community. However, the worthy aim of
fostering public morals and the eradication of the community's social ills
can be achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be
attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute
prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their
conversion into businesses "allowed" under the Ordinance have no
reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise
stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per
seprotect and promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it
will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery,
fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.
Conceding for the nonce that the Ermita-Malate area teems with houses
of ill-repute and establishments of the like which the City Council may
lawfully prohibit,65 it is baseless and insupportable to bring within that
classification sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs,
day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and
inns. This is not warranted under the accepted definitions of these
terms. The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are
not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community.
That these are used as arenas to consummate illicit sexual affairs and as
venues to further the illegal prostitution is of no moment. We lay stress
on the acrid truth that sexual immorality, being a human frailty, may
take place in the most innocent of places that it may even take place in
the substitute establishments enumerated under Section 3 of
the Ordinance. If the flawed logic of the Ordinance were to be followed,
in the remote instance that an immoral sexual act transpires in a church
cloister or a court chamber, we would behold the spectacle of the City of
8
Manila ordering the closure of the church or court concerned. Every
house, building, park, curb, street or even vehicles for that matter will
not be exempt from the prohibition. Simply because there are no "pure"
places where there are impure men. Indeed, even the Scripture and the
Tradition of Christians churches continually recall the presence
and universality of sin in man's history.66
The problem, it needs to be pointed out, is not the establishment, which
by its nature cannot be said to be injurious to the health or comfort of
the community and which in itself is amoral, but the deplorable human
activity that may occur within its premises. While a motel may be used
as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that reason alone be
punished. It cannot be classified as a house of ill-repute or as a
nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked assumption. If that were
so and if that were allowed, then the Ermita-Malate area would not only
be purged of its supposed social ills, it would be extinguished of its soul
as well as every human activity, reprehensible or not, in its every nook
and cranny would be laid bare to the estimation of the authorities.
The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core
issues of morality. Try as the Ordinance may to shape morality, it should
not foster the illusion that it can make a moral man out of it because
immorality is not a thing, a building or establishment; it is in the hearts
of men. The City Council instead should regulate human conduct that
occurs inside the establishments, but not to the detriment of liberty and
privacy which are covenants, premiums and blessings of democracy.
While petitioners' earnestness at curbing clearly objectionable social ills
is commendable, they unwittingly punish even the proprietors and
operators of "wholesome," "innocent" establishments. In the instant
case, there is a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in
the case of those individuals desirous of owning, operating and
patronizing those motels and property in terms of the investments made
and the salaries to be paid to those therein employed. If the City of
Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other
social ills, it can instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily
inspections of the establishments for any violation of the conditions of
their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or
revoke their licenses for these violations;67 and it may even impose
increased license fees. In other words, there are other means to
reasonably accomplish the desired end.
Means employed are
constitutionally infirm
The Ordinance disallows the operation of sauna parlors, massage parlors,
karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs,
discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns in the Ermita-
Malate area. In Section 3 thereof, owners and/or operators of the
enumerated establishments are given three (3) months from the date of
approval of the Ordinance within which "to wind up business operations
or to transfer to any place outside the Ermita-Malate area or convert
said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area."
Further, it states in Section 4 that in cases of subsequent violations of
the provisions of the Ordinance, the "premises of the erring
establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently."
It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the
achievement of its purposes, the governmental interference itself,
infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person's fundamental
right to liberty and property.
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice
Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to be free from
arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere
freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is
deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he
has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are
necessary for the common welfare."68 In accordance with this case, the
rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to
live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling;
and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of
liberty.69
9
The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents,70 sought
to clarify the meaning of "liberty." It said:
While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the
liberty. . . guaranteed [by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from
bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to
engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized…as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no
doubt that the meaning of "liberty" must be broad indeed.
In another case, it also confirmed that liberty protected by the due
process clause includes personal decisions relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education. In explaining the respect the Constitution demands for the
autonomy of the person in making these choices, the U.S. Supreme
Court explained:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices
a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal
dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of universe,
and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters
could not define the attributes of personhood where they
formed under compulsion of the State.71
Persons desirous to own, operate and patronize the enumerated
establishments under Section 1 of the Ordinancemay seek autonomy for
these purposes.
Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may invoke this right to
autonomy to consummate their bonds in intimate sexual conduct within
the motel's premisesbe it stressed that their consensual sexual
behavior does not contravene any fundamental state policy as contained
in the Constitution.72 Adults have a right to choose to forge such
relationships with others in the confines of their own private lives and
still retain their dignity as free persons. The liberty protected by the
Constitution allows persons the right to make this choice.73 Their right to
liberty under the due process clause gives them the full right to engage
in their conduct without intervention of the government, as long as they
do not run afoul of the law. Liberty should be the rule and restraint the
exception.
Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom from
unlawful government restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to
be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is the beginning of
all freedomit is the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men.74
The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to
privacy and interference demands respect. As the case of Morfe v.
Mutuc,75 borrowing the words of Laski, so very aptly stated:
Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity.
His separateness, his isolation, are indefeasible; indeed, they are
so fundamental that they are the basis on which his civic
obligations are built. He cannot abandon the consequences of his
isolation, which are, broadly speaking, that his experience is
private, and the will built out of that experience personal to
himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he surrenders himself.
If his will is set by the will of others, he ceases to be a master of
himself. I cannot believe that a man no longer a master of
himself is in any real sense free.
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized
in Morfe, the invasion of which should be justified by a compelling state
interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully
10
deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should
stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.76
There is a great temptation to have an extended discussion on these civil
liberties but the Court chooses to exercise restraint and restrict itself to
the issues presented when it should. The previous pronouncements of
the Court are not to be interpreted as a license for adults to engage in
criminal conduct. The reprehensibility of such conduct is not diminished.
The Court only reaffirms and guarantees their right to make this choice.
Should they be prosecuted for their illegal conduct, they should suffer
the consequences of the choice they have made. That, ultimately, is their
choice.
Modality employed is
unlawful taking
In addition, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it
substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its
property.77 The Ordinance in Section 1 thereof forbids the running of the
enumerated businesses in the Ermita-Malate area and in Section 3
instructs its owners/operators to wind up business operations or to
transfer outside the area or convert said businesses into allowed
businesses. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of
property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond
regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without
just compensation.78 It is intrusive and violative of the private property
rights of individuals.
The Constitution expressly provides in Article III, Section 9, that "private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."
The provision is the most important protection of property rights in the
Constitution. This is a restriction on the general power of the
government to take property. The constitutional provision is about
ensuring that the government does not confiscate the property of some
to give it to others. In part too, it is about loss spreading. If the
government takes away a person's property to benefit society, then
society should pay. The principal purpose of the guarantee is "to bar the
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole.79
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A
"possessory" taking occurs when the government confiscates or
physically occupies property. A "regulatory" taking occurs when the
government's regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of
the property.80
In the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,81 it was held that a
taking also could be found if government regulation of the use of
property went "too far." When regulation reaches a certain magnitude,
in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain
and compensation to support the act. While property may be regulated
to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking.82
No formula or rule can be devised to answer the questions of what is too
far and when regulation becomes a taking. In Mahon, Justice Holmes
recognized that it was "a question of degree and therefore cannot be
disposed of by general propositions." On many other occasions as well,
the U.S. Supreme Court has said that the issue of when regulation
constitutes a taking is a matter of considering the facts in each case. The
Court asks whether justice and fairness require that the economic loss
caused by public action must be compensated by the government and
thus borne by the public as a whole, or whether the loss should remain
concentrated on those few persons subject to the public action.83
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that
government regulation is a taking if it leaves no reasonable economically
viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable
expectations for use.84 A regulation that permanently denies all
economically beneficial or productive use of land is, from the owner's
point of view, equivalent to a "taking" unless principles of nuisance or
property law that existed when the owner acquired the land make the
use prohibitable.85 When the owner of real property has been called
11
upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the
common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has
suffered a taking.86
A regulation which denies all economically beneficial or productive use
of land will require compensation under the takings clause. Where a
regulation places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all
economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred,
depending on a complex of factors including the regulation's economic
effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes
with reasonable investment-backed expectations and the character of
government action. These inquiries are informed by the purpose of the
takings clause which is to prevent the government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole.87
A restriction on use of property may also constitute a "taking" if not
reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose
or if it has an unduly harsh impact on the distinct investment-backed
expectations of the owner.88
The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the "prohibited"
establishments three (3) months from its approval within which to "wind
up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-
Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business
allowable within the area." The directive to "wind up business
operations" amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent
deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the owner
converts his establishment to accommodate an "allowed" business, the
structure which housed the previous business will be left empty and
gathering dust. Suppose he transfers it to another area, he will likewise
leave the entire establishment idle. Consideration must be given to the
substantial amount of money invested to build the edifices which the
owner reasonably expects to be returned within a period of time. It is
apparent that the Ordinance leaves no reasonable economically viable
use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations
for use.
The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the
Ermita-Malate area or to convert into allowed businessesare
confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in cases of
subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also
equivalent to a "taking" of private property.
The second option instructs the owners to abandon their property and
build another one outside the Ermita-Malate area. In every sense, it
qualifies as a taking without just compensation with an additional
burden imposed on the owner to build another establishment solely
from his coffers. The proffered solution does not put an end to the
"problem," it merely relocates it. Not only is this impractical, it is
unreasonable, onerous and oppressive. The conversion into allowed
enterprises is just as ridiculous. How may the respondent convert a
motel into a restaurant or a coffee shop, art gallery or music lounge
without essentially destroying its property? This is a taking of private
property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation.
The penalty of closure likewise constitutes unlawful taking that should
be compensated by the government. The burden on the owner to
convert or transfer his business, otherwise it will be closed permanently
after a subsequent violation should be borne by the public as this end
benefits them as a whole.
Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning
ordinance. A zoning ordinance, although a valid exercise of police power,
which limits a "wholesome" property to a use which can not reasonably
be made of it constitutes the taking of such property without just
compensation. Private property which is not noxious nor intended for
noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed without
compensation. Such principle finds no support in the principles of justice
as we know them. The police powers of local government units which
have always received broad and liberal interpretation cannot be
stretched to cover this particular taking.
Distinction should be made between destruction from necessity and
eminent domain. It needs restating that the property taken in the
12
exercise of police power is destroyed because it is noxious or intended
for a noxious purpose while the property taken under the power of
eminent domain is intended for a public use or purpose and is therefore
"wholesome."89 If it be of public benefit that a "wholesome" property
remain unused or relegated to a particular purpose, then certainly the
public should bear the cost of reasonable compensation for the
condemnation of private property for public use.90
Further, the Ordinance fails to set up any standard to guide or limit the
petitioners' actions. It in no way controls or guides the discretion vested
in them. It provides no definition of the establishments covered by it and
it fails to set forth the conditions when the establishments come within
its ambit of prohibition. The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary
and unrestricted power to close down establishments. Ordinances such
as this, which make possible abuses in its execution, depending upon no
conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated
arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone by which its
validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid.
The Ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial
enforcement could be secured.91
Ordinances placing restrictions upon the lawful use of property must, in
order to be valid and constitutional, specify the rules and conditions to
be observed and conduct to avoid; and must not admit of the exercise,
or of an opportunity for the exercise, of unbridled discretion by the law
enforcers in carrying out its provisions.92
Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati,93 as cited in People v.
Nazario,94 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that had
made it illegal for "three or more persons to assemble on any sidewalk
and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing
by." The ordinance was nullified as it imposed no standard at all
"because one may never know in advance what 'annoys some people but
does not annoy others.' "
Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain
which establishments "tend to disturb the community," "annoy the
inhabitants," and "adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the
community." The cited case supports the nullification of
the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible standards to guide the law
enforcers in carrying out its provisions.
Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated
establishments without infringing the due process clause. These lawful
establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on
their business. This is a sweeping exercise of police power that is a result
of a lack of imagination on the part of the City Council and which
amounts to an interference into personal and private rights which the
Court will not countenance. In this regard, we take a resolute stand to
uphold the constitutional guarantee of the right to liberty and property.
Worthy of note is an example derived from the U.S. of a reasonable
regulation which is a far cry from the ill-considered Ordinance enacted
by the City Council.
In FW/PBS, INC. v. Dallas,95 the city of Dallas adopted a comprehensive
ordinance regulating "sexually oriented businesses," which are defined
to include adult arcades, bookstores, video stores, cabarets, motels, and
theaters as well as escort agencies, nude model studio and sexual
encounter centers. Among other things, the ordinance required that
such businesses be licensed. A group of motel owners were among the
three groups of businesses that filed separate suits challenging the
ordinance. The motel owners asserted that the city violated the due
process clause by failing to produce adequate support for its supposition
that renting room for fewer than ten (10) hours resulted in increased
crime and other secondary effects. They likewise argued than the ten
(10)-hour limitation on the rental of motel rooms placed an
unconstitutional burden on the right to freedom of association. Anent
the first contention, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
reasonableness of the legislative judgment combined with a study which
the city considered, was adequate to support the city's determination
that motels permitting room rentals for fewer than ten (10 ) hours
should be included within the licensing scheme. As regards the second
point, the Court held that limiting motel room rentals to ten (10) hours
13
will have no discernible effect on personal bonds as those bonds that are
formed from the use of a motel room for fewer than ten (10) hours are
not those that have played a critical role in the culture and traditions of
the nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs.
The ordinance challenged in the above-cited case merely regulated the
targeted businesses. It imposed reasonable restrictions; hence, its
validity was upheld.
The case of Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v.
City Mayor of Manila,96 it needs pointing out, is also different from this
case in that what was involved therein was a measure which regulated
the mode in which motels may conduct business in order to put an end
to practices which could encourage vice and immorality. Necessarily,
there was no valid objection on due process or equal protection grounds
as the ordinance did not prohibit motels. The Ordinance in this case
however is not a regulatory measure but is an exercise of an assumed
power to prohibit.97
The foregoing premises show that the Ordinance is an unwarranted and
unlawful curtailment of property and personal rights of citizens. For
being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, even
under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.
B. The Ordinance violates Equal
Protection Clause
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated
differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate
against others.98 The guarantee means that no person or class of persons
shall be denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other
persons or other classes in like circumstances.99 The "equal protection of
the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws."100 It limits
governmental discrimination. The equal protection clause extends to
artificial persons but only insofar as their property is concerned.101
The Court has explained the scope of the equal protection clause in this
wise:
… What does it signify? To quote from J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Land
Tenure Administration: "The ideal situation is for the law's
benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the
sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be
excluded and the affairs of men governed by that serene and
impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the idea of
law." There is recognition, however, in the opinion that what in
fact exists "cannot approximate the ideal. Nor is the law
susceptible to the reproach that it does not take into account the
realities of the situation. The constitutional guarantee then is not
to be given a meaning that disregards what is, what does in fact
exist. To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is
the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to
liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such
circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can
show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired
by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the
spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no
support in reason." Classification is thus not ruled out, it being
sufficient to quote from the Tuason decision anew "that the laws
operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar
circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same
manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges
conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue
preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal
protection and security shall be given to every person under
circumstances which, if not identical, are analogous. If law be
looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within
a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever
restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the
rest.102
Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If the
classification is reasonable, the law may operate only on some and not
14
all of the people without violating the equal protection clause.103 The
classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. To be
valid, it must conform to the following requirements:
1) It must be based on substantial distinctions.
2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law.
3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.
4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.104
In the Court's view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels,
inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar
establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments
providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No
reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses,
hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The classification
in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated,
both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it
does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to
the purpose of the Ordinance.
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and
operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this
area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if
located outside the area.
The standard "where women are used as tools for entertainment" is also
discriminatory as prostitutionone of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims
to banishis not a profession exclusive to women. Both men and
women have an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. It is not any
less grave a sin when men engage in it. And why would the assumption
that there is an ongoing immoral activity apply only when women are
employed and be inapposite when men are in harness? This
discrimination based on gender violates equal protection as it is not
substantially related to important government objectives.105 Thus, the
discrimination is invalid.
Failing the test of constitutionality, the Ordinance likewise failed to pass
the test of consistency with prevailing laws.
C. The Ordinance is repugnant
to general laws; it is ultra vires
The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code as the latter merely
empowers local government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the
establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.
The power of the City Council to regulate by ordinances the
establishment, operation, and maintenance of motels, hotels and other
similar establishments is found in Section 458 (a) 4 (iv), which provides
that:
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a)
The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city,
shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants
pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of
the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22
of this Code, and shall:
. . .
(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and
structures within the city in order to promote the general
welfare and for said purpose shall:
. . .
(iv) Regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of
cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension
15
 houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments,
including tourist guides and transports . . . .
While its power to regulate the establishment, operation and
maintenance of any entertainment or amusement facilities, and to
prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment is provided under
Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code, which reads as follows:
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a)
The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city,
shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants
pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of
the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22
of this Code, and shall:
. . .
(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and
structures within the city in order to promote the general
welfare and for said purpose shall:
. . .
(vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and
maintenance of any entertainment or amusement
facilities, including theatrical performances, circuses,
billiard pools, public dancing schools, public dance halls,
sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for
entertainment or amusement; regulate such other events
or activities for amusement or entertainment,
particularly those which tend to disturb the community
or annoy the inhabitants, or require the suspension or
suppression of the same; or, prohibit certain forms of
amusement or entertainment in order to protect the
social and moral welfare of the community.
Clearly, with respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels,
inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments,
the only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to
regulate them to promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds
from cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the
establishment, operation and maintenance of such establishments. It is
well to recall the rulings of the Court in Kwong Sing v. City of
Manila106 that:
The word "regulate," as used in subsection (l), section 2444 of
the Administrative Code, means and includes the power to
control, to govern, and to restrain; but "regulate" should not be
construed as synonymous with "suppress" or "prohibit."
Consequently, under the power to regulate laundries, the
municipal authorities could make proper police regulations as to
the mode in which the employment or business shall be
exercised.107
And in People v. Esguerra,108 wherein the Court nullified an ordinance of
the Municipality of Tacloban which prohibited the selling, giving and
dispensing of liquor ratiocinating that the municipality is empowered
only to regulate the same and not prohibit. The Court therein declared
that:
(A)s a general rule when a municipal corporation is specifically
given authority or power to regulate or to license and regulate
the liquor traffic, power to prohibit is impliedly withheld.109
These doctrines still hold contrary to petitioners' assertion110 that they
were modified by the Code vesting upon City Councils prohibitory
powers.
Similarly, the City Council exercises regulatory powers over public
dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and
other places for entertainment or amusement as found in the first clause
of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii). Its powers to regulate, suppress and suspend
"such other events or activities for amusement or entertainment,
16
particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the
inhabitants" and to "prohibit certain forms of amusement or
entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the
community" are stated in the second and third clauses, respectively of
the same Section. The several powers of the City Council as provided in
Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code, it is pertinent to emphasize, are
separated by semi-colons (;), the use of which indicates that the clauses
in which these powers are set forth are independent of each other albeit
closely related to justify being put together in a single enumeration or
paragraph.111 These powers, therefore, should not be confused,
commingled or consolidated as to create a conglomerated and unified
power of regulation, suppression and prohibition.112
The Congress unequivocably specified the establishments and forms of
amusement or entertainment subject to regulation among which are
beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and
other similar establishments (Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)), public dancing
schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other
places for entertainment or amusement (Section 458 (a) 4 (vii)). This
enumeration therefore cannot be included as among "other events or
activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend
to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants" or "certain forms of
amusement or entertainment" which the City Council may suspend,
suppress or prohibit.
The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are expressly
granted to it and those which are necessarily implied or incidental to the
exercise thereof. By reason of its limited powers and the nature thereof,
said powers are to be construed strictissimi juris and any doubt or
ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting said powers must be
construed against the City Council.113 Moreover, it is a general rule in
statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or
consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion of all
others. Expressio unius est exclusio alterium. This maxim is based upon
the rules of logic and the natural workings of human mind. It is
particularly applicable in the construction of such statutes as create new
rights or remedies, impose penalties or punishments, or otherwise come
under the rule of strict construction.114
The argument that the City Council is empowered to enact
the Ordinance by virtue of the general welfare clause of the Code and of
Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila is likewise without
merit. On the first point, the ruling of the Court in People v.
Esguerra,115 is instructive. It held that:
The powers conferred upon a municipal council in the general
welfare clause, or section 2238 of the Revised Administrative
Code, refers to matters not covered by the other provisions of
the same Code, and therefore it can not be applied to
intoxicating liquors, for the power to regulate the selling, giving
away and dispensing thereof is granted specifically by section
2242 (g) to municipal councils. To hold that, under the general
power granted by section 2238, a municipal council may enact
the ordinance in question, notwithstanding the provision of
section 2242 (g), would be to make the latter superfluous and
nugatory, because the power to prohibit, includes the power to
regulate, the selling, giving away and dispensing of intoxicating
liquors.
On the second point, it suffices to say that the Code being a later
expression of the legislative will must necessarily prevail and override
the earlier law, the Revised Charter of Manila. Legis posteriores priores
contrarias abrogant, or later statute repeals prior ones which are
repugnant thereto. As between two laws on the same subject matter,
which are irreconcilably inconsistent, that which is passed later prevails,
since it is the latest expression of legislative will.116 If there is an
inconsistency or repugnance between two statutes, both relating to the
same subject matter, which cannot be removed by any fair and
reasonable method of interpretation, it is the latest expression of the
legislative will which must prevail and override the earlier.117
Implied repeals are those which take place when a subsequently enacted
law contains provisions contrary to those of an existing law but no
17
provisions expressly repealing them. Such repeals have been divided into
two general classes: those which occur where an act is so inconsistent or
irreconcilable with an existing prior act that only one of the two can
remain in force and those which occur when an act covers the whole
subject of an earlier act and is intended to be a substitute therefor. The
validity of such a repeal is sustained on the ground that the latest
expression of the legislative will should prevail.118
In addition, Section 534(f) of the Code states that "All general and special
laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and
administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are
inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly." Thus, submitting to petitioners' interpretation
that the Revised Charter of Manila empowers the City Council to prohibit
motels, that portion of the Charter stating such must be considered
repealed by the Code as it is at variance with the latter's provisions
granting the City Council mere regulatory powers.
It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the
general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without
judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one
which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be
summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not be
said that motels are injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort
of the community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per
accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A
motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement
without judicial intervention.119
Notably, the City Council was conferred powers to prevent and prohibit
certain activities and establishments in another section of the Code
which is reproduced as follows:
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a)
The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city,
shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants
pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of
the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22
of this Code, and shall:
(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an
efficient and effective city government, and in this connection,
shall:
. . .
(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and
impose appropriate penalties for habitual drunkenness in public
places, vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution, establishment and
maintenance of houses of ill repute, gambling and other
prohibited games of chance, fraudulent devices and ways to
obtain money or property, drug addiction, maintenance of drug
dens, drug pushing, juvenile delinquency, the printing,
distribution or exhibition of obscene or pornographic materials
or publications, and such other activities inimical to the welfare
and morals of the inhabitants of the city;
. . .
If it were the intention of Congress to confer upon the City Council the
power to prohibit the establishments enumerated in Section 1 of
the Ordinance, it would have so declared in uncertain terms by adding
them to the list of the matters it may prohibit under the above-quoted
Section. The Ordinance now vainly attempts to lump these
establishments with houses of ill-repute and expand the City Council's
powers in the second and third clauses of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the
Code in an effort to overreach its prohibitory powers. It is evident that
these establishments may only be regulated in their establishment,
operation and maintenance.
It is important to distinguish the punishable activities from the
establishments themselves. That these establishments are recognized
legitimate enterprises can be gleaned from another Section of the Code.
18
Section 131 under the Title on Local Government Taxation expressly
mentioned proprietors or operators of massage clinics, sauna, Turkish
and Swedish baths, hotels, motels and lodging houses as among the
"contractors" defined in paragraph (h) thereof. The same Section also
defined "amusement" as a "pleasurable diversion and entertainment,"
"synonymous to relaxation, avocation, pastime or fun;" and "amusement
places" to include "theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other
places of amusement where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by
seeing or viewing the show or performances." Thus, it can be inferred
that the Code considers these establishments as legitimate enterprises
and activities. It is well to recall the maxim reddendo singula
singulis which means that words in different parts of a statute must be
referred to their appropriate connection, giving to each in its place, its
proper force and effect, and, if possible, rendering none of them useless
or superfluous, even if strict grammatical construction demands
otherwise. Likewise, where words under consideration appear in
different sections or are widely dispersed throughout an act the same
principle applies.120
Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs
counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. As correctly argued by MTDC, the
statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a
commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and operation
of all kinds of commercial establishments except warehouse or open
storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service station,
light industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is
that for an ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must not
only be within the powers of the council to enact but the same must not
be in conflict with or repugnant to the general law.121As succinctly
illustrated in Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority:122
The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing
law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate
only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the
national legislature (except only that the power to create their
own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the
Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with what is
called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the
Congress, the local government units cannot contravene but
must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case
before us, the enactment in question, which are merely local in
origin cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and
effect of a statute.123
Petitioners contend that the Ordinance enjoys the presumption of
validity. While this may be the rule, it has already been held that
although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or
reasonableness of the ordinance, such presumption must nevertheless
be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face
of the ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence. The exercise
of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes
the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it
is against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial,
discriminating or in derogation of a common right.124
Conclusion
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and
property rights and impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally
infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and
unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit
that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be
forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to enact
the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.
Concededly, the challenged Ordinance was enacted with the best of
motives and shares the concern of the public for the cleansing of the
Ermita-Malate area of its social sins. Police power legislation of such
character deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary we reiterate
our support for it. But inspite of its virtuous aims, the enactment of
the Ordinance has no statutory or constitutional authority to stand on.
Local legislative bodies, in this case, the City Council, cannot prohibit the
operation of the enumerated establishments under Section 1 thereof or
order their transfer or conversion without infringing the constitutional
19
guarantees of due process and equal protection of laws not even
under the guise of police power.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the

Regional Trial Court declaring the Ordinancevoid is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

20

[G.R. No. 131652. March 9, 1998]
BAYANI M. ALONTE, petitioner, vs. HON. MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO JR.,
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 131728. March 9, 1998]
BUENAVENTURA CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. JUDGE MAXIMO
SAVELLANO, JR., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and JUVIELYN
Y. PUNONGBAYAN, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Pending before this Court are two separate petitions, one filed by
petitioner Bayani M. Alonte, docketed G.R. No. 131652, and the other by
petitioner Buenaventura Concepcion, docketed G.R. No. 131728, that
assail the decision of respondent Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., of the
Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 53, of Manila finding both petitioners
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. The two petitions
were consolidated.
On 05 December 1996, an information for rape was filed against
petitioners Bayani M. Alonte, an incumbent Mayor of Bian, Laguna, and
Buenaventura Concepcion predicated on a complaint filed by Juvie-lyn
Punongbayan. The information contained the following averments; thus:
That on or about September 12, 1996, in Sto. Tomas, Bian, Laguna, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the above named
accused, who is the incumbent mayor of Bian, Laguna after giving
complainant-child drinking water which made her dizzy and weak, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with said JUVIELYN PUNONGBAYAN against her will and
consent, to her damage and prejudice.
That accused Buenaventura `Wella Concepcion without having
participated as principal or accessory assisted in the commission of the
offense by bringing said complainant child to the rest house of accused
Bayani `Arthur Alonte at Sto. Tomas, Bian, Laguna and after receiving the
amount of P1,000.00 left her alone with Bayani Alonte who subsequently
raped her.
Contrary to Law.[1]
The case was docketed Criminal Case No. 9619-B and assigned by
raffle to Branch 25 of the RTC of Bian, Laguna, presided over by Judge
Pablo B. Francisco.
On 13 December 1996, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through her counsel
Attorney Remedios C. Balbin, and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor (ACSP)
Leonardo Guiyab, Jr., filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a
Petition for a Change of Venue (docketed Administrative Matter No. 97-
1-12-RTC) to have the case transferred and tried by any of the Regional
Trial Courts in Metro Manila.
During the pendency of the petition for change of venue, or on 25
June 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, assisted by her parents and counsel,
executed an affidavit of desistance, quoted herein in full, as follows:
AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE
I, JUVIE-LYN YAMBAO PUNONGBAYAN, 17 years of age, a resident of No.
5 Uranus Street, Congressional Avenue Subdivision, Quezon City, duly
assisted by private legal counsel and my parents, after having duly sworn
in accordance with law, depose and say:
1
1. That I am the Complainant in the rape case filed against Mayor Bayani 8. That this is my final decision reached without fear or favor, premised
`Arthur Alonte of Bian, Laguna, with the RTC-Branch 25 of Bian, Laguna; on a corresponding commitment that there will be no reprisals in
whatever form, against members of the police force or any other official
2. That the case has been pending for some time, on preliminary issues, of officer, my relatives and friends who extended assistance to me in
specifically, (a) change of venue, filed with the Supreme Court; whatever way, in my search for justice.
(b) propriety of the appeal to the Court of Appeals, and after its denial by
said court, brought to the Office of the President, on the veracity of the "WHEREOF, I affix my signature this 25 day of June, 1997, in Quezon City.
findings of the Five-Man Investigating Panel of the State Prosecutors
Office, and the Secretary of Justice, and (c) a hold-departure order filed "(Sgd) JUVIE-LYN Y.
with the Bian Court; PUNONGBAYAN
Compl
3. That the legal process moves ever so slowly, and meanwhile, I have ainant
already lost two (2) semesters of my college residence. And when the
actual trial is held after all the preliminary issues are finally resolved, I "Assisted by:
anticipate a still indefinite suspension of my schooling to attend the
hearings; (Sgd) ATTY. REMEDIOS C. BALBIN
Private Prosecutor
4. That during the entire period since I filed the case, my family has lived
a most abnormal life: my father and mother had to give up their jobs; my "In the presence of:
younger brother, who is in fourth grade, had to stop his schooling, like
myself; (Sgd) PABLO PUNONGBAYAN
Father
5. That I do not blame anyone for the long, judicial process, I simply wish
to stop and live elsewhere with my family, where we can start life anew, (Sgd) JULIE Y. PUNONGBAYAN
and live normally once again; Mother

6. That I pray that I be allowed to withdraw my complaint for rape and "SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25 day of June, 1997, in
the other charge for child abuse wherein the Five-Man Investigating Quezon City.
Panel of the Office of the State Prosecutor found a prima facie case
although the information has not been filed, and that I will not at any "(Sgd) Illegible
time revive this, and related cases or file new cases, whether, criminal, Administering
civil, and/or administrative, here or anywhere in the Philippines; Officer"[2]

