G.R. No.

L-20761 July 27, 1966

LA MALLORCA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, MARIANO BELTRAN, ET AL., respondents.

G. E. Yabut, R. Monterey and M.C. Lagman for petitioner.

Ahmed Garcia for respondents.

BARRERA, J.:

La Mallorca seeks the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 23267-R, holding it liable for quasi-
delict and ordering it to pay to respondents Mariano Beltran, et al., P6,000.00 for the death of his minor daughter Raquel
Beltran, plus P400.00 as actual damages.

The facts of the case as found by the Court of Appeals, briefly are:

On December 20, 1953, at about noontime, plaintiffs, husband and wife, together with their minor daughters,
namely, Milagros, 13 years old, Raquel, about 4½ years old, and Fe, over 2 years old, boarded the Pambusco
Bus No. 352, bearing plate TPU No. 757 (1953 Pampanga), owned and operated by the defendant, at San
Fernando, Pampanga, bound for Anao, Mexico, Pampanga. At the time, they were carrying with them four pieces
of baggages containing their personal belonging. The conductor of the bus, who happened to be a half-brother of
plaintiff Mariano Beltran, issued three tickets (Exhs. A, B, & C) covering the full fares of the plaintiff and their
eldest child, Milagros. No fare was charged on Raquel and Fe, since both were below the height at which fare is
charged in accordance with the appellant's rules and regulations.

After about an hour's trip, the bus reached Anao whereat it stopped to allow the passengers bound therefor,
among whom were the plaintiffs and their children to get off. With respect to the group of the plaintiffs, Mariano
Beltran, then carrying some of their baggages, was the first to get down the bus, followed by his wife and his
children. Mariano led his companions to a shaded spot on the left pedestrians side of the road about four or five
meters away from the vehicle. Afterwards, he returned to the bus in controversy to get his other bayong, which he
had left behind, but in so doing, his daughter Raquel followed him, unnoticed by her father. While said Mariano
Beltran was on the running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand him his bayong which he left under
one of its seats near the door, the bus, whose motor was not shut off while unloading, suddenly started moving
forward, evidently to resume its trip, notwithstanding the fact that the conductor has not given the driver the
customary signal to start, since said conductor was still attending to the baggage left behind by Mariano Beltran.
Incidentally, when the bus was again placed into a complete stop, it had travelled about ten meters from the point
where the plaintiffs had gotten off.

Sensing that the bus was again in motion, Mariano Beltran immediately jumped from the running board without
getting his bayong from the conductor. He landed on the side of the road almost in front of the shaded place
where he left his wife and children. At that precise time, he saw people beginning to gather around the body of a
child lying prostrate on the ground, her skull crushed, and without life. The child was none other than his daughter
Raquel, who was run over by the bus in which she rode earlier together with her parents.

For the death of their said child, the plaintiffs commenced the present suit against the defendant seeking to
recover from the latter an aggregate amount of P16,000 to cover moral damages and actual damages sustained
as a result thereof and attorney's fees. After trial on the merits, the court below rendered the judgment in question.

On the basis of these facts, the trial court found defendant liable for breach of contract of carriage and sentenced it to pay
P3,000.00 for the death of the child and P400.00 as compensatory damages representing burial expenses and costs.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, La Mallorca claimed that there could not be a breach of contract in the case, for the
reason that when the child met her death, she was no longer a passenger of the bus involved in the incident and,
therefore, the contract of carriage had already terminated. Although the Court of Appeals sustained this theory, it
nevertheless found the defendant-appellant guilty of quasi-delict and held the latter liable for damages, for the negligence
of its driver, in accordance with Article 2180 of the Civil Code. And, the Court of Appeals did not only find the petitioner
liable, but increased the damages awarded the plaintiffs-appellees to P6,000.00, instead of P3,000.00 granted by the trial
court.

In its brief before us, La Mallorca contends that the Court of Appeals erred (1) in holding it liable for quasi-delict,
considering that respondents complaint was one for breach of contract, and (2) in raising the award of damages from
P3,000.00 to P6,000.00 although respondents did not appeal from the decision of the lower court.

