Amado Picart vs Frank Smith, Jr.
when the defendant, riding on his car,
In December 1912, Amado Picart was riding his
horse and while they were on a 75 meter long
bridge, he saw Frank Smith Jr.’s car
approaching. Smith blew his horn thrice while
he was still at a distance away because Picart
and his horse were on Smith’s lane. But Picart
did not move his horse to the other lane,
instead he moved his horse closer to the railing.
Smith continued driving towards Picart without
slowing down and when he was already so near
the horse he swerved to the other lane. But the
horse got scared so it turned its body across the
bridge; the horse struck the car and its limb got
broken. Picart suffered injuries which required
several days of medical attention while the
horse eventually died.
ISSUE: Whether or not Smith is negligent.
HELD: Yes. And so was Picart for planting
himself on the wrong side of the road. But
Smith’s negligence succeeded that of Picart.
Smith saw at a distance when he blew his horn
that Picart and his horse did not move to the
other lane so he should have steered his car to
the other lane at that point instead of swerving
at the last minute. He therefore had the last
clear chance to avoid the unfortunate incident.
When Smith’s car has approached the horse at
such proximity it left no chance for Picart
extricate himself and vigilance on his part will
not avert injury. Picart can therefore recover
damages from Smith but such should be
proportioned by reason of his contributory
negligence
Picart v. Smith
Facts:
Plaintiff Amado Picart was riding on his pony on
the Carlatan Bridge in San Fernando, La Union
approached. Defendant blew his horn to give
warning. Plaintiff moved the horse to the right
instead of moving to the left, reasoning that he
had no sufficient time to move to the right
direction. Defendant continued to approach,
and when he had gotten quite near, he quickly
turned to the left. The horse was frightened
that it turned his body across the bridge. His
limb was broken and the rider was thrown off
and got injured. The horse died. An action for
damages was filed against the defendant.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant in maneuvering
his car in the manner above described was
guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil
obligation to repair the damage done
Held:
As the defendant started across the bridge, he
had the right to assume that the horse and rider
would pass over to the proper side; but as he
moved toward the center of the bridge it was
demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be
done; and he must in a moment have perceived
that it was too late for the horse to cross with
safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the
nature of things this change of situation
occurred while the automobile was yet some
distance away; and from this moment it was not
longer within the power of the plaintiff to
escape being run down by going to a place of
greater safety. The control of the situation had
then passed entirely to the defendant.
The test by which to determine the existence of
negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person
would have used in the same situation? If not,
then he is guilty of negligence. Conduct is said
to be negligent when a prudent man in the
position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen
that an effect harmful to another was
sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing
the conduct or guarding against its
consequences.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself
was not free from fault, for he was guilty of
antecedent negligence in planting himself on
the wrong side of the road. But as we have
already stated, the defendant was also
negligent; and in such case the problem always
is to discover which agent is immediately and
directly responsible. It will be noted that the
negligent acts of the two parties were not
contemporaneous, since the negligence of the
defendant succeeded the negligence of the
plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these
circumstances the law is that the person who
has the last fair chance to avoid the impending
harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior
negligence of the other party.
David Taylor vs Manila Electric Railroad and
Light Company
David Taylor was a 15 year old boy who spent
time as a cabin boy at sea; he was also able to
learn some principles of mechanical engineering
and mechanical drawing from his dad’s office
(his dad was a mechanical engineer); he was
also employed as a mechanical draftsman
earning P2.50 a day – all said, Taylor was
mature well beyond his age.
One day in 1905, he and another boy entered
into the premises of Manila Electric power plant
where they found 20-30 blasting caps which
they took home. In an effort to explode the said
caps, Taylor experimented until he succeeded in
opening the caps and then he lighted it using a
match which resulted to the explosion of the
caps causing severe injuries to his companion
and to Taylor losing one eye.
Taylor sued Manila Electric alleging that
because the company left the caps exposed to
children, they are liable for damages due to the
company’s negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Electric is liable
for damages.
HELD: No. The SC reiterated the elements of
quasi delict as follows:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which
defendant personally, or some person for
whose acts it must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between
the negligence and the damage.
In the case at bar, it is true that Manila Electric
has been negligent in disposing off the caps
which they used for the power plant, and that
said caps caused damages to Taylor. However,
the causal connection between the company’s
negligence and the injuries sustained by Taylor
is absent. It is in fact the direct acts of Taylor
which led to the explosion of the caps as he
even, in various experiments and in multiple
attempts, tried to explode the caps. It is from
said acts that led to the explosion and hence
the injuries.
Taylor at the time of the accident was well-
grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally
and physically than the average boy of his age;
he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to
earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman
thirty days after the injury was incurred; and
the record discloses throughout that he was
exceptionally well qualified to take care. The
evidence of record leaves no room for doubt
that he well knew the explosive character of the
cap with which he was amusing himself. The
series of experiments made by him in his
attempt to produce an explosion admit of no
other explanation. His attempt to discharge the
cap by the use of electricity, followed by his
efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer,
and the final success of his endeavors brought
about by the applications of a match to the
contents of the cap, show clearly that he knew
what he was about. Nor can there be any
reasonable doubt that he had reason to
anticipate that the explosion might be
dangerous.
“The just thing is that a man should suffer the
damage which comes to him through his own
fault, and that he cannot demand reparation
therefor from another.”
Taylor V. Manila Electric Railroad And Light
Co.(1910)
G.R. No. L-4977 March 22, 1910
FACTS:
September 30, 1905 Sunday afternoon: David
Taylor, 15 years of age, the son of a mechanical
engineer, more mature than the average boy of
his age, and having considerable aptitude and
training in mechanics with a boy named Manuel
Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the
footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the
purpose of visiting Murphy, an employee of the
defendant, who and promised to make them a
cylinder for a miniature engine
After leaving the power house where they had
asked for Mr. Murphy, they walked across the
open space in the neighborhood of the place
where the company dumped in the cinders and
ashes from its furnaces
they found some twenty or thirty brass
fulminating caps scattered on the ground
These caps are approximately of the size and
appearance of small pistol cartridges and each
has attached to it 2 long thin wires by means of
which it may be discharged by the use of
electricity
They are intended for use in the explosion of
blasting charges of dynamite, and have in
themselves a considerable explosive power
the boys picked up all they could find, hung
them on stick, of which each took end, and
carried them home
After crossing the footbridge, they met Jessie
Adrian, less than 9 years old, and they went to
Manuel's home
The boys then made a series of experiments
with the caps
trust the ends of the wires into an electric light
socket - no result
break the cap with a stone - failed
opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding
that it was filled with a yellowish substance they
got matches
David held the cap while Manuel applied a
lighted match to the contents
An explosion followed, causing more or less
serious injuries to all three
Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a
match to the contents of the cap, became
frightened and started to run away, received a
slight cut in the neck
Manuel had his hand burned and wounded
David was struck in the face by several particles
of the metal capsule, one of which injured his
right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate
its removal by the surgeons
Trial Court: held Manila Electric Railroad And
Light Company liable
ISSUE:
1. W/N the elemnents of quasi-delict to
make Manila Electric Railroad And Light
Company liable - NO
2. W/N Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co.
sufficiently proved that they employed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to avoid
the damage - NO
HELD: reversing the judgment of the court
below
ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by
contracts, by quasi-contracts, and illicit acts and
omissions or by those in which any kind of fault
or negligence occurs.
ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission
causes damage to another when there is fault
or negligence shall be obliged to repair the
damage so done.
ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the
preceding article is demandable, not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those
of the persons for whom they should be
responsible.
The father, and on his death or incapacity the
mother, is liable for the damages caused by the
minors who live with them.
xxx xxx xxx
Owners or directors of an establishment or
enterprise are equally liable for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter may be employed
or on account of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
The liability referred to in this article shall cease
when the persons mentioned therein prove that
they employed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to avoid the damage.
ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for
the damage caused —
1 By the explosion of machines which may not
have been cared for with due diligence, and for
kindling of explosive substances which may not
have been placed in a safe and proper place.
in order to establish his right to a recovery,
must establish by competent evidence:
Damages to the plaintiff
Negligence by act or omission of which
defendant personally, or some person for
whose acts it must respond, was guilty.
The connection of cause and effect between the
negligence and the damage.
while we hold that the entry upon the property
without express invitation or permission would
not have relieved Manila Electric from
responsibility for injuries incurred, without
other fault on his part, if such injury were
attributable to his negligence, the negligence in
leaving the caps exposed on its premises was
not the proximate cause of the injury received
cutting open the detonating cap and putting
match to its contents was the proximate cause
of the explosion and of the resultant injuries
inflicted
Manila Electric is not civilly responsible for the
injuries thus incurred
2 years before the accident, David spent 4
months at sea, as a cabin boy on one of the
interisland transports. Later he took up work in
his father's office, learning mechanical drawing
and mechanical engineering. About a month
after his accident he obtained employment as a
mechanical draftsman and continued in that
employment for 6 months at a salary of P2.50 a
day; and it appears that he was a boy of more
than average intelligence, taller and more
mature both mentally and physically than most
boys of 15
The series of experiments made by him in his
attempt to produce an explosion, as described
by Jessie who even ran away
True, he may not have known and probably did
not know the precise nature of the explosion
which might be expected from the ignition of
the contents of the cap, and of course he did
not anticipate the resultant injuries which he
incurred; but he well knew that a more or less
dangerous explosion might be expected from
his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and
knowingly produced the explosion. It would be
going far to say that "according to his maturity
and capacity" he exercised such and "care and
caution" as might reasonably be required of
him, or that defendant or anyone else should be
held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by
him under such circumstances.
The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor
can be said to have the necessary capacity to
understand and appreciate the nature and
consequences of his own acts, so as to make it
negligence on his part to fail to exercise due
care and precaution in the commission of such
acts; and indeed it would be impracticable and
perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very
nature of things the question of negligence
necessarily depends on the ability of the minor
to understand the character of his own acts and
their consequences
he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his
experience qualified him to understand and
appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that
degree of caution which would have avoided
the injury which resulted from his own
deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by
him must be held to have been the direct and
immediate result of his own willful and reckless
act, so that while it may be true that these
injuries would not have been incurred but for
the negligence act of the defendant in leaving
the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless
plaintiff's own act was the proximate and
principal cause of the accident which inflicted
the injury
rule of the Roman law was: Quod quis ex culpa
sua damnum sentit, non intelligitur sentire
just thing is that a man should suffer the
damage which comes to him through his own
fault, and that he can not demand reparation
therefor from another
Negligence is not presumed, but must be
proven by him who alleges it.
Salud Villanueva Vda. De Bataclan vs Mariano
Medina
Pass-midnight in September 1952, Juan
Bataclan rode a bus owned by Mariano Medina
from Cavite to Pasay. While on its way, the
driver of the bus was driving fast and when he
applied the brakes it cause the bus to be
overturned. The driver, the conductor, and
some passengers were able to free themselves
from the bus except Bataclan and 3 others. The
passengers called the help of the villagers and
as it was dark, the villagers brought torch with
them. The driver and the conductor failed to
warn the would-be helpers of the fact that
gasoline has spilled from the overturned bus so
a huge fire ensued which engulfed the bus
thereby killing the 4 passengers trapped inside.
It was also found later in trial that the tires of
the bus were old.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proximate cause of
the death of Bataclan et al was their burning by
reason of the torches which ignited the
gasoline.
HELD: No. The proximate cause was the
overturning of the bus which was caused by the
negligence of the driver because he was
speeding and also he was already advised by
Medina to change the tires yet he did not. Such
negligence resulted to the overturning of the
bus. The torches carried by the would-be
helpers are not to be blamed. It is just but
natural for the villagers to respond to the call
for help from the passengers and since it is a
rural area which did not have flashlights,
torches are the natural source of lighting.
Further, the smell of gas could have been all
over the place yet the driver and the conductor
failed to provide warning about said fact to the
villagers.
WHAT IS “PROXIMATE CAUSE”?
Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have
occurred.
And more comprehensively, the proximate legal
cause is that acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural
and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as
an ordinary prudent and intelligent person,
have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person might probably result therefrom.
Fernando V. CA (1992)
FACTS:
November 7, 1975: Bibiano Morta, market
master of the Agdao Public Market filed a
requisition request with the Chief of Property of
the City Treasurer's Office for the re-emptying
of the septic tank in Agdao wherein Bascon won
November 22, 1975: bidder Bertulano with four
other companions namely Joselito Garcia,
William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando and Jose
Fajardo, Jr. were found dead inside the septic
tank.
The bodies were removed by a fireman.
The body of Joselito Garcia, was taken out by
his uncle, Danilo Garcia and taken to the
Regional Hospital but he expired there.
The City Engineer's office investigated the case
and learned they entered the septic tank
without clearance from it nor with the
knowledge and consent of the market master.
Since the septic tank was found to be almost
empty, they were presumed to be the ones who
did the re-emptying.
Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office found
them to have died from "asphyxia" - diminution
of oxygen supply in the body and intake of toxic
gas
November 26, 1975: Bascon signed the
purchase order
RTC: Dismissed the case
CA: Reversed - law intended to protect the
plight of the poor and the needy, the ignorant
and the indigent
ISSUE: W/N Davao city is negligent and its
negligence is the proximate cause therefore can
be liable for damages

