MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs PASAY TRANS-PORTATION COMPANY, INC. ET AL.

Constitutional Law; Act No. 1446, Section 11, Validity of; Members of the Supreme
Court Sitting as a Board of Ar-bitrators; Division of Powers. — The Supreme Court
of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in the
Philippine Government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is
exercised by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court and its members should not
and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to
assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial
functions.

Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.—The Supreme Court exercises jurisdiction as a

court and this juris-diction does not include the exercise of jurisdiction by the
members of the Supreme Court sitting as a board of arbitrators. A board of
arbitrators is not a "court" in any proper sense of the term and possesses none of
the ju-risdiction which the Organic Act contemplates shall be exer-cised by the
Supreme Court.

Arbitration and Award.—Arbitration represents a method of the parties' own

choice. A submission to arbitration is a contract. A clause in a contract providing
that all matters in dispute between the parties shall be referred to arbitrators and
to them alone is contrary to public policy and cannot oust the courts of
jurisdiction. However, unless the ar-bitration agreement is such as absolutely to
close the doors of the courts against the parties, the courts should look with favor
upon such amicable arrangements.

Case at Bar.—Section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide
the operation of a demo-cratic government constitutionally established. It would
be improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme Court, to sit as a board
of arbi-trators the decision of a majority of whom shall be final. [Manila Electric
Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co., 57 Phil,. 600(1932)]

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (SMART) vs. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS

COMMISSION (NTC) G.R. No. 151908. August 12, 2003. Administrative Law;
National Telecommunications Commission; Powers; Quasi-Legislative Power;
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and
quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers.—Administrative agencies
possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or
administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the
power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is
within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability
and separability of powers.

The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are the
product of a delegated legislative power to create new and additional legal
provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory
authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. — The rules and
regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are the product of a
delegated legislative power to create new and additional legal provisions that
have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority
granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the
regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in
contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law. They
must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute in
order for such rule or regulation to be valid. Constitutional and statutory provisions
control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by an
administrative body, as well as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation
by it. It may not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the
provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering
or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a
statute. In case of conflict between a statute and an administrative order, the
former must prevail.

Quasi-Judicial Power; The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power

when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive
or administrative nature.— Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-
making power of an administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative
adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to
which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the
standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.
The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative
nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably
necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted
to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative officers or
bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their
official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Exception; In questioning the validity or

constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party
need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court.— In questioning
the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative
agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court.
This principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned
was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed
act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.

Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction; The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only

where the administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory
function. — In like manner, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where
the administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function.
Thus, in cases involving specialized disputes, the practice has been to refer the
same to an administrative agency of special competence pursuant to the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The courts will not determine a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal
prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is
essential to comply with the premises of the regulatory statute administered. The
objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining
whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative
agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising
in the proceeding before the court. It applies where the claim is originally
cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim
requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been
placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case,
the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view.

Constitutional Law; Judicial Power; Words and Phrases; Definition; Where what is
assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the
administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the
regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.—Where what is assailed is
the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative
agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts
have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific
rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the
constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution
vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty,
international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. This is
within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to
determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political
departments. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

BLAS F. OPLE vs. RUBEN D. TORRES, et al. G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998.
Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; Administrative Order No. 308; As a
Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the
issue that the issuance of Administrative Order No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative
power.—As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold
issues relating to the standing to sue of the petitioner and the justiciability of the
case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no legal
interest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be
promulgated. These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner
Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed
of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No.
308 is a usurpation of legislative power. As taxpayer and member of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the
legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to
implement A.O. No. 308.

Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and

enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs.—Administrative
power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a
uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of
his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.

Administrative Order No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be

covered by an administrative order.—Prescinding from these precepts, we hold
that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an
administrative order. x x x An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the
President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of
government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole
purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.

Argument that Administrative Order No. 308 implements the legislative policy of
the Administrative Code of 1987 rejected.—We reject the argument that A.O. No.
308 implements the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987. The
Code is a general law and “incorporates in a unified document the major
structural, functional and procedural principles of governance” and “embodies
changes in administrative structures and procedures designed to serve the
people.”

Administrative Order No. 308 cannot pass constitutional muster as an

administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy.—
Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it
cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because facially
it violates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the “right to be let alone.”

Any law or order that invades individual privacy will be subjected by the Court to
strict scrutiny.—In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy
does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle
scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the
common good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly focused and a
compelling interest justify such intrusions. Intrusions into the right must be
accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent
unconstitutional invasions. We reiterate that any law or order that invades
individual privacy will be subjected by this Court to strict scrutiny.

KAPUNAN, J., Dissenting Opinion

Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; Administrative Order No. 308; The new
identification system would tremendously improve and uplift public service in our
country to the benefit of Filipino citizens and resident aliens.—The new
identification system would tremendously improve and uplift public service in our
country to the benefit of Filipino citizens and resident aliens. It would promote,
facilitate and speed up legitimate transactions with government offices as well
as with private and business entities. Experience tells us of the constant delays and
inconveniences the public has to suffer in availing of basic public services and
social security benefits because of inefficient and not too reliable means of
identification of the beneficiaries.

The Administrative Code of 1987 has unequivocally vested the President with
quasi-legislative powers in the form of executive orders, administrative orders,
proclamations, memorandum orders and circulars and general or special
orders.—The Administrative Code of 1987 has unequivocally vested the President
with quasi-legislative powers in the form of executive orders, administrative orders,
proclamations, memorandum orders and circulars and general or special orders.
An administrative order, like the one under which the new identification system is
embodied, has its peculiar meaning under the 1987 Administrative Code: SEC. 3.
Administrative Orders.—Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of
governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall
be promulgated in administrative orders. [Ople vs. Torres, 293 SCRA 141(1998)]
BALQUERA vs ALCALA
Administrative Law; Public Officers; Government-Owned and Controlled
Corporations; Productivity Incentives Act of 1990 (R.A. No. 6971); Government-
owned and controlled corporations may perform governmental or proprietary
functions or both, depending on the purpose for which they have been
created.—Government-owned and controlled corporations may perform
governmental or proprietary functions or both, depending on the purpose for
which they have been created. If the purpose is to obtain special corporate
benefits or earn pecuniary profit, the function is proprietary. If it is in the interest of
health, safety and for the advancement of public good and welfare, affecting
the public in general, the function is governmental. Powers classified as
“proprietary” are those intended for private advantage and benefit.

Philippine Tourism Authority; The powers and functions of the PTA are
predominantly governmental, principally geared towards the development and
promotion of tourism in the scenic Philippine archipelago.—The aforecited
powers and functions of PTA are predominantly governmental, principally geared
towards the development and promotion of tourism in the scenic Philippine
archipelago. But it is irrefutable that PTA also performs proprietary functions, as
envisaged by its charter.

Statutory Construction; To ascertain whether PTA is within the ambit of RA 6971,

there is need to find out the legislative intent, and to refer to other provisions of
RA 6971 and other pertinent laws that may aid the Court in ruling on the right of
officials and employees of PTA to receive bonuses under RA 6971.—Reliance on
the above analysis of the functions and powers of PTA does not suffice for the
determination of whether or not it is within the coverage of RA 6971. For us to
resolve the issues raised here solely on the basis of the classification of PTA’s
powers and functions may lead to the rendition of judgment repugnant to the
legislative intent and to established doctrines, as well, such as on the prohibition
against government workers to strike. Under RA 6971, the workers have the right
to strike. To ascertain whether PTA is within the ambit of RA 6971, there is need to
find out the legislative intent, and to refer to other provisions of RA 6971 and other
pertinent laws, that may aid the Court in ruling on the right of officials and
employees of PTA to receive bonuses under RA 6971.

The government-owned and controlled corporations contemplated in R.A. 6971

are those incorporated under the general corporation law.—After a careful study,
the Court is of the view, and so holds, that contrary to petitioner’s interpretation,
the government-owned and controlled corporations Mr. Chairman Veloso had in
mind were government-owned and controlled corporations incorporated under
the general corporation law. This is so because only workers in private
corporations and government-owned and controlled corporations, incorporated
under the general corporation law, have the right to bargain (collectively). Those
in government corporations with special charter, which are subject to Civil Service
Laws, have no right to bargain (collectively), except where the terms and
conditions of employment are not fixed by law. Their rights and duties are not
comparable with those in the private sector.

Government corporations created by special charters are governed by the Civil

Service Law while those incorporated under the general corporation law are
governed by the Labor Code.—Government corporations may be created by
special charters or by incorporation under the general corporation law. Those
created by special charters are governed by the Civil Service Law while those
incorporated under the general corporation law are governed by the Labor
Code.

Statutory Construction; The legislative intent to place only government-owned

and controlled corporations performing proprietary functions under the coverage
of RA 6971 is gleanable from the other provisions of law.—The legislative intent to
place only government-owned and controlled corporations performing
proprietary functions under the coverage of RA 6971 is gleanable from the other
provisions of the law. For instance, section 2 of said law envisions “industrial peace
and harmony” and “to provide corresponding incentives to both labor and
capital”; section 4 refers to “representatives of labor and management”; section
5 mentions of “collective bargaining agent(s) of the bargaining unit(s)”; section 6
relates to “existing collective bargaining agreements,” and “labor and
management”; section 7 speaks of “strike or lockout”; and section 9 purports to
“seek the assistance of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of the
Department of Labor and Employment” and “include the name(s) of the
voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators.” All the aforecited provisions
of law apply only to private corporations and government-owned and controlled
corporations organized under the general corporation law. Only they have
collective bargaining agents, collective bargaining units, collective bargaining
agreements, and the right to strike or lockout.

The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of

the statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative
enactment.—All things studiedly considered in proper perspective, the Court finds
no reversible error in the finding by respondent Commission that PTA is not within
the purview of RA 6971. As regards the promulgation of implementing rules and
regulations, it bears stressing that the “power of administrative officials to
promulgate rules in the implementation of the statute is necessarily limited to what
is provided for in the legislative enactment.” In the case under scrutiny, the
Supplementary Rules Implementing RA 6971 issued by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment and the Secretary of Finance accord with the intendment and
provisions of RA 6971. Consequently, not being covered by RA 6971, AO 29 applies
to the petitioner.

It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be

interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every party of the statute must
be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment.—It is a rule in statutory construction that every
part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that
every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and
kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. The provisions of
RA 6971, taken together, reveal the legislative intent to include only government-
owned and controlled corporations performing proprietary functions within its
coverage.

Statutes; Philippine Tourism Authority; Every statute must be construed and

harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence; PTA,
being a government-owned and controlled corporation with original charter
subject to Civil Service Law, Rules and Regulations, is already within the scope of
an incentives award system under Section 1, Rule X of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing EO 292 issued by the Civil Service Commission; Congress enacted
R.A. 6971 to address the same concern—an incentive award system—of officials
and employees of government-owned and controlled corporations incorporated
under the general corporation law.—Every statute must be construed and
harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. We
note Section 1, Rule X of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292, which
reads: “SECTION 1.—Each department or agency of government, whether
national or local, including bureaus and agencies, state colleges and universities,
and government owned and controlled corporations with original charters, shall
establish its own Department or Agency Employee Suggestions and Incentives
Award System in accordance with these Rules and shall submit the same to the
Commission for approval.” (italics ours) It is thus evident that PTA, being a
government-owned and controlled corporation with original charter subject to
Civil Service Law, Rules and Regulations, is already within the scope of an
incentives award system under Section 1, Rule X of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing EO 292 issued by the Civil Service Commission (“Commis-sion”).
Since government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters do
have an incentive award system, Congress enacted a law that would address
the same concern of officials and employees of government-owned and
controlled corporations incorporated under the general corporation law.

Presidency; Power of Control; Administrative Orders; AO 29 and AO 268 were

issued in the valid exercise of presidential control over the executive
departments.—The Court is not impressed with petitioners’ submission. AO 29 and
AO 268 were issued in the valid exercise of presidential control over the executive
departments.

The President is the head of the government—governmental power and authority

are exercised and implemented through him.—The President is the head of the
government. Governmental power and authority are exercised and
implemented through him. His power includes the control over executive
departments—“The president shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.”
(Section 17, Article VII, 1987 Constitution)

Words and Phrases; “Control,” Explained; The President can, by virtue of his power
of control, review, modify, alter or nullify any action, or decision, of his subordinate
in the executive departments, bureaus, or offices under him, and he can exercise
this power motu proprio without need of any appeal from any party.—Control
means “the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment
of the former for that of the latter.” It has been held that “[t]he President can, by
virtue of his power of control, review, modify, alter or nullify any action, or decision,
of his subordinate in the executive departments, bureaus, or offices under him. He
can exercise this power motu proprio without need of any appeal from any
party.”

When the President issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits,

enjoining heads of government agencies from granting incentive benefits without
prior approval from him, and directing the refund of the excess over the
prescribed amount, he was just exercising his power of control over executive
departments.—When the President issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive
benefits, enjoining heads of government agencies from granting incentive
benefits without prior approval from him, and directing the refund of the excess
over the prescribed amount, the President was just exercising his power of control
over executive departments. This is decisively clear from the WHEREAS CLAUSES
of AO 268 and AO 29. x x x The President issued subject Administrative Orders to
regulate the grant of productivity incentive benefits and to prevent
discontentment, dissatisfaction and demoralization among government
personnel by committing limited resources of government for the equal payment
of incentives and awards. The President was only exercising his power of control
by modifying the acts of the respondents who granted incentive benefits to their
employees without appropriate clearance from the Office of the President,
thereby resulting in the uneven distribution of government resources. In the view
of the President, respondents did a mistake which had to be corrected. In so
acting, the President exercised a constitutionally-protected prerogative.

AO 29 and AO 268 did not revoke the privilege of employees to receive incentive
benefits—the same merely regulated the grant and amount thereof.—Neither
can it be said that the President encroached upon the authority of the
Commission on Civil Service to grant benefits to government personnel. AO 29
and AO 268 did not revoke the privilege of employees to receive incentive
benefits. The same merely regulated the grant and amount thereof.

Civil Service Commission; Sound management and effective utilization of

financial resources of government are basically executive functions, not the Civil
Service Commission’s; It is not the duty of the CSC to fix the amount of the
incentives—such function belongs to the President or his duly empowered alter
ego.—Sound management and effective utilization of financial resources of
government are basically executive functions, not the Commission’s.
Conformably, it is “the President or the head of each department or agency who
is authorized to incur the necessary expenses involved in the honorary recognition
of subordinate officers and employees of the government.” It is not the duty of
the Commission to fix the amount of the incentives. Such function belongs to the
President or his duly empowered alter ego.

Constitutional Law; State Immunity; Contracts; Not all contracts entered into by
the government will operate as a waiver of its non-suability—distinction must be
made between its sovereign and proprietary acts.—Anent petitioners’ contention
that the forcible refund of incentive benefits is an unconstitutional impairment of
a contractual obligation, suffice it to state that “[n]ot all contracts entered into
by the government will operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must be
made between its sovereign and proprietary acts (United States of America v.
Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487).” The acts involved in this case are governmental. Besides, the
Court is in agreement with the Solicitor General that the incentive pay or bene-fit
is in the nature of a bonus which is not a demandable or enforceable obligation.
Same; Productivity Incentive Benefits; Separation of Powers; Courts; Constitutional
Commissions; Fiscal Autonomy; The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions,
and Office of the Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal autonomy, are not covered by
the amount fixed by the President.—It is understood that the Judiciary, Civil
Service Commission, Commission on Audit, Commission on Elections, and Office
of the Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal autonomy, are not covered by the
amount fixed by the President.

Administrative Law; Public Officers; Absent a showing of bad faith or malice,

public officers are not personally liable for damages resulting from the
performance of official duties.—Untenable is petitioners’ contention that the
herein respondents be held personally liable for the refund in question. Absent a
showing of bad faith or malice, public officers are not personally liable for
damages resulting from the performance of official duties.

Presumption of Good Faith; Every public official is entitled to the presumption of

good faith in the discharge of official duties.—Every public official is entitled to the
presumption of good faith in the discharge of official duties. Absent any showing
of bad faith or malice, there is likewise a presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties.

Statutory Construction; Presumption of Constitutionality; In interpreting statutes,

that which will avoid a finding of unconstitutionality is to be preferred.—In
upholding the constitutionality of AO 268 and AO 29, the Court reiterates the well-
entrenched doctrine that “in interpreting statutes, that which will avoid a finding
of unconstitutionality is to be preferred.”

Administrative Law; Public Officers; Productivity Incentive Benefits; Considering

that all the parties acted in good faith, the Court cannot countenance the refund
of subject incentive benefits for the year 1992, which amounts the employees
have already received.—Considering, however, that all the parties here acted in
good faith, we cannot countenance the refund of subject incentive benefits for
the year 1992, which amounts the petitioners have already received. Indeed, no
indicia of bad faith can be detected under the attendant facts and
circumstances. The officials and chiefs of offices concerned disbursed such
incentive benefits in the honest belief that the amounts given were due to the
recipients and the latter accepted the same with gratitude, confident that they
richly deserve such benefits. [Blaquera vs. Alcala, 295 SCRA 366(1998)]

BALTAZAR G. CAMPOREDONDO, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

(NLRC) et al. G.R. No. 129049. August 6, 1999. Corporation Law; Philippine National
Red Cross; Court rules that the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a
government owned and controlled corporation, with an original charter under
Republic Act No. 95, as amended.– Resolving the issue set out in the opening
paragraph of this opinion, we rule that the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC)
is a government owned and controlled corporation, with an original charter
under Republic Act No. 95, as amended. The test to determine whether a
corporation is government owned or controlled, or private in nature is simple. Is it
created by its own charter for the exercise of a public function, or by
incorporation under the general corporation law? Those with special charters are
government corporations subject to its provisions, and its employees are under
the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, and are compulsory members of
the Government Service Insurance System. [Camporedondo vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, 312 SCRA 47(1999)]

SHIPSIDE INCORPORATED vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS. G.R. No. 143377.
February 20, 2001. Actions; Parties; Corporation Law; The power of a corporation
to sue and be sued in any court is lodged with the board of directors that exercises
its corporate powers.— A corporation, such as petitioner, has no power except
those expressly conferred on it by the Corporation Code and those that are
implied or incidental to its existence. In turn, a corporation exercises said powers
through its board of directors and/or its duly authorized officers and agents. Thus,
it has been observed that the power of a corporation to sue and be sued in any
court is lodged with the board of directors that exercises its corporate powers
(Premium Marble Resources, Inc. v. CA, 264 SCRA 11 [1996]). In turn, physical acts
of the corporation, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by
natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by a
specific act of the board of directors.

Pleadings and Practice; Verification; The requirement regarding verification of a

pleading is formal, not jurisdictional—verification is simply intended to secure an
assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the
product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is
filed in good faith.—The Court has consistently held that the requirement
regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional (Uy v. LandBank,
G.R. No. 136100, July 24, 2000, 336 SCRA 419). Such requirement is simply a
condition affecting the form of the pleading, non-compliance with which does
not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply
intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and
correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and
that the pleading is filed in good faith. The court may order the correction of the
pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not verified,
if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may
be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.

Certification on Non-Forum Shopping; The rule that the lack of certification

against forum shopping is generally not curable by the submission thereof after
the filing of the petition applies to certifications against forum shopping signed by
a person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that
said signatory is authorized to file a petition on behalf of the corporation.—On the
other hand, the lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not
curable by the submission thereof after the filing of the petition. Section 5, Rule 45
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the failure of the petitioner to
submit the required documents that should accompany the petition, including
the certification against forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal
thereof. The same rule applies to certifications against forum shopping signed by
a person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that
said signatory is authorized to file a petition on behalf of the corporation. In certain
exceptional circumstances, however, the Court has allowed the belated filing of
the certification. In Loyola v. Court of Appeals, et al. (245 SCRA 477 [1995]), the
Court considered the filing of the certification one day after the filing of an
election protest as substantial compliance with the requirement. In Roadway
Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (264 SCRA 696 [1996]), the Court allowed
the filing of the certification 14 days before the dismissal of the petition. In Uy v.
LandBank, supra, the Court had dismissed Uy’s petition for lack of verification and
certification against non-forum shopping. However, it subsequently reinstated the
petition after Uy submitted a motion to admit certification and non-forum
shopping certification. In all these cases, there were special circumstances or
compelling reasons that justified the relaxation of the rule requiring verification
and certification on non-forum shopping.

Procedural Rules; While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable

objective, the granting of substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal.—It must
also be kept in mind that while the requirement of the certificate of non-forum
shopping is mandatory, nonetheless the requirements must not be interpreted too
literally and thus defeat the objective of preventing the undesirable practice of
forum-shopping (Bernardo v. NLRC, 255 SCRA 108 [1996]). Lastly, technical rules of
procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate justice. While the swift
unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of substantial
justice is an even more urgent ideal.

Revival of Judgment; Prescription; An action for revival of judgment must be

brought within ten years from the time said judgment becomes final.—The action
instituted by the Solicitor General in the trial court is one for revival of judgment
which is governed by Article 1144(3) of the Civil Code and Section 6, Rule 39 of
the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. Article 1144(3) provides that an action upon a
judgment “must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action
accrues.” On the other hand, Section 6, Rule 39 provides that a final and
executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years
from the date of its entry, but that after the lapse of such time, and before it is
barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.
Taking these two provisions into consideration, it is plain that an action for revival
of judgment must be brought within ten years from the time said judgment
becomes final.

Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations; While it is true that prescription

does not run against the State, the same may not be invoked by the government
where it is no longer interested in the subject matter.—While it is true that
prescription does not run against the State, the same may not be invoked by the
government in this case since it is no longer interested in the subject matter. While
Camp Wallace may have belonged to the government at the time Rafael
Galvez’s title was ordered cancelled in Land Registration Case No. N-361, the
same no longer holds true today.

Words and Phrases; “Real Party in Interest,” Explained; To qualify a person to be a

real party in interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must
appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to be enforced.—With
the transfer of Camp Wallace to the BCDA, the government no longer has a right
or interest to protect. Consequently, the Republic is not a real party in interest and
it may not institute the instant action. Nor may it raise the defense of
imprescriptibility, the same being applicable only in cases where the government
is a party in interest. Under Section 2 of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
“every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest.” To qualify a person to be a real party in interest in whose name an action
must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real owner of the right
sought to be enforced (Pioneer Insurance v. CA, 175 SCRA 668 [1989]). A real
party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. And by real interest is meant
a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a
future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest (Ibonilla v. Province of
Cebu, 210 SCRA 526 [1992]). Being the owner of the areas covered by Camp
Wallace, it is the Bases Conversion and Development Authority, not the
Government, Which stands to be benefited if the land covered by TCT No. T-5710
issued in the name of petitioner is cancelled.

Government-owned and Controlled Corporations; Bases Conversion and

Development Authority; The BCDA is an entity invested with a personality
separate and distinct from the government.—We, however, must not lose sight of
the fact that the BCDA is an entity invested with a personality separate and
distinct from the government. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7227 reads: Section
3. Creation of the Bases Conversion and Development Authority.—There is hereby
created a body corporate to be known as the Conversion Authority which shall
have the attribute of perpetual succession and shall be vested with the powers
of a corporation.

Constituent and Ministrant Functions; While public benefit and public welfare,
particularly, the promotion of the economic and social development of Central
Luzon, may be attributable to the operation of the BCDA, yet it is certain that the
functions performed by the BCDA are basically proprietary in nature—the
promotion of economic and social development of Central Luzon, in particular,
and the country’s goal for enhancement, in general, do not make the BCDA
equivalent to the Government; The BCDA is not a mere agency of the
Government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions.—It may not
be amiss to state at this point that the functions of government have been
classified into governmental or constituent and proprietary or ministrant. While
public benefit and public welfare, particularly, the promotion of the economic
and social development of Central Luzon, may be attributable to the operation
of the BCDA, yet it is certain that the functions performed by the BCDA are
basically proprietary in nature. The promotion of economic and social
development of Central Luzon, in particular, and thecountry’s goal for
enhancement, in general, do not make the BCDA equivalent to the Government.
Other corporations have been created by government to act as its agents for the
realization of its programs, the SSS, GSIS, NAWASA and the NIA, to count a few,
and yet, the Court has ruled that these entities, although performing functions
aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, are not government-
function corporations invested with governmental attributes. It may thus be said
that the BCDA is not a mere agency of the Government but a corporate body
performing proprietary functions.

Prescription; Parties; The rule that prescription does not run against the State does
not apply to corporations or artificial bodies created by the State for special
purposes, it being said that when the title of the Republic has been divested, its
grantees, although artificial bodies of its own creation, are in the same category
as ordinary persons.—E.B. Marcha is, however, not on all fours with the case at
bar. In the former, the Court considered the Republic a proper party to sue since
the claims of the Republic and the Philippine Ports Authority against the petitioner
therein were the same. To dismiss the complaint in E.B. Marcha would have
brought needless delay in the settlement of the matter since the PPA would have
to refile the case on the same claim already litigated upon. Such is not the case
here since to allow the government to sue herein enables it to raise the issue of
imprescriptibility, a claim which is not available to the BCDA. The rule that
prescription does not run against the State does not apply to corporations or
artificial bodies created by the State for special purposes, it being said that when
the title of the Republic has been divested, its grantees, although artificial bodies
of its own creation, are in the same category as ordinary persons (Kingston v.
LeHigh Valley Coal Co., 241 Pa 469). By raising the claim of imprescriptibility, a
claim which cannot be raised by the BCDA, the Government not only assists the
BCDA, as it did in E.B. Marcha, it even supplants the latter, a course of action
proscribed by said case.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EXPRESS TELECOMMUNICATION CO., INC. and

BAYAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS CO., INC., G.R. No. 147096. January 15, 2002.
Administrative Law; Public Utilities; Telecommunications; In the regulatory
telecommunications industry, the National TelecommunicationsCommission
(NTC) has the sole authority to issue Certificates of Public Convenience and
Necessity (CPCN) for the installation, operation, and maintenance of
communications facilities and services, radio communications systems,
telephone and telegraph systems.—The NTC was created pursuant to Executive
Order No. 546, promulgated on July 23, 1979. It assumed the functions formerly
assigned to the Board of Communications and the Telecommunications Control
Bureau, which were both abolished under the said Executive Order. Previously,
the NTC’s functions were merely those of the defunct Public Service Commission
(PSC), created under Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, otherwise
known as the Public Service Act, considering that the Board of Communications
was the successor-in-interest of the PSC. Under Executive Order No. 125-A, issued
in April 1987, the NTC became an attached agency of the Department of
Transportation and Communications. In the regulatory telecommunications
industry, the NTC has the sole authority to issue Certificates of Public Convenience
and Necessity (CPCN) for the installation, operation, and maintenance of
communications facilities and services, radio communications systems,
telephone and telegraph systems. Such power includes the authority to
determine the areas of operations of applicants for telecommunications services.
Specifically, Section 16 of the Public Service Act authorizes the then PSC, upon
notice and hearing, to issue Certificates of Public Convenience for the operation
of public services within the Philippines “whenever the Commission finds that the
operation of the public service proposed and the authorization to do business will
promote the public interests in a proper and suitable manner.”

Publication of Laws; National Administrative Register; There is nothing in the

Administrative Code of 1987 which implies that the filing of the rules with the UP
Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules force and effect; The National
Administrative Register is merely a bulletin of codified rules and it is furnished only
to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts, the National Library,
other public offices or agencies as the Congress may select, and to other persons
at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs.—
Respondent Extelcom, however, contends that the NTC should have applied the
Revised Rules which were filed with the Office of the National Administrative
Register on February 3, 1993. These Revised Rules deleted the phrase “on its own
initiative”; accordingly, a provisional authority may be issued only upon filing of
the proper motion before the Commission. In answer to this argument, the NTC,
through the Secretary of the Commission, issued a certification to the effect that
inasmuch as the 1993 Revised Rules have not been published in a newspaper of
general circulation, the NTC has been applying the 1978 Rules. The absence of
publication, coupled with the certification by the Commissioner of the NTC stating
that the NTC was still governed by the 1978 Rules, clearly indicate that the 1993
Revised Rules have not taken effect at the time of the grant of the provisional
authority to Bayantel. The fact that the 1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP
Law Center on February 3, 1993 is of no moment. There is nothing in the
Administrative Code of 1987 which implies that the filing of the rules with the UP
Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules force and effect. x x x The
National Administrative Register is merely a bulletin of codified rules and it is
furnished only to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts, the
National Library, other public offices or agencies as the Congress may select, and
to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or
distribution costs.
Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is a
condition sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations can take effect; The
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the NTC, which implements Section 29 of the
Public Service Act (C.A. 146, as amended), fall squarely within the scope of these
laws, as explicitly mentioned in the case of Tañada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446
(1986).—Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation
is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations can take effect.
This is explicit from Executive Order No. 200, which repealed Article 2 of the Civil
Code, and which states that: Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper
of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided. The Rules
of Practice and Procedure of the NTC, which implements Section 29 of the Public
Service Act (C.A. 146, as amended), fall squarely within the scope of these laws,
as explicitly mentioned in the case Tañada v. Tuvera.

Where the records show that the amended application filed by a

telecommunications firm in fact included a motion for the issuance of a
provisional authority, it cannot be said that the NTC granted the provisional
authority motu proprio.—In any event, regardless of whether the 1978 Rules or the
1993 Revised Rules should apply, the records show that the amended application
filed by Bayantel in fact included a motion for the issuance of a provisional
authority. Hence, it cannot be said that the NTC granted the provisional authority
motu proprio. The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred when it found that the NTC
issued its Order of May 3, 2000 on its own initiative. This much is acknowledged in
the Decision of the Court of Appeals: As prayer, ICC asked for the immediate
grant of provisional authority to construct, install, maintain and operate the
subject service and to charge the proposed rates and after due notice and
hearing, approve the instant application and grant the corresponding certificate
of public convenience and necessity.

Archiving of Cases; Revival of Cases; The archiving of cases is a widely accepted

measure designed to shelve cases in which no immediate action is expected but
where no grounds exist for their outright dismissal, albeit without prejudice, and
there is nothing irregular in the revival of the application after the condition
therefor is fulfilled.—The Court of Appeals also erred when it declared that the
NTC’s Order archiving Bayantel’s application was null and void. The archiving of
cases is a widely accepted measure designed to shelve cases in which no
immediate action is expected but where no grounds exist for their outright
dismissal, albeit without prejudice. It saves the petitioner or applicant from the
added trouble and expense of re-filing a dismissed case. Under this scheme, an
inactive case is kept alive but held in abeyance until the situation obtains wherein
action thereon can be taken. In the case at bar, the said application was ordered
archived because of lack of available frequencies at the time, and made subject
to reinstatement upon availability of the requisite frequency. To be sure, there was
nothing irregular in the revival of the application after the condition therefor was
fulfilled.

Due Process; Where the order refers to a simple revival of an archived application,
it cannot be said that an oppositor’s right to procedural due process was
prejudiced if it was not given an opportunity to question the motion for revival;
There is no denial of due process where full-blown adversarial proceedings are
conducted before an administrative body.—The Court of Appeals ruled that
there was a violation of the fundamental right of Extelcom to due process when
it was not afforded the opportunity to question the motion for the revival of the
application. However, it must be noted that said Order referred to a simple revival
of the archived application of Bayantel in NTC Case No. 92-426. At this stage, it
cannot be said that Extelcom’s right to procedural due process was prejudiced.
It will still have the opportunity to be heard during the full-blown adversarial
hearings that will follow. In fact, the records show that the NTC has scheduled
several hearing dates for this purpose, at which all interested parties shall be
allowed to register their opposition. We have ruled that there is no denial of due
process where fullblown adversarial proceedings are conducted before an
administrative body. With Extelcom having fully participated in the proceedings,
and indeed, given the opportunity to file its opposition to the application, there
was clearly no denial of its right to due process.

The requirements of notice and publication of the application are no longer

necessary where the application is a mere revival of an application which has
already been published earlier.—The requirements of notice and publication of
the application is no longer necessary inasmuch as the application is a mere
revival of an application which has already been published earlier. At any rate,
the records show that all of the five (5) CMTS operators in the country were duly
notified and were allowed to raise their respective oppositions to Bayan-tel’s
application through the NTC’s Order dated February 1, 2000.

Public Telecommunications Policy Act of the Philippines (R.A. No. 7925); Among
the declared national polices under R.A. No. 7925 is the healthy competition
among telecommunications carriers, and clearly the need for a healthy
competitive environment in telecommunications is sufficient impetus for the NTC
to consider all those applicants who are willing to offer competition, develop the
market and provide the environment necessary for greater public service.—It
should be borne in mind that among the declared national policies under
Republic Act No. 7925, otherwise known as the Public Telecommunications Policy
Act of the Philippines, is the healthy competition among telecommunications
carriers, to wit: A healthy competitive environment shall be fostered, one in which
telecommunications carriers are free to make business decisions and to interact
with one another in providing telecommunications services, with the end in view
of encouraging their financial viability while maintaining affordable rates. The NTC
is clothed with sufficient discretion to act on matters solely within its competence.
Clearly, the need for a healthy competitive environment in telecommunications
is sufficient impetus for the NTC to consider all those applicants who are willing to
offer competition, develop the market and provide the environment necessary
for greater public service. This was the intention that came to light with the
issuance of Memorandum Circular 9-3-2000, allocating new frequency bands for
use of CMTS.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; The rule is well-entrenched that a party

must exhaust all administrative remedies before resorting to the courts—the
premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one’s cause of
action.—We now come to the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The
rule is well-entrenched that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies
before resorting to the courts. The premature invocation of the intervention of the
court is fatal to one’s cause of action. This rule would not only give the
administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, but
would also prevent the unnecessary and premature resort to courts. In the case
of Lopez v. City of Manila, we held: As a general rule, where the law provides for
the remedies against the action of an administrative board, body or officer, relief
to courts can be sought only after exhausting all remedies provided. The reason
rests upon the presumption that the administrative body, if given the chance to
correct its mistake or error, may amend its decision on a given matter and decide
it properly. Therefore, where a remedy is available within the administrative
machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts,
not only to give the administrative agency the opportunity to decide the matter
by itself correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to courts.

Certiorari; Motions for Reconsideration; It is well-settled that the filing of a motion

for reconsideration is a prerequisite to the filing of a special civil action for
certiorari; Exceptions.—Clearly, Extelcom violated the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies when it went directly to the Court of Appeals on a
petition for certiorari and prohibition from the Order of the NTC dated May 3, 2000,
without first filing a motion for reconsideration. It is well-settled that the filing of a
motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to the filing of a special civil action for
certiorari. The general rule is that, in order to give the lower court the opportunity
to correct itself, a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to certiorari. It also
basic that petitioner must exhaust all other available remedies before resorting to
certiorari. This rule, however, is subject to certain exceptions such as any of the
following: (1) the issues raised are purely legal in nature, (2) public interest is
involved, (3) extreme urgency is obvious, or (4) special circumstances warrant
immediate or more direct action.

That the Order of the NTC became immediately executory does not mean that
the remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration is foreclosed to the petitioner.—
This case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions to this rule.
Although the Order of the NTC dated May 3, 2000 granting provisional authority
to Bayantel was immediately executory, it did not preclude the filing of a motion
for reconsideration. Under the NTC Rules, a party adversely affected by a
decision, order, ruling or resolution may within fifteen (15) days file a motion for
reconsideration. That the Order of the NTC became immediately executory does
not mean that the remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration is foreclosed to
the petitioner.

The general rule is that purely administrative and discretionary functions may not
be interfered with by the courts—courts have no supervising power over the
proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of the government;
The established exception to the rule is where the issuing authority has gone
beyond its statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted
arbitrarily and without regard to his duty or with grave abuse of discretion.—The
Court of Appeals erred in annulling the Order of the NTC dated May 3, 2000,
granting Bayantel a provisional authority to install, operate and maintain CMTS.
The general rule is that purely administrative and discretionary functions may not
be interfered with by the courts. Thus, in Lacuesta v. Herrera, it was held: x x x (T)he
powers granted to the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (natural
resources) by law regarding the disposition of public lands such as granting of
licenses, permits, leases and contracts, or approving, rejecting, reinstating, or
canceling applications, are all executive and administrative in nature. It is a well
recognized principle that purely administrative and discretionary functions may
not be interfered with by the courts. (Coloso vs. Board of Accountancy, G.R. No.
L-5750, April 20, 1953) In general, courts have no supervising power over the
proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of the government.
This is generally true with respect to acts involving the exercise of judgement or
discretion and findings of fact. (54 Am. Jur. 558-559) x x x. The established
exception to the rule is where the issuing authority has gone beyond its statutory
authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and
without regard to his duty or with grave abuse of discretion. None of these obtains
in the case at bar.

In petitions for certiorari, evidentiary matters or matters of fact raised in the court
below are not proper grounds nor may such be ruled upon the proceedings.—In
petitions for certiorari, evidentiary matters or matters of fact raised in the court
below are not proper grounds nor may such be ruled upon in the proceedings.
As held in National Federation of Labor v. NLRC: At the outset, it should be noted
that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will prosper only if
there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or an act without or in excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the national Labor Relations Commission. It does not
include an inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of evidence which was
the basis of the labor official or officer in determining his conclusion. It is not for this
Court to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of witnesses
nor substitute the findings of fact of an administrative tribunal which has gained
expertise in its special field. Considering that the findings of fact of the labor arbiter
and the NLRC are supported by evidence on record, the same must be accorded
due respect and finality.

Courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
the government agency entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under
the special and technical training and knowledge of such agency; Administrative
agencies are given a wide latitude in the evaluation of evidence and in the
exercise of their adjudicative functions, latitude which includes the authority to
take judicial notice of facts within its special competence.—This Court has
consistently held that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed
to the sound discretion of the government agency entrusted with the regulation
of activities coming under the special and technical training and knowledge of
such agency. It has also been held that the exercise of administrative discretion
is a policy decision and a matter that can best be discharged by the government
agency concerned, and not by the courts. In Villanueva v. Court of Appeals it
was held that findings of fact which are supported by evidence and the
conclusion of experts should not be disturbed. This was reiterated in Metro Transit
Organization, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, wherein it was ruled
that factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies which have acquired expertise
because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded
not only respect but even finality and are binding even upon the Supreme Court
if they are supported by substantial evidence. Administrative agencies are given
a wide latitude in the evaluation of evidence and in the exercise of its
adjudicative functions. This latitude includes the authority to take judicial notice
of facts within its special competence.

Courts; Supreme Court; The divisions of the Supreme Court are not to be
considered as separate and distinct courts—the Supreme Court remains a unit
notwithstanding that it works in divisions.—This Court finds that the Manifestations
of Extelcom alleging forum shopping on the part of the NTC and Bayantel are not
impressed with merit. The divisions of the Supreme Court are not to be considered
as separate and distinct courts. The Supreme Court remains a unit
notwithstanding that it works in divisions. Although it may have three divisions, it is
but a single court. Actions considered in any of these divisions and decisions
rendered therein are, in effect, by the same Tribunal. The divisions of this Court are
not to be considered as separate and distinct courts but as divisions of one and
the same court.

Forum Shopping; Circular No. 28-91 was designed to serve as an instrument to

promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and should not be
interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and
legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure—which is to achieve
substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.—The rules on forum shopping
should not be literally interpreted. We have stated thus: It is scarcely necessary to
add that Circular No. 28-91 must be so interpreted and applied as to achieve the
purposes projected by the Supreme Court when it promulgated that circular.
Circular No. 28-91 was designed to serve as an instrument to promote and
facilitate the orderly administration of justice and should not be interpreted with
such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or
the goal of all rules of procedure—which is to achieve substantial justice as
expeditiously as possible.

Even assuming that separate actions have been filed by two different parties
involving essentially the same subject matter, no forum shopping was committed
where the parties did not resort to multiple judicial remedies.—Even assuming that
separate actions have been filed by two different parties involving essentially the
same subject matter, no forum shopping was committed as the parties did not
resort to multiple judicial remedies. The Court, therefore, directed the
consolidation of the two cases because they involve essentially the same issues.
It would also prevent the absurd situation wherein two different divisions of the
same court would render altogether different rulings in the cases at bar.