7. That I likewise realize that the execution of this Affidavit will put to
doubt my credibility as a witness-complainant;
On 28 June 1997, Atty. Ramon C. Casino, on behalf of petitioners,
moved to have the petition for change of venue dismissed on the ground
that it had become moot in view of complainant's affidavit of
desistance. On 22 August 1997, ACSP Guiyab filed his comment on the
2
motion to dismiss. Guiyab asserted that he was not aware of the
desistance of private complainant and opined that the desistance, in any
case, would not produce any legal effect since it was the public prosecutor
who had direction and control of the prosecution of the criminal
action. He prayed for the denial of the motion to dismiss.
On 02 September 1997, this Court issued a Resolution (Administrative
Matter No. 97-1-12-RTC), granting the petition for change of venue. The
Court said:
"These affidavits give specific names, dates, and methods being used to
abort, by coercion or corruption, the prosecution of Criminal Case No.
9619-B. It is thus incorrect for oppositors Alonte and Concepcion to
contend that the fear of the petitioner, her private counsel and her
witnesses are too generalized if not fabricated.Indeed, the probability
that in desisting from pursuing her complaint for rape, petitioner, a
minor, may have succumbed to some illicit influence and undue
pressure. To prevent possible miscarriage of justice is a good excuse to
grant the petition to transfer the venue of Criminal Case No. 9619-B
from Bian, Laguna to the City of Manila.
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Change of Venue from Bian, Laguna
to the City of Manila is granted.The Executive Judge of RTC Manila is
ordered to raffle Crim. Case No. 9619-B to any of its branches. The judge
to whom Crim. Case No. 9619-B shall be raffled shall resolve the
petitioner's Motion to Resume Proceedings filed in Br. XXV of the RTC of
Bian, Laguna and determine the voluntariness and validity of petitioner's
desistance in light of the opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief
State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiyab. The branch clerk of court of Br. XXV
of the RTC of Bian, Laguna is ordered to personally deliver to the
Executive Judge of Manila the complete records of Crim. Case No. 9619-
B upon receipt of this Resolution."[3]
On 17 September 1997, the case, now re-docketed Criminal Case No.
97-159955 by the Clerk of Court of Manila, was assigned by raffle to
Branch 53, RTC Manila, with respondent Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr.,
presiding.
On 07 October 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through Attorney
Balbin, submitted to the Manila court a "compliance" where she
reiterated "her decision to abide by her Affidavit of Desistance."
In an Order, dated 09 October 1997, Judge Savellano found probable
cause for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of petitioners Alonte and
Concepcion without prejudice to, and independent of, this Courts
separate determination as the trier of facts, of the voluntariness and
validity of the [private complainant's] desistance in the light of the
opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo
Guiyab.
On 02 November 1997, Alonte voluntarily surrendered himself to
Director Santiago Toledo of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
while Concepcion, in his case, posted the recommended bail
of P150,000.00.
On 07 November 1997, petitioners were arraigned and both pleaded
not guilty to the charge. The parties manifested that they were waiving
pre-trial. The proceedings forthwith went on. Per Judge Savellano, both
parties agreed to proceed with the trial of the case on the
merits.[4] According to Alonte, however, Judge Savellano allowed the
prosecution to present evidence relative only to the question of the
voluntariness and validity of the affidavit of desistance.[5]
It would appear that immediately following the arraignment, the
prosecution presented private complainant Juvie-lyn Punongbayan
followed by her parents. During this hearing, Punongbayan affirmed the
validity and voluntariness of her affidavit of desistance. She stated that
she had no intention of giving positive testimony in support of the charges
against Alonte and had no interest in further prosecuting the
action. Punongbayan confirmed: (i) That she was compelled to desist
because of the harassment she was experiencing from the media, (ii) that
no pressures nor influence were exerted upon her to sign the affidavit of
desistance, and (iii)that neither she nor her parents received a single
centavo from anybody to secure the affidavit of desistance.
Assistant State Prosecutor Marilyn Campomanes then presented, in
sequence: (i) Punongbayans parents, who affirmed their signatures on the
3
affidavit of desistance and their consent to their daughters decision to
desist from the case, and (ii) Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alberto
Nofuente, who attested that the affidavit of desistance was signed by
Punongbayan and her parents in his presence and that he was satisfied
that the same was executed freely and voluntarily. Finally, Campomanes
manifested that in light of the decision of private complainant and her
parents not to pursue the case, the State had no further evidence against
the accused to prove the guilt of the accused. She, then, moved for the
"dismissal of the case" against both Alonte and Concepcion.
Thereupon, respondent judge said that "the case was submitted for
decision."[6]
On 10 November 1997, petitioner Alonte filed an "Urgent Motion to
Admit to Bail." Assistant State Prosecutor Campomanes, in a Comment
filed on the same date, stated that the State interposed no objection to
the granting of bail and in fact Justice and Equity dictates that it joins the
accused in his prayer for the granting of bail.
Respondent judge did not act on the application for bail.
On 17 November 1997, Alonte filed anew an Urgent Plea to Resolve
the Motion for Bail. On even date, ASP Campomanes filed a Manifestation
deeming "it proper and in accord with justice and fair play to join the
aforestated motion.
Again, the respondent judge did not act on the urgent motion.
The records would indicate that on the 25th November 1997, 1st
December 1997, 8th December 1997 and 10th December 1997, petitioner
Alonte filed a Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Motion for Early Resolution,
respectively, in respect of his application for bail. None of these motions
were acted upon by Judge Savellano.
On 17 December 1997, Attorney Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun, the lead
counsel for petitioner Alonte received a notice from the RTC Manila,
Branch 53, notifying him of the schedule of promulgation, on 18
December 1997, of the decision on the case. The counsel for accused
Concepcion denied having received any notice of the scheduled
promulgation.
On 18 December 1997, after the case was called, Atty. Sigrid Fortun
and Atty. Jose Flaminiano manifested that Alonte could not attend the
promulgation of the decision because he was suffering from mild
hypertension and was confined at the NBI clinic and that, upon the other
hand, petitioner Concepcion and his counsel would appear not to have
been notified of the proceedings. The promulgation, nevertheless, of the
decision proceeded in absentia; the reading concluded:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the two (2) accused
Mayor Bayani Alonte and Buenaventura `Wella Concepcion guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the heinous crime of RAPE, as defined and
penalized under Article 335(2) in relation to Article 27 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, for which each one of
the them is hereby sentenced to suffer the indivisible penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA or imprisonment for twenty (20) years and one
(1) day to forty (40) years.
In view thereof, the bail bond put up by the accused Buenaventura
`Wella Concepcion for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled and
rendered without any further force and effect.
SO ORDERED.[7]
On the same day of 18th December 1997, petitioner Alonte filed a
motion for reconsideration. Without waiting for its resolution, Alonte
filed the instant "Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam" for "Certiorari,
Prohibition, Habeas Corpus, Bail, Recusation of respondent Judge, and for
Disciplinary Action against an RTC Judge."Petitioner Concepcion later filed
his own petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court.
Alonte submits the following grounds in support of his petition
seeking to have the decision nullified and the case remanded for new trial;
thus:
The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he rendered a Decision in the
4
case a quo (Annex A) without affording the petitioner his Constitutional
right to due process of law (Article III, 1, Constitution).
The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he rendered a Decision in the
case a quo in violation of the mandatory provisions of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, specifically, in the conduct and order of trial (Rule
119) prior to the promulgation of a judgment (Rule 120; Annex A).
The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, in total disregard of the Revised
Rules on Evidence and existing doctrinal jurisprudence, he rendered a
Decision in the case a quo (Annex A) on the basis of two (2) affidavits
(Punongbayans and Balbins) which were neither marked nor offered into
evidence by the prosecution, nor without giving the petitioner
an opportunity to cross-examine the affiants thereof, again in violation
of petitioners right to due process (Article III, 1, Constitution).
The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he rendered a Decision in the
case a quo without conducting a trial on the facts which would establish
that complainant was raped by petitioner (Rule 119, Article III, 1,
Constitution), thereby setting a dangerous precedent where heinous
offenses can result in conviction without trial (then with more reason
that simpler offenses could end up with the same result).[8]
On the other hand, Concepcion relies on the following grounds in
support of his own petition; thus:
1. The decision of the respondent Judge rendered in the course of
resolving the prosecutions motion to dismiss the case is a patent nullity
for having been rendered without jurisdiction, without the benefit of a
trial and in total violation of the petitioners right to due process of law.
2. There had been no valid promulgation of judgment at least as far as
petitioner is concerned.
3. The decision had been rendered in gross violation of the right of the
accused to a fair trial by an impartial and neutral judge whose actuations
and outlook of the case had been motivated by a sinister desire to ride
on the crest of media hype that surrounded this case and use this case as
a tool for his ambition for promotion to a higher court.
4. The decision is patently contrary to law and the jurisprudence in so far
as it convicts the petitioner as a principal even though he has been
charged only as an accomplice in the information.[9]
The petitions deserve some merit; the Court will disregard, in view of
the case milieu, the prematurity of petitioners' invocation, i.e., even
before the trial court could resolve Alonte's motion for reconsideration.
The Court must admit that it is puzzled by the somewhat strange way
the case has proceeded below. Per Judge Savellano, after the waiver by
the parties of the pre-trial stage, the trial of the case did proceed on the
merits but that -
"The two (2) accused did not present any countervailing evidence during
the trial. They did not take the witness stand to refute or deny under
oath the truth of the contents of the private complainant's
aforementioned affidavit which she expressly affirmed and confirmed in
Court, but, instead, thru their respective lawyers, they rested and
submitted the case for decision merely on the basis of the private
complainant's so called 'desistance' which, to them, was sufficient
enough for their purposes. They left everything to the so-called
'desistance' of the private complainant."[10]
According to petitioners, however, there was no such trial for what
was conducted on 07 November 1997, aside from the arraignment of the
accused, was merely a proceeding in conformity with the resolution of this
Court in Administrative Case No. 97-1-12-RTC to determine the validity
and voluntariness of the affidavit of desistance executed by Punongbayan.
It does seem to the Court that there has been undue precipitancy in
the conduct of the proceedings.Perhaps the problem could have well been
avoided had not the basic procedures been, to the Court's perception,
5
taken lightly. And in this shortcoming, looking at the records of the case, "(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in
the trial court certainly is not alone to blame. the proper case, the civil liability.
Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the Constitution
"(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense, and
provides the fundamentals.
damages, if any, arising from the issuance of any provisional remedy in
the case.
"(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law.
"(c) The parties may then respectively present rebutting evidence only,
unless the court, in furtherance of justice, permits them to present
"(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
additional evidence bearing upon the main issue.
until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
"(d) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to
submitted for decision unless the court directs the parties to argue orally
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to
or to submit memoranda.
secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding
"(e) However, when the accused admits the act or omission charged in
the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and
the complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense, the order
his failure to appear is unjustifiable."
of trial may be modified accordingly."
Jurisprudence[11] acknowledges that due process in criminal
In Tabao vs. Espina,[14] the Court has underscored the need to adhere
proceedings, in particular, require (a) that the court or tribunal trying the
strictly to the above rules. It reminds that -
case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the
"x x x each step in the trial process serves a specific purpose. In the trial
person of the accused; (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be
of criminal cases, the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of
heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.[12]
an accused requires that an accused be given sufficient opportunity to
The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now present his defense. So, with the prosecution as to its evidence.
elementary and deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are
mandatory and indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance "Hence, any deviation from the regular course of trial should always take
and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural into consideration the rights of all the parties to the case, whether in the
due process cannot possibly be met without a "law which hears before it prosecution or defense. In the exercise of their discretion, judges are
condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after sworn not only to uphold the law but also to do what is fair and just. The
trial."[13] judicial gavel should not be wielded by one who has an unsound and
distorted sense of justice and fairness.[15]
The order of trial in criminal cases is clearly spelled out in Section 3,
Rule 119, of the Rules of Court; viz:
While Judge Savellano has claimed in his Comment that -
"Sec. 3. Order of trial. - The trial shall proceed in the following order:

6
"Petitioners-accused were each represented during the hearing on 07 Nevertheless, it is needful to stress a few observations on the
November 1997 with their respective counsel of choice. None of their affidavit of desistance executed by the complainant.
counsel interposed an intention to cross-examine rape victim Juvielyn
Firstly, the affidavit of desistance of Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan,
Punongbayan, even after she attested, in answer to respondent judge's
hereinbefore quoted, does not contain any statement that disavows the
clarificatory questions, the voluntariness and truth of her two affidavits -
veracity of her complaint against petitioners but merely seeks to "be
one detailing the rape and the other detailing the attempts to buy her
allowed to withdraw" her complaint and to discontinue with the case for
desistance; the opportunity was missed/not used, hence waived. The
varied other reasons. On this subject, the case of People vs.
rule of case law is that the right to confront and cross-examine a witness
Junio,[21] should be instructive. The Court has there explained:
'is a personal one and may be waived.'" (emphasis supplied) -
The appellants submission that the execution of an Affidavit of
it should be pointed out, however, that the existence of the waiver must
Desistance by complainant who was assisted by her mother supported
be positively demonstrated. The standard of waiver requires that it "not
the `inherent incredibility of prosecutions evidence is specious. We have
only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with
said in so many cases that retractions are generally unreliable and are
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts. The unreliable
consequences."[16] Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so
character of this document is shown by the fact that it is quite incredible
construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every
that after going through the process of having accused-appellant
reasonable presumption against waiver.[17] The Solicitor General has aptly
arrested by the police, positively identifying him as the person who
discerned a few of the deviations from what otherwise should have been
raped her, enduring the humiliation of a physical examination of her
the regular course of trial: (1) Petitioners have not been directed to
private parts, and then repeating her accusations in open court by
present evidence to prove their defenses nor have dates therefor been
recounting her anguish, Maryjane would suddenly turn around and
scheduled for the purpose;[18] (2) the parties have not been given the
declare that `[a]fter a careful deliberation over the case, (she) find(s)
opportunity to present rebutting evidence nor have dates been set by
that the same does not merit or warrant criminal prosecution.
respondent Judge for the purpose;[19] and (3) petitioners have not
admitted the act charged in the Information so as to justify any
Thus, we have declared that at most the retraction is an afterthought
modification in the order of trial.[20] There can be no short-cut to the legal
which should not be given probative value. It would be a dangerous rule
process, and there can be no excuse for not affording an accused his full
to reject the testimony taken before the court of justice simply because
day in court. Due process, rightly occupying the first and foremost place
the witness who has given it later on changed his mind for one reason or
of honor in our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable right that
another. Such a rule will make a solemn trial a mockery and place the
cannot be denied even to the most undeserving.
investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. Because affidavits
This case, in fine, must be remanded for further proceedings. And, of retraction can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses,
since the case would have to be sent back to the court a quo, usually for monetary consideration, the Court has invariably regarded
this ponencia has carefully avoided making any statement or reference such affidavits as exceedingly unreliable. [Flores vs. People, 211 SCRA
that might be misconstrued as prejudgment or as pre-empting the trial 622, citing De Guzman vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 184 SCRA 128;
court in the proper disposition of the case. The Court likewise deems it People vs. Galicia, 123 SCRA 550.][22]
appropriate that all related proceedings therein, including the petition for
bail, should be subject to the proper disposition of the trial court.

7
 The Junio rule is no different from ordinary criminal cases. For
instance, in People vs. Ballabare,[23] a murder case, the Court has ruled:
The contention has no merit. To begin with, the Affidavit executed by
eyewitness Tessie Asenita is not a recantation. To recant a prior
statement is to renounce and withdraw it formally and publicly. [36
WORDS AND PHRASES 683, citing Pradlik vs. State, 41-A 2nd, 906,
907.] In her affidavit, Tessie Asenita did not really recant what she had
said during the trial. She only said she wanted to withdraw her testimony
because her father, Leonardo Tacadao, Sr., was no longer interested in
prosecuting the case against accused-appellant.Thus, her affidavit
stated:
3. That inasmuch as my father, Leonardo Tacadao, Sr., the complainant
therein, was no longer interested to prosecute the case as manifested in
the Sworn Affidavit of Desistance before the Provincial Prosecutor, I do
hereby WITHDRAW and/or REVOKE my testimony of record to confirm
(sic) with my fathers desire;
It is absurd to disregard a testimony that has undergone trial and
scrutiny by the court and the parties simply because an affidavit
withdrawing the testimony is subsequently presented by the defense. In
the first place, any recantation must be tested in a public trial with
sufficient opportunity given to the party adversely affected by it to cross-
examine the recanting witness. In this case, Tessie Asenita was not
recalled to the witness stand to testify on her affidavit. Her affidavit is
thus hearsay. It was her husband, Roque Asenita, who was presented
and the matters he testified to did not even bear on the substance of
Tessies affidavit. He testified that accused-appellant was not involved in
the perpetration of the crime.
In the second place, to accept the new evidence uncritically would be to
make a solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation at the mercy
of unscrupulous witnesses. [De Guzman vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 184 SCRA 128, 134, citing People vs. Morales, 113 SCRA 683.] For
even assuming that Tessie Asenita had made a retraction, this
circumstance alone does not require the court to disregard her original
testimony. A retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier
declaration. [People vs. Davatos, 229 SCRA 647.] For this reason, courts
look with disfavor upon retractions because they can easily be obtained
from witnesses usually through intimidation or for monetary
considerations. [People vs. Clamor, 198 SCRA 642.] Hence, when
confronted with a situation where a witness recants his testimony,
courts must not automatically exclude the original testimony solely on
the basis of the recantation. They should determine which testimony
should be given credence through a comparison of the original testimony
and the new testimony, applying the general rules of evidence. [Reano
vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 525.] In this case we think the trial court
correctly ruled.[24]
It may not be amiss to state that courts have the inherent power to
compel the attendance of any person to testify in a case pending before
it, and a party is not precluded from invoking that authority.[25]
Secondly, an affidavit of desistance by itself, even when construed as
a pardon in the so-called "private crimes," is not a ground for the dismissal
of the criminal case once the action has been instituted. The affidavit,
nevertheless, may, as so earlier intimated, possibly constitute evidence
whose weight or probative value, like any other piece of evidence, would
be up to the court for proper evaluation. The decision in Junio went on to
hold -
While `[t]he offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of
lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by
the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor in any
case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above named
persons, as the case may be, [Third par. of Art. 344, The Revised Penal
Code.] the pardon to justify the dismissal of the complaint should have
been made prior to the institution of the criminal action. [People vs.
Entes, 103 SCRA 162, cited by People vs. Soliao, 194 SCRA 250, which in
turn is cited in People vs. Villorente, 210 SCRA 647.] Here, the motion to
dismiss to which the affidavit of desistance is attached was filed after the
institution of the criminal case. And, affiant did not appear to be serious
in `signifying (her) intention to refrain from testifying since she still
8
completed her testimony notwithstanding her earlier affidavit of
desistance. More, the affidavit is suspect considering that while it was
dated `April 1992, it was only submitted sometime in August 1992, four
(4) months after the Information was filed before the court a quo on 6
April 1992, perhaps dated as such to coincide with the actual filing of the
case.[26]
In People vs. Miranda,[27] applying the pertinent provisions of Article
344 of the Revised Penal Code which, in full, states -
"Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction,
abduction, rape, and acts of lasciviousness. The crimes of adultery and
concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by
the offended spouse.
"The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without
including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if
he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.
"The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness,
shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended
party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the
offender has been expressly pardoned by the above named persons, as
the case may be.
"In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the
marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the
criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. The
provisions of this paragraph shall also be applicable to the coprincipals,
accomplices and accessories after the fact of the above-mentioned
crimes." -
the Court said:
"Paragraph 3 of the legal provision above quoted prohibits a prosecution
for seduction, abduction, rape, or acts of lasciviousness, except upon a
complaint made by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or
guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned
by the above-named persons, as the case may be. It does not prohibit
the continuance of a prosecution if the offended party pardons the
offender after the cause has been instituted, nor does it order the
dismissal of said cause. The only act that according to article 344
extinguishes the penal action and the penalty that may have been
imposed is the marriage between the offended and the offended
party."[28]
In People vs. Infante,[29] decided just a little over a month
before Miranda, the Court similarly held:
"In this court, after the case had been submitted, a motion to dismiss
was filed on behalf of the appellant predicated on an affidavit executed
by Manuel Artigas, Jr., in which he pardoned his guilty spouse for her
infidelity. But this attempted pardon cannot prosper for two
reasons. The second paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code
which is in question reads: 'The offended party cannot institute criminal
prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both
alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the
offenders.' This provision means that the pardon afforded the offenders
must come before the institution of the criminal prosecution, and
means, further, that both the offenders must be pardoned by the
offended party. To elucidate further, article 435 of the old Penal Code
provided: 'The husband may at any time remit the penalty imposed upon
his wife. In such case the penalty imposed upon the wife's paramour
shall also be deemed to be remitted.' These provisions of the old Penal
Code became inoperative after the passage of Act No. 1773, section 2,
which had the effect of repealing the same. The Revised Penal Code
thereafter expressly repealed the old Penal Code, and in so doing did not
have the effect of reviving any of its provisions which were not in
force. But with the incorporation of the second paragraph of article 344,
the pardon given by the offended party again constitutes a bar to the
prosecution for adultery. Once more, however, it must be emphasized
that this pardon must come before the institution of the criminal
prosecution and must be for both offenders to be effective -
circumstances which do not concur in this case."[30]
9
 The decisions speak well for themselves, and the Court need not say (b) For FAILURE OF DUE PROCESS, the assailed judgment, dated 12
more than what it has heretofore already held. December 1997, convicting petitioners is declared NULL AND VOID and
thereby SET ASIDE; accordingly, the case is REMANDED to the trial court
Relative to the prayer for the disqualification of Judge Savellano from
for further proceedings; and
further hearing the case, the Court is convinced that Judge Savellano
should, given the circumstances, be best excused from the case. Possible
(c) Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., presiding Judge of Branch 53 of the
animosity between the personalities here involved may not all be that
Regional Trial Court of Manila, is ENJOINED from further hearing Criminal
unlikely. The pronouncement of this Court in the old case of Luque vs.
Case No. 97-159935; instead, the case shall immediately be scheduled
Kayanan[31] could again be said: All suitors are entitled to nothing short of
for raffle among the other branches of that court for proper disposition.
the cold neutrality of an independent, wholly-free, disinterested and
unbiased tribunal. Second only to the duty of rendering a just decision is
No special pronouncement on costs.
the duty of doing it in a manner that will not arouse any suspicion as to
the fairness and integrity of the Judge.[32] It is not enough that a court is SO ORDERED.
impartial, it must also be perceived as impartial.
The Court cannot end this ponencia without a simple reminder on the
use of proper language before the courts. While the lawyer in promoting
the cause of his client or defending his rights might do so with fervor,
simple courtesy demands that it be done within the bounds of propriety
and decency. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions
hardly can be justified nor can have a place in the dignity of judicial
forum.Civility among members of the legal profession is a treasured
tradition that must at no time be lost to it.
Finally, it may be opportune to say, once again, that prosecutors are
expected not merely to discharge their duties with the highest degree of
excellence, professionalism and skill but also to act each time with utmost
devotion and dedication to duty.[33] The Court is hopeful that the zeal
which has been exhibited many times in the past, although regrettably a
disappointment on few occasions, will not be wanting in the proceedings
yet to follow.
WHEREFORE, conformably with all the foregoing, the Court hereby
RULES that -

(a) The submission of the "Affidavit of Desistance," executed by Juvie-Lyn

Y. Punongbayan on 25 June 1997, having been filed AFTER the institution
of Criminal Case No. 97-159935, DOES NOT WARRANT THE DISMISSAL of
said criminal case;
10

