EN BANC
B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR
APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of homicide in
connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan
stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as
part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea
bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of
homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11
February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a
period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the lower
court. The application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional Trial
Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the
probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar
Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation status.
He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August
1993.1 He passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath of
office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his
probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his probation period did not last
for more than ten (10) months from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated
18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for
Admission to the Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands
it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational
qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.2 The essentiality of good moral character in those who would
be lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard as
having persuasive effect:
In Re Farmer:
This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the applicant's right to
receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he must, in addition to other requisites,
satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary to make up such a character. It is something more
than an absence of bad character. It is the good name which the applicant has acquired, or should have
acquired, through association with his fellows. It means that he must have conducted himself as a man of
upright character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such character expresses itself, not in negatives nor
in following the line of least resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and
the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently proper. Consider for a moment
the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, to
every man's fireside. Vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and
confidence; he deals with is client's property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn
officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the administration of justice. . . .
It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate from the straight and
narrow path than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the practice of profession. For these
reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to possess a high moral standard
therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the board of bar examiners as an arm of the court, is required to
cause a minute examination to be made of the moral standard of each candidate for admission to practice.
. . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that the highest degree of scrutiny
must be exercised as to the moral character of a candidate who presents himself for admission to the
bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully met at its very source, and prevented, for, after a lawyer has
once been admitted, and has pursued his profession, and has established himself therein, a far more
difficult situation is presented to the court when proceedings are instituted for disbarment and for the
recalling and annulment of his license.
In Re Keenan:
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the right to carry on an
ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued only to those who demonstrate
special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character. All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal
basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate machinery has been set up to test applicants by standards fair to
all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed to enter the profession,
and only those who maintain the standards are allowed to remain in it.
Re Rouss:
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and professional character
is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not to punish him for past offense: an
examination into character, like the examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness.
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:
Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not only protect the rights
and interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the cause. Yet what protection to
clients or assistance to courts could such agents give? They are required to be of good moral character, so
that the agents and officers of the court, which they are, may not bring discredit upon the due
administration of the law, and it is of the highest possible consequence that both those who have not such
qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had them, have fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to
appear in courts to aid in the administration of justice.
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so
far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of
legal learning:
The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the practice of the law unless he
covered an upright moral character. The possession of this by the attorney is more important, if
anything, to the public and to the proper administration of justice than legal learning. Legal learning may be
acquired in after years, but if the applicant passes the threshold of the bar with a bad moral character the
chances are that his character will remain bad, and that he will become a disgrace instead of an ornament
to his great calling — a curse instead of a benefit to his community — a Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap,
instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin.9
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to
the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry into the moral
proceedings for disbarment:
Re Stepsay:
The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his admission to practice is broader
in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.
Re Wells:
. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the California Bar the court cannot
reject him for want of good moral character unless it appears that he has been guilty of acts which would
be cause for his disbarment or suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is broader in its scope
than that in a disbarment proceeding, and the court may receive any evidence which tends to show the
applicant's character as respects honesty, integrity, and general morality, and may no doubt refuse
admission upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of any of the acts declared to be causes for
disbarment.
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar
must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general
public. There is a very real need to prevent a general perception that entry into the legal profession is open
to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the
progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system as we
know it.12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the required
standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction of
severe physical injuries which proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly
indicated serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-
accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had,
by seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the very
least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the
prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of
that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the
participant was then possessed of good moral character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is prepared to
consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious
deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress that good moral character is a requirement
possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the time of application for permission to take the
bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and to
take the attorney's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration, evidence that he
may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those
seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible
members of the community who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr.
Argosino for a significant period of time, particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by
Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a
helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must,
in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now, that he has become
morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the
names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul
Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the
parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan.
G.R. No. 160965 July 21, 2008
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
MARIA NYMPHA MANDAGAN, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
For resolution is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
seeking the review and the reversal of the Decision2 dated May 29, 2002 and the Resolution3 dated
November 10, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 63166.
Petitioner Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) hired respondent Maria Nympha
Mandagan on December 16, 1995, as Legal Assistant, with the rank of Assistant Manager, on probationary
status while she was waiting for the results of the Bar examinations. Respondent was assigned to the
corporate legal division where she performed research work, drafted legal opinions, served as a member
of a management collective bargaining agreement (CBA) negotiating panel, and handled litigation, mostly
labor cases. On June 16, 1996, after successfully hurdling the Bar examinations, respondent was issued a
regular appointment by petitioner.
4 of its corporate officers.
On June 2, 1998, petitioner issued a memorandum to respondent requiring her to show cause in writing
why no disciplinary action should be taken against her for committing acts violative of the PNCC Code of
Employee Discipline, to wit:
1. Engaging in private law practice which is in violation of Section 6(a), Section 6(b)(26) and
Section 11 of the PNCC Code of Employee Discipline;
2. Using the company’s official address as your address for your private case which is not only in
violation of Section 8(A)(1) of the PNCC Code on Employee Discipline but is prejudicial to the
best interests of the PNCC; and
3. Representing a client who has a pending case against PNCC which is not only prejudicial to
the interests of the company but is in violation of the ethics of your profession. 5
This memorandum was served on respondent on the eve of June 3, 1998 at her residence.
On June 4, 1998, in reply, respondent wrote a strongly worded memorandum 6 stating that she took offense
at the manner of service of the office memorandum. According to her, the June 2, 1998 memorandum was
merely a scheme intended to terminate her from employment. She said it was sparked by the incident on
March 30, 1998 in which she was seen with then PNCC Corporate Comptroller Renato R. Ramirez, who
was able to enter the PNCC compound despite being unauthorized to do so, he having filed a constructive
dismissal case against petitioner.
On June 9, 1998, respondent submitted another memorandum 7 denying the charges against her, claiming
that the case she handled was only an accommodation, accepted by her upon the request and authority of
then PNCC President Melvin Nazareno and Mr. Ramirez, and that she was on leave at every scheduled
hearing of the said case. She explained that she had the distinct impression that the lawyers of the PNCC
Legal Division can take on accommodation cases. She cited as an example Atty. Glenna Jean Ogan who,
appearing as counsel for PNCC employee Fabian Codera, was even provided with a service vehicle and
considered on official time during hearings. She further explained that when a petition for the annulment of
judgment was filed with the regional trial court (RTC) assailing the final and executory decision in the
ejectment case in favor of Mr. Ramirez, she desisted from representing the latter. She said that she
signed, as counsel of record, the petition for certiorari filed before the CA only for the purpose of
terminating it. She also claimed that there was no conflict of interest between Ramirez’s labor and
ejectment cases since the former was still pending resolution.
Petitioner, thereafter, conducted a clarificatory hearing.
Later, petitioner, thru then PNCC President and Chief Executive Officer Rogelio L. Luis, sent respondent a
letter8dated June 15, 1998 notifying her that her explanation in both memoranda and her statements
during the clarificatory conference were inconsistent, unacceptable, and, by themselves, admission of the
truth of the charges against her. As a consequence, her employment would be terminated effective at the
close of office hours on June 19, 1998 for violations of the PNCC Code of Employee Discipline and for loss
of trust and confidence.
On October 28, 1998, respondent initiated a complaint9 for illegal dismissal against petitioner and four (4)
In a Decision10 dated July 15, 1999, Labor Arbiter (LA) Edgardo M. Madriaga dismissed the complaint for
being unmeritorious, stating that petitioner was justified in dismissing respondent for loss of trust and
confidence for handling the constructive dismissal case of Mr. Ramirez against PNCC, in a conflict of
interest with her employer. Petitioner was, however, directed to pay respondent separation pay in
accordance with law.1avvphi1
Aggrieved, respondent appealed the said Decision to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). In
the Resolution11 promulgated July 31, 2000, the NLRC Second Division denied the appeal for lack of merit.
While affirming in toto the Decision of LA Madriaga, the NLRC, however, declared that the allegation of
conflict of interest was baseless as respondent was able to refute the same by documentary evidence that
the labor case of Mr. Ramirez against petitioner was represented by another counsel. The dismissal of
respondent was upheld on the ground that she failed to adduce documentary evidence to show that her
appearance in the ejectment case of Mr. Ramirez was with the authority and approval of then PNCC
President Nazareno and Mr. Ramirez. By reason thereof, the NLRC gave more credence to the theory of
petitioner that she violated the PNCC Code of Employee Discipline on moonlighting and using company
property for personal purposes. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was, likewise, denied in a
Resolution12 dated November 8, 2000.
Respondent thus went to the CA via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
This time, the tide turned in her favor. In its Decision13 dated May 29, 2002, the CA annulled the Decision
and Resolutions of the LA and the NLRC, respectively, for lack of sufficient proof that respondent did
engage in the private practice of law since there was only a single case involved which had the
corresponding authorization from her superiors. Finding the dismissal of respondent illegal, the CA ordered
petitioner to pay respondent separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement, in view of their already strained
relations, and full backwages from date of dismissal until the finality of its Decision.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the CA Decision insisting inter alia that respondent’s handling
of even only a single non-PNCC case already constituted a violation of the PNCC Code of Employee
Discipline, since moonlighting is strictly prohibited under existing company rules and regulations.
The CA, in its assailed Resolution dated November 10, 2003, denied petitioner’s motion for lack of merit,
citing Office of the Court Administrator v. Atty. Misael M. Ladaga14 which held that an isolated appearance
did not constitute private practice of law, especially when done with the permission of superiors.
Hence, this petition assigning the following errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT HEREIN RESPONDENT DID
NOT VIOLATE ANY COMPANY POLICY OR REGULATION WHEN SHE HANDLED A PRIVATE CASE
AND USED COMPANY TIME AND FACILITIES FOR SUCH UNAUTHORIZED OUTSIDE
ENGAGEMENT.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FOUND NO VALID CAUSE TO TERMINATE
THE EMPLOYMENT OF HEREIN RESPONDENT, A MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEE, FOR VIOLATION OF
COMPANY RULES, BREACH OF TRUST, AND/OR LOSS OF CONFIDENCE.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT ANNULLED THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE
NLRC AND GRANTED HEREIN RESPONDENT’S PETITION FINDING THE NLRC TO HAVE
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION.15
In a nutshell, petitioner contends that the CA erred in holding that respondent’s dismissal was illegal when
it ruled that respondent did not violate the PNCC Code of Employee Discipline on moonlighting and
personal use of company time and property despite undisputed and overwhelming evidence to the
contrary. It posits that respondent readily admitted rendering services outside PNCC in her pleadings and
her taking advantage of office time and property was shown by using the address of PNCC for her
personal cases and utilizing her leave credits to attend hearings. It further claims that the CA gravely erred
in reversing the findings of both the LA and the NLRC despite existing jurisprudence to the effect that their
findings are entitled to great weight and respect, nay conclusiveness, when buttressed by substantial
evidence. This is in addition to the fact that the case cited by the CA is not on all fours with the present
case. It also asserts that respondent’s fault-finding cannot exculpate her from her misdeeds. In view of
these, petitioner insists that, as employer who is given a wide latitude in determining who among its
managerial employees are entitled to its trust and confidence, and also taking into consideration its
findings of her alleged frequent tardiness and absences, her not being able to "get along well with her co-
employees," and her misrepresentations in the resume she submitted to Malacañang to get a favorable
endorsement for promotion, it is only justified in dismissing respondent from employment.
The petition is without merit.
In petitions for review before this Court, as a general rule, only questions of law are allowed. An exception
to this is when the findings of the administrative agencies below and the appellate court differ, as in the
case at bar.16 Thus, an independent evaluation of the facts of this case is called for, especially considering
that, while the LA and the NLRC both found respondent’s dismissal valid and legal, the bases for their
findings are also different.17 Hence, the claim of petitioner that these findings are conclusive upon us is
incorrect.
Petitioner dismissed respondent from employment because she was found guilty of the charges against
her. It found respondent to have engaged in private law practice in violation of Sections 6(a)(b)(26) and 11
of the PNCC Code of Employee Discipline.18 It also found her to have used the company’s official address
for her private case in violation of Section 8(A)(1) of the same Code, which is also prejudicial to its best
interests. Finally, it found her to have represented a client who had a pending case against PNCC. The
pertinent sections of the Code are quoted hereunder:
SECTION 6. Conduct and Behavior
a. An employee’s conduct in the performance of his duties should be beyond reproach and free
from the appearance of impropriety.
b. x x x
26) Moonlighting or rendering services for another employer without the knowledge or approval
of Management.
SECTION 8. Company Property. –
A. The following acts shall constitute violation of this section:
1) Using Company property, equipment or materials for personal use or purpose.
SECTION 11. Conflict of Interest. –
a. The following act shall constitute violation of this section:
1) Engaging, participating or involving oneself, directly or indirectly, in any transaction,
undertaking, or business enterprise, where such engagement, participation, or involvement is in
conflict with, or is improper or undesirable in the interest of the Company. 19
The imposable penalties for the said offenses within a 12-month period are as follows: a) for moonlighting
– a 5-day suspension for the first offense, a 15-day suspension for the second offense, and dismissal on
the third offense; b) for the use of company property for personal purposes – suspension to dismissal,
depending on the gravity of the offense; and c) for committing acts constituting conflict of interest –
reprimand to dismissal depending on the gravity of the offense.
According to petitioner, respondent failed to substantiate her claim that her appearance in the ejectment
case of Mr. Ramirez was upon his and former PNCC President Nazareno’s authority and directive, since
she did not present any documentary evidence to prove the same. To support its position that respondent
was without the proper authority, it presented a handwritten note from Atty. Hoover Abling, former Head of
the Legal Division of PNCC, stating that her appearance was without his prior authority and clearance.
We must stress, however, that in termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show
that the dismissal of the employee is for just or authorized cause. Failure to do so would mean that the
dismissal is not justified. This is consonant with the guarantee of security of tenure in the
Constitution20 and reiterated in the Labor Code.21 A dismissed employee is not required to prove his
innocence of the charges leveled against him by his employer. Likewise, the determination of the existence
and sufficiency of a just cause is to be exercised with fairness and in good faith and after observing due
process.
Thus, we agree with the CA that petitioner failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that
respondent was indeed guilty of moonlighting as defined under the PNCC Code of Employee Discipline,
i.e., rendering services for another employer without the knowledge OR approval of management. In the
manner in which the rule is phrased, since the words "knowledge" and "approval" are separated by the
disjunctive OR, it is evident that even knowledge alone by the management of PNCC of the alleged
moonlighting is tantamount to an implied approval and is sufficient to exonerate respondent from liability.
Therefore, it cannot be said that her appearance in the ejectment case of PNCC Corporate Comptroller
Ramirez was without the knowledge of management considering that the former PNCC top officers were
the ones who asked her to do so. Moreover, when she filed her application for leave of absence during
one of her hearings, she specifically stated in the leave form that her absence was due to the filing of the
ejectment complaint for Mr. Ramirez, and this application was approved by petitioner.
We also find the handwritten note of the former head of the Legal Division, Atty. Hoover Abling, presented
by petitioner to refute respondent’s allegation of approval from the top management of PNCC, to be of
questionable probative value in light of respondent’s revelation that Atty. Abling himself appeared as
counsel before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 3, in the criminal case for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 2222 filed against the wife of Jose Z. Gregorio, employee of PNCC. From the proceedings
before the LA to its pleadings before this Court, the petitioner has consistently kept silent about the matter.
It may also be mentioned that respondent proffered documentary evidence in the form of an exchange of
correspondence showing that another member of the Legal Division, Atty. Glenna Jean Ogan, was hired
by the very same Mr. Ramirez to handle his annulment case for a fee.23 Again, this Court notes that
petitioner tried to dodge this allegation by simply claiming that respondent’s "name-dragging" will not
exculpate her from her misdeeds.
The CA, thus, did not err in citing Office of the Court Administrator v. Atty. Misael M. Ladaga24 because the
June 2, 1998 Memorandum enumerated among the violations committed by respondent the "private
practice of law." In the cited case, we held that "private practice of law" does not refer to an isolated court
appearance but contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding
one’s self to the public as a lawyer.
As to the charge that respondent made personal use of company property, the only evidence submitted by
petitioner were copies of the complaint filed before the MTC, Parañaque City and copies of the pleadings
and resolutions in the CA case, showing that her mailing address corresponded to the company’s address.
As respondent pointed out, there was no proof from petitioner as to her use of any other properties
belonging to the company. It is safe to assume that respondent received personal mail using the address
of petitioner because, since it pertained to the same ejectment suit which the former top PNCC officers
authorized her to litigate, the handling of the said case would be more convenient. As there is no express
prohibition under the PNCC Code of Employee Discipline as to the use of the company’s address to
receive personal mail, and, more importantly, there is no clear and convincing proof presented by
petitioner as to the prejudice it suffered from such respondent’s act, the charge of violation of the PNCC
Code of Employee Discipline, Sec. 8(A)(1) should fall.
With respect to petitioner’s claim that respondent’s appearance in the same ejectment case was in conflict
with the interests of the company, the NLRC correctly found that she was able to refute the allegation by
submitting evidence that the constructive dismissal case of Mr. Ramirez was handled by Saguisag &
Associates.25 The petitioner’s assertion is, thus, belied by the record.
We likewise disagree with petitioner’s position that, in addition to the ascribed violations of the PNCC Code
of Employee Discipline, it was justified in terminating respondent from employment because of her alleged
frequent tardiness and absences, her inability to get along with some of her co-workers, and her
misrepresentations in the resume she submitted to Malacañang. The respondent properly concluded that
the claim of frequent absences and tardiness due to attendance to her private cases, and her inability to
get along well with some co-workers were not amply substantiated, as they were, in fact, rebutted by her
performance rating for the period July 1996 to April 1997 indicating that she was "[p]roficient in the duties
of her position."26 Anent her alleged misrepresentations in her resume submitted to Malacañang to gain a
favorable endorsement for promotion, we note that this was raised by petitioner for the first time in the
proceedings before the LA, the same not being included in the charges enumerated in the June 2, 1998
Memorandum. In other words, these causes were merely an afterthought, resorted to by petitioner in a
futile attempt to justify its decision to terminate respondent’s employment on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence.
Long recognized is the right of employers to dismiss employees by reason of loss of trust and confidence,
particularly in cases of personnel occupying positions of responsibility. The burden of proof required in
labor cases, however, must be amply discharged. Ordinarily, with respect to managerial employees, the
mere existence of a basis for believing that such employee has breached the trust of his employer would
be enough, such as when there is a reasonable ground to believe that the employee concerned is
responsible for the purported misconduct, and the nature of his participation therein renders him unworthy
of trust and confidence demanded by his position.27
Be that as it may, we must stress herein that to be a valid ground for dismissal, the loss of trust and
confidence must be based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts. A breach is
willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from
an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. Loss of trust and confidence must rest
on substantial grounds and not on the employer’s arbitrariness, whims, caprices or suspicion, otherwise,
the employee would forever remain at the mercy of the employer. The employer, thus, carries the burden
of clearly and convincingly establishing the facts upon which loss of confidence in the employee is made to
rest. 28

Loss of trust and confidence as a ground of dismissal has never been intended to afford an occasion for
abuse because of its subjective nature. It should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are illegal,
improper, and unjustified. It must be genuine, not a mere afterthought intended to justify an earlier action
taken in bad faith. Let it not be forgotten that what is at stake is the means of livelihood, the name, and the
reputation of the employee. To countenance an arbitrary exercise of that prerogative is to negate the
employee’s constitutional right to security of tenure.29

However, it should be remembered that petitioner is a government-owned and controlled corporation. The
handling by the lawyers in its employ of cases of its employees, whether for a fee or not, and despite the
"knowledge and approval" of management, while not absolutely prohibited is, nonetheless, discouraged,
as it could only breed corruption and cause distraction from the very duties that the lawyers were precisely
hired for. The fact that a number of lawyers in petitioner’s employ have handled private cases, obviously
with the tolerance of petitioner, does not validate the practice or make it an acceptable rule of conduct. A
wrong done by many does not make a right.

In light of the foregoing, we find that respondent, although not entirely faultless, was indeed illegally
dismissed from employment by petitioner. Consequently, she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges, and to full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or
their monetary equivalent, computed from the time of the withholding of the employee’s compensation up
to the time of actual reinstatement. If reinstatement is not possible due to the strained relations between
the employer and the employee, separation pay should instead be paid the employee equivalent to one
month salary for every year of service, computed from the time of engagement up to the finality of this
decision.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 29, 2002 and the Resolution dated November 10, 2003 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63166 are AFFIRMED .

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993 It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous, unethical,
demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the
members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its instance,
but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services"
R E SO L U T I O N
through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues
that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should
REGALADO, J.: be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona,2 reportedly decided by
the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements
similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit
persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required the (1)
those allowed by law." Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers'
Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the
Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows: position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily
responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of which this Court takes note with
Annex A appreciation and gratitude.

SECRET MARRIAGE? The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by
P560.00 for a valid marriage. respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case,
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and enlightening
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am— 6:00 to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar
pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla. associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this bar matter.

