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Zaldivia v Reyes G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 277

Facts: A complaint was filed before the fiscal’s office constituting an offense in violation of a city ordinance. The fiscal
did not file the complaint before the court immediately but instead filed it 3 months later. The defendant’s counsel filed a
motion to quash on ground that the action to file the complaint has prescribed. The fiscal contends that the filing of the
complaint before his office already interrupts the prescription period.
Issue: Whether or not the filing of information/complaint before the fiscal office constituting a violation against a special
law/ordinance interrupts prescription.

Held: The mere filing of complaint to the fiscal’s office does not interrupt the running of prescription on offenses
punishable by a special law. The complaint should have been filed within a reasonable time before the court. It is only
then that the running of the prescriptive period is interrupted.

**Act 3326 is the governing law on prescription of crimes punishable by a special law which states that prescription is
only interrupted upon judicial proceeding.

Crespo v. Mogul
FACTS:

Petitioner Mario Crespo was accused for Estafa in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. When the case was set for
arraignment, the accused filed a motion for defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review
filed with the Secretary of Justice. However, Justice Mogul denied the motion, but the arraignment was deferred in a
much later date to afford time for the petitioner to elevate the mater to the appellate court.

The accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction to the CA. The CA
ordered the trial court to refrain from proceeding with the arraignment until further orders of the Court. Undersecretary
of Justice, Hon. Catalino Macaraig Jr., resolved the petition for review reversed the resolution of the office of the
Provincial Fiscal and directed the Fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused.
Judge Mogul denied the motion for dismissal of the case ad set the arraignment. The accused then filed a petition for
Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary
restraining order in the CA. The CA dismissed the order and lifted the restraining order.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court may refuse to grant a motion to dismiss filed by the Fiscal under orders fro, the Secretary of
Justice and insists on arraignment and trial on the merits.

HELD:

It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of the fiscal. 17 The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of
the fiscal. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent
malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. 19 It cannot be controlled by the complainant.

However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is subject to the
approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe elevated for review
to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal.

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Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or otherwise, that an
information be filed in Court.

The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over
the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for
the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated
upon the filing of the information in the proper court.

Dimatulac v. Villon

Facts:
- In the prosecution of the Yabuts for the murder of Dimatulac, the Office of the Public Prosecutor
(particularly the Asst Prosecutor) and two Judges (who handled the case) committed serious procedural
flaws resulting in the impairment of due process (prejudicial to both the offended party and the accused).
- Procedural irregularities in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor:
 Warrants of arrest were issued by the MCTC, with no bail recommended, but the Yabuts
were not arrested or were never brought unto the custody of the law. Yet, Asst Fiscal
Alfonso-Reyes conducted a reinvestigation. Though a prosecutor may disagree with the
findings of the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation (and conduct his own),
the circumstance that the accused waived the filing of their counter-affidavits left Alfonso-
Reyes no other choice but to sustain the MCTC findings—which she did not do. And later
on, Alfonso-Reyes allowed the Yabuts to file their counter-affidavits without first
demanding that they surrender by virtue of the standing warrants of arrest.
 Alfonso-Reyes recommended a bond of 20k for the Yabuts despite the fact that they were
charged of homicide and that they were fugitives from justice (having avoided service of
warrant of arrest).
 Alfonso-Reyes was aware of the private prosecution’s appeal to the DOJ from her
resolution. (The subsequent resolution of the DOJ Secretary exposed her blatant errors.)
And despite the pending appeal, she filed the Information. It would be more prudent to
wait for the DOJ resolution.
 Office of the Prosecutor did not even inform the trial court of the pending appeal to the
DOJ Secretary.
- Judge Roura’s procedural lapses:
 Deferred resolution on the motion for a hold departure order until “such time that all the
accused who are out on bail are arraigned”
 Denied the motion to defer proceedings for the reason that “private prosecution has not
shown any indication that the appeal was given due course by DOJ”
- Judge Villon’s procedural lapses:
 Ordered arraignment despite: a motion to defer proceedings; a ten-day period with which
the complainants can file petition with the CA; resolution of the CA ordering the Yabuts to
comment on the complainants’ action; pending appeal with the DOJ.

Issue:
Can the orders of Judge Roura and Judge Villon be sustained despite procedural defects?

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Held:
No. The orders of Judge Roura denying Motion to Defer proceedings are void and set aside. The order of Judge Villon on
the arraignment, and the subsequent arraignment of the Yabuts are void and set aside. Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor is ordered to comply with the DOJ Secretary’s resolution.

Prosecutors are the representatives not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest in a criminal prosecution is not
that it shall win every case but that justice be done. They are servants of the law whose two-fold aim is that guilt shall
not escape and innocence shall not suffer.

