FF Cruz and co vs CA

Facts:

A fire broke up from the furniture shop of the petitioner in Caloocan city early September 6, 1974. Prior
to that, neighbor of the said shop requested that the petitioner should build a firewall but failed to do
so. The cause of the fire was never discovered. Private respondent got P35k from the insurance on their
house and contents thereof.

Issue:
Whether or not the 35k be deducted from the damages thereof

Ruling

Since P35k had already been claimed by the respondents, the court held that such amount should be
deducted from the award of damages in accordance with Art 2207 NCC

Art. 2207. If the plaintiff's property has been insured, and he has received indemnity from the insurance
company for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of, the
insurance company shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer or the person
who has violated the contract. If the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully cover the
injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the person causing the
loss or injury.

Having been indemnified by their insurer, private respondents are entitled only to recover the deficiency
from the petitioner.

Whether or not the insurer should exercise the rights of the insured to which it had been subrogated lies
solely within the former's sound discretion. Since the insurer is not a party to the case, its identity is not
of record and no claim is made on its behalf, the private respondent's insurer has to claim his right to
reimbursement of the P35,000.00 paid to the insured.

Marinduqe Iron Mines vs. The Workmen’s Compensation Comm

(https://www.scribd.com/document/94010078/Marinduque-Iron-Mines-Agents-vs-Workmen-s-
Compensation-Commission-Jal)

Cipriano vs CA
FACTS:
Elias S. Cipriano is a business owner engaged in rustproofing of vehicles. Private respondent Maclin
Electronics, Inc., through an employee, brought a 1990 model Kia Pride car to petitioner’s shop for
rustproofing. Sometime in 1991, a fire broke out and spread adjoining to petitioner’s rustproofing shop.
The fire destroyed both the shop and the restaurant, including private respondent’s Kia Pride. Private
respondent then sent a letter to petitioner, demanding reimbursement for the value of the car. In reply,
petitioner denied liability on the ground that the fire was a fortuitous event.
Private respondent filed a suit for the value of car and for damages citing that the vehicle was lost due
to the negligence and imprudence of the petitioner due to its failure to register his business with the DTI
under P.D. No. 1572 and to insure it as required in the rules implementing the Decree.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner’s failure to insure his business and vehicles constituted negligence, rendering him
liable for loss due to the risk required to be insured against.

HELD:
Yes. The answer is affirmative.

Violation of a statutory duty is negligence per se. Petitioner’s negligence is the source of his obligation.
He is held liable for for his negligence in not complying with a duty imposed on him by law. It is
therefore immaterial that the loss occasioned to private respondent was due to a fortuitous event, since
it was petitioner’s negligence in not insuring against the risk which was the proximate cause of the loss.
There is thus a statutory duty imposed on petitioner and it is for his failure to comply with this duty that
he was guilty or negligence rendering him liable for damages to private respondent. While the fire in this
case may be considered a fortuitous event, this circumstance cannot exempt petitioner from liability for
loss.