Annex B 1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:

GUAM DIVORCE. Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the
two terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense
would readily dictate that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. For
DON PARKINSON who could deny that document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in
need of basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies like
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal birth, marriage, property, or business registration, obtaining documents like clearance,
Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours. passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non- The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with
quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position
Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic. effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC,
INC.1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act
of establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through
newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court
to perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the
field of law practice as aforedescribed.4
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent
corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the
advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal
services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned,
apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on the reading
public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to
the very name being used by respondent — "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is
respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just
like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical problems. More
importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic
connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of
the present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces
the impression that it is being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal
services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear with a picture and name
of a person being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes
whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of the service or services being
offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support
services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively
engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction
between "legal services" and "legal support services," as the respondent would have
it. The advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the reading
public that legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts
contrary to law, morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are
only meant to inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Said
advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student ought to
know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce is
recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent
union between a man and woman entered into accordance with
law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relation during the marriage within the limits provided by
this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being
conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated
in accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only
misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the
very least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where certain
defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright
malpractice.
Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed
at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown
in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the
words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address those planning a "secret
marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special contract of
permanent union," the inviolable social institution," which is how the Family Code
describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this
particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy, which
is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that
the above impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are
accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the
advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged
or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is
committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers
do not constitute legal services as commonly understood, the advertisements in
question give the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers
and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical
consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar
themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are contrary to
law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby destroying and demeaning
the integrity of the Bar.
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the
publication of the advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar
thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should be prohibited from further
performing or offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very least,
from offering such services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic
data gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for
gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and
should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such
business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can
be no choice but to prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed
by specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their having
devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting
requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the
legal profession will deny the profession of the great benefits and advantages of
modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a
lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the
illegal practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar but
also, and more importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological development
in the profession may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring
prevention of illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its
services, but only if such services are made available exclusively to members of the
Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal
services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between which
service may be offered to the public in general and which should be made available
exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may require
further proceedings because of the factual considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be
prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of
marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law.
While respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating information
regarding such matters, it must be required to include, in the information given, a
disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that certain course of action may be
illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal
opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course of action
to take, and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to
possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at
members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized
to practice law or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be
allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly
defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and effective means of
regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to be
advantageous to the legal profession, but before allowance of such practice may be
considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to
each and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of
Court.5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving
legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with
the use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment).
This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public
under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its
enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the
regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is merely
engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own commercial
advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the
fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic,
Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been
held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes
drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their
legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case
in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such
limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice
for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic,
Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is
an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate any
grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of
practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec.
1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of the
Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business name, the persons and the
lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The practice of law is not a
profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See
5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves
under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who are
acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein,
are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and
patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal
Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its
unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely
renders "legal support services" to answers, litigants and the general public as
enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages
2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated above,
clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside
of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family
Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret
marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related
problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law of the Philippines and such
other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the
legal principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and
which activities call for legal training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of
respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term
as "the practice of law."7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should
be given to the protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited by
unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of
study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and
pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the
administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or
standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as
such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study
and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist in the
Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to
protect the general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the
general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers
which may be brought about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that
lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional Responsibility from
advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised not
by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken
to protect the general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal services
without being qualified to offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give
the impression that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of
marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign
investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be given to them if they avail of
its services. The Respondent's name — The Legal Clinic, Inc. — does not help
matters. It gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal
problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by
paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in
The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only
"paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President
and majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and
main purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the
purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and
against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases,
but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work
out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in
this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for
a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines
are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an
agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is
towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain
from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the use
of advertisements such as are the subject matter of the petition, for one (cannot)
justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet
to be amended so that such act could become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret
marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so,
are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having
a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice
on divorce, where in this country there is none, except under the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals and is deceitful
because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do that which by our laws
cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for
clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses
of this character justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management
consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the
services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that
the business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the
practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent
guilty of unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render
effective service unless he is familiar with such statutes and
regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of
conduct which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the
consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge
as a factor in determining what measures he shall recommend, do
not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not only presumed that
all men know the law, but it is a fact that most men have
considerable acquaintance with broad features of the law . . . .
Our knowledge of the law — accurate or inaccurate — moulds our
conduct not only when we are acting for ourselves, but when we
are serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally
possess rather precise knowledge of the laws touching their
particular business or profession. A good example is the architect,
who must be familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention
codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and who draws
plans and specification in harmony with the law. This is not
practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower,
replies that it is required by the statute. Or the industrial relations
expert cites, in support of some measure that he recommends, a
decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are they
practicing law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate
fee is charged for the legal advice or information, and the legal
question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal
problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to
engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the
building code and the like, then an architect who performed this
function would probably be considered to be trespassing on
territory reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial
relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed
a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is
not the case. The most important body of the industrial relations
experts are the officers and business agents of the labor unions
and few of them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate
employers, it has been the practice for some years to delegate
special responsibility in employee matters to a management
group chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in such
matter, and without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More
recently, consultants like the defendants have the same service
that the larger employers get from their own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized
profession for which appropriate courses are offered by our
leading universities. The court should be very cautious about
declaring [that] a widespread, well-established method of
conducting business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of
men who customarily perform a certain function have no right to
do so, or that the technical education given by our schools cannot
be used by the graduates in their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should
consider his work for any particular client or customer, as a whole.
I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to
the law defining his client's obligations to his employees, to guide
his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client along
the path charted by law. This, of course, would be the practice of
the law. But such is not the fact in the case before me.
Defendant's primarily efforts are along economic and
psychological lines. The law only provides the frame within which
he must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building
the limits the kind of building the architect may plan. The
incidental legal advice or information defendant may give, does
not transform his activities into the practice of law. Let me add
that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he performed services
which are customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would
be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare program, he
drew employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the
employer in the adjustment of grievances and in collective
bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the
practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and
may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under
discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept the
employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here,
however, there may be an exception where the business turns on
a question of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by
brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land depends
on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the negotiator
is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and persuade
the opposite party to the same opinion, then it may be that only a
lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy between an
employer and his men grows from differing interpretations of a
contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not
handle it. But I need not reach a definite conclusion here, since
the situation is not presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer before
administrative agencies of the federal government, especially
before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An
agency of the federal government, acting by virtue of an authority
granted by the Congress, may regulate the representation of
parties before such agency. The State of New Jersey is without
power to interfere with such determination or to forbid
representation before the agency by one whom the agency
admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a
party the right to appear in person, or by counsel, or by other
representative. Rules and Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S.
203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney, and ther
representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work,
defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows, even
arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d
800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp.
154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which
may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a
whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional
Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation
concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting
as a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See
Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a
marriage license, and making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not
constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that described
in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez
case, then what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such
as the Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence,
annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving
informational materials may not constitute of law. The business is similar to that of a
bookstore where the customer buys materials on the subject and determines on the
subject and determines by himself what courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the
Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and
give legal advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which
publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is
amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or
rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as
a solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is
urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the
forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled out,
constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation
with many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to
the public at large. There is no personal contact or relationship
with a particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of
confidence and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and
client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE — THE
REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR
PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book
assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and does
not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar
to a designated or readily identified person. Similarly the
defendant's publication does not purport to give personal advice
on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified
person in a particular situation — in their publication and sale of
the kits, such publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful
practice of law . . . . There being no legal impediment under the
statute to the sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the
injunction against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose
of selling to persons seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or
separation agreement any printed material or writings relating to
matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of
modification of the judgment against defendant having an interest
in any publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce and
against his having any personal contact with any prospective
purchaser. The record does fully support, however, the finding
that for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave
legal advice in the course of personal contacts concerning
particular problems which might arise in the preparation and
presentation of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of
action or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the
preparation of necessary documents (The injunction therefore
sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of law,
particularly with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by
the defendant relating to specific problems of particular individuals
in connection with a divorce, separation, annulment of separation
agreement sought and should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348,
NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-
advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal
advice or counselling," such would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is
in this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious
disposition of this case.
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or
perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities,
formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no
Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph
thereof (which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the
limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support services", and not legal
services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the proper
determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice of
law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The courts have laid down
general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now
take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of
service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and
the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although such matter
may or may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of
professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations,
preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary
layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to
determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and
enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of
law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an
attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for
compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto
constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and
receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down the
test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds,
and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when
he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their right under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective, before
any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted
by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity,
performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their
clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is
engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.
W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim
in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment,
and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice,
as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves
the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.
(5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and
the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have
no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become
involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear
an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction,
so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part
of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the
welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all
times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
(Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re
Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v.
Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the
aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it has
been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained
paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory,
through the extensive use of computers and modern information technology in the
gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information and
communication, such as computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction of
documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence
gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations; and
assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from government or non-
government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business registrations;
educational or employment records or certifications, obtaining documentation like
clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information about laws of other
countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that
they can avail of preparatory to emigration to the foreign country, and other matters
that do not involve representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer
systems, programs, or software for the efficient management of law offices, corporate
legal departments, courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or administering
legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and
technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to
justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its
contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing
information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of
this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the
client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will
necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper
course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent
and for the which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the
jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that
respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority
holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of
the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an
insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given by its own
"proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with
offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No
matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-
Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like
doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has
specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation, and
family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and
attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field
toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law
firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by
analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted
what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe you for the symptoms
and so on. That's how we operate, too. And once the problem has been categorized,
then it's referred to one of our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up
treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like
preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff
or, if this were a hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care of these
matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi
kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty.
Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If
you had a rich relative who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit
millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There
would be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in order, and your
relative is even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property, and only a
specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal with the problem. Now, if there
were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you would need a litigator,
who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence
to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is
important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which
thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has
caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently
establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal
problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and
corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but
rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which constitute
practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct.
The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty
of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw support
for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who meet the
requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically so
provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar who have complied
with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice
law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through education and study, have been
recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise,
counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to the
construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The justification for excluding from the practice
of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the
protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable
persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little control. 27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United States of
paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever
may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or
legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools
and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the
Philippines. 28As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States,
standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards or
guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of
Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal
assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of
professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal
Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered as
paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have
been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such allowable
services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory
authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper
administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled
person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are
unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to practice
law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and
objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the
mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of
the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers
should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the
lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest
involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot,
without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a
merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of
legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in
the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those
of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper advertising
or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the
respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business
from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that
"the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to
advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession
and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and
adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the
public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary
activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most
worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.
This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27,
Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of
character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of
publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service
which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to
magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the
unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession
enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they may
be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed
and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must
not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date
and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other
educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching
positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific
societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of
references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for
other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative
data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be
published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or
injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement
of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special
branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of
changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the
profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not
under a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is
being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation
for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall
under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with
more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the
Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain from
lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present
proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly
determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of our law and
jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This
interdiction, just like the rule against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-
called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support services.

The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of the
constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of
Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an the factual background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative
exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action
initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to as may be necessary under the circumstances.
be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in
our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides,
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic,
even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not
Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of
applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This goes to
the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting,
show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made
directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional
only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as
Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
in the case at bar.
the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance
herewith.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in Bates,
on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found that public
opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:

Trustworthy from 71% to 14%

Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%

Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the
publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is
already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under
attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the
face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional
conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to
the legal profession.

In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to advertise
his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of
law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and
proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a
ADM. CASE NO. 5737 October 25, 2004
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. STANLEY CABRERA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In an administrative complaint dated July 7, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz charges Atty. Stanley Cabrera with
misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Complainant alleges that he is a fourth year law student; since the latter part of 2001, he instituted several
actions against his neighbors; he appeared for and in his behalf in his own cases; he met respondent who
acted as the counsel of his neighbors; during a hearing on January 14, 2002, in one case before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City, presided by Judge Caridad Cuerdo, the following exchange
transpired:
xxx xxx So, may we know your honor, if he is a lawyer or not?
The Court having been inhibited by the respondent from hearing the case, replied:
You are asking for my inhibition and yet you want me to rule on his appearance xxx
xxx.
Thereafter, the respondent said:
Because your honor, he (pertaining to the complainant) is misrepresenting himself to
be a lawyer!
To this the complainant remarked:
"Your Honor, I’m not xxx xxx."
Respondent, this time engulfed with anger in a raising voice said:
Appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna; x x x.
Respondent’s imputations were uncalled for and the latter’s act of compelling the court to ask complainant
whether he is a lawyer or not was intended to malign him before the public, inasmuch as respondent knew
that complainant is not a lawyer, having appeared for and in his behalf as a party litigant in prior cases;
respondent’s imputations of complainant’s misrepresentation as a lawyer was patently with malice to
discredit his honor, with the intention to threaten him not to appear anymore in cases respondent was
handling; the manner, substance, tone of voice and how the words "appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka
muna!" were uttered were totally with the intention to annoy, vex and humiliate, malign, ridicule, incriminate
and discredit complainant before the public.
Complainant claims that respondent’s display of improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, misconduct in
the performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court, before the public and the court, was
a patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold in their dealings with society and
corresponding appropriate penalty or sanctions for the said administrative violations should be imposed on
the respondent.
In his Comment, respondent contends that the complaint filed against him is a vicious scheme to dissuade
him from appearing as counsel for the Mina family against whom complainant had filed several civil and
criminal cases including him to further complainant’s illegal practice of law; complainant’s complaint
occurred during a judicial proceeding wherein complainant was able to represent himself considering that
he was appearing in barong tagalogthus the presiding judge was misled when she issued an order stating
"[i]n today’s hearing both lawyers appeared;" because of which, respondent stated: "Your honor I would
like to manifest that this counsel (referring to complainant) who represents the plaintiff in this case is not a
lawyer," to which complainant replied: "The counsel very well know that I am not yet a lawyer;" the reason
he informed the court that complainant is not a lawyer was because the presiding judge did not know that
complainant is not a lawyer and complainant did not inform the presiding judge that he is not a lawyer
when he stated: "for the plaintiff your honor;" he stated "pumasa ka muna" out of indignation because of
complainant’s temerity in misrepresenting himself as lawyer; it is surprising that the City Prosecutor of
Pasay City filed a complaint for oral defamation against him considering that in a precedent case the
Supreme Court stated: "It is a settled principle in this jurisdiction that statements made in the course of
judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged (Navarrete vs. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 540);" in another
malicious prosecution being perpetuated by the complainant against the Mina family pending before Judge
Priscilla Mijares of RTC Branch 108, Pasay City, they were able to prohibit the appearance of complainant
as counsel for himself as authenticated by an Order of Judge Priscilla Mijares which allegedly stated
among other; to wit:
In connection with Ferdinand A. Cruz’s motion to appear as counsel, the motion is likewise
denied, movant not having satisfied the requirements and conditions under Rule 138-A, Sections
1 and 2.
Respondent alleges that when complainant filed an administrative case against Judge Priscilla Mijares
when said Judge stated in Tagalog in open court "Hay naku masama yung marunong pa sa Huwes! OK?"
the same was dismissed by the Honorable Court’s Third Division which stated among others: "That the
questioned remarks of respondent were uttered more out of frustration and in reaction to complainant’s
actuations and taking into account that complainant is not yet a lawyer but was already lecturing the court
on a matter which is not even a point of discussion was sheer arrogance on the part of the complainant."
Respondent prays that the complaint against him be dismissed for lack of merit.
The administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.
In a report, dated March 4, 2004, IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended respondent’s
suspension from the practice of law for a period of three months for violating Rule 8.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:
A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
In her report, Commissioner Navarro stated:
After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, the undersigned noted that respondent’s
averment that the utterances he made in open court is (sic) privileged communication does not
hold water for the same was (sic) not relevant to the issue of the case in question under trial
before the said court.
Respondent did not refute the fact that the same utterances he made in open court against the
complainant had been the basis for his indictment of Oral Defamation and later Unjust Vexation under
Criminal Cases Nos. 02-1031 and No. 02-2136 respectively, pending trial before MTC Branch 45, Pasay
City.
Likewise respondent did not refute complainant’s allegation that in 1979 he was held in contempt and was
not allowed to practice law for seven years by the Supreme Court in the administrative case filed against
him by Emilia E. Andres on December 14, 1979 docketed as A.M. L-585 for his fondness in using
contumacious language in his dealing with others.
From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that the utterance hurled by the respondent in the manner,
substance and tone of his voice which was not refuted by him "that appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka
muna" in whatever manner it was uttered are in itself not only abusive but insulting specially on the part of
law students who have not yet taken nor passed the bar examination required of them.
Respondent should have been more discreet and cautious in informing the court if it was his purpose
relative to complainant’s appearance in court; although the latter appeared only in his behalf but not for
others if he had complied with the requirements of Rule 138 (Sections 1 and 3) of the Rules of Court.
Respondent should have been more temperate in making utterances in his professional dealings so as not
to offend the sensitivities of the other party as in this case.
On April 16, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution to annul and set aside the
recommendation of the investigating commissioner and to approve the dismissal of the case for lack of
merit.
Prefatorily, we note that the IBP Board of Governors failed to observe the procedural requirements of Sec.
12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on review and decision by the Board of Governors which states:
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. – (a) Every case heard by an
investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence
transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board upon such review
shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is
based. It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next
meeting of the Board following the submittal of the Investigator’s report. (Emphasis supplied)
In Teodosio vs. Nava,1 the Court stressed the important function of the requirement that the decision of the
Board of Governors state the facts and the reasons on which it is based, which is akin to what is required
of the decisions of courts of record, thus:
For aside from informing the parties the reason for the decision to enable them to point out to the
appellate court the findings with which they are not in agreement, in case any of them decides to
appeal the decision, it is also an assurance that the judge, or the Board of Governors in this
case, reached his judgment through the process of legal reasoning. 2
In this case, the Board of Governors’ resolution absolving respondent of any misconduct does not contain
any findings of facts or law upon which it based its ruling. Ordinarily, non-compliance with the rule would
result in the remand of the case. Nonetheless, where the controversy has been pending resolution for
quite sometime and the issues involved could be resolved on the basis of the records on appeal, the Court
has opted to resolve the case in the interest of justice and speedy disposition of cases. 3 This case falls
within the exception.
We hold that respondent’s outburst of "appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna" does not amount to a
violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Based on the facts of this case, such outburst came about when respondent pointed out to the trial court
that complainant is not a lawyer to correct the judge’s impression of complainant’s appearance, inasmuch
as the judge, in her Order of January 14, 2002, noted that complainant is a lawyer. 4 Such single outburst,
though uncalled for, is not of such magnitude as to warrant respondent’s suspension or reproof. It is but a
product of impulsiveness or the heat of the moment in the course of an argument between them. It has
been said that lawyers should not be held to too strict an account for words said in the heat of the moment,
because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the court to condone even contemptuous
language.5
Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant is not precluded from litigating personally his cases.
A party’s right to conduct litigation personally is recognized by Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court:
SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. -- In the court of a justice of the peace a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.
In Maderada vs. Mediodea,6 this Court expounded on the foregoing provision, thus:
 This provision means that in a litigation, parties may personally do everything during its progress
-- from its commencement to its termination. When they, however, act as their own attorneys,
they are restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice
law; otherwise, ignorance would be unjustifiably rewarded. Individuals have long been permitted
to manage, prosecute and defend their own actions; and when they do so, they are not
considered to be in the practice of law. "One does not practice law by acting for himself any
more than he practices medicine by rendering first aid to himself."

The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a profession or vocation
usually for gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a representative capacity and as counsel by rendering
legal advise to others. Private practice has been defined by this Court as follows:

x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary

action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise.
Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute [referring to the prohibition for judges and
other officials or employees of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General from
engaging in private practice] has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self
out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. x x x.

Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually holding herself
out to the public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for such services. Hence,
she cannot be said to be in the practice of law.7

On the other hand, all lawyers should take heed that lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are
empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and
liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain
obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct themselves
honorably and fairly.8 Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be
dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and
unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum. 9

WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent Atty. Stanley Cabrera for misconduct in violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility is DISMISSED for lack of merit. He is, however, admonished to be
more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an officer of the court.

SO ORDERED.
Resolution March 18, 1954 hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per cent in the nineteen hundred and
fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar
examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in any subject, shall be
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.
Bar: Provided, however, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a
fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole number.
Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject in any
bar examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to have
DIOKNO, J.: passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the
passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he
may take.
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as Republic
Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of Court governing
admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects,
without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless,
Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.
considering the varying difficulties of the different bar examinations held since 1946 and the varying
degree of strictness with which the examination papers were graded, this court passed and admitted to the
bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar
per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per cent. invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their examination papers were still
pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who
have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this court, and
avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective
feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972),
of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to
unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar
revise their grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972
agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others,
which, if declared valid, should be applied equally to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or not.
reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The
A complete list of the petitioners, properly classified, affected by this decision, as well as a more detailed
President requested the views of this court on the bill. Complying with that request, seven members of the
account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are appended to this decision as Annexes I and II. And to
court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the President
realize more readily the effects of the law, the following statistical data are set forth:
vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying
substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this court reiterated their
unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without (1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1 of Republic Act No. 972 total
his signature. The law, which incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in full as follows: 1,168, classified as follows:

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972 1946 (August) 206 121 18

