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 PHILIPPINE-US RELATIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF
PHILIPPINE FOREIGN POLICY

By Benito Lim *

In July 1969 Richard M. Nixon, on the last leg of his

Pacific tour, told newspapermen on the island of Guam that
the Philippines is a part of United States territory.1 His
statement confirmed what I had always suspected: that
most American policy makers have never relinquished the
belief that the Philippines is her colony. At an earlier date,
the late Lyndon B. Johnson made an almost similar de-
claration when he said that President Marcos was his
"right arm in Asia." Although some people would claim
that this statement is a rhetorical expression of big bro-
ther approval, I think it sums up quite accurately Ameri-
can perception of the Philippines and the Filipinos over
the past thirty-seven years. Although there was a formal
transfer of sovereignty from the United States to the Phil-
ippines in 1946, US leaders continued to handle her stra-
tegic and economic interests as if the Philippines were not
an independent state but her colony, to do with it what-
ever is profitable and convenient for her.
The American political scientist Stephen Shalom char-
acterized American policy towards the Philippines as neo-
colonial. But Shalom observed that neocolonialism was pos-
sible only because the elites of the two countries collabo-
rated to serve their mutual interests. What must be added
to Shalom's observation is that many of the members of
the Filipino elite cooperated because they shared the same
outlook with the Americans. Most members of the Fili-
* Associate Professor, Asian Center, University of the Philip-
pines.
1 See Stephen R. Shalom, The United States and the Philippines,
1981.
pino elite who underwent American colonial tutelage be-
lieved that their historic role was as mediators between
the people and their colonial overlords. They were richly
rewarded by being placed in high government positions or
by being given the opportunity to engage in the most pro-
fitable business enterprises. 2 Those who believed different-
ly met either political or economic doom or both. From
1910 to the eve of the Second World War even the seg-
ments of the Filipino elite who saw themselves as spokes-
men of the people were by and large convinced of the sincer-
ity of American democratic aims in the Philippines.
All accounts of Philippine-American relations after
the Second World War draw attention to the significant
differences in viewpoint between Filipino and American
policy makers. Americans rarely concern themselves with
moral issues in foreign relations while Filipinos are unable
to dissociate their national interests with moral issues such
as friendship and loyalty. Americans negotiate for maxi-
mum benefits and minimum losses. On moral issues Ame-
ricans follow one simple dictum: what is good for them is
good for the rest of the world. Nowhere is this American
world view fully developed to a state of art than in foreign
relations.

In HistoricalPerspective

Philippine foreign policy from the short-lived Agui-

naldo government to the Commonwealth period was based
on a moralistic and visionary outlook of the world. Unlike
the American founding fathers who took every advantage
of European and Asian conflicts to win independence and
then to win economic gains, Filipino leaders were hemmed
in by their own misconceptions. They failed to perceive the
inherent similarity between Spain and the US. The Span-
ish colonizers were to be overthrown by force if necessary

2 See David Bernstein, The Philippine Story, 1947. See also

-Garel A. Gunder and William Levery, The Philippines and the
United States, 1951.
while the Americans were their new trustworthy allies,
who championed the emancipation of all former Spanish
colonies. To most Filipino policy makers the US was the
guardian of their best interests.
Since political independence in 1946, Philippine for-
eign policy may be said to have undergone two stages of
growth. This development is by no means an indication'
that Philippine foreign relations have sufficiently matured.
While the Philippines had indeed experienced some growth
after more than 40 years of independence, she has yet to
mature fully to acquire the ability to deal with diverse
ideologies, conflicting interests and challenges in an increa-
singly complex and violent world. At the outset, it can
perhaps be said that the Philippines has moved from a
position where her for~ign relations were excessively cen-
tered on the United States to one wherein she has be-
come aware that the pursuit of her national interests
compels the strengthening of her relations with other
countries.
Having been a colony - first of Spain for more than
300 years, then of the United States for nearly 50 years,
with short interregnums under the British, in 1762-1764,
and the Japanese from 1942 to 1945 - Philippine involve-
ment with foreign countries had always been through the
colonizer. Except for the sultanates of Sulu and Maguin-
danao, which conducted their own foreign relations with
neighboring countries in Southeast Asia and China, Fili-
pinos in Luzon and the Visayas had virtually no experience
in the conduct of foreign relations. For hundreds of years
Filipinos had no control over their relations with other
countries or even any influence over the colonial powers
which brought countries together under their own spheres
of influence, often in disregard of ethnic, cultural and
political affinities.
The first instance in Philippine early history when
the Philippines sought recognition from the big states,
Felipe Agoncillo, foreign minister of the Aguinaldo gov-
ernment, had to cool his heels in the antechambers of
his counterparts in Madrid and Washington, D.C. 8
With no experience in dealing with other countries ex-
cept from the point of view of the colonizer, Philippine
policy-makers were conditioned to think that the colo-
nizer's and their own interests were identical. Even after
independence from the United States the Philippines joined
the United States in her economic blockade of the People's
Republic of China, and aided the United States in sup-
porting pro-US regimes in the Indochina states. But even
if the Philippine government were able to take a different
position vis-a-vis Korea or Indochina in the 50's and 60's,
the strategic location of the Philippines between the West-
ern Pacific and East Asia would inevitably have involved
her in all of these conflicts. It is inevitable that the Philip-
pines is America's strategic operation center for her
activities in Asia.
Philippine foreign policy in the early decades was un-
swerving in its devotion to, and was completely reliant
on, the United States. From 1946 to the early 1960's, Phil-
ippine foreign policy-makers were unable to make the
necessary distinction between personal relations and rela-
tions between states. 4 Foreign policy leaders, and, to a
great extent, the Filipino people, behaved as if the two
levels of relationship were interchangeable. The Philip-
pines was, therefore, not equipped, neither ideologically
nor psychologically, to deal with the United States and
other foreign countries in the arena of world affairs.
Although the Philippines has shown, as in the war
years, a commendable degree of resourcefulness and imagi-
nation, the large majority of her citizens had. no clear
See Felipe Agoncillo, Memorial to the Senate of the United
States with the Laws of the Philippine Republic, January 30, 1899.
(Pamphlet) See also Agoncillo & Guerrero, History of the Filipino
People, 1977, p. 240.
4 See George Taylor, The Philippines and the United States:
Problems of Partnership, 1964.
understanding of what should be their national goals as a
people and could not, as in a true democracy, charge their
leaders with the formulation of a national program that
can be reflected in foreign policy. Filipinos knew that the
first postulate of Philippine foreign policy must be the
protection of Philippine independence, territorial integrity,
and national dignity,. but the leaders, under the heavy
pressures of vested interests readily compromised with
the harsh realities of dealing with larger powers.
Upon the declaration of Philippine independence,
Manuel A. Roxas enunciated the future direction of Philip-
pine foreign policy. It was based on an unequivocal com-
mitment to the United States:

