EN BANC

[G.R. No. 162144-54. November 13, 2012.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , petitioner, vs . HON. MA. THERESA L.

DELA TORRE-YADAO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 81,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, HON. MA. NATIVIDAD M.
DIZON, in her capacity as Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, PANFILO M. LACSON, JEWEL F. CANSON,
ROMEO M. ACOP, FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., MICHAEL RAY B.
AQUINO, CEZAR O. MANCAO II, ZOROBABEL S. LAURELES, GLENN
G. DUMLAO, ALMARIO A. HILARIO, JOSE ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, GIL
C. MENESES, ROLANDO ANDUYAN, JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL,
RICARDO G. DANDAN, CEASAR TANNAGAN, VICENTE P. ARNADO,
ROBERTO T. LANGCAUON, ANGELITO N. CAISIP, ANTONIO FRIAS,
CICERO S. BACOLOD, WILLY NUAS, JUANITO B. MANAOIS, VIRGILIO
V. PARAGAS, ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, CECILIO T. MORITO,
REYNALDO C. LAS PIÑAS, WILFREDO G. CUARTERO, ROBERTO O.
AGBALOG, OSMUNDO B. CARIÑO, NORBERTO LASAGA, LEONARDO
GLORIA, ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG, ELMER FERRER and ROMY CRUZ ,
respondents.

DECISION

ABAD , J : p

This case, which involves the alleged summary execution of suspected members of the
Kuratong Baleleng Gang, is once again before this Court this time questioning, among
other things, the trial court's determination of the absence of probable cause and its
dismissal of the criminal actions. 1
The Facts and the Case
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, the combined forces of the Philippine National
Police's Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (PNP ABRITG) composed of Task
Force Habagat (then headed by Police Chief Superintendent Pan lo M. Lacson), Traf c
Management Command ([TMC] led by then Police Senior Superintendent Francisco G.
Zubia, Jr.), Criminal Investigation Command (led by then Police Chief Superintendent
Romeo M. Acop), and National Capital Region Command (headed by then Police Chief
Superintendent Jewel F. Canson) killed 11 suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng
Gang 2 along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City.
Subsequently, SPO2 Eduardo Delos Reyes of the Criminal Investigation Command told the
press that it was a summary execution, not a shoot-out between the police and those who
were slain. After investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs absolved all the
police of cers involved, including respondents Pan lo M. Lacson, Jewel F. Canson, Romeo
M. Acop, Francisco G. Zubia, Jr., Michael Ray B. Aquino, Cezar O. Mancao II, and 28 others
(collectively, the respondents). 3 On review, however, the Of ce of the Ombudsman
reversed the finding and filed charges of murder against the police officers involved before
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 the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases 23047 to 57, except that in the cases of respondents
Zubia, Acop, and Lacson, their liabilities were downgraded to mere accessory. On
arraignment, Lacson pleaded not guilty. CAcDTI

Upon respondents' motion, the Sandiganbayan ordered the transfer of their cases to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City on the ground that none of the principal accused
had the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. Pending the resolution of the Of ce of the
Special Prosecutor's motion for reconsideration of the transfer order, Congress passed
Republic Act (R.A.) 8249 that expanded the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction by deleting the
word "principal" from the phrase "principal accused" to apply to all pending cases where
trial had not begun. As a result of this new law, the Sandiganbayan opted to retain and try
the Kuratong Baleleng murder cases.
Respondent Lacson challenged the constitutionality of R.A. 8249 in G.R. 128096 4 but this
Court upheld its validity. Nonetheless, the Court ordered the transfer of the trial of the
cases to the RTC of Quezon City since the amended informations contained no allegations
that respondents committed the offenses charged in relation to, or in the discharge of,
their official functions as required by R.A. 8249.
Before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 81, then presided over by Judge Wenceslao Agnir,
Jr., could arraign respondents in the re-docketed Criminal Cases Q-99-81679 to 89,
however, SPO2 Delos Reyes and the other prosecution witnesses recanted their af davits.
Some of the victims' heirs also executed af davits of desistance. These prompted the
respondents to le separate motions for the determination of probable cause before the
issuance of warrants of arrests.
On March 29, 1999 the RTC of Quezon City ordered the provisional dismissal of the cases
for lack of probable cause to hold the accused for trial following the recantation of the
principal prosecution witnesses and the desistance of the private complainants. DHAcET