1946 (November) 477 228 43
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM
NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN 1947 749 340 0
HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE. 1948 899 409 11
1949 1,218 532 164
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled: 1950 1,316 893 26
1951 2,068 879 196
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered one hundred 1952 2,738 1,033 426
twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general average of
seventy per cent in any bar examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up to 1953 2,555 968 284
the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-one per cent in the TOTAL 12,230 5,421 1,168
nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two per cent in the in the nineteen
Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only 586 have filed either
motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere motions for reconsideration.
(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said Republic
Act. These candidates had each taken from two to five different examinations, but failed to obtain a
passing average in any of them. Consolidating, however, their highest grades in different subjects in
previous examinations, with their latest marks, they would be sufficient to reach the passing average as
provided for by Republic Act No. 972.
(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of which only
604 have filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had individually presented
motions for reconsideration which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful candidates of 1952, and 56 of
1953, had presented similar motions, which are still pending because they could be favorably affected by
Republic Act No. 972, — although as has been already stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to
reconsider their grades
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the legal profession and
the administration of justice, and because some doubts have been expressed as to its validity, the court
set the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions for admission on the sole question of whether or not
Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.
We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of the members of the
bar who have amply argued, orally an in writing, on the various aspects in which the question may be
gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and
Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity of the law, and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle, the
Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios,
Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from
the memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and
Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema themselves, has greatly helped us
in this task. The legal researchers of the court have exhausted almost all Philippine and American
jurisprudence on the matter. The question has been the object of intense deliberation for a long time by the
Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the preparation of the majority opinion was assigned to a new
member in order to place it as humanly as possible above all suspicion of prejudice or partiality.
Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion of the
Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:
The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous handicap
which students during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome
such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students
who took up law soon after the liberation.
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is
claimed that in addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because they suffered
from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who
confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as was exactly found by this
Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of legal profession adequate
preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult.
An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should be developed
constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor
and civil liberties. To approve officially of those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves
to such a delicate mission is to create a serious social danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an
insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated. There were abundant materials. Decisions
of this court alone in mimeographed copies were made available to the public during those years and
private enterprises had also published them in monthly magazines and annual digests. The Official
Gazette had been published continuously. Books and magazines published abroad have entered without
restriction since 1945. Many law books, some even with revised and enlarged editions have been printed
locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports began to be published since 1946, which
continued to be supplemented by the addition of new volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.
Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.
The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicable principles, but the
resolution of the question would have been easier had an identical case of similar background been picked
out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history,
from which has been directly derived the judicial system established here with its lofty ideals by the
Congress of the United States, and which we have preserved and attempted to improve, or in our
contemporaneous judicial history of more than half a century? From the citations of those defending the
law, we can not find a case in which the validity of a similar law had been sustained, while those against its
validity cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240
NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of Guariña (24
Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the President which is expressed in his vote of the original bill and
which the postponement of the contested law respects.
This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had been promulgated, the
judiciary immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not within our power to offer a precedent to
uphold the disputed law.
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that has been cited to us as
a favorable precedent of the law — that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of New York
revoked the decision of the Supreme court of that State, denying the petition of Cooper to be admitted to
the practice of law under the provisions of a statute concerning the school of law of Columbia College
promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was declared by the Court of Appeals to be consistent with the
Constitution of the state of New York.
It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:
 They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes for either of them
for any elective office except that of the Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature or the people,
shall be void. They shall not exercise any power of appointment to public office. Any male citizen
of the age of twenty-one years, of good moral character, and who possesses the requisite
qualifications of learning and ability, shall be entitled to admission to practice in all the courts of
this State. (p. 93).
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as follows:
Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing them had previously
rested with the judges, and this was the principal appointing power which they possessed. The
convention was evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which this power had been exercised,
and with the restrictions which the judges had imposed upon admission to practice before them.
The prohibitory clause in the section quoted was aimed directly at this power, and the insertion
of the provision" expecting the admission of attorneys, in this particular section of the
Constitution, evidently arose from its connection with the object of this prohibitory clause. There
is nothing indicative of confidence in the courts or of a disposition to preserve any portion of their
power over this subject, unless the Supreme Court is right in the inference it draws from the use
of the word `admission' in the action referred to. It is urged that the admission spoken of must be
by the court; that to admit means to grant leave, and that the power of granting necessarily
implies the power of refusing, and of course the right of determining whether the applicant
possesses the requisite qualifications to entitle him to admission.
These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the act. (p. 93.)
Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that it provided that the
possession of a diploma of the school of law of Columbia College conferring the degree of Bachelor of
Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications that the constitution required of applicants for admission to
the Bar. The decision does not however quote the text of the law, which we cannot find in any public or
accessible private library in the country.
In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of New York, the Court of
Appeals said of the object of the law:
The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College being an institution of
established reputation, and having a law department under the charge of able professors, the
students in which department were not only subjected to a formal examination by the law
committee of the institution, but to a certain definite period of study before being entitled to a
diploma of being graduates, the Legislature evidently, and no doubt justly, considered this
examination, together with the preliminary study required by the act, as fully equivalent as a test
of legal requirements, to the ordinary examination by the court; and as rendering the latter
examination, to which no definite period of preliminary study was essential, unnecessary and
burdensome.
The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of the applicant, and for
the mere purpose of substituting the examination by the law committee of the college for that of
the court. It could have had no other object, and hence no greater scope should be given to its
provisions. We cannot suppose that the Legislature designed entirely to dispense with the plain
and explicit requirements of the Constitution; and the act contains nothing whatever to indicate
an intention that the authorities of the college should inquire as to the age, citizenship, etc., of
the students before granting a diploma. The only rational interpretation of which the act admits
is, that it was intended to make the college diploma competent evidence as to the legal
attainments of the applicant, and nothing else. To this extent alone it operates as a modification
of pre-existing statutes, and it is to be read in connection with these statutes and with the
Constitution itself in order to determine the present condition of the law on the subject. (p.89)
xxx xxx xxx
The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission, that
has simply prescribed what shall be competent evidence in certain cases upon that question.
(p.93)
From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar may be clearly seen.
Please note only the following distinctions:
(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia College who failed in the bar
examinations be admitted to the practice of law.
(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court its
jurisdiction over the question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree the admission of
any lawyer.
(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines are entirely different on the matter
of admission of the practice of law.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been
disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous and zealous
possession and exercise by the judicial power have been demonstrated during more than six centuries,
which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." Even considering the power granted to Congress by
our Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to
the practice of law, to our judgment and proposition that the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly belonging to Congress, is
unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts,
whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts are
governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. And it becomes
more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of these same
individuals are attempted to be revoked or modified.
We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting,
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly
judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter had been undertaken in the case of
State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which the validity of a legislative enactment providing that
Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts was discussed. From the text of this decision we quote
the following paragraphs:
This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in the history of the
English speaking people so far as we have been able to ascertain. There has been much
uncertainty as to the extent of the power of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate qualifications
of attorney at law has been expressly committed to the courts, and the act of admission has
always been regarded as a judicial function. This act purports to constitute Mr. Cannon an
attorney at law, and in this respect it stands alone as an assertion of legislative power. (p. 444)
Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1, art.
4.) In so far as the prescribing of qualifications for admission to the bar are legislative in
character, the Legislature is acting within its constitutional authority when it sets up and
prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)
But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its judgment will serve the
purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the power of the court to impose other and further
exactions and qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)
Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct, independent, and
coordinate branches of the government. Neither branch enjoys all the powers of sovereignty
which properly belongs to its department. Neither department should so act as to embarrass the
other in the discharge of its respective functions. That was the scheme and thought of the
people setting upon the form of government under which we exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis.,
525; Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)
The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which the
administration of justice is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By
committing a portion of the powers of sovereignty to the judicial department of our state
government, under 42a scheme which it was supposed rendered it immune from
embarrassment or interference by any other department of government, the courts cannot
escape responsibility fir the manner in which the powers of sovereignty thus committed to the
judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)
The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is an attache
of the courts. The quality of justice dispense by the courts depends in no small degree upon the
integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and reproach to the administration
of justice and bring the courts themselves into disrepute. (p.445)
Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over their bars, at least
in the English speaking countries. (p. 445)
After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:
Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries prior to the adoption
of our Constitution, the courts of England, concededly subordinate to Parliament since the
Revolution of 1688, had exercise the right of determining who should be admitted to the practice
of law, which, as was said in Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's New Cases 235,
"constitutes the most solid of all titles." If the courts and judicial power be regarded as an entity,
the power to determine who should be admitted to practice law is a constituent element of that
entity. It may be difficult to isolate that element and say with assurance that it is either a part of
the inherent power of the court, or an essential element of the judicial power exercised by the
court, but that it is a power belonging to the judicial entity and made of not only a sovereign
institution, but made of it a separate independent, and coordinate branch of the government.
They took this institution along with the power traditionally exercise to determine who should
constitute its attorney at law. There is no express provision in the Constitution which indicates an
intent that this traditional power of the judicial department should in any manner be subject to
legislative control. Perhaps the dominant thought of the framers of our constitution was to make
the three great departments of government separate and independent of one another. The idea
that the Legislature might embarrass the judicial department by prescribing inadequate
qualifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent with the dominant purpose of making the judicial
independent of the legislative department, and such a purpose should not be inferred in the
absence of express constitutional provisions. While the legislature may legislate with respect to
the qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its general and unquestioned power to
protect the public interest. When it does legislate a fixing a standard of qualifications required of
attorneys at law in order that public interests may be protected, such qualifications do not
constitute only a minimum standard and limit the class from which the court must make its
selection. Such legislative qualifications do not constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond
which the court cannot go in fixing additional qualifications deemed necessary by the course of
the proper administration of judicial functions. There is no legislative power to compel courts to
admit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit to exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at
law. (p. 450)
Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is quite likely true
that the legislature may exercise the power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a
legislative functions. However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous that the power to admit
attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial function. In all of the states, except New Jersey (In
re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our investigation reveals, attorneys receive their
formal license to practice law by their admission as members of the bar of the court so admitting.
Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565; Ex parteGarland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L.
Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285; Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115
P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030,
20 Ann. Cas. 413.
The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the courts,
it having been so generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to practice is
the judgment of the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to confer such
right upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an
attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function, no matter where the power to
determine the qualifications may reside. (p. 451)
In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of the Senate
of that State, 180 NE 725, said:
 It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws that there be
members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral character. This
arises from the need of enlightened assistance to the honest, and restraining authority over the
knavish, litigant. It is highly important, also that the public be protected from incompetent and
vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for doing mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C.L., in
People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851:
"Membership in the bar is a privilege burden with conditions." One is admitted to the bar "for
something more than private gain." He becomes an "officer of the court", and ,like the court
itself, an instrument or agency to advance the end of justice. His cooperation with the court is
due "whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld." Without such attorneys
at law the judicial department of government would be hampered in the performance of its
duties. That has been the history of attorneys under the common law, both in this country and
England. Admission to practice as an attorney at law is almost without exception conceded to be
a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in courts, as are other proceedings invoking judicial
action. Admission to the bar is accomplish and made open and notorious by a decision of the
court entered upon its records. The establishment by the Constitution of the judicial department
conferred authority necessary to the exercise of its powers as a coordinate department of
government. It is an inherent power of such a department of government ultimately to determine
the qualifications of those to be admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting in its work, and to
protect itself in this respect from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient learning, and those not
possessing good moral character. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex
parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has been well settled, by the rules and practice
of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to
become one of its officers, as an attorney and counselor, and for what cause he ought to be
removed." (p.727)
In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to practice the legal
profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:
In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath for
attorneys to be unconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney's office as follows: "They
are officers of the court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their possessing
sufficient legal learning and fair private character. It has always been the general practice in this
country to obtain this evidence by an examination of the parties. In this court the fact of the
admission of such officers in the highest court of the states to which they, respectively, belong
for, three years preceding their application, is regarded as sufficient evidence of the possession
of the requisite legal learning, and the statement of counsel moving their admission sufficient
evidence that their private and professional character is fair. The order of admission is the
judgment of the court that the parties possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and
counselors, and are entitled to appear as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry the
parties become officers of the court, and are responsible to it for professional misconduct. They
hold their office during good behavior, and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained
and declared by the judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Ex
parte Hoyfron, admission or their exclusion is not the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is
the exercise of judicial power, and has been so held in numerous cases. It was so held by the
court of appeals of New York in the matter of the application of Cooper for admission. Re
Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and Counselors", said that court, "are not only officers of the
court, but officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature; and
hence their appointment may, with propriety, be entrusted to the court, and the latter, in
performing his duty, may very justly considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate
judicial functions." (pp. 650-651).
We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:
Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the
exercise of a judicial function, and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this point.
Admission to practice have also been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent powers of
the court. — Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.
Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent power of
the court. — A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See Annotation on
Power of Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.
On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative
departments of the government.
The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is that it is
the province of the legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of
transactions occurring subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary determines rights
and obligations with reference to transactions that are past or conditions that exist at the time of
the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction is a vital one and not subject to alteration or
change either by legislative action or by judicial decree.
The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other
departments of the government. — 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.
If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of them
construction of the law according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by
settling aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of
offenders, or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry. —
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.
In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average
of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of law,
the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment revoking those promulgated by this
Court during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly
can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and
not the legislative nor executive department, that may be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these
departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as is the case with the law in question.
That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rule
promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument.
Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:
 Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes,
and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify
the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines. — Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities
concerning the admission to the practice of law. the primary power and responsibility which the
Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress found that this Court has not
promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have nothing over which to exercise the power granted to it.
Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this Court, but the authority and
responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their
supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules
does not signify nor permit that Congress substitute or take the place of this Tribunal in the exercise of its
primary power on the matter. The Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend,
disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. Its
power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according to its
judgment the need for a better service of the legal profession requires it. But this power does not relieve
this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the
practice of the legal profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the admission
to the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them may and should be
exercised with the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful consideration to the responsibility
which the nature of each department requires. These powers have existed together for centuries without
diminution on each part; the harmonious delimitation being found in that the legislature may and should
examine if the existing rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the demands which public interest
requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues, culture, training and responsibility. The legislature may, by
means of appeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial
power, which has the inherent responsibility for a good and efficient administration of justice and the
supervision of the practice of the legal profession, should consider these reforms as the minimum
standards for the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these reforms the lofty objective that is
desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys
at law is realized. They are powers which, exercise within their proper constitutional limits, are not
repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in attaining the establishment of a Bar that would
respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of the administration of justice.
The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guariña took examination and failed by a
few points to obtain the general average. A recently enacted law provided that one who had been
appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of law without a previous examination.
The Government appointed Guariña and he discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote province. This
tribunal refused to give his license without previous examinations. The court said:
And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United States, articles 2, 16 and 17
of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:
Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks
admission to the bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds the
office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.
Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:
Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety, entitled
"An Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the Philippine
Islands," is hereby amended to read as follows:
1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the
sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing as members
of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this code; Provided, That any
person who, prior to the passage of this act, or at any time thereafter, shall have held, under the
authority of the United States, the position of justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of
First Instance, or judge or associate judge of the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine
Islands, or the position of Attorney General, Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General,
assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney General, prosecuting attorney for the City of
Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the
Moro Province, or assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law in
the courts of the Philippine Islands without an examination, upon motion before the Supreme
Court and establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said court.
The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant took, and failed to
pass the prescribed examination. The report of the examining board, dated March 23, 1907,
shows that he received an average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of legal learning
upon which he was examined, thus falling four points short of the required percentage of 75. We
would be delinquent in the performance of our duty to the public and to the bar, if, in the face of
this affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant in the required qualifications of
learning in the law at the time when he presented his former application for admission to the bar,
we should grant him license to practice law in the courts of these Islands, without first satisfying
ourselves that despite his failure to pass the examination on that occasion, he now "possesses
the necessary qualifications of learning and ability."
But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is entitled as
of right to be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed examination "upon motion before
the Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and now holds the office
of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged that having in mind the object which the
legislator apparently sought to attain in enacting the above-cited amendment to the earlier
statute, and in view of the context generally and especially of the fact that the amendment was
inserted as a proviso in that section of the original Act which specifically provides for the
admission of certain candidates without examination. It is contented that this mandatory
construction is imperatively required in order to give effect to the apparent intention of the
legislator, and to the candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised.
 Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission and confirmed to it
by the Act of Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a case such as that under
consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the word "may," as used in the above citation from Act
of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of Congress prescribing, defining or limiting the power
conferred upon the commission is to that extent invalid and void, as transcending its rightful
limits and authority.
Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions enumerated, and with
particular emphasis in the case of Guariña, the Court held:
In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the bar under the provisions of
this statute have been considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact that such appointments
had been made as satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the applicant. But in all of those
cases we had reason to believe that the applicants had been practicing attorneys prior to the
date of their appointment.
In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was not and
never had been practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of his
appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the
required qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to the bar.
In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that occasion, we do not think that his
appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his possession of the
necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude therefore that this application for
license to practice in the courts of the Philippines, should be denied.
In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points short of
the necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice; and in view also of the fact that since
that time he has held the responsible office of the governor of the Province of Sorsogon and
presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in the performance of the duties of that office
that the Chief Executive, with the consent and approval of the Philippine Commission, sought to
retain him in the Government service by appointing him to the office of provincial fiscal, we think
we would be justified under the above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his case the
ordinary examination prescribed by general rule, provided he offers satisfactory evidence of his
proficiency in a special examination which will be given him by a committee of the court upon his
application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he desires so to do, to present himself at any
of the ordinary examinations prescribed by general rule. — (In re Guariña, pp. 48-49.)
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively
to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other
authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been found also to suffer from the fatal
defect of being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a classification, it is arbitrary and
unreasonable.
In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the Supreme Court, until December 31
of that year, to grant license for the practice of law to those students who began studying before November
4, 1897, and had studied for two years and presented a diploma issued by a school of law, or to those who
had studied in a law office and would pass an examination, or to those who had studied for three years if
they commenced their studies after the aforementioned date. The Supreme Court declared that this law
was unconstitutional being, among others, a class legislation. The Court said:
This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by virtue of diplomas from
law schools issued to the applicants. The act of the general assembly passed in 1899, under
which the application is made, is entitled "An act to amend section 1 of an act entitled "An act to
revise the law in relation to attorneys and counselors," approved March 28, 1884, in force July 1,
1874." The amendment, so far as it appears in the enacting clause, consists in the addition to
the section of the following: "And every application for a license who shall comply with the rules
of the supreme court in regard to admission to the bar in force at the time such applicant
commend the study of law, either in a law or office or a law school or college, shall be granted a
license under this act notwithstanding any subsequent changes in said rules". — In re Day et al,
54 N.Y., p. 646.
. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that up to December
31, 1899, this court shall grant a license of admittance to the bar to the holder of every diploma
regularly issued by any law school regularly organized under the laws of this state, whose
regular course of law studies is two years, and requiring an attendance by the student of at least
36 weeks in each of such years, and showing that the student began the study of law prior to
November 4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual proofs of good moral character. The other
branch of the proviso is that any student who has studied law for two years in a law office, or
part of such time in a law office, "and part in the aforesaid law school," and whose course of
study began prior to November 4, 1897, shall be admitted upon a satisfactory examination by
the examining board in the branches now required by the rules of this court. If the right to
admission exists at all, it is by virtue of the proviso, which, it is claimed, confers substantial rights
and privileges upon the persons named therein, and establishes rules of legislative creation for
their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)
Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation, prohibited
by the constitution, and invalid as such. If the legislature had any right to admit attorneys to
practice in the courts and take part in the administration of justice, and could prescribe the
character of evidence which should be received by the court as conclusive of the requisite
learning and ability of persons to practice law, it could only be done by a general law, persons or
classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2. The right to practice law is a privilege, and a license
for that purpose makes the holder an officer of the court, and confers upon him the right to
appear for litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees therefor, and creates certain
exemptions, such as from jury services and arrest on civil process while attending court. The law
conferring such privileges must be general in its operation. No doubt the legislature, in framing
an enactment for that purpose, may classify persons so long as the law establishing classes in
general, and has some reasonable relation to the end sought. There must be some difference
which furnishes a reasonable basis for different one, having no just relation to the subject of the
legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 Ill. 98,
40 N.E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.
 The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by experience, may furnish a
basis for classification (Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place where such
physician has resided and practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis, and is an arbitrary
discrimination, making an enactment based upon it void (State vs. Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18
Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes to say what shall serve as a test of fitness for the
profession of the law, and plainly, any classification must have some reference to learning,
character, or ability to engage in such practice. The proviso is limited, first, to a class of persons
who began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897. This class is subdivided into two classes
— First, those presenting diplomas issued by any law school of this state before December 31,
1899; and, second, those who studied law for the period of two years in a law office, or part of
the time in a law school and part in a law office, who are to be admitted upon examination in the
subjects specified in the present rules of this court, and as to this latter subdivision there seems
to be no limit of time for making application for admission. As to both classes, the conditions of
the rules are dispensed with, and as between the two different conditions and limits of time are
fixed. No course of study is prescribed for the law school, but a diploma granted upon the
completion of any sort of course its managers may prescribe is made all-sufficient. Can there be
anything with relation to the qualifications or fitness of persons to practice law resting upon the
mere date of November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of classification. Plainly not. Those
who began the study of law November 4th could qualify themselves to practice in two years as
well as those who began on the 3rd. The classes named in the proviso need spend only two
years in study, while those who commenced the next day must spend three years, although they
would complete two years before the time limit. The one who commenced on the 3rd. If
possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted without examination before December 31, 1899, and
without any prescribed course of study, while as to the other the prescribed course must be
pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless. Such classification cannot rest upon any natural
reason, or bear any just relation to the subject sought, and none is suggested. The proviso is for
the sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain defined persons. (pp. 647-648.)
In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, where the legislature attempted by
law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court also held with regards to its aspect of being a class
legislation:
But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the legislature has power to
prescribe ultimately and definitely the qualifications upon which courts must admit and license
those applying as attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in the manner here
attempted. That power must be exercised through general laws which will apply to all alike and
accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of the right of the Legislature to exact qualifications of
those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice Field in the case of Dent. vs. West
Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: "It is undoubtedly the right of
every citizen of the United States to follow any lawful calling, business or profession he may
choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex, and
condition." This right may in many respects be considered as a distinguishing feature of our
republican institutions. Here all vocations are all open to every one on like conditions. All may be
pursued as sources of livelihood, some requiring years of study and great learning for their
successful prosecution. The interest, or, as it is sometimes termed, the "estate" acquired in them
— that is, the right to continue their prosecution — is often of great value to the possessors and
cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any more than their real or personal property can be thus
taken. It is fundamental under our system of government that all similarly situated and
possessing equal qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutes regulating the
practice of medicine, requiring medications to establish the possession on the part of the
application of his proper qualifications before he may be licensed to practice, have been
challenged, and courts have seriously considered whether the exemption from such
examinations of those practicing in the state at the time of the enactment of the law rendered
such law unconstitutional because of infringement upon this general principle. State vs. Thomas
Call, 121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see, also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis.
172, 76 N.W. 345; State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.
This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right to practice law and to
constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere matter of legislative grace or favor. It is not
material that he had once established his right to practice law and that one time he possessed
the requisite learning and other qualifications to entitle him to that right. That fact in no matter
affect the power of the Legislature to select from the great body of the public an individual upon
whom it would confer its favors.
A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court to admit
to the practice of law without examination, all who had served in the military or naval forces of
the United States during the World War and received a honorable discharge therefrom and who
(were disabled therein or thereby within the purview of the Act of Congress approved June 7th,
1924, known as "World War Veteran's Act, 1924 and whose disability is rated at least ten per
cent thereunder at the time of the passage of this Act." This Act was held |unconstitutional on
the ground that it clearly violated the quality clauses of the constitution of that state. In
re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227 N.W. 179.
A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as
follows:
The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be valid
must rest upon material differences between the person included in it and those excluded and,
furthermore, must be based upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided
the constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and real differences, as
distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones. Therefore, any law that is made applicable to
one class of citizens only must be based on some substantial difference between the situation of
that class and other individuals to which it does not apply and must rest on some reason on
which it can be defended. In other words, there must be such a difference between the situation
and circumstances of all the members of the class and the situation and circumstances of all
other members of the state in relation to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation as presents
a just and natural cause for the difference made in their liabilities and burdens and in their rights
and privileges. A law is not general because it operates on all within a clause unless there is a
substantial reason why it is made to operate on that class only, and not generally on all. (12 Am.
Jur. pp. 151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, have
obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in
1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will be
permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar, notwithstanding
that the rules require a minimum general average of 75 per cent, which has been invariably followed since
1950. Is there any motive of the nature indicated by the abovementioned authorities, for this classification
? If there is none, and none has been given, then the classification is fatally defective.
It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the general average
indicated, were not included because the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful candidates of those
years. This fact does not justify the unexplained classification of unsuccessful candidates by years, from
1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is the exclusion of those who failed before said years under
the same conditions justified. The fact that this Court has no record of examinations prior to 1946 does not
signify that no one concerned may prove by some other means his right to an equal consideration.
To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it is argued
that it is curative, and that in such form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to cure ? Only
from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal permitted admission to the bar of candidates
who did not obtain the general average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained only 72 per cent; in the
1947 and those who had 69 per cent or more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950
to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent, which was considered by the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent
as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of circumstances deemed to be sufficiently justifiable. These
changes in the passing averages during those years were all that could be objected to or criticized. Now, it
is desired to undo what had been done — cancel the license that was issued to those who did not obtain
the prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly not. The disputed law clearly does not propose to do so.
Concededly, it approves what has been done by this Tribunal. What Congress lamented is that the Court
did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient to
qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or defect of judgment of the Court that is being
cured, and to complete the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of the disputed law is being extended up to
the years 1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing each year the general average by one per cent, with the order
that said candidates be admitted to the Bar. This purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof that
what the law attempts to amend and correct are not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the
Court, by means of simply taking its place. This is doing directly what the Tribunal should have done during
those years according to the judgment of Congress. In other words, the power exercised was not to repeal,
alter or supplement the rules, which continue in force. What was done was to stop or suspend them. And
this power is not included in what the Constitution has granted to Congress, because it falls within the
power to apply the rules. This power corresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty been confided.
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite intervals. The grave
defect of this system is that it does not take into account that the laws and jurisprudence are not stationary,
and when a candidate finally receives his certificate, it may happen that the existing laws and
jurisprudence are already different, seriously affecting in this manner his usefulness. The system that the
said law prescribes was used in the first bar examinations of this country, but was abandoned for this and
other disadvantages. In this case, however, the fatal defect is that the article is not expressed in the title
will have temporary effect only from 1946 to 1955, the text of article 2 establishes a permanent system for
an indefinite time. This is contrary to Section 21 (1), article VI of the Constitution, which vitiates and annuls
article 2 completely; and because it is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that its nullity affect the entire
law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the legislative powers
of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because they create or establish
arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and third, because their purposes or
effects violate the Constitution or its basic principles. As has already been seen, the contested law suffers
from these fatal defects.
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional and
therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the following reasons, to wit:
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinations of 1946-
1952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly found by this
Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidates, depriving this
Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they are at present already prepared to become members of the
Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a
manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.
2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of these 810
candidates, without having examined their respective examination papers, and although it is admitted that
this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other
may revise and alter them. In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the
rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they ought to be, intended to
regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the practice of law,
and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum norms towards that end in the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists
immensely in the daily performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy administration of
justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate
decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law according to existing rules.
4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes, is contrary to
facts which are of general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar of law students
inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation.
5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the Constitution
enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.
6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the examinations of 1953
to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in those years, shall continue in
force.
RESOLUTION
Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent and impassioned
discussion of the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close of the debate among the
members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious observations of two of our beloved colleagues who Percentage of failure (per cent) 58.74
since the beginning have announced their decision not to take part in voting, we, the eight members of the
Court who subscribed to this decision have voted and resolved, and have decided for the Court, and under Passing grade (per cent) 72
the authority of the same: November, 1946
Board of Examiners: The same as that of August, 1946, except Hon. Jose Teodoro who was
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952, substituted by Atty. Honesto K. Bausan.
and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and effect.
Number of candidates 481

2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the examinations Number of candidates whose grades were raised 19
subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be (72 per cent and above 73 per cent ---
in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the Constitution. Minutes of March 31, 1947)
Number of candidates who passed 249
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the examinations of
1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a Number of candidates who failed 228
general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 43
considered as having passed, whether they have filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision has
become final, they shall be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of Percentage of success (per cent) 52.20
the Bar on the date or dates that the chief Justice may set. So ordered. Percentage of failure (per cent) 47.80
Passing grade (per cent) 72
Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur. (By resolution of the Court).
October, 1947
Board of Examiners: Hon. Cesar Bengzon, Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B. Guevara, Atty. Antonio
Araneta, Atty. Simon Cruz, Hon. Sixto de la Costa, Atty. Celso B. Jamora, Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty.
ANNEX I Federico Agrava, Atty. Carlos B. Hilado, Members.
Number of candidates 749
PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972 Number of candidates whose grades were raised 43
70.55 per cent with 2 subject below 50 per cent 1
A resume‚ of pertinent facts concerning the bar examinations of 1946 to 1953 inclusive follows:
69 per cent 40