Under the facts as found by the Court of Appeals, we have to sustain the judgement holding petitioner liable for damages
for the death of the child, Raquel Beltran. It may be pointed out that although it is true that respondent Mariano Beltran,
his wife, and their children (including the deceased child) had alighted from the bus at a place designated for
disembarking or unloading of passengers, it was also established that the father had to return to the vehicle (which was
still at a stop) to get one of his bags or bayong that was left under one of the seats of the bus. There can be no
controversy that as far as the father is concerned, when he returned to the bus for his bayong which was not unloaded,
the relation of passenger and carrier between him and the petitioner remained subsisting. For, the relation of carrier and
passenger does not necessarily cease where the latter, after alighting from the car, aids the carrier's servant or employee
in removing his baggage from the car.1 The issue to be determined here is whether as to the child, who was already led
by the father to a place about 5 meters away from the bus, the liability of the carrier for her safety under the contract of
carriage also persisted.

It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger
alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the
passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. And, what is a
reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances. Thus, a person who,
after alighting from a train, walks along the station platform is considered still a passenger. 2 So also, where a passenger
has alighted at his destination and is proceeding by the usual way to leave the company's premises, but before actually
doing so is halted by the report that his brother, a fellow passenger, has been shot, and he in good faith and without intent
of engaging in the difficulty, returns to relieve his brother, he is deemed reasonably and necessarily delayed and thus
continues to be a passenger entitled as such to the protection of the railroad and company and its agents. 3

In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was not unloaded when they alighted
from the bus. Raquel, the child that she was, must have followed the father. However, although the father was still on the
running board of the bus awaiting for the conductor to hand him the bag or bayong, the bus started to run, so that even he
(the father) had to jump down from the moving vehicle. It was at this instance that the child, who must be near the bus,
was run over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier's agent had exercised the "utmost
diligence" of a "very cautions person" required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by a common carrier in the
discharge of its obligation to transport safely its passengers. In the first place, the driver, although stopping the bus,
nevertheless did not put off the engine. Secondly, he started to run the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the
signal to go and while the latter was still unloading part of the baggages of the passengers Mariano Beltran and family.
The presence of said passengers near the bus was not unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as
passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection under their contract of carriage.

But even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already terminated, herein petitioner can be held liable for
the negligence of its driver, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Paragraph 7 of
the complaint, which reads —

That aside from the aforesaid breach of contract, the death of Raquel Beltran, plaintiffs' daughter, was caused by
the negligence and want of exercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious person on the part of the
defendants and their agent, necessary to transport plaintiffs and their daughter safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide in the operation of their vehicle.

is clearly an allegation for quasi-delict. The inclusion of this averment for quasi-delict, while incompatible with the other
claim under the contract of carriage, is permissible under Section 2 of Rule 8 of the New Rules of Court, which allows a
plaintiff to allege causes of action in the alternative, be they compatible with each other or not, to the end that the real
matter in controversy may be resolved and determined.4

The plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded the culpa or negligence upon which the claim was predicated when it was alleged in the
complaint that "the death of Raquel Beltran, plaintiffs' daughter, was caused by the negligence and want of exercise of the
utmost diligence of a very cautious person on the part of the defendants and their agent." This allegation was also proved
when it was established during the trial that the driver, even before receiving the proper signal from the conductor, and
while there were still persons on the running board of the bus and near it, started to run off the vehicle. The presentation
of proof of the negligence of its employee gave rise to the presumption that the defendant employer did not exercise the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees. And this presumption, as the
Court of Appeals found, petitioner had failed to overcome. Consequently, petitioner must be adjudged peculiarily liable for
the death of the child Raquel Beltran.