We are committed to the cause and the international

program of the United States . . . our safest course ...
is in the glistening wake of America whose sure advance
with mighty prow breaks for smaller craft and waves of
fear. 5

In no uncertain terms the late President Roxas com-

mitted the Philippines to the support of whatever inter-
national involvements the United States might have. Thus
if the United States were to declare war on Russia the
Philippines would promptly follow suit. There was no
doubt that in the perception of President Roxas and
those who advised and supported him, America was a
true friend in whom the Filipinos could entrust their
destiny as a people. To quote him again, "We can much
more securely repose our faith in the understanding and
comradeship that exist between the Philippines and the
United States."
For over two decades after the restoration of Philip-
pine independence in 1946, Philippine foreign policymak-
ing was chiefly a question of how to manage Philippine
5 Manuel Roxas, Independence Day Address, July 4, 1946. See
also Manuel Roxas, Important Speeches, Messages and Other Pro-
nouncemets of President Manuel Roxas, 1947. Jose D. Ingles,
Philippine Foreign Policy, 1982, pp. 18-19.
relations with the United States. Filipino leaders in those
days believed that friendship with the United States was
all that was needed in dealing with the rest of the world.
We can say that to many of the Filipinos then, the world
was the United States.
And yet, from a broader perspective, the late Presi-
dent Roxas' foreign policy stance in the context of post
World War II conditions was not entirely naive. Even
those who had criticized President Roxas, after gaining
hindsight today, agree that, from a historical context,
President Roxas did not have very much of a choice ex-
cept to align the Philippines with the United States.
That he could have been cautious, extracted more con-
cessions and allowed for some room for maneuvering out
of the tight confines of the United States "International
Program" remain valid criticisms. Considering the inter-
national conditions right after World War II, however, the
devastated Philippines could only turn to the United States
for aid. There was no alternative source for aid. Russia
was herself undergoing reconstruction and rehabilitation.
Even if she wanted to aid countries like the Philippines,
she was in no position to do so at that time. As for
China she was in the midst of a bloody and devastating
civil war; her economy after the defeat of the Kuomintang
forces was in total shambles. Japan, a defeated country,
was in worse condition than the Philippines. IMost of
Europe, too, was in dire need of economic rehabilitation.
The Philippines could turn to no other country for help
but the United States. The question that could be raised
would not be on the choice of the source of aid but on
the nature and mode by which it would be given or rec-
eived. It is profitable to discuss this at length for it is
the one event in Philippine history that has shaped in
large measure the development of her foreign policy.
Among the Southeast Asians who experienced Euro-
pean colonialism, the Filipinos were unique in that unlike
the Vietnamese or the Indonesians, who saw the war be-
tween Japan and the western powers as an opportunity to
hasten their bid for independence, the Filipinos actively
fought the Japanese in support of their colonizers. Al-
though the Filipinos perceived the Japanese "Co-Prosper-
ity Program for Asia" as a disguised form of Japanese
imperialism they did not view American economic presence
as another form of imperialism. Filipino resistance and
resolute cooperation with the allies all throughout the Paci-
fic war demonstrated very clearly how seriously the Fili-
pinos viewed the matter of their friendship with the Ameri-
cans. While most Southeast Asians offered no resistance to
the Japanese and in fact cooperated with them in transfer-
ring the machinery of government from European to Ja-
panese hands, the Filipinos held out with the Americans
as long as they could in Bataan and Corregidor. Obviously,
the Filipinos, 40 years after the Philippine-American war,
no longer saw the Americans as colonizers but as bene-
factors.

Specific Content of "Special Relations"

The country's hope was that America would give

generous aid for rehabilitation as a matter of justice,
but that hope was quickly shattered. The sharp inequality
in the bargaining positions of the two governments be-
came apparent when the Philippine Rehabilitation Act and
the Philippine Trade Act of 1946 were negotiated. 6 The
Filipinos, negotiating under the impression that friend-
ship and "mutual interests" were paramount considera-
tions, were stunned by America's insistence that as a
pre-condition to any form of aid, the parity amendment
allowing equal rights to Americans in the exploitation of
Philippine natural resources be passed. This demand
shocked many thoughtful Filipinos who saw America as
a power taking undue advantage of a weak ally. The moral
6 See Hernando J. Abaya, Betrayal of the Philippines, 1946.
outrage felt by some of our leaders was expressed by
Vicente G. Sinco:

.*. As an expression of benevolence and friendship, this

act is marred by a feature that is ethically odious . . .
It disregards the sense of dignity and self-respect of the
Filipinos. It dejnands from the Filipinos, for the benefit
of a few selfish American interests, a consideration which
is not just, or fair, or reasonable, but onerous, uncon-
scionable and unfair.7