Two years later or on March 27, 2001 PNP Director Leandro R. Mendoza sought to revive
the cases against respondents by requesting the Department of Justice (DOJ) to conduct
another preliminary investigation in their cases on the strength of the af davits of P/Insp.
Ysmael S. Yu and P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos. In response, then DOJ Secretary Hernando B.
Perez constituted a panel of prosecutors to conduct the requested investigation.
Invoking their constitutional right against double jeopardy, Lacson and his co-accused filed
a petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary injunction before the RTC of Manila in Civil Case 01-100933. In an Order dated
June 5, 2001, that court denied the plea for temporary restraining order. Thus, on June 6,
2001 the panel of prosecutors found probable cause to hold Lacson and his co-accused
liable as principals for 11 counts of murder, resulting in the ling of separate informations
against them in Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 81,
now presided over by respondent Judge Ma. Theresa L. Yadao.
On the same day, respondent Lacson led a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals (CA), assailing the RTC of Manila's order which allowed the renewed preliminary
investigation of the murder charges against him and his co-accused. Lacson also led with
the RTC of Quezon City a motion for judicial determination of probable cause. But on June
13, 2001 he sought the suspension of the proceedings in that court.
In the meantime, the CA issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the RTC of Quezon
City from issuing warrants of arrest or conducting any proceeding in Criminal Cases 01-
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 101102 to 12 before it. On August 24, 2001 the CA rendered a Decision, granting Lacson's
petition on the ground of double jeopardy since, although the dismissal of Criminal Cases
Q-99-81679 to 89 was provisional, such dismissal became permanent two years after
when they were not revived. CTcSAE

Upon the prosecution's appeal to this Court in G.R. 149453, 5 the Court ruled that, based
on the record, Lacson failed to prove compliance with the requirements of Section 8, Rule
117 governing provisional dismissals. The records showed that the prosecution did not
le a motion for provisional dismissal and, for his part, respondent Lacson had merely led
a motion for judicial determination of probable cause. Nowhere did he agree to some
proposal for a provisional dismissal of the cases. Furthermore, the heirs of the victims had
no notice of any motion for such provisional dismissal.
The Court thus set aside the CA Decision of August 24, 2001 and directed the RTC of
Quezon City to try the cases with dispatch. On motion for reconsideration by respondent
Lacson, the Court ordered the re-raf e of the criminal cases to a heinous crimes court.
Upon re-raffle, however, the cases still went to Branch 81, which as already stated was now
presided over by Judge Yadao.
On October 12, 2003 the parents of two of the victims submitted birth certi cates
showing that they were minors. Apparently reacting to this, the prosecution amended the
informations to show such minority and asked respondent Executive Judge Ma. Natividad
M. Dizon to recall the assignment of the cases to Branch 81 and re-raf e them to a family
court. The request for recall was denied.
On October 20, 2003 the prosecution led an omnibus motion before Branch 81, praying
for the re-raf e of Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 to the family courts in view of the
changes in the two informations. On October 24, 2003 the prosecution also led its
consolidated comment ex-abundanti cautela on the motions to determine probable cause.
On November 12, 2003 6 Judge Yadao issued an order, denying the prosecution's motion
for re-raf e to a family court on the ground that Section 5 of R.A. 8369 applied only to
living minors. She also granted the motions for determination of probable cause and
dismissed the cases against the respondents since the af davits of the prosecution
witnesses were inconsistent with those they submitted in the preliminary investigations
before the Ombudsman for the crime of robbery. DTAHSI