The increase of the award of damages from P3,000.00 to P6,000.00 by the Court of Appeals, however, cannot be
sustained. Generally, the appellate court can only pass upon and consider questions or issues raised and argued in
appellant's brief. Plaintiffs did not appeal from that portion of the judgment of the trial court awarding them on P3,000.00
damages for the death of their daughter. Neither does it appear that, as appellees in the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs have
pointed out in their brief the inadequacy of the award, or that the inclusion of the figure P3,000.00 was merely a clerical
error, in order that the matter may be treated as an exception to the general rule. 5Herein petitioner's contention, therefore,
that the Court of Appeals committed error in raising the amount of the award for damages is, evidently,
meritorious.1äwphï1.ñët

Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified by sentencing, the petitioner to pay to the respondents
Mariano Beltran, et al., the sum of P3,000.00 for the death of the child, Raquel Beltran, and the amount of P400.00 as
actual damages. No costs in this instance. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-21486 May 14, 1966

LA MALLORCA and PAMPANGA BUS COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
VALENTIN DE JESUS, MANOLO TOLENTINO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Manuel O. Chan for petitioners.

Sixto T. Antonio for respondents.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Company, Inc., commonly known as La Mallorca-Pambusco, filed
this appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed that rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan in its civil case No. 2100, entitled "Valentin de Jesus and Manolo
Tolentino vs. La Mallorca-Pambusco." The court a quo sentenced the defendant, now petitioner, "to
pay to plaintiffs the amount of P2,132.50 for actual damages; P14,400.00 as compensatory damages;
P10,000.00 to each plaintiff by way of moral damages; and P3,000.00 as counsel fees."

Two errors are attributed to the appellate Court: (1) "in sustaining the decision (of the court a quo)
holding that the petitioners were liable for the accident which was caused by a blow-out of one of the
tires of the bus and in not considering the same as caso fortuito," and (2) in holding petitioners liable
for moral damages.

The suit arose by reason of the death of Lolita de Jesus, 20-year old daughter of Valentin de Jesus
and wife of Manolo Tolentino, in a head-on collision between petitioner's bus, on which she was a
passenger, and a freight truck traveling in the opposite direction, in a barrio in Marilao Bulacan, in the
morning of October 8, 1959. The immediate cause of the collision was the fact that the driver of the
bus lost control of the wheel when its left front tire suddenly exploded.

Petitioner maintains that a tire blow-out is a fortuitous event and gives rise to no liability for
negligence, citing the rulings of the Court of Appeals in Rodriguez vs. Red Line Transportation Co.,
CA-G.R. No. 8136, December 29, 1954, and People vs. Palapad, CA-G.R. No. 18480, June 27, 1958.
These rulings, however, not only are not not binding on this Court but were based on considerations
quite different from those that obtain in the at bar. The appellate Court there made no findings of any
specified acts of negligence on the part of the defendants and confined itself to the question of
whether or not a tire blow-out, by itself alone and without a showing as to the causative factors, would
generate liability. In the present case, the cause of the blow-out was known. The inner tube of the left
front tire, according to petitioner's own evidence and as found by the Court of Appeals "was pressed
between the inner circle of the left wheel and the rim which had slipped out of the wheel." This was,
said Court correctly held, a mechanical defect of the conveyance or a fault in its equipment which was
easily discoverable if the bus had been subjected to a more thorough, or rigid check-up before it took
to the road that morning.

Then again both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found as a fact that the bus was running
quite fast immediately before the accident. Considering that the tire which exploded was not new —
petitioner describes it as "hindi masyadong kalbo," or not so very worn out — the plea of caso
fortuito cannot be entertained.1äwphï1.ñët

The second issue raised by petitioner is already a settled one. In this jurisdiction moral damages are
recoverable by reason of the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract of a common
carrier, as provided in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code. These articles have
been applied by this Court in a number of cases, among them Necesito, etc. vs. Paras, et al., L-
10605-06, June 30, 1958; Mercado vs. Lira, L-13328-29, Sept. 29, 1961; Villa-Rey Transit vs. Bello,
L-18957, April 23, 1963.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against petitioners.
G.R. No. L-16086 May 29, 1964

M. RUIZ HIGHWAY TRANSIT, INC. and MARTIN BUENA, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, GUILLERMO MONSERRAT and MARTA CONSIGNADO, respondents.

BENGZON, C.J.:

Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.

In the Laguna court of first instance, the spouses Guillermo Monserrat and Marta Consignado sued M. Ruiz Highway
Transit, Inc., and Martin Buena to recover damages for the death of their four-year old daughter Victoria.