Anonuevo vs CA

Facts:
the accident in question occurred on 8 February 1989, at around nine in the evening, at the intersection
of Boni Avenue and Barangka Drive in Mandaluyong (now a city). Villagracia was traveling along Boni
Avenue on his... bicycle, while Añonuevo, traversing the opposite lane was driving his Lancer car with
plate number PJJ 359. The car was owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer of Añonuevo's
brother, Jonathan. Añonuevo was in the course of making a left turn towards Libertad Street when... the
collision occurred. Villagracia sustained serious injuries as a result, which necessitated his hospitalization
several times in 1989, and forced him to undergo four (4) operations.
Villagracia instituted an action for damages against Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc. and Añonuevo before
the RTC.
Trial on the civil action ensued, and in a Decision dated 9 March 1990, the RTC rendered judgment
against Procter and Gamble and Añonuevo, ordering them to pay Villagracia the amounts... of One
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150, 000.00). for actual damages, Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for
moral damages, and Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) for attorney's fees, as well as legal costs.
the Court of Appeals Fourth Division affirmed the RTC Decision in toto
Issues:
whether Article 2185 of the New Civil Code, which presumes the driver of a motor vehicle negligent if he
was violating a traffic... regulation at the time of the mishap, should apply by analogy to non-motorized
vehicles.
Should the doctrine of negligence per se apply to Villagracia, resulting from his violation of an
ordinance? It cannot be denied that the statutory purpose for requiring bicycles to be equipped with
headlights or horns is to promote road safety and to minimize the occurrence of... road accidents
involving bicycles.
Ruling:
Añonuevo points out that Villagracia's bicycle had no safety gadgets such as a horn or bell, or headlights,
as invoked by a 1948 municipal ordinance.
Nor was it duly registered... with the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, as required by the same
ordinance.
Villagracia does not dispute these allegations, which he admitted during the... trial, but directs our
attention instead to the findings of Añonuevo's own negligence.
Villagracia also contends that, assuming there was contributory negligence on his part, such would not
exonerate Añonuevo from payment of damages.
What Añonuevo seeks is for the Court to amend the explicit command of the legislature, as embodied in
Article 2185, a task beyond the pale of judicial power. The Court interprets, and not creates, the law.
However, since the Court is being asked to consider the matter, it might... as well examine whether
Article 2185 could be interpreted to include non-motorized vehicles.
If Añonuevo seriously contends that... the application of Article 2185 be expanded due to the greater
interaction today of all types of vehicles, such argument contradicts historical experience.
The more pertinent basis for the segregate... classification is the difference in type of these vehicles.
A motorized vehicle, unimpeded by... the limitations in physical exertion. is capable of greater speeds
and acceleration than non-motorized vehicles.
At the same time, motorized vehicles are more capable in inflicting greater injury or damage in the
event of an accident or collision.
Art. 2185 was not formulated to compel or ensure obeisance by all to traffic rules and regulations.
While the legal argument as formulated by Añonuevo is erroneous, his core contention that Villagracia
was negligent for... failure to comply with traffic regulations warrants serious consideration, especially
since the imputed negligent acts were admitted by Villagracia himself.
The generally accepted view is that the violation of a statutory duty constitutes negligence, negligence
as a matter of law, or negligence per se.
At face value, Villagracia's mishap was precisely the danger sought to be guarded against by the
ordinance he violated. Añonuevo argues that Villagracia's violation should bar the latter's recovery of
damages, and a simplistic interpretation of... negligence per se might vindicate such an argument.
There is the fact which we consider as proven, that Añonuevo was speeding as he made the left turn,
and such negligent act was the proximate cause of the accident. This reckless behavior would have
imperiled anyone unlucky enough within the... path of Añonuevo's car as it turned into the intersection,
whether they are fellow motorists, pedestrians, or cyclists.
Even assuming that Añonuevo had failed to see Villagracia because the bicycle was not equipped with
headlights, such lapse on the cyclist's part would not have acquitted the driver of his duty... to slow
down as he proceeded to make the left turn.
The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may arise from the logical consequences of
the facts leading to the mishap. The doctrine (and Article 2185, for that matter) is undeniably useful as a
judicial guide in adjudging liability, for it seeks to... impute culpability arising from the failure of the actor
to perform up to a standard established by a legal fiat. But the doctrine should not be rendered
inflexible so as to deny relief when in fact there is no causal relation between the statutory violation and
the injury... sustained. Presumptions in law, while convenient, are not intractable so as to forbid rebuttal
rooted in fact. After all, tort law is remunerative in spirit, aiming to provide compensation for the harm
suffered by those whose interests have been invaded owing to the conduct of... others.
Principles:
Thus, we cannot sustain the contention that Art. 2185 should apply to non-motorized vehicles, even if
by analogy. There is factual and legal basis that necessitates the distinction under Art. 2185
The mere fact of violation of a statute is not sufficient basis for an inference that such violation was the
proximate cause of the injury complained. However, if the very injury has happened which was intended
to be prevented by the statute, it has been held that... violation of the statute will be deemed to be the
proximate cause of the injury
Sanitary Steam[42] is controlling in this case. The bare fact that Villagracia was violating a municipal
ordinance at the time of the accident may have sufficiently established some degree of negligence on
his part, but such negligence is without... legal consequence unless it is shown that it was a contributing
cause of the injury.
The failure of the bicycle owner to comply with accepted safety practices, whether or not imposed by
ordinance or statute, is not sufficient to negate or mitigate recovery unless a causal connection is
established between such failure... and the injury sustained. The principle likewise finds affirmation in
Sanitary Steam, wherein we declared that the violation of a traffic statute must be shown as the
proximate cause of the injury, or that it substantially contributed thereto.