On November 25, 2003 the prosecution led a veri ed motion to recuse or disqualify
Judge Yadao and for reconsideration of her order. It also led an administrative complaint
against her for dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service,
manifest partiality, and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. 7 On January 14, 2004, the
prosecution led an urgent supplemental motion for compulsory disquali cation with
motion for cancellation of the hearing on motion for reconsideration.
On January 21, 2004 Judge Yadao issued an order, denying the motion to recuse her,
prompting the prosecution to appeal from that order. Further, on January 22, 2004 Judge
Yadao issued another order, denying the prosecution's motion for reconsideration of the
Order dated November 12, 2003 that dismissed the action against the respondents. In
response, the prosecution led a notice of appeal from the same. Finally, on January 26,
2004 Judge Yadao issued an order, denying the prosecution's motion for reconsideration
of its January 16, 2004 Order not only for lack of merit but also for having become moot
and academic.

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 On February 16, 2004 the prosecution withdrew ex-abundanti cautela the notices of appeal
that it led in the cases. Subsequently, on March 3, 2004 it led the present special civil
action of certiorari.
The Issues Presented
The prosecution presents the following issues:
1. Whether or not Executive Judge Dizon gravely abused her discretion in
allowing Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 to be re-raf ed to other
than among the RTC of Quezon City's family courts.
2. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she
took cognizance of Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 contrary to the
prosecution's view that such cases fell under the jurisdiction of family
courts.
3. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she
did not inhibit and disqualify herself from taking cognizance of the
cases. HDAECI

4. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she
dismissed the criminal actions on the ground of lack of probable
cause and barred the presentation of additional evidence in support
of the prosecution's motion for reconsideration.
5. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she
adopted certain policies concerning the conduct of hearings in her
court.
The Court's Rulings
Before addressing the above issues, the Court notes respondents' contention that the
prosecution's resort to special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is improper. Since the
trial court dismissed the criminal actions against respondents, the prosecution's remedy
was to appeal to the CA from that order of dismissal.
Ordinarily, the proper remedy from an order dismissing an action is an appeal. 8 Here, the
prosecution in fact led a notice of appeal from such an order issued in the subject cases.
But it reconsidered its action and withdrew that notice, believing that appeal was not an
effective, speedy, and adequate remedy. 9 In other words, the prosecution's move was not
a case of forgotten remedy but a conscious resort to another based on a belief that
respondent Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion in issuing her various orders and
t hat certiorari under Rule 65 was the proper and all-encompassing remedy for the
prosecution. The Court is not prepared to say that the remedy is altogether implausible as
to throw out the petition outright.
Still, the Court notes that the prosecution skipped the CA and led its action directly with
this Court, ignoring the principle of judicial hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme
Court, the CA, and the RTCs have concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, such
concurrence does not give the People the unrestricted freedom of choice of forum. 1 0 In
any case, the immense public interest in these cases, the considerable length of time that
has passed since the crime took place, and the numerous times these cases have come
before this Court probably warrant a waiver of such procedural lapse. DASCIc