The judge “should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to
promptly and properly administer justice”. The judge’s action must not impair the substantial rights of the accused, nor
the right of the State and offended party.

When the State is deprived of due process in a criminal case by reason of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court, the acquittal of the accused or dismissal of the case is void.

Dimatulac v. Villon

FACTS:

SPO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead at his residence in Barangay San Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga. A complaint for
Murder was filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) private respondents Mayor Santiago Yabut, Martin
Yabut, Servillano Yabut, Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Casti David, Francisco Yambao, Juan Magat, Arturo Naguit,
Fortunato Mallari, Jesus de la Cruz, Joselito Miranda, SPO3 Gilberto Malabanan, Aniano Magnaye, Vladimir Yumul, a
certain “Danny,” and a certain “Koyang/Arding.”

Judge David conducted a preliminary investigation and found probable cause, issued warrants for the arrest of the
accused. Only David, Mandap, Magat and Yambao were arrested; while only Yambao submitted his counter affidavit.

After the prelim investigation, the judge found reasonable ground to believe that Murder has been committed and the
accused are probably the perpetrators thereof. He recommended the issuance of warrants of arrests and provided
no bail

Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Sylvia Q. Alfonso-Flores conducted a reinvestigation. It is not clear from the record whether
she conducted the same motu proprio or upon motion of private respondents.
 The offense committed was only homicide (NOT murder) and all Yabuts were in conspiracy with one
another. The 2 requisites of murder qualified by treachery were absent. She also recommended bail of
20k each. (note: the Yabuts were not under the custody of the law)

Before the information for Homicide was filed, the heirs of Dimatulac filed an appeal on the resolution of Ass. Prov.
Pros. Alfonso-Flores to the Secretary of Justice (SOJ) alleging mainly that Alfonso-Flores erred in lowering the
crime from Murder as originally filed to Homicide despite the glaring presence of treachery, evident premeditation, etc.
(Take note of Rule 70- NPS Rules on Appeal in Syllabus1)

 Notice of the appeal was furnished to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Alfonso-Flores ignored this

1 Appeals form Resolutions of prosecutors to the Sec. of DOJ

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and proceeded to file the information for Homicide which the Prov. Prosecutor (Manarang) approved and
certified
 Private prosecutor (counsel for private complainants) filed a motion to defer proceedings (i.e.
arraignment) before the RTC in view of his client’s pending appeal with the SOJ
 YABUTs opposed motion to defer proceedings/arraignment arguing that the pendency of the appeal
before the SOJ was not a ground to defer arraignment and they had a right to a speedy trial [invoked
the case of Crespo v. Mogul.

RTC judge denied motion to defer arraignment. RTC Judge set the arraignment. Private prosecutor moved to
inhibit the judge, and filed a petition for prohibition to enjoin the judge from proceeding with the arraignment. RTC Judge
voluntarily inhibited himself and then the case was transferred to herein respondent Judge Villion.

Petitioners filed manifestation informing Judge Villlon him of the cases pending before the SOJ and the prohibition case
before the CA. Judge ignored this and set the arraignment. Yabuts entered their plea of not guilty. Petitioners
moved to set aside arraignment but to no avail. SOJ Guingona FINALLY came up with a resolution of the appeal.
He directed the Provincial Prosec. To amend the info against the accused from homicide to murder. But he wrote to
Provincial Prosec. Again and SET ASIDE his order to amend the info from homicide to murder, considering the appeal was
moot and academic by the arraignment of the accused but Mallari must be included.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Defer Arraignment of Accused Fortunato Mallari, denied.

CA also dismissed the petition.

Petitioners filed with the SC a petition for Certiorari/Prohibition and Mandamus to reverse the order of respondent Judge
denying their Motion to Set Aside Arraignment; set aside arraignment of private respondents; order that no further action
be taken by any court in criminal case until this petition resolved; and order Sec. of Justice and the prosecutors
concerned to amend the information from homicide to murder.

ISSUES

1. WON the provincial prosecutor erred downgrading or lowering the crime charged from Murder to Homicide [YES]
2. WON Judge Villion erred in proceeding with the arraignment of the accused and denying motion to set aside
arraignment [YES]
3. WON SOJ erred in reversing himself and his order to amend the information from Homicide to Murder [YES]

HELD: Petition GRANTED. The orders denying the Motion to Defer Proceeding/Arraignment and denying the Motion to Set
Aside Arraignment are declared VOID and SET ASIDE. The arraignment of private respondents is likewise declared VOID
and SET ASIDE. Furthermore, the order of SOJ is SET ASIDE and his initial order REINSTATED. The Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga is DIRECTED to file with the RTC the amended information for Murder.