August, 19461 68 per cent 2

Board of Examiners: Hon. Pedro Tuason, Chairman, Prof. Gerardo Florendo, Atty. Bernardino Number of candidates who passed 409
Guerrero, Atty. Joaquin Ramirez, Atty. Crispin Oben, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Atty. Federico Agrava, Number of candidates who failed 340
Atty. Jose Perez Cardenas, and Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, members.
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 972
Number of candidates 206
Percentage of success (per cent) 54.59
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 12
Percentage of failure (per cent) 45.41
73'S 6
Passing grade (per cent) 69
72'S 6
(by resolution of the Court).
Number of candidates who passed 85
Number of candidates who failed 121 Note.--In passing the 2 whose grades were 68.95 per cent and 68.1 per cent
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 18 respectively, the Court found out that they were not benefited at all by the bonus of 12
points given by the Examiner in Civil Law.
Percentage of success (per cent) 41.62
 August, 1948 Number of candidates who passed 432
Board of Examiners: Hon. Marceliano R. Montemayor, Chairman Hon. Luis P. Torres, Hon. Felipe Number of candidates who failed 894
Natividad, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Sr., Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Hon. Jesus G.
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 26
Barrera, Hon. Rafael Amparo, Atty. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Members.
Percentage of success (per cent) 32.14
Number of candidates 899
Percentage of failure (per cent) 67.86
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 64
Passing grade (per cent) 75
71's 29
August, 1951
70's 35
Board of Examiners: Hon. Guillermo F. Pablo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Enrique
Number of candidates who passed 490
Altavas, Hon. Manuel Lim, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Vicente Albert, Atty. Arturo Alafriz, Hon.
Number of candidates who failed 409 Enrique V. Filamor, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Members.
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 11 Number of candidates 2,068
Percentage of success (per cent) 62.40 Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) 112
Percentage of failure (per cent) 37.60 Number of candidates who passed 1,189
Passing grade (per cent) 70 Number of candidates who failed 879
(by resolution of the Court). Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 196
August, 1949 Percentage of success (per cent) 57.49
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Fernando Jugo, Hon. Enrique Filamor, Percentage of failure (per cent) 42.51
Atty. Salvador Araneta, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Federico Agrava, Hon. Mariano H. de Joya,
Passing grade (per cent) 75
Hon. Felipe Natividad, Atty. Emeterio Barcelon, Members.
August, 1952
Number of candidates 1,218
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Hon. Enrique V.
Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) 55
Filamor, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Emilio P. Virata, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon.
Number of candidates who passed 686 Felipe Natividad, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Members.
Number of candidates who failed 532 Number of candidates 2,738
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 164 Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) 163
Percentage of success (per cent) 56.28 Number of candidates who passed 1,705
Percentage of failure (per cent) 43.72 Number of candidates who failed 1,033
Passing grade (per cent) 74 Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 426
(by resolution of the Court). Percentage of success (per cent) 62.27
August, 1950 Percentage of failure (per cent) 37.73
2
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo, Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B. Guevara, Atty. Enrique Passing grade (per cent) 75
Altavas, Atty. Marcial P. Lichauco, Atty. Carlos B. Hilado, Atty. J. Antonio Araneta, Hon. Enrique V.
August, 1953
Filamor, Hon. Francisco A. Delgado, Hon. Antonio Horrilleno, Members.
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Enrique
Number of candidates 1,316
Altavas, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr., Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Jose S. de la Cruz, Hon. Alfonso Felix,
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 38 Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, Members.
(The grade of 74 was raised to 75 per cent by recommendation and authority Number of candidates 2,555
of the examiner in Remedial Law, Atty. Francisco Delgado).
Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) 100
 Number of candidates who passed 1,570
Number of candidates who failed 986
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 284
Percentage of success (per cent) 61.04
Percentage of failure (per cent) 38.96
Passing grade (per cent) 75
There are the unsuccessful candidates totaling 604 directly affected by this resolution. Adding 490
candidates who have not presented any petition, they reach a total of 1,094.
The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972
As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced to 72 per cent the passing general average in the bar
examination of august and November of 1946; 69 per cent in 1947; 70 per cent in 1948; 74 per cent in
1949; maintaining the prescribed 75 per cent since 1950, but raising to 75 per cent those who obtained 74
per cent since 1950. This caused the introduction in 1951, in the Senate of the Philippines of Bill No. 12
which was intended to amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and 16 of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, concerning
the admission of attorneys-at-law to the practice of the profession. The amendments embrace many
interesting matters, but those referring to sections 14 and 16 immediately concern us. The proposed
amendment is as follows:
SEC. 14. Passing average. — In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed the
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 70 per cent without
falling below 50 per cent in any subject. In determining the average, the foregoing subjects shall
be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 20 per cent; Land Registration and Mortgages,
5 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law, 10 per cent; Political Law, 10 per cent;
International Law, 5 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises,
5 per cent; Social Legislation, 5 per cent; Taxation, 5 per cent. Unsuccessful candidates shall
not be required to take another examination in any subject in which they have obtained a rating
of 70 per cent or higher and such rating shall be taken into account in determining their general
average in any subsequent examinations: Provided, however, That if the candidate fails to get a
general average of 70 per cent in his third examination, he shall lose the benefit of having
already passed some subjects and shall be required to the examination in all the subjects.
SEC. 16. Admission and oath of successful applicants. — Any applicant who has obtained a
general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without falling below 50 per cent in any
examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, or who has been otherwise found to be entitled
to admission to the bar, shall be allowed to take and subscribe before the Supreme Court the
corresponding oath of office. (Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No. 12).
With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion pertinent to the matter before us being:
It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at bar examinations should be compelled to
repeat even those subjects which they have previously passed. This is not the case in any other
government examination. The Rules of Court have therefore been amended in this measure to
give a candidate due credit for any subject which he has previously passed with a rating of 75
per cent or higher."
Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on May 3, 1951, the President requested the
comments of this Tribunal before acting on the same. The comment was signed by seven Justices while
three chose to refrain from making any and one took no part. With regards to the matter that interests us,
the Court said:
The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule 127. One part of this amendment provides that if a
bar candidate obtains 70 per cent or higher in any subject, although failing to pass the
examination, he need not be examined in said subject in his next examination. This is a sort of
passing the Bar Examination on the installment plan, one or two or three subjects at a time. The
trouble with this proposed system is that although it makes it easier and more convenient for the
candidate because he may in an examination prepare himself on only one or two subjects so as
to insure passing them, by the time that he has passed the last required subjects, which may be
several years away from the time that he reviewed and passed the firs subjects, he shall have
forgotten the principles and theories contained in those subjects and remembers only those of
the one or two subjects that he had last reviewed and passed. This is highly possible because
there is nothing in the law which requires a candidate to continue taking the Bar examinations
every year in succession. The only condition imposed is that a candidate, on this plan, must
pass the examination in no more that three installments; but there is no limitation as to the time
or number of years intervening between each examination taken. This would defeat the object
and the requirements of the law and the Court in admitting persons to the practice of law. When
a person is so admitted, it is to be presumed and presupposed that he possesses the knowledge
and proficiency in the law and the knowledge of all law subjects required in bar examinations, so
as presently to be able to practice the legal profession and adequately render the legal service
required by prospective clients. But this would not hold true of the candidates who may have
obtained a passing grade on any five subjects eight years ago, another three subjects one year
later, and the last two subjects the present year. We believe that the present system of requiring
a candidate to obtain a passing general average with no grade in any subject below 50 per cent
is more desirable and satisfactory. It requires one to be all around, and prepared in all required
legal subjects at the time of admission to the practice of law.
We now come to the last amendment, that of section 16 of Rule 127. This amendment provides
that any application who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without
failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946,
shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office. In other words, Bar
candidates who obtained not less than 70 per cent in any examination since the year 1946
without failing below 50 per cent in any subject, despite their non-admission to the Bar by the
Supreme Court because they failed to obtain a passing general average in any of those years,
will be admitted to the Bar. This provision is not only prospective but retroactive in its effects.
We have already stated in our comment on the next preceding amendment that we are not
exactly in favor of reducing the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent to
govern even in the future. As to the validity of making such reduction retroactive, we have
 serious legal doubts. We should not lose sight of the fact that after every bar examinations, the sets a bad precedent in that the Government would be morally obliged to grant a similar privilege
Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the Bar those who to those who have failed in the examinations for admission to other professions such as
have obtained a passing general average grade, but also rejecting and denying the petitions for medicine, engineering, architecture and certified public accountancy.
reconsideration of those who have failed. The present amendment would have the effect of
repudiating, reversing and revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the
Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress of the Philippines, but it was not repassed by 2/3 vote
petitions of those who may have obtained an average of 70 per cent or more but less than the
of each House as prescribed by section 20, article VI of the Constitution. Instead Bill No. 371 was
general passing average fixed for that year. It is clear that this question involves legal
presented in the Senate. It reads as follows:
implications, and this phase of the amendment if finally enacted into law might have to go thru a
legal test. As one member of the Court remarked during the discussion, when a court renders a
decision or promulgate a resolution or order on the basis of and in accordance with a certain law AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946 UP TO AND
or rule then in force, the subsequent amendment or even repeal of said law or rule may not INCLUDING 1953
affect the final decision, order, or resolution already promulgated, in the sense of revoking or
rendering it void and of no effect.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
Another aspect of this question to be considered is the fact that members of the bar are officers
of the courts, including the Supreme Court. When a Bar candidate is admitted to the Bar, the
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 14, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, any
Supreme Court impliedly regards him as a person fit, competent and qualified to be its officer.
Conversely, when it refused and denied admission to the Bar to a candidate who in any year bar candidate who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any bar examinations after July
since 1946 may have obtained a general average of 70 per cent but less than that required for 4, 1946 up to the August 1951 Bar examinations; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72
per cent in the 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; 74 per cent in
that year in order to pass, the Supreme Court equally and impliedly considered and declared
that he was not prepared, ready, competent and qualified to be its officer. The present 1955 bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any subject,
amendment giving retroactivity to the reduction of the passing general average runs counter to shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the
Philippine Bar; Provided, however, That 75 per cent passing general average shall be restored
all these acts and resolutions of the Supreme Court and practically and in effect says that a
candidate not accepted, and even rejected by the Court to be its officer because he was in all succeeding examinations; and Provided, finally, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact
unprepared, undeserving and unqualified, nevertheless and in spite of all, must be admitted and one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole
number.
allowed by this Court to serve as its officer. We repeat, that this is another important aspect of
the question to be carefully and seriously considered.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any bar
The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating the following: examination after July 4, 1945 shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and
such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average that said
candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.
I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of the bill, namely, to elevate the standard of the
legal profession and maintain it on a high level. This is not achieved, however, by admitting to
practice precisely a special class who have failed in the bar examination, Moreover, the bill SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its approval.
contains provisions to which I find serious fundamental objections.
With the following explanatory note:
Section 5 provides that any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all
subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of the President and to afford another opportunity
day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribed the corresponding oath of office. This to those who feel themselves discriminated by the Supreme Court from 1946 to 1951 when
provision constitutes class legislation, benefiting as it does specifically one group of persons, those who would otherwise have passed the bar examination but were arbitrarily not so
namely, the unsuccessful candidates in the 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950 bar examinations. considered by altering its previous decisions of the passing mark. The Supreme Court has been
altering the passing mark from 69 in 1947 to 74 in 1951. In order to cure the apparent arbitrary
The same provision undertakes to revoke or set aside final resolutions of the Supreme Court fixing of passing grades and to give satisfaction to all parties concerned, it is proposed in this bill
a gradual increase in the general averages for passing the bar examinations as follows; For
made in accordance with the law then in force. It should be noted that after every bar
examination the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the 1946 to 1951 bar examinations, 70 per cent; for 1952 bar examination, 71 per cent; for 1953 bar
Bar those who have obtained a passing general average but also rejecting and denying the examination, 72 per cent; for 1954 bar examination, 73 percent; and for 1955 bar examination,
74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the passing mark will be restored with the condition that the candidate
petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The provision under consideration would
have the effect of revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the petitions of shall not obtain in any subject a grade of below 50 per cent. The reason for relaxing the standard
those who may have failed to obtain the passing average fixed for that year. Said provision also 75 per cent passing grade, is the tremendous handicap which students during the years
immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading
materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law soon after the
liberation. It is believed that by 1956 the preparation of our students as well as the available
reading materials will be under normal conditions, if not improved from those years preceding
the last world war.
In this will we eliminated altogether the idea of having our Supreme Court assumed the
supervision as well as the administration of the study of law which was objected to by the
President in the Bar Bill of 1951.
The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated among his objections that the bill would
admit to the practice of law "a special class who failed in the bar examination". He considered
the bill a class legislation. This contention, however, is not, in good conscience, correct because
Congress is merely supplementing what the Supreme Court have already established as
precedent by making as low as 69 per cent the passing mark of those who took the Bar
examination in 1947. These bar candidates for who this bill should be enacted, considered
themselves as having passed the bar examination on the strength of the established precedent
of our Supreme Court and were fully aware of the insurmountable difficulties and handicaps
which they were unavoidably placed. We believe that such precedent cannot or could not have
been altered, constitutionally, by the Supreme Court, without giving due consideration to the
rights already accrued or vested in the bar candidates who took the examination when the
precedent was not yet altered, or in effect, was still enforced and without being inconsistent with
the principles of their previous resolutions.
If this bill would be enacted, it shall be considered as a simple curative act or corrective statute
which Congress has the power to enact. The requirement of a "valid classification" as against
class legislation, is very expressed in the following American Jurisprudence:
A valid classification must include all who naturally belong to the class, all who possess a
common disability, attribute, or classification, and there must be a "natural" and substantial
differentiation between those included in the class and those it leaves untouched. When a class
is accepted by the Court as "natural" it cannot be again split and then have the dissevered
factions of the original unit designated with different rules established for each. (Fountain Park
Co. vs. Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465 (1926).
Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time with its tides brings new conditions which must
be cared for by new laws. Sometimes the new conditions affect the members of a class. If so,
the correcting statute must apply to all alike. Sometimes the condition affect only a few. If so, the
correcting statute may be as narrow as the mischief. The constitution does not prohibit special
laws inflexibly and always. It permits them when there are special evils with which the general
laws are incompetent to cope. The special public purpose will sustain the special form. . . . The
problem in the last analysis is one of legislative policy, with a wide margin of discretion conceded
to the lawmakers. Only in the case of plain abuse will there be revision by the court. (In
Williams vs. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36, 77 L. Ed. 1015, 53 Sup. Ct.
431). (1932)
This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective statute which always retroacts to the extent of the
care of correction only as in this case from 1946 when the Supreme Court first deviated from the
rule of 75 per cent in the Rules of Court.
For the foregoing purposes the approval of this bill is earnestly recommended.
(Sgd.) PABLO ANGELES DAVID
Senator
Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by Congress as above transcribed. The President again
asked the comments of this Court, which endorsed the following:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting Executive Secretary, Manila, with the
information that, with respect to Senate Bill No. 371, the members of the Court are taking the
same views they expressed on Senate Bill No. 12 passed by Congress in May, 1951, contained
in the first indorsement of the undersigned dated June 5, 1951, to the Assistant Executive
Secretary.
(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS
The President allowed the period within which the bill should be signed to pass without vetoing it, by virtue
of which it became a law on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20, Art. VI, Constitution) numbered 972 (many times
erroneously cited as No. 974).
It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an election year, and that both the President and the author
of the Bill were candidates for re-election, together, however, they lost in the polls.
Separate Opinions
LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:
The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always been, the exclusive privilege of this Court,
because lawyers are members of the Court and only this Court should be allowed to determine admission
thereto in the interest of the principle of the separation of powers. The power to admit is judicial in the
sense that discretion is used in is exercise. This power should be distinguished from the power to
promulgate rules which regulate admission. It is only this power (to promulgate amendments to the rules)
that is given in the Constitution to the Congress, not the exercise of the discretion to admit or not to admit.
Thus the rules on the holding of examination, the qualifications of applicants, the passing grades, etc. are
within the scope of the legislative power. But the power to determine when a candidate has made or has
not made the required grade is judicial, and lies completely with this Court.
I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the judicial function, and lies beyond the scope of
the congressional prerogative of amending the rules. To say that candidates who obtain a general average
of 72 per cent in 1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per cent in 1955 should be considered as having
passed the examination, is to mean exercise of the privilege and discretion judged in this Court. It is a
mandate to the tribunal to pass candidates for different years with grades lower than the passing mark. No
reasoning is necessary to show that it is an arrogation of the Court's judicial authority and discretion. It is
furthermore objectionable as discriminatory. Why should those taking the examinations in 1953, 1954 and
1955 be allowed to have the privilege of a lower passing grade, while those taking earlier or later are not?
I vote that the act in toto be declared unconstitutional, because it is not embraced within the rule-making
power of Congress, because it is an undue interference with the power of this Court to admit members
thereof, and because it is discriminatory.
PARAS, C.J., dissenting:
Under section 145 of Rule of Court No. 127, in order that a bar candidate "may be deemed to have passed
his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects,
without falling below 50 per cent in any subject.' This passing mark has always been adhered to, with
certain exception presently to be specified.
With reference to the bar examinations given in August, 1946, the original list of successful candidates
included only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more. Upon motion for
reconsideration, however, 12 candidates with general averages ranging from 72 to 73 per cent were raised
to 75 per cent by resolution of December 18, 1946. In the examinations of November, 1946 the list first
released containing the names of successful candidates covered only those who obtained a general
average of 75 per cent or more; but, upon motion for reconsideration, 19 candidates with a general
average of 72 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of March 31, 1947. This would indicate that
in the original list of successful candidates those having a general average of 73 per cent or more but
below 75 per cent were included. After the original list of 1947 successful bar candidates had been
released, and on motion for reconsideration, all candidates with a general average of 69 per cent were
allowed to pass by resolution of July 15, 1948. With respect to the bar examinations held in August, 1948,
in addition to the original list of successful bar candidates, all those who obtained a general average of 70
per cent or more, irrespective of the grades in any one subject and irrespective of whether they filed
petitions for reconsideration, were allowed to pass by resolution of April 28, 1949. Thus, for the year 1947
the Court in effect made 69 per cent as the passing average, and for the year 1948, 70 per cent; and this
amounted, without being noticed perhaps, to an amendment of section 14 of Rule 127.
Numerous flunkers in the bar examinations held subsequent to 1948, whose general averages mostly
ranged from 69 to 73 per cent, filed motions for reconsideration invoking the precedents set by this Court
in 1947 and 1948, but said motions were uniformly denied.
In the year 1951, the Congress, after public hearings where law deans and professors, practising
attorneys, presidents of bar associations, and law graduates appeared and argued lengthily pro or con,
approved a bill providing, among others, for the reduction of the passing general average from 75 per cent
to 70 per cent, retroactive to any bar examination held after July 4, 1946. This bill was vetoed by the
President mainly in view of an unfavorable comment of Justices Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes,
Bautista and Jugo. In 1953, the Congress passed another bill similar to the previous bill vetoed by the
President, with the important difference that in the later bill the provisions in the first bill regarding (1) the
supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court of the study of law, (2) the inclusion of Social Legislation
and Taxation as new bar subjects, (3) the publication of the bar examiners before the holding of the
examination, and (4) the equal division among the examiners of all the admission fees paid by bar
applicants, were eliminated. This second bill was allowed to become a law, Republic Act No. 972, by the
President by merely not signing it within the required period; and in doing so the President gave due
respect to the will of the Congress which, speaking for the people, chose to repass the bill first vetoed by
him.
Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any
examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per cent
in 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; and 74 per cent in the 1955 bar
examinations, without obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to pass. Said
Act also provides that any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any
examination after July 4, 1946, shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such
grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing in any subsequent examinations.
Numerous candidates who had taken the bar examinations previous to the approval of Republic Act No.
972 and failed to obtain the necessary passing average, filed with this Court mass or separate petitions,
praying that they be admitted to the practice of law under and by virtue of said Act, upon the allegation that
they have obtained the general averages prescribed therein. In virtue of the resolution of July 6, 1953, this
Court held on July 11, 1953 a hearing on said petitions, and members of the bar, especially authorized
representatives of bar associations, were invited to argue or submit memoranda as amici curiae, the
reason alleged for said hearing being that some doubt had "been expressed on the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 972 in so far as it affects past bar examinations and the matter" involved "a new question
of public interest."
All discussions in support of the proposition that the power to regulate the admission to the practice of law
is inherently judicial, are immaterial, because the subject is now governed by the Constitution which in
Article VII, section 13, provides as follows:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive right. The
existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes and are
declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the
same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
Under this constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning
the admission to the practice of law, the Congress has the power to repeal, alter or supplement said rules.
Little intelligence is necessary to see that the power of the Supreme Court and the Congress to regulate
the admission to the practice of law is concurrent.
The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue that this Act, in so far as it covers bar examinations held
prior to its approval, is unconstitutional, because it sets aside the final resolutions of the Supreme Court
refusing to admit to the practice of law the various petitioners, thereby resulting in a legislative
encroachment upon the judicial power. In my opinion this view is erroneous. In the first place, resolutions
on the rejection of bar candidates do not have the finality of decisions in justiciable cases where the Rules
of Court expressly fix certain periods after which they become executory and unalterable. Resolutions on
bar matters, specially on motions for reconsiderations filed by flunkers in any give year, are subject to
revision by this Court at any time, regardless of the period within which the motion were filed, and this has
been the practice heretofore. The obvious reason is that bar examinations and admission to the practice of
law may be deemed as a judicial function only because said matters happen to be entrusted, under the
Constitution and our Rules of Court, to the Supreme Court. There is no judicial function involved, in the
subject and constitutional sense of the word, because bar examinations and the admission to the practice
of law, unlike justiciable cases, do not affect opposing litigants. It is no more than the function of other
examining boards. In the second place, retroactive laws are not prohibited by the Constitution, except only
when they would be ex post facto, would impair obligations and contracts or vested rights or would deny
due process and equal protection of the law. Republic Act No. 972 certainly is not an ex post
facto enactment, does not impair any obligation and contract or vested rights, and denies to no one the
right to due process and equal protection of the law. On the other hand, it is a mere curative statute
intended to correct certain obvious inequalities arising from the adoption by this Court of different passing
general averages in certain years.
Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to July 4, 1946, are being discriminated against, because
we no longer have any record of those who might have failed before the war, apart from the circumstance
that 75 per cent had always been the passing mark during said period. It may also be that there are no
pre-war bar candidates similarly situated as those benefited by Republic Act No. 972. At any rate, in the
matter of classification, the reasonableness must be determined by the legislative body. It is proper to
recall that the Congress held public hearings, and we can fairly suppose that the classification adopted in
the Act reflects good legislative judgment derived from the facts and circumstances then brought out.
As regards the alleged interference in or encroachment upon the judgment of this Court by the Legislative
Department, it is sufficient to state that, if there is any interference at all, it is one expressly sanctioned by
the Constitution. Besides, interference in judicial adjudication prohibited by the Constitution is essentially
aimed at protecting rights of litigants that have already been vested or acquired in virtue of decisions of
courts, not merely for the empty purpose of creating appearances of separation and equality among the
three branches of the Government. Republic Act No. 972 has not produced a case involving two parties
and decided by the Court in favor of one and against the other. Needless to say, the statute will not affect
the previous resolutions passing bar candidates who had obtained the general average prescribed by
section 14 of Rule 127. A law would be objectionable and unconstitutional if, for instance, it would provide
that those who have been admitted to the bar after July 4, 1946, whose general average is below 80 per
cent, will not be allowed to practice law, because said statute would then destroy a right already acquired
under previous resolutions of this Court, namely, the bar admission of those whose general averages were
from 75 to 79 per cent.
Without fear of contradiction, I think the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power conferred
by the Constitution, may pass a resolution amending section 14 of Rule 127 by reducing the passing
average to 70 per cent, effective several years before the date of the resolution. Indeed, when this Court
on July 15, 1948 allowed to pass all candidates who obtained a general average of 69 per cent or more
and on April 28, 1949 those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of
whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, it in effect amended section 14 of Rule 127 retroactively,
because during the examinations held in August 1947 and August 1948, said section (fixing the general
average at 75 per cent) was supposed to be in force. In stands to reason, if we are to admit that the
Supreme Court and the Congress have concurrent power to regulate the admission to the practice of law,
that the latter may validly pass a retroactive rule fixing the passing general average.
Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious,
since this Court had already adopted as passing averages 69 per cent for the 1947 bar examinations and
70 per cent for the 1948 examinations. Anyway, we should not inquire into the wisdom of the law, since
this is a matter that is addressed to the judgment of the legislators. This Court in many instances had
doubted the propriety of legislative enactments, and yet it has consistently refrained from nullifying them
solely on that ground.
To say that the admission of the bar candidates benefited under Republic Act 972 is against public
interest, is to assume that the matter of whether said Act is beneficial or harmful to the general public was
not considered by the Congress. As already stated, the Congress held public hearings, and we are bound
to assume that the legislators, loyal, as do the members of this Court, to their oath of office, had taken all
the circumstances into account before passing the Act. On the question of public interest I may observe
that the Congress, representing the people who elected them, should be more qualified to make an
appraisal. I am inclined to accept Republic Act No. 972 as an expression of the will of the people through
their duly elected representatives.
I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting that the Congress, in the exercise of its concurrent
power to repeal, alter, or supplement the Rules of Court regarding the admission to the practice of law,
may act in an arbitrary or capricious manner, in the same way that this Court may not do so. We are thus
left in the situation, incidental to a democracy, where we can and should only hope that the right men are
put in the right places in our Government.
Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional and should therefore be given effect in its
entirety.
Separate Opinions
LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:
The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always been, the exclusive privilege of this Court,
because lawyers are members of the Court and only this Court should be allowed to determine admission
thereto in the interest of the principle of the separation of powers. The power to admit is judicial in the
sense that discretion is used in is exercise. This power should be distinguished from the power to
promulgate rules which regulate admission. It is only this power (to promulgate amendments to the rules)
that is given in the Constitution to the Congress, not the exercise of the discretion to admit or not to admit.
Thus the rules on the holding of examination, the qualifications of applicants, the passing grades, etc. are
within the scope of the legislative power. But the power to determine when a candidate has made or has
not made the required grade is judicial, and lies completely with this Court.
I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the judicial function, and lies beyond the scope of
the congressional prerogative of amending the rules. To say that candidates who obtain a general average
of 72 per cent in 1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per cent in 1955 should be considered as having
passed the examination, is to mean exercise of the privilege and discretion judged in this Court. It is a
mandate to the tribunal to pass candidates for different years with grades lower than the passing mark. No
reasoning is necessary to show that it is an arrogation of the Court's judicial authority and discretion. It is
furthermore objectionable as discriminatory. Why should those taking the examinations in 1953, 1954 and
1955 be allowed to have the privilege of a lower passing grade, while those taking earlier or later are not?
I vote that the act in toto be declared unconstitutional, because it is not embraced within the rule-making
power of Congress, because it is an undue interference with the power of this Court to admit members
thereof, and because it is discriminatory.
PARAS, C.J., dissenting:
Under section 145 of Rule of Court No. 127, in order that a bar candidate "may be deemed to have passed
his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects,
without falling below 50 per cent in any subject.' This passing mark has always been adhered to, with
certain exception presently to be specified.
With reference to the bar examinations given in August, 1946, the original list of successful candidates
included only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more. Upon motion for
reconsideration, however, 12 candidates with general averages ranging from 72 to 73 per cent were raised
to 75 per cent by resolution of December 18, 1946. In the examinations of November, 1946 the list first
released containing the names of successful candidates covered only those who obtained a general
average of 75 per cent or more; but, upon motion for reconsideration, 19 candidates with a general
average of 72 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of March 31, 1947. This would indicate that
in the original list of successful candidates those having a general average of 73 per cent or more but
below 75 per cent were included. After the original list of 1947 successful bar candidates had been
released, and on motion for reconsideration, all candidates with a general average of 69 per cent were
allowed to pass by resolution of July 15, 1948. With respect to the bar examinations held in August, 1948,
in addition to the original list of successful bar candidates, all those who obtained a general average of 70
per cent or more, irrespective of the grades in any one subject and irrespective of whether they filed
petitions for reconsideration, were allowed to pass by resolution of April 28, 1949. Thus, for the year 1947
the Court in effect made 69 per cent as the passing average, and for the year 1948, 70 per cent; and this
amounted, without being noticed perhaps, to an amendment of section 14 of Rule 127.
Numerous flunkers in the bar examinations held subsequent to 1948, whose general averages mostly
ranged from 69 to 73 per cent, filed motions for reconsideration invoking the precedents set by this Court
in 1947 and 1948, but said motions were uniformly denied.
In the year 1951, the Congress, after public hearings where law deans and professors, practising
attorneys, presidents of bar associations, and law graduates appeared and argued lengthily pro or con,
approved a bill providing, among others, for the reduction of the passing general average from 75 per cent
to 70 per cent, retroactive to any bar examination held after July 4, 1946. This bill was vetoed by the
President mainly in view of an unfavorable comment of Justices Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes,
Bautista and Jugo. In 1953, the Congress passed another bill similar to the previous bill vetoed by the
President, with the important difference that in the later bill the provisions in the first bill regarding (1) the
supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court of the study of law, (2) the inclusion of Social Legislation
and Taxation as new bar subjects, (3) the publication of the bar examiners before the holding of the
examination, and (4) the equal division among the examiners of all the admission fees paid by bar
applicants, were eliminated. This second bill was allowed to become a law, Republic Act No. 972, by the
President by merely not signing it within the required period; and in doing so the President gave due
respect to the will of the Congress which, speaking for the people, chose to repass the bill first vetoed by
him.
Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any
examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per cent
in 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; and 74 per cent in the 1955 bar
examinations, without obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to pass. Said
Act also provides that any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any
examination after July 4, 1946, shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such
grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing in any subsequent examinations.
Numerous candidates who had taken the bar examinations previous to the approval of Republic Act No.
972 and failed to obtain the necessary passing average, filed with this Court mass or separate petitions,
praying that they be admitted to the practice of law under and by virtue of said Act, upon the allegation that
they have obtained the general averages prescribed therein. In virtue of the resolution of July 6, 1953, this
Court held on July 11, 1953 a hearing on said petitions, and members of the bar, especially authorized
representatives of bar associations, were invited to argue or submit memoranda as amici curiae, the
reason alleged for said hearing being that some doubt had "been expressed on the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 972 in so far as it affects past bar examinations and the matter" involved "a new question
of public interest."
All discussions in support of the proposition that the power to regulate the admission to the practice of law
is inherently judicial, are immaterial, because the subject is now governed by the Constitution which in
Article VII, section 13, provides as follows:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive right. The
existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes and are
declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the
same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
Under this constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning
the admission to the practice of law, the Congress has the power to repeal, alter or supplement said rules.
Little intelligence is necessary to see that the power of the Supreme Court and the Congress to regulate
the admission to the practice of law is concurrent.
The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue that this Act, in so far as it covers bar examinations held because during the examinations held in August 1947 and August 1948, said section (fixing the general
prior to its approval, is unconstitutional, because it sets aside the final resolutions of the Supreme Court average at 75 per cent) was supposed to be in force. In stands to reason, if we are to admit that the
refusing to admit to the practice of law the various petitioners, thereby resulting in a legislative Supreme Court and the Congress have concurrent power to regulate the admission to the practice of law,
encroachment upon the judicial power. In my opinion this view is erroneous. In the first place, resolutions that the latter may validly pass a retroactive rule fixing the passing general average.
on the rejection of bar candidates do not have the finality of decisions in justiciable cases where the Rules
of Court expressly fix certain periods after which they become executory and unalterable. Resolutions on
Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious,
bar matters, specially on motions for reconsiderations filed by flunkers in any give year, are subject to
since this Court had already adopted as passing averages 69 per cent for the 1947 bar examinations and
revision by this Court at any time, regardless of the period within which the motion were filed, and this has
70 per cent for the 1948 examinations. Anyway, we should not inquire into the wisdom of the law, since
been the practice heretofore. The obvious reason is that bar examinations and admission to the practice of
this is a matter that is addressed to the judgment of the legislators. This Court in many instances had
law may be deemed as a judicial function only because said matters happen to be entrusted, under the
doubted the propriety of legislative enactments, and yet it has consistently refrained from nullifying them
Constitution and our Rules of Court, to the Supreme Court. There is no judicial function involved, in the
solely on that ground.
subject and constitutional sense of the word, because bar examinations and the admission to the practice
of law, unlike justiciable cases, do not affect opposing litigants. It is no more than the function of other
examining boards. In the second place, retroactive laws are not prohibited by the Constitution, except only To say that the admission of the bar candidates benefited under Republic Act 972 is against public
when they would be ex post facto, would impair obligations and contracts or vested rights or would deny interest, is to assume that the matter of whether said Act is beneficial or harmful to the general public was
due process and equal protection of the law. Republic Act No. 972 certainly is not an ex post not considered by the Congress. As already stated, the Congress held public hearings, and we are bound
facto enactment, does not impair any obligation and contract or vested rights, and denies to no one the to assume that the legislators, loyal, as do the members of this Court, to their oath of office, had taken all
right to due process and equal protection of the law. On the other hand, it is a mere curative statute the circumstances into account before passing the Act. On the question of public interest I may observe
intended to correct certain obvious inequalities arising from the adoption by this Court of different passing that the Congress, representing the people who elected them, should be more qualified to make an
general averages in certain years. appraisal. I am inclined to accept Republic Act No. 972 as an expression of the will of the people through
their duly elected representatives.
Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to July 4, 1946, are being discriminated against, because
we no longer have any record of those who might have failed before the war, apart from the circumstance I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting that the Congress, in the exercise of its concurrent
that 75 per cent had always been the passing mark during said period. It may also be that there are no power to repeal, alter, or supplement the Rules of Court regarding the admission to the practice of law,
pre-war bar candidates similarly situated as those benefited by Republic Act No. 972. At any rate, in the may act in an arbitrary or capricious manner, in the same way that this Court may not do so. We are thus
matter of classification, the reasonableness must be determined by the legislative body. It is proper to left in the situation, incidental to a democracy, where we can and should only hope that the right men are
recall that the Congress held public hearings, and we can fairly suppose that the classification adopted in put in the right places in our Government.
the Act reflects good legislative judgment derived from the facts and circumstances then brought out.
Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional and should therefore be given effect in its
As regards the alleged interference in or encroachment upon the judgment of this Court by the Legislative entirety.
Department, it is sufficient to state that, if there is any interference at all, it is one expressly sanctioned by
the Constitution. Besides, interference in judicial adjudication prohibited by the Constitution is essentially
aimed at protecting rights of litigants that have already been vested or acquired in virtue of decisions of
courts, not merely for the empty purpose of creating appearances of separation and equality among the
three branches of the Government. Republic Act No. 972 has not produced a case involving two parties
and decided by the Court in favor of one and against the other. Needless to say, the statute will not affect
the previous resolutions passing bar candidates who had obtained the general average prescribed by
section 14 of Rule 127. A law would be objectionable and unconstitutional if, for instance, it would provide
that those who have been admitted to the bar after July 4, 1946, whose general average is below 80 per
cent, will not be allowed to practice law, because said statute would then destroy a right already acquired
under previous resolutions of this Court, namely, the bar admission of those whose general averages were
from 75 to 79 per cent.