In the morning of May 22, 1954, said child and her parents were paying passengers in a bus of defendant transportation
company driven by co-defendant Buena, bound for Antipolo, Rizal. In Sta. Rosa, Laguna, while the bus was running, a
rear tire exploded, blasting a hole in the very place where Victoria was standing in front of her mother. As a result, the
child fell through the hole, and died that same morning from injuries sustained in the fall. 1äw phï1.ñët

The court of first instance dismissed the complaint on the ground that (1) the accident was not due to negligence of the
carrier, but was an act of God; and (2) even if negligence was attributable to defendants, their liability had been
discharged, as evidenced by Exhibits 2 and 3 quoted in the footnote. 1

On appeal by plaintiffs, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, upon the finding that (1) defendants failed to prove
the extraordinary diligence required of carriers; and (2) Exhibits 2 and 3 did not effect a waiver of plaintiffs' right to
damages. Said appellate court, therefore, required defendants to pay plaintiffs P6,000.00 as indemnity for the child's
death; P2,000.00 as moral damages and P500.00 as attorney's fees, with interest from the date of its decision, (minus the
P150.00 that had been given to plaintiff Guillermo Monserrat, thru Exhibit 3).

In their petition for review by certiorari, the carrier and the driver raise the following issues: (1) whether in a contract of
carriage breached by the passenger's death, his parents may be granted moral damages; and (2) whether the sum of
P6,000.00 may be awarded as death indemnity for a child passenger. In their brief, they pose the following questions in
addition to the above issues; (3) was there a contract of carriage between the deceased child and petitioner transportation
company; (4) have petitioners rebutted the presumption that they have been negligent; (5) was the bus crowded; (6) was
the bus running fast when the tire exploded; (7) what caused the bursting of the tire; (8) was the bus floor weak; (9) was
the blow-out of the tire caso fortuito; and (10) was petitioners' liability cancelled by Exhibits 2 and 3?

The alleged lack of a contract of carriage between the deceased child and petitioner transportation company, if true, is a
complete defense against claimants' cause of action. However, the issue is now inarguable, it being partly factual, on
which the appellate court made its finding.

Respondents and the child were paying passengers in the bus; petitioners were duty bound to transport them, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons (Art. 1755, New Civil Code). Therein they failed. The child died because the
floor of the bus gave way; this reinforces the presumption that petitioners had neglected to provide a safe conveyance
(Art. 1756, New Civil Code). Evidence of the required extraordinary diligence was not introduced to rebut the presumption.

On the contrary, the appellate court found that the bus was overcrowded and overspeeding, and the floor thereof was
weak — persuasive indications of negligence; and reasoned out that the tire exploded due to one or a combination of the
following: "The tire was not strong and safe; the air pressure was not properly checked; the load was heavy; the excessive
speed of the bus must have overstrained the tire; and the high velocity generated heat in the tire which could have
expanded the already compressed air therein."2

Petitioners venture to guess that it was due either to accidental puncture by a sharp instrument, as a nail, or to latent
defect in the tire. Evidence should have been — but was not — presented to establish such defense.

Even conceding that the tire blow-out was accidental, we could still hold the carrier liable for failure to provide a safe floor
in the bus.

Exhibits 2 and 3 are not proof that petitioners have discharged their legal liability to claimants. What is expressed there is
the latter's belief — clearly erroneous — that petitioners are not liable to them and acknowledgment of the voluntary help
extended by petitioner transportation company. The belief is baseless. That respondents entertained such an ill-founded
impression is not to be wondered at. They are ignorant, illiterate, indigent, and, at the time they signed Exhibits 2 and 3,
thoroughly confused and distracted by the death of their child.

The minimum death indemnity is P3,0003, although this Court has in various instances granted P6,000.00. As for moral
damages, the carrier is liable therefor to the parents of a child who meets death while a passenger in any of the carrier's
vehicles (Arts. 2206 and 1764, New Civil Code). Since respondents are indigents, and have litigated as paupers, they
should be allowed attorney's fees of P500.00.

FOR THESE REASONS, the appealed decision is affirmed, with costs.