Sinco urged that "If we must pay for rehabilitation

as we should, let us do so. But let us not agree to any
exaction that would ultimately endanger the future of our
independent existence. Let the American Congress con-
sider the huge sums appropriated in the rehabilitation act
as loans to be replaced by us with interests."
Despite the protestations of leaders such as Sinco,
there was no massive outcry from the people. Those who
opposed the Parity found very little support from the ma-
jority of the Filipinos. 8 To the man in the street, the issues
of sovereignty-or, for that matter, national interest and
national dignity-were all abstract. Although he cherished
political independence, he had no clear idea of its conco-
mitant responsibilities. His schooling under the American
system did not help matters, for he saw nothing wrong
with granting Americans the right to exploit Philippine
natural resources. He weocomed the parity amendment as
the means by which the country could be rehabilitated.
Moreover, since most of our people suffered extreme de-
privation during the war, they were easily lured by the
American promise of swift and immediate war damage
payments and backpay and were not too interested in the
discussion of the long-term consequences of Parity.

7See Vicente G. Sinco, "Alien Sovereignty in the Philippine

Republic" in Teodoro Agoncillo & Milagros Guerrero, History of the
Filipino People, 1977, p. 508.
8 "Free Press Readers React to Parity," Philippines Free Press,
January 11, 1947. See also Salvador Araneta, America's Double-
Cross of the Philippines, 1978.
 The ease with which the military bases agreement was
forged showed too how vividly our people remembered our
country's defenselessness in the face of Japanese aggres-
sion, but they failed to understand that an independent
government should not yield to another power the exercise
of sovereignty over vast areas of its territory-at the risk,
moreover, of inviting the hostility of that power's enemies.
The prevailing view then was that America's defense um-
brella was the sure guarantee of our safety.
The late Senator Claro M. Ilecto, a consistent oppo-
nent of the United States military presence in the Philip-
pines, questioned the wisdom of this position. To him what-
ever benefits the Philippines gained from such relations
could not be mutual, but only incidental. In his speech be-
fore the Senate in 1958 he elaborated on grounds for his
objection to Parity:

In time of peace, foreign bases serve as protection for

foreign investments with the country where the bases are
established. In time of war, these bases take on their real
mnilitary character . . . American commentators candidly
admit that the purpose of these bases is not our protec-
tion against invasion but our invitation to enemy attack
in order to protect the people of the United States at the
cost of lives of our people. Overseas bases, like those in
the Philippines, are precisely the diversionary objectives
for such an enemy attack on the United States.

That the Filipino people were barely aware of the im-

plications of the issues, that they lacked discipline and the
willingness to sacrifice for a truly independent nation in
those years can all be conceded. But what was most crucial
was the absence of an alternative rehabilitation and eco-
nomic program by Filipino leaders that could counter the
one designed by the United States. The absence of such
an alternative program hindered all future attempts to
draw up a more autonomous economic plan for the coun-
try.
 What was the trade agreement and why were its terms
not favorable to the country's economy in the long run?
Basically, the act provided for reciprocal free trade for
eight years whereby both countries were to admit each
other's goods duty-free and an annual five percent tariff
increase in the following twenty years (up to 1974). It also
included as a condition the proposed American parity
rights which declared that American citizens and business
enterprises be given full and equal rights with Filipinos
concerning property, residence, occupation and taxation.
But the parity amendment aside, the Trade Act was not
exactly reciprocal. The Act did not limit the amount of
United States goods entering the Philippines but subjected
seven of the Philippines' most important exports to the
United States to absolute quotas. It also stipulated that
should her exports be in competition with similar items
produced in the United States, the United States Tariff
Commission could impose quotas on such exports. No simi-
lar 'authority was granted to the Philippines. 9 But all these
inequalities paled before the long-range effects the Act had
on the Philippine economy. According to a study made by
the IMF:

The Bell Trade Act under which the Philippines and the
United States admit each other's goods duty-free had the
effect of discouraging the establishment of local Philippine
industries and thereby contributed to the tendency to over-
export.lo

One of the consequences of the Bell Trade Act was

that the Philippines was unable to develop and expand her
local industries precisely because she was unable to com-
pete against foreign products.
9 See Testimony of William Clayton, Senate Finance Commit.
tee, Hearings (on Philippine Ti'ade Act) 79th Cong., 2nd Session,
1946, p. 99 Ibid. also in Shirley Jenkins, American Economic Policy,
p. 63. House, Ways and Means Committee; Hearings on the Trade
Act, 79th Cong., 1st Session 1946, p. 136.
10"Report of the Philippine Mission of International Mone-
tary Fund," Washington, January 17, 1950.
 To the Filipinos, American demands for military bases
and parity rights as the preconditions for extending US
aid and rehabilitation funds were a callous way of taking
advantage of a weak and prostrate nation. Worse, since
the Philippines was America's ally during the war, the lat-
ter's impositions was a moral betrayal of friendship. By
contrast the Americans felt no moral obligations towards
their war allies. In fact they viewed the occasion as an op-
portunity to extract the most profitable terms in the bar-
gain. Rep. Harold Knutson speaking before the Ways and
Means Committee of the US Senate explained in 1945:

We have interests to look after, too . .. It is not that we

do not desire to be helpful to the Philippine people. God
knows, I would give them the shirt off my back, if I had
another one to replace it. In other words, I would give
them half. But we have certain obligations here and we
can't let our hearts run away with -;s altogether.1l