Without fear of contradiction, I think the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power conferred
by the Constitution, may pass a resolution amending section 14 of Rule 127 by reducing the passing
average to 70 per cent, effective several years before the date of the resolution. Indeed, when this Court
on July 15, 1948 allowed to pass all candidates who obtained a general average of 69 per cent or more
and on April 28, 1949 those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of
whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, it in effect amended section 14 of Rule 127 retroactively,
G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959
PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office, respondent.
Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction against
Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.
On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27,
1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys
before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the
rules of practice before said office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and
other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said examination. It
would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been holding similar examinations.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the bar
examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good
standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently, the cat of
the respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an
examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed to practice before
said office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent, is
in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.
In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution of patent
cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and
technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the prosecution of patent
cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific
and technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the Patent Office; . . . that the
Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial body from requiring further
condition or qualification from those who would wish to handle cases before the Patent Office which, as
stated in the preceding paragraph, requires more of an application of scientific and technical knowledge
than the mere application of provisions of law; . . . that the action taken by the respondent is in accordance
with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of the Philippines, which similar to the
United States Patent Law, in accordance with which the United States Patent Office has also prescribed a
similar examination as that prescribed by respondent. . . .
Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of America authorizes the
Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to who practice before the United
States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly authorized to do so by our Patent Law, Republic Act No.
165.
Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have been holding tests or
examinations the passing of which was imposed as a required qualification to practice before the Patent
Office, to our knowledge, this is the first time that the right of the Director of Patents to do so, specially as
regards members of the bar, has been questioned formally, or otherwise put in issue. And we have given it
careful thought and consideration.
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law
anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines.
Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not appearance before the patent Office and the
preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and
in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement
of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice
as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p.
262, 263). (Emphasis supplied).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of
any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing,
the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of
legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other
affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they
are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree
of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult
and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an
intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as
concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that
these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning
and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to
clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953
ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is.
Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).
In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of
applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their
oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. In the first place, although the
transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of technical and scientific
knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as
well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance
with law. Not only this, but practice before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of
other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the
law of evidence and procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an invention shall
not be patentable if it is contrary to public order or morals, or to public health or welfare. Section 9 says
that an invention shall not be considered new or patentable if it was known or used by others in the
Philippines before the invention thereof by the inventor named in any printed publication in the Philippines
or any foreign country more than one year before the application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in
public use or on sale in the Philippines for more than one year before the application for the patent
therefor. Section 10 provides that the right to patent belongs to the true and actual inventor, his heirs, legal
representatives or assigns. Section 25 and 26 refer to connection of any mistake in a patent. Section 28
enumerates the grounds for cancellation of a patent; that although any person may apply for such
cancellation, under Section 29, the Solicitor General is authorized to petition for the cancellation of a
patent. Section 30 mentions the requirements of a petition for cancellation. Section 31 and 32 provide for a
notice of hearing of the petition for cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents in case the said
cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the expiration of three years from the day the
patent was granted, any person patent on several grounds, such as, if the patented invention is not being
worked in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines
on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines is not being met to an
adequate extent and reasonable terms, or if by reason of the patentee's refusal to grant a license on
reasonable terms or by reason of the condition attached by him to the license, purchase or use of the
patented article or working of the patented process or machine of production, the establishment of a new
trade or industry in the Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or invention relates to food or medicine or
is necessary to public health or public safety. All these things involve the applications of laws, legal
Zprinciples, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and experience for which a
member of the bar has been prepared.
In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders and decisions of the
Patent Director involve questions of law or a reasonable and correct evaluation of facts, the very Patent
Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61, provides that:
. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a proceeding to
cancel a patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and any party to any other proceeding in the
Office may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the director.
In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the Patent Office and
the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific
knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather
to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.
Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions and acts of the
Head of the Patent Office.
. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences, and
extensions, exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents are public records, and it is the duty of the
Commissioner to give authenticated copies to any person, on payment of the legal fees. (40 Am.
Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied).
. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the granting
and delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to decide whether the patent is new and whether it is
the proper subject of a patent; and his action in awarding or refusing a patent is a judicial
function. In passing on an application the commissioner should decide not only questions of law,
but also questions of fact, as whether there has been a prior public use or sale of the article
invented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).
The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold
that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice
before the Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification. Of course, the Director of
Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may require that members of the bar practising before him
enlist the assistance of technical men and scientist in the preparation of papers and documents, such as,
the drawing or technical description of an invention or machine sought to be patented, in the same way
that a lawyer filing an application for the registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his clients, is required
to submit a plan and technical description of said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.
But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons desiring to
practice or to do business before him to submit an examination, even if they are already members of the
bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the United States Patent
Law; and of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases prescribes an examination similar to that
which he (respondent) has prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention to the following provisions of
said Rules of Practice:
Registration of attorneys and agents. — A register of an attorneys and a register agents are kept
in the Patent Office on which are entered the names of all persons recognized as entitled to
represent applicants before the Patent Office in the preparation and prosecution of applicants for
patent. Registration in the Patent Office under the provisions of these rules shall only entitle the
person registered to practice before the Patent Office.
(a) Attorney at law. — Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before any
United States Court or the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States who fulfills
the requirements and complied with the provisions of these rules may be admitted to practice
before the Patent Office and have his name entered on the register of attorneys.
(c) Requirement for registration. — No person will be admitted to practice and register unless he
shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form supplied by the
Commissioner and furnish all requested information and material; and shall establish to the
satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral character and of good repute and
possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications necessary to enable him to
render applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise competent to advise and assist
him in the presentation and prosecution of their application before the Patent Office. In order that
the Commissioner may determine whether a person seeking to have his name placed upon
either of the registers has the qualifications specified, satisfactory proof of good moral character
and repute, and of sufficient basic training in scientific and technical matters must be submitted
and an examination which is held from time to time must be taken and passed. The taking of an
examination may be waived in the case of any person who has served for three years in the
examining corps of the Patent Office.
Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office in
Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself, which reads as follows:
The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may
prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other persons
representing applicants or other parties before his office, and may require of such persons,
agents, or attorneys, before being recognized as representatives of applicants or other persons,
that they shall show they are of good moral character and in good repute, are possessed of the
necessary qualifications to enable them to render to applicants or other persons valuable
service, and are likewise to competent to advise and assist applicants or other persons in the
presentation or prosecution of their applications or other business before the Office. The
Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, suspend or exclude,
either generally or in any particular case from further practice before his office any person, agent
or attorney shown to be incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of gross misconduct, or who
refuses to comply with the said rules and regulations, or who shall, with intent to defraud in any
matter, deceive, mislead, or threaten any applicant or prospective applicant, or other person
having immediate or prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective
business before the office, by word, circular, letter, or by advertising. The reasons for any such
suspension or exclusion shall be duly recorded. The action of the Commissioner may be
reviewed upon the petition of the person so refused recognition or so suspended by the district
court of the United States for the District of Columbia under such conditions and upon such
proceedings as the said court may by its rules determine. (Emphasis supplied)
Finance, upon recommendation of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all needful rules and
regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the code. We understand that rules and
regulations have been promulgated not only for the Bureau of Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for
other bureaus of the Government, to govern the transaction of business in and to enforce the law for said
bureaus.
Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law giving the
necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination prescribed by it before they
are allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then there would be no reason why other bureaus
specially the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Customs, where the business in the same area are more or
less complicated, such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc., assessments
exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the classification of
goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs, may
not also require that any lawyer practising before them or otherwise transacting business with them on
behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify.
In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this
Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for
the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of the
scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence
to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so
much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.

Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the provisions of
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is hereby
law just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations requiring that persons
prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass the
desiring to practice before him should submit to and pass an examination. We reproduce said Section 78,
same before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office. No costs.
Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison:

SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. — The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the
conduct of all business in the Patent Office.

The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the United
States Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations to determine the qualifications of those
allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While the U.S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner of
Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the necessary qualifications and competence to
render valuable service to and advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which showing may take the
form of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this
important point. Our attention has not been called to any express provision of our Patent Law, giving such
authority to determine the qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the Patent Office.

Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms and
make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and efficient
administration of his branch of the service and to carry into full effect the laws relating to matters within the
jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the approval of the Department
Head, makes all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of said code. Section 338 of the
National Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the Secretary of
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 132601. October 12, 1998]
LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and THE DIRECTOR OF
THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, THE EXECUTIVE JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF QUEZON CITY AND THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 104, respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
On June 25, 1996, this Court affirmed[1] the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the
crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the
death penalty for the said crime.
Petitioner duly filed a Motion for Reconsideration raising mainly factual issues, and on its heels, a
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first time the issue of the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7659[2] (the death penalty law) and the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of
rape.
On February 7, 1998, this Court denied[3] petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration with a finding that Congress duly complied with the requirements for the
reimposition of the death penalty and therefore the death penalty law is not unconstitutional.
In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death penalty from
electrocution to lethal injection,[4] and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY
LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR
THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659.[5] Pursuant to the provisions of said law, the Secretary of Justice promulgated
the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 ("implementing rules") [6] and directed the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual. [7]
On March 2, 1998, petitioner filed a Petition[8] for Prohibition, Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order to enjoin respondents Secretary of Justice and Director of the Bureau of Prisons from
carrying out the execution by lethal injection of petitioner under R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules
as these are unconstitutional and void for being: (a) cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment per seas
well as by reason of its being (b) arbitrary, unreasonable and a violation of due process, (c) a violation of
the Philippines' obligations under international covenants, (d) an undue delegation of legislative power by
Congress, (e) an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and (f) an unlawful
delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to respondent Director.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner, through counsel, filed a Motion for Leave of Court [9] to Amend and
Supplement Petition with the Amended and Supplemental Petition[10] attached thereto, invoking the
additional ground of violation of equal protection, and impleading the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City and the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 104, in order to enjoin
said public respondents from acting under the questioned rules by setting a date for petitioner's execution.
On March 3, 1998, the Court resolved, without giving due course to the petition, to require the
respondents to COMMENT thereon within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice, and
directed the parties "to MAINTAIN the status quo prevailing at the time of the filing of this petition."
On March 10, 1998, the Court granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Amend and Supplement
Petition, and required respondents to COMMENT thereon within ten (10) days from notice.
On March 16, 1998, petitioner filed a Very Urgent Motion (1) To clarify Status Quo Order, and (2) For
the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order expressly enjoining public respondents from taking any
action to carry out petitioner's execution until the petition is resolved.
On March 16, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General [11] filed a Comment (On the Petition and the
Amended Supplemental Petition)[12] stating that (1) this Court has already upheld the constitutionality of the
Death Penalty Law, and has repeatedly declared that the death penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or
unusual punishment; (2) execution by lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the
questioned rules, is constitutional, lethal injection being the most modern, more humane, more
economical, safer and easier to apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); (3) the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the death
penalty; (4) R.A. No. 8177 properly delegated legislative power to respondent Director; and that (5) R.A.
No. 8177 confers the power to promulgate the implementing rules to the Secretary of Justice, Secretary of
Health and the Bureau of Corrections.
On March 17, 1998, the Court required the petitioner to file a REPLY thereto within a non-extendible
period of ten days from notice.
On March 25, 1998, the Commission on Human Rights [13] filed a Motion for Leave of Court to
Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae[14] with the attached Petition to Intervene and/or Appear
as Amicus Curiae[15] alleging that the death penalty imposed under R.A. No. 7659 which is to be
implemented by R.A. No. 8177 is cruel, degrading and outside the limits of civil society standards, and
further invoking (a) Article II, Section 11 of the Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of
every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights."; (b) Article III of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights which states that "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of
person," and Article V thereof, which states that "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment."; (c) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in
particular, Article 6 thereof, and the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights Aiming At The Abolition of the Death Penalty; (d) Amnesty International statistics showing
that as of October 1996, 58 countries have abolished the death penalty for all crimes, 15 countries have
abolished the death penalty for ordinary crimes, and 26 countries are abolitionists de facto, which means
that they have retained the death penalty for ordinary crimes but are considered abolitionists in practice
that they have not executed anyone during the past ten (10) years or more, or in that they have made an
international commitment not to carry out executions, for a total of 99 countries which are total abolitionists
in law or practice, and 95 countries as retentionists; [16] and (e) Pope John Paul II's encyclical, "Evangelium
Vitae." In a Resolution dated April 3, 1998, the Court duly noted the motion.
On March 27, 1998, petitioner filed a Reply[17] stating that (1) this Court is not barred from exercising
judicial review over the death penalty per se, the death penalty for rape and lethal injection as a mode of
carrying out the death penalty; (2) capital punishment is a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment; (3)
lethal injection is cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment, and that being the "most modern" does not
make it less cruel or more humane, and that the Solicitor General's "aesthetic" criteria is short-sighted, and
that the lethal injection is not risk free nor is it easier to implement; and (4) the death penalty violates
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights considering that the Philippines participated in the
deliberations of and voted for the Second Optional Protocol.
 After deliberating on the pleadings, the Court gave due course to the petition, which it now resolves
on the merits.
In the Amended and Supplemental Petition, petitioner assails the constitutionality of the mode of
carrying out his death sentence by lethal injection on the following grounds:[18]
I.
DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING A CRUEL, DEGRADING
AND INHUMAN PUNISHMENT.
II.
THE DEATH PENALTY VIOLATES THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS, WHICH IS PART OF THE LAW OF THE LAND.
III.
LETHAL INJECTION, AS AUTHORIZED UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8177 AND THE
QUESTIONED RULES, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT IS AN UNNECESSARY AND
WANTON INFLICTION OF PAIN ON A PERSON AND IS, THUS, A CRUEL, DEGRADING, AND
INHUMAN PUNISHMENT.
IV.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8177 UNDULY DELEGATES LEGISLATIVE POWER TO RESPONDENT
DIRECTOR.
V.
RESPONDENT SECRETARY UNLAWFULLY DELEGATED THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS
DELEGATED TO HIM UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8177 TO RESPONDENT DIRECTOR.
VI.
RESPONDENT SECRETARY EXCEEDED THE AUTHORITY DELEGATED TO HIM UNDER
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8177 AND UNLAWFULLY USURPED THE POWER TO LEGISLATE IN
PROMULGATING THE QUESTIONED RULES.
VII.
SECTION 17 OF THE QUESTIONED RULES IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING
DISCRIMINATORY AS WELL AS FOR BEING AN INVALID EXERCISE BY RESPONDENT
SECRETARY OF THE POWER TO LEGISLATE.
VIII.
INJUCTION MUST ISSUE TO PREVENT IRREPARABLE DAMAGE AND INJURY TO
PETITIONER'S RIGHTS BY REASON OF THE EXISTENCE, OPERATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE AND EQUALLY INVALID AND
IMPLEMENTING RULES.
Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do not pass
constitutional muster for: (a) violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment, (b) violation of our international treaty obligations, (c) being an undue delegation of legislative
power, and (d) being discriminatory.
The Court shall now proceed to discuss these issues in seriatim.
I. LETHAL INJECTION, NOT CRUEL, DEGRADING OR INHUMAN PUNISHMENT UNDER
SECTION 19, ARTICLE III OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
The main challenge to R.A. 8177 and its implementing rules is anchored on Article III, Section 19 (1)
of the 1987 Constitution which proscribes the imposition of "cruel, degrading or inhuman"
punishment. "The prohibition in the Philippine Bill against cruel and unusual punishments is an Anglo-
Saxon safeguard against governmental oppression of the subject, which made its first appearance in the
reign of William and Mary of England in 'An Act declaring the rights and liberties of the subject, and settling
the succession of the crown,' passed in the year 1689. It has been incorporated into the Constitution of the
United States (of America) and into most constitutions of the various States in substantially the same
language as that used in the original statute. The exact language of the Constitution of the United States is
used in the Philippine Bill."[19] "The counterpart of Section 19 (1) in the 1935 Constitution reads: 'Excessive
fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and inhuman punishment inflicted.' xxx In the 1973 Constitution the
phrase became 'cruel or unusual punishment.' The Bill of Rights Committee of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission read the 1973 modification as prohibiting 'unusual' punishment even if not 'cruel.' It was thus
seen as an obstacle to experimentation in penology. Consequently, the Committee reported out the
present text which prohibits 'cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment' as more consonant with the
meaning desired and with jurisprudence on the subject."[20]
Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishment considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to be used in carrying out
lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to be administered, and the procedure in administering said
drug/s into the accused; (2) R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules are uncertain as to the date of the
execution, time of notification, the court which will fix the date of execution, which uncertainties cause the
greatest pain and suffering for the convict; and (3) the possibility of "botched executions" or mistakes in
administering the drugs renders lethal injection inherently cruel.
Before the Court proceeds any further, a brief explanation of the process of administering lethal
injection is in order.
In lethal injection, the condemned inmate is strapped on a hospital gurney and wheeled into the
execution room. A trained technician inserts a needle into a vein in the inmate's arm and begins an
intravenous flow of saline solution. At the warden's signal, a lethal combination of drugs is injected into the
intravenous line. The deadly concoction typically includes three drugs: (1) a nonlethal dose of sodium
thiopenthotal, a sleep inducing barbiturate; (2) lethal doses of pancuronium bromide, a drug that paralyzes
the muscles; and (3) potassium chloride, which stops the heart within seconds. The first two drugs are
commonly used during surgery to put the patient to sleep and relax muscles; the third is used in heart
bypass surgery.[21]
Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment.[22] In the oft-cited case of Harden v. Director of Prisons,[23] this Court held that
"[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not
cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and
barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life." Would the lack in particularity then as to
the details involved in the execution by lethal injection render said law "cruel, degrading or inhuman"? The
Court believes not. For reasons hereafter discussed, the implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are
matters which are properly left to the competence and expertise of administrative officials. [24]
[25]
Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which "court" will fix the time
and date of execution, and the date of execution and time of notification of the death convict. As petitioner
already knows, the "court" which designates the date of execution is the trial court which convicted the
accused, that is, after this Court has reviewed the entire records of the case[26] and has affirmed the
judgment of the lower court. Thereupon, the procedure is that the "judgment is entered fifteen (15) days
after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records are remanded to the court below including a
certified copy of the judgment for execution.[27] Neither is there any uncertainty as to the date of execution
nor the time of notification. As to the date of execution, Section 15 of the implementing rules must be read
in conjunction with the last sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the death sentence
shall be carried out "not earlier than one (1) year nor later then eighteen (18) months from the time the
judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executory, without prejudice to the exercise by the
President of his executive clemency powers at all times." Hence, the death convict is in effect assured of
eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and
executory[28] wherein he can seek executive clemency[29] and attend to all his temporal and spiritual
affairs.[30]
Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain" in case of possible complications in the
intravenous injection, considering and as petitioner claims, that respondent Director is an untrained and
untested person insofar as the choice and administration of lethal injection is concerned, renders lethal
injection a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. Such supposition is highly speculative and
unsubstantiated.
First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection required the
expertise only of phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the drugs to be administered are unsafe
or ineffective.[31] Petitioner simply cites situations in the United States wherein execution by lethal injection
allegedly resulted in prolonged and agonizing death for the convict,[32] without any other evidence
whatsoever.
Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which requires that all
personnel involved in the execution proceedings should be trained prior to the performance of such
task.We must presume that the public officials entrusted with the implementation of the death penalty (by
lethal injection) will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment.[33]
Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the execution of
death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishment. "In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since
punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But of
course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished."[34] The cruelty
against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment,
not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely.[35] Numerous
federal and state courts of the United States have been asked to review whether lethal injections constitute
cruel and unusual punishment. No court has found lethal injections to implicate prisoner's Eighth
Amendment rights. In fact, most courts that have addressed the issue state in one or two sentences that
lethal injection clearly is a constitutional form of execution.[36] A few jurisdictions, however, have addressed
the merits of the Eighth Amendment claims. Without exception, these courts have found that lethal
injection does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. After reviewing the medical evidence that
indicates that improper doses or improper administration of the drugs causes severe pain and that prison
officials tend to have little training in the administration of the drugs, the courts have found that the few
minutes of pain does not rise to a constitutional violation.[37]
What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public
opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice" and "must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." [38] Indeed, "[o]ther (U.S.) courts have
focused on 'standards of decency' finding that the widespread use of lethal injections indicates that it
comports with contemporary norms."[39] the primary indicator of society's standard of decency with regard
to capital punishment is the response of the country's legislatures to the sanction. [40] Hence, for as long as
the death penalty remains in our statute books and meets the most stringent requirements provided by the
Constitution, we must confine our inquiry to the legality of R.A. No. 8177, whose constitutionality we duly
sustain in the face of petitioner's challenge. We find that the legislature's substitution of the mode of
carrying out the death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection infringes no constitutional rights of
petitioner herein.
II. REIMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY LAW DOES NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL
TREATY OBLIGATIONS
Petitioner assiduously argues that the reimposition of the death penalty law violates our international
obligations, in particular, the International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights, which was adopted by
the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 16, 1996, signed and ratified by the Philippines
on December 19, 1966 and October 23, 1986,[41] respectively.
Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides:
"1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his life.
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for
the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime
and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment
rendered by a competent court." (emphasis supplied)
3. When deprivation of life constitutes the crime of genocide, it is understood that nothing in this article
shall authorize any State Party to the present Covenant to derogate in any way from any obligation
assumed under the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide.
4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation of the
sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may be granted in all-cases.
5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age
and shall not be carried out on pregnant women.
6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the abolition of capital punishment by any
State. Party to the present Covenant."
Indisputably, Article 6 of the Covenant enshrines the individual's right to life. Nevertheless, Article 6
(2) of the Covenant explicitly recognizes that capital punishment is an allowable limitation on the right to
life, subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the "most serious crimes". Pursuant to Article 28 of
the Covenant, a Human Rights Committee was established and under Article 40 of the Covenant, State
parties to the Covenant are required to submit an initial report to the Committee on the measures they
have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized within the Covenant and on the progress made on
the enjoyment of those rights one year of its entry into force for the State Party concerned and thereafter,
after five years. On July 27, 1982, the Human Rights Committee issued General Comment No.
6 interpreting Article 6 of the Covenant stating that "(while) it follows from Article 6 (2) to (6) that State
parties are not obliged to abolish the death penalty totally, they are obliged to limit its use and, in
particular, to abolish it for other than the 'most serious crimes.' Accordingly, they ought to consider
reviewing their criminal laws in this light and, in any event, are obliged to restrict the application of the
death penalty to the most serious crimes.' The article strongly suggests (pars. 2 (2) and (6) that abolition is
desirable. xxx The Committee is of the opinion that the expression 'most serious crimes' must be read
restrictively to mean that the death penalty should be a quite exceptional measure." Further,
the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of Those Facing the Death Penalty [42] adopted by the Economic
and Social Council of the United Nations declare that the ambit of the term 'most serious crimes' should
not go beyond intentional crimes, with lethal or other extremely grave consequences.
The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations on December 16, 1966, and signed and ratified by the Philippines
on December 19, 1966 and August 22, 1989,[43] respectively. The Optional Protocol provides that the
Human Rights Committee shall receive and consider communications from individuals claiming to be
victims of violations of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant.
On the other hand, the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by the General Assembly on December
15, 1989. The Philippines neither signed nor ratified said document.[44] Evidently, petitioner's assertion
of our obligation under the Second Optional Protocol is misplaced.
III. THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER IN R.A. NO. 8177 TO
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF
CORRECTIONS, BUT SECTION 19 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO
IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177 IS INVALID.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not
through express provision but by actual division in the framing of our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters placed within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its
own sphere.[45] Corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of
powers. "The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin
maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest."[46] The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.[47]
Empowering the Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and the Director of
the Bureau of Corrections, to promulgate rules and regulations on the subject of lethal injection is a form of
delegation of legislative authority to administrative bodies.
The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the increasing complexity of the
task of government requiring expertise as well as the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly
with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and
created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected to attend to by
itself. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. On many problems involving day-to-day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the needed competence to provide the required direct and
efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates,
who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them. [48]
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details
in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the
principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself - it must set forth therein the policy
to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate[49] - and (b) fix a standard - the limits of which
are sufficiently determinate or determinable - to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions.[50]
Considering the scope and the definiteness of R.A. No. 8177, which changed the mode of carrying
out the death penalty, the Court finds that the law sufficiently describes what job must be done, who is to
do it, and what is the scope of his authority.[51]
R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its limits,
map out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. it indicates the circumstances
under which the legislative purpose may be carried out. [52] R.A. No. 8177 specifically requires that "[t]he
death sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person under the
sentence during the lethal injection as well as during the proceedings prior to the
execution."[53] Further, "[t]he Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall take steps to ensure that the
lethal injection to be administered is sufficient to cause the instantaneous death of the
convict."[54] The legislature also mandated that "all personnel involved in the administration of lethal
injection shall be trained prior to the performance of such task."[55] The Court cannot see that any
useful purpose would be served by requiring greater detail. [56] The question raised is not the definition of
what constitutes a criminal offense,[57] but the mode of carrying out the penalty already imposed by the
Courts. In this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is sufficiently definite and the exercise of discretion by the
administrative officials concerned is, to use the words of Justice Benjamin Cardozo, canalized within banks
that keep it from overflowing.
Thus, the Court finds that the existence of an area for exercise of discretion by the Secretary of
Justice and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections under delegated legislative power is proper where
standards are formulated for the guidance and the exercise of limited discretion, which though general, are
capable of reasonable application.[58]
It is also noteworthy that Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code which originally provided for the death
penalty by electrocution was not subjected to attack on the ground that it failed to provide for details such
as the kind of chair to be used, the amount of voltage, volume of amperage or place of attachment of
electrodes on the death convict. Hence, petitioner's analogous argument with respect to lethal injection
must fail.
The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to information of public concern is a
recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy. [63] In the same way
that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of their time, [64] access to
information of general interest aids the people in democratic decision-making[65] by giving them a better
perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation.[66]
D. SECTION 17 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177 IS
INVALID FOR BEING DISCRIMINATORY AND CONTRARY TO LAW.

A careful reading of R.A. No. 8177 would show that there is no undue delegation of legislative power Even more seriously flawed than Section 19 is Section of the implementing rules which provides:
from the Secretary of Justice to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections for the simple reason that under
the Administrative Code of 1987, the Bureau of Corrections is a mere constituent unit of the Department of
"SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE. Execution by
Justice.[59] Further, the Department of Justice is tasked, among others, to take charge of the
lethal injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the date of
"administration of the correctional system."[60] Hence, the import of the phraseology of the law is that the
the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy (70) years of age. In this
Secretary of Justice should supervise the Director of the Bureau of Corrections in promulgating the Lethal
latter case, the death penalty shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
Injection Manual, in consultation with the Department of Health.[61]
accessory penalties provided in Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code."
However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 suffer serious flaws that
could not be overlooked. To begin with, something basic appears missing in Section 19 of the Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as well as for being
implementing rules which provides: an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17
amends the instances when lethal injection may be suspended, without an express amendment of Article
"SEC. 19. EXECUTION PROCEDURE. - Details of the procedure prior to, during and after 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.
administering the lethal injection shall be set forth in a manual to be prepared by the Director. The
Article 83 f the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659 now reads as
manual shall contain details of, among others, the sequence of events before and after execution;
follows:
procedures in setting up the intravenous line; the administration of the lethal drugs; the
pronouncement of death; and the removal of the intravenous system.
"ART. 83, Suspension of the execution of the death sentence.- The death sentence shall not be
inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, nor upon any
Said manual shall be confidential and its distribution shall be limited to authorized prison
person over seventy years of age. In this last case, the death sentence shall be commuted to the
personnel."
penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalty provided in Article 40. x x x".

Thus, the Courts finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the implementing rules a veritable
On this point, the Courts finds petitioner's contention impressed with merit. While Article 83 of the
vacuum. The Secretary of Justice has practically abdicated the power to promulgate the manual on the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, suspends the implementation
execution procedure to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, by not providing for a mode of review
of the death penalty while a woman is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of the
and approval thereof. Being a mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of
implementing rules omits the one (1) year period following delivery as an instance when the death
Corrections could not promulgate a manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the administrative
sentence is suspended, and adds a ground for suspension of sentence no longer found under Article 83 of
superior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule-making authority under R.A. No. 8177. Such apparent
the Revised Penal Code as amended, which is the three-year reprieve after a woman is
abdication of departmental responsibility renders the said paragraph invalid.
sentenced. This addition is, in petitioner's view, tantamount to a gender-based discrimination sans
As to the second paragraph of section 19, the Court finds the requirement of confidentiality of the statutory basis, while the omission is an impermissible contravention of the applicable law.
contents of the manual even with respect to the convict unduly suppressive. It sees no legal impediment
Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not override, but instead remain
for the convict, should he so desire, to obtain a copy of the manual. The contents of the manual are
consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement. Administrative rules and
matters of public concern "which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their
regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law." [67] An administrative
lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen."[62] Section 7 of
agency cannot amend an act of Congress.[68] In case of discrepancy between a provision of statute and a
Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
rule or regulation issued to implement said statute, the statutory provision prevails. Since the cited clause
in Section 17 which suspends the execution of a woman within the three (3) years next following the date
"SEC. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be of sentence finds no supports in Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, perforce Section 17
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, must be declared invalid.
transaction, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as a basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitation as may be provided by law."
 One member of the Court voted to declare Republic Act. No. 8177 as unconstitutional insofar as it
delegates the power to make rules over the same subject matter to two persons (the Secretary of Justice
and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections) and constitutes a violation of the international norm towards
the abolition of the death penalty. One member of the Court, consistent with his view in People v.
Echegaray, 267 SCRA 682, 734-758 (1997) that the death penalty law (Republic Act. No. 7659) is itself
unconstitutional, believes that Republic Act No. 8177 which provides for the means of carrying out the
death sentence, is likewise unconstitutional. Two other members of the court concurred in the aforesaid
Separate Opinions in that the death penalty law (Republic Act No. 7659) together with the assailed statute
(Republic Act No. 8177) are unconstitutional. In sum, four members of the Court voted to declare Republic
Act. No. 8177 as unconstitutional. These Separate Opinions are hereto annexed, infra.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks to declare the assailed statute
(Republic Act No. 8177) as unconstitutional; but GRANTED insofar as Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules
and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are concerned, which are hereby
declared INVALID because (a) Section 17 contravenes Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Section 25 of the Republic Act No. 7659; and (b) Section 19 fails to provide for review and approval of
the Lethal Injection Manual by the Secretary of Justice, and unjustifiably makes the manual confidential,
hence unavailable to interested parties including the accused/convict and counsel. Respondents are
hereby enjoined from enforcing and implementing Republic Act No. 8177 until the aforesaid Sections 17
and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are appropriately amended,
revised and/or corrected in accordance with this Decision.

NO COSTS.

SO ORDERED.
BAGUIO MARKET VENDORS G.R. No. 165922
MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE subject to legal fees based on the value of the mortgagees claim. Invoking Article 62 (6) of RA 6938,
(BAMARVEMPCO), represented by Present:
RECTO INSO, Operations Manager, petitioner sought exemption from payment of the fees.
Petitioner, CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
- versus - ABAD, and The Ruling of the Trial Court
PEREZ, JJ.

HON. ILUMINADA CABATO-CORTES,

Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Promulgated: In an Order dated 30 August 2004, Judge Iluminada Cabato-Cortes (respondent), Executive
Baguio City,
Respondent. ____________________ Judge of the trial court, denied the request for exemption, citing Section 22 of Rule 141 of the Rules of

DECISION Court, as amended, exempting from the Rules coverage only the Republic of the Philippines, its agencies

and instrumentalities and certain suits of local government units.[7]

CARPIO, J.:
Petitioner sought reconsideration but respondent denied its motion in the Order dated 6 October

2004. This time, respondent reasoned that petitioners reliance on Article 62(6) of RA 6938 is misplaced
The Case
because the fees collected under Rule 141 are not fees payable to the Philippine Government as they do
For review[1] are the Orders[2] of the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City finding
not accrue to the National Treasury but to a special fund[8] under the Courts control.[9]
petitioner Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative liable for payment of foreclosure fees.
Hence, this petition.
The Facts
Petitioner maintains that the case calls for nothing more than a simple application of Article 62(6)

of RA 6938.
Petitioner Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (petitioner) is a credit cooperative organized

under Republic Act No. 6938 (RA 6938), or the Cooperative Code of the Philippines. [3] Article 62(6) of RA The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Manifestation (in lieu of Comment), joins causes with
6938 exempts cooperatives: petitioner. The OSG submits that as the substantive rule, Article 62(6) of RA 6938 prevails over Section 22

of Rule 141, a judicial rule of procedure. The OSG also takes issue with respondents finding that the legal
from the payment of all court and sheriff's fees payable to the Philippine Government
for and in connection with all actions brought under this Code, or where such action is fees collected under Rule 141 are not fees payable to the Philippine Government as the judiciary forms
brought by the Cooperative Development Authority before the court, to enforce the
payment of obligations contracted in favor of the cooperative.[4] part of the Philippine government, as defined under the Revised Administrative Code.[10]
In 2004, petitioner, as mortgagee, filed with the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of

Baguio City (trial court) a petition to extrajudicially foreclose a mortgage under Act 3135, as Although not a party to this suit, we required the Courts Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) to comment
[5] [6]
amended. Under Section 7(c) of Rule 141, as amended, petitions for extrajudicial foreclosure are on the petition, involving as it does, issues relating to the Courts power to promulgate judicial rules. In its

compliance, the OCAT recommends the denial of the petition, opining that Section 22, Rule 141, as

amended, prevails over Article 62(6) of RA 6938 because (1) the power to impose judicial fees is eminently
judicial and (2) the 1987 Constitution insulated the Courts rule-making powers from Congress interference
by omitting in the 1987 Constitution the provision in the 1973 Constitution allowing Congress to alter
judicial rules. The OCAT called attention to the Courts previous denial of a request by a cooperative group
for the issuance of guidelines to implement cooperatives fees exemption under Article 62(6) of RA
6938.[11] Lastly, the OCAT recommends the amendment of Section 22, Rule 141 to make explicit the non-
exemption of cooperatives from the payment of legal fees.
The Issue
The question is whether petitioners application for extrajudicial foreclosure is exempt from legal fees under
Article 62(6) of RA 6938.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that Article 62(6) of RA 6938 does not apply to petitioners foreclosure proceeding.
Petitions for Extrajudicial Foreclosure
Outside of the Ambit of Article 62(6) of RA 6938
The scope of the legal fees exemption Article 62(6) of RA 6938 grants to cooperatives is limited to two
types of actions, namely: (1) actions brought under RA 6938; and (2) actions brought by the Cooperative
Development Authority to enforce the payment of obligations contracted in favor of cooperatives. By simple
deduction, it is immediately apparent that Article 62(6) of RA 6938 is no authority for petitioner to claim
exemption from the payment of legal fees in this proceeding because first, the fees imposable on petitioner
do not pertain to an action brought under RA 6938 but to a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage
under Act 3135. Second, petitioner is not the Cooperative Development Authority which can claim
exemption only in actions to enforce payments of obligations on behalf of cooperatives.
The Power of the Legislature
vis a vis the Power of the Supreme Court
to Enact Judicial Rules
Our holding above suffices to dispose of this petition. However, the Court En Banc has recently
ruled in Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System from
Payment of Legal Fees[12] on the issue of legislative exemptions from court fees. We take the opportunity
to reiterate our En Banc ruling in GSIS.
Until the 1987 Constitution took effect, our two previous constitutions textualized a power sharing scheme
between the legislature and this Court in the enactment of judicial rules. Thus, both the 1935 [13] and the
1973[14] Constitutions vested on the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. However, these
constitutions also granted to the legislature the concurrent power to repeal, alter or supplement such
rules.[15]
The 1987 Constitution textually altered the power-sharing scheme under the previous charters
by deleting in Section 5(5) of Article VIII Congress subsidiary and corrective power.[16] This glaring and
fundamental omission led the Court to observe in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice[17] that this Courts
power to promulgate judicial rules is no longer shared by this Court with Congress:
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent
judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court [under]
Section 5(5), Article VIII[18] x x x .
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first
time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the
power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But
most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal,
alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the
power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared
by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. x x x x (Italicization in the
original; boldfacing supplied)
 Any lingering doubt on the import of the textual evolution of Section 5(5) should be put to rest

with our recent En Banc ruling denying a request by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for

exemption from payment of legal fees based on Section 39 of its Charter, Republic Act No. 8291,

exempting GSIS from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or dues of all

kinds.[19] Reaffirming Echegarays construction of Section 5(5), the Court described its exclusive power to

promulgate rules on pleading, practice and procedure as one of the safeguards of this Courts institutional

independence:

[T]he payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by

this Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled,
changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Courts institutional
independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is
now the Courts exclusive domain.[20] x x x (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Orders dated 30 August 2004 and 6 October