G.R. No. L-28014-15 May 29, 1970

SPOUSES MARCELO LANDINGIN and RACQUEL BOCASAS, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO. and MARCELO OLIGAN, defendants-appellants.

SPOUSES PEDRO GARCIA and EUFRACIA LANDINGIN, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO. and MARCELO OLIGAN, defendants-appellants.

VILLAMOR, J.:

Direct appeal on a question of law from the portion of the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila ordering
the defendants Pangasinan Transportation Co. (PANTRANCO) and Marcelo Oligan to pay the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. D-1468
(L-28014) the sum of P6,500.00, and the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1470 (L-28015) the sum of P3,500.00.

The complaints in said Civil Cases Nos. D-1468 and D-1470 were filed by the spouses Marcelo Landingin and
Racquel Bocasas, and the spouses Pedro Garcia and Eufracia Landingin, respectively, for damages allegedly
suffered by them in connection with the death of their respective daughter, Leonila Landingin and Estrella Garcia,
due to the alleged negligence of the defendants and/or breach of contract of carriage. In their complaints, plaintiffs
averred, among others, that in the morning of April 20, 1963, their above-mentioned daughters were among the
passengers in the bus driven by defendant Marcelo Oligan and owned and operated by defendant PANTRANCO on
an excursion trip from Dagupan City to Baguio City and back, that the bus was open on one side and enclosed on
the other, in gross violation of the rules of the Public Service Commission; that defendant PANTRANCO acted with
negligence, fraud and bad faith in pretending to have previously secured a special permit for the trip when in truth it
had not done so; that upon reaching an uphill point at Camp 8, Kennon Road, Baguio City, on the onward trip,
defendant driver, through utter lack of foresight, experience and driving knowledge, caused the bus to stall and stop
for a few moments; that through the said defendant's fault and mishandling, the motor ceased to function, causing
the bus to slide back unchecked; that when the said defendant suddenly swerved and steered the bus toward the
mountainside, Leonila and Estrella, together with several other passengers, were thrown out of the bus through its
open side unto the road, suffering serious injuries as a result of which Leonila and Estrella died at the hospital and
the same day; and that in connection with the incident, defendant driver had been charged with and convicted of
multiple homicide and multiple slight physical injuries on account of the death of Leonila and Estrella and of the
injuries suffered by four others, although it may be said, by way of parenthesis, that this case is now pending appeal
in a higher court. The plaintiffs prayed for awards of moral, actual and exemplary damages in the total sum of
P40,000.00 in Civil Case No. D-1468, and in the total sum of P25,000.00 in Civil Case No. D-1470 as well as
attorney's fees in the amounts of P5,000.00 and P4,000.00, respectively.

Defendants filed a joint answer to each of the two complaints alleging, among others, that at the time of the
accident, defendant driver was driving the bus at, the slow speed of about 10 kilometers per hour; that while the said
defendant was steering his bus toward the mountainside after hearing a sound coming from under the rear end of
the bus, Leonila and Estrella recklessly, and in disobedience to his shouted warnings and advice, jumped out of the
bus causing their heads to hit the road or pavement; that the bus was then being driven with extraordinary care,
prudence and diligence; that defendant PANTRANCO observed the care and diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent the accident as well as in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly of defendant driver;
and that the decision convicting the said defendant was not yet final, the same having been appealed to the Court of
Appeals where it was still pending.

By agreement of the parties, the two cases were tried jointly. On October 17, 1966, the court a quo rendered its
decision therein in which it made the following findings; that upon reaching the fatal spot at Camp 8, a sudden
snapping or breaking of metal below the floor of the bus was heard, and the bus abruptly stopped, rolling back a few
moments later; that as a result, some of the passengers jumped out of the bus, while others stepped down; that
defendant driver maneuvered the bus safely to and against the side of the mountain where its rear end was made to
rest, ensuring the safety of the many passengers still inside the bus; that while defendant driver as steering the bus
towards the mountainside, he advised the passengers not to jump, but to remain seated; that Leonila and Estrella
were not thrown out of the bus, but that they panicked and jumped out; that the malfunctioning of the motor resulted
from the breakage of the cross-joint; that there was no negligence on the part of either of the defendants; that only
the day before, the said cross-joint was duly inspected and found to be in order; and that defendant PANTRANCO
had exercised the requisite care in the selection and supervision of its employees, including the defendant driver.
The court concluded that "the accident was caused by a fortuitous event or an act of God brought about by some
extra-ordinary circumstances independent of the will of the Pantranco or its employees."