American official position was that the Bell Trade Act

was the only way to attract United States capital to the
Philippines in order to help rehabilitate a war-torn coun-
try.
This is not to say that the entire US citizenry thought
the same way. There were sectors of the American public
who disagreed with Rep. Knutson. In fact the analysts in
the Department of State, Commerce and Navigation felt
that the standard Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation which the US negotiated with other European
allies would be sufficient to protect US interests in the
Philippines.12 But the fact remains that American official
policy did not heed their advice. Those who advocated a
policy of imposing more stringent demands on the Philip-
pines prevailed and so the US government insisted on the
parity amendment to the Philippine Constitution.
11 HCarings, Trade Act, 1945, pp. 18, 34, 36, 247.
12 Heariugs, Trade Act, 1946, pp. 76-78; Hearings, Trade Act,
1945, pp. 88-89.
 To make sure that the amendment to the Philippine
Constitution would be passed, President Roxas prevented
the 8 elected representatives to the Philippine Congress,
known opponents of the Parity Amendment, from taking
their seats in Congress. In doing so President Roxas vir-
tually subverted the democratic process. And yet The New
York Times which is generally an exponent of liberal
causes praised Roxas' action for showing "political ma-
turity." Senator Jasper Bell, author of the Trade Act which
bore his name understandably, congratulated Roxas for
preserving "the ties of friendship between Filipinos and
Americans" and said that Philippine-American friendship
will be "broadened and strengthened by the effects of the
trade act, but the foundations of democracy both here and
in the Orient will be given a new life."' 13 But the main rea-
son why most Americans did not wish to terminate trade
preferences comes mainly from the War Department's posi-
tion that the Philippine economy must be prevented from
developing into a complement either to Japan or the Soviet
Union. 14
Similarly disadvantageous to the Philippines' economy
were the terms of the military bases agreement. Under this
agreement, the Philippines leased 23 bases occupying over
400,000 hectares of good agricultural land for 99 years at
no cost to the US. The bases were located in places char-
acterized by the most intense population pressure and the
highest percentages of tenancy. The combined acreage
of the bases denied a vast segment of the Filipino popu-
lation a livelihood in agriculture, fisheries and forestry. In
addition, much of the rehabilitation and aid money was
allotted to US military and private agencies and a large
amount was spent to build the best roads that could make
these bases easily accessible to Americans. For instance,
1 Quoted by S. Shalom in The United States and The Philippines,
p. 59.
14 E. R. Stettenius, Memorandum for the President, April 22,
1945. Department of State Records, Record Group 59, National
Archives, Washington, D.C.
the $1,400.1 million aid was distributed in the following
manner :'5

US military agencies including

civilian employees P427,900,000
Philippine War Damage Commission 301,900,000
Veterans Administration 112,700,000
Reconstruction Finance Commission 60,000,000
Others 94,800,000

Moreover, not only was the Philippines obliged to

grant large tracts of land for free to the Americans, the
Philippine government was not given jurisdiction over
American personnel inside these bases no matter how re-
prehensible their behavior may be toward Filipino citizens.
One need not dwell on the many conflicts that took place
over the years. Nor should those "irritants" be the sources
of recriminations and regrets today. But it must be pointed
out that it was the Filipino people's notion of America as
their friend and ally that prevented them from examining
the military bases agreement more critically. They did not
even. demand rent for they felt so grateful for America's
willingness "to defend us from external aggression."
It took a long time for the Filipinos to realize that
the bases were not intended to defend the Philippines from
any external aggressor but to promote American interests
in Asia, especially her forward strategic position in a glo-
bal cold war. There was no better proof of this than dur-
ing the Philippine dispute with Malaysia over the province
of Sabah, North Borneo. America, despite her avowed goals
to come to the aid of the Philippines in case of external
threat, chose to be neutral. It was only then that Philippine
foreign policy-makers realized the limitations of the bases
agreement including the mutual defense treaty between the
15 Quoted in M. Ventura's United States-Philippine Coopera-
tion and Cross-Purposes Bell Mission Report, p. 36. Other accounts
not included: $78.4 million in 1948; P22.5 in 1949 allowance for
American military personnel to dependents in the U.S.; $100 mil-
lion worth of surplus property; and $35.5 million grants in kind.
Philippines and the United .States. Although the mutual
defence treaty constitutes a guarantee against external ag-
gression, the treaty has no ironclad guarantees that the
United States will take immediate retaliatory action in the
event of external aggression against the Philippines. The
commitment embodied in the treaty provided only for the
following:
Article IV
Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific
area on either party would be dangerous to its own peace
and safety and de clares that it would act to meet the com-
mon dangers in accordance with its constitutional pro-
cesses.

According to the United States Congress during the

Symington hearings, the United States is obliged to repel
an attack only if the United States bases in the Philippines
were directly attacked, but not if the Philippines itself
were attacked in a way which did not endanger the
United States bases.
This is very different from the concept of mutual
defense under the N AT 0 Treaty:
The parties agree that an armed attack against one or
more of them in Europe or North America shall be con-
sidered an attack against them all, and consequently they
agree that, if such armed attack occurs, each of them,
in the exercise of the right of individual or collective
self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of
the United Nations, will assist the party or parties so
attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert
with the parties, such action as it deems necessary in-
cluding the use of armed force, to restore and maintain
the security of the North Atlantic areas.