2004 of the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 12-2-03-0 March 13, 2012
RE: IN THE MATTER OF CLARIFICATION OF EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF ALL COURT AND
SHERIFF'S FEES OF COOPERATIVES DULY REGISTERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 9520 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE PHILIPPINE COOPERATIVE CODE OF 2008,
PERPETUAL HELP COMMUNITY COOPERATIVE (PHCCI), Petitioner,
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
In a Petition1 dated 24 October 2011, Perpetual Help Community Cooperative (PHCCI), through counsel,
requests for the issuance of a court order to clarify and implement the exemption of cooperatives from the
payment of court and sheriff’s fees pursuant to Republic Act No. 6938, as amended by Republic Act No.
9520, otherwise known as the Philippine Cooperative Act of 2008.
PHCCI contends that as a cooperative it enjoys the exemption provided for under Section 6, Article 61 of
Republic Act No. 9520, which states:
(6) Cooperatives shall be exempt from the payment of all court and sheriff’s fees payable to the Philippine
Government for and in connection with all actions brought under this Code, or where such actions is
brought by the Authority before the court, to enforce the payment of obligations contracted in favor of the
cooperative.
It claims that this was a reiteration of Section 62, paragraph 6 of Republic Act No. 6938, An Act to Ordain a
Cooperative Code of the Philippines,2 and was made basis for the Court’s Resolution in A.M. No. 03-4-01-
0, as well as of Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) Circular No. 44-2007.3
It avers that despite the exemptions granted by the aforesaid laws and issuances, PHCCI had been
continuously assessed and required to pay legal and other fees whenever it files cases in court.
PHCCI reports that it filed with the Office of the Executive Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, a Motion to implement the exemption of cooperatives from the
payment of court and sheriff’s fees in cases filed before the courts in his jurisdiction, but the Executive
Judge ruled that the matter is of national concern and should be brought to the attention of the Supreme
Court for it to come up with a straight policy and uniform system of collection. In the meantime, the MTCC
has continued the assessment of filing fees against cooperatives.
Records reveal that on 21 September 2011, Executive Judge Antonio Estoconing (Executive Judge
Estoconing), MTCC, Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, issued an Order treating the motion filed by PHCCI
as a mere consulta considering that no main action was filed in his court. Executive Judge Estoconing
submits that he had second thoughts in considering the exemption in view of the guidelines laid down in
the Rules. He reported that many cases filed by PHCCI are small claims cases and under Section 8 of the
Rule on Small Claims, the plaintiff is required to pay docket fees and other related costs unless he is
allowed to litigate the case as an indigent.
Hence, this Petition.
Before this Court is the issue on whether cooperatives are exempt from the payment of court and sheriff’s
fees. The fees referred to are those provided for under Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the Rules of Court.
The term "all court fees" under Section 6, Article 61 of Republic Act No. 9520 refers to the totality of "legal
fees" imposed under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court as an incident of instituting an action in court. 4 These
fees include filing or docket fees, appeal fees, fees for issuance of provisional remedies, mediation fees,
sheriff’s fees, stenographer’s fees and commissioner’s fees.5
With regard to the term "sheriff’s fees," this Court, in an extended minute Resolution dated 1 September
2009, held that the exemptions granted to cooperatives under Section 2, paragraph 6 of Republic Act No.
6938; Section 6, Article 61 of Republic Act No. 9520; and OCA Circular No. 44-2007 clearly do not cover
the amount required "to defray the actual travel expenses of the sheriff, process server or other court-
authorized person in the service of summons, subpoena and other court processes issued relative to the
trial of the case,"6 which are neither considered as court and sheriff’s fees nor are amounts payable to the
Philippine Government.7
In fine, the 1 September 2009 Resolution exempted the cooperatives from court fees but not from sheriff’s
fees/expenses.
On 11 February 2010, however, the Supreme Court En Banc issued a Resolution in A.M. No. 08-2-01-
0,8 which denied the petition of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for recognition of its
exemption from payment of legal fees imposed under Section 22 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. In the
GSIS case, the Court citing Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 9 stressed that the 1987 Constitution molded
an even stronger and more independent judiciary; took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure; and held that the power to promulgate
these Rules is no longer shared by the Court with Congress, more so, with the Executive,10 thus:
Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning
pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one
of the safeguards of this Court’s institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure is now the Court’s exclusive domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court
with Congress, much less with the Executive.11
xxxx
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an
impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the
sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue
orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by this Court. Viewed
from this perspective, the claim of a legislative grant of exemption from the payment of legal fees under
Section 39 of R.A. 8291 necessarily fails.
Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the payment of legal fees without
transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of the Court’s independence - fiscal
autonomy.12Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the Court to levy, assess and collect
fees,13 including legal fees. Moreover, legal fees under Rule 141 have two basic components, the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF) and the Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF). 14 The laws which
established the JDF and SAJF15 expressly declare the identical purpose of these funds to guarantee the
independence of the Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution and public policy.16 Legal fees therefore do
not only constitute a vital source of the Court’s financial resources but also comprise an essential element
of the Court’s fiscal independence. Any exemption from the payment of legal fees granted by Congress to
government-owned or controlled corporations and local government units will necessarily reduce the JDF
and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it impairs the Court’s guaranteed
fiscal autonomy and erodes its independence.17
In a decision dated 26 February 2010 in Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative
(BAMARVEMPCO) v. Cabato-Cortes,18 this Court reiterated its ruling in the GSIS case when it denied the
petition of the cooperative to be exempted from the payment of legal fees under Section 7(c) of Rule 141
of the Rules of Court relative to fees in petitions for extra-judicial foreclosure.
On 10 March 2010, relying again on the GSIS ruling, the Court En Banc issued a resolution clarifying that
the National Power Corporation is not exempt from the payment of legal fees. 19
With the foregoing categorical pronouncements of the Supreme Court, it is evident that the exemption of
cooperatives from payment of court and sheriff’s fees no longer stands. Cooperatives can no longer invoke
Republic Act No. 6938, as amended by Republic Act No. 9520, as basis for exemption from the payment
of legal fees.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the petition of PHCCI requesting for this Court to
issue an order clarifying and implementing the exemption of cooperatives from the payment of court and
sheriff’s fees is hereby DENIED.1âwphi1
The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to issue a circular clarifying that cooperatives are not
exempt from the payment of the legal fees provided for under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
Bar Matter No. 1153
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated March 9, 2010
"B.M. No. 1153 (Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza Proposing Reforms in the Bar Examinations
Through Amendments to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court). - The Court Resolved to APPROVE the
proposed amendments to Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138, to wit:
SEC. 5.Additional Requirement for Other Applicants. — All applicants for admission other than those
referred to in the two preceding sections shall, before being admitted to the examination, satisfactorily
show that they have successfully completed all the prescribed courses for the degree of Bachelor of Laws
or its equivalent degree, in a law school or university officially recognized by the Philippine Government or
by the proper authority in the foreign jurisdiction where the degree has been granted.
No applicant who obtained the Bachelor of Laws degree in this jurisdiction shall be admitted to the bar
examination unless he or she has satisfactorily completed the following course in a law school or university
duly recognized by the government: civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and
private international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal
ethics.
A Filipino citizen who graduated from a foreign law school shall be admitted to the bar examination only
upon submission to the Supreme Court of certifications showing: (a) completion of all courses leading to
the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree; (b) recognition or accreditation of the law school
by the proper authority; and (c) completion of all the fourth year subjects in the Bachelor of Laws academic
program in a law school duly recognized by the Philippine Government.
SEC. 6.Pre-Law. — An applicant for admission to the bar examination shall present a certificate issued by
the proper government agency that, before commencing the study of law, he or she had pursued and
satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission
thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a
bachelor's degree in arts or sciences.
A Filipino citizen who completed and obtained his or her Bachelor of Laws degree or its equivalent in a
foreign law school must present proof of having completed a separate bachelor's degree course.
The Clerk of Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, is hereby directed to CIRCULARIZE this
resolution among all law schools in the country."
 Republic of the Philippines (b) At least (4) hours shall be devoted to trial and pretrial skills.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
(c) At least five (5) hours shall be devoted to alternative dispute resolution.

B.M. No. 850 August 22, 2000

(d) At least nine (9) hours shall be devoted to updates on substantive and procedural laws, and
jurisprudence.
MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION (MCLE)
ADOPTING THE RULES ON MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION FOR MEMBERS OF
(e) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to legal writing and oral advocacy.
THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

(f) At least two (2) hours shall be devoted to international law and international conventions.
EN BANC

(g) The remaining six (6) hours shall be devoted to such subjects as may be prescribed by the
RESOLUTION
MCLE Committee.

Considering the Rules on Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) for members of the Integrated
RULE 3
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), recommended by the IBP, endorsed by the Philippine Judicial Academy, and
COMPLIANCE PERIOD
reviewed and passed upon by the Supreme Court Committee on Legal Education, the Court hereby
resolves to adopt, as it hereby adopts, the following rules for proper implementation:
Section 1. Initial compliance period
RULE 1
PURPOSE The initial compliance period shall begin not later than three (3) months from the constitution of the MCLE
Committee. Except for the initial compliance period for members admitted or readmitted after the
establishment of the program, all compliance periods shall be for thirty-six (36) months and shall begin the
Section 1. Purpose of the MCLE
day after the end of the previous compliance period.

Continuing legal education is required of members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to ensure
Section 2. Compliance Group 1.
that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the
profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law.
Members in the National Capital Region (NCR) or Metro Manila shall be permanently assigned to
Compliance Group 1.
RULE 2
MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
Section 3. Compliance Group 2.
Section 1. Constitution of the MCLE Committee
Members in Luzon outside NCR shall be permanently assigned to Compliance Group 2.
Within two (2) months from the approval of these Rules by the Supreme Court En Banc, the MCLE
Committee shall be constituted in accordance with these Rules. Section 4. Compliance Group 3.

Section 2. Requirements of completion of MCLE Members in Visayas and Mindanao shall be permanently assigned to Compliance Group 3.

Members of the IBP not exempt under Rule 7 shall complete, every three (3) years, at least thirty-six (36)
hours of continuing legal education activities approved by the MCLE Committee. Of the 36 hours:
(a) At least six (6) hours shall be devoted to legal ethics.
Section 5. Compliance period for members admitted or readmitted after establishment of the program.
Members admitted or readmitted to the Bar after the establishment of the program shall be permanently
assigned to the appropriate Compliance Group based on their Chapter membership on the date of
admission or readmission.
The initial compliance period after admission or readmission shall begin on the first day of the month of 2. AUTHORSHIP, EDITING AND REVIEW
admission or readmission and shall end on the same day as that of all other members in the same
Compliance Group.
2.1 RESEARCH/ 5-10 CREDIT UNITS DULY CERTIFIED/PUBLISHED INNOVATIVE
TECHNICAL REPORT/PAPER PROGRAM/CREATIVE PROJECT
(a) Where four (4) months or less remain of the initial compliance period after admission or
readmission, the member is not required to comply with the program requirement for the initial
2.2 BOOK 50-100 PP 101+ PUBLISHED BOOK SINGLE AUTHOR 12-16 CU 17-20
compliance.
CU
2 AUTHORS 10-12 CU 13-16 CU
(b) Where more than four (4) months remain of the initial compliance period after admission or 3 OR MORE 5-6 CU 7-11 CU
readmission, the member shall be required to complete a number of hours of approved
continuing legal education activities equal to the number of months remaining in the compliance
2.3 BOOK EDITOR 1/2 OF THE CU OF PUBLISHED BOOK WITH PROOF
period in which the member is admitted or readmitted. Such member shall be required to
AUTHORSHIP AS EDITOR CATEGORY
complete a number of hours of education in legal ethics in proportion to the number of months
remaining in the compliance period. Fractions of hours shall be rounded up to the next whole
number. 2.4 LEGAL ARTICLE 5-10 PP 11+ PUBLISHED ARTICLE SINGLE AUTHOR 6 CU 8
CU
2 AUTHORS 4 CU 6 CU
RULE 4
3 OR MORE 2 CU 4 CU
COMPUTATION OF CREDIT UNITS

2.5 LEGAL 3-6 CU PER ISSUE PUBLISHED NEWSLETTER/JOURNAL

Section 1. Guidelines
NEWSLETTER/LAW JOURNAL EDITOR

The following are the guidelines for computation of credit units (CU):
3. PROFESSIONAL 6 CU PER CHAIR CERTIFICATION OF LAW DEAN CHAIR/BAR 1 CU
PER LECTURE OR BAR REVIEW DIRECTOR REVIEW/ HOUR LECTURE/LAW TEACHING
PROGRAMS CREDIT UNITS SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
Section 2. Limitation on certain credit units
1. SEMINARS, CONVENTIONS, CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIA, IN-HOUSE EDUCATION
PROGRAMS, WORKSHOPS, DIALOGUES, ROUND TABLE DISCUSSIONS BY APPROVED
In numbers 2 and 3 of the guidelines in the preceding Section, the total maximum credit units shall not
PROVIDERS UNDER RULE 7 AND OTHER RELATED RULES
exceed twenty (20) hours per three (3) years.

1.1 PARTICIPANT 1 CU PER HOUR CERTIFICATE OF ATTENDANCE WITH

RULE 5
NUMBER OF HOURS
CATEGORIES OF CREDIT

1.2 LECTURER 5 CU PER HOUR PHOTOCOPY OF PLAQUE OR SPONSOR'S

Section 1. Classes of credits
CERTIFICATION

The credits are either participatory or non-participatory.

1.3 RESOURCE 3 CU PER HOUR PHOTOCOPY OF PLAQUE OR SPONSOR'S
SPEAKER CERTIFICATION
Section 2. Claim for participatory credit
1.4 ASSIGNED 2 CU PER HOUR CERTIFICATION FROM SPONSORING
PENALIST/ ORGANIZATION REACTOR/COMMENTATOR Participatory credit may be claimed for:

1.5 MODERATOR/ 2 CU PER HOUR CERTIFICATION FROM SPONSORING (a) Attending approved education activities like seminars, conferences, symposia, in-house
COORDINATOR/ ORGANIZATION FACILITATOR education programs, workshops, dialogues or round table discussions.
 (b) Speaking or lecturing, or acting as assigned panelist, reactor, commentator, resource
speaker, moderator, coordinator or facilitator in approved education activities.
(c) Teaching in a law school or lecturing in a bar review class.
Section 3. Claim for non-participatory credit
Non-participatory credit may be claimed per compliance period for:
(e) The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitor General;
(f) The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant Government Corporate Counsel;
(g) The Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions;
(h) The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy Ombudsmen and the Special
Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman;

(a) Preparing, as an author or co-author, written materials published or accepted for publication, (i) Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions;
e.g., in the form of an article, chapter, book, or book review which contribute to the legal
education of the author member, which were not prepared in the ordinary course of the
(j) Incumbent deans, bar reviews and professors of law who have teaching experience for at
member's practice or employment.
least 10 years accredited law schools;

(b) Editing a law book, law journal or legal newsletter.

(k) The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of Professors and Professorial
Lectures of the Philippine Judicial Academy; and
RULE 6
COMPUTATION OF CREDIT HOURS
(l) Governors and Mayors.

Section 1. Computation of credit hours

Section 2. Other parties exempted from the MCLE

Credit hours are computed based on actual time spent in an activity (actual instruction or speaking time), in
The following Members of the Bar are likewise exempt:
hours to the nearest one-quarter hour.

(a) Those who are not in law practice, private or public.

RULE 7
EXEMPTIONS
(b) Those who have retired from law practice with the approval of the IBP Board of Governors.
Section 1. Parties exempted from the MCLE
Section 3. Good cause for exemption from or modification of requirement
The following members of the Bar are exempt from the MCLE requirement:
A member may file a verified request setting forth good cause for exemption (such as physical disability,
illness, post graduate study abroad, proven expertise in law, etc.) from compliance with or modification of
(a) The President and the Vice President of the Philippines, and the Secretaries and
any of the requirements, including an extension of time for compliance, in accordance with a procedure to
Undersecretaries of Executives Departments;
be established by the MCLE Committee.

(b) Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;

Section 4. Change of status

(c) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, incumbent and retired
The compliance period shall begin on the first day of the month in which a member ceases to be exempt
members of the judiciary, incumbent members of the Judicial and Bar Council and incumbent
under Sections 1, 2, or 3 of this Rule and shall end on the same day as that of all other members in the
court lawyers covered by the Philippine Judicial Academy program of continuing judicial
same Compliance Group.
education;

Section 5. Proof of exemption

(d) The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant Secretaries of the
Department of Justice;
Applications for exemption from or modification of the MCLE requirement shall be under oath and
supported by documents.
RULE 8
STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF EDUCATION ACTIVITIES
Section 1. Approval of MCLE program
Subject to the rules as may be adopted by the MCLE Committee, continuing legal education program may
be granted approval in either of two (2) ways: (1) the provider of the activity is an approved provider and
certifies that the activity meets the criteria of Section 3 of this Rules; and (2) the provider is specially
mandated by law to provide continuing legal education.
Section 2. Standards for all education activities
All continuing legal education activities must meet the following standards:
(a) The activity shall have significant current intellectual or practical content.
(b) The activity shall constitute an organized program of learning related to legal subjects and
the legal profession, including cross profession activities (e.g., accounting-tax or medical-legal)
that enhance legal skills or the ability to practice law, as well as subjects in legal writing and oral
advocacy.
(c) The activity shall be conducted by a provider with adequate professional experience.
(d) Where the activity is more than one (1) hour in length, substantive written materials must be
distributed to all participants. Such materials must be distributed at or before the time the activity
is offered.
(e) In-house education activities must be scheduled at a time and location so as to be free from
interruption like telephone calls and other distractions.
RULE 9
APPROVAL OF PROVIDERS
Section 1. Approval of providers
Approval of providers shall be done by the MCLE Committee.
Section 2. Requirements for approval of providers
Any persons or group may be approved as a provider for a term of two (2) years, which may be renewed,
upon written application. All providers of continuing legal education activities, including in-house providers,
are eligible to be approved providers. Application for approval shall:
(a) Be submitted on a form provided by the IBP;
(b) Contain all information requested on the form;
(c) Be accompanied by the approval fee;
Section 3. Requirements of all providers
All approved providers shall agree to the following:
(a) An official record verifying the attendance at the activity shall be maintained by the provider
for at least four (4) years after the completion date. The provider shall include the member on
the official record of attendance only if the member's signature was obtained at the time of
attendance at the activity. The official record of attendance shall contain the member's name
and number in the Roll of Attorneys and shall identify the time, date, location, subject matter,
and length of the education activity. A copy of such record shall be furnished the IBP.
(b) The provider shall certify that:
(1) This activity has been approved for MCLE by the IBP in the amount of ________
hours of which hours will apply in (legal ethics, etc.), as appropriate to the content of
the activity;
(2) The activity conforms to the standards for approved education activities prescribed
by these Rules and such regulations as may be prescribed by the IBP pertaining to
MCLE.
(c) The provider shall issue a record or certificate to all participants identifying the time, date,
location, subject matter and length of the activity.
(d) The provider shall allow in-person observation of all approved continuing legal education
activities by members of the IBP Board of Governors, the MCLE Committee, or designees of the
Committee and IBP staff for purposes of monitoring compliance with these Rules.
(e) The provider shall indicate in promotional materials, the nature of the activity, the time
devoted to each devoted to each topic and identify of the instructors. The provider shall make
available to each participant a copy of IBP-approved Education Activity Evaluation Form.
(f) The provider shall maintain the completed Education Activity Evaluation Forms for a period of
not less than one (1) year after the activity, copy furnished the IBP.
 (g) Any person or group who conducts an unauthorized activity under this program or issues a The following shall constitute non-compliance
spurious certificate in violation of these Rules shall be subject to appropriate sanctions.
(a) Failure to complete the education requirement within the compliance period;
Section 4. Renewal of provider approval
(b) Failure to provide attestation of compliance or exemption;
The approval of a provider may be renewed every two (2) years. It may be denied if the provider fails to
comply with any of the requirements of these Rules or fails to provide satisfactory education activities for
(c) Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance (including evidence of exempt status)
the preceding period.
within the prescribed period;

Section 5. Revocation of provider approval

(d) Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish evidence of such compliance within
sixty (60) days from receipt of a non-compliance notice;
The approval of any provider referred to in Rule 9 may be revoked by a majority vote of the IBP Board of
Governors, upon recommendation of the MCLE Committee, after notice and hearing and for good cause.
(e) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to circumvent or
evade compliance with the MCLE requirements.
RULE 10
ACTIVITY AND PROVIDER APPROVAL FEE
Section 2. Non-compliance notice and 60-day period to attain compliance

Section 1. Payment of fees

A member failing to comply will receive a Non-Compliance Notice stating the specific deficiency and will be
given sixty (60) days from the date of notification to explain the deficiency or otherwise show compliance
Application for approval of an education activity or as a provider requires payment of an appropriate fee. with the requirements. Such notice shall contain, among other things, the following language in capital
letters:
RULE 11
GENERAL COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES YOUR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-COMPLIANCE OR
PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE REQUIREMENT BY (INSERT DATE 60 DAYS
FROM THE DATE OF NOTICE), SHALL BE A CAUSE FOR LISTING AS A DELINQUENT
Section 1. Compliance card
MEMBER.

Each member shall secure from the MCLE Committee a Compliance Card before the end of his
The Member may use this period to attain the adequate number of credit hours for compliance. Credit
compliance period. He shall complete the card by attesting under oath that he has complied with the
hours earned during this period may only be counted toward compliance with the prior compliance period
education requirement or that he is exempt, specifying the nature of the exemption. Such Compliance
requirement unless hours in excess of the requirement are earned, in which case, the excess hours may
Card must be returned to the address indicated therein not later than the day after the end of the member's
be counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement.lawphil.net
compliance period.

RULE 13
Section 2. Member record keeping requirement
CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE

Each member shall maintain sufficient record of compliance or exemption, copy furnished the MCLE
Section 1. Non-compliance fee
Committee. The record required to be provided to the members by the provider pursuant to Section 3(c) of
Rule 9 should be sufficient record of attendance at a participatory activity. A record of non-participatory
activity shall also be maintained by the member, as referred to in Section 3 of Rule 5. A member who, for whatever reason, is in non-compliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay a
non-compliance fee.
RULE 12
NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES Section 2. Listing as delinquent member

Section 1. What constitutes non-compliance

Any member who fails to satisfactorily comply with Section 2 of Rule 12 shall be listed as a delinquent The IBP shall employ such staff as may be necessary to perform the record-keeping, auditing, reporting,
member by the IBP Board of Governors upon the recommendation of the MCLE Committee, in which case, approval and other necessary functions.
Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court shall apply.
Section 4. Submission of annual budget
RULE 14
REINSTATEMENT
The IBP shall submit to the Supreme Court an annual budget for a subsidy to establish, operate and
maintain the MCLE Program.
Section 1. Process
This resolution shall take effect in October 2000, following its publication in two (2) newspaper of general
The involuntary listing as a delinquent member shall be terminated when the member provides proof of circulation in the Philippines.
compliance with the MCLE requirement, including payment of non-compliance fee. A member may attain
the necessary credit hours to meet the requirement for the period of non-compliance during the period the
Adopted this 22nd day of August, 2000.
member is on inactive status. These credit hours may not be counted toward meeting the current
compliance period requirement. Credit hours attained during the period of non-compliance in excess of the
number needed to satisfy the prior compliance period requirement may be counted toward meeting the Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima,
current compliance period requirement.lawphil.net Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,concur.

Section 2. Termination of delinquent listing administrative process

The termination of listing as a delinquent member is administrative in nature but it shall be made with
notice and hearing by the MCLE Committee.

RULE 15
MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION COMMITTEE

Section 1. Composition

The MCLE Committee shall be composed of five (5) members, namely: a retired Justice of the Supreme
Court, as Chair, and four (4) members, respectively, nominated by the IBP, the Philippine Judicial
Academy, a law center designated by the Supreme Court and associations of law schools and/or law
professors.

The members of the Committee shall be of proven probity and integrity. They shall be appointed by the
Supreme Court for a term of three (3) years and shall receive such compensation as may be determined
by the Court.

Section 2. Duty of the Committee

The MCLE Committee shall administer and adopt such implementing rules as may be necessary subject to
the approval by the Supreme Court. It shall, in consultation with the IBP Board of Governors, prescribe a
schedule of MCLE fees with the approval of the Supreme Court.