Yamada vs. Manila Railroad

In January 1913, Yamada et al hired a taxi owned and operated by Bachrach Garage so that they may
travel to Cavite Viejo. The trip was safe going to said place but when they were going back from said
place the taxi was hit by a train owned by Manila Railroad. Yamada et al sued the driver, Bachrach, and
Manila Railroad. They claimed that the driver was negligent as he did not slow down while he was
approaching the railroad tracks. The driver said there was no way for him to see the train coming
because of the tall growing bushes and trees. Bachrach said that it is not liable as an employer because
prior to hiring the driver, the driver has been of good record for 5 years and had had no traffic
infractions prior to the collision; and that the negligence of the driver is also imputable to Yamada et al
they being the ones in control of the vehicle; that Yamada et al should have controlled the driver and
instructed him to slow down. Manila Railroad said that it is not liable as well because its engineers
provided proper warning signals on their approach and that there were no tall trees or bushes at the
time of the accident.
Yamada’s counsel presented the president of Bachrach who alleged that all their drivers habitually drove
their taxis over railroad crossings without slowing down or investigating whether a train is coming – such
practice being allowed and tolerated by Bachrach.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bachrach Garage Manila railroad should be liable.
 HELD: It was established that the driver was negligent. A prudent driver should have slowed down
approaching a railroad crossing regardless if he could see a train or not regardless of the presence of tall
bushes.
Manila Railroad and its employees are not negligent as showed by the evidence which were
uncontroverted hence no liability can be had against them.
Bachrach Garage however is liable for damages as an employer. Although they did establish that they
have done their diligence in properly selecting their driver and in providing said driver with a good car,
they have failed to provide proper supervision and control over their employee. Bachrach Garage did
not perform its full duty when it furnished a safe and proper car and a driver with a long and satisfactory
record. It failed to comply with one of the essential requirements of the law of negligence in this
jurisdiction, that of supervision and instruction, including the promulgation of proper rules and
regulations and the formulation and publication of proper instructions for their guidance in cases where
such rules and regulations and instructions are necessary.
Bachrach’s contention that Yamada et al were also negligent because they failed to properly instruct the
driver is untenable. Those on a cab do not become responsible for the negligence of the driver if they
exercise no control over him further than to indicate the route they wish to travel or the places to which
they wish to go. Note that in order to impute negligence to a passenger, at least one of these two things
must exist:

1. That the driver is actually the passenger’s agent in all respect

2. The passengers have cooperated in producing the injury complained of.

Martinez vs. William Van Buskirk

Facts:

On the 11th day of September, 1908, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding a carromatain Ermita, Manila
when a delivery wagon owned by the defendant (used for the transportation of fodder and to which two
horses are attached), came from the opposite direction, while their carromata went close to the
sidewalk in order to let the delivery wagon pass by. However, instead of merely passing by, the horses
ran into the carromata occupied by the plaintiff with her child and overturned it, causing a serious cut
upon the plaintiff’s head.

The defendant contends that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the time of the accident,
was actually a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero. He also claims that the
cochero was tasked to deliver some forage at Calle Herran, and for that purpose the defendant’s
employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon for the purpose of
unloading the forage to be delivered. However, a vehicle passed by the driver and made noises that
frightened the horses causing them to run. The employee failed to stop the horses since he was thrown
upon the ground.

From the stated facts, the court ruled that the defendant was guilty of negligence. The court specifically
cited a paragraph of Article 1903 of the Civil Code. Hence, this is appeal to reverse such decision.
Issue: Whether or not the employer, who has furnished a gentle and tractable team (of horses) and a
trusty and capable driver, is liable for the negligence of such driver.

