In re: The Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus for Dr. respect to which under Proclamation No.
on No. 2045, the
Aurora Parong, et al. vs. Ponce Enrile, [G.R. No. L-61388,
April 20, 1983] *
FACTS:
The records show that nine (9) of the fourteen
(14) detainees herein were arrested on July 6, 1982 at
about 1:45 p.m. when three (3) teams of the PC/INP of
Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya led by Lt. Col. Coronel, 1st Lt.
de Guzman and 1st Lt. Baria, after securing a Search
Warrant No. S-82 issued by Judge Sofronio Sayo of the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Viscaya conducted a raid
at the residence of Dra. Aurora Parong. Apprehended
during the said raid were Dra. Aurora Parong, Benjamin
Pineda, Sabino Padilla, Francisco Divinagracia, Zenaida
Mallari, Letty Ballogan, Norberto Portuguese, and
Mariano Soriano who were then having a conference in
the dining room of Dra. Parong's residence which had
been doing on since 10:00 a.m. of that same day. The five
other detainees were arrested on a different date. Prior
to their arrest, all the detainees were under surveillance
as they were then identified as members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines engaging in
subversive activities.
The herein fourteen (14) detainees (hereafter
referred to sometimes as petitioners) were all detained
at the PC/INP Command Headquarters, Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya from July 6, 1982 until their transfer on
the morning of August 10, 1982 to an undisclosed place
reportedly to Camp Crame, Quezon City, to Echague,
Isabela, and to Tuguegarao, Cagayan.
Hence, this petition for the writ of habeas corpus
and mandamus filed by Josefina Garcia-Padilla, mother
of detained petitioner Sabino G. Padilla, Jr. on August 13,
1982. The mandamus aspect of the instant petition has,
however, become moot and academic, and whereabouts
of petitioners having already become known to
petitioner Josefina Garcia-Padilla.
The Court en banc issued a writ of habeas corpus
and required the respondents to make a return of the
writ. In return to the writ filed, the respondents, through
the Solicitor General, alleged that (1) the detainees
mentioned in the petition, with the exception of Tom
Vasquez who was temporarily released, are all being
detained by virtue of a Presidential Commitment Order
(PCO), pursuant to LOI No. 1211 in relation to
Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, and that said PCO
was issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos for
violation of P.D. No. 885; (2) the corresponding charges
against the said detainees have been filed in court and
before the Acting Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Viscaya
where they are pleading; (3) persons named in the PCO
were arrested and are being detained for offenses with
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus continues to be
suspended, thus:
“ x x x and in all other places the suspension of
the privilege of the writ shall also continue
with respect to persons at present detained as
well as others who may hereafter be similarly
detained for the crimes of insurrection or
rebellion, subversion conspiracy or proposals
to commit such crimes, and for all other crimes
and offenses committed by them in
furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or
incident thereto, or in connection therewith.”
ISSUE:
W/n the petitioners may post bail
RULING:
NO. From the clear language of the Lansang
case, “the function of Court is merely to check — not to
supplant — the Executive, or to ascertain merely
whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of
his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him
or to determine the wisdom of his act.” If, however, the
constitutional right to bail is granted to the herein
petitioners by the court, through the procedure laid
down under Rule 114 of the Rules of court, what
inevitably results is the supplanting of the decision of the
President to detain pursuant to Proclamation No. 2045,
of persons who come under its coverage.
The specific mention in the Constitution of
rebellion and insurrection along with invasion and
imminent danger thereof, shows that the terms
"rebellion and insurrection" are used therein in the sense
of a state or condition of the Nation, not in the concept
of a statutory offense. What, therefore, should
determine the legality of imposing what is commonly
referred to as "preventive detention" resulting from the
suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus, is the
necessity of its adoption as a measure to suppress or
quell the rebellion, or beat off an invasion. The necessity
for such measure as a means of defense for national
survival quite clearly transcends in importance and
urgency the claim of those detained to the right to bail to
obtain their freedom. To hold otherwise would defeat
the purpose of the constitutional grant of the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on the
occasions expressly mentioned in the charter. For what
indeed could the purpose be of suspending the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus other than to restrict, at
least for the duration of the emergency of invasion or
rebellion, the right to personal liberty, dictated as it is, in
the greater interest of public safety and national
security.