[ G.R. No. 72670, September 12, 1986 ]
Galman v Sandiganbayan
228 Phil. 42
TEEHANKEE, C.J.
Last August 21st, our nation marked with solemnity and for the first time
in freedom the third anniversary of the treacherous assassination of
foremost opposition leader former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr.
imprisoned for almost eight years since the imposition of martial law in
September, 1972 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, he was
sentenced to death by firing squad by a military tribunal for common
offenses alleged to have been committed long before the declaration of
martial law and whose jurisdiction over him as a civilian entitled to trial
by judicial process by civil courts he repudiated. Ninoy pleaded in vain
that the military tribunals are admittedly not courts but mere
instruments and subject to the control of the President as created by
him under the General Orders issued by him as Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and that he had already been
publicly indicted and adjudged guilty by the President of the charges in a
nationwide press conference held on August 24, 1971 when he declared
the evidence against Ninoy "not only strong but overwhelming."[1] This
followed the Plaza Miranda bombing of August 21, 1971 of the
proclamation rally of the opposition Liberal Party candidates for the
November, 1971 elections (when eight persons were killed and
practically all of the opposition candidates headed by Senator Jovito
Salonga and many more were seriously injured), and the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Proclamation No. 889 on
August 23, 1971. The massacre was instantly attributed to the
communists but the truth has never been known. But the then President
never filed the said charges against Ninoy in the civil courts.
Ninoy Aquino was nevertheless thereafter allowed in May, 1980 to leave
the country to undergo successful heart surgery. After three years of
exile and despite the regime's refusal to give him a passport, he sought
to return home "to strive for a genuine national reconciliation founded
on justice." He was to be cold-bloodedly killed while under escort away
by soldiers from his plane that had just landed at the Manila
International Airport on that fateful day at past 1 p.m. His brain was
smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into the back of his head by a
murderous assassin, notwithstanding that the airport was ringed by
airtight security of close to 2,000 soldiers and "from a military viewpoint,
it (was) technically impossible to get inside (such) a cordon."[2] The
military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man
who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and
was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman, although he was the
personal friend of accused Col. Arturo Custodio who picked him up from
his house on August 17, 1983) was a communist-hired gunman, and that
the military escorts gunned him down in turn. The military later filmed a
re-enactment of the killing scripted according to this version and
continuously replayed it on all TV channels as if it were taken live on the
spot. The then President instantly accepted the military version and
repeated it in a nationally televised press conference that he gave late in
the evening of August 22, 1983, wherein he said, in order to induce
disbelief that the military had a hand in the killing, that "if the purpose
was to eliminate Aquino, this was not the way to do it."
The national tragedy shocked the conscience of the entire nation and
outraged the free world. The large masses of people who joined in the
ten-day period of national mourning and came out in millions in the
largest and most orderly public turnout for Ninoy's funeral reflected
their grief for his martyrdom and their yearning for the truth, justice and
freedom.
The then President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board[3] to
investigate "the treacherous and vicious assassination of former Senator
Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. on August 21, 1983 [which] has to all Filipinos
become a national tragedy and national shame specially because of the
early distortions and exaggerations in both foreign and local media[4] so
that all right thinking and honest men desire to ventilate the truth
through fare, independent and dispassionate investigation by prestigious
1
and free investigators." After two false starts,[5] he finally constituted the
Board[6] on October 22, 1983 which held 125 hearing days commencing
November 3, 1983 (including 3 hearings in Tokyo and 8 hearings in Los
Angeles, California) and heard the testimonies' of 194 witnesses
recorded in 20,377 pages of transcripts, until the submission of their
minority and majority reports to the President on October 23 and 24,
1984. This was to mark another first anywhere in the world wherein the
minority report was submitted one day ahead by the ponente thereof,
the chairman, who was received congenially and cordially by the then
President who treated the report as if it were the majority report instead
of a minority report of one and forthwith referred it to respondent
Tanodbayan "for final resolution through the legal system" and for trial
in the Sandiganbayan which was better known as a graft court; and the
majority report of the four other members was submitted on the
following day to the then President who coldly received them and could
scarcely conceal his instant rejection of their report with the grim
statement that "I hope you can live with your conscience with what you
have done."
The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting
the military version as propounded by the chief investigator, respondent
Gen. Olivas, that Rolando Galman was the NPA hired assassin, stating
that "the evidence shows [to the contrary] that Rolando Galman had no
subversive affiliations." They were in agreement that "only the soldiers
in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him;" that Galman, the
military's "fall guy" was "not the assassin of Sen. Aquino" and that "the
SWAT troopers who gunned down Galman and the soldiers who
escorted Sen. Aquino down the service stairs, deliberately and in
conspiracy with one another, gave a perjured story to us regarding the
alleged shooting by Galman of Sen. Aquino and the mowing down, in
turn, of Galman himself;" in short, that Ninoy's assassination was the
product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot. The only
difference between the two reports is that the majority report found all
the twenty-six private respondents abovenamed in the title of the case
headed by then AFP Chief General Fabian C. Ver involved in the military
conspiracy and therefore "indictable for the premeditated killing of
Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman at the MIA on August
21, 1983;" while the chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen
of them and limit as plotters "the six persons who were on the service
stairs while Senator Aquino was descending" and "General Luther
Custodio x x x because the criminal plot could not have been planned
and implemented without his intervention."
The chairman wrote in her minority report (somewhat prophetically)
that "The epilogue to our work lies in what will transpire in accordance
with the action that the Office of the President may thereafter direct to
be taken." The four-member majority report (also prophetically) wrote in
the epilogue (after warning the forces who adhere to an alien and
intolerable political ideology against unscrupulously using the report "to
discredit our traditionally revered institutions"), that "the tragedy
opened our eyes and for the first time confirmed our worst fears of what
unchecked evil would be capable of doing." They wrote:
"The task of the Board was clear and unequivocal. This task was not only
to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the death of the
late former Senator. Of greater significance is the awesome
responsibility of the Board to uphold righteousness over evil, justice over
injustice, rationality over irrationality, humaneness over inhumanity. The
task was indeed a painful test, the inevitable result of which will restore
our country's honored place among the sovereign nations of the free
world where peace, law and order, freedom, and justice are a way of life.
"More than any other event in contemporary Philippine history, the
killing of the late former Senator Aquino has brought into sharper focus,
the ills pervading Philippine society. It was the concretization of the
horror that has been haunting this country for decades, routinely
manifested by the breakdown of peace and order, economic instability,
subversion, graft and corruption, and an increasing number of abusive
elements in what are otherwise noble institutions in our country the
military and law enforcement agencies. We are, however, convinced
that, by and large, the great majority of the officers and men of these
institutions have remained decent and honorable, dedicated to their
noble mission in the service of our country and people.
2
"The tragedy opened our eyes and for the first time confirmed our worst
fears of what unchecked evil would be capable of doing. As former Israeli
Foreign Minister Abba Eban observes. 'Nobody who has great authority
can be trusted not to go beyond its proper limits.' Social apathy, passivity
and indifference and neglect have spawned in secret a dark force that is
bent on destroying the values held sacred by freedom-loving people.
"To assert our proper place in the civilized world, it is imperative that
public officials should regard public service as a reflection of human
ideals in which the highest sense of moral values and integrity are strictly
required.
"A tragedy like that which happened on August 21, 1983, and the crisis
that followed, would have normally caused the resignation of the Chief
of the Armed Forces in a country where public office is viewed with
highest esteem and respect and where the moral responsibilities of
public officials transcend all other considerations."
It is equally the fact that the then President through all his recorded
public acts and statements from the beginning disdained and rejected
his own Board's above findings and insisted on the military version of
Galman being Ninoy's assassin. In upholding this view that "there is no
involvement of anyone in his government in the assassination," he told
David Briscoe (then AP Manila Bureau Chief) in a Radio-TV interview on
September 9, 1983 that "I am convinced that if any member of my
government were involved, I would have known somehow xxx Even at a
fairly low level, I would have known. I know how they think. I know what
they are thinking of."[7] He told CBS in another interview in May, 1984 (as
his Fact Finding Board was holding its hearings) the following:
"CBS: 'But indeed there has been recent evidence that seems to
contradict earlier reports, namely, the recent evidence seems to indicate
that some of the guards may have been responsible (for shooting
Ninoy).' "
"MARCOS: 'Well, you are of course wrong. What you have been reading
are the newspapers and the newspaper reports have been biased. The
evidence still proves that Galman was the killer. The evidence also shows
that there were intelligence reports connecting the communist party to
the killing.' "[8] In his reply of October 25, 1984 to General Ver's letter of
the same date going on leave of absence upon release of the Board's
majority report implicating him, he wrote that "(W)e are even more
aware, general, that the circumstances under which the board has
chosen to implicate you in its findings are fraught with doubt and great
contradictions of opinion and testimony. And we are deeply disturbed
that on the basis of so-called evidence, you have been so accused by
some members of the Board," and extended "My very best wishes to you
and your family for a speedy resolution of your case,"[9] even as he
announced that he would return the general to his position as AFP Chief
"if he is acquitted by the Sandiganbayan." In an interview on June 4,
1985 with the Gamma Photo Agency, as respondent court was hearing
the cases, he was quoted as saying that "as will probably be shown,
those witnesses (against the accused) are perjured witnesses."[10]
It was against this setting that on November 11, 1985 petitioners
Saturnina Galman and Reynaldo Galman, mother and son, respectively,
of the late Rolando Galman, and twenty-nine (29) other petitioners,
composed of three former Justices of this Court, five incumbent and
former university presidents, a former AFP Chief of Staff, outstanding
members of the Philippine Bar and solid citizens of the community, filed
the present action alleging that respondents Tanodbayan and
Sandiganbayan committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and
resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional
rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to
due process of law. They asserted that the Tanodbayan did not represent
the interest of the people when he failed to exert genuine and earnest
efforts to present vital and important testimonial and documentary
evidence for the prosecution and that the Sandiganbayan Justices were
biased, prejudiced and partial in favor of the accused, and that their acts
"clouded with the gravest doubts the sincerity of government to find out
the truth about the Aquino assassination." Petitioners prayed for the
immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order restraining the
respondent Sandiganbayan from rendering a decision on the merits in
the pending criminal cases which it had scheduled on November 20,
1985 and that judgment be rendered declaring a mistrial and nullifying
the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before
3
an impartial tribunal by an unbiased prosecutor.[10-a]
At the hearing on November 18, 1985 of petitioners' prayer for issuance
of a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent court from
rendering a decision in the two criminal cases before it, the Court
resolved by nine-to-two votes[11] to issue the restraining order prayed
for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to
respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-
day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the
prosecution as filed in the Sandiganbayan, the signature page of which
alone had been submitted to the Court as Annex 5 of his comment.
But ten days later on November 28, 1985, the Court by the same nine-to-
two-vote ratio in reverse,[12] resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift
the temporary restraining order issued ten days earlier enjoining the
Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision.[13] The same Court majority
denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt
of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which
apparently was not served on them and which they alleged was "very
material to the question of his partiality, bias and prejudice" within
which to file a consolidated reply thereto and to respondents' separate
comments, by an eight-to three vote, with Justice Gutierrez joining the
dissenters.[14]
On November 29, 1985, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,
alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such
action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits
because if the charge of partiality and bias against the respondents and
suppression of vital evidence by the prosecution are proven, the
petitioners would be entitled to the reliefs demanded: The People are
entitled to due process which requires an impartial tribunal and an
unbiased prosecutor. If the State is deprived of a fair opportunity to
prosecute and convict because certain material evidence is suppressed
by the prosecution and the tribunal is not impartial, then the entire
proceedings would be null and void. Petitioners prayed that the
Sandiganbayan be restrained from promulgating their decision as
scheduled anew on December 2, 1985.
On December 5, 1985, the Court required the respondents to comment
on the motion for reconsideration but issued no restraining order. Thus,
on December 2, 1985, as scheduled, respondent Sandiganbayan issued
its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged, declaring
them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. This
marked another unusual first in that respondent Sandiganbayan in effect
convicted the very victim Rolando Galman (who was not on trial) as the
assassin of Ninoy contrary to the very information and evidence
submitted by the prosecution. In opposition, respondents submitted that
with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had
become moot and academic.
On February 4, 1986, the same Court majority denied petitioners' motion
for reconsideration for lack of merit, with the writer and Justice Abad
Santos maintaining our dissent.
On March 20, 1986, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second
motion for reconsideration attached therewith. The thrust of the second
motion for reconsideration was the startling and therefore unknown
revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera as reported in the
March 6, 1986 issue of the Manila Times entitled "Aquino Trial a Sham,"
that the then President had ordered the respondents Sandiganbayan and
Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez and the prosecution panel headed by
Herrera to whitewash the criminal cases against the 26 respondents
accused and produce a verdict of acquittal.
On April 3, 1986, the Court granted the motion to admit the second
motion for reconsideration and ordered the respondents to comment
thereon.[15]
Respondent Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez stated in his Manifestation
filed on April 11, 1986 that he had ceased to hold office as Tanodbayan
as of April 8, 1986 when he was replaced by the new Tanodbayan, Raul
M. Gonzales, but reiterating his position in his comment on the petition,
he added "relative to the reported alleged revelations of Deputy
Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera, herein respondent never succumbed to any
4
alleged attempts to influence his actuations in the premises, having
instead successfully resisted perceived attempts to exert pressure to drop
the case after preliminary investigation and actually ordered the filing
and prosecution of the two (2) murder cases below against herein
private-party respondents." He candidly admitted also in his
memorandum: "There is not much that need be said about the existence
of pressure. That there were pressures can hardly be denied; in fact, it
has never been denied."[15-a] He submitted that "even as he vehemently
denies insinuations of any direct or indirect complicity or participation in
any alleged attempt to supposedly whitewash the cases below, x x x
should this Honorable Court find sufficient cause to justify the reopening
and retrial of the cases below, he would welcome such development so
that any wrong that had been caused may be righted and so that, at the
very least the actuations of herein respondent in the premises may be
reviewed and reexamined, confident as he is that the end will show that
he had done nothing in the premises that violated his trust as
Tanodbayan (Ombudsman)." New Tanodbayan Raul M. Gonzales in his
comment of April 14, 1986 "interposed no objection to the reopening of
the trial of the cases x x x as, in fact, he urged that the said cases be
reopened in order that justice could take its course."
Respondents Justices of the Sandiganbayan First Division in their
collective comment of April 9, 1986 stated that the trial of the criminal
cases by them was valid and regular and decided on the basis of
evidence presented and the law applicable, but manifested that "if it is
true that the former Tanodbayan and the Deputy Tanodbayan, Chief of
the Prosecution Panel, were pressured into suppressing vital evidence
which would probably alter the result of the trial, Answering
Respondents would not interpose any objection to the reopening of
those cases, if only to allow justice to take its course." Respondent
Sandiganbayan Justice Bienvenido C. Vera Cruz, in a separate comment,
asserted that he passed no note to anyone; the note being bandied
about is not in his handwriting; he had nothing to do with the writing of
the note or of any note of any kind intended for any lawyer of the
defense or even of the prosecution; and requested for an investigation
by this Court to settle the note-passing issue once and for all.
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera, in his comment of April 14, 1986
affirmed the allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he
revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors
were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case.
He amplified his revelations, as follows:
"1. AB INITIO, A VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL!
Incidents during the preliminary investigation showed ominous signs
that the fate of the criminal case on the death of Ex-Senator Benigno
Aquino and Rolando Galman on August 21, 1983 wasdooned to an
ignominous end. Malacañang wanted dismissal to the extent that a
prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel (composed of
the undersigned, Fiscals Ernesto Bernabe and Leonardo Tamayo) for
signature. This, of course, was resisted by the panel, and a resolution
charging all the respondents as principals was forwarded to the
Tanodbayan on January 10, 1985.
2. MALACAÑANG CONFERENCE PLANNED SCENARIO OF TRIAL.
At 6:00 p.m. of said date (January 10) Mr. Ferdinand E. Marcos (the
former President) summoned to Malacañang Justice Bernardo Fernandez
(the Tanodbayan), Sandiganbayan Justice Manuel Pamaran (the
Presiding Justice) and all the members of the Panel.
Also present at the meeting were Justice Manuel Lazaro (the
Coordinator) and Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, who left earlier, came back and
left again. The former President had a copy of the panel's signed
resolution (charging all accused as principals), evidently furnished him in
advance, and with prepared notes on the contents thereof.
The former President started by vehemently maintaining that Galman
shot Aquino at the tarmac. Albeit initially the undersigned argued against
the theory, to remain silent was the more discreet posture when the
former President became emotional (he was quite sick then).
During a good part of the conference, the former President talked about
5
Aquino and the communists, lambasting the Agrava Board, specially the
Legal Panel. Shifting to the military he rumbled on such statements as: 'It
will be bloody x x x Gen. Ramos, though close to me, is getting ambitious
and poor Johnny does not know what to do' xxx 'our understanding with
Gen. Ramos is that his stint is only temporary, but he is becoming
ambitious;' x x x 'the boys were frantic when they heard that they will be
charged in court, and will be detained at city jail.'
From outright dismissal, the sentiment veered towards a more pragmatic
approach. The former President more or less conceded that for political
and legal reasons all the respondents should be charged in court.
Politically, as it will become evident that the government was serious in
pursuing the case towards its logical conclusion, and thereby ease public
demonstrations; on the other hand, legally, it was perceived that after
(not IF) they are acquitted, double jeopardy would inure. The former
President ordered then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the
participation of each respondent.
In the matter of custody of the accused pendente lite the Coordinator
was ordered to get in touch with Gen. Narciso Cabrera, Gen. Vicente
Eduardo and Director Jolly Bugarin to put on record that they had no
place in their respective institutions. The existence of PD No. 1950
(giving custody to commanding officers of members of AFP charged in
court) was never mentioned.
It was decided that the presiding justice (First Division) would personally
handle the trial, and assurance was made by him that it would be
finished in four to six months, pointing out that, with the recent
effectivity of the New Rules on Criminal Procedure, the trial could be
expedited.
Towards the end of the two hour meeting and after the script had been
tacitly mapped out, the former President uttered: 'Magmoro-moro na
lang kayo.'
The parting words of the former President were: 'Thank you for your
cooperation. I know how to reciprocate.'
While still in the palace grounds on the way out, the undersigned
manifested his desire to the Tanodbayan to resign from the panel, or
even the office. This, as well as other moves to this effect, had always
been refused. Hoping that with sufficient evidence sincerely and
efficiently presented by the prosecution, all involves in the trial would be
conscience-pricked and realize the futility and injustice of proceeding in
accordance with the script, the undersigned opted to say on."
Herrera further added details on the "implementation of the script,"
such as the holding of a "make-believe raffle" within 18 minutes of the
filing of the Informations with the Sandiganbayan at noon of January 23,
1985, while there were no members of the media; the installation of TV
monitors directly beamed to Malacañang; the installation of a "war
room" occupied by the military; attempts to direct and stifle witnesses
for the prosecution; the suppression of the evidence that could be given
by U.S. Airforce men about the "scrambling" of Ninoy's plane; the
suppression of rebuttal witnesses and the bias and partiality of the
Sandiganbayan; its cavalier disregard of his plea that it "should not
decide these cases on the merits without first making a final ruling on
the Motion for Inhibition;" and the Presiding Justice's over-kill with the
declaration that "the Court finds all accused innocent of the crimes
charged in the two informations, and accordingly, they incur neither
criminal nor civil liability," adding that "in the almost twenty years that
the undersigned has been the prosecutor in the sala of the Presiding
Justice this is the only occasion where civil liability is pronounced in a
decision of acquittal." He "associated himself with the motion for
reconsideration and likewise prayed that the proceedings in the
Sandiganbayan and its decision be declared null and void."
New Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordonez' comment of April 25, 1986
submitted that a declaration of mistrial will depend on the veracity of
the evidence supportive of petitioners' claim of suppression of evidence
and collusion. He submitted that this would require reception of
evidence by a Court appointed or designated commissioner or body of
commissioners (as was done in G.R. No. 71316, Fr. Romano case; and
G.R. No. 61016, Morales case; and G.R. No. 70054, Banco Filipino case);
and that if petitioners' claim were substantiated, a reopening of the
6
double murder case is proper to avoid a miscarriage of justice since the
verdict of acquittal would no longer be a valid basis for a double
jeopardy claim.
Respondents-accused opposed the second motion for reconsideration
and prayed for its denial. Respondent Olivas contended that the proper
step for the government was to file a direct action to annul the judgment
of acquittal and at a regular trial present its evidence of collusion and
pressures.
As a whole, all the other respondents raised the issue of double
jeopardy, and invoked that the issues had become moot and academic
because of the rendition of the Sandiganbayan's judgment of acquittal of
all respondents-accused on December 2, 1985, with counsels for
respondents Ver and Tigas, as well as Olivas, further arguing that
assuming that the judgment of acquittal is void for any reason, the
remedy is a direct action to annul the judgment where the burden of
proof falls upon the plaintiff to establish by clear, competent and
convincing evidence the cause of the nullity.
After petitioners had filed their consolidated reply, the Court resolved
per its resolution of June 5, 1986 to appoint a three-member commission
composed of retired Supreme Court Justice Conrado Vasquez, chairman,
and retired Intermediate Appellate Court Justices Milagros German and
Eduardo Caguioa as members, to hear and receive evidence, testimonial
and documentary, of the charges of collusion and pressures and relevant
matters, upon prior notice to all parties, and to submit their findings to
this Court for proper disposition. The Commission conducted hearings on
19 days, starting on June 16, 1986 and ending on July 16, 1986. On the
said last day, respondents announced in open hearing that they decided
to forego the taking of the projected deposition of former President
Marcos, as his testimony would be merely corroborative of the
testimonies of respondents Justice Pamaran and Tanodbayan Fernandez.
On July 31, 1986, it submitted its extensive 64-page Report[16] wherein it
discussed fully the evidence received by it and made a recapitulation of
its findings in capsulized form, as follows:
"1. The Office of the Tanodbayan. particularly Justice Fernandez and the
Special Investigating Panel composed of Justice Herrera, Fiscal Bernabe
and Special Prosecutor Tamayo, was originally of the view that all of the
twenty-six (26) respondents named in the Agrava Board majority report
should all be charged as principals of the crime of double murder for the
death of Senator Benigno Aquino and Rolando Galman.
2. When Malacañang learned of the impending filing of the said charge
before the Sandiganbayan. the Special Investigating Panel having already
prepared a draft Resolution recommending such course of action,
President Marcos summoned Justice Fernandez, the three members of
the Special Investigating Panel, and Justice Pamaran to a conference in
Malacañang in the early evening of January 10, 1985.
3. In said conference. President Marcos initially expressed his
disagreement with the recommendation of the Special Investigating
Panel and disputed the findings of the Agrava Board that it was not
Galman who shot Benigno Aquino.
4. Later in the conference, however, President Marcos was convinced of
the advisability of filing the murder charge in court so that, after being
acquitted as planned, the accused may no longer be prosecuted in view
of the doctrine of double jeopardy.
5. Presumably in order to be assured that not all of the accused would be
denied bail during the trial, considering that they would be charged with
capital offenses. President Marcos directed that the several accused be
'categorized' so that some of them would merely be charged as
accomplices and accessories.
6. In addition to said directive. President Marcos ordered that the case
be handled personally by Justice Pamaran who should dispose of it in the
earliest possible time.
7. The instructions given in the Malacañang conference were followed to
the letter and compliance therewith manifested itself in several specific
instances in the course of the proceedings, such as the changing of the
7
resolution of the special investigating panel, the filing of the case with
the Sandiganbayan and its assignment to Justice Pamaran, suppression
of some vital evidence, harassment of witnesses, recantation of
witnesses who gave adverse testimony before the Agrava Board,
coaching of defense counsels, the hasty trial, monitoring of proceedings,
and even in the very decision rendered in the case.
8. That expression of President Marcos' desire as to how he wanted the
Aquino-Galman case to be handled and disposed of constituted
sufficient pressure on those involved in said task to comply with the
same in the subsequent course of the proceedings.
9. That while Justice Pamaran and Justice Fernandez manifested no
revulsion against complying with the Malacañang directive. Justice
Herrera played his role with manifestly ambivalent feelings.
10. Sufficient evidence has been ventilated to show a scripted and
predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman
murder case, as stage-managed from Malacañang and performed by
willing dramatis personnae as well as by recalcitrant ones whipped into
line by the omni present influence of an authoritarian ruler."
The Commission submitted the following recommendation.
"Considering the existence of adequate credible evidence showing that
the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried
and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure
which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist, and which not only
prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to offer all
the evidences which it could have otherwise presented, but also
predetermined the final outcome of the case, the Commission is of the
considered thinking and belief, subject to the better opinion and
judgment of this Honorable Court, that the proceedings in the said case
have been vitiated by lack of due process, and hereby respectfully
recommends that the prayer in the petition for a declaration of a mistrial
in Sandiganbayan Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled 'People vs. Luther
Custodio, et al.,' be granted."
The Court per its Resolution of July 31, 1986 furnished all the parties
with copies of the Report and required them to submit their objections
thereto. It thereafter heard the parties and their objections at the
hearing of August 26, 1986 and the matter was submitted for the Court's
resolution.
The Court adopts and approves the Report and its findings and holds on
the basis thereof and of the evidence received and appreciated by the
Commission and duly supported by the facts of public record and
knowledge set forth above and hereinafter, that the then President
(code-named Olympus) had stage-managed in and from Malacañang
Palace "a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing
of the Aquino-Galman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the
Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same
acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be
beyond their capacity to resist, and which not only prevented the
prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to offer all the evidences
which it could have otherwise presented, but also predetermined the
final outcome of the case" of total absolution of the twenty-six
respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability.
The Court finds that the Commission's Report (incorporated herein by
reference) and findings and conclusions are duly substantiated by the
evidence and facts of public record. Composed of distinguished
members of proven integrity with a combined total of 141 years of
experience in the practice of law (55 years) and in the prosecutoral and
judicial services (86 years in the trial and appellate courts), experts at
sifting the chaff from the grain,[17] the Commission properly appraised
the evidences presented and denials made by public respondents, thus:
"The desire of President Marcos to have the Aquino-Galman case
disposed of in a manner suitable to his purposes was quite
understandable and was but to be expected. The case had stirred
unprecedented public outcry and wide international attention. Not
invariably, the finger of suspicion pointed to those then in power who
supposedly had the means and the most compelling motive to eliminate
Senator Aquino. Aday or so after the assassination, President Marcos
8
came up with a public statement aired over television that Senator
Aquino was killed not by his military escorts, but by a communist hired
gun. It was, therefore, not a source of wonder that President Marcos
would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent with his
announced theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his
name and his administration of any suspected guilty participation in the
assassination.
"The calling of the conference was undoubtedly to accomplish thus
purpose x x x.
"President Marcos made no bones to conceal his purpose for calling
them. From the start, he expressed irritation and displeasure at the
recommendation of the investigating panel to charge all of the twenty-
six (26) respondents as principals of the crime of double murder. He
insisted that it was Galman who shot Senator Aquino, and that the
findings of the Agrava Board were not supported by evidence that could
stand in court. He discussed and argued with Justice Herrera on this
point. Midway in the course of the discussion, mention was made that
the filing of the charge in court would at least mollify public demands
and possibly prevent further street demonstrations. It was further
pointed out that such a procedure would be a better arrangement
because, if the accused are charged in court and subsequently acquitted,
they may claim the benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and
thereby avoid another prosecution if some other witnesses shall appear
when President Marcos is no longer in office.
xxx xxx xxx
"After an agreement was reached as to filing the case, instead of
dismissing it, but with some of the accused to be charged merely as
accomplices or accessories, and the question of preventive custody of
the accused having thereby received satisfactory solution, President
Marcos took up the matter of who would try the case and how long it
would take to be finished.
"According to Justice Herrera, President Marcos told Justice Pamaran
'point blank' to personally handle the case. This was denied by Justice
Pamaran. No similar denial was voiced by Justice Fernandez in the entire
course of his two-day testimony. Justice Pamaran explained that such
order could not have been given inasmuch as it was not yet certain then
that the Sandiganbayan would try the case and, besides, cases therein
are assigned by raffle to a division and not to a particular Justice thereof.
"It was preposterous to expect Justice Pamaran to admit having received
such presidential directive. His denial, however, falls to pieces in the light
of the fact that the case was indeed handled by him after being assigned
to the division headed by him. A supposition of mere coincidence is at
once dispelled by the circumstance that he was the only one from the
Sandiganbayan called to the Malacañang conference wherein the said
directive was given x x x.
"The giving of such directive to Justice Pamaran may also be inferred
from his admission that he gave President Marcos the possible time
frame when asked as to how long it would take him to finish the case.
"The testimony of Justice Herrera that, during the conference, and after
an agreement was reached on filing the case and subsequently
acquitting the accused, President Marcos told them 'Okay, mag moro-
moro na lamang kayo;' and that on their way out of the room President
Marcos expressed his thanks to the group and uttered 'I know how to
reciprocate,' did not receive any denial or contradiction either on the part
of Justice Fernandez or Justice Pamaran. (No other person present in the
conference was presented by the respondents. Despite an earlier
manifestation by the respondents of their intention to present Fiscal
Bernabe and Prosecutor Tamayo, such move was abandoned without any
reason having been given therefor).
"The facts set forth above are all supported by the evidence on record. In
the mind of the Commission, the only conclusion that may be drawn
therefrom is that pressure from Malacañang had indeed been made to
bear on both the court and the prosecution in the handling and
disposition of the Aquino-Galman case. The intensity of this pressure is
readily deductible from the personality of the one who exerted it, his
9
moral and official ascendancy over those to whom his instructions were
directed, the motivation behind such instructions, and the nature of the
government prevailing at that time which enabled the then head of state
to exercise authoritarian powers. That the conference called to script or
stage-manage the prosecution and trial of the Aquino-Galman case was
considered as something anomalous that should be kept away from the
public eye is shown by the effort to assure its secrecy. None but those
directly involved were called to attend. The meeting was held in an inner
room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant
Justice Lazaro were with the President. The conferees were told to take
the back door in going to the room where the meeting was held,
presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the reception hall waiting
to see the President. Actually, no public mention was ever made of this
conference until Justice Herrera made his expose some fifteen (15)
months later when the former President was no longer around.
"President Marcos undoubtedly realized the importance of the matter
he wanted to take up with the officials he asked to be summoned. He
had to do it personally, and not merely through trusted assistants. The
lack of will or determination on the part of Justice Fernandez and Justice
Pamaran to resist the presidential summons despite their realization of
its unwholesome implications on their handling of the celebrated
murder case may be easily inferred from their unquestioned obedience
thereto. No effort to resist was made, despite the existence of a most
valid reason to beg off, on the lame excuses that they went there out of
'curiosity,' or 'out of respect to the Office of the President,' or that it
would be 'unbecoming to refuse a summons from the President.' Such
frame of mind only reveals their susceptibility to presidential pressure
and lack of capacity to resist the same. The very acts of being summoned
to Malacañang and their ready acquiescence thereto under the
circumstances then obtaining, are in themselves pressure dramatized and
exemplified. Their abject deference to President Marcos may likewise be
inferred from the admitted fact that, not having been given seats during
the two-hour conference (Justice Fernandez said it was not that long, but
did not say how long) in which President Marcos did the talking most of
the time, they listened to him on their feet. Verily, it can be said that any
avowal of independent action or resistance to presidential pressure
became illusory from the very moment they stepped inside Malacañang
Palace on January 10, 1985."[18]
The Commission pinpointed the crucial factual issue thus: "the more
significant inquiry is on whether the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the
Tanodbayan actually succumbed to such pressure, as may be gauged by
their subsequent actuations in their respective handling of the case." It
duly concluded that "the pressure exerted by President Marcos in the
conference held on January 10, 1985 pervaded the entire proceedings of
the Aquino-Galman [murder] cases" as manifested in several specific
incidents and instances it enumerated in the Report under the heading
of "Manifestations of Pressure and Manipulation."
Suffice it to give hereinbelow brief excerpts:
1. The changing of the original Herrera panel draft Resolution charging
all the twenty-six accused as principals by conspiracy by categorizing and
charging 17 as principals, Generals Ver and Olivas and 6 others as
accessories and the civilian as accomplice, and recommending bail for
the latter two categories: "The categorization may not be completely
justified by saying that, in the mind of Justice Fernandez, there was no
sufficient evidence to justify that all of the accused be charged as
principals. The majority of the Agrava Board found the existence of
conspiracy and recommended that all of the accused be charged
accordingly. Without going into the merit of such finding, it may hardly
be disputed that, in case of doubt, and in accordance with the standard
practice of the prosecution to charge accused with the most serious
possible offense or in the highest category so as to prevent an incurable
injustice in the event that the evidence presented in the trial will show
his guilt of the graver charge, the most logical and practical course of
action should have been, as originally recommended by the Herrera
panel, to charge all the accused as principals. As it turned out, Justice
Fernandez readily opted for categorization which, not surprisingly, was in
consonance with the Malacañang instruction." It is too much to attribute
to coincidence that such unusual categorization came only after the then
President's instruction at Malacañang when Gen. Ver's counsel Atty.
Coronel, had been asking the same of Tanodbayan Fernandez since
November, 1984; and "Justice Fernandez himself, admit(ted) that, as of
10
that time, [the Malacañang conference on January 10, 1985], his own
view was in conformity with that of the Special Investigating Panel to
charge all of the twenty-six (26) respondents as principals of the crime of
double murder.[19] As the Commission further noted, "Justice Fernandez
never denied the claim of Justice Herrera that the draft resolution of
January 10, 1985 (Exhibit 'B-l') [charging all 26 accused as principals] was
to have been the subject of a press conference on the afternoon of said
date which did not go through due to the summons for them to go to
Malacañang in the early evening of said date."[20]
2. Suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses: "Realizing,
no doubt, that a party's case is as strong as the evidence it can present,
unmistakable and persistent efforts were exerted in behalf of the
accused to weaken the case of the prosecution and thereby assure and
justify [the accused's] eventual scripted acquittal. Unfavorable evidences
were sought to be suppressed, and some were indeed prevented from
being ventilated. Adverse witnesses were harassed, cajoled, perjured or
threatened either to refrain from testifying or to testify in a manner
favorable to the defense."
The Report specified the ordeals of the prosecution witnesses:[21] Cesar
Loterina, PAL employee, Roberta Masibay, Galman's step-daughter who
recanted their testimonies before the Fact Finding Board and had to be
discarded as prosecution witnesses before at the trial.
Witnesses Viesca and Rañas who also testified before the Board
disappeared all of a sudden and could not be located by the police. The
Commission narrated the efforts to stifle Kiyoshi Wakamiya, eyewitness
who accompanied Ninoy on his fateful flight on August 21, 1983 and
described them as "palpable, if crude and display(ing) sheer abuse of
power." Wakamiya was not even allowed to return to Manila on August
20, 1984 to participate in the first death anniversary of Ninoy but was
deported as an undesirable alien and had to leave on the next plane for
Tokyo. The Board had to go to Tokyo to hear Wakamiya give his
testimony before the Japanese police in accordance with their law and
Wakamiya claimed before the Commission that the English transcription
of his testimony, as prepared by an official of the Philippine Embassy in
Tokyo, was inaccurate and did not correctly reflect the testimony he
gave "although there was no clear showing of the discrepancy from the
original transcription which was in Nippongo. Upon his arrival at the MIA
on August 21, 1985 on invitation of Justice Herrera to testify at the
ongoing trial, "a shot was fired and a soldier was seen running away by
media men who sought to protect Wakamiya from harm by surrounding
him." Wakamiya was forced by immigration officials to leave the country
by Saturday (August 24th) notwithstanding Herrera's request to let him
stay until he could testify the following Monday (August 26th). In the
case of principal eyewitness Rebecca Quijano, the Commission reported
that
"x x x Undoubtedly in view of the considerable significance of her
proposed testimony and its unfavorable effect on the cause of the
defense, the efforts exerted to suppress the same was as much as, if not
more than those in the case of Wakamiya x x x She recounted that she
was in constant fear of her life, having been hunted by armed men; that
their house in Tabaco, Albay was ransacked, her family harassed by the
foreclosure of the mortgage on their house by the local Rural Bank, and
ejected therefrom when she ignored the request of its manager to talk
with her about her proposed testimony; that a certain William Farinas
offered her plane tickets for a trip abroad; that Mayor Rudy Farinas of
Laoag City kept on calling her sister in the United States to warn her not
to testify; that, later, Rudy and William Farinas offered her two million
pesos supposedly coming from Bongbong Marcos, a house and lot in
Baguio, the dropping of her estafa case in Hongkong, and the
punishment of the persons responsible for the death of her father, if she
would refrain from testifying.
"It is a matter of record, however, that despite such cajolery and
harassments, or perhaps because of them, Ms. Quijano eventually
testified before the Sandiganbayan. Justice Herrera was told by Justice
Fernandez of the displeasure expressed by Olympus at Justice Herrera's
going out of his way to make Ms. Quijano to testify, and for his refusal to
honor the invitation to attend the birthday party of the First Lady on
May 1, 1985, as on the eve of Ms. Quijano's testimony on May 2, 1985.
The insiduous attempts to tamper with her testimony, however, did not
end with her taking the witness stand. In the course of her testimony
11
several notes were passed to Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez, the defense counsel
who cross-examined her, one of which suggested that she be asked
more questions about Dean Narvasa who was suspected of having
coached her as to what to declare (Exhibit 'D'); and on another occasion,
at a crucial point in her testimony, a power brownout occurred; which
lasted for about twenty minutes, throwing the courtroom into darkness,
and making most of those present to scamper for safety, and Ms.
Quijano to pass over the ratling of the rostrum so as to be able to leave
the courtroom. It was verified that the brownout was limited to the
building housing the Sandiganbayan, it not having affected the nearby
Manila City Hall and the Finance Building Justice Herrera declared that
the main switchboard of the Sandiganbayan electrical system was
located beside the room occupied by Malacañang people who were
keeping track of the proceedings."
Atty. Lupino Lazaro for petitioners further made of record at that August
26th hearing that the two Olivas sisters, Ana and Catherine (hospitality
girls) disappeared on September 4, 1984, two weeks after Ninoy's
assassination. And the informant, by the name of Evelyn (also a
hospitality girl) who jotted down the number of the car that took them
away, also disappeared. On January 29, 1984, during the proceedings of
the Board, Lina Galman, the common-law wife of Rolando Galman, was
kidnapped together with a neighbor named Rogelio Taruc. They have
been missing since then, despite his attempts to find any of them.
According to him, "nobody was looking for these five persons because
they said Marcos was in power [despite his appeal to the Minister of
National Defense to locate them]. Today, still no one is looking for these
people." And he appealed to the new leadership for its assistance in
learning their fate.
3. The discarding of the affidavits executed bv U.S. airmen: "While it is
true that the U.S. airmen's proposed testimonies would show an attempt
of the Philippine Air Force to divert the plane to Basa Airfield or some
other place, such showing would not necessarily contravene the theory
of the prosecution, nor the actual fact that Senator Aquino was killed at
the Manila International Airport. Justice Herrera had accurately pointed
out that such attempt of scrambling Aquino's plane merely showed a
'wider range of conspiracy,' it being possibly just one of two or three
other plans designed to accomplish the same purpose of liquidating
Senator Aquino. In any event, even assuming that the said piece of
evidence could go either way, it may not be successfully contended that
it was prudent or wise on the part of the prosecution to totally discard
the said piece of evidence. Despite minor inconsistencies contained
therein, its introduction could have helped the cause of the prosecution.
If it were not so, or that it would even favor the defense, as averred by
Justice Fernandez, the determined effort to suppress the same would
have been totally uncalled for.
"4. Nine proposed rebuttal witnesses not presented.
"5. The failure to exhaust available remedies against adverse
developments: "When the Supreme Court denied the petition of Justice
Fernandez [against the exclusion of the testimonies given by the military
respondents headed by Gen. Ver before the Fact Finding Board], the
latter almost immediately announced to media that he was not filing a
motion for the reconsideration of said denial, for the reason that it would
be futile to do so and foolhardy to expect a favorable action on the same
x x x His posture x x x is, in the least, indicative that he was living up to
the instruction of finishing the trial of the case as soon as possible, if not
of something else.
"6. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran: "Justice
Herrera testified that President Marcos ordered Justice Pamaran point-
blank to handle the case. The pro-forma denial by Justice Pamaran of
such instruction crumbles under the actuality of such directive having
been complied with to the letter x x x.
"Justice Pamaran sought to discredit the claim that he was ordered by
President Marcos to handle the case personally by explaining that cases
in the Sandiganbayan are assigned by raffle and not to a particular
Justice, but to a division thereof. The evidence before the Commission
on how the case happened to be assigned to Justice Pamaran evinces a
strong indication that such assignment was not done fairly or regularly.
"There was no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by virtue
12
of a regular raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice
Pamaran x x x Despite an announcement that Justice Escareal would be
presented by the respondents to testify on the contents of his aforesaid
Memorandum, such was not done. No reason was given why Justice
Escarel could not, or would not like to testify. Neither was anx one of the
officials or employees of the Sandiganbayan who, according to Justice
Pamaran, were present during the supposed raffle, presented to
corroborate the claim of Justice Pamaran as regards the said raffle.
xxx xxx xxx
"It is also an admitted fact that the two Informations in the double
murder case were filed by Justice Herrera on January 23, 1985, at 12:02
p.m., and the members of the Raffle Committee were summoned at
12:20 p.m. or only 18 minutes after the filing of the two Informations.
Such speed in the actual assignment of the case can truly be categorized
as unusual, if not extraordinary, considering that before a case filed may
be included in the raffle, there is need for a certain amount of paper
work to be undertaken. If such preliminary requirements were done in
this case within the limited time available therefor, the charge that the
raffle was rushed to avoid the presence of media people would ring with
truth.
"What is more intriguing is the fact that although a raffle might have
been actually conducted which resulted in the assignment of the case to
the First Division of the Sandiganbayan, the Commission did not receive
any evidence on how or why it was handled personally by Justice
Pamaran who wrote the decision thereof, and not by any one of the two
other members of his division x x x"
7. The custody of the accused; their confinement in a military camp,
instead of in a civilian jail: "When the question of custody came up after
the case was filed in the Sandiganbayan, the latter issued an order
directing the confinement of the accused in the City Jail of Manila. This
order was not carried out in view of the information given by the
Warden of the City Jail that there was no space for the twenty-six
accused in said jail. The same information was given when the custody
was proposed to be given to the National Penitentiary in Muntinglupa
and to the National Bureau of Investigation. At that point, the defense
came up with Presidential Decree No. 1950-A which authorizes the
custody of the accused military personnel with their respective
Commanding Officers. Justice Herrera claimed that the said Presidential
Decree was not known even to the Tanodbayan Justice Fernandez who
had to call up the then Minister of Justice Estelito Mendoza to request a
copy of the same, and was given such copy only after sometime x x x."
8. The monitoring of proceedings and developments from Malacañang
and by Malacañang personnel. "There is an uncontradicted evidence that
the progress of the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan as well as the
developments of the case outside the Court had been monitored by
Malacañang presumably for it to know what was happening and to take
remedial measures as may be necessary, Justice Pamaran had candidly
admitted that television cameras "boldly carrying the label of 'Office of
the President of the Philippines' " were installed in the courtroom for
that purpose. There was a room in the Sandiganbayan, mischievously
called 'war room', wherein military and Malacañang personnel stayed to
keep track of the proceedings." The close monitoring by Malacañang
showed its results oh several occasions specified in the
Report. Malacañang was immediately aware of the Japanese witness
Wakamiya 's presence in Justice Herrera's office on August 21, 1985 and
forestalled the giving of his testimony by having the Japanese Embassy
advise Wakamiya to leave the country at once. Likewise, Col. Balbino
Diego, Malacañang intelligence chief, suddenly appearedat the National
Bureau of Investigation office when the "crying lady" Rebecca
Quijanowas brought there by NBI agents for interrogation and therein
sought to obtain custody of her. "It is likewise an undisputed fact," the
Commission noted "that several military personnel pretended to be
deputy sheriffs of the Sandiganbayan and attended the trials thereof in
the prescribed deputy sheriffs' uniforms." The Commission's inescapable
finding: It is abundantly clear that President Marcos did not only give
instructions as to how the case should be handled. He saw to it that he
would know if his instructions will be complied with.
9. Partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That President
13
Marcos had wanted ail of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not
be denied. The disposal of the case in said manner is an integral part of
the scenario which was cleverly designed to accomplish two principal
objectives, seemingly conflicting in themselves, but favorable both to
then administration and to the accused; to wit, [1] the satisfaction of the
public clamor for the suspected killers of Senator Aquino to be charged
in court, and [2] the foreclosure of any possibility that they may again be
prosecuted for the same offense in the event that President Marcos shall
no longer be in power.
"In rendering its decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring
the presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the accused
was glaringly obvious. The evidence presented by the prosecution was
totally ignored and disregarded. x x x It was deemed not sufficient to
simply acquit all of the twenty-six accused on the standard ground that
their guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, as was the
most logical and appropriate way of justifying the acquittal in the case,
there not being a total absence of evidence that could show guilt on the
part of the accused. The decision had to pronounce them innocent of the
crimecharged on the two intormations, and accordingly, they incur
neither criminal nor civil liability. It is a rare phenomenon to see a person
accused of a crime to be favored with such total absolution. x x x.
"Doubt on the soundness of the decision entertained by one of the two
justices who concurred with the majority decision penned by Justice
Pamaran was revealed by Justice Herrera who testified that in October,
1985, when the decision was being prepared, Justice Augusto Amores
told him that he was of the view that some of the accused should be
convicted, he having found difficulty in acquitting all of them;
however, he confided to Justice Herrera that Justice Pamaran made it
clear to him and Justice Vera Cruz that Malacañang had instructions to
acquit all of the twenty-six accused (TSN. July 17, 1986, p. 49). Justice
Amores also told Justice Herrera that he would confirm this
statement (which was mentioned in Justice Herrera's comment to the
Second Motion for Reconsideration) if asked about it (TSN, June 19,
1986, pp. 92-93). This testimony of Justice Herrera remained
unrebutted." (Italics supplied).
The record shows suffocatingly that from beginning to end, the then
President used, or more precisely, misused the overwhelming resources
of the government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a
mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. As
graphically depicted in the Report, supra, and borne out by the
happenings (res ipsa loquitura[22]), since the resolution prepared by his
"Coordinator," Manuel Lazaro, his Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs,
for the Tanodbayan's dismissal of the cases against all accused was
unpalatable (it would summon the demonstrators back to the streets[23])
and at any rate was not acceptable to the Herrera prosecution panel, the
unholy scenario for acquittal of all 26 accused after the rigged trial as
ordered at the Malacañang conference, would accomplish the two
principal objectives of satisfaction of the public clamor for the suspected
killers to be charged in court and of giving them through their acquittal
the legal shield of double jeopardy.[24]
Indeed, the secret Malacañang conference at which the authoritarian
President called together the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and
Tanodbayan Fernandez and the entire prosecution panel headed by
Deputy Tanodbayan Herrera and told them how to handle and rig (moro-
moro) the trial and the close monitoring of the entire proceedings to
assure the predetermined ignominious final outcome are without
parallel and precedent in our annals and jurisprudence. To borrow a
phrase from Ninoy's April 14, 1975 letter withdrawing his petition for
habeas corpus,[25] "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our
Penal Code penalizes "any executive officerwho shall address any order
or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or
business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of
justice."[26]His obsession for "the boys" acquittal led to several first which
would otherwise be inexplicable:
1. He turned his back on and repudiated the findings of the very Fact
Finding Board that he himself appointed to investigate the "national
tragedy and national shame" of the "treacherous and vicious
assassination of Ninoy Aquino" and to ventilate the truth through free,
independent and dispassionate investigation by prestigious and free
14
investigators.
2. He cordially received the chairman with her minority report one day
ahead of the four majority members and instantly referred it to
respondents "for final resolution through the legal system" as if it were
the majority and controlling report; and rebuked the four majority
members when they presented to him the next day their report calling
for the indictment of all 26 respondents headed by Gens. Ver and Olivas
(instead of the lesser seven under the chairman's minority report).
3. From the day after the Aquino assassination to the dictated verdict of
acquittal, he totally disregarded the Board's majority and minority
findings of fact and publicly insisted that the military's "fall guy" Rolando
Galman was the killer of Ninoy Aquino and sought futilely to justify the
soldiers' incompetence and gross negligence to provide any security for
Ninoy in contrast to their alacrity in gunning down the alleged assassin
Galman and sealing his lips.
4. The Sandiganbayan's decision (Pamaran, J. ponente) in effect
convicted Rolando Galman as Ninoy's assassin notwithstanding that he
was not on trial but the victim according to the very information filed,
and evidence to the contrary submitted, by the Herrera prosecution
panel; and
5. Justice Pamaran's ponencia (despite reservations expressed by Justice
Amores who wanted to convict some of the accused) granted all 26
accused total absolution and pronounced them "innocent of the crimes
charged in the two informations, and accordingly, they incur neither
criminal nor civil liability," notwithstanding the evidence on the basis of
which the Fact Finding Board had unanimously declared the soldiers'
version of Galman being Aquino's killer a "perjured story, given
deliberately and in conspiracy with one another."
The fact of the secret Malacañang conference of January 10, 1985 at
which the authoritarian President discussed with the Presiding Justice of
the Sandiganbayan and the entire prosecution panel the matter of the
imminent filing of the criminal charges against all the twenty-six accused
(as admitted by respondent Justice Fernandez to have been confirmed
by him to the then President's "Coordinator" Manuel Lazaro on the
preceding day) is not denied. It is without precedent. This was illegal
under our penal laws, supra. This illegality vitiated from the very
beginning all proceedings in the Sandiganbayan court headed by the very
Presiding Justice who attended. As the Commission noted: "The very acts
of being summoned to Malacañang and their ready acquiescence
thereto under the circumstances then obtaining, are in themselves
pressure dramatized and exemplified x x x Verily, it can be said that any
avowal of independent action or resistance to presidential pressure
became illusory from the very moment they stepped inside Malacañang
Palace on January 10, 1985."
No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or suggestions"
from the very President who by an amendatory decree (disclosed only at
the hearing of oral arguments on November 8, 1984 on a petition
challenging the referral of the Aquino-Galman murder cases to the
Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan instead of to a court martial, as
mandatory required by the known P.D. 1850 at the time providing for
exclusive jurisdiction of courts martial over criminal offenses committed
by military men[26-a]) made it possible to refer the cases to the
Sandiganbayan, can be an impartial court, which is the very essence of
due process of law. As the writer then wrote, "jurisdiction over cases
should be determined by law, and not by preselection of the Executive,
which could be much too easily transformed into a means
of predetermining the outcome of individual cases."[26-b] This criminal
collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public
respondents at the secret Malacañang conference (and revealed only
after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified
respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. This renders
moot and irrelevant for now the extensive arguments of respondents
accused, particularly Generals Ver and Olivas and those categorized as
accessories, that there has been no evidence or witness suppressed
against them, that the erroneous conclusions of Olivas as police
investigator do not make him an accessory of the crimes he investigated
and the appraisal and evaluation of the testimonies of the witnesses
presented and suppressed. There will be time and opportunity to
15
present all these arguments and considerations at the remand and
retrial of the cases herein ordered before a neutral and impartial court.
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and
travesty of justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its
aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They would have no
reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice,
deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of
repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to
render impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or
protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong, without
fear or favor and removed from the pressures of politics and prejudice.
More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled
to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. In
life, as an accused before the military tribunal Ninoy had pleaded in vain
that as a civilian he was entitled to due process of law and trial in the
regular civil courts before an impartial court with an unbiased
prosecutor. In death, Ninoy, as the victim of the "treacherous and vicious
assassination" and the relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved
parties plead once more for due process of law and a retrial before an
impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. The Court is constrained to
declare the sham trial a mock trial the non-trial of the century and that
the predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab
initio.
1. No double jeopardy. It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot
be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment
of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which represents the
sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. As the Court
stressed in the 1985 case of People vs. Bocar,[27]
"Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute
and prove its case, its right to due process is thereby violated.[27-a]
"The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic
constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the
violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional
issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, L-30026, 37 SCRA
420 [Jan. 30, 1971] which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will.
Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a
decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction
(Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370 [May 25, 19731, 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co. vs.
Enage, L-30111-12, 49 SCRA 416 Feb. 27, 1973]). Any judgment or
decision rendered notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a
'lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or
ignored wherever it exhibits its head' (Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).
"Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and
void for lack of jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a proper basis
for a claim of double jeopardy (Serino vs. Zosa, supra).
xxx xxx xxx
"Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a
competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been
entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil.
851). The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its
jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process.
"In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of
the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts
amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not
expose the accused to a second jeopardy."
More so does the rule against the invoking of double jeopardy hold in
the cases at bar where as we have held, the sham trial was but a mock
trial where the authoritarian president ordered respondents
Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial and closely monitored
the entire proceedings to assure the predetermined final outcome of
acquittal and total absolution as innocent of all the respondents-
accused. Notwithstanding the laudable efforts of Justice Herrera which
saw him near the end "deactivating" himself from the case, as it was his
belief that its eventual resolution was already a foregone conclusion,
they could not cope with the misuse and abuse of the overwhelming
16
powers of the authoritarian President to weaken the case of the
prosecution, to suppress its evidence, harass, intimidate and threaten its
witnesses, secure their recantation or prevent them from testifying. Fully
aware of the prosecution's difficulties in locating witnesses and
overcoming their natural fear and reluctance to appear and testify,
respondent Sandiganbayan maintained a "dizzying tempo" of the
proceedings and announced its intention to terminate the proceedings in
about 6 months time or less than a year, pursuant to the scripted
scenario. The prosecution complained of "the Presiding Justice's
seemingly hostile attitude towards (it)" and their being the subject of
warnings, reprimand and contempt proceedings as compared to the nil
situation for the defense. Herrera likewise complained of being "cajoled
into producing witnesses and pressed on making assurances that if given
a certain period, they will be able to produce their witnesses," Herrera
pleaded for "a reasonable period of preparation of its evidence" and
cited other pending cases before respondent court that were pending
trial for a much longer time where the "dizzying tempo" and "fast pace"
were not maintained by the court.[28] Manifestly, the prosecution and
the sovereign people were denied due process of law with a partial court
and biased Tanodbayan under the constant and pervasive monitoring
and pressure exerted by the authoritarian President to assure the
carrying out of his instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict
of acquittal such as that in the case at bar is a void judgment. In legal
contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It neither binds nor bars anyone.
Such a judgment is "a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw".
It is a terrible and unspeakable affront to the society and the people. To
paraphrase Brandeis:[29] If the authoritarian head of the government
becomes the lawbreaker, he breeds contempt for the law, he invites
every man to become a law unto himself, he invites anarchy.
Respondents-accused's contention that the Sandiganbayan judgment of
acquittal ends the case which cannot be appealed or reopened, without
being put in double jeopardy was forcefully disposed of by the Court
in People vs. Court of Appeals, which is fully applicable here, as follows:
That is the general rule and presupposes a valid judgment. As earlier
pointed out, however, respondent Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a
void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double
jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no
judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. Through it, no rights can be
attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally
worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it
and all claims flowing out of it are void.
xxx xxx xxx
Private respondent invoke 'justice for the innocent'. For justice to
prevail, the scales must balance. It is not to be dispensed for the accused
alone. The interests of the society, which they have wronged must also
be equally considered. A judgment of conviction is not necessarily a
denial of justice. A verdict of acquittal neither necessarily spells a
triumph of justice. To the party wronged, to the society offended, it
could also mean injustice. This is where the Courts play a vital role. They
render justice where justice is due.[30]
2. Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. - The
private prosecutors had filed a motion to disqualify and for inhibition of
respondents Justices of the Sandiganbayan on grounds of manifest bias
and partiality to the defense and arising from then Atty. (now
Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzales' charge that Justice Vera-Cruz had been
passing coaching notes to defense counsel. Justice Herrera had joined
the motion and pleaded at the hearing of June 25, 1985 and in the
prosecution memorandum that respondent Sandiganbayan "should not
decide the case on the merits without first making a final ruling on the
Motion for Inhibition." Herrera quoted the exchange between him and
the Presiding Justice to show the latter's "following the script of
Malacañang" -
"PJ PAMARAN
"Well, the court believes that we should proceed with the trial and then
deal later on with that. After all the most important thing here is, shall
we say, the decision of the case."
"J. HERRERA
17