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 1. Raffle of the Cases
The prosecution points out that the RTC of Quezon City Executive Judge gravely abused
her discretion when she placed Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 under a separate
category which did not restrict their raf e to the city's special criminal and family courts in
accordance with SC Administrative Order 36-96. Further, the prosecution points out that
she violated Administrative Order 19-98 when Branches 219 and 102 were left out of the
raf e. The presiding judges of these two branches, both heinous crimes courts eligible to
receive cases by raffle, had just been appointed to the CA.
The records of the cases show nothing irregular in the conduct of the raf e of the subject
cases. The raf e maintained a separate list for criminal and civil cases. Criminal cases
cognizable by special criminal courts were separately listed. Criminal Cases 01-101102 to
12 were given a separate heading, "Re-Raf e," but there was nothing irregular in this since it
merely indicated that the cases were not being raffled for the first time.
The Executive Judge did not err in leaving out Branches 219 and 102 from raf e since
these branches remained without regularly appointed judges. Although the pairing judges
of these branches had authority to act on incidental, interlocutory, and urgent matters, this
did not mean that such branches should already be included in the raffle of cases.
Parenthetically, the prosecution was represented during the raf e yet it did not then object
to the manner by which it was conducted. The prosecution raised the question only when it
filed this petition, a clear afterthought.
2. Jurisdiction of Family Courts
The prosecution points out that, although this Court's October 7, 2003 Resolution directed
a re-raf e of the cases to a heinous crimes court, the prosecution in the meantime
amended the informations to re ect the fact that two of the murder victims were minors.
For this reason, the Executive Judge should have raf ed the cases to a family court
pursuant to Section 5 of R.A. 8369.
The Court is not impervious to the provisions of Section 5 of R.A. 8369, that vests in family
courts jurisdiction over violations of R.A. 7610, which in turn covers murder cases where
the victim is a minor. Thus: aTcSID

Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. — The Family Courts shall have

exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18)
years of age but not less than nine (9) years of age, or where one or more of
the victims is a minor at the time of the commission of the offense :
Provided, That if the minor is found guilty, the court shall promulgate sentence
and ascertain any civil liability which the respondent may have incurred.
(Emphasis supplied)

Undoubtedly, in vesting in family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases
involving minors, the law but seeks to protect their welfare and best interests. For this
reason, when the need for such protection is not compromised, the Court is able to relax
the rule. In several cases, 1 1 for instance, the Court has held that the CA enjoys concurrent
jurisdiction with the family courts in hearing petitions for habeas corpus involving minors.
Here, the two minor victims, for whose interests the people wanted the murder cases
moved to a family court, are dead. As respondents aptly point out, there is no living minor
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 in the murder cases that require the special attention and protection of a family court. In
fact, no minor would appear as party in those cases during trial since the minor victims are
represented by their parents who had become the real private offended parties.
3. Inhibition of Judge Yadao
The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao committed grave abuse of discretion in failing
to inhibit herself from hearing the cases against the respondents.
The rules governing the disquali cation of judges are found, rst, in Section 1, Rule 137 of
the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 1. Disquali cation of judges. — No judge or judicial of cer shall sit in
any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee,
creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth
degree of consanguinity or af nity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any
inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the
written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the
record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above. aCcSDT

and in Rule 3.12, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which states:
Rule 3.12. — A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These cases include among others,
proceedings where:
(a) the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceeding;
xxx xxx xxx

(e) the judge knows the judge's spouse or child has a nancial interest, as
heir, legatee, creditor, duciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy
or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially
affected by the outcome of the proceeding. In every instance, the judge shall
indicate the legal reason for inhibition.

The rst paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 and Rule 3.12, Canon 3 provide for the
compulsory disquali cation of a judge while the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137
provides for his voluntary inhibition.
The matter of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion
on the part of the judge since he is in a better position to determine whether a given
situation would unfairly affect his attitude towards the parties or their cases. The mere
imputation of bias, partiality, and prejudgment is not enough ground, absent clear and
convincing evidence that can overcome the presumption that the judge will perform his
duties according to law without fear or favor. The Court will not disqualify a judge based
on speculations and surmises or the adverse nature of the judge's rulings towards those
who seek to inhibit him. 1 2
Here, the prosecution contends that Judge Yadao should have inhibited herself for
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 improperly submitting to a public interview on the day following her dismissal of the
criminal cases against the respondents. But the Court nds nothing basically
reprehensible in such interview. Judge Yadao's dismissal of the multiple murder cases
aroused natural public interest and stirred the media into frenzy for correct information.
Judge Yadao simply accommodated, not sought, the requests for such an interview to
clarify the basis of her order. There is no allegation that she gave out false information. To
be sure, the prosecution never once accused her of making public disclosures regarding
the merits of those cases prior to her order dismissing such cases. TDCaSE