Many American military experts themselves do not

believe that the bases were intended to defend the Phil-
ippines from any external aggressor. 16 In 1959 the Pacific
16 Hearings, Mutual Security Aid of 1959 (U.S. Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations) 86th Congress, 1st Session, 1959, p. 12.
naval commander testified that he could not "visualize
the Philippines being attacked in any situation short of
general war situation." Ten years later another admiral as-
serted that the principal threat to the Philippines was
China but that it was currently a "very small threat."'1
In 1972 "there was no identifiable conventional force that
is likely capable of invading the Philippines."' 8
In short, while Americans use the defense of the
Philippines as an argument for their continued occupation
of the bases, they agree that the bases are intended as
forward positions in the Western Pacific to project con-
ventional forces. More recently, they have become part of
the "first strike" strategy of nuclear warfare directed at
the Soviet Union.' 9
It is ironical that even the strategic importance of
Philippine bases to US security interests in the Pacific
does not compel the Americans from coming to terms with
the perceptions and aspirations of the Filipinos. Instead
the US policy-makers continue to view the bases as in-
dependent American enclaves in the Philippines.
For instance, as early as 1944 some members of the
US Congress had even proposed deleting the requirements
for negotiations since the US has the power to retain
whatever bases it chooses in the Philippines. It was only
when a former US High Commissioner pleaded that the
US must show courtesy and save the face of Filipino
leaders that negotiations between the two sides took
place. 20
17 D. MacArthur to Roxas, October 29, 1946. Douglas A. Mac-
Arthur Papers (DAM). See also Chief JUSMAG Philippines to
Commande: in-Chief Far East, November 17, 1948, DAM papers.
18 Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appro-
priations, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1972, p. 938.
19 See Hearings, Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad,
Part I: The Republic of the Philippines, USSCFR sub-committee,
91st Congress, 1st Session, 1969, p. 91. January 21, 1973, p. 17, Tom
Wicker, "On Nuclear Weapons," New York Times.
20 See Victory and the Threshold of Peace, compiled by Sa-
muel I. Roseman, 1950, p. 186.
 In almost all American policy discussions it is an un-
stated assumption that bases in the Philippines were not
designed to serve the interest of the Filipinos. When Paul
McNutt was asked in July 1946 whether the presence of
American bases was consistent to the national independ-
ence of the Philippines, he admitted that it was not.21
He justified the continuation of the military bases by
arguing that the traditional notions of independence which
requires territorial integrity, complete sovereignty were
already rendered obsolete by contemporary global develop-
ments. Yet if we look at the North Atlantic Treaty, the
basis for their alliance is precisely to protect "the ter-
ritorial integrity, political independence or security of any
'22
of the parties threatened.
George F. Kennan puts it more diplomatically when
he said that while the US should "permit Philippine in-
dependence," it must do so "in a way as to assure .the
archipelago remained a bulwark of American security in
the Pacific region. ' 23 It was clear that the US would not
have agreed to Philippine independence unless she is
aligned with the United States.
The late 60's and early 70's witnessed the occurrence
of widespread Filipino protests and demonstrations against
the United States, more than two decades after the sign-
ing of these agreements. The manifestations against conti-
nued United States military presence are legion. The Fili-
pino people have become keenly aware of the economic in-
equities, the humiliation, and the killing of Filipinos in
and out of the bases. They denounce the occupation of vast
tracts of land which could otherwise be put to better use,
and the rights of extra-territoriality the base personnel
enjoy. There is the well founded fear that the bases are
used as staging grounds for United States offensive at-
C1 U.S. Cong. Rec., July 1946, p. A3922.
122 See Harold U. Faulkner, American Political and Social His-
tory, 1952, pp. 843-844.
23 George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1967, p. 402.
tacks against third countries, which would make them
magnets for retaliatory actions by countries hostile to-
wards the United States. Finally, the concentration of US
military arsenal and armed forces on Philippine soil can
easily be utilized against the Philippines herself should
the Philippines decide to adopt policies that could under-
mine US business interests, such as the expropriation of
24
American-owned enterprises.
Mounting public outcry led the Philippine policy makers
to the realization that the bases limited not only the ex-
ercise of Philippine sovereignty but also the options in for-
mulating independent strategies for national development.
As early as 1954 most Filipino intellectuals and busi-
nessmen were fully conscious of the iniquitous nature of
the Bell Trade Act. After a decade, no longer were Phil-
ippine negotiators under the illusion that they were deal-
ing with special friends. The late Jose P. Laurel who
negotiated its amendment in the form of what is now
known as the Laurel-Langley agreement, was keenly aware
of its adverse effects. Laurel's instructions from the late
President Ramon Magsaysay were clear. Aside from push-
ing for the "selective free trade" principle, he was to ask,
among other things, for "most favored nation treatment,"
for the right of the presidents of both countries to im-
pose quotas on any product of the other country if these
were found to be in substantial competition with local
products, for the elimination of the power of the United
States to fix quotas on certain products, and for Philippine
control of her own currency. 25
,4 See Claro M. Recto, "Military Bases on Foreign Soil, Com-
parison of Spanish and Philippine Treaties with the United States,"
Philippine Rev~ew, March-April, 1965. See also Shirley Jenkins,
American Economic Policy Toward the Philippines, 1952. Mamerto
S. Ventura, United States-Philippines Cooperation and Cross-Pur-
poses, 1974.
125 See A.V.H. Hartendorp, The Magsaysay Administration,
1961.
 In Washington, Laurel not only announced the Philip-
pine proposals but even threatened to abrogate parity
rights if the new provisions were to prove inimical to Phil-
ippine interests. Yet in the actual negotiations, Laurel
was only able to obtain the following concessions from the
US: (1) regain control of 'Philippine currency, (2) to
eliminate quotas on Philipine exports, (3) to delay the
schedule of re-imposition of full duty levels on Philippine
traditional exports, (4) and to advance the period when
full duty would be imposed on American exports to the
Philippines. In exchange the Philippines had to expand
American parity rights. Instead of being confined to in-
vestment in natural resources, Americans were allowed to
engage in all business activities in the Philippines. Under
this new agreement American companies could invest in
all sectors of the Philippine economy in terms similar to
those enjoyed by Filipino citizens but denied to other
foreign investors. The Americans agreed to allow citizens
of either country "the right to engage in business activ-
ities in territories of the other on a reciprocal basis."
Many critics claimed that the Laurel-Langley Agree-
26
ment was no better than the 1946 Trade Agreement.
The reciprocal clause was pointless since no Filipino en-
trepreneur was wealthy enough to challenge General Mo-
tors, General Electric or General Mills. Through public
debates, Filipinos began to develop a keen understanding
of American realpolitik. The competitive edge of American
business enterprises in the Philippines was now viewed
by many Filipinos as the clear evidence of American im-
perial control of the country. Finally they understood the
sad fate in store for a small and weak nation when it
tries to deal with a big and powerful nation like the USA.
When the Laurel-Langley Agreement expired in July,
1974, many Filipinos believed that it was unlikely that
M6 Senator Claro M. Recto, Speech on Floor of the Senate, April
27, 1955.
a similar agreement granting foreigners preferential legal
status would be signed in the near future. Upon the ex-
piration of the Laurel-Langley Agreement Americans con-
tinued to demand the granting of national treatment to
American investors. On December 8, 1983, President Mar-
cos, after 9 years of American wheeling and dealing, even-
tually yielded by lifting Philippine legal restrictions to
foreign investments, giving foreign investors the right to
invest up to 100 percent in non-pioneer enterprises for
one year. 27 The circumstances which led to President Mar-
cos' decision came in the wake of the assassination of for-
mer Senator Benigno Aquino on August 21, 1983 and the
subsequent social upheavals in the country. Simultaneous-
ly in the face of financial crisis the World Bank and In-
ternational Monetary Fund made a series of demands as
pre-conditions to the re-structuring of more loans. These
demands included: the devaluation of the peso, reduction
of the government budget, dismissal of "unnecessary" bu-
reaucratic personnel and the suspension of some of its
industrial projects. Many Filipinos view these moves forced
on President Marcos as still another American ploy to take
advantage of Philippine political, and economic difficulties.
To say today that experience has given Filipinos
more insights on the nature of American imperial designs
is to point out the obvious. But it is no exaggeration to
remark that until today the Philippine government has
not found an effective solution to offset American pres-
sures.
The same can be said of Philippine position vis-a-vis
the bases. While majority of the Filipinos no longer believe
that the bases are intended to serve Philippine security
needs and that at present the Philippines has no iden-
tifiable external enemies, the New Military Bases Agreement
does not offer much for celebration for most Filipinos.
The wide spectrum of Philippine opposition groups have