NO. The cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the manner described by
the evidence in this case. It is believed that acts or performances which, in a long time, have not been
destructive and which are approved by the society are considered as custom. Hence, they cannot be
considered as unreasonable or imprudent.

The reason why they have been permitted by the society is that they are beneficial rather that
prejudicial. One could not easily hold someone negligent because of some act that led to an injury or
accident. It would be unfair therefore to render the cochero negligent because of such circumstances.

The court further held that it is a universal practice of merchants during that time to deliver products
through horse-drawn vehicles; and it is also considered universal practice to leave the horses in the
manner in which they were left during the accident. It has been practiced for a long time and generally
has not been the cause of accidents or injuries the judgment is therefore reversed.

People vs. Vistan (https://www.scribd.com/document/359265828/People-vs-Vistan)

Negros Navigation Co Inc vs. CA

Facts:
Private respondent Ramon Miranda purchased from the Negros Navigation Co., Inc. four special cabin
tickets. The tickets were for Voyage No. 457-A of the M/V Don Juan, leaving Manila and going to
Bacolod.

Subsequently, the Don Juan collided off the Tablas Strait in Mindoro, with the M/T Tacloban City, an oil
tanker owned by the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) and the PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation (PNOC/STC). As a result, the M/V Don Juan sank. Several of her passengers perished in the
sea tragedy. The bodies of some of the victims were found and brought to shore, but the four members
of private respondents’ families were never found.

Private respondents filed a complaint against the Negros Navigation, the Philippine National Oil
Company (PNOC), and the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC), seeking damages for
the death. Petitioner, however, denied that the four relatives of private respondents actually boarded
the vessel as shown by the fact that their bodies were never recovered. Petitioner further averred that
the Don Juan was seaworthy and manned by a full and competent crew, and that the collision was
entirely due to the fault of the crew of the M/T Tacloban City.

In finding petitioner guilty of negligence and in failing to exercise the extraordinary diligence required of
it in the carriage of passengers, both the trial court and the appellate court relied on the findings of this
Court in Mecenas v. Intermediate Appellate Court, which case was brought for the death of other
passengers. In Mecenas, SC found petitioner guilty of negligence in (1) allowing or tolerating the ship
captain and crew members in playing mahjong during the voyage, (2) in failing to maintain the vessel
seaworthy and (3) in allowing the ship to carry more passengers than it was allowed to carry. Petitioner
is, therefore, clearly liable for damages to the full extent.
Petitioner criticizes the lower court’s reliance on the Mecenas case, arguing that, although this case
arose out of the same incident as that involved in Mecenas, the parties are different and trial was
conducted separately. Petitioner contends that the decision in this case should be based on the
allegations and defenses pleaded and evidence adduced in it or, in short, on the record of this case.

Issues:
1. Whether the ruling in Mecenas v. Court of Appeals, finding the crew members of petitioner to be
grossly negligent in the performance of their duties, is binding in this case;

2. Whether the award for damages in Mecenas v. Court of Appeals is applicable in this case.

Held:
1. No. The contention is without merit.

Adherence to the Mecenas case is dictated by this Court’s policy of maintaining stability in
jurisprudence. Where, as in this case, the same questions relating to the same event have been put
forward by parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court,
the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.

2. No, it is not applicable.

Petitioner contends that, assuming that the Mecenas case applies, private respondents should be
allowed to claim only P43,857.14 each as moral damages because in the Mecenascase, the amount of
P307,500.00 was awarded to the seven children of the Mecenas couple. Here is where the principle of
stare decisis does not apply in view of differences in the personal circumstances of the victims. For that
matter, differentiation would be justified even if private respondents had joined the private
respondents in the Mecenas case.

The doctrine of stare decisis works as a bar only against issues litigated in a previous case. Where the
issue involved was not raised nor presented to the court and not passed upon by the court in the
previous case, the decision in the previous case is not stare decisis of the question presently presented.

The Mecenas case cannot be made the basis for determining the award for attorney’s fees. The award
would naturally vary or differ in each case.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with modification and petitioner is
ORDERED to pay private respondents damages.

Cang vs. Cullen