Issue #1: WON the provincial prosecutor erred downgrading or lowering the crime charged from Murder
to Homicide [YES]

There was No Basis for the Reinvestigation or downgrading of the Offense from Murder to
Homicide.
Warrants of arrest were issued against the Yabuts but they were never arrested/or surrendered and never
brought into the custody of the law. How can the Ass. Prov Prosec. Conduct a reinvestigation then lower the
crime from murder to Homicide? (Note that they re-appeared after crime was downgraded).

She should have also waited for the resolution of the Sec of Justice, but instead entertained the motion for

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reinvestigation, accepted counter-affidavits and recommended bail. REMEMBER! They were never brought into
the custody of the law.

Petitioners had the right to appeal to the DOJ under Section 4 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and DOJ
Order No. 223 S. 1993 recognizes the right of both offended parties and the accused to appeal from resolutions
in preliminary investigations or reinvestigations. The sec. speaks of “dismissing criminal complaint” petitioners
herein were not barred from appealing from the resolution holding that only homicide was committed,
considering that their complaint was for murder. By holding that only homicide was committed, the Provincial
Prosecutor's Office of Pampanga effectively "dismissed" the complaint for murder.

Appeal to the Sec. of Justice should not be dismissed motu propio on account of the Yabut’s
arraignment.
The bar on Sec 4 does not apply! The cases of Crespo v Mogul forecloses the power of authority of the SOJ to
review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases despite an information already having been filed in court.
The SOJ is only enjoined to refrain, as far as practicable, from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from
the action of the prosecutor once a complaint or information is filed in court. There was clear and indecent
haste on the part of the public prosec. In the filing of the information for homicide depriving the State and
offended parties of due processs.

Issue #2: WON Judge Villion erred in proceeding with the arraignment of the accused and denying
motion to set aside arraignment [YES]

Judge Villon set arraignment of the accused almost immediately upon receiving the records of the case from the
former RTC Judge. He should have gone over the case and noticed the multiple motions, manifestations and
utter vehemence of the petitioners to hear their cause. The judge had COMPLETE control over the case and any
disposition rested on his discretion + was not bound to await the DOJ resolution on appeal.

But he committed grave abuse of discretion in rushing the arraignment of the YABUTs on the assailed
information for homicide denying due process.

Actions: nullifying without jurisdiction, the denial of the motion to defer further hearings, the denial of the
motion to reconsider such denial, the arraignment of the YABUTs and their
plea of not guilty

Issue #3. WON SOJ erred in reversing himself and his order to amend the information from Homicide to
Murder [YES]

DOJ relinquished its power of control and supervision over the Provincial Prosecutor and the Asst. Provincial
Prosecutors of Pampanga; and meekly surrendered to the latter's inappropriate conduct even hostile attitude,
which amounted to neglect of duty or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

The DOJ could have joined cause with petitioners to set aside arraignment and, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers over its personnel, the DOJ could have directed the public prosecutors concerned to show cause why no
disciplinary action should be taken against them for neglect of duty or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service.

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Teehankee Jr. v. Madayag, et. al., G.R. No. 103102, March 6, 1992
Crim Pro - Rule 110

Facts:
On July 19, 1991 an information for the crime of frustrated murder was filed against Claudio Teehankee Jr.
allegedly committed to Maureen Navarro Hultman.

After the prosecution had rested its case, the petitioner moved for leave to file a demurrer to evidence, but
before the motion was filed, the victim died. So, the private prosecutor filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file
the amended information. The amended information filed on October 31, 1991 charges Teehankee of murder.

The trial court admitted the amended information. During the arraignment, the petitioner refused to be
arraigned on the amended information contending the lack of a preliminary investigation thereon. The judge, then,
ordered the plea of "not guilty" be entered for petitioner. The prosecution was ordered to present its evidence. The
petitioner's counsel manifested that he did not want to take part in the proceedings because of the legal issue raised. So,
the trial court appointed a counsel de officio to represent the petitioner.

The petitioner now seeks, among other things, for the SC to nullify the respondent judge's admittance of the
amended information, and to compel the judge to order preliminary investigation of the crime charged in the amended
information.

Issue: Whether or not an amended information involving a substantial amendment, without preliminary investigation,
after the prosecution has rested on the original information, may legally and validly be admitted.

Held: Yes. Section 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 14. Amendment. — The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at
any time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the
discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused.

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the
court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in
accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy and may
also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.