I think more important than the decision of the case, Your Honor, is the
capacity of the Justices to sit in judgment. That is more important than
anything else." (p. 13 TSN, June 25, 1985) (Italics supplied by
Herrera)."[31]
But the Sandiganbayan brushed aside Herrera's pleas and then wrongly
blamed him, in the decision, for supposedly not having joined the
petition for inhibition, contrary to the facts above-stated, as follows:
"x x x the motion for inhibition above referred to related exclusively for
the contempt proceeding. Too, it must be remembered that the
prosecution neither joined that petition, nor did it at any time manifest a
desire to file a similar motion prior to the submission of these cases for
decision. To do it now is not alone out of season but is also a confession
of official insouciance." (Page 22, Decision).[32]
The action for prohibition was filed in the Court to seek the
disqualification of respondents Justices pursuant to the procedure
recognized by the Court in the 1969 case of Paredes vs.
Gopengco[33] since an adverse ruling by respondent court might result in
a verdict of acquittal, leaving the offended party without any remedy nor
appeal in view of the double jeopardy rule, not to mention the overriding
and transcendental public interest that would make out a case of denial
of due process to the People if the alleged failure on the part of the
Tanodbayan to present the complete evidence for the prosecution is
substantiated.[34]
In this case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt
dismissal of their petition and lifting of the temporary restraining order
enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been taken
cognizance of by the Court which had required the respondents',
including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no restraining order
was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have
precipitately issued its decision of total absolution of all the accused
pending the final action of this Court. This is the teaching of Valdez vs.
Aquilizan,[35] wherein the court in setting aside the hasty convictions,
ruled that "prudence dictated that (respondent judge) refrain from
deciding the cases or at the very least to hold in abeyance the
promulgation of his decision pending action by this Court. But prudence
gave way to imprudence; the respondent judge acted precipitately by
deciding the cases [hastily without awaiting this Court's action]. All of the
acts of the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his
part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the
petitioner."
3. Re: Objections of respondents. - The other related objections of
respondents' counsels must be rejected in the face of the Court's
declaration that the trial was a mock trial and that the predetermined
judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.
(a) It follows that there is no need to resort to a direct action to annul
the judgment, instead of the present action which was timely filed
initially to declare a mistrial and to enjoin the rendition of the void
judgment. And after the hasty rendition of such judgment for the
declaration of its nullity, following the presentation of competent proof
heard by the Commission and the Court's findings therefrom that the
proceedings were from the beginning vitiated not only by lack of due
process but also by the collusion between the public respondents (court
and Tanodbayan) for the rendition of a predetermined verdict of
acquitting all the twenty-six respondents-accused.
(b) It is manifest that this does not involve a case of mere irregularities in
the conduct of the proceedings or errors of judgment which do not
affect the integrity or validity of the judgment or verdict.
(c) The contention of one of defense counsel that the State and the
sovereign people are not entitled to due process is clearly erroneous and
contrary to the basic principles and jurisprudence cited hereinabove.
(d) The submittal of respondents-accused that they had not exerted the
pressure applied by the authoritarian president on public respondents
and that no evidence was suppressed against them must be held to be
untenable in the wake of the evil plot now exposed for their preordained
wholesale exoneration.
18
(e) Respondents' invocation of the writer's opinion in Luzon
Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Bldg. Co., Inc.[36] is inappropriate. The
writer therein held that a party should be entitled to only one Supreme
Court and may not speculate on vital changes in the Court's membership
for review of his lost case once more, since public policy and sound
practice demand that litigation be put to an end and no second pro
formamotion for reconsideration reiterating the same arguments should
be kept pending so long (for over six (6) years and one (1) month since
the denial of the first motion for reconsideration). This opinion cannot
be properly invoked, because here, petitioners' second motion for
reconsideration was filed promptly on March 20, 1986 following the
denial under date of February 4th of the first motion for reconsideration
and the same was admitted per the Court's Resolution of April 3, 1986
and is now being resolved within five months of its filing after the
Commission had received the evidence of the parties who were heard by
the Court only last August 26th. Then, the second motion for
reconsideration is based on an entirely new material ground which was
not known at the time of the denial of the petition and filing of the first
motion for reconsideration, i.e, the secret Malacañang conference on
January 10, 1985 which came to light only fifteen months later in March,
1986 and showed beyond per adventure (as proved in the Commission
hearings) the merits of the petition and that the authoritarian president
had dictated and predetermined the final outcome of acquittal. Hence,
the ten members of the Court (without any new appointees)
unanimously voted to admit the second motion for reconsideration.[37]
4. With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now
be tried before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. There
has been the long dark night of authoritarian regime, since the fake
ambush in September, 1972 of then Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile
(as now admitted by Enrile himself) was staged to trigger the imposition
of martial law and authoritarian one-man rule, with the padlocking of
Congress and the abolition of the office of the Vice-President.
As recently retired Senior Justice Vicente Abad Santos recalled in his
valedictory to the new members of the Bar last May, "In the past few
years, the judiciary was under heavy attack by an extremely powerful
executive. During this state of judicial siege, lawyers both in and outside
the judiciary perceptively surrendered to the animus of technicality. In
the end, morality was overwhelmed by technicality, so that the latter
emerged ugly and naked in its true manifestation."
Now that the light is emerging, the Supreme Court faces the task of
restoring public faith and confidence in the courts. The Supreme Court
enjoys neither the power of the sword nor of the purse. Its strength has
mainly in public confidence, based on the truth and moral force of its
judgments. This has been built on its cherished traditions of objectivity
and impartiality, integrity and fairness and unswerving loyalty to the
Constitution and the rule of law which compels acceptance as well by
the leadership as by the people. The lower courts draw their bearings
from the Supreme Court. With this Court's judgment today declaring the
nullity of the questioned judgment or acquittal and directing a new trial,
there must be a rejection of the temptation of becoming instruments of
injustice as vigorously as we rejected becoming its victims. The end of
one form of injustice should not become simply the beginning of
another. This simply means that the respondents accused must now face
trial for the crimes charged against them before an impartial court with
an unbiased prosecutor with all due process. What the past regime had
denied the people and the aggrieved parties in the sham trial must now
be assured as much to the accused as to the aggrieved parties. The
people will assuredly have a way of knowing when justice has prevailed
as well as when it has failed.
The notion nurtured under the past regime that those appointed to
public office owe their primary allegiance to the appointing authority
and are accountable to him alone and not to the people or the
Constitution must be discarded. The function of the appointing authority
with the mandate of the people, under our system of government, is to
fill the public posts. While the appointee may acknowledge with
gratitude the opportunity thus given of rendering public service, the
appointing authority becomes functus officio and the primary loyalty of
the appointed must be rendered to the Constitution and the sovereign
people in accordance with his sacred oath of office. To paraphrase the
late Chief Justice Earl Warren of the United States Supreme Court, the
19
Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no constituency,
serve no majority nor minority but serve only the public interest as they
see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided only the
Constitution and their own conscience and honor.

5. Note of Commendation. The Court expresses its appreciation with

thanks for the invaluable services rendered by the Commission
composed of retired Supreme Court Justice Conrado M. Vasquez,
chairman, and retired Court of Appeals Justices Milagros German and
Eduardo Caguioa as members. In the pure spirit of public service, they
rendered selflessly and without remuneration thorough, competent and
dedicated service in discharging their tasks of hearing and receiving the
evidence, evaluating the same and submitting their Report and findings
to the Court within the scheduled period and greatly easing the Court's
burden.

ACCORDINGLY, petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is

granted. The resolutions of November 28, 1985 dismissing the petition
and of February 4, 1986 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration
are hereby set aside and in lieu thereof, judgment is hereby rendered
nullifying the proceedings in respondent Sandiganbayan and its
judgment of acquittal in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Gen. Luther Custodio, et al." and ordering a
re-trial of the said cases which should be conducted with deliberate
dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of due process, so
that the truth may be finally known and justice done to all.

This resolution is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

20

[G.R. No. 118882. September 26, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
PEDRO S. ESPINA, CRISTETA REYES, JOHNY SANTOS, ANTONIO
ALEGRO, ROGELIO MENGUIN, PETE ALVERIO, ROGEN DOCTORA
and JANE GO, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS; ESSENTIAL
REQUIREMENT.- One of the essential requirements of procedural due
process in a judicial proceeding is that there must be an impartial
court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine
the matter before it. Thus, every litigant, including the State, is
entitled to the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
2. JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; MUST POSSESS COLD NEUTRALITY TO FAIRLY
ASSESS EVIDENCE OF PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE; PREVIOUS
DECISION IN SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION ENJOINING PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION AGAINST PRINCIPAL ACCUSED, AN INDICATION OF
PARTIALITY; JUDGE SHOULD HAVE VOLUNTARILY INHIBITED FROM
HEARING CRIMINAL CASES.- In the case at bar, Judge Pedro Espina, as
correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, can not be considered
to adequately possess such cold neutrality of an impartial judge as to
fairly assess both the evidence to be adduced by the prosecution and
the defense in view of his previous decision in Special Civil Action No.
92-11-219 wherein he enjoined the preliminary investigation at the
Regional State Prosecutor's Office level against herein respondent
Jane Go, the principal accused in the killing of her husband
Dominador Go.Judge Espina's decision in favor of respondent Jane Go
serves as sufficient and reasonable basis for the prosecution to
seriously doubt his impartiality in handling the criminal case. Verily,
it would have been more prudent for Judge Espina to have voluntarily
inhibited himself from hearing the criminal cases.
RESOLUTION
MELO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review with an urgent prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order which seeks to: (a) annul
and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 31733
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Pedro S. Espina et al.", insofar
as it denied the People's prayer to inhibit respondent Judge Pedro S.
Espina of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City from hearing Criminal
Cases No. 93-01-38 & 9301-39, respectively, entitled "People of
the Philippines vs. Cristeta Reyes, et al." and "People of
the Philippines vs. Jane C. Go"; and b) enjoin respondent judge from
conducting further proceedings in the aforesaid criminal cases.
Acting on the said petition, the Court on April 3, 1995 resolved to
require respondents all of whom are the accused in the aforesaid criminal
cases, to comment thereon within 10 days from notice, to issue the
temporary restraining order prayed for, and to enjoin respondent judge
from taking further action in Criminal Cases No. 93-01-38 & 93-01-39 until
further orders from the Court.
It appearing that private respondents Cristeta Reyes & Rogen
Doctora, Johny Santos & Antonio Alegro & Jane C. Go failed to file their
respective comments within the period which expired on April 17, 1995
and April 18, 1995, respectively, the Court on June 26, 1995 resolved to
require said private respondents to show cause why they should not be
disciplinary dealt with for such failure, and to file the required comments,
both within ten (10) days from notice.
As to respondents Johny Santos & Antonio Alegro (prisoners at the
Tacloban City Jail), copies of the resolution requiring them to file comment
were returned unserved with the postmaster's notation "unknown in said
address". The Court, on October 11, 1995 directed the Solicitor General to
1
serve the same on said respondents and to inform the Court of such
service, both within ten (10) days from notice.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Compliance stating that the
required copies were sent to private respondents Santos & Alegro through
ordinary mail on December 26, 1995.
To date, all the respondents have not yet filed their comments, for
verily, delay in the submission of the same would appear to
benefit respondents, and sanction against them may not really amount to
much, considering that most of them are under detention. Thus, so as not
to unduly delay the disposition of Criminal Cases No. 93-01-38 and 93-01-
39, we now resolve to dispense with respondent's comments and to
proceed with the disposition of the petition.
One of the essential requirements of procedural due process in a
judicial proceeding is that there must be an impartial court or tribunal
clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before
it. Thus, every litigant, including the State, is entitled to the cold neutrality
of an impartial judge which was explained in Javier vs. Commission of
Elections (144 SCRA 194 [1986]), in the following words:
This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of due
process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must
not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added
assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are
entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights
are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They
must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must
believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his
judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking
his action for the justice they expect.
with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after
the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal
hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated
plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach
the denoucement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to
foreordain the ending. The Judge will reach his conclusions only after all
the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the
established facts and the pertinent law.
In the case at bar, Judge Pedro Espina, as correctly pointed out by the
Solicitor General, can not be considered to adequately possess such cold
neutrality of an impartial judge as to fairly assess both the evidence to be
adduced by the prosecution and the defense in view of his previous
decision in Special Civil Action No. 92-11-219 wherein he enjoined the
preliminary investigation at the Regional State Prosecutor's Office level
against herein respondent Jane Go, the principal accused in the killing of
her husband Dominador Go.
Judge Espina's decision in favor of respondent Jane Go serves as
sufficient and reasonable basis for the prosecution to seriously doubt his
impartiality in handling the criminal cases. Verily, it would have been more
prudent for Judge Espina to have voluntarily inhibited himself from
hearing the criminal cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 31733 is hereby SET ASIDE and The
Honorable Pedro Espina, Presiding Judge of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial
Court of the 8th Judicial Region stationed in Tacloban is hereby declared
disqualified from taking cognizance of Criminal Cases No. 93-01-38 and
93-01-39. It is further ordered that these criminal cases be re-raffled to
another branch of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring

compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair
play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where
a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and

