The responsibility of the state is limited to cases wherein
Vicarious liability of the State
E. Merritt vs Government Of The Philippine
Islands
G.R. No. L-11154 March 21, 1916
Facts: E. Merritt was riding on a motorcycle travelling at
ten to twelve miles per hour when he collided with the
General Hospital ambulance which turned suddenly and
unexpectedly before reaching the center of the street
and without sounding its whistle or horn in violation of
the Motor Vehicle Act. The plaintiff suffered from
fractures to the skull, material injury to the grey matter
and brain and a broken right leg as a result of the
collision. He was mentally and physically impaired such
that he lost his efficiency in constructing wooden
buildings, which was his occupation.
Act No. 2457 was enacted specifically to
authorize E.Merritt to bring suit against the Government
“in order to fix the responsibility for the collision
between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the
General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the
damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on
account of said collision.”
The court found the chauffeur of the ambulance solely
negligent and awarded plaintiff a total P14,741.
Issue: Whether the Government is legally liable for the
damages resulting from the collision committed by the
agent or employee of the Government
RULING: The SC increased the total damages awarded to
plaintiff to P18,075 since he was incapacitated for a
period of six months and not only for the time he
remained confined in the hospital.
The general rule is that the Government cannot
be sued by an individual without its consent. In
accordance with Act No.2457, the plaintiff was
authorized to bring action against the Government in
order to fix the responsibility for the collision and to
determine the amount of the damages, if any. However,
Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the
Government's liability to any cause not previously
recognized. According to the Civil Code Article 1903 (now
Art 2180):
“The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a
special agent, but not when the damage should have
been caused by the official to whom properly it
pertained to do the act performed, in which case the
provisions of the preceding article shall be
applicable.”
it acts through a special agent; a special agent is one who
receives a definite and fixed order or commission,
foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a
special official. This does not apply to any executive
agent who is an employee of the acting administration
and who on his own responsibility performs the functions
which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office
and which are regulated by law and the regulations.
Therefore, the State is only liable for the acts of its
agents, officers and employees when they act as special
agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903
(now Article 2180); and that the chauffeur of the
ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an
agent for which the State is made liable.
Inocencio Rosete vs.The Auditor General
G.R. No. L-1120 (August 31, 1948)
Facts: Inocencio Rosete and others filed a claim against
the Government for damages caused to buildings
belonging to the claimants, which were destroyed by fire
from the contiguous warehouse of the Emergency
Control Administration, ECA, an office or agency of the
Government. The fire was initiated by the reckless
ignition of a cigarette-lighter by a certain Jose Frayno y
Panlilio near a five-gallon drum where gasoline was
drained and stored in contrary to the provisions of
Ordinances of the City of Manila.
The Insular Auditor denied or dismissed the
claim of Rosete and others in the amount of P35,376.
Issue: Whether the government is liable for the
damages sustained by the claimant under article 1903 of
the Civil Code (now Article 2180)
Ruling: The pertinent provision reads as follows:
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the
preceding article is enforceable not only for
personal acts and omissions but also for those
persons for whom another is responsible.
The state is liable in the scene when it acts through a
special agent, but not when the damage should have
been caused by the official to whom it properly pertained
to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of
the preceding article shall be applicable.
The court citing Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine
Islands held that the state is not liable for damages
suffered by private individuals by government employees
in the discharge of their responsibilities unless such act
was committed by a special agent, “duly empowered by
a definite order or commission to perform some act or
charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to
the claim.” Since the officers of the ECA did not act as
special agents and there is no negligence imputable to a
special agent, the government is not liable for the
damages resulting from the negligence complained of.
Act No. 327, authorizing the filing of claims
against the Government with the Insular Auditor, does
not make any and all claims against the Government
allowable or the Government responsible for such
claims.
Mendoza vs. De Leon, et al.
G.R. No. L-9596 February 11, 1916
Facts: Marcos Mendoza was the highest bidder for the
lease of an exclusive ferry privilege in the municipality of
Villasis, Pangasinan, and was duly awarded the privilege
under the provisions of Act No. 1643 of the Philippine
Commission. After a little more than a year, the
municipal council of Villasis, Pangasinan, through a
resolution, awarded the franchise for the same ferry to
another person, forcibly ejecting Mendoza therefrom.