Section 3. Staff of the IBP

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the practice of
law.
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada
in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian
citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a
Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a
Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the
Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner
Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship
in May 2004. Thus, this petition.
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys
and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every applicant for
admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one
years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce
before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges
against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the
Philippines.
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the
disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of
law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. 2 It is so delicately affected with public interest
that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to
protect and promote the public welfare.3
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful
observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education
requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the
conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice
law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence
which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional privilege. 4
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the
bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who is in
good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory
requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant for
admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral
character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence
of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are
pending in any court in the Philippines.6
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of
educational, moral and other qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s oath9 and
signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to
practice.10
The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is a continuing
requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership dues
in the IBP;11 payment of the annual professional tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal
education requirement;13 faithful observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and being
continually subject to judicial disciplinary control.14
Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the Philippines?
No.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino
citizens save in cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the
bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in
the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to
practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners. 16

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country
but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens who become
citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of [RA 9225]."17Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is
deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.
Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic
right to resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his
Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or
permit to engage in such practice."18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship
pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do
so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is
specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update
him of legal developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance
with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after
which he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18727 August 31, 1964
JESUS MA. CUI, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO MA. CUI, defendant-appellant,
ROMULO CUI, Intervenor-appellant.
Jose W. Diokno for plaintiff-appellee.
Jaime R. Nuevas and Hector L. Hofileña for defendant-appellant.
Romulo Cui in his own behalf as intervenor-appellants.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is a proving in quo warranto originally filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The office in
contention is that of Administrator of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili. Judgment was rendered on 27
April 1961 in favor of the plaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui, and appealed to us by the defendant, Antonio Ma. Cui,
and by the intervenor, Romulo Cui.
The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna Cui,
now deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and
helpless persons." It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239 of the Philippine Legislature
passed 27 November 1925) and endowed with extensive properties by the said spouses through a series
of donations, principally the deed of donation executed on 2 January 1926.
Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of their
incapacity or death, to "such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them."
Section 2 of the deed of donation provides as follows:
Que en caso de nuestro fallecimiento o incapacidad para administrar, nos sustituyan nuestro
legitime sobrino Mariano Cui, si al tiempo de nuestra muerte o incapacidad se hallare residiendo
en la caudad de Cebu, y nuestro sobrino politico Dionisio Jakosalem. Si nuestro dicho sobrino
Mariano Cui no estuviese residiendo entonces en la caudad de Cebu, designamos en su lugar a
nuestro otro sobrino legitime Mauricio Cui. Ambos sobrinos administraran conjuntamente el
HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI. A la muerte o incapacidad de estos dos administradores,
la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara a una sola persona que sera
el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda legitimainente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos
legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui y Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado, o
medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos, el que pague al Estado mayor
impuesto o contribution. En igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferida el varon de mas edad
descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la administracion. Cuando absolutamente faltare
persona de estas cualificaciones, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI
pasara al senor Obispo de Cebu o quien sea el mayor dignatario de la Iglesia Catolica,
apostolica, Romana, que tuviere asiento en la cabecera de esta Provincia de Cebu, y en su
defecto, al Gobierno Provincial de Cebu.
Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer the Hospicio until her death in 1929.
Thereupon the administration passed to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem. The first died on 8 May
1931 and the second on 1 July 1931. On 2 July 1931 Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui, became
the administrator. Thereafter, beginning in 1932, a series of controversies and court litigations ensued
concerning the position of administrator, to which, in so far as they are pertinent to the present case,
reference will be made later in this decision.
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of
the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna Cui. On 27 February 1960 the then
incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio"
entered into between them and embodied in a notarial document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma.
Cui took his oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of either the "convenio" or of his
brother's assumption of the position.
Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960; on 5 September 1960 the plaintiff wrote a letter to the defendant
demanding that the office be turned over to him; and on 13 September 1960, the demand not having been
complied with the plaintiff filed the complaint in this case. Romulo Cui later on intervened, claiming a right
to the same office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another one of the nephews mentioned by the
founders of the Hospicio in their deed of donation.
As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications to the position of
administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and therefore under equal circumstances would be preferred
pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be, applied the deed
gives preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of the nephews therein named, "que posea
titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos el que pague al
estado mayor impuesto o contribucion."
The specific point in dispute is the mealing of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree
of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but is not a member of the Bar, not
having passed the examinations to qualify him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of
the Bar and although disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 (administrative case No. 141), was
reinstated by resolution promulgated on 10 February 1960, about two weeks before he assumed the
position of administrator of the Hospicio de Barili.
The Court a quo, in deciding this point in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo de abogado,"
taken alone, means that of a full-fledged lawyer, but that has used in the deed of donation and considering
the function or purpose of the administrator, it should not be given a strict interpretation but a liberal one,"
and therefore means a law degree or diploma of Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is assailed as erroneous
both by the defendant and by the intervenor.
We are of the opinion, that whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado" means not mere
possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission
thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. In Spanish the word "titulo" is defined as "testimonies o
instrumento dado para ejercer un empleo, dignidad o profesion" (Diccionario de la Lengua Española, Real
Academia Espanola, 1947 ed., p. 1224) and the word "abogado," as follows: "Perito en el derecho positivo
que se dedica a defender en juicio, por escrito o de palabra, los derechos o intereses de los litigantes, y
tambien a dar dictmen sobre las cuestiones o puntos legales que se le consultan (Id., p.5) A Bachelor's
degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not
entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or
attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and general signification, and has reference to that class of persons
who are by license officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom
peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.
In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of the Supreme
Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the Bar examinations, taking the lawyer's
oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being his license to practice the
profession. The academic degree of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to do with admission to the Bar,
except as evidence of compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has
"successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved by the
Secretary of Education." For this purpose, however, possession of the degree itself is not indispensable:
completion of the prescribed courses may be shown in some other way. Indeed there are instances,
particularly under the former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons who had not gone through any
formal legal education in college were allowed to take the Bar examinations and to qualify as lawyers.
(Section 14 of that code required possession of "the necessary qualifications of learning ability.") Yet
certainly it would be incorrect to say that such persons do not possess the "titulo de abogado" because
they lack the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws from some law school or university.
The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoing test advisely, and
provided in the deed of donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator should be a doctor or a civil
engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these, should be the one who pays the highest taxes
among those otherwise qualified. A lawyer, first of all, because under Act No. 3239 the managers or
trustees of the Hospicio shall "make regulations for the government of said institution (Sec. 3, b); shall
"prescribe the conditions subject to which invalids and incapacitated and destitute persons may be
admitted to the institute" (Sec. 3, d); shall see to it that the rules and conditions promulgated for admission
are not in conflict with the provisions of the Act; and shall administer properties of considerable value — for
all of which work, it is to be presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the
profession would be a distinct asset.
Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to the office
of administrator. But it is argued that although the latter is a member of the Bar he is nevertheless
disqualified by virtue of paragraph 3 of the deed of donation, which provides that the administrator may be
removed on the ground, among others, of ineptitude in the discharge of his office or lack of evident sound
moral character. Reference is made to the fact that the defendant was disbarred by this Court on 29 March
1957 for immorality and unprofessional conduct. It is also a fact, however, that he was reinstated on 10
February 1960, before he assumed the office of administrator. His reinstatement is a recognition of his
moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required for his admission to the Bar in the first place.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by
this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not
covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in the sound discretion of
the court. The court action will depend, generally speaking, on whether or not it decides that the
public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will be conserved by the
applicant's participation therein in the capacity of an attorney and counselor at law. The
applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the court that he is a person of
good moral character — a fit and proper person to practice law. The court will take into
consideration the applicant's character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and
character of the charge for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment,
and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement. (5
Am. Jur., Sec. 301, p. 443)
Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to reinstatement, notwithstanding
the attorney has received a pardon following his conviction, and the requirements for
reinstatement have been held to be the same as for original admission to the bar, except that the
court may require a greater degree of proof than in an original admission. (7 C.J.S., Attorney &
Client, Sec. 41, p. 815.)
The decisive questions on an application for reinstatement are whether applicant is "of good
moral character" in the sense in which that phrase is used when applied to attorneys-at-law and
is a fit and proper person to be entrusted with the privileges of the office of an attorney, and
whether his mental qualifications are such as to enable him to discharge efficiently his duty to
the public, and the moral attributes are to be regarded as a separate and distinct from his mental
qualifications. (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 816).
As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking reinstatement to the office of
attorney cannot be less exacting than that implied in paragraph 3 of the deed of donation as a requisite for
the office which is disputed in this case. When the defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the
restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out.
This action must fail on one other ground: it is already barred by lapse of time amounting the prescription
or laches. Under Section 16 of Rule 66 (formerly sec. 16, Rule 68, taken from section 216 of Act 190), this
kind of action must be filed within one (1) year after the right of plaintiff to hold the office arose.
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui believed himself entitled to the office in question as long ago as 1932. On January
26 of that year he filed a complaint in quo warranto against Dr. Teodoro Cui, who assumed the
administration of the Hospicio on 2 July 1931. Mariano Cui, the plaintiff's father and Antonio Ma. Cui came
in as intervenors. The case was dismissed by the Court of First Instance upon a demurrer by the
defendant there to the complaint and complaint in intervention. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court from
the order of dismissal, the case was remanded for further proceedings (Cui v. Cui, 60 Phil. 37, 48). The
plaintiff, however, did not prosecute the case as indicated in the decision of this Court, but acceded to an
arrangement whereby Teodoro Cui continued as administrator, Mariano Cui was named "legal adviser"
and plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui accepted a position as assistant administrator.
Subsequently the plaintiff tried to get the position by a series of extra-judicial maneuvers. First he informed
the Social Welfare Commissioner, by letter dated 1 February 1950, that as of the previous 1 January he
had "made clear" his intention of occupying the office of administrator of the Hospicio." He followed that up
with another letter dated 4 February, announcing that he had taken over the administration as of 1 January
1950. Actually, however, he took his oath of office before a notary public only on 4 March 1950, after Now for the claim of intervenor and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also a lawyer, grandson of Vicente
receiving a reply of acknowledgment, dated 2 March, from the Social Welfare Commissioner, who thought Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of the Hospicio mentioned by them in the deed of donation. He is
that he had already assumed the position as stated in his communication of 4 February 1950. The rather further, in the line of succession, than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui, who is a son of Mariano Cui, another
muddled situation was referred by the Commissioner to the Secretary of Justice, who, in an opinion dated one of the said nephews. The deed of donation provides: "a la muerte o incapacidad de estos
3 April 1950 (op. No. 45, S. 1950), correcting another opinion previously given, in effect ruled that the administradores (those appointed in the deed itself) pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor
plaintiff, not beings lawyer, was not entitled to the administration of the Hospicio. de edad, que descienda legitimamente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio
Cui, Vicente Cui, Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado ... En igualdad de circumstancias, sera
preferido el varon de mas edad descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la administration." Besides being
Meanwhile, the question again became the subject of a court controversy. On 4 March 1950,
a nearer descendant than Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is older than he and therefore is preferred when
the Hospicio commenced an action against the Philippine National Bank in the Court of First Instance of
the circumstances are otherwise equal. The intervenor contends that the intention of the founders was to
Cebu (Civ. No. R-1216) because the Bank had frozen the Hospicio's deposits therein. The Bank then filed
confer the administration by line and successively to the descendants of the nephews named in the deed,
a third-party complaint against herein plaintiff-appellee, Jesus Ma. Cui, who had, as stated above, taken
in the order they are named. Thus, he argues, since the last administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who
oath as administrator. On 19 October 1950, having been deprived of recognition by the opinion of the
belonged to the Mauricio Cui line, the next administrator must come from the line of Vicente Cui, to whom
Secretary of Justice he moved to dismiss the third-party complaint on the ground that he was relinquishing
the intervenor belongs. This interpretation, however, is not justified by the terms of the deed of donation.
"temporarily" his claim to the administration of the Hospicio. The motion was denied in an order dated 2
October 1953. On 6 February 1954 he was able to take another oath of office as administrator before
President Magsaysay, and soon afterward filed a second motion to dismiss in Civil case No. R-1216. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is reversed and set
President Magsaysay, be it said, upon learning that a case was pending in Court, stated in a telegram to aside, and the complaint as well as the complaint in intervention are dismissed, with costs equally against
his Executive Secretary that "as far as (he) was concerned the court may disregard the oath" thus taken. plaintiff-appellee and intervenor-appellant.
The motion to dismiss was granted nevertheless and the other parties in the case filed their notice of
appeal from the order of dismissal. The plaintiff then filed an ex-parte motion to be excluded as party in the
appeal and the trial Court again granted the motion. This was on 24 November 1954. Appellants
thereupon instituted a mandamus proceeding in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-8540), which was decided
on 28 May 1956, to the effect that Jesus Ma. Cui should be included in the appeal. That appeal, however,
after it reached this Court was dismiss upon motion of the parties, who agreed that "the office of
administrator and trustee of the Hospicio ... should be ventilated in quo warranto proceedings to be
initiated against the incumbent by whomsoever is not occupying the office but believes he has a right to it"
(G.R. No. L-9103). The resolution of dismissal was issued 31 July 1956. At that time the incumbent
administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, but no action in quo warranto was filed against him by plaintiff Jesus
Ma. Cui as indicated in the aforesaid motion for dismissal.

On 10 February 1960, defendant Antonio Ma. Cui was reinstated by this Court as member of the Bar, and
on the following 27 February Dr. Teodoro Cui resigned as administrator in his favor, pursuant to the
"convenio" between them executed on the same date. The next day Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of
office.

The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his claim judicially after this Court decided the first case of Cui v.
Cui in 1934 (60 Phil. 3769), remanding it to the trial court for further proceedings; his acceptance instead of
the position of assistant administrator, allowing Dr. Teodoro Cui to continue as administrator and his failure
to file an action in quo warranto against said Dr. Cui after 31 July 1956, when the appeal in Civil Case No.
R-1216 of the Cebu Court was dismissed upon motion of the parties precisely so that the conflicting claims
of the parties could be ventilated in such an action — all these circumstances militate against the plaintiff's
present claim in view of the rule that an action in quo warranto must be filed within one year after the right
of the plaintiff to hold the office arose. The excuse that the plaintiff did not file an action against Dr.
Teodoro Cui after 31 July 1956 because of the latter's illness did not interrupt the running of the statutory
period. And the fact that this action was filed within one year of the defendant's assumption of office in
September 1960 does not make the plaintiff's position any better, for the basis of the action is his own right
to the office and it is from the time such right arose that the one-year limitation must be counted, not from
the date the incumbent began to discharge the duties of said office. Bautista v. Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624; Lim
vs. Yulo, 62 Phil. 161.
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 2349. July 3, 1992.]
DOROTHY B. TERRE, Complainant, v. ATTY. JORDAN TERRE, Respondent.
Public Attorney’s Office for complainant.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT; GROSSLY IMMORAL CONDUCT; PENALTY OF
DISBARMENT IMPOSED IN CASE AT BAR. — We believe and so hold that the conduct of respondent
Jordan Terre in inveigling complainant Dorothy Terre to contract a second marriage with him; in
abandoning complainant Dorothy Terre after she had cared for him and supported him through law school,
leaving her without means for the safe delivery of his own child; in contracting a second marriage with
Helina Malicdem while his first marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was subsisting, constituted
"grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, affording more than
sufficient basis for disbarment of respondent Jordan Terre. He was unworthy of admission to the Bar in the
first place. The Court will correct this error forthwith.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM, J.:
In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on 24 December 1981, complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged
respondent Jordan Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar with "grossly immoral conduct," consisting of
contracting a second marriage and living with another woman other than complainant, while his prior
marriage with complainant remained subsisting.
The Court resolved to require respondent to answer the complaint. 1 Respondent successfully evaded five
(5) attempts to serve a copy of the Court’s Resolution and of the complaint by moving from one place to
another, such that he could not be found nor reached in his alleged place of employment or residence. 2
On 24 April 1985, that is after three (3) years and a half, with still no answer from the respondent, the
Court noted respondent’s success in evading service of the complaint and the Court’s Resolution and
thereupon resolved to "suspend respondent Atty. Jordan Terre from the practice of law until after he
appears and/or files his answer to the complaint against him" in the instant case. 3
On 28 September 1985, respondent finally filed an Answer with a Motion to Set Aside and/or Lift
Suspension Order. In his Answer, Atty. Terre averred that he had contracted marriage with complainant
Dorothy Terre on 14 June 1977 upon her representation that she was single; that he subsequently learned
that Dorothy was married to a certain Merlito A. Bercenilla sometime in 1968; that when he confronted
Dorothy about her prior marriage, Dorothy drove him out of their conjugal residence; that Dorothy had
mockingly told him of her private meetings with Merlito A. Bercenilla and that the child she was then
carrying (i.e., Jason Terre) was the son of Bercenilla; that believing in good faith that his marriage to
complainant was null and void ab initio, he contracted marriage with Helina Malicdem at Dasol,
Pangasinan. 4
In her reply, complainant Dorothy denied that Jason Terre was the child of Merlito A. Bercenilla and
insisted that Jason was the child of respondent Jordan Terre, as evidenced by Jason’s Birth Certificate and
physical resemblance to Respondent. Dorothy further explained that while she had given birth to Jason
Terre at the PAFGH registered as a dependent of Merlito Bercenilla, she had done so out of extreme
necessity and to avoid risk of death or injury to the fetus which happened to be in a difficult breech
position. According to Dorothy, she had then already been abandoned by respondent Jordan Terre,
leaving her penniless and without means to pay for the medical and hospital bills arising by reason of her
pregnancy.chanrobles law library
The Court denied respondent’s Motion to Set Aside or Lift the Suspension Order and instead referred, by a
Resolution dated 6 January 1986, the complaint to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation. 5
Then Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero was appointed investigator by the Office of the Solicitor General. He set the
case for hearing on 7 July 1986 with notice to both parties. On 7 July 1986, complainant Dorothy appeared
and presented her evidence ex parte, since respondent did not so appear. 6 The Investigating Solicitor
scheduled and held another hearing on 19 August 1986, where he put clarificatory questions to the
complainant; respondent once again did not appear despite notice to do so. Complainant finally offered her
evidence and rested her case. The Solicitor set still another hearing for 2 October 1986, notifying
respondent to present his evidence with a warning that should he fail once more to appear, the case would
be deemed submitted for resolution. Respondent did not appear on 2 October 1986. The Investigating
Solicitor accordingly considered respondent to have waived his right to present evidence and declared the
case submitted for resolution. The parties were given time to submit their respective memoranda.
Complainant Dorothy did so on 8 December 1986. Respondent Terre did not file his memorandum.
On 26 February 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its "Report and Recommendation" to
this Court. The Report summarized the testimony of the complainant in the following
manner:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Complainant Dorothy Terre took the witness stand and testified substantially as follows: she and
respondent met for the first time in 1979 as fourth year high school classmates in Cadiz City High School
(tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 9); she was then married to Merlito Bercenilla, while respondent was single (id.);
respondent was aware of her marital status (ibid, p. 14); it was then that respondent started courting her
but nothing happened of the courtship (ibid, p. 10); they [complainant and respondent] moved to Manila
were they respectively pursued their education, respondent as a law student at the Lyceum University (tsn,
July 7, 1986, p. 12, 15-16); respondent continued courting her, this time with more persistence (ibid, p. 11);
she decided nothing would come of it since she was married but he [respondent] explained to her that their
marriage was void ab initio since she and her first husband were first cousins (ibid. p . 12); convinced by
his explanation and having secured favorable advice from her mother and ex-in-laws, she agreed to marry
him [respondent] (ibid, 12-13, 16); in their marriage license, despite her [complainant’s] objection, he
[respondent] wrote ‘single’ as her status explaining that since her marriage was void ab initio, there was no
need to go to court to declare it as such (ibid, 14-15); they were married before Judge Priscilla Mijares of
the City Court of Manila on June 14, 1977 (Exhibit A; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 16-17); Jason Terre was born
of their union on June 25, 1981 (Exhibit B, tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 18); all through their married state up to the
time he [respondent] disappeared in 1981, complainant supported respondent, in addition to the allowance
the latter was getting from his parents (ibid, pp. 19-20); she was unaware of the reason for his
disappearance until she found out later that respondent married a certain Vilma [sic] Malicdem (Exhibit C,
tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 21-22); she then filed a case for abandonment of minor with the City Fiscal of Pasay
City (ibid, p. 23) which was subsequently filed before Branch II of the City Court of Pasay City as Criminal
Case No. 816159 (Exhibit D; tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 24); she likewise filed a case for bigamy against
respondent and Helina Malicdem with the office of the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, where a prima facie
case was found to exist (Exhibit E; tsn, July 7, pp. 25-26); additionally, complainant filed an administrative
case against respondent with the Commission on Audit where he was employed, which case however was
considered closed for being moot and academic when respondent was considered automatically
separated from the service for having gone on absence without official leave (Exhibit F; tsn, July 7, 1986,
pp. 28-29)." 7
There is no dispute over the fact that complainant Dorothy Terre and respondent Jordan Terre contracted
marriage on 14 July 1977 before Judge Priscila Mijares. There is further no dispute over the fact that on 3
May 1981, respondent Jordan Terre married Helina Malicdem in Dasol, Pangasinan. When the second
marriage was entered into, respondent’s prior marriage with complainant was subsisting, no judicial action
having been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage of
respondent with complainant.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
Respondent Jordan Terre sought to defend himself by claiming that he had believed in good faith that his
prior marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was null and void ab initio and that no action for a judicial
declaration of nullity was necessary.
The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the first
place, respondent has not rebutted complainant’s evidence as to the basic facts which underscores the
bad faith of respondent Terre. In the second place, that pretended defense is the same argument by which
he had inveigled complainant into believing that her prior marriage to Merlito A. Bercenilla being
incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first cousins to each other), she was free
to contract a second marriage with the Respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or
should have known that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of this court which holds
that for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial
declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. 8 Even if we were to assume,
arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if
we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be
deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage to Helina Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous
and criminal in character.
"It is evident that respondent fails to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal
profession. Whether the marriage was a joke as respondent claims, or a trick played on her as claimed by
complainant, it does not speak well of respondent’s moral values. Respondent had made a mockery of
marriage, a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects (Article 216, Civil Code)." 11
In Bolivar v. Simbol, 12 the Court found the respondent there guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" because
he made "a dupe of complainant, living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his schooling and
other personal necessities while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as
soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to demand money from
complainant. . . ." The Court held such acts "indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the Bar."
13
We believe and so hold that the conduct of respondent Jordan Terre in inveigling complainant Dorothy
Terre to contract a second marriage with him; in abandoning complainant Dorothy Terre after she had
cared for him and supported him through law school, leaving her without means for the safe delivery of his
own child; in contracting a second marriage with Helina Malicdem while his first marriage with complainant
Dorothy Terre was subsisting, constituted "grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, affording more than sufficient basis for disbarment of respondent Jordan Terre. He was
unworthy of admission to the Bar in the first place. The Court will correct this error
forthwith.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent Jordan Terre and to STRIKE OUT his name
from the Roll of Attorneys. A copy of this decision shall be spread on the personal record of respondent
Jordan Terre in the Bar Confidant’s Office. A copy of this resolution shall also be furnished to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and shall be circularized to all the courts of the land.

That the moral character of respondent Jordan Terre was deeply flawed is shown by other circumstances.
As noted, he convinced the complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio,
that she was still legally single and free to marry him. When complainant and respondent had contracted
their marriage, respondent went through law school while being supported by complainant, with some
assistance from respondent’s parents. After respondent had finished his law course and gotten
complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned the complainant without support and without the
wherewithal for delivering his own child safely in a hospital.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Thus, we agree with the Solicitor General that respondent Jordan Terre, by his actions, "eloquently
displayed, not only his unfitness to remain as a member of the Bar, but likewise his inadequacy to uphold
the purpose and responsibility of his gender" because marriage is a basic social institution. 9 .

In Pomperada v. Jochico, 10 the Court, in rejecting a petition to be allowed to take the oath as a member
of the Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys, said through Mme. Justice Melencio-
Herrera:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph