Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the
Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited
from passing along the following for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to
traffic:
1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas
Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works
with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of theCommonwealth Act
No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the
use of and traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the recommendations made by the
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the
recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced
and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to
pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding
public as well.
Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth
Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to personal
liberty and freedom of locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion
of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people?
Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in the
interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations
of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to
the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to
promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations.
Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort,
health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall into
anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery.
The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its
preserving.
2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the humanization of
laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the
people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the
members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored
principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse
units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force
in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting
health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.”
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
and LETTIE P. CORPUZ, respondents.
FACTS: respondent Lettie Corpuz was employed as traffic operator at the Manila International Traffic
Division (MITD) by the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) for ten years and nine months,
from. Her primary task was to facilitate requests for incoming and outgoing international calls through the use of a
digital switchboard.
Sometime in December 1987, PLDTs rank-and-file employees and telephone operators went on strike,
prompting the supervisors of the MITD to discharge the formers duties to prevent a total shutdown of its business
operations. While in the course of their emergency assignments, two supervisors almost simultaneously received
two different requests for overseas calls bound for different Middle East countries and both callers reported the
same calling number (98-68-16). []The tone verifications having yielded negative results, the callers were advised to
hang up their telephones to enable the supervisors to effect an alternative verification system by calling the same
number again. As in the first instance, the number remained unverified. Investigating the seemingly anomalous
incident, the matter was reported to the Quality Control Inspection Department (QCID) which revealed that the
subject number was temporarily disconnected on June 10, 1987, and permanently on September 24, 1987. It also
showed that 439 overseas calls were made through the same number between May and November 1987.
On account of such disclosure, the microfiches containing the completed calls through telephone number 98-
68-16 were ordered to be re-run. It yielded the following results: (1) 235 telephone operators handled the 439 calls
placed through the supposedly disconnected number; (2) respondent handled 56 or 12.8% of the total calls, while
the other operators had an average of only 1.8% calls each; (3) respondent completed one call on May 23, 1987
and effected 34 calls after the disconnection, 24 of which were completed through tone verification while the
other 10 calls were done without the requisite tone verification or call-back procedure, and 21 other calls were
cancelled; (4) of the 21 cancelled calls handled by respondent, one bared a BU report (party unavailable) but
fetched a long OCD (operator call duration) of 13 minutes and 21 seconds while another call registered a BB report
(called party, busy) but with an OCD of 22 minutes and 34 seconds, both considered unusually protracted by
respondent for holding a connection; and (5) respondent made several personal calls to telephone numbers 96-50-
72, 99-92-82 and 97-25-68, the latter being her home phone number. Premised on the above findings, on July 26,
1988, MITD Manager ErlindaKabigting directed respondent to explain her alleged infraction, that is, facilitating 34
calls using the disconnected number.
Instead of tendering the required explanation, respondent requested a formal investigation to allow her to
confront the witnesses and rebut the proofs that may be brought against her.On grounds of serious misconduct
and breach of trust, the Legal Department recommended her dismissal. In a letter dated June 16, 1989,
respondent was terminated from employment effective the following day.
Issue: whether or not Curpoz should be reinstated.
HELD: Yes.
This Court agrees with the labor arbiter when he stated that the more frequent handling by the respondent
of overseas calls from the same calling number than other operators does not give rise to the conclusion that,
indeed, respondent was a party to such anomalous transaction.
As regards petitioners claim that no call can be filed through a disconnected line, a certain Ms. Bautista
averred getting the same subject number after going through the standard verification procedures. She added that
this complexity extends even to other disconnected telephone lines. Equally important is the fact that on February
7, 1989, or about two years after it was permanently disconnected, telephone number 98-68-16 was used in calling
an international number, 561-6800, that lasted for 46 minutes. Telephone operator number 448 seems to have
been spared from any administrative sanction considering that this lapse has aggravated the persistent problem
concerning telephone number 98-68-16.