The council claimed that the ferry Mendoza was
operating was not the one leased to him.
Mendoza instituted an action for damages against the
individual members of the Municipal Council.
Issue: Whether the individual members of the
Municipal Council are liable to Mendoza for forcibly
ejecting him from the leased ferry
Ruling: A municipality has a two-fold character of
powers, namely governmental and proprietary. With
respect to liability, numerous cases elucidate that the
municipality is liable for the acts of its officers and agents
in the exercise of proprietary or corporate powers, but it
is not liable for the acts of its officers or agents in the
performance of its governmental functions.
Officers or agents of the Government charged
with the performance of governmental duties are not
liable for the consequences of their official acts, unless
they have acted willfully and maliciously, and with the
express purpose of inflicting injury.
In so far as its governmental functions are
concerned, a municipality is also not liable, unless
expressly made so by statute; nor are its officers, so long
as they perform their duties honestly and in good faith.
But a municipality is not exempt from liability
for the negligent performance of its corporate or
proprietary or business functions. In the administration
of its patrimonial property, it is to be regarded as a
private corporation or individual so far as its liability to
third persons on contract or in tort is concerned.
Mendoza had a vested right to the exclusive operation of
the ferry; and there is no evidence that there was
justifiable reason for his eviction. The contention that
Mendoza was operating a ferry that was not leased to
him is untenable since it was the vice-president himself
who personally placed him in possession thereof, a fact
know to the council members.
It cannot be said that the councilors acted
honestly for the interests of the municipality. Therefore,
they are jointly and severally liable for the damages
sustained by the plaintiff from the rescission of his
contract of lease of the ferry privilege in question.
Fontanilla vs. Maliaman
G.R. No. L-55963 December 1, 1989
FACTS: Francisco Fontanilla, son of the spouses Jose and
Virginia Fontanilla, died as a result of an accident when a
pickup owned and operated by the National Irrigation
Administration, a government agency, driven by Hugo
Garcia (a regular employee of said agency) bumped the
bicycle he was riding. The deceased was thrown 50
meters from the point of impact, while his companion,
who survived the incident, was thrown a bit further
away. Nevertheless, the NIA employees did not stop to
assist the victims and instead sped away.
The trial court directed respondent National
Irrigation Administration to pay damages (death benefits)
and actual expenses to petitioners.
Issue: Whether or not the award of moral damages,
exemplary damages and attorney's fees is legally proper
in a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict against
the NIA
Ruling: The liability of the State has two aspects. namely:
1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for
the tortious acts of special agents only.
2. Its private or business aspects where it becomes liable
as an ordinary employer.
The National Irrigation Administration is a
government corporation and exercises proprietary
functions, by express provision of Rep. Act No. 3601. As a
corporate body performing non-governmental functions,
it is liable as an ordinary employer for the acts of its
employees. As such, the NIA becomes answerable for
damages caused by its employees upon the existence of
negligence of supervision on its part.
At the time the accident took place, the
employees and the driver did not assist the victims and
instead sped off even though there were dent marks
indicating they were aware they hit something or
someone. The strength of the impact also indicated that
they were driving at a high speed at the time the collision
occurred.
There was evident negligence on the part of NIA
when its supervisor within the group allowed the driver
to travel at a high speed.
Considering the foregoing, respondent NIA is
hereby directed to pay herein petitioners-spouses the
amounts of P12,000.00 for the death of Francisco
Fontanilla; P3,389.00 for hospitalization and burial
expenses of the aforenamed deceased; P30,000.00 as
moral damages; P8,000.00 as exemplary damages and
attorney's fees of 20% of the total award.
City of Manila vs. Teotico
G.R. No. L-23052 (January 29, 1968)
Facts: Genaro N. Teotico fell inside an uncovered and
unlighted manhole when he attempted to board a
jeepney at a "loading and unloading" zone. As a result of
the fall, Teotico’s eyeglasses broke and its shards pierced
his left eyelid, impairing his vision. Aside from the
lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid, he also suffered
from several contusions to his body and an allergic
eruption caused by anti-tetanus injections administered
to him in the hospital. His medical expenses amounted to
P1,400.00.
As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence,
Teotico filed a complaint for damages against the City of
Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city
treasurer and chief of police. The City of Manila and its
officers contended that every time a report that a cover
of a manhole is missing, the Office of the City Engineer
immediately had it replaced and that they were attentive
thereto.