2

G.R. No. 205576, November 20, 2017
MIGUEL D. ESCOBAR, EUGENE L. ALZATE, PERLA C. MAGLINTE, CESAR
M. CAGANG, AND VIVENCIA S. TELESFORO, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Except with respect to civil cases impliedly instituted, the rule of
conclusiveness of judgment has no application in criminal law
proceedings. For criminal procedure, it is not res judicata under Rule 39,
Section 47 of the Rules of Court, but res judicata in prison grey as double
jeopardy, under Rule 117, Section 7.
This is a Consolidated Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the
August 22, 2012 Decision2 and January 8, 2013 Resolution3 of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28293. The Sandiganbayan found
petitioners Perla C. Maglinte (Maglinte), Eugene L. Alzate (Alzate),
together with Amelia Carmela C. Zoleta (Zoleta), guilty of the crime of
estafa through falsification of public documents, and petitioners Miguel
D. Escobar (Escobar), Vivencia S. Telesforo (Telesforo), and Cesar M.
Cagang (Cagang), guilty of malversation.4
An Information filed before the Sandiganbayan against petitioners read:
That on May 27, 2002, or prior or subsequent thereto in Sarangani,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
public officers Miguel Draculan Escobar and Felipe Katu Constantino,
being then the Governor and Vice-Governor, respectively, of the Province
of Sarangani, Margie Purisima Rudes and Eugene Lariza Alzate, Provincial
Board Members, Perla Cabilin Maglinte, Provincial Administrator, Cesar
Matas Cagang, Provincial Treasurer, Vivencia Sasam Telesforo,
Management and Audit Analyst III, and Amelia Carmela Constantino
Zoleta, and Executive Assistant, all accountable public officials of the
Provincial Government of Sarangani, by reason of the duties of their
office[s], conspiring and confederating with one another, while
committing the offense in relation to office, taking advantage of their
respective positions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, convert, and misappropriate the amount of THREE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00), Philippine Currency, in public
funds under their custody, and for which they are accountable, by
falsifying or causing to be falsified the corresponding Disbursement
Voucher dated May 27, 2002 and its supporting documents, making it
appear that financial assistance had been sought by Nema Tamayo, the
alleged Team Leader of Malungon Market Vendors Association,
Malungon, Sarangani, when in truth and in fact, the accused knew fully
well that no financial assistance had been requested by Nema Tamayo and
her association, nor did said Nema Tamayo and her association receive
the aforementioned amount, thereby facilitating the release of the above-
mentioned public funds in the amount of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P300,000.00), through the encashment by the accused of
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) Check No. 282390 dated May
27, 2002, which amount they subsequently misappropriated to their
personal use and benefit, and despite demand, the said accused failed to
return the said amount to the damage and prejudice of the government
and the public interest in the aforesaid sum.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
During arraignment, petitioners Cagang, Telesforo, Escobar, Alzate, and
Maglinte, and their co-accused Felipe Katu Constantino (Constantino) and
Zoleta pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.6 Co-accused Board
Member Margie P. Rudes (Rudes) was still-at-large.7 Constantino passed
away on April 25, 2006; thus, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion to
dismiss his case.8
After pre-trial,9 trial commenced.
The prosecution's version of the events was as follows:
1
Commission on Audit State Auditor IV Helen M. Cailing (Auditor Cailing),
the Team Leader of a Special Audit Team in Sarangani Province,
discovered irregularities in Sarangani Province's grant of financial
assistance, violating COA Circular No. 96-003 dated February 27,
1996.10 An Audit and Observation Memorandum dated June 26, 2003
containing the team's findings was sent to then Sarangani Governor
Escobar, Provincial Accountant Maria D. Camanay, Provincial Treasurer
Cagang, Provincial Engineer Mahmod Panayaman, and Provincial
Agriculturist Romeo Miole. Cagang replied that the transaction was
treated as a cash advance; thus, the issuance of official receipt by the Non-
Government Organizations (NGOs) and People's Organizations (POs) was
unnecessary.11 The team found that the supporting documents for
financial assistance to the Malungon Market Vendors Association lacked
the approval of Governor Escobar, in violation of COA Circular No. 96-003.
However, Governor Escobar certified on the disbursement voucher that
the expense was "necessary, lawful and incurred under his direct
supervision."12 Also on the disbursement voucher was a certification from
Telesforo that the supporting documents were complete, and from
Provincial Treasurer Cagang that there were available funds. The team
also found that the disbursement voucher was not received by the
Malungon Market Vendors Association.13 It was signed received by a "Tita
P. Sari�o," for whom the team searched, but failed to locate, in Barangay
Malungon.14 This was in violation of COA Circular No. 96-003 because it
should have been deposited to the account of the Malungon Market
Vendors Association. Further, Auditor Cailing testified that upon
verification with the bank, she was told that the check had been deposited
to the account of the beneficiary but that the amount was withdrawn the
next day.15 The funds for the financial assistance were sourced from the
Countrywide Development Fund (CDF), which was intended for livelihood
projects of Sarangani Province.16
Juanilio V. Vegafria (Vegafria) testified that he was the President of the
Malungon Market Vendors Association from 2001 to 2004.17 With the
help of the vice-mayor and the Department of Social Welfare and
Development, he was able to obtain financial assistance from the
municipal government of Malungon for their recovery from a fire that
burned down the Malungon public market in 2001.18 He received
Commission on Audit's letter dated July 15, 2003, addressed to "Tita P.
Sari�o, Treasurer of the Market Vendors Association of Malungon,"
seeking verification on the financial assistance of P300,000.00 for the
association.19 He executed an affidavit that their association did not
receive this amount. He stated that he received the letter as it was
addressed to the association but there was no officer or member by that
name. When he was shown a document dated May 20, 2002 and a Project
Proposal, both signed by a "Nema Tamayo," purportedly a team leader of
the Malungon Market Vendors Association, Vegafria testified that there
was no association member or officer by that name.20
Mary Ann G. Gadian (Gadian) testified that she was employed in the Office
of then Vice Governor Constantino as a Computer Operator and was
supervised by Vice Governor Constantino's daughter, Amelia Carmela
Zoleta (Zoleta). Zoleta had her make fake documents, requests, and
proposals to make money.21 In May 2002, she received instructions from
Vice Governor Constantino, Board Member Juanito Purisima, and Zoleta
to prepare supporting documents for the disbursement of funds to be
used for the wedding of Board Member Alzate,22 and to use the name
"Tita P. Sari�o" in the fictitious documents.23Thus, Zoleta told her to go to
the office of Provincial Administrator Maglinte who, upon Gadian's arrival,
immediately told her to ask Zoleta whether or not "another P10,000.00
for the . . . department heads could be added to the amount to be
disbursed."24 Upon hearing this, Zoleta instructed Gadian to "double the
amount so that the processing will be expedited."25 Thereafter, Maglinte
told Gadian to source the P300,000.00 from the P1,000,000.00 CDF of
Malungon.26 Thus, Gadian prepared the fictitious letter dated May 20,
2002 and the fictitious Project Proposal under the fictitious name of
"Nema Tamayo."27She asked her co�worker Eleanor Tablani (Tablani) to
sign above the name "Nema Tamayo."28After Zoleta reviewed the
fictitious documents, she submitted them to Maglinte, who reviewed
them and immediately affixed her initials under the name of Governor
Escobar. She and Maglinte then delivered the disbursement voucher and
supporting documents to the office of Governor Escobar. Gadian waited
outside. When Maglinte emerged from Governor Escobar's office, she
handed Gadian the disbursement voucher bearing Governor Escobar's
signature and they returned to Maglinte's office.29Maglinte imprinted the
2
rubber stamp signature of Governor Escobar in the duplicate copies of the
voucher30 then gave the documents to a clerk at the office of the
Provincial Accountant for logging and processing. Since Provincial
Accountant Maria Camanay (Camanay) was in General Santos City,
Telesforo signed over the former's name in the disbursement voucher and
in the Journal Entry Voucher. Thereafter, Maglinte handed the documents
to a clerk in the office of the Provincial Treasurer who wrote
"RCI#1/TFMAY2002" on the voucher and then went to the room of
Provincial Treasurer Cagang. While Provincial Treasurer Cagang reviewed
the documents, "he looked at her shaking his head."31 He signed the
voucher. Then, Gadian went to the cashier, who prepared the check.
Thereafter, she presented the check to Cagang, who signed it. She went
back to the office of Maglinte, who also signed it. Then, Gadian returned
all the documents to the Provincial Treasurer's Office. She called Sheryl
Desiree Jane Tangan, also known as Joy Tangan (Tangan), of the Office of
the Vice Governor to advise the status of the transaction and to receive
further instructions from Zoleta. Pursuant to Zoleta's instructions, Tangan
accompanied a woman, who acted as a "dummy," to claim the check from
the office of the Provincial Treasurer and to encash it at the bank. Tangan
gave Gadian the P300,000.00, which she delivered to Zoleta. Zoleta gave
Gadian P100,000.00 and called Alzate to go to her office.32 When Alzate
arrived, Tatang Purisima (Purisima) gave him P200,000.00 for the
wedding. Gadian placed the P100,000.00 from Zoleta in five (5) envelopes
with P20,000.00 each and brought them to the office of Maglinte, where
she saw Camanay, Lea Duhay Lungsod, Mariter Saison, Sitiwa Maruhom
Sali, and Rose Concon, who were awaiting their shares.
Tangan testified that in 2002, she worked as Local Legislative Assistant
Staff I at the Office of then Vice Governor Constantino.33 She corroborated
Gadian's testimony.34
The version of the defense was as follows:
Cagang testified that when the disbursement voucher was brought to his
office by Gadian, it was already signed by Provincial Governor Escobar,
"certif[ying] that the expenses or cash advances covered by the voucher
were necessary, lawful and incurred under his direct supervision," and by
Telesforo, signifying the completeness of the supporting documents.35
Maglinte denied Gadian's allegations regarding her participation in the
facilitation of the transaction. She testified that she had no participation
in the falsification of the letter request or the Project Proposal, or that
they had been forwarded to her office. She claimed that Vice Governor
Constantino had informed her over the phone that these documents from
the Malungon Market Vendors Association would be brought to her office.
She verified the letter request and Project Proposal before signing the
disbursement voucher. Thereafter, separate investigations were initiated
for the reported anomaly. While the transactions were being investigated,
former Sarangani Governor Priscilla Chiongbian ordered for her to come
to her residence, where Maglinte met Congressman Erwin Chiongbian
(Congressman Chiongbian). They discussed the issue of the anomalous
financial assistance that had been granted to several People's
Organizations in Sarangani, but Maglinte said she had no knowledge of
them. This enraged Congressman Chiongbian, who said that she would
suffer the consequences of withholding the situation from him.36 She said
she was not aware of COA Circular No. 96-003 and was not furnished with
a copy of the COA Audit Observation Memorandum, as it was not
addressed to her.37
Renante L. Dialawi, a casual clerk at the office of Board Member Rudes,
testified that Gadian also used to be a staff in that office and that Gadian
was in the office of Board Member Rudes in the morning of May 27,
2002,38 and did not leave the whole afternoon.39
Escobar denied knowledge of and participation in the crime.40 His only
participation in the transaction was signing the disbursement voucher.
However, after he learned of the anomalies when it was discussed on a
radio show, he created a Fact Finding or Investigation Committee, whose
report was included in the report of the Commission on Audit Special
Audit Team. He did not receive any notice of disallowance or demand to
return the P300,000.00 and was not asked to explain why he signed the
disbursement voucher before the case against him was instituted.41
3
Telesforo testified that she signed the disbursement voucher only after
verifying that the supporting documents were complete and in order:42
[S]he affixed her signature on the voucher after she has verified that the
attachments consisting of - (1) the Certificate of Registration issued by the
Cooperative Development Authority, (2) machine copy of the Certificate
of Accreditation issued by the Provincial Board of Sarangani, (3) the Letter
Request of the Malungon Market Vendors Association, (4) Project
Proposal of the Malungon Market Vendors Association, (5) machine copy
of the memorandum of agreement executed by and between the Province
of Sarangani and the Malungon Market Vendors Association, and (6) the
Board Resolution issued by the Malungon Market Vendors Association
authorizing its treasurer to receive and encash the check, were complete
and in order; that since some of the attached documents were
photo/machine copies, she called Ms. Banderado to go to the office of the
Governor to check the originals of the photo/machine copied documents;
and that it was only after Ms. Banderado informed her that the original
documents are on file in the office of the Governor that she affixed her
signature in Box B of the Disbursement Voucher[.]43
Alzate denied receiving P200,000.00 from Zoleta and having participation
in the anomalous transaction.44 He said that the day the check was
encashed was on May 29, 2002 and not on May 27, 2002, as shown by the
machine validation on the check. He claimed that on May 29, 2002, he was
in Cebu City for the Second Quarter National Board Meeting of the
Provincial Board Members League of the Philippines, held from May 28,
2002 to May 31, 2002.45 His attendance in this event was attested to by
the Agenda of the League, the Allotment and Obligation Slip for his travel
expenses reimbursement, the disbursement voucher for his
reimbursement, his plane tickets, and the Certificate of Appearance
issued by the Department of Interior and Local Government. Additionally,
the Minutes of the First Special Session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Sarangani on May 29, 2002 indicated that he was absent on official
business.46 He claimed that the case was politically motivated because he
refused the late Congressman James Chiongbian's offer to run as the Vice
Governor of a certain Governor Dominguez against former Vice Governor
Constantino and Governor Escobar.47 His wedding expenses were
defrayed by his relatives, not by the illegal disbursement.48 During
additional direct examination, Alzate testified that his observation on the
date of the machine validation of the check was confirmed by a
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) Teller. He also stated that he
sent a letter dated April 30, 2009 to the DBP General Santos City Branch
requesting a certification on the encashment date of the check, but the
bank refused to issue one without a subpoena.49
Zoleta denied Gadian's testimony against her.50 She denied seeing Alzate
in their office on May 27, 2002.51 She testified that she did not participate
in preparing disbursement vouchers because the budget of the Office of
the Vice Governor was controlled by a certain Mr. DelaCruz.52
In its assailed Decision, the Sandiganbayan found that the documents had
been falsified which led to the disbursement of public funds, supposedly
to be given as financial assistance for the Malungon Market Vendors
Association, which neither prepared the documents nor received the
financial assistance. It found that all the accused were public officers at
the time material to the case and that Escobar, Telesforo, and Cagang had
custody of the funds which constituted the source of the financial
assistance granted to the Malungon Market Vendors Association.53 The
funds were public since they were withdrawn from the account of the
Province of Sarangani.54 Escobar, Telesforo, and Cagang signed the
disbursement voucher and the funds were received by the payee.55 The
Sandiganbayan found that Zoleta, Maglinte, and Alzate acted in
conspiracy in the falsification of the letter request dated May 20, 2002 and
the Project Proposal, which were the supporting documents for the
disbursement voucher.56These falsified documents "led to the
malversation of public funds."57
The Sandiganbayan held that petitioners Escobar, Telesforo, and Cagang
approved the disbursement voucher despite the fact that it lacked the
documentation required under COA Circular No. 96-003 dated February
27, 1996:
However, COA Auditor Cailing stated that the said accused approved the
disbursement despite the lack of the needed documentation as provided
4
in COA Circular No. 96-003 dated February 27, 1996, because - (1) the
disbursement was not included in the work and financial plan of the
provincial government of Sarangani; (2) the market vendors association
was not accredited by the provincial government of Sarangani; (3) there
was no memorandum of agreement between the market vendors
association and the provincial government of Sarangani; (4) the
beneficiary did not submit its financial statement for a period of at least
three (3) years and Certificate of Registration with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC); (5) the letter request for the grant dated May
20, 2002, and the accompanying Project Proposal were not approved by
the provincial Governor; (6) DBP Check No. 282390 dated May 27, 2002,
was issued in the name of the alleged Treasurer Tita P. Sari�o instead of
the Malungon Market Vendors Association and it was encashed when it
should have been for deposit only; (7) there was no official receipt
attached to the voucher evidencing receipt by the payee or recipient of
the payment; and (8) there was no listing of the officials and members of
the association who will benefit from the financial assistance. Auditor
Cailing testified that the only documents attached to the voucher were
the said letter request dated May 20, 2002, and the Project Proposal that
was signed by Nema Tamayo which did not bear the approval of the
Provincial Governor; and that because of said violations, the financial
assistance given to the Malungon Market Vendors Association was
illegally and fraudulently made.58
The Sandiganbayan found that petitioners Escobar, Telesforo, and Cagang
should have asked for documents to show the members' names who
would avail of financial assistance and the authority of "Tita P. Sari�o" to
act as the treasurer of Malungon Market Vendors Association.59 Further,
they allowed the misappropriation considering that when the Commission
on Audit Special Audit Team conducted its audit, petitioners Escobar,
Telesforo, and Cagang "failed to account or liquidate the disbursement or
to give reasonable explanation of its disappearance."60 Having failed to
observe the necessary care under the circumstances, they were criminally
negligent and liable for malversation.61
On the issue of conclusiveness of judgment, the Sandiganbayan held that
the issue in Criminal Case No. 28331 was different from the issue in this
case. The issue there was the malversation of P375,000.00 as financial
assistance to the Kanlaong Fishermen's Group and covered by
Disbursement Voucher No. 101-2002-7-10376 and DBP Check No.
11521401.62
The dispositive portion of the Sandiganbayan Decision read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows -
1. finding accused PERLA C. MAGLINTE, AMELIA CARMELA C.
ZOLETA, and EUGENE ALZATE, GUILTY as principals of the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents defined and penalized under the provisions of
Articles 315 and 171 in relation to Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law
sentencing each of them to suffer indeterminate penalty
of ten (10) years as minimum, to eleven (11) years and four
(4) months of prision mayor as maximum, with the
accessories provided by law, and to pay a fine of
PhP5,000.00;
2. finding accused MIGUEL D. ESCOBAR, VIVENCIA S.
TELESFORO and CESAR M. CAGANG GUILTY of
malversation and applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law sentencing each of them to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum, and to pay a fine of PhP300,000.00 and the
penalty of perpetual special disqualification to hold public
office and other accessory penalties provided by law; and
3. ordering all the accused, jointly and severally, to indemnify
the Provincial Government of Sarangani the
defrauded/malversed amount of PhP300,000.00, and to
pay the cost.
5
As for accused MARGIE P. RUDES, who is at-large and beyond the
jurisdiction of the Court, this case is ordered ARCHIVED.
SO ORDERED.63 (Emphasis in the original)
Petitioners filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration, which were
denied by the Sandiganbayan in its January 8, 2013 Resolution. The
dispositive portion of the Resolution read:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the respective Motions for
Reconsideration of accused-movants Zoleta, Maglinte, Escobar, Telesforo
and Cagang, and the Motion for New Trial of accused-movant Alzate,
are DENIED.
SO ORDERED.64 (Emphasis in the original)
Thus, petitioners filed this petition on March 14, 201365 before this Court.
On June 20, 2013, respondent, through the Office of the Ombudsman,
filed its Comment.66 On March 3, 2014, petitioners filed their Reply. On
July 7, 2017, petitioner Maglinte filed a Motion to Travel, which this Court
denied.
Petitioners claim that the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting petitioners
Maglinte and Alzate of the crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public
Documents, considering that it was not shown that they acquired juridical
possession of the money subject of the case.67 Even assuming they
acquired juridical possession, it was not received "in trust, or on
commission or for administration or under any other obligation involving
the duty to make delivery of or to return the same."68 Likewise, there was
no prior demand made upon petitioners Maglinte or Alzate.69
Respondent argues that all the accused were charged with conspiracy to
commit malversation of public funds through falsification of public
documents. However, since the accountable public officials were
convicted only of malversation through negligence, those who were not
accountable for the funds were liable for estafa through falsification of
public documents, a charge that is "necessarily included in a charge of
malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents."70
There was no proof that petitioners Maglinte and Alzate participated in
the falsification of the fictitious documents.71 The Sandiganbayan
misinterpreted Gadian's testimony when she said petitioner Maglinte
"advised Gadian in the preparation of the voucher and the falsified
supporting documents."72 Gadian did not testify that she informed
Maglinte that she was about to falsify the fictitious documents, or that
Maglinte told her to falsify them, or agreed to the falsification. It was only
conjecture on the part of Gadian that Maglinte was aware of the
falsification.73 Petitioners quote Gadian's testimony:
ATTY. LARGO:
� �
Q: Now, be candid to the Court, Ms. Witness. Prior to the giving of
instruction to you by accused Zoleta, you have no knowledge
at all of whether accused Zoleta had any discussion with any of
the accused her[e] with respect to this transaction?
� �
A: I am no longer concerned with that, sir, but I am just told what
to do.
� �
Q: Am I correct to say that your answer to my last question is
"yes"? That you had no knowledge at all if they had any
conversation, discussion with respect to this transaction?
� �
6
 A: Yes, sir. Q You stated that after receiving the P200,000.00 from Mary Ann
- Gadian, Ms. Zoleta gave this P200,000.00 to the Vice Governor,
� � her father?

Q: Prior to Zoleta's giving of instruction to you? � �

� � A Yes[,] Ma'am.
-
A: Yes, sir. That is none of my business.74
� �

Similarly, there was no testimony showing that petitioner Alzate was
aware of the falsification. Tangan testified regarding petitioner Alzate's
participation:
Q What did Mary Ann Gadian do with the money that you gave
- her?
Q And after she gave the P200,000.00 to the Vice Governor, she
- then made a phone call to Board Member Alzate. What
happened after she made this phone call to Board Member
Alzate?
� �

� � A Board Member Alzate went to our office, Ma'am.

-
A She separated the P200,000.00, then the P100,000.00, then the
- P200,000.00 was given to Amelia Carmela Zoleta, Ma'am. � �

� � Q What happened when Board Member Alzate arrived in that

- office?
Q After Ms. Gadian gave the P200,000.00 to Amelia Carmela
- Zoleta, what happened to that amount? � �

� � A Sinabihan sya ni Vice Governor, "To, akin na ang kwarta mo,

- To."
A She gave it to her father. Then Amelia Carmela Zoleta called up
- Board Member Alzate that the money is ready. Then Board �
Member Alzate went to our office, Ma'am.
INTERPRETATION:
� �

7
 Petitioner's claim on Gadian's testimony conflicts with this:
� �

He was told by the Vice Governor, "To ... (discontinued)["] Q What did you do with the money given to you by Joy Tangan?
-
�
� �
WITNESS:
A I gave it to Amelia Carmela Zoleta.
� � -

This is your money. � �

� Q You gave the money to Amelia Carmela Zoleta in the amount

- of?
INTERPRETATION:
� �
� �
A P300,000.00. She placed it in her drawer first.
To, this is your money, To. -

� � �

PROSEC. HIDALGO: Q What happened after Amelia Carmela Zoleta placed the cash of
- P300,000.00 in her drawer?
� �
� �
Q After the Vice Governor informed Board Member Alzate that
- this money was there, what was the Board Member's A She gave me a bundle of P100,000.00.
response? -

� � � �

A He said thank you, smiled and went out, Ma'am.75 Q What happened to the other P200,000.00?
- -

8
� � � �

A She called through the intercom Eugene Alzate to come up. Q What is that money that Tatang gave to Eugene?
- -

� � � �

Q After accused Zoleta called up accused Alzate to go up to her A The amount of P200,000.00 for wedding expenses.
- office, what happened afterwards, if any? -

� � � �

A Eugene Alzate arrived with Tatang Purisima. Q Why do you know that, that incident transpired in the
- - computer room?

� � � �

Q What did both of them do afterwards, if any? A Because the place is very near and you can see what they are
- - doing.76

� �
Petitioners argue that to be considered a conspirator, an accused must
have performed an overt act that contributed to the execution of the
A They entered the computer room.
crime.77 There must be evidence of actual cooperation in the crime and
-
approval of an illegal act is not sufficient to establish
conspiracy.78 Respondent contends that petitioner Maglinte's complicity
� �
to the crime is evident from her conduct before, during, and after its
commission.79 She instructed Gadian to ask Zoleta whether or not a total
Q What transpired inside [the] computer room?
of P10,000.00 could be added to the amount to be disbursed for
-
distribution to several provincial employees and to source the fund from
the CDF allocated to the municipality of Malungon.80 Both Maglinte and
� � Alzate shared in the proceeds.81 After the encashment of the check issued
pursuant to the falsified documents, Alzate quickly arrived to receive the
A Tatang gave the money to Eugene. P200,000.00 from Constantino after being informed by Zoleta that the
- money was ready.82