The prosecution also assails as constituting bias Judge Yadao's statement that a very
close relative stood to be promoted if she was to issue a warrant of arrest against the
respondents. But this statement merely shows that she cannot be dissuaded by some
relative who is close to her. How can this constitute bias? Besides, there is no evidence
that the close relative she referred to was her spouse or child which would be a mandatory
ground for disqualification.
Further, the prosecution claims that Judge Yadao prejudged its motion for reconsideration
when she said in her comment to the administrative complaint against her that such
motion was merely the prosecution's stubborn insistence on the existence of probable
cause against the respondents. The comment could of course not be regarded as a
prejudgment of the issue since she had precisely already issued an order holding that the
complainant's evidence failed to establish probable cause against the respondents. And
there is nothing wrong about characterizing a motion for reconsideration as a "stubborn"
position taken by the party who led it. Judge Yadao did not characterize the motion as
wholly unjustified at the time she filed her comment.
4. Dismissal of the Criminal Cases
The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she set the
motions for determination of probable cause for hearing, deferred the issuance of
warrants of arrest, and allowed the defense to mark its evidence and argue its case. The
prosecution stresses that under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court Judge Yadao's
duty was to determine probable cause for the purpose of issuing the arrest warrants
solely on the basis of the investigating prosecutor's resolution as well as the informations
and their supporting documents. And, if she had some doubts as to the existence of
probable cause, the rules required her to order the investigating prosecutor to present
additional evidence to support the finding of probable cause within five days from notice.
Rather than take limited action, said the prosecution, Judge Yadao dug up and adopted the
Ombudsman's ndings when the latter conducted its preliminary investigation of the crime
of robbery in 1996. Judge Yadao gave weight to the af davits submitted in that earlier
preliminary investigation when such documents are proper for presentation during the trial
of the cases. The prosecution added that the af davits of P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos and
SPO1 Wilmor B. Medes reasonably explained the prior inconsistent af davits they
submitted before the Ombudsman.
The general rule of course is that the judge is not required, when determining probable
cause for the issuance of warrants of arrests, to conduct a de novo hearing. The judge only
needs to personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor nding a probable
cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. 1 3 DcHSEa

But here, the prosecution conceded that their own witnesses tried to explain in their new
af davits the inconsistent statements that they earlier submitted to the Of ce of the
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 Ombudsman. Consequently, it was not unreasonable for Judge Yadao, for the purpose of
determining probable cause based on those af davits, to hold a hearing and examine the
inconsistent statements and related documents that the witnesses themselves brought up
and were part of the records. Besides, she received no new evidence from the
respondents. 1 4
The public prosecutor submitted the following af davits and documents along with the
criminal informations to enable Judge Yadao to determine the presence of probable cause
against the respondents:
1. P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu's af davit of March 24, 2001 1 5 in which he said that on May
17, 1995 respondent Canson, NCR Command Head, ordered him to form two teams that
would go after suspected Kuratong Baleleng Gang members who were seen at the
Superville Subdivision in Parañaque City. Yu headed the assault team while Marlon Sapla
headed the perimeter defense. After the police team apprehended eight men inside the
safe house, it turned them over to their investigating unit. The following day, Yu just learned
that the men and three others were killed in a shoot-out with the police in Commonwealth
Avenue in Quezon City.
2. P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos' af davit of March 24, 2001 1 6 in which he said that he
was part of the perimeter defense during the Superville operation. After the assault team
apprehended eight male suspects, it brought them to Camp Crame in two vans. Ramos
then went to the of ce of respondent Zubia, TMC Head, where he saw respondents
Lacson, Acop, Laureles, Villacorte and other police officers. aSAHCE