HELD: NO. CA affirmed.
test by which to determine the existence of
negligence in a particular case:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent
act use that reasonable care and caution which
an ordinarily prudent person would have used
in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence
standard supposed to be supplied by the
imaginary conduct of the discreet pater
familias of the Roman law
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent
man in the position of the tortfeasor would
have foreseen that an effect harmful to another
was sufficiently probable warrant his foregoing
the conduct or guarding against its
consequences
The question as to what would constitute the
conduct of a prudent man in a given situation
must of course be always determined in the
light of human experience and in view of the
facts involved in the particular case
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the
ignoring of the suggestion born of this
provision, is always necessary before negligence
can be held to exist
Distinction must be made between the accident
and the injury
Where he contributes to the principal
occurrence, as one of its determining factors,
he can not recover
Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he
contributes only to his own injury, he may
recover the amount that the defendant
responsible for the event should pay for such
injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent
for his own imprudence
Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisances per
se as defined in Article 694 of the New Civil
Code which would necessitate warning signs for
the protection of the public
While the construction of these public facilities
demands utmost compliance with safety and
sanitary requirements, the putting up of
warning signs is not one of those requirements
accident such as toxic gas leakage from the
septic tank is unlikely to happen unless one
removes its covers
Considering the nature of the task of emptying
a septic tank especially one which has not been
cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person
should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant
risks. The victims are no exception; more so
with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of
service, who is presumed to know the hazards
of the job. His failure, therefore, and that of his
men to take precautionary measures for their
safety was the proximate cause of the accident.
proximate and immediate cause of the death of
the victims was due to their own
negligence. Consequently, the petitioners
cannot demand damages from the public
respondent.
Mercury Drug Corporation vs. Sebastian Baking
(Torts – Proximate Cause)
Facts:
Respondent Sebastian Baking went to the clinic
of Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical check-up.
Subsequently, after several tests, Dr. Sy
prescribed two medical prescriptions –
Diamicron for his blood Sugar and Benalize
tablets for his triglyceride.
Respondent then proceeded to petitioner
Mercury Drug Store (MDC) to buy the
prescribed medicines. However, the saleslady
misread the prescription for Diamicron for
Dormicrum – a potent sleeping tablet.
Unaware of the mistake, Respondent took it for
three consecutive days. On the third day, he
figured in a vehicular accident. His car collided
with another car driven by one Josie Peralta. It
turned out that Respondent fell asleep while
driving and has no idea regarding the accident.
Suspecting that the tablet he took may have
caused the accident, he returned to Dr. Sy and
the latter was shocked because of the wrong
medicine sold to his patient.
Respondent thereafter filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) complaint for damages against
petitioner.
The RTC ruled in favour of the plaintiff; decision
of which was affirmed in toto by the Court of
Appeals. Hence this present petition.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was negligent,
if so, whether such negligence was the
proximate cause of respondent’s accident?
Ruling:
YES.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides that
“Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no re-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict”.
The Court also enumerated the three (3)
elements of Quasi-delict, to wit:
Damage suffered by the plaintiff;
Fault or negligence of the defendant
Connection of the cause and effect between the
fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damage incurred by the plaintiff
The Court stressed that there is no dispute that
respondent suffered damages. It is generally
recognized that the drugstore business is
imbued with public interest. The health and
safety of the people will be put into jeopardy if
the drugstore employees will not exercise the
highest degree of care and diligence.
That petitioner’s employee was grossly
negligent. The care required must be
commensurate with the danger involved, and
the skill employed must correspondent with the
superior knowledge of the business which the
law demands.
Hence, the Court sustained that the proximate
cause of the accident was the petitioner’s
employee’s negligence. The vehicular accident
could have not occurred had the employee
been careful to his job.
CAEDO et al vs. YU KHE THAI and
RAFAEL BERNARDO
G.R. No. L-20392 December 18, 1968
FACTS:
Plaintiff Caedo was driving his Mercury car at
about 5:30 in the morning of March 24, 1958
along E. de los Santos Ave., in the vicinity of San
LorenzoVillage bound for the airport. Several
members of his family were in the car. Coming
from the opposite direction was the Cadillac car
of defendant Yu Khe Thai driven by
his driver Rafael Bernardo. The two cars were
traveling at a moderate speed with their
headlights on. Ahead of the Cadillac was a
caretela. Defendant’s driver did not notice it
until he was about eight (8) meters away.
Instead of slowing down behind the caretela
defendant’s driver veered to the left with the
intention of passing by the caretela but in doing
so its rear bumper caught the ream of
thecaretela’s left wheel wrenching it off.
Defendant’s car skidded obliquely to the other
end and collided with the on-coming vehicle of
the plaintiff. The plaintiff on his part, slackened
his speed and tried to avoid the collision by
veering to the right but the collisionoccurred
just the same injuring the plaintiff and members
of his family. Plaintiff brought an action for
damages against both the driver and owner of
the Cadillac car. There was no question that
defendant’s driver was negligent and liable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not defendant Yu Khe Thai, owner
of the car, who was in the car, was solidarily
liable with the driver under Art. 2184, of the
Civil Code.
RULING:
The applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil
Code. Under the said provision, if the causative
factor was the driver’s negligence, the owner of
the vehicle who was present is likewise held
liable if he could have prevented the mishap by
the exerciseof due diligence. The basis of the
master’s liability in civil law is not respondent
superior but rather the relationship of
paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the
negligence of the servant, if known to the
master and susceptible of timely correction by
him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to
correct it in order to prevent injury or damage.
Negligence on the part of the owner, if any,
must be sought in the immediate setting and
circumstances of the accident, that is, in his
failure to detain the driver from pursuing a
course which not only gave him clear notice of
the danger but also sufficient time to act upon
it. We do not see that such negligence may be
imputed. The car, as has been stated, was not
running at an unreasonable speed. The road
was wide and open, and devoid of traffic that
early morning. There was no reason for the car
owner to be in any special state of alert. He had
reason to rely on the skill and experience of
his driver. He became aware of the presence of
the carretela when his car was only twelve
meters behind it, but then his failure to see it
earlier did not constitute negligence, for he was
not himself at the wheel. And even when he did
see it at that distance, he could not have
anticipated his driver’s sudden decision to pass
the carretela on its left side in spite of the fact
that another car was approaching from the
opposite direction. The time element was such
that there was no reasonable opportunity for
Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and
warn the driver accordingly. The thought that
entered his mind, he said, was that if he
sounded a sudden warning it might only make
the other man nervous and make the situation
worse. It was a thought that, wise or not,
connotes no absence of that
due diligence required by law to prevent the
misfortune. Under the facts the owner of the
car was not liable.
KAPALARAN BUS LINE vs. CORONADO
(G.R. No. 85331; August 25, 1989)
Legal Issue:
Whether or not KAPALARAN BUS LINE
(KBL) is liable for damages from the collision.
Facts of the Case: The jeepney driven by Lope
Grajera was then coming from Pila, Laguna and
traversing the an old highway towards Sta. Cruz
collided with a KBL bus driven by its regular
driver Virgilio Llamoso. As testified to by Atty.
Conrado L. Manicad who was driving a Mustang
car coming from the direction of Sta. Cruz and
proceeding towards the direction of Manila, he
stopped at the intersection to give way to the
jeepney driven by Grajera. The sketch marked
very clearly that the jeepney had already
traversed the intersection when it met the KBL
bus head-on. It is also obvious that the point of
impact was on the right lane of the highway
which is the lane properly belonging to the
jeepney. Judging from the testimony of Atty.
Conrado L. Manicad and the sketch (Exhibit 'E'),
the sequence of events shows that the first
vehicle to arrive at the intersection was
the jeepney. Seeing that the road was clear, the
jeepney which had stopped at the
intersection began to move forward, and for his
part, Atty. Manicad stopped his car at the
intersection to give way to the jeepney. The KBL
bus had no more room within which to stop
without slamming into the rear of the vehicle
behind the car of Atty. Manicad. The KBL
driver chose to gamble on proceeding on its
way, unfortunately, the jeepney driven by
Grajera, which had the right-of-way, was about
to cross the center of the highway and was
directly on the path of the KBL bus. The impact
indicates that the KBL bus was travelling at a
fast rate of speed because, after the collision, it
did not stop; it travelled for another 50meters
and stopped only when it hit an electric post.
Ruling of the Court:YES
. KBL is liable for the damages in the collision.
Reason behind the Ruling:
The patent and gross negligence on the part of
the petitioner Kapalaran's driver raised the
legal presumption that Kapalaran as employer
was guilty of negligence either in the selection
or in the supervision of its bus driver, where the
employer is held liable for damages; it has of
course a right of recourse against its own
negligent employee. The liability of the
employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is
direct and immediate; it is not conditioned
upon prior recourse against the negligent emplo
yee and a prior showing of the insolvency of
such employee. So far as the record shows,
petitioner Kapalaran was unable to rebut the
presumption of negligence on its own part. The
award of moral damages against petitioner
Kapalaran is not only entirely in order; it is also
quite modest consideirng Dionisio Shinyo's
death during the pendency of this petition, a
death hastened by, if not directly due to, the
grievous injuries sustained by him in the violent
collision.
JONAS AÑONUEVO, petitioner vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JEROME
VILLAGRACIA, respondent
Tinga, J.
FACTS
Villagracia was traveling along Boni Ave. on his
bicycle, while Añonuevo,
traversing the opposite lane was driving a
Lancer car owned by Procter and Gamble
Inc., the employer of Añonuevo’s brother.
Añonuevo was in the course of making a left
turn towards Libertad Street when the collision
occurred. Villagracia sustained serious
injuries and had to undergo four operations.
Villagracia instituted an action for damages
against P&G Phils., Inc. and
Añonuevo before the RTC. He had also filed a
criminal complaint against Añonuevo
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Mandaluyong, but the latter was subsequently
acquitted of the criminal charge. Añonuevo
claims that Villagracia violated traffic
regulations when he failed to register his bicycle
or install safety gadgets. He posits that
Article 2185 of the Civil Code applies by
analogy.
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the
contrary, it is presumed that a person
driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at
the time of the mishap he was
violating any traffic regulation.
W/N Art. 2185 of the New Civil Code should
apply to non-motorized vehicles, making
Villagracia presumptively negligent --> N
does not demonstrate why this finding
should be reversed. It is hard to imagine that
the same result would not have occurred
even if Villagracia’s bicycle had been equipped
with safety equipment.