27 Tim"s Journal, December 8, 1983, p. 1.

severely criticized the Agreement. Philippine domestic
debates over the bases reflect a wide range of dissatisfac-
tion. It remains the major source of conflict between poli-
cy-makers and opposition groups. One of the most recently
organized opposition groups has focused only on the issue
of the bases. The Anti-Bases Coalition (ABC) consider the
new agreement as having "worsened, not lessened, the
threats to the survival and sovereignty of the Filipino
28
people.",
Even the most sympathetic critics of the government
see the new agreement as onerous. They had expected the
new agreement to be something similar to the defense
agreement between the United States and Spain. But as
it turned out, the new Agreement is essentially a rehash
of the old one. The new Agreement makes no provisions
whatsoever to aid or rescue Filipinos should there, be an
accidential explosion or malfunction of nuclear weapons or
other deadly weapons either in transit or in storage at
these bases. Many believe that the bases have nuclear
installations.
About the only positive feature of the new agreement
is the commitment of President Reagan to pay $900 mil-
lion over a period of 5 years beginning October 1, 1984
as follows :29

Military Assistance $125,000,000.00

Foreign Military Sales Credits $300,000,000.00
Economic Support Fund Assistance $475,000,000.00

While the assistance is almost twice the amount promised

by President Carter, it is almost insignificant compared
to the American program of economic and military assist-
ance of $3.2 billion over a six-year period to Pakistan.
28 See Jose W. Diokno, "Only Marcos and the U.S. Benefit..."
Southeast Asia ChronicZe, April 1983, pp. 33-34.
2 President Ronald Reagan's letter to President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, June 2, 1983.
The New Memorandum of Understanding further stip-
ulates that the Philippines assures "the United States of
unhampered military operations involving its forces in the
Philippines." And all that the United States is required
to do with respect to Philippine interests is that she "will
inform the Philippine government the current level of its
forces and their equipment within a reasonable period."
How long is a "reasonable period" is not indicated.
There is no doubt that today the two countries are
stressing different aspects of national interests; in more
senses than one, the United States and the Philippines
are steadily growing apart. The Second World War and
the decade right after the war had held the two countries
together for strategic and economic reasons whatever the
different moral premises they may have based their
alliance on. The succession of postwar treaties and agree-
ments with the USA could only provoke anger and frus-
tration on the part of Filipinos since all of them made
iniquitious exactions on the country's economy and sov-
ereignty. The Bell Trade Agreement, parity, extension of
national treatment, US tariff barriers to Philippine ex-
ports, lack of Philippine sovereignty over the bases, rent
which is tied to military aid, World Bank and IMF pres-
sures; all of these exacerbated the already festering rela-
tions with the US.
By the 1970's Filipino leaders sought alternative
plans for their future relations not only with the United
States but with other countries that will offer more bene-
ficial and reasonable cooperative schemes. For a brief mo-
ment in the early 1970's, the Philippines was on the
verge of putting an end to the privileged position the US
citizens enjoyed in the country. The Philippine Supreme
Court ruled on the Quasha case which declared illegal U.S.
ownership of private agricultural land between 1946 and
1974, and that firms in sectors of the Philippines reserved
for Filipinos could not have foreigners as directors or as
top management personnel. Despite these rulings, US firms
had intended to continue to invest in the Philippines from
January 1971 to December 1973.30 Yet the Supreme Court
decision on the Quasha case was never implemented. In
1972 President Marcos reversed the Supreme Court
decision and restored the traditional special privileges of
US citizens in the Philippines after he had declared martial
law. This action was taken mainly to reassure US busi-
ness investors that there would be no serious obstacles to
their operations in the Philippines.
Despite all of these iniquitous arrangements, Filipinos
still hoped that in future negotiations American policy-
makers would come around and make some concessions
for the disparity of power. But they failed to realize that
American policy-makers will never relinquish their im-
perial position. Past experiences have demonstrated time
and again that any attempt by Filipinos to lobby American
policy-makers to interfere in Philippine politics on their
behalf can only lead to intensify American control of Phil-
ippine affairs.
There is no doubt that Philippine foreign policy has
been evolving from a parochial to a wider range of world
concerns. 3 1 And as the Philippine government searches
for better terms of agreements, it has gained more .ex-
perience in the formulation of foreign policy. From re-
assessing her "special relations" with the United States,
the Philippines learned that she can no longer depend en-
tirely on the alliance and protection of one strong and
powerful nation. She has also come to realize that she
cannot obtain maximum demands from any country much
less from the US. In the meantime she must be prepared
with alternatives, and alert to all opportunities to
strengthen her position in international relations.
3
0Business Day, May 9, 1972, p. 3.
31 See Ferdinand E. MaTcos, "We Must Survive in Asia," Pres-
idential Speeches, Vol. II, 1978.
 Through the years the Filipinos have unmasked the
true nature of this relationship with the US which is one
of inequality born of years of colonialism and the superior
might of the US in global affairs. And yet this realization
ha* failed to generate any systematic re-structuring of
Philippine economic programs much less a way of life
that has grown more and more dependent on the US. Para-
doxically, it is always to the US that some enlightened
Filipino leaders and economic elites rush for treatment
much like the dope addict begs for a fix from his pusher.
Perhaps the answer lies in allowing our increasingly
maturing citizens to decide and work out together the
solutions to the morass our country has found itself in
the 80s.

Re-assessment Period

The Filipino people underwent a period of intros-

pection in the late 60s and early 70s and began question-
ing many policies which were held sacrosanct before. That
period of introspection was the start of the second stage
of growth of Philippine foreign policy. It began in the
late sixties with the drama of American involvement in
Vietnam and an upsurge of nationalism and radicalism
among students, professionals and wage-earners. Filipinos
were exposed to a wide range of social, political and econo-
mic issues. Public discussion ultimately linked them to
national interests and national goals. The mood of the
country began to favor drastic change. The Filipino peo-
ple were willing to examine their relationship with the
communist countries and to shift from a predominantly
adversary position to one characterized by open-minded-
ness if not outright support. They no longer viewed the
nationalist struggle of other Third World countries against
the rich countries as communist-instigated. The Philip-
pines changed from a bipolar to a multipolar vision of
world affairs.
 Within the last two decades, Filipinos have seen a
degree and pace of change that have virtually transformed
the environment for international relations, not only for
the Philippines but for other countries as well. And it has
been largely under the thrust of this development as a
nation that they have more and more recognized the need
to fully develop on their own the foreign policies of
the Republic, and to employ their diplomacy in the ser-
vice of national needs and interests.
In sum, Philippine foreign policy witnessed during
this period profound changes, changes which placed all
of the country's foreign relations in the context of global
politics with regard to the participating actors and their
security perceptions, the distribution of nuclear and con-
ventional power, the alignment of forces in East-West
relations, the quantum leap of the armed might of the
superpowers, the proliferation of modern weapons in many
regions, the emergence of new issues related to energy
dependence, and the mounting campaign of the impover-
ished nations of the world for a just and equitable econo-
mic order.
As early as 1968 Philippine foreign policy sought to
steer away from its US-centered orientation to the wider
base of Asia. In the words of then President Marcos:

... The destiny of the Philippines had shifted from the

west to the east. We are in Asia and there lies our destiny.
For this reason, the conduct of our foreign relations is
necessarily influenced by our understanding of the Asian
situation today and our anticipation of the future.32

The American defeat in Indochina and the sharp dimi-

nution of America interest at that time in the mainland
of Asia, led the Philippines to forge new policies to ac-
commodate new changes.
32 Marcos, op. cit, p. 50.
 The Martial Law Period
The seventies and eighties was the period of major
global realignments when the Philippines joined forces with
the poor, underdeveloped and previously colonized coun-
tries of the world - the Third World countries. Like most
people of the Third World countries, the Filipinos see the
causal relationship between their poverty and the relent-
less expansion of the arms race of the two superpowers.
There is the growing realization that the world's resour-
ces are being squandered only to bring about the destruc-
tion of the earth. American defeat in Indochina and Iran,
preceded by increasing restiveness of countries in the
Soviet bloc particularly that of Poland were taken by
most Third World countries as cracks in what seemed like
an impregnable fortress set up by the two superpowers.
Oil-producing countries banded together to set up OPEC,
Asian and African countries sought to rectify iniquitous
trade and commercial arrangements imposed on them by
the rich and developed countries. Even Western European
countries began to challenge US supremacy in global af-
fairs. Japan, far from being left behind in this competi-
tion stepped up her program of trade expansion into the
Third World countries as well as Europe and the US her-
self. The changes in global conditions clearly called for
an entirely new set of foreign policy. Most thoughtful
Filipinos began to question previous political and economic
assumptions. The policies adopted during this period were
based on many of the suggestions and recommendations in
the debates that had taken place in the sixties. The foreign
policy proposals reflect this new Filipino outlook of join-
ing forces with the developing countries for the creation
'of a new international economic order. For instance the
Philippines has:

1. Intensified her relations with members of the Asean;

2. Pursued vigorously the establishment of diplomatic re-
lations with the socialist states, particularly with
China and the Soviet Union;
 3. Sought closer identification with the Third World,
with which she shared the same problems;
4. Supported the Arab countries in their struggle for a
just and enduring peace in the Middle East;
5. Developed relations with Japan; and
6. Searched for new bases, compatible with the emerging
realities in Asean, for a continuing and healthy rela-
tionship with the United States.