So it is that Proclamation No. 2045 mentions not
only rebellion or insurrection as coming within the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
but also other offenses, including subversion which is not
mentioned in the Constitution, committed by reason or
on the occasion of the rebellion, or in connection
therewith, or in the furtherance thereof. There need be
no alarm over what libertarian jurists fear as violation of
the constitutional right to personal liberty when the
President decrees the suspension of the privilege of
habeas corpus. Only those who give cause for it will be
subject to restriction of their liberty, as the necessity
therefor arises in the interest of national defense and
survival. The constitutional guarantee of individual
freedom is intact in all its plenitude and sanctity, save
only as the Constitution has envisioned the need for its
limitation, and only to a few, in relation to the entire
population, as the Constitution itself permits in case of
overwhelming and imperious necessity.
As previously noted, "invasion" which is not a
statutorily-defined offense and "imminent danger
thereof" as mentioned in the Constitution indicate that
"rebellion and insurrection" are also mentioned therein
not in their concept as statutorily-defined public crimes,
but as a state or condition of extreme emergency
resulting from the existence of the aforesaid events.
Now, if captured enemies from the invading
force may not be charged with any statutory offense that
would provide the occasion to demand the right to bail,
it is obvious that persons engaged in rebellion or
insurrection may not claim the right to be released on
bail when similarly captured or arrested during the
continuance of the aforesaid contingency. They may not
even claim the right to be charged immediately in court,
as they may rightfully do so, were they being charged
with an ordinary or common offense. This is so because
according to legal writers or publicists, the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus “has the sole
effect of allowing the executive to defer the trials of
persons charged with certain offenses during the period
of emergency.” This clearly means denial of the right to
be released on bail on being charged in court with
bailable offenses.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the suspension
of the right to bail, if the government's campaign to
suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered
effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the
continuance of the rebellion, and those arrested,
captured and detained in the course thereof will be
released, they would, without the least doubt, rejoin
their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the
success of government efforts to bring to an end the
invasion, rebellion or insurrection.
Realistically, a person engaged in the rebellion
does not, upon being arrested or captured, cease to be
as committed to the cause of the movement. Through a
grand conspiracy, as is of the essence of how rebellion is
committed, involving a great mass of confederates
bound together by a common goal, he remains in a state
of continued participation in the criminal act or design.
His heart still beats with the same emotion for the
success of the movement of which he continues to be an
ardent adherent and ally. It is simple logic then to hold
that there should be no legal compulsion for a captured
rebel to be charged in court, only to be released on bail,
while he is, realistically and legally, still as much as part
and parcel of the movement, continuing as it is, as those
still engaged in carrying on actively to attain their goal of
overthrowing the established regime.
It is, likewise, all too well-known that when the
rebel forces capture government troopers or kidnap
private individuals, they do not accord to them any of the
rights now being demanded by the herein petitioners,
particularly to be set at liberty upon the filing of bail. As
a matter of common knowledge, captives of the rebels
or insurgents are not only not given the right to be
released, but also denied trial of any kind. In some
instances, they may even be liquidated
unceremoniously. What is then sought by the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is, among
others, to put the government forces on equal fighting
terms with the rebels, by authorizing the detention of
their own rebel or dissident captives as the rebellion
goes on. In this way, the advantage the rebellion forces
have over those of the government, as when they resort
to guerrilla tactics with sophisticated weapons, is, at
least, minimized, thereby enhancing the latter's chances
of beating their enemy. It would, therefore, seem to be
ignoring realities in the name of misplaced magnanimity
and compassion, and for the sake of humanity, to grant
the demand for respect of rights supposedly guaranteed
by the Constitution by those who themselves seek to
destroy that very same instrument, trampling over it
already as they are still waging war against the
government. This stark actuality gives added force and
substance to the rationale of the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in case of invasion,
insurrection, rebellion, or imminent danger thereof,
when public safety requires it.