There is pertinent basis for segregating

between motorized and non-motorized FLORDELIZA MENDOZA vs. MUTYA SORIANO
vehicles. A motorized vehicle, unimpeded by and Minor
the limitations in physical exertion. is JULIE ANN SORIANO duly represented by her
capable of greater speeds and acceleration than natural mother
non-motorized vehicles. At the same and guardian ad litem MUTYA SORIANO, G.R.
time, motorized vehicles are more capable in No. 164012,
inflicting greater injury or damage in the June 8, 2007
event of an accident or collision. This is due to a
Facts:
combination of factors peculiar to the
On July 14, 2007, Sonny Soriano, while crossing
motor vehicle, such as the greater speed, its
Commonwealth Avenue, was hit by a speeding
relative greater bulk of mass, and greater
FX driven by Lomer Macasasa. Macasasa fled
combustibility due to the use of fuel.
the scene. Soriano was brought by a school bus
W/N Villagracia was negligent for failure to to
comply with traffic regulations --> N East Avenue Medical Center where he later
died. On August 20, 1997, respondents
The existence of negligence in a given case is
(Soriano’s wife and daughter) filed a complaint
not determined by the personal
for damages against Macasasa and petitioner
judgment of the actor in a given situation, but
Mendoza, the registered owner of the vehicle.
rather, it is the law which determines what
In her answer, petitioner maintained that she
would be reckless or negligent. Añonuevo
was not liable as owner of the vehicle, because
asserts that Villagracia was negligent as the
she had exercised the diligence of a good father
latter had transgressed traffic regulations.
of a family over her employee, Macasasa. Upon
However, Añonuevo was speeding as he
respondents’ motion, the complaint for
made the left turn, and such negligent act was
damages against Macasasa was dismissed.
the proximate cause of the accident.
After trial, trial court dismissed the complaint. It
Even assuming that Añonuevo had failed to see
found Soriano negligent for crossing
Villagracia because the bicycle was not
Commonwealth Avenue by using a gap in the
equipped with headlights, such lapse on the
island’s fencing rather the pedestrian overpass.
cyclist’s part would not have acquitted the
Also, the complainants presented no evidence
driver of his duty to slow down as he proceeded
to support their allegation of the petitioner’s
to make the left turn.
negligence.
W/N Villagracia is guilty of contributory
CA reversed trial court’s decision.
negligence --> N
Issue:
As between Añonuevo and Villagracia, the
lower courts adjudged Añonuevo as Was there sufficient legal basis to award
solely responsible for the accident. The petition damages?
 other explanation can be had as to the real
Ruling: reason for the fire. Apparently also, Caltex and
Yes. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the branch owner (Mateo Boquiren) failed to
employers are liable for the damages caused by install a concrete firewall to contain fire if in
their employees acting within the scope of their case one happens.
assigned tasks. The liability arises due to the
ISSUE: Whether or not Caltex and Boquiren are
presumed negligence of the employers in
liable to pay for damages.
supervising their employees unless they prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good HELD: Yes. This is pursuant to the application on
father of a family to prevent the damage. In this the principle of res ipsa loquitur (“the
case, petitioner failed to prove that she transaction speaks for itself”) which states:
exercised the diligence of a good father of a “where the thing which caused injury, without
family in supervising Macasasa. fault of the injured person, is under the
exclusive control of the defendant and the
However, Soriano was guilty of contributory
injury is such as in the ordinary course of things
negligence for not using the pedestrian
does not occur if he having such control use
overpass while crossing Commonwealth
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in
Avenue. Hence, the reduction by 20% of the
the absence of the explanation, that the injury
damages awarded, based on Article 2179 of the
arose from defendant’s want of care.” The
Civil Code which reads: “When the plaintiff's
gasoline station, with all its appliances,
own negligence was the immediate and
equipment and employees, was under the
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
control of Caltex and Boquiren. A fire occurred
damages. But if his negligence was only
therein and spread to and burned the
contributory, the immediate and proximate
neighboring houses. The persons who knew or
cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of
could have known how the fire started were
due care, the plaintiff may recover damages,
Boquiren, Caltex and their employees, but they
but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be
gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a
awarded”.
fair and reasonable inference that the incident
Petition denied for lack of merit. Decision of CA happened because of want of care.
affirmed.
Note that ordinarily, he who charges negligence
shall prove it. However, res ipsa loquitur is the
exception because the burden of proof is
Spouses Africa et al vs Caltex Philippines,
shifted to the party charged of negligence as
Boquiren and the Court of Appeals
the latter is the one who had exclusive control
In March 1948, in Rizal Avenue, Manila, a tank of the thing that caused the injury complained
truck was hosing gasoline into the underground of.
storage of Caltex. Apparently, a fire broke out
from the gasoline station and the fire spread
and burned several houses including the house Africa vs. Caltex, 16 SCRA 448
of Spouses Bernabe and Soledad Africa.
Facts: In the afternoon of March 18, 1948, a fire
Allegedly, someone (a passerby) threw a
broke out at the Caltex service station at the
cigarette while gasoline was being transferred
corner of Antipolo St. and Rizal Avenue, Manila.
which caused the fire. But there was no
It started while gasoline was being hosed from a
evidence presented to prove this theory and no
tank truck into the underground storage, right
at the opening of the receiving tank where the
nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire spread
to and burned several houses. The owners,
among them petitioner spouses Africa and heirs
of Ong, sued respondents Caltex Phil., Inc., the
alleged owner of the station, and Mateo
Boquiren, the agent in charge of its operation,
for damages. The CFI and CA found that the
petitioners failed to prove negligence of the
respondents, and that there was due care in the
premises and with respect to the supervision of
their employees.
Issue: Whether or not, without proof as to the
cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur should apply so as to presume
negligence on the part of the respondents.
Held: Yes. Res ipsa loquitur literally means “the
thing or transaction speaks for itself.” For the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply, the
following requisites should be present: (a) the
accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not
occur in the absence of someone’s negligence;
(b) it is caused by an instrumentality within the
exclusive control of the defendant or
defendants; and (c) the possibility of
contributing conduct which would make the
plaintiff responsible is eliminated. In the case at
bar, the gasoline station, with all its appliances,
equipment and employees, was under the
control of respondents. A fire occurred therein
and spread to and burned the neighboring
houses. The persons who knew or could have
known how the fire started were respondents
and their employees, but they gave no
explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and
reasonable inference that the incident
happened because of want of care. The
negligence of the employees was the proximate
cause of the fire, which in the ordinary course
of things does not happen. Therefore, the
petitioners are entitled to the award for
damages.
F.F. CRUZ and CO., INC., petitioner, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, GREGORIO MABLE as
substituted by his wife LUZ ALMONTE MABLE
and children DOMING, LEONIDAS, LIGAYA,
ELENA, GREGORIO, JR., SALOME, ANTONIO, and
BERNARDO all surnamed MABLE, respondents.
(WENCESLAO)
DOCTRINE
Upon payment of the loss incurred by the
insured, the insurer is entitled to be subrogated
pro tanto to any right of action which the
insured may have against the third person
whose negligence or wrongful act caused the
loss. Under Art. 2207, the real party in interest
with regard to the indemnity received by the
insured is the insurer.
FACTS
FF Cruz’s furniture manufacturing shop in
Caloocan was situated adjacent to private
respondent Gregorio Mable’s residence. Mable
first approached Eric Cruz (plant manager of
petitioner) to request that a firewall be
construcred between the shop and Mable
residence. This request was repeated several
times but Cruz fell on deaf ears.
Sept 6 1974—a fire broke out in FF Cruz’s shop.
Petitioner’s employees, who slept in the shop
premises tried to put out the fire but their
efforts proved futile. The fire spread to Mable’s
house. Both the shop and the house was razed
to the ground. The cause of the conflagration
was never discovered.
Subsequently, Mable filed an action for
damages against Cruz. RCFI held for the Mables
ordering Cruz to pay for damages.
CA affirmed CFI decision. MR was filed by Cruz
but was denied. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari and eventually submitted for
decision on Jan 1981.
Petitioner argues that the sum of P35,000 which
Mable recovered on the insurance of their
house must be deducted from the award of
damages. Also, they argue that the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur must apply in the case,
ISSUE/S
W/N private respondents may still recover from
petitioner notwithstanding the indemnity paid
by their insurer?
HELD/RATIO
YES!
Art. 2207. If the plaintiff’s property has been
insured, and he has received indemnity from
the insurance company for the injury or loss
arising out of the wrong or breach of contract
complained of, the insurance company is