The trial court rendered a decision in favour of
the City of Manila but the Court of Appeals sentenced
the City of Manila to pay damages amounting to
P6,750.00.
Issue: Whether the City of Manila is liable for payment of
damages to Teotico
Held: Between RA 409, the Charter of Manila, exempting
the City from liability, and the Civil Code, the Civil Code
applies because its subject-matter is more particular. RA
409 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general,
regardless of the object thereof. On the other hand,
Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be
liable for damages for the death of, or injuries
suffered by, any person by reason of defective
conditions of road, streets, bridges, public buildings,
and other public works under their control or
supervision.
Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets,"
in particular. Since the present action is based upon the
alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is
decisive thereon.
Even assuming that the incident took place in a
national highway, it is not necessary for liability to attach
that the defective roads or streets belongs to the
province, city or municipality from which responsibility is
exacted. What Article 2189 requires is that the province,
city or municipality have either "control or supervision"
over said street or road.
Republic Act No. 917 provides that the
construction, maintenance and improvement of national,
provincial and city roads shall be accomplished by the
Highway District Engineers and Highway City Engineers.
Liability of employees
Araneta vs. De Joya
G.R. No. L-25172 (May 24, 1974)
Facts: Antonio de Joya was the general manager of the
Ace Advertising. He proposed that an employee, Ricardo
Taylor, be sent to the United States to take up special
studies in television. Although the board of directors
failed to act on the proposal, Taylor was still sent to the
US, with the assurance that Taylor’s expenses would be
defrayed by parties other than the company.
Taylor received his salaries while abroad
through checks and vouchers signed by Luis Araneta
(vice-president), Vicente Araneta (company treasurer) or
de Joya. The total costs of Taylor’s travel and study
expenses was P 5,043.20.
Ace Advertising filed a complaint with the court
for the recovery of the total amount disbursed to Taylor
since the travel and expenses were made without its
knowledge, authority or ratification. A third-party
complaint was filed by de Joya against Vicente Araneta,
Luis Araneta and Taylor.
 Both Aranetas disowned any personal liability,
claiming that they signed the checks covering part of the
travel expenses and payroll in good faith since they were
approved by de Joya.
The trial court ruled that de Joya was liable for
the amount disbursed by the company but dismissed the
third party complaint, while the Court of Appeals held
that according to the facts of the case, the two Aranetas
were also privy to the unauthorized disbursement of the
corporate moneys jointly with the appellant.
Issue: Whether Luis Araneta is solidarily liable with de
Joya and Vicente Araneta for payment of the erroneously
disbursed funds.
Ruling: Luis Araneta is guilty of a quasi-delict. His
allegations of good faith were not substantiated and
established. In fact, as vice-president of the company,
Luis Araneta remained passive concerning the
unauthorized disbursement of corporate funds and
approved three of the payroll checks for Taylor’s salary.
Luis Araneta evidently neglected to perform his duties as
an officer of the firm.
1
Applying Article 2194 of the New Civil Code, it
is proper that the other joint tortfeasors be made
solidarily liable and shoulder their proportional
responsibility.
Engineers/Architect- Nature of liability
Lanuzo vs. Sy Bon Ping
G.R. No. L-53064 September 25, 1980
Facts: Salvador Mendoza, driver of Sy Bon Ping,
recklessly and negligently rammed the residential house
and store or Felix Lanuzo. The total damage to his
property was P13,000 and he was deprived of his
monthly income from the store of P300.
In a complaint for damages instituted by Lanuzo
independently from the criminal action, the trial court
ruled that Sy Bon Ping and Mendoza were jointly and
severally liable to pay Lanuzo P 13,000.00 as damages
and P 300.00, representing Lanuzo’s monthly income,
until the entire P 13,000.00 has been paid in full.
Issue: Whether Sy Bon Ping, as employer, and
Mendoza, as employee are solidarily liable for payment
of damages to Lanuzo
Held: Plaintiff predicated his claim for damages on quasi-
delict, which may proceed independently and regardless
of the result of the criminal case. Salvador Mendoza is
1Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who
are liable for quasi-delict is solidary
evidently primarily liable for his reckless driving resulting
to the damage caused to Lanuzo under Article 2176 of
the Civil Code2
Sy Bon Ping, as employer, is also primary and
direct under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which
explicitly provides:
Employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in any business or industry.