A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of
the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. 11 Thus, the following have been held to be merely
formal amendments, viz: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in
the event of conviction; 12 (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that
charged in the original one; 13 (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as to
cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; and (4) an amendment which does
not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused, such as his right to invoke prescription.

Going now to the case at bar, it is evident that frustrated murder is but a stage in the execution of the crime of
murder, hence the former is necessarily included in the latter. It is indispensable that the essential element of intent to
kill, as well as qualifying circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation, be alleged in both an information for
frustrated murder and for murder, thereby meaning and proving that the same material allegations are essential to the
sufficiency of the informations filed for both. This is because, except for the death of the victim, the essential elements of

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consummated murder likewise constitute the essential ingredients to convict herein petitioner for the offense of
frustrated murder.

In the present case, therefore, there is an identity of offenses charged in both the original and the amended
information. What is involved here is not a variance in the nature of different offenses charged, but only a change in the
stage of execution of the same offense from frustrated to consummated murder. This is being the case, we hold that an
amendment of the original information will suffice and, consequent thereto, the filing of the amended information for
murder is proper.

DENNIS T. GABIONZA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner was accused in an information for violating Sec. 22, pars. (a) and (d), in relation to Sec. 28, par. (e),
of RA 1161(Social Security Law). The said information alleged that that "in and about or during the period from January
1991 to May 1993" petitioner, President of the Manila City Bus Corporation, a compulsorily-covered employer under RA
1161, willfully and unlawfully failed, neglected and refused to remit to the Social Security System (SSS) contributions for
SSS, Medicare and Employee Compensation (EC) amounting to P1,652,330.10 and the 3% penalty imposed thereon in
the amount of P541,417.87.3

On December 7, 1993,petitioner was arraigned. After four years, the public prosecutor filed a Motion for Leave
of Court to Amend Information, to change the material dates stated in the Information from "January 1991 to May 1993"
to January 1991 to May 1992." Petitioner opposed the motion contending that the proposed amendment was substantial
in nature, hence to allow the same would be a violation of his right to be informed of the cause and nature of the
accusation against him, and would negate or prejudice defenses that were otherwise available to him. The RTC granted
the motion and allowed amendment of the Information, ruling that the amendment pertained only to matters of form.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.

Petitioner brought the issue before the Court of Appeals . CA upheld the amendment and dismissed the petition.

Issue:

Whether or not an information can be amended to change the material dates of the commission of the offense
after the arraignment of the accused

Ruling:

The proper procedure for the amendment of an Information is governed by Sec. 14, Rule 110, of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure -

Sec. 14. Amendment. - The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of
court at any time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by

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leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the
accused x x x x

The court held that after the accused enters a plea, amendments to the Information may be allowed, as to
matters of form, provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused. The test as to when the rights of an
accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a Complaint or Information is when a defense under the Complaint or
Information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence
the accused might have, would be inapplicable to the Complaint or the Information as amended.

Jurisprudence allows amendments to information so long as: (a) it does not deprive the accused of the right to
invoke prescription;(b) it does not affect or alter the nature of the offense originally charged (c) it does not involve a
change in the basic theory of the prosecution so as to require the accused to undergo any material change or
modification in his defense;(d) it does not expose the accused to a charge which would call for a higher penalty;and, (5)
it does not cause surprise nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment.

In the case at bar, it is clear that the questioned amendment is one of form and not of substance. The allegation
of time when an offense is committed is a matter of form, unless time is a material ingredient of the offense. It is not
even necessary to state in the Information the precise time the offense was committed unless time is a material factor.It
is sufficient that the act is alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense
was committed as the Complaint or Information will permit. 14

Thus, petitioner's argument that the amendment prejudiced his rights is untenable. We fail to see how his original
defenses would be rendered inapplicable by the amendment, nor the prosecution's theory in anyway altered by the
same. Petitioner failed to adduce any evidence in support of his allegation that the amendment would adversely affect his
rights.

Petitioner invokes Wong v. Yatco,15 People v. Opemia16 and People v. Reyes17 in support of his cause. However, we hold
that the ratio decidendi of the three (3) cases does not apply in the present case.

In Wong the prosecution amended the Information of a violation of Commonwealth Act No. 104 to change the dates of
the violation from "May 3, 1954 to October 11, 1954" to "between January 2, 1955 and March 17, 1955." The Court
disallowed the amendment because in 1954, the law punishing the act had not been published yet, therefore there was
no crime in legal contemplation, The Court said that since an amended Information retroacted to the time of the original
one, the proper course would have been not to amend the previous Information but to file another one. This crucial fact
is not involved here.