Thus, Labor Arbiter de Vera correctly ruled:
It need not be emphasized here that there were lapses in certain operational aspects of the respondent
company which made the irregularity possible, for indeed there exists a mystery about the serviceability
of the subject telephone line. That there were personnel of the respondent company involved who could
have restored what was earlier disconnected permanently appears certain.Nonetheless, exacting the
ultimate blame upon the respondent (complainant) in the absence of concrete inculpatory proofs of her
complexity (sic) to an anomaly if there be one, cannot be justified.
This Court will not sanction a dismissal premised on mere conjectures and suspicions. To be a valid ground for
respondents dismissal, the evidence must be substantial and not arbitrary and must be founded on clearly
established facts sufficient to warrant his separation from work. ]
It should be borne in mind that in termination cases, the employer bears the burden of proving that the
dismissal is for just cause failing which would mean that the dismissal is not justified and the employee is entitled
to reinstatement.[8] The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain ones
side or a chance to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. ] The twin requirements of notice
and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process. This simply means that the employer shall afford the
worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so
desires. Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the employee to
enable him to prepare adequately for his defense including legal representation. ] In the instant case, the petitioner
failed to convincingly establish valid bases on the alleged serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence.
In carrying out and interpreting the Labor Codes provisions and its implementing regulations, the
workingmans welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. This kind of interpretation gives
meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as provided for in Article 4 of the Labor
Code, as amended, which states that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the
Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor, [11] as well as the
Constitutional mandate that the State shall afford full protection to labor and promote full employment
opportunities for all. Likewise, it shall guarantee the rights of all workers to security of tenure. Such constitutional
right should not be denied on mere speculation of any unclear and nebulous basis.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
ALBERTO SANTOS, JR., HOUDIEL MAGADIA, GILBERT ANTONIO, REGINO DURAN, PHILIPPINE AIRLINES
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, and THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.
FACTS: Individual respondents are all Port Stewards of Catering Sub-Department, Passenger Services Department
of petitioner. Their duties and responsibilities, among others, are: Prepares meal orders and checklists, setting up
standard equipment in accordance with the requirements of the type of service for each flight; skiing, binning, and
inventorying of Commissary supplies and equipment. On various occasions, several deductions were made from
their salary. The deductions represented losses of inventoried items charged to them for mishandling of company
properties , which respondents resented. Such that on August 21, 1984, individual respondents, represented by
the union, made a formal notice regarding the deductions to petitioner thru Mr. Reynaldo Abad, Manager for
Catering. As there was no action taken on said representation, private respondents filed a formal grievance on
pursuant to the grievance machinery Step 1 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between petitioner and the
union. The topics which the union wanted to be discussed in the said grievance were the illegal/questionable
salary deductions and inventory of bonded goods and merchandise being done by catering service personnel
which they believed should not be their duty.
The said grievance was submitted on November 21, 1984 to the office of Mr. Reynaldo Abad, Manager for
Catering, who at the time was on vacation leave. Subsequently, the grievants (individual respondents) thru the
shop steward wrote a letter on December 5, 1984 addressed to the office of Mr. Abad, who was still on leave at
the time, that inasmuch as no reply was made to their grievance which "was duly received by your secretary" and
considering that petitioner had only five days to resolve the grievance as provided for in the CBA, said grievance as
believed by them (private respondents) was deemed resolved in their favor. . . . Upon Mr. Abad's return on
December 7, 1984, he immediately informed the grievants and scheduled a meeting on December 12, 1984.
Thereafter, the individual respondents refused to conduct inventory works. Alberto Santos, Jr. did not conduct
ramp inventory on December 7, 10 and 12. Gilbert Antonio did not conduct ramp inventory on December 10. In
like manner, Regino Duran and HoudielMagadia did not conduct the same on December 10 and 12.
At the grievance meeting which was attended by some union representatives, Mr. Abad resolved the grievance by
denying the petition of individual respondents and adopted the position that inventory of bonded goods is part of
their duty as catering service personnel, and as for the salary deductions for losses, he rationalized:
It was only proper that employees are charged for the amount due to mishandling of company property which
resulted to losses. However, loss may be cost price 1/10 selling price.