Sy Bon Ping failed to disprove the legal
presumption of his negligence in the selection and
supervision of this employee (Article 2180) and is primary
and solidarily liable with Mendoza. Nevertheless, Sy Bon
Ping may demand reimbursement from Mendoza for
whatever amount he will have to pay the offended party
to satisfy the claim for damages3.
Malipol vs. Tan
G.R. No. L-27730 January 21, 1974
Facts: Pantaleon Malijan was walking with his companion
Leonardo Amante when he was hit by a gasoline tanker,
got thrown to the ground and was ran over by the
tanker’s right wheel that got detached. Although he was
brought to the hospital, Malijan died that night from
"possible traumatic cerebral hemorrhage due to
vehicular accident."
The gasoline tanker at that time was driven by
Ernesto Labsan and was used and owned by Lily Lim Tan
for her gasoline business. The mother and minor siblings
of Malijan filed a complaint for damages against Tan and
Labsan. The trial court ruled that Labsan was primarily
liable to pay the damages, and in case he would not be
able to do so, Tan would be subsidiarily liable.
Issue: Whether the trial court erred in ruling Labsan as
primarily liable for damages, and Tan as subsidiarily
liable.
Held: The court ruled that the trial court correctly denied
the motion to set aside order of default and for new trial;
however, the trial court erred in holding Tan subsidiarily
liable.
2 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions
of this Chapter
3
Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or
employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered
in satisfaction of the claim
 The action was based on quasi-delict and not to
demand civil liability arising from a crime, since the
complaint makes no mention of a crime. Under Article
2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the owners and
managers of an establishment or enterprise for damages
caused by their employees is primary and direct, not
subsidiary.
Therefore, the employer, Lily Lim Tan, must be
held primarily and directly, not subsidiarily, liable for
damages awarded in the decision of the lower court,
without prejudice to the right to demand reimbursement
from damages from Ernesto Labsan for whatever she
would have to pay the relatives of the deceased.
Viluan vs. CA
G.R. Nos. L-21477-81 (April 29, 1966)
Facts: The bus owned by Francisca Viluan, and driven by
Hermenigildo Aquino raced with the overtaking bus
driven by Gregorio Hufana and owned by Patricio
Hufana. Aquino lost control of the bus, hitting a post and
crashing into a tree, after which it burst into flames
wherein seven persons were killed and thirteen others
were injured.
In the complaint for breach of contract of
carriage and damages filed by the heirs of those who
perished in the incident and Carolina Sabado, an injured
passenger, Vilaun and Aquino filed third party complaints
against Gregorio Hufana and his employer, Patricio
Hufana, contending that the incident was their fault.
The lower court found that the accident was
due to the concurrent negligence of the drivers of the
two buses and held both the two drivers and their
employers jointly and severally liable for damages.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of
concurrent negligence on the part of the two buses but
held that only Vilaun is liable because Aquino, as driver,
cannot be made jointly and severally liable in a contract
of carriage. It ruled that the Hufana’s cannot be made
liable since the plaintiffs did not amend their complaints
in the main action so as to assert a claim against them.
Issue: Whether Patricio and Gregorio Hufana should be
made equally liable although they were third-party
defendants and not principal defendants
Held: The fact that the respondents were not sued as
principal defendants but were brought into the cases as
third party defendants should not preclude a finding of
their liability.
Section 5 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, precluding a
judgment in favor of a plaintiff and against a third party
defendant where the plaintiff has not amended his
complaint to assert a claim against a third party
defendant, applies only to cases where the third party
defendant is brought in on an allegation of liability to the
defendants. It does not apply where a third-party
defendant is impleaded on the ground of direct liability
to the plaintiffs, in which case no amendment of the
plaintiffs complaint is necessary.
In this case the third-party complaints filed by
Viluan and Aquino charged Gregorio and Patrcio Hufana
with direct liability to the plaintiffs. Amendment of the
complaint is not necessary and is merely a matter of
form since the liability of the Hufana’s as third-party
defendant was already asserted in the third-party
complaint.