One would wonder why in the face of such factual findings and conclusion of the trial court, the defendants, instead
of the plaintiffs, should come to this Court on appeal. The answer lies in the dispositive portion of the decision, to
wit:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby renders judgment: (a)
Absolving the defendants from any liability on account of negligence on their part and therefore
dismissing the complaints in these two cases; (b) However, as stated above, the Court hereby
 orders the defendant Pantranco to pay to the plaintiffs spouses Marcelo Tandingin and Racquel
Bocasas in Civil Case No. D-1468 the amount of P6,500.00; and the amount of P3,500.00 to the
spouses Pedro Garcia and Eufracia Landingin in Civil Case No. D-1470, not in payment of liability
because of any negligence on the part of the defendants but as an expression of sympathy and
goodwill. (Emphasis supplied.)

As to what impelled the court below to include item (b) in the dispositive portion of its decision, can be gathered from
the penultimate paragraph of the decision, which reads:

However, there is evidence to the effect that an offer of P8,500.00 in the instant cases without any
admission of fault or negligence had been made by the defendant Pantranco and that actually in
Civil Case No. D-1469 for the death of Pacita Descalso, the other deceased passenger of the bus in
question, the heirs of the decease received P3,000.00 in addition to hospital and medical bills and
the coffin of the deceased for the dismissal of the said case without Pantranco accepting liability.
There was as a matter of fact during the pre-trial of these two cases a continuing offer of settlement
on the part of the defendant Pantranco without accepting any liability for such damages, and the
Court understood that the Pantranco would be willing still to pay said amounts even if these cases
were to be tried on the merits. It is well-known that the defendant Pantranco is zealous in the
preservation of its public relations. In the spirit therefore of the offer of the defendant Pantranco
aforesaid, to assuage the feelings of the herein plaintiffs an award of P6,500.00 for the spouses
Marcelo Landingin and Racquel Bocasas in Civil Case No. D-1468 whose daughter Leonila was,
when she died, a third-year Commerce student at the Far Eastern University, and P3,500.00 for the
spouses Pedro Garcia and Eufracia Landingin in Civil Case No. D-1470 whose daughter Estrella
was in the fourth year High at the Dagupan Colleges when she died, is hereby made in their favor.
This award is in addition to what Pantranco might have spent to help the parents of both deceased
after the accident.

Defendants-appellants complain that having found them to be absolutely free from fault or negligence, and having in
fact dismissed the complaints against them, the court should not have ordered them to assume any pecuniary
liability. There would be merit in his argument but for the fact that defendant-appellant PANTRANCO was guilty of
breach of contract of carriage. It will be noted that in each of the two complaints it is averred that two buses
including the one in which the two deceased girls were riding, were hired to transport the excursionist passengers
from Dagupan City to Baguio City, and return, and that the said two passengers did not reach destination safely.

As a common carrier, defendant-appellant PANTRANCO was duty bound to carry its passengers "safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all
the circumstances." (Article 1755, Civil Code.) Did defendant-appellant PANTRANCO measure up to the degree of
care and foresight required it under the circumstances? We think not. The court below found that the cross-joint of
the bus in which the deceased were riding broke, which caused the malfunctioning of the motor, which in turn
resulted in panic among some of the passengers. This is a finding of fact which this Court may not disturb. We are
of the opinion, however, that the lower court's conclusion drawn from that fact, i.e., that "the accident was caused by
a fortuitous event or an act of God brought about by some extraordinary circumstances independent of the will of the
Pantranco or its employees," is in large measure conjectural and speculative, and was arrived at without due regard
to all the circumstances, as required by Article 1755. In Lasam vs. Smith (45 Phil. 660), this Court held that an
accident caused by defects in the automobile is not a caso fortuito. The rationale of the carrier's liability is the fact
that "the passenger has neither the choice nor control over the carrier in the selection and use of the equipment and
appliances in use by the carrier." (Necesito, et al. vs. Paras, et al., 104 Phil. 75.)