Parties; Administrative Law; National Telecommunications Commission; The NTC

has legal standing to file and initiate legal action in cases where it is clear that its
inaction would result in an impairment of its ability to execute and perform its
functions.—We rule, likewise, that the NTC has legal standing to file and initiate
legal action in cases where it is clear that its inaction would result in an impairment
of its ability to execute and perform its functions. Similarly, we have previously held
in Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy that the Civil Service Commission, as an
aggrieved party, may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to this Court.
Same; Actions; Appeals; Certiorari; While Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that public respondents shall not appear in or file an answer or comment
to the petition or any pleading therein, no similar proscription exists under Rule
45.—As correctly stated by the NTC, the rule invoked by Extelcom is Rule 65 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that public respondents shall not appear
in or file an answer or comment to the petition or any pleading therein. The instant
petition, on the other hand, was filed under Rule 45 where no similar proscription
exists. [Republic vs. Express Telecommunication Co., Inc., 373 SCRA 316(2002)]

PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT vs. THE HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND

EMPLOYMENT. G.R. No. 103144. April 4, 2001. Labor Law; Illegal Recruitment; Illegal
Exaction; The question of whether a certain person charged applicants with
placement fees in excess of that allowed by law is clearly a question of fact which
is for the POEA, as trier of facts, to determine.—With respect to the first ground,
petitioner would want us to overturn the findings of the POEA, subsequently
affirmed by the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, that it is
guilty of illegal exaction committed by collecting placement fees in excess of the
amounts allowed by law. This issue, however, is a question of fact which cannot
be raised in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. As we have previously held: “It
should be noted, in the first place, that the instant petition is a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. An extraordinary remedy,
its use is available only and restrictively in truly exceptional cases wherein the
action of an inferior court, board or officer performing judicial or quasi-judicial
acts is challenged for being wholly void on grounds of jurisdiction. The sole office
of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the
commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. It does not include correction of public respondent NLRC’s evaluation
of the evidence and factual findings based thereon, which are generally
accorded not only great respect but even finality.” The question of whether or
not petitioner charged private respondents placement fees in excess of that
allowed by law is clearly a question of fact which is for public respondent POEA,
as a trier of facts, to determine. As stated above, the settled rule is that the factual
findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the POEA, which have acquired expertise
because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded
not only respect, but at times even finality if such findings are supported by
substantial evidence.

Publication of Laws; Administrative Law; Considering that POEA Administrative

Circular No. 2, Series of 1983, has not yet been published or filed with the National
Administrative Register, the same is ineffective and may not be enforced.—POEA
Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 must likewise be declared ineffective
as the same was never published or filed with the National Administrative Register.
POEA Memorandum Order No. 2, Series of 1983 provides for the applicable
schedule of placement and documentation fees for private employment
agencies or authority holders. Under the said Order, the maximum amount which
may be collected from prospective Filipino overseas workers is P2,500.00. The said
circular was apparently issued in compliance with the provisions of Article 32 of
the Labor Code which provides, as follows: “Article 32. Fees to be paid by
workers.—Any person applying with a private fee-charging employment agency
for employment assistance shall not be charged any fee until he has obtained
employment through its efforts or has actually commenced employment. Such
fee shall be always covered with the approved receipt clearly showing the
amount paid. The Secretary of Labor shall promulgate a schedule of allowable
fees.” (italics supplied) It is thus clear that the administrative circular under
consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its
effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant
to a valid delegation. Considering that POEA Administrative Circular No. 2, Series
of 1983 has not as yet been published or filed with the National Administrative
Register, the same is ineffective and may not be enforced.

An Administrative Circular that was never filed with the National Administrative
Register cannot be used as basis for the imposition of administrative sanctions.—
The Office of the Solicitor General argues however that the imposition of
administrative sanctions on petitioner was based not on the questioned
administrative circular but on Article 32 and Article 34 (a) of the Labor Code. The
argument is not meritorious. The said articles of the Labor Code were never cited,
much less discussed, in the body of the questioned Orders of the POEA and
Secretary of Labor and Employment. In fact, the said Orders were consistent in
mentioning that petitioner’s violation of Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of
1983 was the basis for the imposition of administrative sanctions against petitioner.
Furthermore, even assuming that petitioner was held liable under the said
provisions of the Labor Code, Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the Laber Code
presupposes the promulgation of a valid schedule of fees by the Department of
Labor and Employment. Considering that, as, previously discussed, Administrative
Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 embodying such a schedule of fees never took
effect, there is thus no basis for the imposition of the administrative sanctions
against petitioner. Moreover, under Book VI, Chapter II, Section 3 of the
Administrative Code of 1987, “(r)ules in force on the date of the effectivity of this
Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not
thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons.” Considering
that POEA Administrative Circular No. 2 was never filed with the National
Administrative Register, the same cannot be used as basis for the imposition of
administrative sanctions against petitioner.

The fact that POEA Administrative Circular No. 2 is addressed only to a specified
group, namely private employment agencies or authority holders, does not take
it away from the ambit of the ruling in Tañada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, which is
clear and categorical—administrative rules and regulations must be published if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation.—The fact that the said circular is addressed only to a specified group,
namely private employment agencies or authority holders, does not take it away
from the ambit of our ruling in Tañada vs. Tuvera. In the case of Phil. Association
of Service Exporters vs. Torres, the administrative circulars questioned therein were
addressed to an even smaller group, namely Philippine and Hong Kong agencies
engaged in the recruitment of workers for Hong Kong, and still the Court ruled
therein that, for lack of proper publication, the said circulars may not be enforced
or implemented. Our pronouncement in Tañada vs. Tuvera is clear and
categorical. Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.
The only exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature,
or those so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties. Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not
been shown to fall under any of these exceptions.

Suspension or Cancellation of License; Findings of the POEA regarding alleged

contract substitution constitute question of fact which may not be disturbed if
supported by substantial evidence.—With respect to the second ground,
petitioner would want us to review the findings of fact of the POEA regarding the
two counts of alleged contract substitution. Again, this is a question of fact which
may not be disturbed if the same is supported by substantial evidence. A reading
of the August 29, 1988 Order of the POEA shows that, indeed, the ruling that
petitioner is guilty of two (2) counts of prohibited contract substitution is supported
by substantial evidence.

Administrative sanctions, which are distinct and separate from the money claims,
may still be properly imposed by the POEA despite findings in another case
absolving the recruitment agency from the money claims; The fact that the claim
for salary deduction was not raised by complainants in their complaint will not bar
the POEA from holding petitioner liable for illegal deduction or withholding of
salaries as a ground for the suspension or cancellation of a recruitment agency’s
license.—Petitioner is correct in stating that the July 26, 1989 Decision of the NLRC
has attained finality by reason of the dismissal of the petition for certiorari assailing
the same. However, the said NLRC Decision dealt only with the money claims of
private respondents arising from employer-employee relations and illegal
dismissal and as such, it is only for the payment of the said money claims that
petitioner is absolved. The administrative sanctions, which are distinct and
separate from the money claims of private respondents, may still be properly
imposed by the POEA. In fact, in the August 31, 1988 Decision of the POEA dealing
with the money claims of private respondents, the POEA Adjudication Office
precisely declared that “respondent’s liability for said money claims is without
prejudice to and independent of its liabilities for the recruitment violations aspect
of the case which is the subject of a separate Order.” The NLRC Decision
absolving petitioner from paying private respondent de Mesa’s claim for salary
deduction based its ruling on a finding that the said money claim was not raised
in the complaint. While there may be questions regarding such finding of the
NLRC, the finality of the said NLRC Decision prevents us from modifying or
reviewing the same. But the fact that the claim for salary deduction was not raised
by private respondents in their complaint will not bar the POEA from holding
petitioner liable for illegal deduction or withholding of salaries as a ground for the
suspension or cancellation of petitioner’s license.

Under the POEA Rules and Regulations, the POEA, on its own initiative, may
conduct the necessary proceeding for the suspension or cancellation of the
license of any private placement agency on any of the grounds mentioned
therein.—Under the POEA Rules and Regulations, the POEA, on its own initiative,
may conduct the necessary proceeding for the suspension or cancellation of the
license of any private placement agency on any of the grounds mentioned
therein. As such, even without a written complaint from an aggrieved party, the
POEA can initiate proceedings against an erring private placement agency and,
if the result of its investigation so warrants, impose the corresponding
administrative sanction thereof. Moreover, the POEA, in an investigation of an
employer-employee relationship case, may still hold a respondent liable for
administrative sanctions if, in the course of its investigation, violations of
recruitment regulations are uncovered. It is thus clear that even if recruitment
violations were not included in a complaint for money claims initiated by a private
complainant, the POEA, under its rules, may still take cognizance of the same and
impose administrative sanctions if the evidence so warrants. [Philsa International
Placement and Services Corporation vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 356
SCRA 174(2001)]

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS vs. JUDGE MA. LUISA QUIJANO-PADILLA. G. R. No.