In Opemia the Court held, "the period of almost five years between 1947 and 1952 covers such a long stretch of time
that one may be led to believe that another theft different from that committed by the defendants in 1952 was also
perpetrated by them in 1947. The variance is certainly unfair to them, for it violates their constitutional rights to be
informed before the trial of the specific charge against them and deprives them of the opportunity to defend ,
themselves."

In Reyes, this Court held that "the disparity of time between the years 1964 and 1969 is so great as to defy
approximation in the commission of one and the same offense."

The last two (2) cases involved changes in dates which were so far removed from each other that substituting one for
the other would clearly work to the detriment of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
charges against him. This is not so in the present case. For one, a comparison of the amended Information (January
1991 to May 1992) and the original one (January 1991 to May 1993) shows that the period stated in the former is even
shorter than and is included within the latter. Also, the averment "in or about and during the period" gives a sufficient
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approximation of the date of the commission of the offense. Therefore, the first Information had adequately informed
petitioner of the period of time when the crime was committed. No surprise, ergo, no violation of rights, could spring
from merely replacing the original period, more so with one that is shorter and included within the same.

Moreover, the imposable penalty will not increase as a result of the amendment. A reading of Sec. 28, par. (e), RA 1611,
shows that it penalizes, among others, the failure or refusal of a compulsorily-covered employer from remitting
compulsory contributions to the SSS. Neither time nor duration of the offense charged is a material ingredient of the
offense. In fact, the penalty imposed for this violation is constant at six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years,
regardless of the number of infractions.

Matalam v. The 2nd Division of the Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 165751, April 12, 2005
Crim Pro - Rule 110

Facts:
On November 15, 2004, Datu Guimid Matalam, the Vice-Governor of Cotabato City and the Regional Secretary of DAR,
and other low-ranking public officials were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. Allegedly, Matalam illegally and unjustifiably refused to pay the monetary claims of several employees of the DAR.
Later, the Information was amended charging him of illegally dismissing from the service the complaining employees. He
then insisted that he is entitled to a new preliminary investigation.

Issue: Whether or not Matalam is entitled to a preliminary investigation since he was not informed that he is being
charged for the alleged dismissal of the complaining witnesses.

Held: Yes. According to the SC, if the petitioner is not to be given a new PI for the amended charge, his right will
definitely be prejudiced because he will be denied his right to present evidence to show or rebut evidence regarding the
element of evident bad faith and manifest partiality on the alleged dismissal. He will be denied due process. Although the
charge remained the same, which is violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 as amended, the prohibited act allegedly
committed changed, that is, failure to pay monetary claims to illegal dismissal, and he was not given the opportunity to
submit his evidence on the absence or presence of evident bad faith and manifest partiality as to the illegal dismissal.
Accused has not waived his right to a new PI and in fact asked for one.

Leviste v. Alameda, et. al., G.R. No. 182677, Aug. 3, 2010

Crim Pro - Rule 110

Facts:
On January 16, 2007, an Information was filed against Jose Antonio Leviste charging him with homicide for the
death of Rafael de las Alas on January 12, 2007 before the RTC of Makati. The private complainants-heirs of de las Alas
filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying for the deferment of the proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-
examine the evidence on record or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense. The RTC thereafter
issued the Order granting the motion by the complainants, thus, allowing the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation.
Later, the trial court issued the other order that admitted the Amended Information for murder and directed the issuance
of a warrant of arrest. Petitioner questioned these two orders before the appellate court.
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Upon arraignment, the petitioner refused to plead. The trial court entered the plea of "not guilty" for him. Prior
to this, the petitioner filed an Urgent Application for Admission to Bail Ex Abundanti Cautela, which the trial court granted
on the ground that the evidence of guilt of the crime of murder is not strong. The trial court went on to try the petitioner
under the Amended Information. Then, the trial court found the petitioner guilty of homicide. From the trial court's
decision, the petitioner filed an appeal to the CA. The appellate court confirmed the decision of the trial court. The
petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition to the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the amendment of the Information from homicide to murder is considered a substantial
amendment, which would make it not just a right but a duty of the prosecution to ask for a preliminary investigation.

Held: Yes. A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of
the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the
amendment is whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is
made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form
as in the other.

An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect
the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had
each been held to be one of form and not of substance. here is no substantial distinction between a preliminary
investigation and a reinvestigation since both are conducted in the same manner and for the same objective of
determining whether there exists sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.

What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from the charge of murder after the
claimed circumstances were made known to him as early as the first motion. Petitioner did not, however, make much of
the opportunity to present countervailing evidence on the proposed amended charge. Despite notice of hearing,
petitioner opted to merely observe the proceedings and declined to actively participate, even with extreme caution, in the
reinvestigation.

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