When a passenger dies or is injured, the presumption is that the common carrier is at fault or that it acted
negligently (Article 1756). This presumption is only rebutted by proof on the carrier's part that it observed the
"extraordinary diligence" required in Article 1733 and the "utmost diligence of very cautious persons" required in
Article 1755 (Article 1756). In the instant case it appears that the court below considered the presumption rebutted
on the strength of defendants-appellants' evidence that only the day before the incident, the crossjoint in question
was duly inspected and found to be in order. It does not appear, however, that the carrier gave due regard for all the
circumstances in connection with the said inspection. The bus in which the deceased were riding was heavily laden
with passengers, and it would be traversing mountainous, circuitous and ascending roads. Thus the entire bus,
including its mechanical parts, would naturally be taxed more heavily than it would be under ordinary circumstances.
The mere fact that the bus was inspected only recently and found to be in order would not exempt the carrier from
liability unless it is shown that the particular circumstances under which the bus would travel were also considered.

In the premises, it was error for the trial court to dismiss the complaints. The awards made by the court should be
considered in the concept of damages for breach of contracts of carriage.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is modified as indicated above,
and defendant-appellant PANTRANCO is ordered to pay to plaintiffs-appellees the amounts stated in the judgment
appealed from, as damages for breach of contracts, with interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of the filing
of the complaints. Costs against defendant-appellant PANTRANCO.
G.R. No. L-47772 August 31, 1978

INOCENCIO TUGADE, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF PEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Manuel M. Camacho for petitioner.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Nathanael P. de Pano, Jr. and
Solicitor Francisco J. Bautista for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:

There is nothing impressive about this petition sinking to justify a review of a decision of respondent
Court of Appeals on the ground that instead of relying on what counsel considers applicable rulings
of: respondent Court,. the judgment was based, on a case decided by this Tribunal Moreover,
counsel for petitioner ignored earlier doctrines of this Court consistently holding that a mishap caused
by defective brakes could not be considered as fortuitous in character and thus caged for an acquittal
of the driver if subsequently haled to court. This Court, nonetheless, was persuaded to give due
course to the petition primarily for clarifying the state of the law and thus hopefully avoid any further
lurking doubt on the matter. It is quite evident that the reversal of the decision sought to be reviewed
is not justified.

The decision of respondent Court, with Justice Julia Agrava as ponente, set forth the relevant facto
thus: "At about 9:15 o'clock in the morning of January 4,, 1972, Rodolfo [Rayan- dayan] was driving a
Hodlen Kingswood car (the [Holden] car), plate No. 52-19V (L-Rizal '71) owned by the Sta. Ines Corp.
and assigned for use of its manager, an Ayala Avenue in Makati, Rizal, going northwards. At the
intersection of Ayala Avenue will Mabati Avenue, [Rayan-dayan] was going to turn left on Makati
Avenue but he stopped to wait for the left-turn signal and because a jeep in front of him was also at a
stop ... While in that sup position, the [Holden] car was bumped from behind by Blue Car Taxi bearing
Plate No. 55-71R (TX-QC '71) and by Inocencio [Tugade] causing damage to the [Holden] car, the
repairs of which cost P778.10 ... [Tugade] was then charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property. He pleaded not guilty and while admitting that the collision was caused by faulty
brakes of his taxicab, sought to expeculate himself with an explanation that this fault could not and
should not be traced to him. after trial, the lower court held: '[Accordingly], the court finds that
accused Inocencio Tugade guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property and hereby sentences him to pay a [fine of one thousand (P1,000.00)
pesos], with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in accordance with the provisions of
Article 39 of the Revised, Penal Code, as amended, to indemnify the Sta. Ines Mining Corporation in
the amount of P778.10 by way of actual damages; and to pay the costs.' While [Tugade] admitted the
facts of the case as set out above, he, nevertheless, appealed from the judgment reiterating that 'the
malfunctioning of the brakes at the time of the accident was due to a mechanical defect which even
the exercise of due diligence of a good father of a family cannot have prevented.' As the lower court
had found: "this witness ([Tugade]) testified that after the accident, he admitted that his taxicab
bumped the car on his front because the brakes of his vehicle malfunctioned; and that the document,
..., is the handwritten statement he prepared to this effect." 1 Respondent Court of Appeals, after
stating that upon review of the record, it agreed with the trial court, its decision affirming in toto their
judgment appealed from.