According to Ramos, Zubia said that the eight suspects were to be brought to
Commonwealth Avenue and killed in a supposed shoot-out and that this action had been
cleared with higher authorities, to which remark Lacson nodded as a sign of approval.
Before Ramos left the meeting, Lacson supposedly told him, "baka may mabuhay pa
diyan." Ramos then boarded an L-300 van with his men and four male suspects. In the early
morning of May 18, 1995, they executed the plan and gunned down the suspects. A few
minutes later, P/S Insp. Glenn G. Dumlao and his men arrived and claimed responsibility for
the incident.
3. SPO1 Wilmor B. Medes' af davit of April 24, 2001 1 7 in which he corroborated
Ramos' statements. Medes said that he belonged to the same team that arrested the eight
male suspects. He drove the L-300 van in going to Commonwealth Avenue where the
suspects were killed.
4. Mario C. Enad's af davit of August 8, 1995 1 8 in which he claimed having served as
TMC civilian agent. At around noon of May 17, 1995, he went to Superville Subdivision
together with respondents Dumlao, Tannagan, and Nuas. Dumlao told Enad to stay in the
car and observe what went on in the house under surveillance. Later that night, other police
of cers arrived and apprehended the men in the house. Enad went in and saw six men lying
on the oor while the others were handcuffed. Enad and his companions left Sucat in the
early morning of May 18, 1995. He fell asleep along the way but was awaken by gunshots.
He saw Dumlao and other police of cers re their guns at the L-300 van containing the
apprehended suspects.
5. SPO2 Noel P. Seno's af davit of May 31, 2001 1 9 in which he corroborated what
Ramos said. Seno claimed that he was part of the advance party in Superville Subdivision
and was also in Commonwealth Avenue when the suspected members of the Kuratong
Baleleng Gang were killed.
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 6. The PNP ABRITG After Operations Report of May 31, 1995 2 0 which narrated the
events that took place on May 17 and 18, 1995. This report was submitted by Lacson,
Zubia, Acop and Canson.
7. The PNP Medico-Legal Reports 2 1 which stated that the suspected members of the
Kuratong Baleleng Gang tested negative for gunpowder nitrates.
The Court agrees with Judge Yadao that the above af davits and reports, taken together
with the other documents of record, fail to establish probable cause against the
respondents. AHCaED

First. Evidently, the case against respondents rests on the testimony of Ramos,
corroborated by those of Medes, Enad, and Seno, who supposedly heard the commanders
of the various units plan the killing of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang members somewhere in
Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City and actually execute such plan. Yu's testimony is
limited to the capture of the gang members and goes no further. He did not see them
killed.
Second. Respecting the testimonies of Ramos, Medes, Enad, and Seno, the prosecution's
own evidence — the PNP ABRITG's After Operations Report of May 31, 1995 — shows that
these men took no part in the operations against the Kuratong Baleleng Gang members.
The report included a comprehensive list of police personnel from Task Force Habagat
(Lacson), Traf c Management Command (Zubia), Criminal Investigation Command (Acop),
and National Capital Region Command (Canson) who were involved. The names of Ramos,
Medes, Enad, and Seno were not on that list. Notably, only Yu's name, among the new set
of witnesses, was on that list. Since an after-battle report usually serves as basis for
commendations and promotions, any omitted name would hardly have gone unchallenged.
Third. Ramos, whose story appeared to be the most signi cant evidence against the
respondents, submitted in the course of the preliminary investigation that the Of ce of the
Ombudsman conducted in a related robbery charge against the police of cers involved a
counter-af davit. He claimed in that counter-af davit that he was neither in Superville
Subdivision nor Commonwealth Avenue during the Kuratong Baleleng operations since he
was in Bulacan on May 17, 1995 and at his home on May 18. 2 2 Notably, Medes claimed in
a joint counter-af davit that he was on duty at the TMC headquarters at Camp Crame on
May 17 and 18. 2 3
Fourth. The Of ce of the Ombudsman, looking at the whole picture and giving credence to
Ramos and Medes' statements, dismissed the robbery case. More, it excluded Ramos
from the group of of cers that it charged with the murder of the suspected members of
the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. Under the circumstances, the Court cannot be less skeptical
than Judge Yadao was in doubting the sudden reversal after six years of testimony of
these witnesses.
Of course, Yu may have taken part in the subject operation but, as he narrated, his role was
limited to cornering and arresting the suspected Kuratong Baleleng Gang members at
their safe house in Superville Subdivision. After his team turned the suspects over to an
investigating unit, he no longer knew what happened to them. HIaSDc