151992. September 18, 2002. Remedial Law; Actions; In the discharge of its task,
the primordial concern of the OSG is to see to it that the best interest of the
government is upheld; This is regardless of the fact that what it perceived as the
“best interest of the government” runs counter to its client agency’s position.—
PHOTOKINA alleges that the OSG has no standing to file the present petition since
its legal position is contrary to that espoused by the majority of the COMELEC
Commissioners. This is a leap to a non-sequitur conclusion. The OSG is an
independent office. Its hands are not shackled to the cause of its client agency.
In the discharge of its task, the primordial concern of the OSG is to see to it that
the best interest of the government is upheld. This is regardless of the fact that
what it perceived as the “best interest of the government” runs counter to its client
agency’s position. Endowed with a broad perspective that spans the legal
interest of virtually the entire government officialdom, the OSG may transcend
the parochial concerns of a particular client agency and instead, promote and
protect the public weal.

In the final analysis, the client of the OSG is not the agency but no less than the
Republic of the Philippines in whom the plenum of sovereignty resides.—Hence,
while petitioners’ stand is contrary to that of the majority of the Commissioners,
still, the OSG may represent the COMELEC as long as in its assessment, such would
be for the best interest of the government. For, indeed, in the final analysis, the
client of the OSG is not the agency but no less than the Republic of the Philippines
in whom the plenum of sovereignty resides.

The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad dictum.—Anent the alleged

breach of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, suffice it to say that it is not an iron-
clad dictum. On several instances where this Court was confronted with cases of
national interest and of serious implications, it never hesitated to set aside the rule
and proceed with the judicial determination of the case. The case at bar is of
similar import. It is in the interest of the State that questions relating to government
contracts be settled without delay. This is more so when the contract, as in this
case, involves the disbursement of public funds and the modernization of our
country’s election process, a project that has long been overdue.

Mandamus; Mandamus does not lie to enforce the performance of contractual

obligations.—No rule of law is better settled than that mandamus does not lie to
enforce the performance of contractual obligations.

Mandamus applies as a remedy only where petitioner’s right is founded clearly in

law and not when it is doubtful; Legal rights may be enforced by mandamus only
if those rights are well-defined, clear and certain.—Moreover, worth stressing is the
judicial caution that mandamus applies as a remedy only where petitioner’s right
is founded clearly in law and not when it is doubtful. In varying language, the
principle echoed and reechoed is that legal rights may be enforced by
mandamus only if those rights are well-defined, clear and certain. Here, the
alleged contract, relied upon by PHOTOKINA as source of its rights which it seeks
to be protected, is being disputed, not only on the ground that it was not
perfected but also because it is illegal and against public policy.

PHOTOKINA, though the winning bidder, cannot compel the COMELEC to

formalize the contract; The proposed contract is not binding upon the COMELEC
and is considered void; In issuing the questioned preliminary writs of mandatory
and prohibitory injunction and in not dismissing Special Civil Action No. Q-01-
45405, respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion.—In fine, we rule
that PHOTOKINA, though the winning bidder, cannot compel the COMELEC to
formalize the contract. Since PHOTOKINA’s bid is beyond the amount
appropriated by Congress for the VRIS Project, the proposed contract is not
binding upon the COMELEC and is considered void; and that in issuing the
questioned preliminary writs of mandatory and prohibitory injunction and in not
dismissing Special Civil Action No. Q-01-45405, respondent judge acted with
grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners cannot be compelled by a writ of
mandamus to discharge a duty that involves the exercise of judgment and
discretion, especially where disbursement of public funds is concerned.
[Commission on Elections vs. Quijano-Padilla, 389 SCRA 353(2002)]
BRIGIDO R. SIMON, vs. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS. G.R. No. 100150 January
5, 1994. Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; Human Rights; Commission on Human
Rights; Creation of.—The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987
Constitution. It was formally constituted by then President Corazon Aquino via
Executive Order No. 163, issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her legislative
power at the time. It succeeded, but so superseded as well, the Presidential
Committee on Human Rights.

Words and Phrases; The phrase “human rights” is so generic a term that any
attempt to define it could at best be described as inconclusive.—It can hardly be
disputed that the phrase “human rights” is so generic a term that any attempt to
define it, albeit not a few have tried, could at best be described as inconclusive.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or more specifically, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, suggests that the scope of human rights can be
understood to include those that relate to an individual’s social, economic,
cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the term to the
universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is
generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing
almost all aspects of life.

“Civil Rights”, defined.—The term “civil rights,” has been defined as referring—
“(to) those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in a
wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or
administration of government. They include the rights of property, marriage, equal
protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil
rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or
community. Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of
being enforced or redressed in a civil action.” Also quite often mentioned are the
guarantees against involuntary servitude, religious persecution, unreasonable
searches and seizures, and imprisonment for debt.

“Political Rights”, explained.—Political rights, on the other hand, are said to refer
to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or
administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office,
the right of petition and, in general, the right appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis
the management of government.

The Constitutional Commission delegates envisioned a Commission on Human

Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights
violations.—Recalling the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission,
aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission
on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human
rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the “(1)
protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the
prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5)
salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious.”
While the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any preclusive effect,
more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for
the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort
in peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the CHR’s scope of
investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that
“Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should
fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its
recommendation.”

Demolition of stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia does not fall within the
compartment of “human rights violations involving civil and political rights”
intended by the Constitution.—In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil
that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and
carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a
land which is planned to be developed into a “People’s Park.” More than that,
the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial
notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is
not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which
is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be
invoked, if it is not, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards
hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we
are not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-
sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the
compartment of “human rights violations involving civil and political rights”
intended by the Constitution.

Contempt; The CHR is constitutionally authorized to cite or hold any person in

direct or indirect contempt.—On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally
authorized to “adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite
for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court.”
Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its
power “to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose
the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions
provided for in the Rules of Court.” That power to cite for contempt, however,
should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational
guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers.
To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons
who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant
information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its
investigative work.

An “order to desist”, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from

an adjudicative power that the CHR does not possess.—The “order to desist” (a
semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is
not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it
does not possess.

Prohibition; Moot and Academic; Prohibition not moot simply because the
hearings in the proceedings sought to be restrained have been terminated where
resolution of the issues raised still to be promulgated.—The public respondent
explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the petitioners has become moot
and academic since the case before it (CHR Case No. 90-1580) has already been
fully heard, and that the matter is merely awaiting final resolution. It is true that
prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be
done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished.
Here, however, said Commission admittedly has yet to promulgate its resolution
in CHR Case No. 90-1580. The instant petition has been intended, among other
things, to also prevent CHR from precisely doing that. [Simon, Jr. vs. Commission
on Human Rights, 229 SCRA 117(1994)]
EMMANUEL PELAEZ vs. THE AUDITOR GENERAL. G.R. No. L-23825 December 24,
1965. Administrative law; Power of President to create municipalities.—Since
January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may "not
be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act
of Congress or of the corresponding" provincial board "upon petition of a majority
of the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of
the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." This
statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a
negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of
several barrios.

Nature of power to create municipalities.—Whereas the power to f ix a common

boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining
municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature—involving, as it does, the
adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating" said
municipalities—the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially
legislative in nature,

Requisites for valid delegation of power.—Although Congress may delegate to

another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential that said law: (a) be
complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate; and (b) fix a standard—the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable—to which the delegate must conform in
the performance of his functions.

Requirements of due delegation of power not met by Section 68 of Revised

Administrative Code.—Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, insofar as
it grants to the President the power to create municipalities, does not meet the
well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in
the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or
implemented by the President.

Abdication of powers of Congress in favor of the Executive.—If the validity of said

delegation of powers, made in Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code,
were upheld. there would no longer be any legal impediment to a statutory grant
of authority to the President to do anything which, in his opinion, may be required
by public welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority would be a virtual
abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of the Executive, and would bring
about a total collapse of the democratic system established by the Constitution.

Nature of powers dealt with in Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code.—It

is true that in Calalang vs. WiIliams (70 Phil. 726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil.
328), this Court had upheld "public welfare" and "public interest," respectively, as
sufficient standards for a valid delegation of the authority to execute the law. But
the doctrine laid down in these cases must be construed in relation to the specific
facts and Issues involved therein, outside of which they do not constitute
precedents and have no binding effect. Both cases involved grants to
administrative officers of powers related to the exercise of their administrative
functions, calling for the determination of questions of fact. Such is not the nature
of the powers dealt with in Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. The
creation of municipalities being essentially and eminently legislative in character,
the question whether or not "public interest" demands the exercise of such power
is not one of fact It is purely a legislative question (Carolina-Virginia Coastal
Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310-313, 315-318), or a political
question (Udall vs. Severn, 79 P. 2d. 347-349).