9
Petitioners assert that the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting petitioners
based on the uncorroborated testimonies of witnesses who participated
in the crime, appeared to be the most guilty,83 and were motivated to lie
by their desire to be made state witnesses.84 Respondent argues that
petitioners are the ones who controlled and directed the commission of
the crime.85
Petitioners claim that petitioner Alzate's constitutional rights were
violated when the Sandiganbayan denied his motion for new trial and
motion to allow him to present additional witnesses.86 Respondent points
out that petitioner Alzate was still not ready to present evidence in his
defense despite having four (4) years to prepare for it.87 He only asked for
the opportunity to present additional evidence via a motion for
reconsideration after the Sandiganbayan had already admitted all the
formal offers of evidence of the petitioners.88 His Motion to Allow Accused
Alzate to Present Additional Witnesses or Motion to Allow Accused Alzate
to Enter into Stipulation of Facts with the Prosecution was filed two (2)
years after he testified. It was also a year and a half after manifesting that
he was not presenting any additional evidence, and a year and two (2)
months after the Sandiganbayan had already ruled on the admissibility of
his exhibits.89
Petitioners also argue that petitioners Escobar and Telesforo are not
accountable officers under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.90 To be
accountable officers, they must receive, by reason of their office,
government funds or property over which they acquire custody and for
which they are held responsible.91 Under the Local Government Code,
only the Provincial Treasurer is accountable for the funds of a province in
relation to Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.92 Further, petitioners
insist that based on the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines
and Arriola and Radan v. Sandiganbayan,93what dictates whether or not
officers are accountable are their duties and functions which allow them
to receive public property for which they are required to
account.94 Respondent argues that the funds were in the nature of a trust
fund, which was in "the possession of the local government as trustee and
for the management of the local government officials as
administrators."95 As a trust fund in their possession, petitioner "Escobar
had ... to certify and approve the validity, propriety and legality of
expenditures to be charged [to the fund]."96 As a trust fund, petitioner
Telesforo also had to certify and approve the completeness and propriety
of the supporting documents.97
In Arias v. Sandiganbayan,98 this Court held that a head of office can rely
on their subordinates to a reasonable extent, and there has to be some
reason shown why any particular voucher must be examined in detail.
Petitioners argue that this case can be invoked to refute negligence on the
part of petitioner Escobar, who relied in good faith that his subordinates
would perform their functions in accordance with the law.99 The voucher
presented to petitioner Escobar for signature appeared to have been
prepared with regularity, and nobody called his attention to any
anomalies in the request for fund assistance. Gadian made sure that her
falsification of the fictitious documents would be
100 101
undetectable. Likewise, in Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan, this Court
held that if there is no evidence of conspiracy, the head of an office is not
negligent for relying on misplaced good faith on a subordinate primarily
responsible for a particular matter.102 Respondent argues that the cases
of Arias and Magsuci do not apply, considering there were reasons for
petitioner Escobar to closely examine the transaction. The letter request
and Project Proposal were signed by "Nema Tamayo," yet the
disbursement voucher was payable to "Tita P. Sari�o/Treasurer Market
Vendors Assoc."103 Escobar did not make any attempt to ensure the
implementation and completion of the project for which the funds were
disbursed, monitor the funds after it was released, make an attempt to
accredit the organization, or enter into a Memorandum of Agreement.
This was reckless imprudence on his part. Petitioner Escobar disputes this
and says there was no discrepancy, as both the check and the
disbursement voucher were payable to "Tita P. Sari�o/Treasurer Market
Vendors Association."104 Petitioners further argue that the duty to
accredit and enter into a Memorandum of Agreement does not belong to
petitioner Escobar, but generally, to the government office
concerned.105 Moreover, when the transaction was being investigated,
petitioner Escobar lost his bid for governor and stepped down in 2004. He
lost track of the investigation, which he later learned had been
discontinued by the elected officials of Sarangani province.106
10
In Criminal Case No. 28331, which arose from the same COA Audit Report
and Ombudsman Resolution dated August 11, 2004,107 the Sandiganbayan
relied on the testimonies of Gadian and Cailing 108 and held that petitioner
Escobar is not an accountable officer for purposes of Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code.109 It also held that there is nothing that shows that
petitioner Escobar was aware of the anomalies in the transaction or that
he participated in the falsification of the fictitious documents.110 The
Sandiganbayan also found that petitioner Escobar could not be liable
based only on signing the disbursement voucher and the project proposal
after petitioner Maglinte certified the legal assistance as legitimate and
lawful.111 Thus, as quoted by petitioners, the Sandiganbayan held:
As for accused Escobar, the prosecution evidence does not even attempt
to link him to the anomalous transaction. There is absolutely nothing that
would show knowledge on his part about it. The most that the prosecution
did was to rely merely on his signatures appearing in the project proposal
and the disbursement voucher. However, this alone would not suffice,
especially taking into consideration his testimony, which the court
similarly observes, that the documents, taken at face value, do not show
any irregularity. Moreover, the initials of accused Provincial Administrator
Maglinte, as the prior reviewing authority, appear in the disbursement
voucher, which is an accepted common practice or control measure
before the approving authority affixes his signature and expresses his
conformity. What is more is that accused Escobar did not even sign the
check. And finally, as Provincial Governor, he does not have custody of the
funds, and neither is he accountable therefor. Instead, as pointed out
above, it is accused Cagang, as the Provincial Treasurer, who has custody
and who is accountable for the public funds of the province.
Accordingly, except for the fact that accused Escobar is a public officer,
none of the elements essential to support a charge for malversation are
present. Neither is there anything to connect him to the fabrication or
falsification of the supporting documents submitted to justify the release
of the funds. Similarly, therefore, there is no legal and factual basis to
sustain the position of the prosecution as to his alleged guilt. Again, unless
it can be shown that there was conspiracy, and there is none on record,
such essential elements cannot be deemed to have been established with
respect to accused Escobar.112
Petitioners argue that conclusiveness of judgment bars these
determinations of the Sandiganbayan on material facts from being
litigated again.113 Respondent argues that the principle of conclusiveness
of judgment is inapplicable because this case is not a continuation of
Criminal Case No. 28331.114Petitioners rely on Hacienda Bigaa, Inc. v.
Chavez115 to argue that the rule can be raised under different claims or
causes of action and that it only requires identity of parties and issues to
be invoked.116
Petitioners argue that COA Circular No. 96-003 does not apply to fund
assistance to NGOs or POs funded out of a CDF of a congressman117 and
that it was not sufficiently established that the supporting documents for
the disbursement were deficient or incomplete.118 According to
petitioners, the disposition of a trust fund is subject to the provisions of
the Special Allotment Release Order (SARO), and not the COA Circular No.
96-003.119
Respondent argues that COA Circular No. 96-003 applies to all releases of
fund as financial assistance to NGOs or POs, based on its text:
1. The subject of the circular is described as a restatement of COA
Circular No. 95-003 prescribing accounting and auditing guidelines
on the release of fund assistance to NGOs/POs.
2. In its definition of terms, it defines fund assistance as "government
funds entrusted to the NGO/PO to cover the implementation of a
project which is included in the Work and Financial Plan (WFP) and
Budget of the GO release of which is not necessarily limited to
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MODE), 'Grants,
Subsid[i]es and Contributions (3-10-000).' This may be in the form
of training packages, livelihood projects, interest-free loans, etc."
11
 3. In its guidelines, it states that "... if the fund assistance will be
charged to savings or trust receipts received for the purpose, such
utilization shall be approved by proper authorities."120
This Court resolves the following issues:
First, whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting petitioners
Eugene L. Alzate and Perla C. Maglinte of estafa through conspiracy;
Second, whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in not applying the case
of Arias v. Sandiganbayan121to find that petitioner Miguel D. Escobar
properly relied on good faith that his subordinates would perform their
functions in accordance with the law;
Third, whether or not the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner Eugene L.
Alzate due process when it denied his motion for new trial and did not
allow his presentation of additional witnesses based on technicalities;
Fourth, whether or not petitioners Miguel D. Escobar and Vivencia S.
Telesforo are accountable public officers;
Fifth, whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting Miguel D.
Escobar, Eugene L. Alzate, Perla C. Maglinte, Cesar M. Cagang, and
Vivencia S. Te1esforo based primarily on the testimony of participants in
the commission of the crime; and
Finally, whether or not the principle of conclusiveness of judgment in
Criminal Case No. 28331 binds the Sandiganbayan in this case.
This Court denies the Petition.
I
Although not expressly stated by the Sandiganbayan, petitioners Alzate,
Maglinte, and co-accused Zoleta were convicted of estafa under Article
315, paragraph 2(a), and not 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code as claimed by
petitioners. Article 315, paragraph 2(a) provides that estafa may be
committed:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
Thus, the elements of estafa by means of deceit are:
a. That there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent
means.
b. That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must
be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud.
c. That the offended party must have relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act, or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to
part with his money or property because of the false pretense,
fraudulent act, or fraudulent means.
d. That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered
damage. 122 (Emphasis in the original)
The elements of the crime were proved. That the documents were
falsified was amply established by the evidence. The documents were
falsified before the disbursement, which was allowed based on the
falsified documents.
The conspiracy among petitioners Alzate, Maglinte, and co-accused Zoleta
to commit the crime was also sufficiently established. Under the Revised
Penal Code, there is a conspiracy "when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
it."123
12
It is well established that conspiracy may be inferred. In Alvizo v.
Sandiganbayan,124
Direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy. It need not be shown that
the parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter
into and pursue a common design. The existence of the assent of minds
which is involved in a conspiracy may be, and from the secrecy of the
crime, usually must be, inferred by the court from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are
merely parts of some complete whole. If it is proved that two or more
persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though apparently
independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a
closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiments, then
a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to
concert means is proved. Thus, the proof of conspiracy, which is
essentially hatched under cover and out of view of others than those
directly concerned, is perhaps most frequently made by evidence of a
chain of circumstances only.125 (Citations omitted)
In People v. Romualdez,126 this Court explained:
It is alleged in the information that the accused conspired together and
acted in common accord in the commission of the crime. As the Attorney-
General says, a conspiracy can seldom be proved except by circumstantial
evidence, but once it is proved, the acts of one of the conspirators are the
acts of all. (U.S. vs. Ipil, 27 Phil., 530.)
"The existence of the assent of minds which IS involved in a conspiracy
may be, from the secrecy of the crime, usually must be, inferred by the
jury from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together,
apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole.
If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that
their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and
cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual
meeting among them to concert means is proved. Evidence of actual
participation, rather than of passive acquiescence, is desirable. But proof
of acquiescence in, or consent to, the actions of others is relevant to show
the criminal intention of the passive party, and generally the smallest
degree of consent or collusion among parties lets in the act or words of
one against the others." (Underhill on Criminal Evidence, pp. 795, 796.)
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the conclusions of the trial court
are fully justified by the evidence.127
Petitioners claim that the Sandiganbayan only surmised petitiOner
Maglinte's involvement based on her advising witness Gadian to source
the funds from the CDF of then Congressman Chiongbian.128 To the
contrary, the records amply support the conclusion that petitioner
Maglinte conspired in the scheme in ways in addition to the instruction
regarding the CDF of then Congressman Chiongbian. Gadian testified that
Maglinte instructed for additional money to be requested and given to
other officials, called "suso," to facilitate the approval of the request:
A Madame Perla told me to add P10,000.00 each for the "suso".
� �
Q When she said that, what did you reply to her, if any?
� �
A "Okey, I wil[l] tell Ate Beng."
� �
Q Having given that answer, what did you do afterwards?
� �
13
 A I went back to Ate Beng and informed her that Mam Perla
requested for additional amount of P10,000.00 each for the
"suso".
� �
Q What was the answer of accused Zoleta, if any?
� �
129
A "Make it double so that the processing will be expedited."
Gadian's testimony also shows that petitioner Maglinte checked and
reviewed the falsified documents, then accompanied witness Gadian to
bring the falsified documents to the office of the Vice Governor,130and
that after the disbursed check was signed by Cagang,131 it was brought to
Maglinte's office.132
Likewise, petitioners claim that the Sandiganbayan only surmised
petitioner Alzate's participation because he received most of the illegally
disbursed funds.133 To the contrary, the Sandiganbayan's finding was
based on the fact that the illegal disbursement was set into motion
specifically for Alzate's wedding:
Q You mentioned you make fictitious documents, could you
inform us why you made those fake letter requests, fake
proposals and fake disbursement vouchers?
� �
A Because I was called by Tatang Purisima to go inside the room
where Felipe Constantino, Juanito Purisima including Amelia
Carmela Zoleta were. When I entered the room, Tatang
Purisima said, "anak, magprepare ka ng documents para sa
kasal ni Eugene."
� �
Q Who is this "Eugene" that you mentioned?
� �
A Eugene, the ex-board member of the province, mam."134
Further, Alzate received the P200,000.00 without hesitation:
[W]hile there is no direct evidence to show that accused Alzate
participated in the preparation and planning of the illegal/fictitious
disbursement, the records, however, showed that when accused Zoleta
called up and informed accused Alzate of the availability of the money,
the latter immediately proceeded to the vice governor's office and there
and then, without any hesitation, received the PhP200,000.00 from the
late Vice Governor Constantino, in the presence of Gadian, Tangan,
accused Zoleta and Board Member Purisima. This act of accused Alzate
receiving his share in the misappropriation, is a clear indication that, true
to the plan of the late vice governor, he was part of the conspiracy in the
anomalous transaction for the purpose of financing accused Alzate's
forthcoming wedding and hence, the "biggest" beneficiary thereof.135
As for Zoleta, the prosecution established that she regularly instructed
Gadian to make fictitious documents136 and that she directed Gadian and
Tangan to falsify the documents.137 She gave instructions throughout the
process of obtaining the disbursed cash, such as directing that the
amounts to be given to the other officials or "suso" be doubled for faster
processing of the disbursement.138 She reviewed the falsified documents
before they were given to Maglinte.139 She instructed Tangan to
accompany a dummy payee to receive and encash the disbursed
check.140 Once the cash was obtained, Zoleta received it from Gadian. 141
14
The foregoing is sufficient to establish the participation of petitioners
Alzate and Maglinte in the conspiracy.
II
Where there are circumstances that should have alerted heads of offices
to exercise more diligence in the performance of their duties, they cannot
escape liability by claiming that they relied on good faith on the
submissions of their subordinates. In such cases, this Court's ruling in Arias
v. Sandiganbayan does not apply. In Rivera v. People,142 this Court held:
Arias v. Sandiganbayan is not applicable in the present case
Perez invokes the Arias doctrine which states that "[a]ll heads of offices
have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good
faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into
negotiations." He contends that he merely relied on the vouchers and
reports prepared by his subordinates and released the payments in good
faith.
To clarify, the Arias doctrine is not an absolute rule. It is not a magic cloak
that can be used as a cover by a public officer to conceal himself in the
shadows of his subordinates and necessarily escape liability. Thus, this
ruling cannot be applied to exculpate the petitioners in view of the
peculiar circumstances in this case which should have prompted them, as
heads of offices, to exercise a higher degree of circumspection and,
necessarily, go beyond what their subordinates had prepared.
The case of Cruz v. Sandiganbayan carved out an exception to the Arias
doctrine, stating that:
Unlike in Arias, however, there exists in the present case an exceptional
circumstance which should have prodded petitioner, if he were out to
protect the interest of the municipality he swore to serve, to be curious
and go beyond what his subordinates prepared or recommended. In fine,
the added reason contemplated in Arias which would have put petitioner
on his guard and examine the check/s and vouchers with some degree of
circumspection before signing the same was obtaining in this
case.143 (Citations omitted)
In Cruz v. Sandiganbayan,144 discrepancy between the names indicated in
the checks and in the disbursement vouchers should have alerted
petitioner:
We refer to the unusual fact that the checks issued as payment for
construction materials purchased by the municipality were not made
payable to the supplier, Kelly Lumber, but to petitioner himself even as
the disbursement vouchers attached thereto were in the name of Kelly
Lumber. The discrepancy between the names indicated in the checks, on
one hand, and those in the disbursement vouchers, on the other, should
have alerted petitioner �if he were conscientious of his duties as he
purports to be �that something was definitely amiss. The fact that the
checks for the municipality's purchases were made payable upon his order
should, without more, have prompted petitioner to examine the same
further together with the supporting documents attached to them, and
not rely heavily on the recommendations of his subordinates. 145
Here, there were discrepancies in the voucher and the check, which
should have prodded petitioners Escobar, Telesforo, and Cagang to
examine the supporting documents for the fund disbursement. Thus, as
properly held by the Sandiganbayan, Arias is not applicable, and
petitioners Escobar, Telesforo, and Cagang were properly found guilty of
malversation through negligence.
III
This Court has repeatedly held that the essence of due process is an
opportunity to be heard.146
As pointed out by respondent, petitioner Alzate had four (4) years to
prepare to present evidence, yet he only asked for the opportunity to
present additional evidence via a motion for reconsideration after the
Sandiganbayan had already admitted all the formal offers of evidence of
the accused.147 Thus, the Sandiganbayan properly held:
15
It should be pointed out that inasmuch as accused-movant Alzate invoked
the significance of said entry and even testified and marked it as his Exhibit
"2-A", the burden of proof is shifted to him to establish the interpretation
thereof that he wants to be appreciated by the Court through the
presentation of the said DBP lady teller. Thusly, his failure to present said
DBP lady teller as his witness through the compulsory process
of subpoena, during all the time that he testified for his defense from
September 6, 2010, until March 7, 2011, or for a period of six (6) months,
militates against his prayer for a new trial just to present and produce
evidence relating to the date of subject check's encashment. While the
records show that accused-movant Alzate filed a Motion to Allow Accused
Alzate to Present Additional Witnesses (With Request for Issuance of
Subpoena or Motion to Allow Accused Alzate to Enter into Stipulation of
Facts with the Prosecution) dated September 16, 2011, this motion was,
however, denied by the Court in its Resolution of October 17, 2011, on the
ground that the motion failed to comply with the requirement under
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court on notice and hearing of
motions because the motion was not set for hearing.
Moreover, the said machine validated entry appearing on the subject
check, marked as Exhibit "Q", is not a newly discovered evidence
considering that said evidence was already presented by the prosecution
and accused-movant Alzate, at the time he took the witness stand, was
already aware of the existence thereof and even marked it as his Exhibit
"2-A" and hence, he is not entitled to the remedy of a new trial pursuant
to the provision of Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of [C]ourt which
provides as follows�
"SEC. 2. Grounds for a new trial. - The court shall grant a new trial on any
of the following grounds:
(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the
substantive rights of the accused have been committed during
the trial;
(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which
accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered
and produced at the trial and which if introduced and
admitted would probably change its judgment."148
Petitioners do not refute the foregoing circumstances and fail to establish
that petitioner Alzate was not afforded ample opportunity to be heard.
Thus, the claim that the Sandiganbayan violated his constitutional right to
due process has no legal or factual basis and must be rejected.
IV
The Local Government Code provides that local officials, other than those
considered accountable officers by reason of their duties, may be held
accountable for local government funds:
Section 340. Persons Accountable for Local Government Funds. �Any
officer of the local government unit whose duty permits or requires the
possession or custody of local government funds shall be accountable and
responsible for the safekeeping thereof in conformity with the provisions
of this Title. Other local officers who, though not accountable by the
nature of their duties, may likewise be similarly held accountable and
responsible for local government funds through their participation in the
use or application thereof.
Thus, local government officials, such as petitioners Escobar and
Telesforo, may become accountable officers by reason of their
participation in the application of public funds.
Petitioners claim that to be accountable officers, they must receive and
acquire custody or control over government funds or property by reason
of their office and they must be required to account for them.149 Thus,
only the Provincial Treasurer is an accountable officer over the funds
disbursed under the Local Government Code. However, this argument is
unmeritorious. In Zoleta v. Sandiganbayan,150 this Court applied Section
16
340 of the Local Government Code and held officials whose signatures
were necessary for disbursement of funds as accountable officers:
Third, Vice-Governor Constantino and Camanay were accountable public
officers. Under the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, an
accountable public officer is a public officer who, by reason of his office,
is accountable for public funds or property. The Local Government Code
expanded this definition with regard to local government officials. Section
340 of the [Local Government Code] reads:
Section 340. Persons Accountable for Local Government Funds. �Any
officer of the local government unit whose duty permits or requires the
possession or custody of local government funds shall be accountable and
responsible for the safekeeping thereof in conformity with the provisions
of this title. Other local officials, though not accountable by the nature
of their duties, may likewise be similarly held accountable and
responsible for local government funds through their participation in the
use or application thereof. (Emphasis ours.)
Local government officials become accountable public officers either (1)
because of the nature of their functions; or (2) on account of their
participation in the use or application of public funds.
As a required standard procedure, the signatures of, among others, the
Vice-Governor and the Provincial Accountant are needed before any
disbursement of public funds can be made. No checks can be prepared
and no payment can be effected without their signatures on a
disbursement voucher and the corresponding check. In other words, any
disbursement and release of public funds require their approval. Thus,
Constantino and Camanay, in their capacities as Vice-Governor and
Provincial Accountant, had control and responsibility over the subject
funds.151 (Citation omitted)
In this case, as in Zoleta, as part of standard procedure, it was required
that petitioner Telesforo certify that the supporting documents were
complete, and that petitioner Escobar sign them before a check could be
approved for disbursement. Thus, as in Zoleta, petitioners Escobar and
Telesforo are accountable officers.
V
Well aware of the possibility that the testimonies of Gadian and Tangan
would be impugned, the Sandiganbayan took it upon itself to exercise
extreme caution in evaluating them. Thus, this Court quotes with
affirmation the finding of the Sandiganbayan:
Of course, cognizant that the versions threshed out by the admissions
made by Gadian and Tangan who were particeps criminis or participants
in the commission of the crime charged may be said to emanate from
polluted sources, the Court, extra-careful and exercising extreme caution
in assaying their stories, finds no reason to shun or set aside the said
admissions as wholly unbelievable. In fact, their candor in coming forward
to own their complicity in the commission of the crime here charged is, in
a way, a guarantee of their truthfulness. Thus, in People v. Bayona[,] it was
stated that -
"... As a matter of fact, the candid admission of an accused, of his
participation in a crime, is a guaranty that if he will testify in court he will
testify truthfully; so that even if an accused actually participated in the
offense charged in the information, he may still be made a
witness.Individuals who are candid enough to admit their guilt are
expected to testify truthfully and it is from that circumstance that all the
facts involved shall be expected to be truthfully disclosed by him."
Moreover, the fact that Gadian and Tangan had participated in the
commission of the crime charged in the information and as such equally
guilty thereof, does not disqualify them to testify in the proceeding or to
render their testimony ineffectual if competent and admissible. Apropos
is the ruling of the Supreme Court in People v. Binsol, et al.-
"The fact that a person has not been previously charged or included in the
information even if he appears to have taken part in the commission of
the crime does not, and cannot, prevent the government prosecutor from
17
utilizing him as a witness if he believes that he is the best witness that can
testify as to the commission of the crime. In the discharge of his duties, a
government prosecutor is free to choose the witness or witnesses he
deems more qualified or competent to testify for the prosecution and
there is nothing either in the law or in the rules that would require him to
first include him in the information and then later secure his discharge
before he could present him as a government witness. The rule therefore
relative to the right of the government prosecutor to utilize a person who
has participated in the commission of a crime as a witness for the
prosecution, is as follows: (1) when an offense is committed by more than
one person, it is the duty of the fiscal to include all of them in the
complaint or information ... (2) if the fiscal desires to utilize one of those
charged with the offense as a government witness, the fiscal may ask the
court to discharge one of them after complying with the conditions
prescribed by law. . . (3) there is nothing in the rule from which it can be
inferred that before a person can be presented as a government witness
in the information that he be first included as a co-accused in the
information, for the fiscal is free to produce as a witness anyone whom he
believes can testify to the truth of the crime charged . . . and (4) the failure
to follow the requirements of the rule relative to the use of a person,
himself a particeps criminis, as a government witness does not violate the
due process clause of the [C]onstitution, nor render his testimony
ineffectual if otherwise competent and admissible[.]"152 (Emphasis in the
original, citations omitted)
Petitioners have not presented any cogent reason to reverse the
Sandiganbayan's appreciation of Gadian's and Tangan's testimonies. In
any case, the issue of the credibility of witnesses Gadian and Tangan are
matters of evidence, not proper for a petition for review on certiorari.
VI
The principle of conclusiveness has no application in criminal cases such
as this.
This Court has held that conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation
of issues already litigated and settled in litigation between identical
parties in different causes of action,153 and on occasion, has applied this
principle in criminal cases.154 However, this Court takes this occasion to
reiterate that the concept ofres judicata is a civil law doctrine, not to be
applied in criminal proceedings, except with respect to civil cases
impliedly instituted. This is not novel.
In Tecson v. Sandiganbayan,155 the petitioner maintained that considering
the rule prohibiting the relitigation of matters resolved by competent
judicial authority, the dismissal of an administrative case against him was
conclusive and binding upon the parties. This Court rejected this
contention:
[R]es judicata is a doctrine of civil law. It thus has no bearing in the criminal
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. Second, it is a basic principle of
the law on public officers that a public official or employee is under a
three-fold responsibility for violation of duty or for a wrongful act or
omission. This simply means that a public officer may be held civilly,
criminally, and administratively liable for a wrongful doing. Thus, if such
violation or wrongful act results in damages to an individual, the public
officer may be held civilly liable to reimburse the injured party. If the law
violated attaches a penal sanction, the erring officer may be punished
criminally. Finally, such violation may also lead to suspension, removal
from office, or other administrative sanctions. This administrative liability
is separate and distinct from the penal and civil liabilities. Thus, the
dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a
criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts, which were the subject
of the administrative complaint.156
In Asistio y Consino v. People,157 the petitioner invoked res judicata as a
bar for her from being prosecuted for violation of Section 46 of Republic
Act No. 6938, or the Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee
Members, because she had been previously acquitted in a criminal case
for falsification of a private document. This Court held:
The Court also finds no merit in petitioner's new argument that the
prosecution of her case before the RTC for violation of Section 46 of RA
6938 in Criminal Case No. 07-197750 is barred by res judicata because the
18
MeTC of Manila, Branch 22, in a Resolution dated August 13, 2012,
granted her demurrer to evidence and acquitted her in a criminal case for
falsification of private document in Criminal Case No. 370119-20-CR. In
support of her flawed argument, petitioner points out that the private
complainants [officers and directors of the Cooperative] and the subject
matter [unreported sales profits of Coca-Cola products] of both cases are
the same, and that the case for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 is
actually and necessarily included in the case for falsification of private
documents.
the claim that even where the subject matter differs, the erroneous
application of the law is forever binding on those parties. Thus, this
argument cannot be countenanced.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The
Sandiganbayan August 22, 2012 Decision and January 8, 2013 Resolution
in Criminal Case No. 28293 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

At the outset, res judicata is a doctrine of civil law and thus has no bearing
on criminal proceedings. At any rate, petitioner's argument is incidentally
related to double jeopardy which embraces a prohibition against being
tried for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included
in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.158(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Likewise, in Trinidad v. Marcelo,159 this Court reiterated that res

judicata is a civil law doctrine and has no application in criminal
proceedings. In that case, this Court rejected the argument that since the
Ombudsman had twice found there was no sufficient basis to indict
petitioner in earlier, similar cases, res judicata barred the reinvestigation.

It may be argued that these cases are not on all fours with the case at
hand. Nonetheless, except with respect to civil cases impliedly
instituted, res judicata is not applicable in criminal proceedings. This Court
has expressly stated this rule multiple times. At most, the applicable
concept of res judicata is that of res judicata in prison grey as double
jeopardy under Rule 117, Section 7, which is not in question here.

Indeed, if this Court accepts the argument that conclusiveness of

judgment bars this case considering that the Sandiganbayan already found
that Escobar is not an accountable officer, which was an error of law in
light of Zoleta v. Sandiganbayan, it will lead to an absurd effect. Once a
person has been acquitted of a crime, despite the ground being a question
of law resolved erroneously, once that decision is final, that person can
commit the exact same crime against the same party with impunity, under
19

G.R. No. L-19272 January 25, 1967
JAIME HERNANDEZ, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
DELFIN ALBANO, HERMOGENES CONCEPCION, JR., City Fiscal of Manila
and CARLOS C. GONZALES, Second Assistant City Fiscal of
Mania, respondents-appellees.
San Juan, Africa & Benedicto for petitioner-appellant.
City Fiscal Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr. and Assistant Fiscal E. S. Arguelles
for and in their own behalf.
Valera Law Office for respondent-appellee Albano.
SANCHEZ, J.:
This case has its roots in a complaint lodged with the Office of the City
Fiscal of Manila, by respondent Delfin Albano, quondam Congressman
for the lone district of Isabela, against petitioner Jaime Hernandez, then
the Secretary of Finance and Presiding Officer of the Monetary Board of
the Central Bank — for violation of Article 216 of the Revised Penal
Code, Commonwealth Act 6261 or Republic Act 265.2 The complaint
revolves around petitioner's alleged shareholdings in the University of
the East, Bicol Electric Co., Rural Bank of Nueva Caceres, DMG inc., and
University of Nueva Caceres and the claim that said corporations
obtained dollar allocations from the Central Bank, through the Monetary
Board, during petitioner's incumbency as presiding officer thereof. The
charges involved were docketed in the City Fiscal's Office, as —
I.S. No. 11379 — re petitioner's holdings in Rural Bank of Nueva
Caceres;
I.S. No. 11380 — re petitioner's holdings in the University of
Nueva Caceres;
I.S. No. 11381 — re petitioner's holdings in the Bicol Electric Co.;
I.S. No. 11382 — re petitioner's holdings in the University of the
East; and
I.S. No. 11383 — re petitioner's holdings in the DMG, Inc.
At the joint investigation of the foregoing charges before respondent
Carlos C. Gonzales, the investigating Fiscal, complainant moved to
exclude therefrom the alleged violation of Article 216 of the Revised
Penal Code because the applicability of this statute was in issue
of Solidum, et al. vs. Hernandez, L-16570, at the time pending before this
Court, but which had since been resolved by us — February 28, 1963 —
adversely to Hernandez. Fiscal Gonzales granted the motion.
Then, petitioner sought the dismissal of the remaining charges upon the
averment that (a) violation of Article VII, Section 11, subsection (2) of the
Constitution, punishable under Commonwealth Act 626, should be
prosecuted at the domicile of the private enterprises affected there by;
and that (b) violation of Section 13 of Republic Act 265 is not criminal in
nature. Dismissal was denied; reconsideration thereof failed.
To restrain the respondent Fiscals from continuing the investigation,
petitioner went to the Court of First Instance of Manila on certiorari and
prohibition with a prayer for preliminary injunction.3 The decision dated
October 13, 1961, reached upon a stipulation of facts, dismissed the
petition, with costs.
Petitioner appealed.
1. Stripped of inconsequential issues, the forefront question thrust upon
us is whether the prosecuting arm of the City of Manila should be
restrained from proceeding with the investigation of the charges levelled
against petitioner.
By statute, the prosecuting officer of the City of Manila and his assistants
are empowered to investigate crimes committed within the city's
territorial jurisdiction. Not a mere privilege, it is the sworn duty of a
Fiscal to conduct an investigation of a criminal charge filed with his
1
office. The power to investigate postulates the other obligation on the
part of the Fiscal to investigate promptly and file the case of as speedily.
Public interest — the protection of society — so demands. Agreeably to
the foregoing, a rule — now of long standing and frequent application —
was formulated that ordinarily criminal prosecution may not be blocked
by court prohibition or injunction.4 Really, if at every turn investigation
of a crime will be halted by a court order, the administration of criminal
justice will meet with an undue setback.5 Indeed, the investigative power
of the Fiscal may suffer such a tremendous shrinkage that it may end up
in hollow sound rather than as a part and parcel of the machinery of
criminal justice.
We are not to be understood, however, as saying that the heavy hand of
a prosecutor may not be shackled — under all circumstances. The rule is
not an invariable one. Extreme cases may, and actually do, exist where
relief in equity may be availed of to stop a purported enforcement of a
criminal law where it is necessary (a) for the orderly administration of
justice; (b) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an
oppressive and vindictive manner; (c) to avoid multiplicity of actions;6 (d)
to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights; 7 and (e) in proper
cases, because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional, or was "held
invalid."8
With the foregoing guidelines, we come to grips with the legal problems
of
whether —
a. Violation of Art. VII, Section 11, Subsection (2) of the
Constitution punishable under C.A. 626, should be prosecuted at
the domicile of the private enterprise affected by the violation;
and
b. Violation of Section 13 of Republic Act 265 is criminal in
nature.
2. The constitutional prescription allegedly violated, Article VII, Section
11(2), reads:
(2) The heads of departments and chiefs of bureaus or offices
and their assistants shall not, during their continuance engage in
the practice of any profession, or intervene, directly or indirectly,
in the management or control of any private which in any way
may be affected by the function of their office; nor shall they
directly or indirectly, be financially interested in any contract
with the Government, or any subdivision or instrumentality
thereof.
Commonwealth Act 626 provides the penal sanction for a violation of
this constitutional precept, i.e., a fine of not than P5,000 or
imprisonment of not more than 2 years, or both.
The legal mandate in Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of the Court is
that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried
in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was
committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took
place."9 This principle is fundamental. 10 Thus, where an offense is wholly
committed outside the territorial limits wherein the court operates, said
court is powerless to try the case. For, "the rule is that one cannot be
held to answer for any crime committed by him except in the
jurisdiction where it was committed." 11
Similarly, the City Fiscal of Manila and his assistants — as such — may
not investigate a crime committed within the exclusive confines of, say,
Camarines Norte. This proposition offers no area for debate. Because,
said prosecuting officers would then be overreaching the territorial limits
of their jurisdiction, and, in the process, step on the shoes of those who,
by statute, are empowered and obligated to perform that task. They
cannot unlawfully encroach upon powers and prerogatives of the Fiscals
of the province aforesaid.
Petitioner seeks to bar respondent Fiscals from investigating the
constitutional violation charged. His claim is that — except for his
holdings in Manila's University of the East — the Manila Fiscals are
powerless to investigate him. His reason is that the essence of the crime
is his possession of prohibited interests in corporations domiciled
2
in Naga City (Rural Bank of Nueva Caceres, University of Nueva Caceres
and Bicol Electric Co.,) and in Mandaluyong, Rizal (DMG Inc.); and that
the place where the crime is to be prosecuted is "the situs of such
shares."
In effect, petitioner asks us to carve out an exception to the rule that
said Fiscals may not be enjoined from conducting the inquiry aforesaid.
We would not hesitate to state that, if it clearly appears that the crime
or any essential ingredient thereof was committed outside the
boundaries of the City of Manila, petitioner's argument should merit
serious consideration. For, orderly administration of justice so demands;
multiplicity of criminal actions is to be obviated; the long arm of the law
cannot be used in an oppressive or vindictive manner.
But let us take a look at the admitted facts of this case. Petitioner himself
concedes that he stands "charged with allegedly having shareholdings in
the Bicol Electric Co., Rural Bank of Nueva Caceres, University of Nueva
Caceres, DMG Inc., and the University of the East, and a that the said
corporations purportedly obtained doll or allocations from the Central
Bank thru the Monetary Board during the incumbency of respondent as
presiding officer thereof." 12
Petitioner relies on Black Eagle Mining Co. vs. Conroy et al., 221 Pac. 425,
426, thus —
Shares of stock are a peculiar kind of personal property, and are
unlike other classes of personal property in that the property
right of shares of stock can only be exercised or enforced where
the corporation is organized and has its place of business and can
exist only as an incident to and connected with the corporation,
and this class of property is inseparable from the domicile of the
corporation itself.
By no stretch can the cited case be taken as germane to the
controversial point here. It speaks of property right to shares of stock
which can only be enforced in the corporation's domicile. In the case at
bar, the charges are not directed against the corporations. Not mere
ownership of or title to shares is involved. Possession of prohibited
interests is but one of the essential components of the offense. As
necessary an ingredient thereof is the fact that petitioner was head of a
department — Secretary of Finance. So also, the fact that while head of
department and chairman of the Monetary Board he allegedly was
financially interested in the corporations aforesaid which so the dollar
allocations, and that he had to act officially, in his dual capacity, not in
Camarines Sur, but in Manila where he held his office.
Since criminal action must be instituted and tried in the place where the
crime or an essential ingredient there of, took place, it stands to reason
to say that the Manila under the facts obtained here, have jurisdiction to
investigate the violation complained of.
3. The other argument pressed upon us — that a violation of Section 13
of Republic Act 265 is not criminal in nature — furnishes no better
foundation.
Section 13 of Republic Act 265, allegedly violated by petitioner, recites:
SEC. 13. Withdrawal of persons having a personal interest. —
Whenever any person attending a meeting of the Monetary
Board has a personal interest of any sort in the discussion or
resolution of any given matter, or any of his business associates
or any of his relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity
or second degree of affinity has such an interest, said person may
not participate in the discussion or resolution of the matter and
must retire from the meeting during the deliberations thereon.
The minutes of the meeting shall note the withdrawals of the
member concerned.
The gravamen of petitioner's argument is that for a violation of Section
13 of the law aforesaid, Section 15 of the same statute provides "only for
a civil sanction." — "not a criminal sanction." Said Section 15 reads:
SEC. 15. Responsibility. — Any member of the Monetary Board or
officer or employee of the Central Bank who willfully violates this
3
 Act or who is guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his
duties shall be held liable for any loss or injury suffered by the
Bank as a result of such violation or negligence. ...
The nonsequitur is at once apparent. For, Section 34 of the same
Republic Act 265, in terms clear and certain and free from the taint of
ambiguity, provides the penal sanction.13 thus —
SEC. 34. Proceedings upon violation of laws and regulations. —
Whenever any person or entity willfully violates this Act or any
order, instruction, rule or regulation legally issued by the
Monetary Board, the person or persons responsible for such
violation shall be punished by a fine of not more than twenty
thousand pesos and by imprisonment of not more than five
years. ...
But, petitioner draws attention to the fact that Sections 13 and 15 both
fall under "Article II — The Monetary Board," of Chapter 1. —
"Establishment and Organization of the Central Bank of the Philippines,"
whereas Section 34 comes under the heading "B. — Department
Supervision and Examination" of "Article IV. — Departments of the
Central Bank." From this, petitioner puts forth the claim that the penal
provisions in Section 34 are "to be restricted to the matters
encompassed in that topic, that is, the supervision of banking
institutions."14 We are unable to join petitioner in this ipse
dixit pronouncement. And, for a number of reasons. First, because while
Section 15 provides for the civil liability "for any loss or injury suffered by
the (Central) Bank as a result of such violation," Section 34 prescribes the
penalty for the willful violation of "this Act," irrespective of whether the
bank suffered any loss or not. Second, the entire statute is not in
piecemeal style — but as a whole. Effort be exerted "to make every part
effective, harmonious sensible." 15 And so construing we find that the
one refers to the civil liability at the same time that the other specifies a
separate criminal liability. Indeed, it could well be said that the penal
sanction in Section 34 is an "additional incentive toward obedience of
the mandates of the law." 16 One does not preclude the other. Third, We
observe that the penal provisions of Republic Act 265 were placed in
three successive sections thereof, Sections 32, 33 and 34. Section 32
penalizes any owner, agent, manager or other officers in charge of any
banking who willfully refuses to file the required reports to have the
bank's affairs examined. Section 33 penalizes the making of a false
statement to the Monetary Board. Section 34 provides for the penalty to
be imposed upon any person who violates, among others, the provisions
of said Act. This grouping of penalties obviously was intended to present
a clearer picture of the liabilities which the Central Bank Act specifies,
and thus avoid confusion. 17
All else failing, petitioner summons to his aid the Congressional Record
on the deliberations on House Bill 1704 (which later became Republic
Act 265), to wit:
Mr. Topacio Nueno. On page 6, Section 13 - prohibiting relatives
from transacting business. I should like to insert a punishment, a
penal clause. On line 11, add the following: "Violation of this
section is punishable by dismissal and fine of from five thousand
to ten thousand pesos."
The Speaker. What does the Committee say?
Mr. Roy. We cannot accept the amendment.
The Speaker. When we come to the provision with regard to the
penalties, the gentleman from Manila may propose that
amendment, in order that they may be included in the same
section.
Mr. Topacio Nueno I reserve that amendment later on.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Laurel. May we be informed which of the three offenses
mentioned in Sections 32, 33, and 34 is regarded to be the most
serious? I am asking this question because I notice that the
penalties imposed are not the same. Which of the three offenses
4
 covered by the three sections I have mentioned is the most In the light of the considerations, we vote to affirm the judgment under
serious? review. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.