As noted at the outset, petitioner is not entitled to acquittal. His plea for the reversal of the decision
reached by respondent Court is not impressed with merit. At the most, as was likewise previously
mentioned, the fine imposed could be reduced.

1. Counsel for petitioner vigorously contends that respondent Court of Appeals ought not to have
applied the pronouncement in La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Co. vs. De Jesus 2 on the ground that
it was obiter dictum. That is not the case at all. A little more time and attention in the study of the
above decision could have resulted in its correct appraisal He would have realized then that
respondent Court acted correctly. This Tribunal passed squarely on the specific issue raised. The
opinion penned by the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Makalintal, is categorical: "Petitioner
maintains that a tire blow-out is a fortuitous event and gives rise to no liability for negligence, citing
the rulings of the Court of Appeals in Rodriguez V. Red Line Transportation Co., CA-G.R. No. 8136,
December 29, 1954, and People v. Palapal, CA-G.R. No. 18480, June 27, 1958. These rulings,
however, not only are not binding on this Court but were based on considerations, quite different from
those that obtain in the case at bar." 3 The above doctrine is controlling. The reference to the Court of
appeals decisions is of no moment. 4 It may be printed out that they were not ignored in the opinion of
Justice Agrava, six of its nine pages being devoted to distinguishing them. Even without the La
Mallorca ruling then, the decision of respondent Court sought to be reviewed can stand the test of
strict scrutiny. It is this Tribunal, not respondent Court of Appeals, that speaks authoritatively.

2. Respondent Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice at all. It could not have ruled in any
other way on the legal question raised. This Tribunal having spoken, its duty was to obey. It is as
simple as that. There is relevance to this excerpt from Barrera v. Barrera: 5 "The delicate task of
ascertaining the significance that attaches to a constitutional or statutory provision, an executive
order, a procedural norm or a municipal ordinance is committed to the judiciary. It thus discharges a
role no less crucial than that appertaining to the other two departments in the maintenance of the rule
of law. To assure stability in legal relations and avoid confusion, it has to speak with one voice. It
does so with finality, logically and rightly, through the highest judicial organ, this Court. What it says
then should be definitive and authoritative, binding on those occupying the lower ranks in the judicial
heirarchy. They have to defer and to submit." 6 The ensuing paragraph of the opinion in Barrera
further emphasizes the point: "Such a thought was reiterated in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes
and further emphasized in these words: "Judge Gaudencio Cloribel need not be reminded that the
Supreme Court, by tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has the last word on what the
law is it is the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy. There is only one Supreme Court from whose
decisions all other courts should take their bearings." 7

3. The lack of merit in this petition becomes even more obvious when it is recalled that the La
Mallorca decision did not enunciate a new principle. As far back as Lasam v. Smith, 8 promulgated
more than half a century ago, in 1924 to be exact, this Court has been committed to such a doctrine.
Thus; "As will be seen, these authorities agree that some extraordinary circumstance independent of
the will of the obligor, or of his employees, is an essential element of a caso fortuito. Turning to the
present case, it is at once apparent that this element is lacking. It is not suggested that the accident in
question was due to an act of God or to adverse road conditions which could not have been foreseen.
As far as the record shows, the accident was caused either by defects in the automobile or else
through the negligence of its driver. That is not a caso fortuito." 9 Lasam was cited with approval in the
two subsequent cases of Son v. Cebu Autobus Co. 10 and Necesito v. Paras. 11

WHEREFORE, The decision of respondent Court of Appeals of December 15, 1977 is affirmed. No
costs.