As there was no ramp inventory conducted on the mentioned dates, Mr. Abad, on January 3, 1985 wrote by an
inter-office memorandum addressed to the grievants, individual respondents herein, for them to explain on (sic)
why no disciplinary action should be taken against them for not conducting ramp inventory. . . .
The directive was complied with . . . . The reason for not conducting ramp inventory was put forth as:
Since the grievance step 1 was not decided and no action was done by your office within 5 days from November
21, 1984, per provision of the PAL-PALEA CBA, Art. IV, Sec. 2, the grievance is deemed resolved in PALEA's favor.
Going over the explanation, Mr. Abad found the same unsatisfactory. Thus, a penalty of suspension ranging from 7
days to 30 days were (sic) imposed depending on the number of infractions committed. After the penalty of
suspension was meted down, PALEA filed another grievance asking for lifting of, or at least, holding in abeyance
the execution of said penalty. The said grievance was forthwith denied but the penalty of suspension with respect
to respondent Ramos was modified, such that his suspension which was originally from January 15, 1985 to April 5,
1985 was shortened by one month and was lifted on March 5, 1985. The union, however, made a demand for the
reimbursement of the salaries of individual respondents during the period of their suspension. Petitioner stood
pat (o)n the validity of the suspensions. Hence, a complaint for illegal suspension was filed before the
Arbitration Branch of the Commission, . . . Labor Arbiter Ceferina J. Diosana, on March 17, 1986, ruled in favor of
petitioner by dismissing the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether the Court is accordingly called upon to resolve the issue of whether or not public respondent NLRC
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in rendering the aforementioned decision.
HELD: No, It is a fact that the sympathy of the Court is on the side of the laboring classes, not only because the
Constitution imposes such sympathy, but because of the one-sided relation between labor and capital.9 The
constitutional mandate for the promotion of labor is as explicit as it is demanding. The purpose is to place the
workingman on an equal plane with management — with all its power and influence — in negotiating for the
advancement of his interests and the defense of his rights. 10 Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over
backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with less
privileges in life should have more privileges in law. 11
It is clear that the grievance was filed with Mr. Abad's secretary during his absence. 12 Under Section 2 of the CBA
aforequoted, the division head shall act on the grievance within five (5) days from the date of presentation
thereof, otherwise "the grievance must be resolved in favor of the aggrieved party." It is not disputed that the
grievants knew that division head Reynaldo Abad was then "on leave" when they filed their grievance which was
received by Abad's secretary.13 This knowledge, however, should not prevent the application of the CBA.
On this score, respondent NLRC aptly ruled:
. . . Based on the facts heretofore narrated, division head Reynaldo Abad had to act on the
grievance of complainants within five days from 21 November 1984. Therefore, when Reynaldo
Abad, failed to act within the reglementary period, complainants, believing in good faith that the
effect of the CBA had already set in, cannot be blamed if they did not conduct ramp inventory for
the days thereafter. In this regard, respondent PAL argued that Reynaldo Abad was on leave at
the time the grievance was presented. This, however, is of no moment, for it is hard to believe
that everything under Abad's authority would have to stand still during his absence from office.
To be sure, it is to be expected that someone has to be left to attend to Abad's duties. Of course,
this may be a product of inadvertence on the part of PAL management, but certainly,
complainants should not be made to suffer the consequences. 14
Contrary to petitioner's submission,15 the grievance of employees is not a matter which requires the personal act
of Mr. Abad and thus could not be delegated. Petitioner could at least have assigned an officer-in-charge to look
into the grievance and possibly make his recommendation to Mr. Abad. It is of no moment that Mr. Abad
immediately looked into the grievance upon returning to work, for it must be remembered that the grievants are
workingmen who suffered salary deductions and who rely so much on their meager income for their daily
subsistence and survival. Besides, it is noteworthy that when these employees first presented their complaint on
August 21, 1984, petitioner failed to act on it. It was only after a formal grievance was filed and after Mr. Abad
returned to work on December 7, 1984 that petitioner decided to turn an ear to their plaints.