Mr. Roy. Under Section 32, the offenses intended to be

punishable are specified. It is in Section 34 where the law is very
broad. It provides: 'Whenever any person or entity willfully
violates this Act or any order, instruction, rule or regulation
legally issued by the Monetary Board, ....' I think the court will
determine the gravity of the offense. Mr. Speaker, because there
are many provisions of law; and the rules and regulations of the
Monetary Board will vary in their importance and in the
seriousness of the consequences of the violation. So we will
leave to the Court the determination of the gravity of the
offense. That is why the range of penalties provided under
Section 34 is not more than ten thousand pesos and by
imprisonment of not more than five years. ...

Congressional Record, First Congress, Third Session, Vol. 3, pp. 1259,

1281.

Petitioner notes the failure of Congressman Topacio Nueno to reiterate

his proposed amendment to Section 13 by providing therein a penal
clause. Paying full respect to the congressional intent as it may be
reflected in the debates, nonetheless it seems to us that nothing in the
quoted transcript of the congressional record may be reasonably
deemed as foreclosing criminal action. That the announced amendment
was not submitted, is perfectly understandable. There was no need
therefor. For, as Congressman Roy aptly puts it (in the aforesaid record),
"Under Section 32 the offenses intended to be punishable are specified.
It is under section 34 where the law is very broad, which simply means
that any person — and this includes the Chairman of the Monetary
Board — who "wilfully violates this Act," shall be punished.

The respondent Fiscals, indeed justifiably relied or Section 34 in pursuing

their investigation for a violation Section 13. For Section 15 is not
intended to write off from the said Section 34. To do so is to sanction
pointless rigidity in statutory construction.
5

[G.R. No. 69863-65 : December 10, 1990.]
192 SCRA 183
LINO BROCKA, BENJAMIN CERVANTES, COSME GARCIA, RODOLFO
SANTOS, VALENTINO SALIPSIP, RICARDO VEGA, ERIC MARIANO, JOSE
EMMANUEL OYALES, RONNIE MATTA, ALFREDO VIAJE, RUBEN
EUGENIO, REYNALDO ORTIZ, ORLANDO ORTIZ, NOEL REYES, EDUARDO
IMPERIAL, NESTOR SARMIENTO, FRANCO PALISOC, VIRGILIO DE
GUZMAN, ALBERTO REYES, JESSIE PINILI, ROMULO AUGUIS,
DOMINADOR RESURRECION III, RONNIE LAYGO, ROSAURO ROQUE,
CLARENCE SORIANO, OCTAVO DEPAWA, CARLITO LA TORRE, SEVERNO
ILANO, JR., DOMINGO CAJIPE, ALAN ALEGRE, RAMON MARTINEZ, MA.
GILDA HERNANDEZ, EDNA P. VILLANUEVA, DOLLY S. CANU,
MELQUIADES C. ATIENZA, ELIGIO P. VERA CRUZ, ROGER C. BAGAN,
ABUNDIO M. CALISTE, Petitioners, vs. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, MAJ.
GENERAL FIDEL V. RAMOS, BRIG. GENERAL PEDRO BALBANERO, COL.
ABAD, COL. DAWIS, SERGIO APOSTOL, P/LT, RODOLFO M. GARCIA and
JUDGE RICARDO TENSUAN, Respondents.
DECISION
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition was originally filed on February 13, 1985 to secure the
release of petitioners on habeas corpus and to permanently enjoin the
City Fiscal of Quezon City from investigating charges of "Inciting to
Sedition" against petitioners Lino Brocka, Benjamin Cervantes, Cosme
Garcia and Rodolfo Santos, (hereafter Brocka, et al.). On learning that the
corresponding informations for this offense has been filed by the City
Fiscal against them on February 11, 1985, a supplemental petition was
filed on February 19, 1985 (p. 51, Rollo) to implead the Presiding Judge, 1
and to enjoin the prosecution of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-38023, Q-38024
and Q-38025 (p. 349, Rollo) and the issuance of warrants for their arrests,
including their arraignment. Since then President Ferdinand E. Marcos had
ordered the provisional release of Brocka, et al., the issue on habeas
corpus has become moot and academic (p. 396, Rollo). We shall thus focus
on the question of whether or not the prosecution of the criminal cases
for Inciting to Sedition may lawfully be enjoined.:-cralaw
Petitioners were arrested on January 28, 1985 by elements of the
Northern Police District following the forcible and violent dispersal of a
demonstration held in sympathy with the jeepney strike called by the
Alliance of Concerned Transport Organization (ACTO). Thereafter, they
were charged with Illegal Assembly in Criminal Cases Nos. 37783, 37787
and 37788 with Branch 108, Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Quezon City. 2
Except for Brocka, et al. who were charged as leaders of the offense of
Illegal Assembly and for whom no bail was recommended, the other
petitioners were released on bail of P3,000.00 each. Brocka, et al.'s
provisional release was ordered only upon an urgent petition for bail for
which daily hearings from February 1-7, 1985 were held.
However, despite service of the order of release on February 9, 1985,
Brocka, et al. remained in detention, respondents having invoked a
Preventive Detention Action (PDA) allegedly issued against them on
January 28, 1985 (p. 6, Rollo). Neither the original, duplicate original nor
certified true copy of the PDA was ever shown to them (p. 367, Rollo).
Brocka, et al. were subsequently charged on February 11, 1985 with
Inciting to Sedition, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-38023, Q-38024
and Q-38025 (p. 349, Rollo), without prior notice to their counsel (p. 7,
Rollo). The original informations filed recommended no bail (p. 349,
Rollo). The circumstances surrounding the hasty filing of this second
offense are cited by Brocka, et al. (quoting from a separate petition filed
on their behalf in G.R. Nos. 69848-50 entitled "Sedfrey A. Ordoñez vs. Col.
Julian Arzaga, et al."), as follows:
"x x x
"6. The sham' character of the inquest examination concocted by all
respondents is starkly bizarre when we consider that as early as 10:30
A.M. today, February 11, 1985, Benjamin Cervantes was able to contact
undersigned petitioner by phone informing counsel that said Benjamin
Cervantes and the 4 other persons who are the subjects of this petition
1
will be brought before the Quezon City Fiscal at 2:30 for undisclosed
reasons: subsequently, another phone call was received by petitioning
counsel informing him that the appearance of Benjamin Cervantes et al.
was to be at 2:00 P.M. When petitioning counsel arrived in the office of
Assistant City Fiscal Arturo Tugonon, the complainants' affidavits had not
yet been received by any of the panel of three assistant city fiscals,
although the five persons under detention were already in the office of
said assistant fiscal as early as 2:00 P.M. It was only at 3:00 when a
representative of the military arrived bringing with him alleged
statements of complainants against Lino Broka (sic) et al. for alleged
inciting to sedition, whereupon undersigned counsel asked respondent
Colonel Agapito Abad 'who ordered the detained persons to be brought
to the office of Assistant Fiscal Arturo Tugonon since there were no
charges on file;' and said Colonel Agapito Abad said aloud: 'I only received
a telephone call from Colonel Arzaga about 11:00 A.M. to bring the
detained persons today — I am only the custodian.' At 3:15, petitioning
counsel inquired from the Records Custodian when the charges against
Lino Broka (sic) had been officially received and he was informed that the
said charges were never coursed through the Records Office.
"7. Under the facts narrated above, respondents have conspired to use
the strong arm of the law and hatched the nefarious scheme to deprive
Lino Broka (sic) et al. the right to bail because the utterances allegedly
constituting inciting to sedition under Article 142 of the Revised Penal
Code are, except for varying nuances, almost verbatim the same
utterances which are the subject of Criminal Cases No. 37783, 37787 and
37788 and for which said detained persons are entitled to be released on
bail as a matter of constitutional right. Among the utterances allegedly
made by the accused and which the respondents claimed to be violative
of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code are: 'Makiisa sa mga drivers,
"Makiisa sa aming layunin, "Digmaang bayan ang sagot sa kahirapan,' Itigil
ang pakikialam ng imperyalismo sa Pilipinas,' 'Rollback ng presyo ng langis
sa 95 Centavos.' (See Annex B)
"8. That when petitioning counsel and other members of the defense
panel requested that they be given 7 days within which said counsel may
confer with their clients — the detained persons named above, the panel
of assistant fiscals demanded that said detained persons should sign a
'waiver' of their rights under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a
condition for the grant of said request, which is a harassing requirement
considering that Lino Broka (sic) et al. were already under the detention,
albeit illegally, and they could not have waived the right under Rule 125
which they did not enjoy at the time the ruling was made by the panel of
assistant city fiscals." (pp. 4-6, Rollo in G.R. 69848-50).
They were released provisionally on February 14, 1985, on orders of then
President F. E. Marcos. The circumstances of their release are narrated in
Our resolution dated January 26, 1985, as quoted in the Solicitor General's
Manifestation as follows:
"G.R. Nos. 69848-50 (Sedfrey A. Ordoñez, Petitioner, vs. Col. Julian Arzaga,
et al., Respondents). — Petitioner Sedfrey A. Ordoñez filed this petition
for habeas corpus in behalf of Lino Brocka, Benjamin Cervantes, Cosme
Garcia, Alexander Luzano, and Rodolfo Santos, who were all detained
under a Preventive Detention Action (PDA) issued by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos on January 28, 1985. They were charged in three
separate informations of the crime of illegal assembly under Art. 146,
paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by PD 1834. On
February 7, 1985, the Honorable Miriam Defensor Santiago, Regional Trial
Judge of Quezon City, issued a resolution in the above criminal cases,
directing the release of the five accused on bail of P6,000.00 for each of
them, and from which resolution the respondent fiscals took no appeal.
Immediately thereafter, the accused filed their respective bail bonds. This
notwithstanding, they continued to be held in detention by order of the
respondent colonels; and on February 11, 1985, these same accused were
'reinvestigated,' this time on charges of 'inciting to sedition' ** under Art.
142 of the Revised Penal Code, following which corresponding cases were
filed. The respondents complied with Our resolution requiring them, inter
alia, to make a RETURN of the writ of habeas corpus. In their RETURN, it
appeared that all the accused had already been released, four of them on
February 15, 1985 and one February 8, 1985. The petitioner, nevertheless,
argued that the petition has not become moot and academic because the
accused continue to be in the custody of the law under an invalid charge
of inciting to sedition." (p. 395, Rollo).
Hence, this petition.
2
Brocka, et al. contend that respondents' manifest bad faith and/or
harassment are sufficient bases for enjoining their criminal prosecution,
aside from the fact that the second offense of inciting to sedition is illegal,
since it is premised on one and the same act of attending and participating
in the ACTO jeepney strike. They maintain that while there may be a
complex crime from a single act (Art. 48, RTC), the law does not allow the
splitting of a single act into two offenses and filing two informations
therefor, further, that they will be placed in double jeopardy.
The primary issue here is the legality of enjoining the criminal prosecution
of a case, since the two other issues raised by Brocka, et al. are matters of
defense against the sedition charge.
We rule in favor of Brocka, et al. and enjoin their criminal prosecution for
the second offense of inciting to sedition.
Indeed, the general rule is that criminal prosecution may not be restrained
or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final. There are however
exceptions, among which are:
"a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the
accused (Hernandez vs. Albano, et al., L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA
95);
"b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43
Phil. 304; Hernandez vs. Albano, supra; Fortun vs. Labang, et al., L-38383,
May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607);
"c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice (De Leon
vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202);
"d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority
(Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62);
"e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation
(Young vs. Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385,
389);
"f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People and
Avendia, 109 Phil. 1140);
"g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. City
Judge, L-25795, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616);
"h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia
vs. Ocampo, CA-G.R. No. 4760, March 25, 1960);
"i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance (Recto vs. Castelo, 18 L.J. [1953], cited in Rañoa vs. Alvendia,
CA-G.R. No. 30720-R, October 8, 1962; Cf, Guingona, et al vs. City Fiscal,
L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577); and
"j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a
motion to quash on that ground has been denied (Salonga vs. Paño, et al.,
L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438).
"7. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to
prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners (Rodriguez
vs. Castelo, L-6374, August 1, 1958)." (cited in Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, p. 188, 1988 Ed.)
In the petition before Us, Brocka, et al. have cited the circumstances to
show that the criminal proceedings had become a case of persecution,
having been undertaken by state officials in bad faith.: nad
Respondents, on the other hand, had invoked a PDA in refusing Brocka, et
al.'s release from detention (before their release on orders of then Pres.
Marcos). This PDA was, however, issued on January 28, 1985, but was
invoked only on February 9, 1985 (upon receipt of the trial court's order
of release). Under the guidelines issued, PDAs shall be invoked within 24
hours (in Metro Manila) or 48 hours (outside Metro Manila). (Ilagan v.
Enrile, G.R. No. 70748, October 28, 1985, 139 SCRA 349). Noteworthy also
is Brocka, et al.'s claim that, despite subpoenas for its production, the
prosecution merely presented a purported xerox copy of the invoked PDA
(par. 4, Counter-Rejoinder, p. 367, Rollo).
The foregoing circumstances were not disputed by the Solicitor General's
office. In fact they found petitioner's plight "deplorable" (par. 51,
Manifestation, p. 396, Rollo).
The hasty filing of the second offense, premised on a spurious and
inoperational PDA, certainly betrays respondent's bad faith and malicious
intent to pursue criminal charges against Brocka, et al.
3
We have expressed Our view in the Ilagan case that "individuals against Brocka, et al. were barred from enjoying provisional release until such
whom PDAs have been issued should be furnished with the original, and time that charges were filed, and where a sham preliminary investigation
the duplicate original, and a certified true copy issued by the official was hastily conducted, charges that are filed as a result should lawfully be
having official custody of the PDA, at the time of the apprehension" enjoined.
(supra, p. 369).
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The trial court is
We do not begrudge the zeal that may characterize a public official's PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from proceeding in any manner with the cases
prosecution of criminal offenders. We, however, believe that this should subject of the petition. No costs.
not be a license to run roughshod over a citizen's basic constitutional
SO ORDERED.
lights, such as due process, or manipulate the law to suit dictatorial
tendencies.
We are impelled to point out a citizen's helplessness against the awesome
powers of a dictatorship. Thus, while We agree with the Solicitor General's
observation and/or manifestation that Brocka, et al. should have filed a
motion to quash the information, We, however, believe that such a course
of action would have been a futile move, considering the circumstances
then prevailing. Thus, the tenacious invocation of a spurious and
inoperational PDA and the sham and hasty preliminary investigation were
clear signals that the prosecutors intended to keep Brocka, et al. in
detention until the second offense of "Inciting to Sedition" could be
facilitated and justified without need of issuing a warrant of arrest anew.
As a matter of fact the corresponding informations for this second offense
were hastily filed on February 11, 1985, or two days after Brocka, et al.'s
release from detention was ordered by the trial judge on February 9, 1985.
Constitutional rights must be upheld at all costs, for this gesture is the true
sign of democracy. These may not be set aside to satisfy perceived illusory
visions of national grandeur.: nad
In the case of J. Salonga v. Cruz Paño, We point out:
"Infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules
of criminal procedure is respect for the citizen's right to be free not only
from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and
vexatious prosecution . . ." (G.R. No. L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA
438-at p. 448).
We, therefore, rule that where there is manifest bad faith that
accompanies the filing of criminal charges, as in the instant case where