Fifth. True, the PNP Medico-Legal Reports showed that the Kuratong Baleleng Gang
members tested negative for gunpowder nitrates. But this nding cannot have any legal
signi cance for the purpose of the preliminary investigation of the murder cases against
the respondents absent suf cient proof that they probably took part in gunning those
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 gang members down.
The prosecution points out that, rather than dismiss the criminal action outright, Judge
Yadao should have ordered the panel of prosecutors to present additional evidence
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. — (a) By the Regional Trial Court. —
Within ten (10) days from the ling of the complaint or information, the judge
shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly
fails to establish probable cause. If he nds probable cause, he shall issue a
warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested
pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary
investigation or when the complaint or information was led pursuant to section
7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may
order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within ve (5) days from
notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the
filing of the complaint of information.

Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options upon the ling
of the criminal information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to
establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest if it nds probable cause; and (3)
order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within ve days from notice in case of
doubt as to the existence of probable cause. 2 4 ETCcSa

But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is not mandatory.
The court's rst option under the above is for it to "immediately dismiss the case if the
evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause." That is the situation here: the
evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause against the respondents.
It is only "in case of doubt on the existence of probable cause" that the judge may order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within ve days from notice. But that is not the
case here. Discounting the af davits of Ramos, Medes, Enad, and Seno, nothing is left in
the record that presents some doubtful probability that respondents committed the crime
charged. PNP Director Leandro Mendoza sought the revival of the cases in 2001, six years
after it happened. It would have been ridiculous to entertain the belief that the police could
produce new witnesses in the five days required of the prosecution by the rules.
In the absence of probable cause to indict respondents for the crime of multiple murder,
they should be insulated from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial. 2 5
5. Policies Adopted for Conduct of Court Hearing
The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao arbitrarily recognized only one public prosecutor
and one private prosecutor for all the offended parties but allowed each of the counsels
representing the individual respondents to be heard during the proceedings before it. She
also unjustifiably prohibited the prosecution's use of tape recorders.
But Section 5, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court ample inherent and
administrative powers to effectively control the conduct of its proceedings. Thus: HaSEcA

Sec. 5. Inherent powers of court. — Every court shall have power:

xxx xxx xxx
(b) To enforce order in proceedings before it, or before a person or persons
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 empowered to conduct a judicial investigation under its authority;
xxx xxx xxx
(d) To control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial of cers,
and of all other persons in any manner connected with a case before it, in every
manner appertaining thereto;

xxx xxx xxx

(g) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them
conformable to law and justice;
xxx xxx xxx

There is nothing arbitrary about Judge Yadao's policy of allowing only one public
prosecutor and one private prosecutor to address the court during the hearing for
determination of probable cause but permitting counsels representing the individual
accused to do so. A criminal action is prosecuted under the direction and control of the
public prosecutor. 2 6 The burden of establishing probable cause against all the accused is
upon him, not upon the private prosecutors whose interests lie solely in their clients'
damages claim. Besides, the public and the private prosecutors take a common position
on the issue of probable cause. On the other hand, each of the accused is entitled to adopt
defenses that are personal to him.
As for the prohibition against the prosecution's private recording of the proceedings,
courts usually disallows such recordings because they create an unnecessary distraction
and if allowed, could prompt every lawyer, party, witness, or reporter having some interest
in the proceeding to insist on being given the same privilege. Since the prosecution makes
no claim that the of cial recording of the proceedings by the court's stenographer has
been insuf cient, the Court nds no grave abuse of discretion in Judge Yadao's policy
against such extraneous recordings. cICHTD