subrogated to the rights of the insured against
the wrongdoer or the person who violated the
contract. If the amount paid by the insurance
company does not fully cover the injury or loss,
the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover
the deficiency from the person causing the loss
or injury.
The law is clear and needs no interpretation. On
the other hand, the insurer may seek
reimbursement of the amount it indemnified
private respondents from petitioner. This is the
essence of the right to subrogation under Art.
2207. Upon payment of the loss incurred by the
insured, the insurer is entitled to be subrogated
to any right of action which the insurer may
have against the third person whise negligence
or wrongful act caused the loss. (Fireman’s
Fund Insurance Co. v. Jamila & Co.)
Under Art. 2207, the real party in interest with
regard to the indemnity received is the insurer.
Whether or not the insurer should exercise the
rights of the insured to which it had been
subrogated lies solely within the former’s sound
discretion. Since the insurer is not a party to
this case, its identity is not of record, and no
claim is made on its behalf, the private
respondent’s insurer has to claim his right to
reimbursement of the P35,000 paid to the
insured.
RULING: CA AFFIRMED. P35000 is reduced rom
the damages and the right of the insurer to
subrogation and thus seek reimbursement from
petitioner for P35000 is recognized.
NOTES:
Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur (found to be
applicable in this case)
 Concept: where the thing which caused the
injury complained of is shown to be under the
management of the defendant or his servants
and the accident is such as in the ordinary
course of things does not happen if those who
have its management or control use the proper
case, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of explanation by the defendant, that
the accident arose from want of care.
 Applicability: petitioner failed to construct a
firewall between its shop and the residence of
private respondents as required by the city
ordinance. Thus, the accident arose from want
of care.
FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. G.P.S
TRUCKING CORPORATION and LAMBERT M.
EROLES
FACTS OF THE CASE:
G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS)
undertook to deliver on 18 June 1994 thirty (30)
units of Condura S.D. white refrigerators aboard
one of its Isuzu truck, driven by Lambert Eroles.
While the truck was traversing the north
diversion road along McArthur highway in
Barangay Anupol, Bamban, Tarlac, it collided
with an unidentified truck, causing it to fall into
a deep canal, resulting in damage to the
cargoes.
FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU), an insurer of
the shipment, paid to Concepcion Industries,
Inc., the value of the covered cargoes: P204,
450.00. FGU, in turn, being the subrogee of the
rights and interests of the insured sought
reimbursement of the amount, from GPS. Since
GPS failed to heed the claim, FGU filed a
complaint for damages and breach of contract
of carriage against GPS and its driver with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, of Makati City.
In its answer, respondents asserted that GPS
was the exclusive hauler only of Concepcion
Industries, Inc., since 1988, and it was not so
engaged in business as a common carrier.
Respondents further claimed that the cause of
damage was purely accidental. GPS, instead of
submitting its evidence, filed with leave of court
a motion to dismiss the complaint by way of
demurrer to evidence on the ground that
petitioner had failed to prove that it was a
common carrier. The RTC and CA both ruled in
favor of the Respondent.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
WHETHER RESPONDENT GPS, EITHER AS A
COMMON CARRIER OR A PRIVATE CARRIER,
MAY BE PRESUMED TO HAVE BEEN NEGLIGENT
WHEN THE GOODS IT UNDERTOOK TO
TRANSPORT SAFELY WERE SUBSEQUENTLY
DAMAGED WHILE IN ITS PROTECTIVE CUSTODY
AND POSSESSION.
- In culpa contractual, upon which the action of
petitioner rests as being the subrogee of
Concepcion Industries, Inc., the mere proof of
the existence of the contract and the failure of
its compliance justify, prima facie, a
corresponding right of relief. Thus, FGU has a
claim for the amount paid out.
- The law, recognizing the obligatory force of
contracts, will not permit a party to be set free
from liability for any kind of misperformance of
the contractual undertaking or a contravention
of the tenor thereof
- GPS recognizes the existence of a contract of
carriage between it and petitioner’s assured,
and admits that the cargoes it has assumed to
deliver have been lost or damaged while in its
custody. In such a situation, a default on, or
failure of compliance with, the obligation in this
case, the delivery of the goods in its custody to
the place of destination - gives rise to a
presumption of lack of care and corresponding
liability on the part of the contractual obligor
the burden being on him to establish otherwise.
GPS has failed to do so.
HELD:
The decision of the lower courts insofar as
Lambert M. Eroles is concerned is affirmed but
assailed decision with regard to GPS trucking is
reversed. It, is hereby ordered to pay FGU
Insurance Corporation the value of the
damaged and lost cargoes in the amount of
P204, 450.00
Obligations and Contracts Terms:
• expectation interest- the interest in having
the benefit of his bargain by being put in as
good a position as he would have been in had
the contract been performed
• reliance interest- the interest in being
reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the
contract by being put in as good a position as he
would have been in had the contract not been
made
• Restitution interest- which is his interest in
having restored to him any benefit that he has
conferred on the other party.
• Subrogee- the person or entity that assumes
the legal right to attempt to collect a claim of
another (subrogor) in return for paying the
other's expenses or debts which the other
claims against a third party. A subrogee is
usually the insurance company which has
insured the party whose expenses were paid.
Layugan vs. IAC; Torts- vicarious liability of
owner of a truck
Facts:
Pedro T. Layugan filed an action for damages
against Godofredo Isidro, alleging that while at
Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, the Plaintiff
and a companion were repairing the tire of their
cargo truck which was parked along the right
side of the National Highway; that defendant's
truck, driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano
bumped the plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff
was injured and hospitalized where he incurred
and will incur more expenses as he recuperates
from said injuries; Plaintiff's right leg was
amputated and that because of said injuries he
would be deprived of a lifetime income.
To free themselves from liability, defendants
Isidro [owner] and Serrano [driver] averred that
he knows his responsibilities as a driver and
further contends that it was the negligence of
plaintiff that was the proximate cause of the
accident. They alleged that plaintiff parked his
truck in a manner which occupied a part of the
highway and he did not even put a warning
sign.
Subsequently, a third-party complaint was filed
by the defendant against his insurer, the
Travellers Multi Indemnity Corporation; that the
third-party plaintiff [Isidro], without admitting
his liability to the plaintiff, claimed that the
third-party defendant [Travellers] is liable to the
former for contribution, indemnity and
subrogation by virtue of their insurance
contract which covers the insurer's liability for
damages arising from death, bodily injuries and
damage to property. The Insurance company
argued that it is only liable for the amount
agreed in the policy and the complaint was
premature since no claim was made to it.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Petitioners. The
CA reversed the decision, stating that it is the
petitioners who were negligent since they did
not exercise caution by putting warning signs
that their truck is park on the shoulder of the
highway.
Issue:
Whether or not Isidro is liable as employer of
Serrano.
Ruling:
Yes!
The SC held that the CA erroneously
appreciated the evidence. It was proven that
the petitioner placed a warning sign within 3 to
4 meters from their truck in the form of a
lighted kerosene lamp. The existence of this
warning sings was corroborated by Serrano,
respondent's driver, and further stated that
when he saw a parked truck, he kept on
stepping on the brake pedal but it did not
function. Thus despite this warning signs, the
truck recklessly driven by Serrano and owned by
Respondent Isidro bumped the truck of
petitioner.
The private respondent is sued under Art. 2176
in relation to Art. 2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil
Code. In the latter, when an injury is caused by
the negligence of a servant or employee there
instantly arises a presumption of law that there
was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in the selection of the servant
or employee, or in supervision over him after
selection, or both. Such presumption is juris
tantum and not juris et de jure and
consequently, may be rebutted. If follows
necessarily that if the employer shows to the
satisfaction of the court that in the selection
and in the supervision he has exercised the care
and diligence of a good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome and he is relieved
from liability. In disclaiming liability for the
incident, the private respondent stresses that
the negligence of his employee has already
been adequately overcome by his driver's
statement that he knew his responsibilities as a
driver and that the truck owner used to instruct
him to be careful in driving.
We do not agree with the private respondent in
his submission. In the first place, it is clear that
the driver did not know his responsibilities
because he apparently did not check his vehicle
before he took it on the road. If he did he could
have discovered earlier that the brake fluid pipe
on the right was cut, and could have repaired it