From these policy changes, many observers were led

to think that we were abandoning our traditional policies
completely. In a way we were.
With these changes, the Philippines is slowly abandon-
ing its total pro-American position in favor of a more
pragmatic and non-aligned stance. Instead of remaining
unequivocably an ally of one superpower, she has sought
cooperation from other big powers, for in a world where
new power realignments are emerging, it is only appro-
priate to seek other options.
It is too early to assess the overall gains in the new
directions of Philippine foreign policy in the seventies.
However, a few things appear certain, even to one who is
rather skeptical about the efficacy of those new policies.
The changes that have been made in the past few years
constitute the minimum in terms of action necessary in
order for the Philippines to forge an independent foreign
policy.

Flexibility and Pragmatism

After many years of independence, the Filipinos have
learned to become more flexible and to realize the previous
folly of unequivocal loyalty to the United States. They
have finally learned the validity of the idea that a nation
has neither permanent friends nor enemies, but only
permanent interests. They have also learned 'to be more
pragmatic in dealing with other countries and to be no
longer obsessed with conflicting ideologies and economic
systems. This is an unmistakable sign of our growing
sophistication-the realizatiofi that we can be friends and
do business with any country regardless of political, reli-
gious, economic and ideological differences. As long as
we can improve their country's economic situation and
prevent further violent conflicts, the Filipino people shall
actively seek mutually beneficial relations with all coun-
tries. Philippine policy-makers have also learned the cold
calculus of survival with the superpowers by seeking com-
mon cause with the small nations of the world and eval-
uating various combinations of factors and interests in
search of a proper balance.

I have no desire to give the impression that hence-

forth all will be smooth and well. The Philippines has
yet to resolve issues regarding the nature and extent of
foreign investments, new economic treaties, and a host
of other domestic issues that impinge directly on her
foreign relations, especially those with the pressures of
the World Bank and the IMF, the United States of Amer-
ica and Japan.
As the Philippines moves well into the 80's, there is
a diminution of international tensions and conflicts in
her region. Tensions which were originally spawned by
French, British and American involvement in Indochina
during the fifties and sixties have finally ended. Instead,
new alignments are emerging, in which former ideological
allies have become bitter enemies (Vietnam vs. China) and
former enemies have become "indispensable friends"
(China and the United States). No doubt, the states of
the world still find themselves in serious disagreement;
but they are no longer divided along the lines of ideolog-
ical-political groupings or blocs. Rather the issues are the
threat of nuclear annihilation, population expansion, the
limits of growth to the industrializing process that con-
sumes increasing amounts of raw materials, squanders
energy resources and poisons the environment, as well as
the issues that divide the developed and the developing
countries on changing the old economic order.

Strengthening Old Relationships

There are complex internal and external challenges

confronting United States-Philippine relations. The prob-
lem basically lies in the fact that the two countries are
situated on different planes, with divergent levels of poli-
cy priorities. The United States is a global power with
worldwide security interests, and is engaged in a strategic
adversary relationship with the Soviet Union. The Philip-
pines, on the other hand, is a young state concerned pri-
marily with her developmental problems and anxious to
show the world that she is a sovereign state enjoying
complete autonomy in the formulation of her domestic
and foreign policies.

These differences can only impel the Philippines to re-

examine current foreign policy in a different light, and to
pursue domestic policy through new structures and terms
of cooperation.
The past years have shown that Philippine agree-
ments with the Big Powers were not the outcome of free
choice, but a recognition of her limitations as a small na-
tion. Even as she begins to recognize that maximum gains
and minimum losses must be her guiding principles in in-
ternational negotiations, the Philippines is realistic enough
to realize that such principles are ideals. Filipinos have a
right to be proud of how they have met this challenge.
Despite some setbacks and mistakes they have managed
to change their international agreements to achieve great-
er equity, particularly with America and Japan. The Phil-
ippines is among the growing number of nations search-
ing for and building new structures, new policies and new
means of achieving her goals of economic development.
 The Filipinos have seen on a limited scale the triumph
of self-determination and mutually beneficial cooperation,
as a truly meaningful working principle in foreign rela-
tions. Now they must dedicate themselves to the imple-
mentation of their foreign policy goals along this line.
Above all, the first' and transcendent concern in Phil-
ippine foreign policy is its support of her domestic program
of liberating her citizens from abject poverty. Economic
underdevelopment and redistribution of economic resources
cannot be resolved overnight. The new challenge will be
to develop a policy that shall comprehend this goal by
determining present needs, while at the same time still
drawing the active cooperation and support of the Philip-
pines' international friends. This task requires a new
approach and another form of skill than those of the
past. Reliance on the goodwill of her traditional foreign
partners must give way to a more systematic calculus of
the prices and limits of Philipine relationships. New pur-
poses require new methods of planning and new policies.
The dilemma is that, even in the 1980's despite so much
international meetings and discussions, the Philippines
cannot change her existing policy agreements without pay-
ing a price for it. Worse, the price she has to pay may not
bring her the returns needed immediately.
There is a need therefore for all citizens to come to-
gether and discuss the ways and means to support this
new policy. A policy in which the conquest of poverty is
at the mercy of a few would not only fail but spell doom
from the very start. A sense of commitment by the en-
tire citizenry is essential. All sectors of society have a
stake in its success. The Filipino people must see the
relationship of inflation, recession, unemployment and
contemporary unrest to issues of national development
and the international economic order. I see this not only
as a political necessity but as an important process not
only to resolve national conflicts but in nation building
as well. For the matter of solving domestic and interna-
tional problems will have to be threshed out first among
the Filipino people. They have to seek an alternative life-
style which will be the basis of their foreign policy. After
all, an effective foreign policy presupposes a clearcut
domestic program and a solid domestic base.
Despite the Philippines' short history of foreign poli-
cy-making, she has it in her power to prove she has enough
resolve to achieve prosperity for all her people. A common
policy can only mean serving the common interest.