As respondent NLRC has pointed out, Abad's failure to act on the matter may have been due to petitioner's
inadvertence,16 but it is clearly too much of an injustice if the employees be made to bear the dire effects thereof.
Much as the latter were willing to discuss their grievance with their employer, the latter closed the door to this
possibility by not assigning someone else to look into the matter during Abad's absence. Thus, private respondents
should not be faulted for believing that the effects of the CBA in their favor had already stepped into the
controversy.
If the Court were to follow petitioner's line of reasoning, it would be easy for management to delay the resolution
of labor problems, the complaints of the workers in particular, and hide under the cloak of its officers being "on
leave" to avoid being caught by the 5-day deadline under the CBA. If this should be allowed, the workingmen will
suffer great injustice for they will necessarily be at the mercy of their employer. That could not have been the
intendment of the pertinent provision of the CBA, much less the benevolent policy underlying our labor laws.
ST.LUKES Vs. NLRC
FACTS: . Maribel S. Santos was an X-Ray Technician in St. Luke’s Medical Center, Inc. (SLMC) during the
time RA No 7431 or “Radiologic Technology Act of 1992” was passed and enacted. The said law requires
that no person shall practice or offer to practice as a radiology or x-ray technologist in the Philippines
without having the proper certificate of registrtion from the Board of Radiologic Technolgy. Pursuant to the
said statute, SLMC issued a final notice to all practitioners of Radiologic Technology, including Santos, to
comply with the requirements. Unlicensed employees will be trasnfered in an area which does not require
a license to practice if a slot is available. Several notices were sent to Santos requiring her to comply with
the law; otherwise she will be compelled to retire should there be no other position available where she
may be employed. They advised her to submit her PRC registration form/examination permit since only a
license can assure her of her continued employment. Santos disregarded these letters and refused to
accept the offer for early retirement. She was also not qualified for any other present vacant positions in
the hospital. Later on, she took but failed the board examination. As a result, SLMC issued a “notice of
separation from the company” to Santos. Santos filed for illegal dismissal, non-payment of salaries,
allowances, and other monetary benefits. She also prayed for award of moral and exemplary damages
plus attorney’s fees. Labor Arbiter decided in favor of Santos and ordered SLMC to pay her P115,500
representing her separation pay. Dissatisfied, Santos filed for an appeal with NLRC. NLRC affirmed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. It also denied the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioners, then,
filed a petition for certiorary with CA, which affirmed NLRC’s decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Santos Should be retained as employee
HELD: No. It
While the right of workers to security of tenure is guaranteed by the Constitution, its exercise may be
reasonably regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education,
order, safety, and the general welfare of the people. Consequently, persons who desire to engage in the learned
professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to
engaging in their chosen careers.] The most concrete example of this would be in the field of medicine, the practice
of which in all its branches has been closely regulated by the State. It has long been recognized that the regulation
of this field is a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public to protect the public from the
potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who would practice medicine. [10] The same
rationale applies in the regulation of the practice of radiologic and x-ray technology.
In this regard, the Court quotes with approval the disquisition of public respondent NLRC in its decision
dated August 23, 2002:
without any derogatory record to make her qualify as an x-ray technician in the absence
of a proper certificate of Registration from the Board of Radiologic Technology which can only be
obtained by passing the required examination. The law is clear that the Certificate of Registration
cannot be substituted by any other requirement to allow a person to practice as a Radiologic
Technologist and/or X-ray Technologist (Technician).]