Regardless whether the injury is quasi-delict or
breach of contract of carriage, in case of injury to a
passenger due to the negligence of the driver of the bus
on which he was riding and of the driver of another
vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the two
vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages.
Torts with Independent Civil Actions
(Violation of Civil and Political rights)
Lim vs. Ponce De Leon
G.R. No. L-22554 August 29, 1975
Facts: Jikil Taha sold a motor launch named M/L "SAN
RAFAEL" to Alberto Timbangcaya but a year later
Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal that Taha forcibly took the motor launch.
Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon in his capacity as
Acting Provincial Fiscal of Palawan, filed an information
for Robbery with Force and Intimidation upon Persons
against Jikil Taha and instructed Orlando Maddela,
Detachment Commander of Balabac to impound and
take custody of the motor launch, which was already sold
to Delfin Lim. Fiscal de Leon informed Maddela that the
subsequent sale of the launch to Delfin Lim could not
prevent the court from taking custody of the same.
Lim filed a complaint for damages against Fiscal de Leon
and Maddela. Lim contended that there was a violation
of his constitutional rights when the motor launch was
seized without a search warrant. As defense, de Leon and
Maddela contended that the motor launch was the
corpus delicti in an ongoing investigation and filed a
counterclaim for malicious and groundless filing of the
complaint by Lim and Taha.
 The trial court upheld the validity of the seizure
of the motor launch and ordered Taha and Lim to pay for
damages.
Issue: Whether the constitutional rights of Jakil Taha
and Delfin Lim was violated, and if so, whether they are
entitled to damages
Held: The taking of the motor launch was ruled to be in
violation of the constitutional right of the parties against
unreasonable searches and seizure as provided in the Bill
of Rights since it was effected without a search warrant,
the authority of which lies with a magistrate or judge and
not a fiscal.
With respect to damages, Delfin Lim and Jikil
Taha were entitled to damages under Article 32 and 2219
of the New Civil Code for the violation of their
constitutional right. Good faith is not a defense against
liability under Article 32 of the NCC. To be liable it is
enough that there was a violation of the constitutional
rights of the plaintiffs and it is not required that the act
was attended with bad faith or malice.
Therefore, Fiscal de Leon was liable to pay
damages to Delfin Lim for violating his constitutional
right; but Orlando Maddela cannot be held accountable
because he acted upon the order of his superior officer
believing that there was a legal basis and authority to
impound the launch.
Aberca vs. Ver
G.R. No. L-69866 April 15, 1988
Facts: The intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM), were
ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive
strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT). The
plaintiffs complained that in the execution of such order,
the TFM raided several places using “defectively issued
judicial warrants” and arrested the plaintiffs without
warrant, confiscated personal property, interrogated
plaintiffs without council and employed threats, tortures
and other forms of violence.
The plaintiffs filed an action for damages, which
was dismissed by the trial court on the grounds that (1)
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was
suspended, (2) the defendants were performing their
official duties and (3)the complaint states no cause of
action.
Issue: Whether the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for
illegal searches conducted by military personnel and
other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under
the Constitution, and if so, who should be made liable
Held: The contention that respondents are covered by
state immunity for acts done in the performance of their
official duties was not accepted by the court because
plaintiffs may have been ordered to conduct pre-emptive
strikes against the communist terrorists but this did not
amount to “a blanket license or a roving commission
untramelled by any constitutional restraint”. In carrying
out their task and mission, constitutional and legal
safeguards should still have been observed by
respondents.
The plaintiff’s cause of action were not barred
by the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, which was explicitly recognized in PD No. 1755:
However, when the action (for injury to
the rights of the plaintiff or for a quasi-
delict) arises from or out of any act,
activity or conduct of any public officer
involving the exercise of powers or
authority arising from Martial Law
including the arrest, detention and/or
trial of the plaintiff, the same must be
brought within one (1) year.
Even if the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus suspended petitioners' right of action for
damages for illegal arrest and detention, it did not
extend to suspend their right to demand damages for
injuries suffered through the confiscation of their private
belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent
and to counsel and their right to protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture
and other cruel and inhuman treatment.
As to who should be made liable for damages,
the doctrine of respondent superior is applicable to the
case. Article 32 speaks of “an officer or employee or
person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the
violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of
another”. Thus, the person directly causing damage and
the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for
the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.
Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit
of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly,
responsible for its violation.
MHP Garments vs. CA
G.R. No. 86720 September 2, 1994
Facts: MHP Garments, Inc. had the exclusive franchise to
sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies,
badges, and insignias. When MHP Garments received
information that Agnes Villa Cruz, Mirasol Lugatiman,
and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items
and paraphernalia without any authority, Larry de
Guzman, an employee of MHP Garments, together with
members of the police constabulary, went to the stores
of Cruz, Lugatiman, and Gonzales at the Marikina Public
Market and seized these items. The seizure caused a
commotion to the embarrassment of Cruz, Lugatiman
and Gonzales.
MHP Garments instituted a criminal complaint
for unfair competition against the vendors. The Provincial
fiscal dismissed the complaint and ordered the return of
the seized items. Cruz, Lugatiman and Gonzales
instituteed an action for sums of money and damages
against MHP Garments and de Guzman. MHP Garments
contend that they should not be made liable for damages
since they did not commit the act of seizure.
Issue: Whether MHP Garments and de Guzman should
be held liable for the seizure of the goods in question
although it was the Police constabulary who effected the
seizure
Held: The seizure was conducted without a warrant in
evident violation of the constitutional right of the
vendors. The facts of the case did not justify the
warrantless search and seizure of the vendors’ goods.
There was sufficient time for de Guzman in behalf of
MHP Garments to secure a warrant from the time of
receipt of the information and the raid of the stores.
Although the Philippine Constabulary conducted
the raid, their omission as party to the complaint does
not exculpate MHP Garments and de Guzman from
liability. The company was indirectly involved in
transgressing the rights of Cuz, Lugatiman and Gonzales.
It was MHP Garments who instigated the raid
and the raid was conducted with the active participation
of their employee, Larry de Guzman, who apparently
assented to the conduct of the raid and is as liable to the
same extent as the officers themselves. The corporation
is also liable to the same extent as the officers when it
received the goods for safekeeping and refused to
surrender them for quite a time despite the dismissal of
its complaint for unfair competition.
Independent Civil Action (Defamation,
Fraud and Physical Injuries)
Marcia et al. vs.CA
G.R. No. L-34529 January 27, 1983
Facts: A passenger bus operated by private respondent
Victory Liner, Inc.,driven by its employee, Felardo Paje,
collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting
in the latter's death and in physical injuries to Edgar
Marcia and Renato Yap.
An information for homicide and serious
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed
against the driver while an action for damages was filed
by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap, and the heirs of
Clemente Marcia against the Victory Liner, Inc. and
Felardo Paje.
The trial court initially convicted Paje of the
offense charged, but on appeal, Paje was acquitted after
it was found that he was not speeding and was diligent,
but the collision, nevertheless, took place and was a
fortuitous event. It further ruled that criminal negligence
was wanting and that Paje was not even guilty of civil
negligence.
The court dismissed the civil case against Paje
and Victory Liner ruling that they could not be held civilly
liable after it had ruled in the criminal action that
negligence was wanting and that the collision was a case
of pure accident.
Issue: Whether the acquittal in the criminal case would
result in the dismissal in the civil case
Held: The judgment of acquittal included a declaration
that the fact from which civil liability may arise did not
exist. In acquitting Paje, the court ruled that the event
was an accident and that Paje was without fault, and it is
only proper that the civil case be dismissed.
Furthermore, the charge against Felardo Paje
was not for homicide and physical injuries but for
reckless imprudence or criminal negligence resulting in
homicide and physical injuries. They are not one of the
three (3) crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code
and, therefore, no civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, which
provides:
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action may be brought by the
injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.
Therefore, it was only proper that the court dismiss the
civil case against Paje and Victory Liner since Paje was
acquitted of the fact from which the civil case arose.
Madeja v. Caro
211 Phil 469 (December 21, 1983)
Facts: Dra. Eva Japzon is accused of homicide through
reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madejo after
an appendectomy. The widow of Madejo filed a criminal
complaint and reserved her right to claim for a separate
action for damages. The judge dismissed the civil case
because of Rule 111 3(a) but the petitioner appealed to
the SC by using Rule 111 Section 2 ROC in relation to
Article 33 of the NCC, which states:
Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases
provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil
action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party during
the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right
is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence." (Rule 111, Rules of
Court.)