and thus the accident could have been avoided.
Moveover, to our mind, the fact that the private
respondent used to intruct his driver to be
careful in his driving, that the driver was
licensed, and the fact that he had no record of
any accident, as found by the respondent court,
are not sufficient to destroy the finding of
negligence of the Regional Trial Court given the
facts established at the trial. The private
respondent or his mechanic, who must be
competent, should have conducted a thorough
inspection of his vehicle before allowing his
driver to drive it.
In the light of the circumstances obtaining in
the case, we hold that Isidro failed to prove that
the diligence of a good father of a family in the
supervision of his employees which would
exculpate him from solidary liability with his
driver to the petitioner. But even if we concede
that the diligence of a good father of a family
was observed by Isidro in the supervision of his
driver, there is not an iota of evidence on
record of the observance by Isidro of the same
quantum of diligence in the supervision of his
mechanic, if any, who would be directly in
charge in maintaining the road worthiness of his
(Isidro's) truck. But that is not all. There is
paucity of proof that Isidro exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection of his driver, Daniel Serrano, as well as
in the selection of his mechanic, if any, in order
to insure the safe operation of his truck and
thus prevent damage to others. Accordingly,
the responsibility of Isidro as employer treated
in Article 2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code
has not ceased.
Perla Compania De Seguros, Inc., Et Al. V. Sps.
Gaudencio And Primitiva Sarangaya (2005)
G.R. No. 147746 October 25, 2005
Lessons Applicable: Res Ipsa Loquitur (Torts and
Damages)
FACTS:
1986: Spouses Gaudencio Sarangaya III and
Primitiva Sarangaya erected Super A Building,
a semi-concrete, semi-narra, one-storey
commercial building fronting the provincial road
of Santiago, Isabela
It has three doors which were leased out
The two-storey residence of the Sarangayas was
behind the second and third doors of the
building
On the left side of the commercial building
stood the office of the Matsushita Electric
Philippine Corporation (Matsushita)
1988: Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. through
its branch manager Bienvenido Pascual, entered
into a contract of lease of the first door beside
the Matsushita office
It was converted into a two door so he had a
garage where he parked a company car 1981
model 4-door Ford Cortina which he used to
supervise different towns
July 7, 1988: Pascual went to San Fernando,
Pampanga leaving the car
3 days later: When he returned and warmed up
the car, it made an odd sound. On the second
try, there was again an odd sound and a small
flames came out of its engine so he was
startled, stopped the car, went out and pushed
it out of the garage
Soon, fire spewed out of its rear compartment
and burned the whole garage where he was
trapped so he suffered burns in the face, legs
and arms
The spouses were busy atching TV when they
heard 2 loud explosions, smelt of gasoline and
fire burned all their belongings
city fire marshall investigated and concluded
that the fire was accidental
Spouses filed a complaint against Pascual for
gross negligence and Perla for lacking the
required diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employee.
RTC: Pascual and Perla liable jointly and
solidarily
Pascual was held liable under the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur
CA: affirmed but modified the amount of
damages
ISSUE:
1. W/N the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
applicable - YES
2. W/N Perla lacked the required diligence in
the selection and supervision of its employee. -
NO
HELD: DENIED
1. YES.
Res ipsa loquitur
Latin phrase which literally means “the thing or
the transaction speaks for itself.
It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an
inference to the cause thereof or establishes
the plaintiff’s prima facie case
The doctrine rests on inference and not on
presumption
facts of the occurrence warrant the supposition
of negligence and they furnish circumstantial
evidence of negligence when direct evidence is
lacking
based on the theory that the defendant either
knows the cause of the accident or has the best
opportunity of ascertaining it and the plaintiff,
having no knowledge thereof, is compelled to
allege negligence in general terms
plaintiff relies on proof of the happening of the
accident alone to establish negligence
provides a means by which a plaintiff can pin
liability on a defendant who, if innocent, should
be able to explain the care he exercised to
prevent the incident complained of
defendant’s responsibility to show that there
was no negligence on his part
Requisites of Res Ipsa Loquitur
1) the accident is of a kind which does not
ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent
“Ordinary” refers to the usual course of events
Flames spewing out of a car engine, when it is
switched on, is obviously not a normal event.
Neither does an explosion usually occur when a
car engine is revved.
Pascual, as the caretaker of the car, failed to
submit any proof that he had it periodically
checked - negligence
2) the cause of the injury was under the
exclusive control of the person in charge and
3) the injury suffered must not have been due
to any voluntary action or contribution on the
part of the person injured.
When there is caso fortuito:
(a) the cause of the unforeseen and
unexpected occurrence was independent of t
he human will
human agency must be entirely excluded as the
proximate cause or contributory cause of the
injury or loss -Not because car not maintained
(b) it was impossible to foresee the event which
constituted the caso fortuito or, if it could be
foreseen, it was impossible to avoid
- NOT under the control of pascual
(c) the occurrence must be such as to render it
impossible to perform an obligation in a normal
manner - Spouses had no access nor obligation
for the maintenance
(d) the person tasked to perform the obligation
must not have participated in any course of
conduct that aggravated the accident
2. YES.
Perla did not include any rule or regulation that
Pascual should have observed in performing his
functions
There was no guidelines for the maintenance
and upkeep of company property like the
vehicle that caught fire
Did not require periodic reports on or
inventories of its properties
Article 2180 of the Civil Code states that
employers shall be liable for the damage caused
by their employees. The liability is imposed on
all those who by their industry, profession or
other enterprise have other persons in their
service or supervision
Nowhere does it state that the liability is limited
to employers in the transportation business.
Paulan vs Sarabia
GR No. L-10542
July 31, 1958
Facts:
On July 25, 1951, a truck owned and operated
by Zacarias Sarabia and driven by Emilio Celeste
fell into a creek after it collided with another
truck of the Mary Lim Line. As a result of the
collision, Gaudencio Basco who was one of the
passengers of Sarabia’s Truck died. On April 19,
1955, Basco’s widow and heirs filed a complaint
against Zacarias Sarabia and Emilio Celeste for
compensation and damages. On July 11, 1955
Sarabia filed a third-party complaint against
driver of the truck of Mary Lim Line and a
certain Quintin Lim. The third-party complaint
was amended on December 20, 1955 replacing
Quintin Lim with the name of Maria M. Lim.
Maria Lim filed a motion to dismiss contending
among others that the action has already
prescribed. Sarabia argued that the
computation of the presriptive period should be
counted from April 19, 1955 the date when the
main action was filed against them.
Issue:
Whether or not the action already prescribed
Held:
Yes. The action which appellants(Sarabia) desire
to press against appellee (Lim) is really one
based on quasi-delict which prescribes in four
years, and this period having already expired
when the action was taken, it is obvious that
the action has prescribed. Thus, in the third-
party complaint against the appelle it is alleged
that the collision “was the exclusive, direct and
immediate result of the felonious, negligent,
careless, reckless and imprudent driving of the
TPU truck of Mary Lim Line No. 108 by Juan
Cadungon xxx without any regard for traffic
laws, and regulations and vehicle laws as to
speed, blowing of horn, right of way and other
rules”, which truck is owned and operated by
appellee. And Article 1146 of the New Civil
Code provides that an action based “upon a
quasi-delict”prescribes in four years.
The law ordinarily provides that the period
during which an action may be brought shall be
computed from the time the right of action
accrues (Articles 1144 & 1149, New Civil Code),
but nothing is provided in this respect with
regard to an action based on a quasi-delict,
Article 1146 (New Civil Code) simply provides
that the action shall be instituted within four
years. There being no provision as to when shall
the period of four years commence to run, the
provision of Article 1150 shall apply, which
reads: “The time for prescription for all kinds of
actions, when there is no special provision
which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from
the day they may be brought.” Evidently, the
day therein referred to is that of the collision,
for an action based on a quasi-delict can be
brought now independently of the criminal
action and even regardless of the outcome of
the latter (Article 31, New Civil Code). There can
therefore be no dispute that the action of
appellants against the appellee should have
been brought within the period of four years
counted from July 25, 1951.
Hidalgo Enterprises Inc. v. Guillermo Balandan,
Anselma Anila and CA
GR No. L-3422. June 13, 1952, J. Bengzon
Topic: Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance
Facts: Hidalgo Enterprises was the owner of an
ice-plant factory in San Pablo, Laguna. In the
factory, there were two tanks full of water, both
9-ft deep, for cooling purposes of its engine.
There was no fence or top cover; the edges of
the tanks were barely a foot high from the