No malice or ill-will can be imputed upon private respondent as the separation of petitioner Santos was
undertaken by it conformably to an existing statute. It is undeniable that her continued employment without the
required Board certification exposed the hospital to possible sanctions and even to a revocation of its license to
operate. Certainly, private respondent could not be expected to retain petitioner Santos despite the inimical threat
posed by the latter to its business. This notwithstanding, the records bear out the fact that petitioner Santos was
given ample opportunity to qualify for the position and was sufficiently warned that her failure to do so would
result in her separation from work in the event there were no other vacant positions to which she could be
transferred. Despite these warnings, petitioner Santos was still unable to comply and pass the required exam. To
reiterate, the requirement for Board certification was set by statute. Justice, fairness and due process demand that
an employer should not be penalized for situations where it had no participation or control. [13]
It would be unreasonable to compel private respondent to wait until its license is cancelled and it is
materially injured before removing the cause of the impending evil. Neither can the courts step in to force private
respondent to reassign or transfer petitioner Santos under these circumstances. Petitioner Santos is not in the
position to demand that she be given a different work assignment when what necessitated her transfer in the first
place was her own fault or failing. The prerogative to determine the place or station where an employee is best
qualified to serve the interests of the company on the basis of the his or her qualifications, training and
performance belongs solely to the employer.[14] The Labor Code and its implementing Rules do not vest in the
Labor Arbiters nor in the different Divisions of the NLRC (nor in the courts) managerial authority. [15]
While our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of
labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes
that management has rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair
play.[16] Labor laws, to be sure, do not authorize interference with the employer's judgment in the conduct of the
latters business. Private respondent is free to determine, using its own discretion and business judgment, all
elements of employment, "from hiring to firing" except in cases of unlawful discrimination or those which may be
provided by law. None of these exceptions is present in the instant case.
The fact that another employee, who likewise failed to pass the required exam, was allowed by private
respondent to apply for and transfer to another position with the hospital does not constitute unlawful
discrimination. This was a valid exercise of management prerogative, petitioners not having alleged nor proven
that the reassigned employee did not qualify for the position where she was transferred. In the past, the Court has
ruled that an objection founded on the ground that one has better credentials over the appointee is frowned upon
so long as the latter possesses the minimum qualifications for the position. [17] Furthermore, the records show that
Ms. Santos did not even seriously apply for another position in the company.
FACTS: On April 25, 1999, the Board of Directors of the Rural Bank of Lucban, Inc., issued Board Resolution which
entailed that a random reshuffling shall be conducted in pursuance to further strengthen the existing internal
control system of the bank. a letter to Alejo B. Daya, the banks board chairman, directed Briccio V. Cada, the
manager of the banks Tayabas branch, to implement the reshuffle, The new assignments were to be effective on
May 1, 1999 without changes in salary, allowances, and other benefits received by the aforementioned employees.
in an undated letter addressed to Daya, Petitioner Elmer Mendoza expressed his opinion on the reshuffle stating
that such reshuffling is a blatant harassment on the part of the bank as a prelude to his termination in due time
and This will constitute an unfair labor practice. The management replied by saying “Anent your undated letter
expressing your resentment/comments on the recent managements decision to reshuffle the duties of bank
employees, please be informed that it was never the intention (of management) to downgrade your position in the
bank considering that your due compensation as Bank Appraiser is maintained and no future reduction was
intended. Aside from giving bank employees a wider experience in various banking operations, the reshuffle will
also afford management an effective tool in providing the bank a sound internal control system/check and balance
and a basis in evaluating the performance of each employee. A continuing bankwide reshuffle of employees shall
be made at the discretion of management which may include bank officers, if necessary as expressed in Board
Resolution No. 99-53, dated April 25, 1999. Management merely shifted the duties of employees, their position
title [may be] retained if requested formally. Being a standard procedure in maintaining an effective internal
control system recommended by the Bangko Sentralng Pilipinas, we believe that the conduct of reshuffle is also a
prerogative of bank management.[9]
On June 7, 1999, petitioner submitted to the banks Tayabas branch manager a letter in which he applied for a
leave of absence from work:
On June 21, 1999, petitioner again submitted a letter asking for another leave of absence for twenty days effective
on the same date.[11]
On June 24, 1999, while on his second leave of absence, petitioner filed a Complaint before Arbitration Branch No.
IV of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The Complaint -- for illegal dismissal, underpayment,
separation pay and damages -- was filed against the Rural Bank of Lucban and/or its president, Alejo B. Daya; and
its Tayabas branch manager, Briccio V. Cada. The case was docketed as NLRC Case SRAB-IV-6-5862-99-Q.