WHEREFORE , the Court DISMISSES this petition and AFFIRMS the following assailed
Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81 in Criminal Cases 01-101102
to 12:
1. the Order dated November 12, 2003 which denied the prayer for re-
raf e, granted the motions for determination of probable cause, and
dismissed the criminal cases;
2. the Order dated January 16, 2004 which granted the motion of the
respondents for the immediate resolution of the three pending
incidents before the court;
3. the Order dated January 21, 2004 which denied the motion to recuse
and the urgent supplemental motion for compulsory disqualification;
4. the Order dated January 22, 2004 which denied the motion for
reconsideration of the Order dated November 12, 2003; and
5. the Order dated January 26, 2004 which denied the motion for
reconsideration of the January 16, 2004 Order.
SO ORDERED .

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 Sereno, C.J., Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., took no part, prior inhibition in related cases.

Footnotes

1. See Lacson v. The Executive Secretary, 361 Phil. 251 (1999); People v. Lacson, 432 Phil.
113 (2002); People v. Lacson, 448 Phil. 317 (2003).
2. Namely: Manuel Montero, Rolando Siplon, Sherwyn Abalora, Ray Abalora, Joel Amora,
Hilario Jevy Redillas, Meleubren Sorronda, Pacifico Montero, Jr., Welbor Elcamel, Carlito
Alap-ap and Tirso Daig @ Alex Neri.

3. Namely: Zorobabel S. Laureles, Glenn G. Dumlao, Almario A. Hilario, Jose Erwin T.

Villacorte, Gil C. Meneses, Rolando Anduyan, Joselito T. Esquivel, Ricardo G. Dandan,
Ceasar Tannagan, Vicente P. Arnado, Roberto T. Langcauon, Angelito N. Caisip, Antonio
Frias, Cicero S. Bacolod, Willy Nuas, Juanito B. Manaois, Virgilio V. Paragas, Rolando R.
Jimenez, Cecilio T. Morito, Reynaldo C. Las Piñas, Wilfredo G. Cuartero, Roberto O.
Agbalog, Osmundo B. Cariño, Norberto Lasaga, Leonardo Gloria, Alejandro G. Liwanag,
Elmer Ferrer, and Romy Cruz.
4. Lacson v. The Executive Secretary, supra note 1.
5. People v. Lacson, supra note 1.
6. Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 235-251.
7. Id., Vol. II, pp. 768-796; Dismissed on May 17, 2004, see rollo, Vol. IV, pp. 3225-3226.
8. Santos v. Orda, Jr., G.R. No. 189402, May 6, 2010, 620 SCRA 375, 383.
9. Rollo, Vol. II, p. 1244.
10. AAA v. Carbonell, G.R. No. 171465, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 496, 506.
11. Madriñan v. Madriñan, G.R. No. 159374, July 12, 2007, 527 SCRA 487; Thornton v.
Thornton, 480 Phil. 224 (2004).
12. Spouses Abrajano v. Heirs of Augusto F. Salas, Jr., 517 Phil. 663, 674-675 (2006).
13. AAA v. Carbonell, supra note 10, at 508-509; De Joya v. Judge Marquez, 516 Phil. 717,
722 (2006).
14. Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 235-251.
15. Id. at 600-601.
16. Id. at 632-634.
17. Id. at 665-666.
18. Id. at 667-675.
19. Id. at 676-680.
20. Id. at 624-631.
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 21. Id. at 618-622; Vol. II, pp. 685-706.
22. Id., Vol. III, pp. 2076-2078.
23. Id. at 2081-2082.
24. Ong v. Genio, G.R. No. 182336, December 23, 2009, 609 SCRA 188, 197.
25. Santos v. Orda, Jr., supra note 8, at 386-387.
26. Mobilia Products, Inc. v. Umezawa, 493 Phil. 85, 106 (2005).

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