surface of the ground. The factory itself was
surrounded with a fence. However, the wide
gate entrance was continually open, and
anyone could easily enter the factory. There
was no guard assigned on the gate.
Around noon on April 16, 1948, Mario
Balandan, a boy barely 3 years old, was playing
with other boys his age when he entered the
factory premises through the gate. Mario
Balandan then took a bath in one of the tanks of
water and, later on, sank to the bottom of the
tank. He died of “asphyxia secondary to
drowning.” The CFI and CA ruled that Hidalgo
Enterprises maintained an attractive nuisance
and neglected to adopt the necessary
precautions to avoid accident to person
entering its premises.
Issue: Whether or not a water tank is an
attractive nuisance.
Held: No. Hidalgo Enterprises Inc.’s water tanks
are not classified as attractive nuisance. Other
issues such as whether it exercised reasonable
precautions, and if the parents were guilty of
contributory negligence are immaterial.
Appealed decision reversed. Hidalgo Enterprises
is absolved from liability.
Ratio:
One who maintains on his premises dangerous
instrumentalities or appliances of a character
likely to attract children in play, and who fails to
exercise ordinary care to prevent children from
playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable
to a child of tender years who is injured
thereby, even if the child is technically a
trespasser in the premises. This is the doctrine
of attractive nuisance. The principal reason for
the doctrine is that the condition or appliance in
question although its danger is apparent to
those of age, is so enticing or alluring to
children of tender years as to induce them to
approach, get on or use it, and this'
attractiveness is an implied invitation to such
children.
The majority of American jurisprudence posits
that the doctrine of attractive nuisance is
generally not applicable to bodies of water,
whether artificial or natural. The exception to
this is if there is some unusual condition or
artificial feature other than mere water and its
location. Furthermore, in Anderson v. Reith-
Riley Const. Co., the Indiana Appellate Court
explained why bodies of water are not
considered as attractive nuisance. It ruled that
children have been instructed early on to
exercise caution around bodies of water and are
presumed to know the danger.
Dissent of J. Pablo: Children are naturally
curious and do not have perfect knowledge of
things. They are amazed by the natural
attraction of the waters and shall explore where
their curiosity leads them unless there is
something that prevents them. As such,
petitioners should have placed fences around
the ponds as an ordinary precaution. (Note:
translated and paraphrased from Spanish text)
Margarita Afialda vs Basilio Hisole et al
Loreto Afialda was a caretaker of the carabaos
owned by Basilio Hisole. In March 1947, without
any fault from Afialda or any force majeure, one
of the carabaos gored him thereby causing his
death. Afialda’s sister, Margarita Afialda, sued
Hisole arguing that under the Civil Code, “The
possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the
same, is liable for any damages it may cause,
even if such animal should escape from him or
stray away. This liability shall cease only in case,
the damage should arise fromforce majeure or
from the fault of the person who may have
suffered it.”
ISSUE: Whether or not Hisole is liable in the
case at bar as owner of the carabao which killed
Afialda.
HELD: No. The law uses the term “possessor
and user of the animal”. Afialda was the
caretaker of the animal and he was tasked and
paid to tend for the carabaos. He, at the time of
the goring, is the possessor and the user of the
carabao and therefore he is the one who had
custody and control of the animal and was in a
position to prevent the animal from causing
damage. It would have been different had
Afialda been a stranger. Obviously, it was the
caretaker’s business to try to prevent the
animal from causing injury or damage to
anyone, including himself. And being injured by
the animal under those circumstances was one
of the risks of the occupation which he had
voluntarily assumed and for which he must take
the consequences.
This action could have been more appropriately
raised in court under the provisions of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act as the risk
involve was one of occupational hazards.
THE ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, 1st
Division, LILIAN JUAN LUIS, JANE JUAN YABES,
VIRGINIA JUAN CID, GLORIA JUAN CARAG, and
PURISIMA JUAN, respondents.
[G.R. No. L-53401; November 6,
1989] Obligations and Contracts|Fortuitous
Events|
FACTS:
A strong typhoon engulfed the province of
Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy rains and flooding
in its wake. The deceased Isabel Lao Juan,
fondly called Nana Belen, ventured out of the
house towards the direction of the Five Sisters
Emporium, a commercial establishment. While
wading in waist-deep flood, Nana Belen, in an
unfortunate accident, had suffered and died in
a circulatory shock electrocution. An action for
damages was instituted by the heirs of the
deceased. Petitioner, on the
other hand, contended that the deceased could
have died either by drowning or by
electrocution due to negligence attributable
only to herself and not to the electric company.
That the deceased installed an electrical wire
enclosing the iron gate and fence to deter the
area from burglars.
ISSUES:
Whether petitioner may be held liable for the
deceased’s death.
HELD:
While it is true that typhoons and floods are
considered Acts of God for which no person
may be held responsible, however, it was
through the intervention of petitioner’s
negligence that death took place.
Under the circumstances, petitioner was
negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to
the general public “… considering that
electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the
measure of care required of electric companies
must be commensurate with or proportionate
to the danger. The duty of exercising this high
degree of diligence and care extends to every
place where persons have a right to be“. “The
negligence of petitioner having been shown, it
may not now absolve itself from liability by
arguing that the victim’s death was solely due
to a fortuitous event.” When an act of God
combines or concurs with the negligence of the
defendant to produce an injury, the defendant
is liable if the injury would not have resulted
but for his own negligent conduct or omission
Hence, the heirs of Nana Belen, may not be
barred from recovering damages caused by
petitioner’s negligence.
Calalas v Court of Appeals & Eliza Sunga (Torts –
Proximate Cause)
Facts:
Private Respondent Eliza Saunga took a
passenger jeepney owned and operated by
Petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was
already full, she was just given an “extension
seat”, a wooden stool, at the rear end of the
vehicle.
On the way, the jeepney stopped to let a
passenger off. Since Sunga was seated at the
rear end, she gave way to the outgoing
passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu Elf
Truck driven by Igclerio Verena and owned by
Francisco Salva, bumped to the left rear end of
the jeepney. This incident cause injury to Sunga.
She filed a compliant for damages against
Calalas on the ground of breach of contract of
carriage. On the other hand, Calalas filed a
third-party complaint against Salva, the owner
of the truck.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Salva guilty
and absolved Calalas from liability holding that
it was the truck owner who is responsible for
the accident based on quasi-delict.
However, on appeal to the Court of Appeals
(CA), the appellate court reversed the RTC’s
decision, on the ground that Sunga’s cause of
action was based on a breach of contract of
carriage and not on quasi-delict.
Hence, this appeal from Calalas.
ISSUE: Whether or not the negligence of the
truck driver as the proximate cause of the
accident which negates petitioner’s liability?
RULING:
No.
First, the issue in this case is the liability under
contract of carriage.
In this case, the petitioner failed to transport his
passenger safely to his destination as a common
carrier in violation of Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the
New Civil Code.
Moreso, there is no basis that the ruling of the
RTC binds Sunga. It is immaterial that the
proximate cause of the collision was the truck
driver, because the doctrine of proximate cause
applies only to cases of quasi-delict.
The doctrine of proximate cause is a device for
imputing liability to a person where there is no
relation between him and another party. But in
the case at bar, there is a pre-existing relation
between petitioner and respondent in their
contract of carriage. Hence, upon happening of
the accident, the presumption of negligence at
once arose on Calalas’ part, which makes him
liable.
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM
vs. ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. “AMAY BISAYA” G.R.
No. 154259 doctrine of volenti non fit injuria
Reyes, more popularly known by the screen
name “Amay Bisaya,” alleged that while he was
having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, Mrs.
Filart, his friend of several years, approached
him and invited him to join her in a party at the
hotel’s penthouse for the birthday of the hotel’s
manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. Mr. Reyes asked if she
could vouch for him for which she replied: “of
course.” Mr. Reyes then went up with Dr. Filart
carrying the basket of fruits which was the
latter’s present for the celebrant.
After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner
was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet
table but, to his great shock, shame and
embarrassment, he was stopped by petitioner
Ruby Lim, Executive Secretary of Hotel Nikko. In
a loud voice and within the presence and
hearing of the other guests who were making a
queue at the buffet table, Ruby Lim told him to
leave the party (“huwag ka nang kumain, hindi
ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang”).

Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited
by Dr. Filart. Dr. Filart, who was within hearing
distance, however, completely ignored him thus
adding to his shame and humiliation. Not long
after, while he was still recovering from the
traumatic experience, a Makati policeman
approached and asked him to step out of the
hotel.
Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes asked for One
Million Pesos actual damages, One Million
Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages and
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos attorney’s fees.
Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked
Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not under the
ignominious circumstance painted by the latter.
Ms. Lim narrated that she was the Hotel’s
Executive Secretary for the past twenty (20)
years. For Mr. Tsuruoka’s party, Ms. Lim
generated an exclusive guest list limited to Mr.
Tsuruoka’s closest friends and some hotel
employees and that Mr. Reyes was not one of
those invited.
Dr. Filart gave her version of the story to the
effect that she never invited Mr. Reyes to the
party. According to her, it was Mr. Reyes who
volunteered to carry the basket of fruits
intended for the celebrant as he was likewise
going to take the elevator. When they reached
the penthouse, she reminded Mr. Reyes to go
down as he was not properly dressed and was
not invited.
Then there was a commotion and she saw Mr.
Reyes shouting. She ignored Mr. Reyes. She was
embarrassed and did not want the celebrant to
think that she invited him.
The court a quo dismissed the complaint, giving
more credence to the testimony of Ms. Lim. The
trial court likewise ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes
assumed the risk of being thrown out of the
party as he was uninvited:
On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of the
trial court.
Thus, the instant petition for review.
Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that
pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit
injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages
as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being
asked to leave (and being embarrassed and
humiliated in the process) as he was a “gate-
crasher.”
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (“to which
a person assents is not esteemed in law as
injury” ) refers to self-inflicted injury or to the
consent to injury which precludes the recovery
of damages by one who has knowingly and
voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if
he is not negligent in doing so. As formulated by
petitioners, however, this doctrine does not
find application to the case at bar because even
if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being
asked to leave the party, petitioners, under
Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were
still under obligation to treat him fairly in order
not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and
shame.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in
asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. “Amay Bisaya,” to
leave the party where he was not invited by the
celebrant thereof thereby becoming liable
under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
Parenthetically, and if Ruby Lim were so liable,
whether or not Hotel Nikko, as her employer, is
solidarily liable with her.
RULING:
Indeed, the general rule is that we are not a
trier of facts as our jurisdiction is limited to
reviewing and revising errors of law. One of the
exceptions to this general rule, however,
obtains herein as the findings of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court.
From an in depth review of the evidence, we
find more credible the lower court’s findings of
fact.
We are dealing with a formal party in a posh,
five-star hotel, for-invitation-only, thrown for
the hotel’s former Manager, a Japanese
national. Then came a person who was clearly
uninvited (by the celebrant) and who could not
just disappear into the crowd as his face is
known by many, being an actor. While he was
already spotted by the organizer of the party,
Ms. Lim, the very person who generated the
guest list, it did not yet appear that the
celebrant was aware of his presence.
In the absence of any proof of motive on the
part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and
expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly
unlikely that she would shout at him from a
very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the
hotel business for twenty years wherein being
polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated,
the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to
the contrary does not inspire belief and is
indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was
correct in observing that –
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to
plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave
the party was made such that they nearly kissed
each other, the request was meant to be heard
by him only and there could have been no
intention on her part to cause embarrassment
to him.
Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested,
there was no need for the police to take him
out.
Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyes’s
version of the story is that it is unsupported. It
is a basic rule in civil cases that he who alleges
proves. Mr. Reyes, however, had not presented
any witness to back his story up.
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr.
Reyes to leave the party to which he was not
invited, cannot be made liable to pay for
damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil
Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer,
Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs
from that of its employee.
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly
referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, is
not a panacea for all human hurts and social
grievances.
Article 19 states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.
Elsewhere, we explained that when “a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform
with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer
must be responsible.”
The object of this article, therefore, is to set
certain standards which must be observed not
only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in
the performance of one’s duties. These
standards are the following: act with justice,
give everyone his due and observe honesty and
good faith.6 Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act
evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its
elements are the following: (1) There is a legal
right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith;
(3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another. When Article 19 is violated, an action
for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of
the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages
arising from a violation of law which does not
obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within
her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21,
on the other hand, states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 21refers to acts contra bonus mores and
has the following elements: (1) There is an act
which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to
morals, good custom, public order, or public
policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure.
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and
21, and that is, the act complained of must be
intentional.
As applied to herein case and as earlier
discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms.
Lim was driven by animosity against him. These
two people did not know each other personally
before the evening of 13 October 1994.
All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko
are concerned, any damage which Mr. Reyes
might have suffered through Ms. Lim’s exercise
of a legitimate right done within the bounds of
propriety and good faith, must be his to bear
alone.
Rakes v Atlantic (Torts)
RAKES v ATLANTIC [G.R. No. 1719. January 23,
1907.] M. H., RAKES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. THE
ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY,
defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
The plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro
laborers in the employment of the defendant,
was at work transporting iron rails from a barge
in the harbor to the company's yard near the
malecon in Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one
hand car was used in this work. The defendant
has proved that there were two immediately
following one another, upon which were piled
lengthwise seven rails, each weighing 560
pounds, so that the ends of the rails lay upon
two crosspieces or sills secured to the cars, but
without side pieces or guards to prevent them
from slipping off. According to the testimony of
the plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of
the car or at its sides. According to that
defendant, some of them were also in front,
hauling by a rope. At a certain spot at or near
the water's edge the track sagged, the tie
broke, the car either canted or upset, the rails
slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg,
which was afterwards amputated at about the
knee.
ISSUE:
Whether the company is liable
RULING:
Yes. The negligence of the plaintiff, contributing
to the accident, to what extent it existed in fact
and what legal effect is to be given it. In two
particulars is he charged with carelessness:
First. That having noticed the depression in the
track he continued his work; and
Second. That he walked on the ends of the ties
at the side of the car instead of along the
boards, either before or behind it.
The Court ruled that His lack of caution in
continuing at his work after noticing the slight
depression of the rail was not of so gross a
nature as to constitute negligence, barring his
recovery under the severe American rule. While
the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not
only were they not forbidden to proceed in this
way, but were expressly directed by the
foreman to do so, both the officers of the
company and three of the workmen testify that
there was a general prohibition frequently
made known to all the gang against walking by
the side of the car, and the foreman swears that
he repeated the prohibition before the starting
of this particular load. On this contradiction of
proof we think that the preponderance is in
favor of the defendant's contention to the
extent of the general order being made known
to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the
plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed
in some degree to the injury as a proximate,
although not as its primary cause.
Distinction must be between the accident and
the injury, between the event itself, without
which there could have been no accident, and
those acts of the victim not entering into it,
independent of it, but contributing under
review was the displacement of the crosspiece
or the failure to replace it. This produced the
event giving occasion for damages — that is,
the sinking of the track and the sliding of the
iron rails.
1. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES. — In order to
enforce the liability of an employer for injuries
to his employee, it is not necessary that a
criminal action be first prosecuted against the
employer or his representative primarily
chargeable with the accident. No criminal
proceeding having been taken, the civil action
may proceed to judgment.
2. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER TO WORKMEN. —
The responsibility of an employer to his
employee of a fellow-servant of the employee
injured, is not adopted in Philippine
jurisprudence.
3. FELLOW-SERVANT RULE. — Sua cuique culpa
nocet. The doctrine known as the "Fellow-
servant rule," exonerating the employer where
the injury was incurred through the negligence
of a fellow-servant of the employee injured, is
not adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.
BERNAL V JV HOUSE (1930) G.R. No. L-30741
January 30, 1930 TOMAS BERNAL and
FORTUNATA ENVERSO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.
J. V. HOUSE and TACLOBAN ELECTRIC and ICE
PLANT, LTD., defendants-appellee.
FACTS: On the evening of April 10, 1925, the
procession of Holy Friday was held in Tacloban,
Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with her daughter
Purificacion Bernal came from another
municipality to attend the religious celebration.
After the procession was over, the woman and
her daughter, accompanied by two other
persons by the names of Fausto and Elias,
passed along a public street named Gran
Capitan. The little girl was allowed to get a short
distance in advance of her mother and her
friends. When in front of the offices of the
Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., and
automobile appeared from the opposite
direction which so frightened the child that she
turned to run, with the result that she fell into
the street gutter. At that time there was hot
water in this gutter or ditch coming from the
Electric Ice Plant of J.V. House. When the
mother and her companions reached the child,
they found her face downward in the hot water.
Her clothes were immediately removed and,
then covered with a garment, the girl was taken
to the provincial hospital. There she was
attended by the resident physician, Dr.
Victoriano A. Benitez. Despite his efforts, the
child died that same night at 11:40 o'clock.
Defense: The hot water was permitted to flow
down the side of the street Gran Captain with
the knowledge and consent of the authorities;
that the cause of death was other than the hot
water; and that in the death the plaintiffs
contributed by their own fault and negligence.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: (1) Court of First
Instance â Leyte: denied them P15,000 damages
from J.V. House and the Tacloban Electric & Ice
Plant, Ltd., for the death of the child as a
consequence of burns alleged to have been
caused by the fault and negligence of the
defendants.
ISSUE: Whether the company is liable
RULING: Yes. The mother and her child had a
perfect right to be on the principal street of
Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the
religious procession was held. There was
nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run
along a few paces in advance of the mother. No
one could foresee the coincidence of an
automobile appearing and of a frightened child
running and falling into a ditch filled with hot
water. The contributory negligence of the child
and her mother, if any, does not operate as a
bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could
only result in reduction of the damages. The
plaintiffs are Tomas Bernal and Fortunata
Enverso. The latter was the mother of
Purificacion Bernal and the former was the
natural father, who had never legally
recognized his child. The daughter lived with
the mother, and presumably was supported by
her. Under these facts, recovery should be
permitted the mother but not the father. As to
the defendants, they are J.V. House and the
Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., J.V. House
was granted a franchise by Act No. 2700 of the
Philippine Legislature approved on March 9,
1917. He only transferred this franchise
formally to the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant,
Ltd. on March 30, 1926, that is, nearly a year
after the death of the child Purificacion Bernal.
Under these facts, J.V. House is solely
responsible.
JARCO MARKETING CORPORATION, LEONARDO
KONG, JOSE TIOPE and ELISA PANELO,
Petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, CONRADO C. AGUILAR and CRISELDA
R. AGUILAR, Respondents.
G.R. No. 129792. December 21, 1999
FACTS:
When respondent Criselda was signing her
credit card slip at payment and verification
counter in Syvels Department Store in Makati,
she felt a sudden gust of wind a heard a loud
sound. She looked behind her and saw her
daughter Zhieneth (6 years old) on the floor
pinned by the bulk of the stores gift-wrapping
counter.
She was rushed to the hospital but died after 14
days.
Private respondents filed a complaint for
damages.
Petitioners on the other hand, denied any
liability imputing the negligence to Criselda for
allowing her daughter to roam freely in the
department store. Alleging further, that the
deceased committed contributory negligence
when she climbed the counter. Also herein
petitioners defense is that they have exercised
due diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection, supervision and control of their
employees.
Trial Court favored petitioners, contemplating
that Zhieneth’s action is the proximate cause of
the accident.
CA favored respondents on it declared that
ZHIENETH, who was below seven (7) years old
at the time of the incident, was absolutely
incapable of negligence or other tort. It
reasoned that since a child under nine (9) years
could not be held liable even for an intentional
wrong, then the six-year old ZHIENETH could
not be made to account for a mere mischief or
reckless act. It also absolved CRISELDA of any
negligence, finding nothing wrong or out of the
ordinary in momentarily allowing ZHIENETH to
walk while she signed the document at the
nearby counter.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Zhieneth was guilty of
contributory negligence.
(2) Whether or not the death of ZHIENETH was
accidental or attributable to negligence.
HELD:
(1)NO
Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we
apply the conclusive presumption that favors
children below nine (9) years old in that they
are incapable of contributory negligence.
In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of
age is conclusively presumed to have acted
without discernment, and is, on that account,
exempt from criminal liability. The same
presumption and a like exemption from criminal
liability obtains in a case of a person over nine
and under fifteen years of age, unless it is
shown that he has acted with discernment.
(2)NEGLIGENCE.
An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in
which no fault or negligence attaches to the
defendant
negligence is the omission to do something
which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or the
 doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do.