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud,
and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may
be brought by the injured party. Such
civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
The Court found the case impressed with merit.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the civil case can carry on
independently of the criminal case. (2) Whether or not
physical injuries of Article 33 encompass other bodily
injury in its definition
Held: (1)Yes. Rule 111 Section 2 creates an exception to
the rule when the offense is defamation, fraud, or
physical injuries. In these cases, a civil action may be filed
independently of the criminal action, even if there has
been no reservation made by the injured party; the law
itself in this article makes such reservation.
(2)Yes. The Code Commission discussed that the term
"physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the
crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal
Code. It includes not only physical injuries by
consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide but
also any other bodily injury including battery based on
the American Law.
Arafiles v. Phil. Journalists
GR No 135306 (2003)
Facts: In 1987, Emelita Despuig, working as a grant-in-
aid scholar at a Manila university and as an office worker
at a government office in Quezon City, was raped by her
boss, a government agency director, last March 15, but
afraid to lose her job – and of being harmed – she chose
to keep her ordeal to herself.
On the second night, she was almost raped
again by the same man, Catalino Arafiles. However, the
bellboy and the security guard noticed something
suspicious as Emelita was fighting back while they were
checking in the Flamingo Hotel, thus the bellboy followed
them to their room. Arafiles rushed to leave as soon as
he paid money to the bellboy and the security guard not
to report the same.
Emelita reported the same information to the
police and she was interviewed by Romy Morales, a
journalist of People’s Journal Tonight. During the
following day, the news was part of the headlines in the
said newspaper. After a year of publication, Arafiles filed
a complaint for damages arising from the said publication
against the journalist and its employer.
Arafiles alleged that on account of the “grossly
malicious and overly sensationalized reporting in the
news item” prepared by respondent Morales, edited by
respondent Buan, Jr., allowed for publication by
respondent Villareal, Jr. as president of Philippine
Journalists, Inc., and published by respondent Philippine
Journalists, Inc., aspersions were cast on his character;
his reputation as a director of the NIAS at the Philippine
Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services
Administration (PAGASA) was injured; he became the
object of public contempt and ridicule as he was
depicted as a sex-crazed stalker and serial rapist; and the
news item deferred his promotion to the position of
Deputy Administrator of PAGASA. The RTC of Quezon
City ruled in favor of Arafiles granting him awards for
damages. 1.) P1,000,000.00, as nominal damages; 2.)
P50,000.00, as exemplary damages; 3.) P1,000.000.00, as
moral damages; 4.) P50,000.00, as attorney’s fees; and
5.) Costs of suit. .
CA reversed RTC’s decision. MR from CA made by Arafiles
was denied. Hence they elevated it to the SC.
Issue: Whether or not the publication of the news item
was not attended with malice, hence, must free
respondents of liability for damages.
Held: Yes. There was no malice in the article. Art. 33. In
cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from
the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, shall require only a preponderance
of evidence.
 Article 33 contemplates a civil action for the
recovery of damages that is entirely unrelated to the
purely criminal aspect of the case. A civil action for libel
under this article shall be instituted and prosecuted to
final judgment and proved by preponderance of evidence
separately from and entirely independent of the
institution, pendency or result of the criminal action
because it is governed by the provisions of the New Civil
Code and not by the Revised Penal Code governing the
criminal offense charged and the civil liability arising
therefrom

In actions for damages for libel, it is axiomatic

that the published work alleged to contain libelous
material must be examined and viewed as a whole. The
article must be construed as an entirety including the
headlines, as they may enlarge, explain, or restrict or be
enlarged, explained or strengthened or restricted by the
context. Whether or not it is libelous, depends upon the
scope, spirit and motive of the publication taken in its
entirety.

Arafiles brands the news item as a “malicious

sensationalization” of a patently embellished and
salacious narration of fabricated facts involving rape and
attempted rape incidents. For, so petitioner argues, the
police blotter which was the sole basis for the news item
plainly shows that there was only one count of abduction
and rape reported by Emelita.

The presentation of the news item subject of

petitioner’s complaint may have been in a sensational
manner, but it is not per se illegal. In determining the
manner in which a given event should be presented as a
news item and the importance to be attached thereto,
newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of discretion.