4

G.R. Nos. 99289-90 January 13, 1992
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner,
vs.
CONRADO M. VASQUEZ; Ombudsman; GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA,
Special Prosecutor; SANDIGANBAYAN and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA, respondents.
Mariano P. Defensor for petitioner.
Nestor F. Ifurong for movant-intervenor.
Danilo C. Cunanan for respondents Vasquez and de la Llana.
REGALADO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction,
and the addendum thereto, petitioner seeks to enjoin the
Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Courts of Manila from proceeding
with Criminal Case No. 16698 for violation of Republic Act No. 3019,
Section 3(e); Criminal Case No. 91-94555 for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 46; and Criminal Case No. 91-94897 for libel.
In Criminal Case No. 16698 1 filed before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner;
stands charged as follows:
That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime prior
or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Miriam
Defensor-Santiago, being then the Commissioner of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the
application for legalization of aliens who arrived in the
Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive
Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which does not allow
the legalization of the same, thereby causing undue
injury to the government and giving unwarranted
benefits and advantage to said aliens in the discharge of
the official nd administrative functions of said accused.
Contrary to law.
In Criminal Case No. 91-94555 2 pending before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, petitioner, together with Daisy Montinola and Fermin Pacia,
are accused of a violation of Presidential Decree No. 46, allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about November 28, 1988, or for sometime
prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Daisy Montinola and
Fermin Pacia, all public officers, being then the
Commissioner, Chief of the Board of Special Inquiry and
employee of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation, respectively, in conspiracy with each other,
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally
solicit and receive money, gifts and other valuable things
from several (F)ilipino and foreign businessmen the same
being given by reason of their respective official positions
for past favor and expected favor and better treatment in
the future from said accused, in the discharge of their
respective official functions.
Contrary to law.
The information filed by the Office of the Special Prosecutor with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila and docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-
94897 3 indicts petitioner for the crime of libel, as follows:
1
 That on or about May 24, 1988, at the Office of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation, Port Area,
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused, Miriam Defensor-
Santiago, a public officer, being then the Commissioner
of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation,
acting in such capacity and taking advantage of her
official position, did then and there with malice
aforethought, wilfully, unalwfully and feloniously call,
uter, state, impute and make scurrilous and defamotory
statements against Maria S. Tatoy, by portraying the
latter, then Chief of the Certificate Section, Commission
on Immigration and Deportation to be "corrupt
employee, a perennial trouble-maker who has filed
administrative cases against all the commissioners under
whom she served" and the Certificate Section of which
she as the head as "not only useless but the most corrupt
unit in the CID," in the presence of newspaper reporters
and media personalities, thereby finding printin the
newspapers, which tend to cause dishonor, discredit and
contempt of said Maria S. Tatoy, to the damage and
prejudice of the latter.
Contrary to law.
A temporary order was issued by this Court on May 24, 1991 4 ordering
the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, to
respectively cease and desist from proceeding with Criminal
Informations Nos. 11698 for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section
3(e) and 91-94555 for violation of Presidential Decree No. 46. This Court,
in issuing the said restraining order, took into consideration the fact that,
according to petitioner, her arraignment, originally set for June 5, 1991,
was inexplicably advanced to May 27, 1991, hence the advisability of
conserving and affording her the opportunity to avail herself of any
remedial right to meet said contingency.
Petitioner avers that in filing the aforequoted criminal informations,
respondents Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Specifically,
petitioner contends that the criminal charges are meant and intended to
harass her as a presidential candidate, in violation of Section 10, Article
IX-C of the Constitution which provides that "(b)ona fide candidates for
any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and
discrimination."
Petitioner likewise asserts that the Ombudsman violated the very
essence of fair play by choosing to file the informations at a time when
petitioner was clearly disadvantaged by the injuries which she sustained
in a vehicular accident, and only after three (3) years from the time the
sixteen (16) charges were initially filed in 1988 by disgruntled employees
of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID); and that in
filing the criminal informations just a year before the presidential
elections, respondent Ombudsman in effect wants to detain petitioner
by reason of her political aspirations. She further submits that the
instant petition seeks to prevent respondents Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor from proceeding against her in an oppressive and vindictive
manner and to afford adequate protection to her constitutional rights.
She consequently posits that, on the foregoing premises, her present
recourse should be considered as an exception to the general prohibition
against petitions of this nature in criminal cases.
In their Comment, respondents Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor
refute the claims of petitioner, explaining in the process the sequence of
events which oed to the filing of the three (3) informations, in this wise:
The charges involved in Criminal Case No. 16698 and
Criminal Case No. 91-94555 were taken cognizance of by
the Office of the Ombudsman upon the same having
been prominently published in the January 10, 1989 issue
of the "Manila Standard." The investigation was originally
handled by then Investigator Gualberto de la Llana but,
on request of the petitioner, was reassigned to the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon sometime in March,
2
1989. The case was handled by an investigating panel
which submitted its draft resolution only on March 29,
1990. After the usual reviews by the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon, the resolution was submitted for
final action of respondent Ombudsman in late March,
1991.
A judicious appraisal of the record resulted in the
issuance by the Ombudsman of the Memorandum for the
Office of the Special Prosecutor directing the filing of the
two (2) informations which have been docketed as
Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan, and
Criminal Case No. 91-94555 of the Manila Regional Trial
Court . . .
The said Memorandum, as may be noted on the face
thereof, is dated April 26, 1991, or two (2)
days before petitioner met the vehicular accident on April
28, 1991.
Respondent Ombudsman received the informations
prepared by the Office of the Special Prosecutor only on
May 13, 1991. Per office routine, after respondent
Ombudsman approved the informations, they were
forwarded to the Office of the Special Prosecutor which
filed the same in the appropriate courts on May 13, 1991.
The record thus attests to the fact that the filing of
Criminal Cases No. 16698 and 91-94555 was already a
settled matter as early as two days before petitioner's
unfortunate mishap. Their filing in court was in
accordance with routine procedure, and impelled in
some way by media's impatient and irritating inquiries as
to what respondent Ombudsman had done in the
petitioner's cases, induced no doubt by premature
persistent false reports that the cases against petitioner
had been dismissed by the Office of the Ombudsman.
With respect to the libel case which was filed with the
Manila Regional Trial Court on May 24, 1991, docketed
therein as Criminal Case No. 91-94897, the record will
also show that the information in this case could have
been filed as early as October 12, 1990 when the
resolution recommending the prosecution of petitioner
for libel was approved by respondent Ombudsman. . . .
However, on the day it was to be filed, some lawyers of
the petitioner came and asked the respondent
Ombudsman to defer the filing of the information
inasmuch as they intended to file a motion for
reinvestigation, which they did on October 29, 1990. The
reinvestigation was denied in a Memorandum dated 25
March 1991 of Special Prosecution Officer Reynaldo L.
Mendoza (approved by respondent Ombudsman on April
22, 1991) and an information was subsequently filed on
May 24, 1991.
Like in the previous two (2) cases, the filing of Criminal
Case No. 91-94897 for libel had no relation at all to the
accident which befell the petitioner on April 28, 1991. Its
filing after the accident was caused by a clearly delaying
tactic on the part of the petitioner. It is rather unkind for
petitioner to impute ill-motivation on the part of the
respondents, for something she herself is to blame. 5
The Court accordingly also takes note of the aforesaid disclosures of
respondent Ombudsman that it was petitioner, personally or through
counsel, who made representations with said respondents which we
granted and caused him to defer action for some time on the complaints
which were ultimately filed against her.
It is a long-standing doctrine that writs of injunction or prohibition will
not lie to restrain a criminal prosecution for the reason that public
interest requires that criminal acts be immediately investigated and
prosecuted for the protection of society, except in specified cases among
which are to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an
3
oppressive and vindictive manner, and to afford adequate protection to
constitutional rights. 6
The rule is equally applicable in cases where the Ombudsman had
authorized the Special Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation
or to file an information as in the case at bar. Indubitably, such a
responsible official is vested with discretion and is endowed with the
competence to determine whether the complaint filed is sufficient in
form and substance to merit such referral. The Ombudsman may himself
dismiss the complaint in the first instance if in his judgment the acts or
omissions complained of are not illegal, unjust, improper or sufficient.
The Special Prosecutor, in case of referral of the complaint, may also
dismiss the same on proper grounds after the requisite investigate and
adjudicatory proceedings. 7 But if, as emphasized by respondent
Ombudsman, "the evidence presented during the preliminary
investigation constitute very valid grounds to charge petitioner Santiago
and her co-accused before the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial
Courts of Manila," no compelling reason would exist for us to rule
otherwise.
Petitioner, claiming exception to the interdiction against a suit to enjoin
criminal prosecution, avers that the instant petition seeks to prevent the
strong arm of the law from being utilized in an oppressive and vindictive
manner. 8 She then postulates that as one who has consistently topped
all major presidential surveys from 1990 to 1991, the filing of the
informations against her will prejudice her standing in the presidential
surveys. This is, contextually and for legal intents and purposes herein, a
mere verisimilitude.
At any rate, we definitely cannot subordinate the demands of public
interest and policy to the political aspirations of herein petitioner. We
have carefully gone over the records of the case and, contrary to the
pretensions of petitioner, there is nothing to show that the informations
in question were filed with the vindictive intention to oppress, harass
and discriminate against her or to violate her constitutional rights. It is
significant that petitioner failed to impute, much less prove, any ill-
motive on the part of herein public respondents. Respondent
Ombudsman categorically states that, and convincingly explains why, he
"has no purpose, motive nor desire to endanger or discredit petitioner's
aspirations for the highest position in the land." 9 This is made no more
apparent than in the various memoranda 10 approved by respondent
Ombudsman establishing that the admitted facts of record are sufficient
to engender a well founded belief that each of the crimes charged has
been committed, which parentheticaly, is the requisite quantum of
evidence at this posture of each of said cases.
Petitioner submits that she cannot be held liable as charged and raises
the following defenses: that the donations received were not for
personal use but were distributed to the CID employees in a raffle held
during the CID Christmas party; that the legalization of aliens who
arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 984 was in accordance with the
authority vested in her by Executive Order No. 324 and was intended to
assure family unity; and that the defamatory words were made against
Maria Tatoy only in self-defense.
We are not persuaded that we should, in the present recourse, pass
upon these asseverations of petitioner which we note have previously
been raised during the preliminary investigation. She will, of course,
have all the opportunity to ventilate and substantiate the same in the
proceedings before and/or during the trial of these cases in the lower
courts which would be the proper stages and for the adjudication
thereof. Accordingly, we quote with approval this portion of the
Comment of respondent Ombudsman:
In her Petition and in the Addendum hereto, the
petitioner had not made any denial of he operative facts
on the basis of which the charges have been filed.
Instead, petitioner relies on her perceived defenses on
her interpretation of the said acts and the laws applicable
thereto.
Thus, in Criminal Case No. 91-94555 for a violation of P.D.
46, petitioner admits the solicitation of donations and the
giving of the same by those from whom such donations
4
were solicited. Petitioner justifies the said act by claiming
that the donations were not given for her "personal use"
but for the purpose of the Christmas party of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Whether
this claim would negate the applicability of P.D. 46 would
involve an inquiry into certain facts which could only be
ascertained during the trial of the case. Significantly,
petitioner had not denied that the solicitation of said gifts
was at her instance, and that she even scolded a certain
Renato Orlanda whom she requested to sign the
solicitation letters, but who refused to do so for fear of
committing a violation of the law punishing such act.
With respect to Criminal Case No. 16698 for a violation of
Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, petitioner has also not denied
that she admitted and approved the legalization of aliens
who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984,
which act is contrary to the express provision of
Executive Order No. 324. She reasons out her doing so by
putting forth certain alleged principles and provisions of
the same Executive Order which could be interpreted as
giving her such authority to disregard the express
prohibition in Executive Order No. 324. Again, these are
matters of defense which the petitioner should prove
during the trial.
In the libel case (Criminal Case No. 91-94897), petitioner
likewise admits having uttered the words constituting the
bases thereof in a television interview. She does not deny
its libelous nature. She claims justification for having
uttered the defamatory words against complainant Maria
Tatoy on the ground of self-defense. Allegedly, Tatoy in
an earlier interview, had mentioned about desiring to
form a labor union among the employees of CID, but that
the petitioner was against such move. Respondents fail to
see how said statement of Tatoy could be considered as
defamatory to justify a libelous response thereto on the
ground of self-defense. 11
WHEREFORE, the petition and the addendum thereto are hereby
DISMISSED, the writs prayed for are DENIED, and the temporary
restraining order issued in this case is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Nocon, J., took no part.
Separate Opinion
MELENCIO-HERERRA, J., concurring:
The long-standing doctrine is, indeed, that Writs of Injunction or
Prohibition do not lie to restrain a criminal prosecution in view of the
public interest involved. In fact, petitioner concedes this point but seeks
an exception in her case.
I just wish to emphasize that the dismissal of this Petition in no way
reflects on the criminal liability of petitioner. Its immediate effect is only
that the cases against her may now proceed but without prejudice to
procedural remedies that are open to her, like a Motion to Quash, and
the defenses that she may raise, among them being, in at least two of
the three cases, that the acts charged, as a matter of law, do not
constitute an offense but are, as stated in Justice Feliciano's dissent, a
5
matter of administrative interpretation or policy for which a public
official should not be subjected to civil or criminal liability.
I would also like to point out that the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation is charged with the administration of immigration laws.
Section 3 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 (C.A. No. 613)
provides that the Commissioner "shall issue from time to time such
instructions, not inconsistent with law, as he shall deem best calculated
to carry out the provisions of the immigration laws." Executive Order No.
324, likewise, explicitly authorizes the Commissioner to issue rules and
regulations necessary to implement the said Executive Order (paragraph
16). The Commissioner may even waive exclusion grounds under the
Immigration Act, save in cases otherwise provided by law (paragraph 11).
In a pending bill in Congress (H. No. 30878), or the "Alien Legalization Act
of 1991," the stay in the country of aliens who entered the Philippines
prior to 2 February 1987 may be legalized upon their application (Sec. 2),
which could mean any time prior thereto or even after January 1, 1984.
The Commissioner is likewise given the authority to determine who
among the alien-applicants may be qualified to be permanent residents,
any adverse decision made being appealable only to the Office of the
President (Sec. 7).
Indeed, inherent in the Commissioner's function is the exercise of
judgment and discretion in the application of the laws that said official
has been authorized to administer and enforce. The interpretation given
by that Office, as with all other administrative bodies, is, as a general
rule, entitled to great weight and respect.
FELICIANO, J., dissenting:
It is with regret that I am unable to agree completely with the majority
opinion written by my learned brother in the Court, Mr. Justice
Regalado, with his customary lucidity. That opinion expresses clearly the
ordinary rule in the following terms:
It is a long-standing doctrine that writs of injunction or
prohibition will not lie to restrain a criminal prosecution
for the reason that public interest requires that criminal
acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the
protection of society, except in specified cases among
which are to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law
in an oppressive and vindictive manner, and to afford
adequate protection to constitutional right. (Citation
omitted)
Mr. Justice Regalado also points out that the above general rule
is applicable in respect of criminal prosecutions commenced by
the Special Prosecutor and the Ombudsman:
The rule is of equal application in cases where the
Ombudsman had authorized the Special Prosecutor to
conduct a preliminary investigation or to file an
information as in the case at bar. Indubitably, such a
responsible official is vested with discretion and is
endowed with the competence to determine whether
the complaint filed is sufficient in form and substance to
merit such referral. The Ombudsman may himself dismiss
the complaint in the first instance if in his judgment the
acts or omissions complained of are not illegal, unjust,
improper or sufficient. The Special Prosecutor, in case of
referral of the complaint, may also dismiss the same on
proper grounds after the requisite investigative and
adjudicatory proceedings. . . . (Citation omitted)
It is clear, of course, that there are more than a few exceptions
to the above general rule. In Brocka, et al. v.Ponce-Enrile, et
al., 1 the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Medialdea, included
the following in a list which would appear to be an open-ended
one:
6
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional
rights of the accused (Hernandez v. Albano, et al., L-
19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of
Justice
or . . . [to prevent] multiciplity of actions (Dimayuga, et al.
v. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez v. Albano, supra;
Fortun v. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA
607);
c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub
judice (De Leon v. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202);
xxx xxx xxx
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law,
ordinance or regulation (Young v. Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556;
Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang v.
People and Alvendia, 109 Phil. 1140);
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense
(Lopez v. City Judge, L-25795, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA
616);
xxx xxx xxx
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the
accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been
denied (Salonga v. Pano, et al., L-59524, February 18,
1985, 134 SCRA 438);
xxx xxx xxx
It is my respectful submission that if the instant case, to the extent
discussed below, does not already fall within one of the above
exceptions, another and separate exception ought to be recognized.
The information filed before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case NO.
16698 charges the petitioner as follows:
That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime prior
or subsequent thereto, Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Miriam
Defensor-Santiago, being then the Commissioner of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and
there wilfully, unalwfully and criminally approve the
application for legalization of aliens who arrived in the
Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive
Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which does not allow
the legalization of the same, thereby causing undue
injury to the government and giving unwarranted
benefits and advantage to the said aliens in the discharge
of the official and administrative functions of said
accused.
Contrary to law.
Essentially, the above information charges that petitioner had, in
violation of the provisions of Executive Order No. 324, approved
applications for legalization of the stay of aliens who had arrived in the
Philippines after January 1, 1984. The information takes the position that
Executive Order "does not allow the legalization of the same."
Executive Order No. 324 entitled "Waiving Passport Requirements for
Immigrants under Certain Conditions," dated April 13, 1988, was
promulgated pursuant to Section 47(A) (3) of C.A. No. 613, as amended,
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, which provides that:
7
 Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act, the President
is authorized:
(a) when the public interest so warrants:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) to waive the passport requirements for immigrants,
under such conditions as he may prescribe.
Executive Order No. 324 provides that an alien may apply with the
Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation for waiver of passport
requirements during a 12-month period beginning on a date to be
designated by the Commissioner. The Order provides, among other
things, that the alien "must establish that he entered the Philippines
before January 1, 1984 and that he has resided continuously in the
Philippines in an unlawful status from such date to the filing of his
application."
Petitioner is charged with having unlawfully waived the passport
requirements of certain aliens who arrived after January 1, 1984. It is
clear from the record of this case, especially of the preliminary
investigation conducted by the Office of the Special Prosecutor, that
petitioner herself stated that she had allowed aliens who had arrived in
the Philippines after January 1, 1984, but who were the spouses or minor
children of qualified aliens — the latter being alien spouses or parents
who had entered the Philippines before January 1, 1984 and who were
themselves qualified for waiver of passport requirements under Executive
Order No. 324 — to apply for waiver of passport requirements and, after
compliance with requirements of Executive No. 324, approved such
"legalization."
Executive Order No. 324 is not itself a statute prescribing penal sanctions
for certain acts. Thus, disregard of Executive Order No. 324 would not,
by itself, give rise to criminal liability. The criminal information in this
case in effect links up Executive Order No. 324 with Section 3 (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft Act reads as follows:
Sec. 3. Corrupt Practices of such Officers. — In addition to
acts or omissions of such officers already penalized by
existing law, the following constitute corrupt practices of
any public officer and hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
consessions. (Emphasis supplied)
It must be noted, firstly, that petitioner, as the then Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation, was expressly authorized and obliged by
Executive Order No. 324 to apply and administer and enforce its
provisions. Indeed, petitioner was authorized to issue rules and
regulations to implement that Executive Order (paragraph 16). Secondly,
the application and administration of Executive Order No. 324 involve,
not ministerial or mechanical acts, but rather the exercise of judgment
and discretion, adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial in nature. Thirdly,
and perhaps most notably, paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Executive Order
provide as follows:
11. Except as provided in Paragraph 12, herein, the
Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation may
waive exclusion grounds under the Immigration Act in the
case of individual aliens for humanitarian purposes to
assure family unity or for the public interest.
8
 12. The following grounds for exclusion may not be
waived by the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation, namely, (a) those relating to criminals; (b)
those relating to aliens likely to become public charges;
(c) those relating to drug offenses, except for so much of
those provisions as relates to a single offense of simple
possession of marijuana; and (d) those relating to
national security and members of subversive
organization.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Paragraph 11, it will be seen, expressly authorizes petitioner to waive
grounds for exclusion of aliens under the Immigration Act in two (2)
cases; (a) "for humanitarian purposes to assure family unity;" and (b)
"for the public interest." Under Section 29(a) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, the classes of aliens excluded
from entry into the Philippines include:
(17) Persons not properly documented for admission as
may be required under the provisions of this Act. 2
Upon the other hand, paragraph 12 specifies the categories of persons in
whose cases no waiver of grounds of exclusion may be granted.
It will be seen that the acts of petitioner, which the information assumes
to be criminal in nature, constituted official acts of petitioner done in the
course of applying, interpreting and construing Executive Order No. 324.
There is no question that the applications for waiver of passport
requirements by the spouses and minor children of qualified aliens were
admitted and approved by petitioner "for humanitarian purposes to
assure family unity." It is also not disputed that the said alien spouses
and minor children did not fall under any of the (non-waivable) excluded
classes listed in paragraph 12 of Executive Order No. 324. It is similarly
undisputed that no one has pretended that petitioner had any personal
or corrupt interest in any of the cases of alien spouses and minor
children of qualified aliens she had acted upon. No one has suggested,
for instance, that the fees specified in paragraph 9 of Executive Order
No. 324 either were not collected by the Government or were
misappropriated by petitioner and converted to her own use. It may be
noted, incidentally, that paragraph 9 expressly authorizes the
Commissioner "in her discretion, [to] charge a lower fee for the spouses
and minor children below 21 years old of the applicant." The criminal
information, as noted above, included an allegation of "evident bad faith
and manifest partiality." It is clear, however, that the facts brought out in
the preliminary investigation offered absolutely no basis for such an
allegation which is actually a conclusion offered by the Special
Prosecutor, much like the words "wilfully, unlawfully and criminally"
which are recited redundantly in the criminal information here. Again,
the facts disclosed in the preliminary investigation showed no
"undue injury," to the Government and no "unwarranted benefit or
advantage" to the alien wives and minor children of qualified
aliens outside of the simple acceptance and approval of the applications
for waiver of passport requirements (so called "legalization") by
petitioner. In other words, if the interpretation or construction given by
petitioner to Executive Order No. 324 is correct — i.e., that applications
for waiver of passport requirements by alien wives and minor children,
arriving after January 1, 1984, of qualified aliens who had themselves
arrived in the Philippines before January 1, 1984 and who were
otherwise eligible under the terms and conditions of Executive Order No.
324 may be granted for humanitarian purposes in the interest of
allowing or restoring family unity — there would be no "injury," let alone
an "undue injury," to the Government. Neither can the benefit of waiver
of passport requirements in the cases of such spouses and minor
children of qualified aliens be deemed to be an "unwarranted" benefit to
such aliens if petitioner's interpretation of Executive Order No. 324 be
held to be correct.
It is a rule too firmly established to require documentation that
contemporaneous interpretations of a statute or implementing
regulations by the executive or administrative officials precisely charged
with the implementation of such a statute or regulation, are entitled to
9
great weight and respect from the courts. This Court itself has in many
instances deferred to such interpretations rendered by such
administrative officers. 3 But even if an administrative interpretation be
ultimately found to be incorrect as a matter of law by this Court, the
official responsible for such interpretation is not, for that reason alone,
to be held liable personally, whether civilly or criminally or
administratively. It is just as firmly settled that to impose liability upon
the public officer who has so acted, something far graver than error of
law or error of judgment must be clearly shown and that is corrupt
personal intentions, personal malice or bad faith. 4 As noted above, no
such allegations were made during the preliminary investigation in
Criminal Case No. 16698.
My submission, with respect, is that whether the acts admittedly done
by petitioner were criminal in nature, is a legal question, on which
petitioner in effect asks us to rule in this Petition. I believe, further, that
there is nothing to prevent this Court from addressing and ruling on this
legal issue. There is no real need for proof of any additional essential
facts apart from those already admitted by petitioner. It seems to me
that a public officer is entitled to have legal questions like that before
this Court resolved at the earliest possible opportunity, that a public
officer should not be compelled to go through the aggravation,
humiliation and expense of the whole process of criminal trial, if the
legal characterization of the acts charged as criminal is the very issue at
stake.
I respectfully submit, still further, that the acts charged do not, as a
matter of law, constitute a crime. Indeed, if the acts which petitioner
admits having done constitute a criminal offense, very serious
consequences would follow for the administration of law and
government rules and regulations in general. For the thrust of the
criminal information here would appear to be that public officers
interpret and apply statutory and regulatory provisions at their own peril
and at the risk of criminal liability, notwithstanding the absence of any
corrupt intent to profit personally by any such interpretation and
application.
The second information was filed in Criminal Case No. 91-94555 before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, charging petitioner with Daisy
Montinola and Fermin Pacia with violation of P.D. No. 46 allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about November 28, 1988, or for sometime
prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Daisy Montinola and
Fermin Pacia, all public officers, being then the
Commissioner, Chief of the Board of Special Inquiry and
employee of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation, respectively, in conspiracy with each other,
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally
solicit and receive money, gifts and other valuable things
from several (F)ilipino and foreign businessmen the same
being given by reason of their respective official positions
for past favor and expected favor and better treatment in
the future from said accused, in the discharge of their
respective official functions.
Contrary to law.
The facts brought out during the preliminary investigation of the above
charge showed that, in connection with a Christmas party held on 20
December 1988 at 3:30 p.m. in front of the CID building, held by the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation for the benefit of its
employees, letters of solicitation were sent out to a great many people
and companies, under the signature of Daisy Montinola and Fermin
Pacia who were Chairman of the Christmas Committee and President of
the CID Employees Association, respectively. The identical letters of
solicitation read as follows:
Dear . . . :
10
 The CID Christmas Party for employees will be held on
Tuesday, 20 December 1988 at 3:30 p.m., in front of the
CID Building on Magallanes Drive, Intramuros.
We shall be happy to receive your donations for the CID,
to be distributed to the employees during the party.
Further, we wish to invite you to the party, so that you
can witness the distribution of proposed Christmas bags.
Under P.D. Nos. 46 and 807, the Commissioner strictly
prohibits any employee from receiving any Christmas gift.
Hence, Christmas gifts may be given, only to the CID as an
agency.
Thank you very much for your generosity, and please
accept our best Christmas wishes. . . .
Three hundred twenty six (326) letters were sent out; one hundred one
(101) addressees responded with donations. Petitioner submitted a list
of the donors and of the items and cash donated to the CID. The cash
donations were used to purchase food and grocery items which,
together with donations consisting of food, were then divided and
packaged as individual Christmas baskets and distributed to 700 officers
and employees of the CID, plus 34 members of the CID security force.
Donations in kind, including five (5) electric appliances, plus small
consolation prizes, were raffled off to the employees during the
Christmas party. Petitioner also furnished a list of these prizes and of the
purchases of food and grocery items. The accounting showed that a
balance of P8,588.75 remained, which balance was earmarked to assist
in the funding of the CID summer excursion for CID employees and their
families. 5
The operative portion of P.D. No. 46, dated 10 November 1972, reads as
follows:
NOW THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of
the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by
the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation
No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, and General Order
No. 1 dated September 22, 1972, do hereby make it
punishable for any public official or employee, whether of
the national or local governments, to receive, directly or
indirectly, and for private persons to give, or offer to
give, any gift, present or other valuable thing on any
occasion, including Christmas, when such gift, present or
other valuable thing is given by reason of his official
position, regardless of whether or not the same is for
past favor or favors or the giver hopes or expects to
receive a favor or better treatment in the future from the
public official or employee concerned in the discharge of
his offical functions. Included within the prohibition is the
throwing of parties or entertainments in honor of the
official or employee or his immediate relatives.
For violation of this Decree, the penalty of imprisonment
for not less than one (1) year nor more than five (5) years
and perpetual disqualification from public office shall be
imposed. The official or employee concerned shall
likewise be subject to administrative disciplinary action
and if found guilty, shall be meted out the penalty of
suspension or removal, depending on the seriousness of
the offense. (Emphases supplied)
Here again, I respectfully submit, a serious legal question exists: whether
or not the above acts of petitioner, as admitted by her during the course
of the preliminary investigation, fall within the scope of P.D. No. 46. It is
not disputed that the solicitation had been made for the purpose stated
in the solicitation letter itself — the 1988 Christmas party of the CID
officers and employees. It is also not disputed that all the donations in
cash or in kind had been utilized for and in connection with such
Christmas party, and that the only personal benefit received by petitioner
and her two (2) co-accused consisted of one Christmas food basket each,
along with more than 700 other officers and employees of the CID.
11
One may, of course debate the wisdom of the measures so adopted or
tolerated by petitioner in connection with that 1988 CID Christmas party.
Petitioner hardly invented the employees' Christmas party, a practice
widely observed in both the public and the private sectors. Petitioner's
special contribution consisted of making sure that the solicitation,
receipt and distribution of gifts were all done in organized and public
manner, in full view of all the officers and employees of the CID and of
the general public, doubtless to emphasize for whose benefit such
solicitation had been conducted, to minimize private or secret
solicitation by individual CID officers or employees, and to preclude any
charge of secret personal benefit on her part nd of those who signed the
solicitation letters. What is at stake here, however, is the legal question
of whether or not the acts which petitioner has admitted constitute a
criminal offense under P.D. No. 46 which, I believe, is ripe for
determination by this Court. I also submit that those acts do not fall
within the scope of P.D. No. 46 as it is presently written. 6 It may well be
that, as a matter of administrative policy, all solicitation including
solicitation for the benefit of the officers and employees of a particular
agency of government should be prohibited and perhaps criminalized.
That, however, is something for the legislative authority to consider and
act upon, not the courts and certainly not in a criminal case.
For all the foregoing, and certainly in respect of two (2) out of the three
(3) criminal informations filed against petitioner, I believe that the
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition should be granted and vote
accordingly.
Gutierrez, Jr., Griño-Aquino and Romero, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERERRA, J., concurring:
The long-standing doctrine is, indeed, that Writs of Injunction or
Prohibition do not lie to restrain a criminal prosecution in view of the
public interest involved. In fact, petitioner concedes this point but seeks
an exception in her case.
I just wish to emphasize that the dismissal of this Petition in no way
reflects on the criminal liability of petitioner. Its immediate effect is only
that the cases against her may now proceed but without prejudice to
procedural remedies that are open to her, like a Motion to Quash, and
the defenses that she may raise, among them being, in at least two of
the three cases, that the acts charged, as a matter of law, do not
constitute an offense but are, as stated in Justice Feliciano's dissent, a
matter of administrative interpretation or policy for which a public
official should not be subjected to civil or criminal liability.
I would also like to point out that the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation is charged with the administration of immigration laws.
Section 3 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 (C.A. No. 613)
provides that the Commissioner "shall issue from time to time such
instructions, not inconsistent with law, as he shall deem best calculated
to carry out the provisions of the immigration laws." Executive Order No.
324, likewise, explicitly authorizes the Commissioner to issue rules and
regulations necessary to implement the said Executive Order (paragraph
16). The Commissioner may even waive exclusion grounds under the
Immigration Act, save in cases otherwise provided by law (paragraph 11).
In a pending bill in Congress (H. No. 30878), or the "Alien Legalization Act
of 1991," the stay in the country of aliens who entered the Philippines
prior to 2 February 1987 may be legalized upon their application (Sec. 2),
which could mean any time prior thereto or even after January 1, 1984.
The Commissioner is likewise given the authority to determine who
among the alien-applicants may be qualified to be permanent residents,
any adverse decision made being appealable only to the Office of the
President (Sec. 7).
Indeed, inherent in the Commissioner's function is the exercise of
judgment and discretion in the application of the laws that said official
has been authorized to administer and enforce. The interpretation given
12
by that Office, as with all other administrative bodies, is, as a general
rule, entitled to great weight and respect.
FELICIANO, J., dissenting:
It is with regret that I am unable to agree completely with the majority
opinion written by my learned brother in the Court, Mr. Justice
Regalado, with his customary lucidity. That opinion expresses clearly the
ordinary rule in the following terms:
It is a long-standing doctrine that writs of injunction or
prohibition will not lie to restrain a criminal prosecution
for the reason that public interest requires that criminal
acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the
protection of society, except in specified cases among
which are to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law
in an oppressive and vindictive manner, and to afford
adequate protection to constitutional right. (Citation
omitted)
Mr. Justice Regalado also points out that the above general rule
is applicable in respect of criminal prosecutions commenced by
the Special Prosecutor and the Ombudsman:
The rule is of equal application in cases where the
Ombudsman had authorized the Special Prosecutor to
conduct a preliminary investigation or to file an
information as in the case at bar. Indubitably, such a
responsible official is vested with discretion and is
endowed with the competence to determine whether
the complaint filed is sufficient in form and substance to
merit such referral. The Ombudsman may himself dismiss
the complaint in the first instance if in his judgment the
acts or omissions complained of are not illegal, unjust,
improper or sufficient. The Special Prosecutor, in case of
referral of the complaint, may also dismiss the same on
proper grounds after the requisite investigative and
adjudicatory proceedings. . . . (Citation omitted)
It is clear, of course, that there are more than a few exceptions
to the above general rule. In Brocka, et al. v.Ponce-Enrile, et
al., 1 the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Medialdea, included
the following in a list which would appear to be an open-ended
one:
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional
rights of the accused (Hernandez v. Albano, et al., L-
19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of
Justice
or . . . [to prevent] multiciplity of actions (Dimayuga, et al.
v. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez v. Albano, supra;
Fortun v. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA
607);
c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub
judice (De Leon v. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202);
xxx xxx xxx
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law,
ordinance or regulation (Young v. Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556;
Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang v.
People and Alvendia, 109 Phil. 1140);
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense
(Lopez v. City Judge, L-25795, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA
616);
13
 xxx xxx xxx
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the
accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been
denied (Salonga v. Pano, et al., L-59524, February 18,
1985, 134 SCRA 438);
xxx xxx xxx
It is my respectful submission that if the instant case, to the extent
discussed below, does not already fall within one of the above
exceptions, another and separate exception ought to be recognized.
The information filed before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case NO.
16698 charges the petitioner as follows:
That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime prior
or subsequent thereto, Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Miriam
Defensor-Santiago, being then the Commissioner of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and
there wilfully, unalwfully and criminally approve the
application for legalization of aliens who arrived in the
Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive
Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which does not allow
the legalization of the same, thereby causing undue
injury to the government and giving unwarranted
benefits and advantage to the said aliens in the discharge
of the official and administrative functions of said
accused.
Contrary to law.
Essentially, the above information charges that petitioner had, in
violation of the provisions of Executive Order No. 324, approved
applications for legalization of the stay of aliens who had arrived in the
Philippines after January 1, 1984. The information takes the position that
Executive Order "does not allow the legalization of the same."
Executive Order No. 324 entitled "Waiving Passport Requirements for
Immigrants under Certain Conditions," dated April 13, 1988, was
promulgated pursuant to Section 47(A) (3) of C.A. No. 613, as amended,
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, which provides that:
Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act, the President
is authorized:
(a) when the public interest so warrants:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) to waive the passport requirements for immigrants,
under such conditions as he may prescribe.
Executive Order No. 324 provides that an alien may apply with the
Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation for waiver of passport
requirements during a 12-month period beginning on a date to be
designated by the Commissioner. The Order provides, among other
things, that the alien "must establish that he entered the Philippines
before January 1, 1984 and that he has resided continuously in the
Philippines in an unlawful status from such date to the filing of his
application."
Petitioner is charged with having unlawfully waived the passport
requirements of certain aliens who arrived after January 1, 1984. It is
clear from the record of this case, especially of the preliminary
investigation conducted by the Office of the Special Prosecutor, that
petitioner herself stated that she had allowed aliens who had arrived in
the Philippines after January 1, 1984, but who were the spouses or minor
children of qualified aliens — the latter being alien spouses or parents
who had entered the Philippines before January 1, 1984 and who were
themselves qualified for waiver of passport requirements under Executive
Order No. 324 — to apply for waiver of passport requirements and, after
14
compliance with requirements of Executive No. 324, approved such
"legalization."
Executive Order No. 324 is not itself a statute prescribing penal sanctions
for certain acts. Thus, disregard of Executive Order No. 324 would not,
by itself, give rise to criminal liability. The criminal information in this
case in effect links up Executive Order No. 324 with Section 3 (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft Act reads as follows:
Sec. 3. Corrupt Practices of such Officers. — In addition to
acts or omissions of such officers already penalized by
existing law, the following constitute corrupt practices of
any public officer and hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
consessions. (Emphasis supplied)
It must be noted, firstly, that petitioner, as the then Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation, was expressly authorized and obliged by
Executive Order No. 324 to apply and administer and enforce its
provisions. Indeed, petitioner was authorized to issue rules and
regulations to implement that Executive Order (paragraph 16). Secondly,
the application and administration of Executive Order No. 324 involve,
not ministerial or mechanical acts, but rather the exercise of judgment
and discretion, adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial in nature. Thirdly,
and perhaps most notably, paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Executive Order
provide as follows:
11. Except as provided in Paragraph 12, herein, the
Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation may
waive exclusion grounds under the Immigration Act in the
case of individual aliens for humanitarian purposes to
assure family unity or for the public interest.
12. The following grounds for exclusion may not be
waived by the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation, namely, (a) those relating to criminals; (b)
those relating to aliens likely to become public charges;
(c) those relating to drug offenses, except for so much of
those provisions as relates to a single offense of simple
possession of marijuana; and (d) those relating to
national security and members of subversive
organization.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Paragraph 11, it will be seen, expressly authorizes petitioner to waive
grounds for exclusion of aliens under the Immigration Act in two (2)
cases; (a) "for humanitarian purposes to assure family unity;" and (b)
"for the public interest." Under Section 29(a) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, the classes of aliens excluded
from entry into the Philippines include:
(17) Persons not properly documented for admission as
may be required under the provisions of this Act. 2
Upon the other hand, paragraph 12 specifies the categories of persons in
whose cases no waiver of grounds of exclusion may be granted.
It will be seen that the acts of petitioner, which the information assumes
to be criminal in nature, constituted official acts of petitioner done in the
course of applying, interpreting and construing Executive Order No. 324.
There is no question that the applications for waiver of passport
15
requirements by the spouses and minor children of qualified aliens were
admitted and approved by petitioner "for humanitarian purposes to
assure family unity." It is also not disputed that the said alien spouses
and minor children did not fall under any of the (non-waivable) excluded
classes listed in paragraph 12 of Executive Order No. 324. It is similarly
undisputed that no one has pretended that petitioner had any personal
or corrupt interest in any of the cases of alien spouses and minor
children of qualified aliens she had acted upon. No one has suggested,
for instance, that the fees specified in paragraph 9 of Executive Order
No. 324 either were not collected by the Government or were
misappropriated by petitioner and converted to her own use. It may be
noted, incidentally, that paragraph 9 expressly authorizes the
Commissioner "in her discretion, [to] charge a lower fee for the spouses
and minor children below 21 years old of the applicant." The criminal
information, as noted above, included an allegation of "evident bad faith
and manifest partiality." It is clear, however, that the facts brought out in
the preliminary investigation offered absolutely no basis for such an
allegation which is actually a conclusion offered by the Special
Prosecutor, much like the words "wilfully, unlawfully and criminally"
which are recited redundantly in the criminal information here. Again,
the facts disclosed in the preliminary investigation showed no
"undue injury," to the Government and no "unwarranted benefit or
advantage" to the alien wives and minor children of qualified
aliens outside of the simple acceptance and approval of the applications
for waiver of passport requirements (so called "legalization") by
petitioner. In other words, if the interpretation or construction given by
petitioner to Executive Order No. 324 is correct — i.e., that applications
for waiver of passport requirements by alien wives and minor children,
arriving after January 1, 1984, of qualified aliens who had themselves
arrived in the Philippines before January 1, 1984 and who were
otherwise eligible under the terms and conditions of Executive Order No.
324 may be granted for humanitarian purposes in the interest of
allowing or restoring family unity — there would be no "injury," let alone
an "undue injury," to the Government. Neither can the benefit of waiver
of passport requirements in the cases of such spouses and minor
children of qualified aliens be deemed to be an "unwarranted" benefit to
such aliens if petitioner's interpretation of Executive Order No. 324 be
held to be correct.
It is a rule too firmly established to require documentation that
contemporaneous interpretations of a statute or implementing
regulations by the executive or administrative officials precisely charged
with the implementation of such a statute or regulation, are entitled to
great weight and respect from the courts. This Court itself has in many
instances deferred to such interpretations rendered by such
administrative officers. 3 But even if an administrative interpretation be
ultimately found to be incorrect as a matter of law by this Court, the
official responsible for such interpretation is not, for that reason alone,
to be held liable personally, whether civilly or criminally or
administratively. It is just as firmly settled that to impose liability upon
the public officer who has so acted, something far graver than error of
law or error of judgment must be clearly shown and that is corrupt
personal intentions, personal malice or bad faith. 4 As noted above, no
such allegations were made during the preliminary investigation in
Criminal Case No. 16698.
My submission, with respect, is that whether the acts admittedly done
by petitioner were criminal in nature, is a legal question, on which
petitioner in effect asks us to rule in this Petition. I believe, further, that
there is nothing to prevent this Court from addressing and ruling on this
legal issue. There is no real need for proof of any additional essential
facts apart from those already admitted by petitioner. It seems to me
that a public officer is entitled to have legal questions like that before
this Court resolved at the earliest possible opportunity, that a public
officer should not be compelled to go through the aggravation,
humiliation and expense of the whole process of criminal trial, if the
legal characterization of the acts charged as criminal is the very issue at
stake.
I respectfully submit, still further, that the acts charged do not, as a
matter of law, constitute a crime. Indeed, if the acts which petitioner
admits having done constitute a criminal offense, very serious
consequences would follow for the administration of law and
16
government rules and regulations in general. For the thrust of the
criminal information here would appear to be that public officers
interpret and apply statutory and regulatory provisions at their own peril
and at the risk of criminal liability, notwithstanding the absence of any
corrupt intent to profit personally by any such interpretation and
application.
The second information was filed in Criminal Case No. 91-94555 before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, charging petitioner with Daisy
Montinola and Fermin Pacia with violation of P.D. No. 46 allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about November 28, 1988, or for sometime
prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Daisy Montinola and
Fermin Pacia, all public officers, being then the
Commissioner, Chief of the Board of Special Inquiry and
employee of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation, respectively, in conspiracy with each other,
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally
solicit and receive money, gifts and other valuable things
from several (F)ilipino and foreign businessmen the same
being given by reason of their respective official positions
for past favor and expected favor and better treatment in
the future from said accused, in the discharge of their
respective official functions.
Contrary to law.
The facts brought out during the preliminary investigation of the above
charge showed that, in connection with a Christmas party held on 20
December 1988 at 3:30 p.m. in front of the CID building, held by the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation for the benefit of its
employees, letters of solicitation were sent out to a great many people
and companies, under the signature of Daisy Montinola and Fermin
Pacia who were Chairman of the Christmas Committee and President of
the CID Employees Association, respectively. The identical letters of
solicitation read as follows:
Dear . . . :
The CID Christmas Party for employees will be held on
Tuesday, 20 December 1988 at 3:30 p.m., in front of the
CID Building on Magallanes Drive, Intramuros.
We shall be happy to receive your donations for the CID,
to be distributed to the employees during the party.
Further, we wish to invite you to the party, so that you
can witness the distribution of proposed Christmas bags.
Under P.D. Nos. 46 and 807, the Commissioner strictly
prohibits any employee from receiving any Christmas gift.
Hence, Christmas gifts may be given, only to the CID as an
agency.
Thank you very much for your generosity, and please
accept our best Christmas wishes. . . .
Three hundred twenty six (326) letters were sent out; one hundred one
(101) addressees responded with donations. Petitioner submitted a list
of the donors and of the items and cash donated to the CID. The cash
donations were used to purchase food and grocery items which,
together with donations consisting of food, were then divided and
packaged as individual Christmas baskets and distributed to 700 officers
and employees of the CID, plus 34 members of the CID security force.
Donations in kind, including five (5) electric appliances, plus small
consolation prizes, were raffled off to the employees during the
Christmas party. Petitioner also furnished a list of these prizes and of the
purchases of food and grocery items. The accounting showed that a
balance of P8,588.75 remained, which balance was earmarked to assist
in the funding of the CID summer excursion for CID employees and their
families. 5
17
The operative portion of P.D. No. 46, dated 10 November 1972, reads as
follows:
NOW THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of
the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by
the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation
No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, and General Order
No. 1 dated September 22, 1972, do hereby make it
punishable for any public official or employee, whether of
the national or local governments, to receive, directly or
indirectly, and for private persons to give, or offer to
give, any gift, present or other valuable thing on any
occasion, including Christmas, when such gift, present or
other valuable thing is given by reason of his official
position, regardless of whether or not the same is for
past favor or favors or the giver hopes or expects to
receive a favor or better treatment in the future from the
public official or employee concerned in the discharge of
his offical functions. Included within the prohibition is the
throwing of parties or entertainments in honor of the
official or employee or his immediate relatives.
For violation of this Decree, the penalty of imprisonment
for not less than one (1) year nor more than five (5) years
and perpetual disqualification from public office shall be
imposed. The official or employee concerned shall
likewise be subject to administrative disciplinary action
and if found guilty, shall be meted out the penalty of
suspension or removal, depending on the seriousness of
the offense. (Emphases supplied)
Here again, I respectfully submit, a serious legal question exists: whether
or not the above acts of petitioner, as admitted by her during the course
of the preliminary investigation, fall within the scope of P.D. No. 46. It is
not disputed that the solicitation had been made for the purpose stated
in the solicitation letter itself — the 1988 Christmas party of the CID
officers and employees. It is also not disputed that all the donations in
cash or in kind had been utilized for and in connection with such
Christmas party, and that the only personal benefit received by petitioner
and her two (2) co-accused consisted of one Christmas food basket each,
along with more than 700 other officers and employees of the CID.
One may, of course debate the wisdom of the measures so adopted or
tolerated by petitioner in connection with that 1988 CID Christmas party.
Petitioner hardly invented the employees' Christmas party, a practice
widely observed in both the public and the private sectors. Petitioner's
special contribution consisted of making sure that the solicitation,
receipt and distribution of gifts were all done in organized and public
manner, in full view of all the officers and employees of the CID and of
the general public, doubtless to emphasize for whose benefit such
solicitation had been conducted, to minimize private or secret
solicitation by individual CID officers or employees, and to preclude any
charge of secret personal benefit on her part nd of those who signed the
solicitation letters. What is at stake here, however, is the legal question
of whether or not the acts which petitioner has admitted constitute a
criminal offense under P.D. No. 46 which, I believe, is ripe for
determination by this Court. I also submit that those acts do not fall
within the scope of P.D. No. 46 as it is presently written. 6 It may well be
that, as a matter of administrative policy, all solicitation including
solicitation for the benefit of the officers and employees of a particular
agency of government should be prohibited and perhaps criminalized.
That, however, is something for the legislative authority to consider and
act upon, not the courts and certainly not in a criminal case.
For all the foregoing, and certainly in respect of two (2) out of the three
(3) criminal informations filed against petitioner, I believe that the
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition should be granted and vote
accordingly.
Gutierrez, Jr., Griño-Aquino and Romero, JJ., concur.
18