We rule that the tragedy which befell ZHIENETH

was no accident and that ZHIENETHs death
could only be attributed to negligence.

Part of res gestae. Statements made by a

person while a startling occurrence is taking
place or immediately prior or subsequent
thereto with respect to the circumstances
thereof, may be given in evidence as part of
the res gestae. So, also, statements
accompanying an equivocal act material to the
issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be
received as part of the res gestae.

018 Kapalaran Bus Line v. Coronado AUTHOR: Jimi R. Arranchado

G.R. No. 85331 August 25, 1989
TOPIC: Diligence Required of Common Carriers
PONENTE: FELICIANO, J.

FACTS:

1. The jeepney driven by Lope Grajera was then coming from Pila, Laguna and traversing the old highway
towards Sta. Cruz collided with a KBL bus driven by its regular driver Virgilio Llamoso.

2. As testified to by Atty. Conrado L. Manicad who was driving a Mustang car coming from the direction of Sta.
Cruz and proceeding towards the direction of Manila, he stopped at the intersection to give way to the jeepney
driven by Grajera.
3. The sketch marked very clearly that the jeepney had already traversed the intersection when it met the KBL
bus head-on. It is also obvious that the point of impact was on the right lane of the highway which is the lane
properly belonging to the jeepney.

4. Judging from the testimony of Atty. Conrado L. Manicad and the sketch (Exhibit 'E'), the sequence of events
shows that the first vehicle to arrive at the intersection was the jeepney.

5. Seeing that the road was clear, the jeepney which had stopped at the intersection began to move forward,
and for his part, Atty. Manicad stopped his car at the intersection to give way to the jeepney.

6. The KBL bus had no more room within which to stop without slamming into the rear of the vehicle behind
the car of Atty. Manicad. The KBL driver chose to gamble on proceeding on its way, unfortunately, the jeepney
driven by Grajera, which had the right-of-way, was about to cross the center of the highway and was directly
on the path of the KBL bus.

7. The impact indicates that the KBL bus was travelling at a fast rate of speed because, after the collision, it did
not stop; it travelled for another 50meters and stopped only when it hit an electric post.

8. On 14 September 1982, Kapalaran, apparently believing that the best defense was offense, filed a complaint
for damage to property and physical injuries through reckless imprudence against respondents Angel Coronado
and Lope Grajera in the Regional Trial Court. Respondents answered with their own claims (counter-claims) for
damages. A third-party complaint and/or a complaint for intervention was also filed in the same case against
Kapalaran by jeepney passenger Dionisio Shinyo.

9. The petitioner contended that the jeepney should have stopped before entering the "Y-intersection"
because of the possibility that another vehicle behind the cars which had stopped might not similarly stop and
might swerve to the left to proceed to the highway en route to Manila, is more ingenious than substantial.

9. The trial court rendered a judgment in favor of private respondents.

10. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified the award of damages by setting
aside the grant of exemplary damages as well as the award of attorney's fee and litigation expenses made to
Dionisio Shinyo.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Kapalaran's driver exercised the diligence required of common carriers.
HELD: NO.

RATIO:

1. Kapalaran's driver had become aware that some vehicles ahead of the bus and travelling in the same
direction had already stopped at the intersection obviously to give way either to pedestrians or to another
vehicle about to enter the intersection.
2. The bus driver, who was driving at a speed too high to be safe and proper at or near an intersection on the
highway, and in any case too high to be able to slow down and stop behind the cars which had preceded it and
which had stopped at the intersection, chose to swerve to the left lane and overtake such preceding vehicles,
entered the intersection and directly smashed into the jeepney within the intersection.

3. Immediately before the collision, the bus driver was actually violating the following traffic rules and
regulations, among others, in the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, Republic Act No. 4136, as amended:

Sec. 35. Restriction as to speed. — (a) Any person driving a motor vehicle on a highway shall drive the
same at a careful and prudent speed, not greater nor less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard for
the traffic, the width of the highway, and or any other condition then and there existing; and no person shall
drive any motor vehicle upon a highway at such a speed as to endanger the life, limb and property of any
person, nor at a speed greater than will permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop within the assured clear
distance ahead.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 41. Restrictions on overtaking and passing. 1 (a) The driver of a vehicle shall not drive to the left side
of the center line of a highway in overtaking or passing another vehicle, proceeding in the same direction,
unless such left side is clearly visible, and is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to permit
such overtaking or passing to be made in safety.

xxx xxx xxx

(c) The driver of a vehicle shall not overtake or pass any other vehicle proceeding in the same direction, at
any railway grade crossing, or at any intersection of highways, unless such intersection or crossing is controlled
by traffic signal, or unless permitted to do so by a watchman or a peace officer, except on a highway having
two or more lanes for movement of traffic in one direction where the driver of a vehicle may overtake or pass
another vehicle on the right. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a driver overtaking or
passing, upon the right, another vehicle which is making or about to make a left turn.

xxx xxx xxx

4. Thus, a legal presumption arose that the bus driver was negligent 3 a presumption Kapalaran was unable to
overthrow.

5. The jeepney driver, seeing the cars closest to the intersection on the opposite side of the highway come to a
stop to give way to him, had the right to assume that other vehicles further away and behind the stopped cars
would similarly come to a stop and not seek illegally to overtake the stopped vehicles and come careening into
the intersection at an unsafe speed.

6. Petitioner's bus was still relatively far away from the intersection when the jeepney entered the same; the
bus collided head on into the jeepney because the bus had been going at an excessively high velocity
immediately before and at the time of overtaking the stopped cars, and so caught the jeepney within the
intersection. It was also the responsibility of the bus driver to see to it, when it overtook the two (2) cars ahead
which had stopped at the intersection, that the left lane of the road within the intersection and beyond was
clear. The point of impact was on the left side of the intersection (the light lane so far as concerns the jeepney
coming from the opposite side), which was precisely the lane or side on which the jeepney had a right to be.

7. Kapalaran argues that there was no justification for holding it, the employer, liable for damages, considering
that such liability was premised upon the bus driver's negligence and that petitioner "as mere employer" was
not guilty of such negligence or imprudence. This contention in thoroughly unpersuasive. The patent and gross
negligence on the part of the petitioner Kapalaran's driver raised the legal presumption that Kapalaran as
employer was guilty of negligence either in the selection or in the supervision of its bus driver.

8. Where the employer is held liable for damages, it has of course a right of recourse against its own negligent
employee. If petitioner Kapalaran was interested in maintaining its right of recourse against or reimbursement
from its own driver, it should have appealed from that portion of the trial court's decision which had failed to
hold the bus driver is not "merely subsidiary," and is not limited to cases where the employee "cannot pay his
liability" nor are private respondents compelled first to proceed against the bus driver.

9. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is direct and immediate; it is not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such
employee. So far as the record shows, petitioner Kapalaran was unable to rebut the presumption of
negligence on its own part. The award of moral damages against petitioner Kapalaran is not only entirely in
order; it is also quite modest considering Dionisio Shinyo's death during the pendency of this petition, a death
hastened by, if not directly due to, the grievous injuries sustained by him in the violent collision.

10. The law requires petitioner as common carrier to exercise extraordinary diligence in carrying and
transporting their passenger safely "as far as human care and foresight can proved, using the utmost diligence
of very cautious persons, with due regard for all circumstances."

11. In requiring the highest possible degree of diligence from common carriers and creating a presumption of
negligence against them, the law compels them to curb the recklessness of their drivers. While the immediate
beneficiaries of the standard of extraordinary diligence are, of course, the passengers and owners of cargo
carried by a common carrier, they are not only persons that the law seeks to benefit. For if common carriers
carefully observed the statutory standard of extraordinary diligence in respect of their own passengers, they
cannot help but simultaneously benefit pedestrians and the owners and passengers of other vehicles who are
equally entitled to the safe and convenient use of our roads and highways.

12. The law seeks to stop and prevent the slaughter and maiming of people (whether passengers or not) and
the destruction of property (whether freight or not) on our highways by buses, the very size and power of
which seem often to inflame the minds of their drivers. Article 2231 of the Civil Code explicitly authorizes the
imposition of exemplary damages in cases of quasi-delicts "if the defendant acted with gross negligence."
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: In requiring the highest possible degree of diligence from common carriers and creating
a presumption of negligence against them, the law compels them to curb the recklessness of their drivers.
While the immediate beneficiaries of the standard of extraordinary diligence are, of course, the passengers and
owners of cargo carried by a common carrier, they are not only persons that the law seeks to benefit. For if
common carriers carefully observed the statutory standard of extraordinary diligence in respect of their own
passengers, they cannot help but simultaneously benefit pedestrians and the owners and passengers of other
vehicles who are equally entitled to the safe and convenient use of our roads and highways.

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S): WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on certiorari is DENIED for lack of
merit and the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, except (1) that the award of exemplary
damages to Dionisio Shinyo shall be restored and increased from P10,000.00 to P25,000.00, and (2) that the
grant of attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the sum of P15,000.00 to Dionisio Shinyo shall similarly be
restored. Costs against petitioner.