Proof that issuance of Executive Orders in question entails exercise of purely

legislative functions.—The fact that Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 128
to 129, creating thirty-three municipalities, were issued after the legislative bills for
the creation of the said municipalities had failed to pass Congress, is the best
proof that their issuance entails the exercise of purely legislative functions.

Power of control over local governments.—The power of control under Section 10

(a) of Article X of the Constitution implies the right of the President to interfere in
the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the
executive departments, bureaus or offices of the national government, as well as
to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the
Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter,
the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking
whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as
provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with
local governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their
authority. He may not, for instance, suspend an elective official of a regular
municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, 'except on appeal from
a decision of the corresponding provincial board. If, on the other hand, the
President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of' its
officials, by creating a new municipality and including therein the barrio in which
the official concerned resides, for his office would thereby become vacant
(Section 2179, Revised Administrative Code). Thus, by merely brandishing the
power to create a new municipality, without actually creating it, he could compel
local officials to submit to his dictation; thereby, in effect, exercising over them
the power of control denied to him by the Constitution.

Section 68, Revised Administrative Code repealed by the Constitution.—The

power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus or offices
under Section 10(a) of Article X of the Constitution implies no more than the
authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the exercise of
discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such control does not include the authority
either to abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. As
a consequence, the alleged power of the President to create municipal
corporations would necessarily connote the 'exercise by him of an authority even
greater than that of control which he has over the executive departments,
bureaus or offices, Instead of giving the President less power over local
governments than that vested in him over the executive departments, bureaus or
offices, it reverses the process and does the exact opposite, by conferring upon
him more power over municipal corporations than that which he has over
executive departments, bureaus or offices. Even if, therefore, it did not entail an
undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly does, said Section 68, as
part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1967, must be
deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution in 1935, which
is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment. (De los
Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289, 298299.)
Municipal officials concerned duly represented in present case.—lt is contended
that not all the proper parties have been impleaded in the present case. Suffice
it to say that the records do not show, and the parties do not claim, that the
officers of any of the municipalities concerned have been appointed or elected
and have assumed office. At any rate, the Solicitor General, who has appeared
on behalf of respondent Auditor General, is the officer authorized by law "to act
and represent the Government of the Philippines, its offices and agents, in any
official investigation, proceeding or matter requiring the services of a lawyer"
(Section 1661, Revised Administrative Code), and, in connection with the creation
of the municipalities involved in this case, which involves a political, not
proprietary function. said local officials, if any, are mere agents or representatives
of the national government. Their interest in the case has accordingly been duly
represented. (Mangubat vs. Osmeña, Jr., G.R. No. L-12837, April 30, 1959; City of
Cebu vs. Judge Piccio, G.R. Nos L-13012 & 14876. December 81, 1960.)

Action not premature.—The present action cannot be said to be premature

simply because respondent Auditor General has not yet acted on any of the
executive orders in question and has not intimated how he would act in
connection therewith. It is a matter of common knowledge that the President has
for many years issued executive orders creating municipal corporations and that
the same have been organized and are in actual operation, thus indicating
without peradventure or doubt, that the expenditures incidental thereto have
been sanctioned, approved or passed in audit by the General Auditing Office
and its officials. There is no reason to believe that respondent would adopt a
different policy as regards the new municipalities involved in this case, in the
absence of an allegation to such effect, and none has been made by him.
[Pelaez vs. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569(1965)]

CEBU INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (CIT) vs. OPLE. 160 SCRA 503. 1988. Labor Law;
Court reiterates its ruling that section 42 ofBP Blg. 232 has repealed Pres. Dec. No.
451.—These matters raised by the movants have been sufficiently discussed by
the Court in the Decision sought to be reconsidered. There is therefore no need
to pass upon them again in this resolution. This Court reiterates its ruling that
section 42 of B.P. Blg. 232 (The Education Act of 1982) has repealed Pres. Dec. No.
451. Furthermore, B.P. Blg. 232 has set the standards to be followed by the
Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports in promulgating the necessary rules
and regulations to implement the law and which thereby negates any allegation
of undue delegation of legislative power.

Actions; Prescription; The period within which to file actions for money claims
which accrued during the effectivity of the Labor Code is three (3) years from the
accrual of the cause of action; In the Divine Word College Case, inasmuch as the
original complaint was filed on February 17, 1983, the claims prior to February 17,
1980 have indeed already prescribed.—Article 292 of the Labor Code expressly
provides that the period within which to file actions for money claims which
accrued during the effectivity of the Labor Code is three (3) years from the
accrual of the cause of action. Money claims which accrued more than three (3)
years prior to the filing of the complaint are barred by prescription. In the instant
case, inasmuch as the original complaint was filed on February 17,1983, the claims
prior to February 17,1980 have indeed already prescribed.
The three-year period within which to file actions involving money claims arising
out of an employer-employee relationship equally applies to claims for the
incremental proceeds arising from tuition fee increases under Pres. Dec. No.
451.—As an incident to the main arguments in this action for reconsideration,
petitioners express doubt on the applicability of the three-year period of
prescription under the Labor Code. There is no doubt that the three-year period
within which to file actions involving money claims arising out of an employer-
employee relationship fixed by Article 292 of Pres. Dec. No. 442 (Labor Code, as
amended, equally applies to claims for the incremental proceeds arising from
tuition fee increases under Pres. Dec. No. 451. The claims which gave rise to all
these cases are clearly money claims arising from an employer-employee
relationship and thus falls under the coverage of Article 292 of the Labor Code.

Negotiation Fee; Award of ten percent (10%) of the backwages payable to all
members of the bargaining unit as negotiation fee affirmed with modification.—
The first matter raised for clarification in this case concerns the award of ten
percent (10%) of the backwages payable to all members of the bargaining unit
as negotiation fee which covers attorney’s fees, agency fee and the like. Thie
Court in its December 18,1987 Decision affirmed this award with the modification
that only members of the bargaining unit should be made to pay this assessment.

Argument that only thirty percent (30%) should be subject to the computation of
the ten percent (10%) negotiation fee meritorious.—There is merit in petitioners’
and the School’s argument. The whole ninety percent (90%) economic package
awarded by the National Labor Relations Commission cannot be the basis for
computing the negotiation fees. The law has already provided for the minimum
percentage of tuition fee increases to be allotted for teachers and other school
personnel. This is mandatory and cannot be diminished although it may be
increased by collective bargaining. It follows that only the amount corresponding
beyond that mandated by law should be subject to negotiation fees and
attorney’s fees for the simple reason that it is only this which the school employees
had to bargain for. The sixty percent (60%) which is what the law grants them is
not a negotiable issue.

Backwages; Meaning of backwages.—The Court does not agree with the view
taken by the Soliritor General. The term “backwages” as used in the questioned
order of the former Minister of Labor apparently refers to whatever back
payments will be received by the teachers and other school employees from the
economic package which was ordered to be included in the collective
bargaining agreement. “Backwages” do not cover only the amount
corresponding to the period prior to the promulgation of the Order on April
14,1986. Hence, the ten percent (10%) negotiation fee should be computed on
the amount in excess of that portion allocated by law for increases in salaries of
teachers and other school employees for the entire contract period covered by
the economic package, starting school year 1985–1986 and ending school year
1987–1988.

Attorney’s Fee; FEU-ELU Resolution disclaim any contract with Atty. Herminio Z.
Florendo for and in its own behalf.—A careful examination of the FEU-ELU
Resolution dated July 6,1983 granting Atty. Ortega a ten percent (10%)
contingent fee and the allegations in the opposition filed by the Union President,
Carmelito Nocon, reveals a disclaimer by the Uriion of any contract with Atty.
Herminio Z. Florendo for and in behalf of the FEU-ELU. The appearance of Atty.
Florendo for and in behalf of the Union was allegedly a private arrangement
between said Atty. Florendo and his brother-in-law, Mr. Troadio Carbungco, when
the latter was then the FEU-ELU President.
Court deems it necessary to remand settlement the National Labor Relations
Commission.—The Court notes the motion filed by Atty. Herminio Z. Florendo for a
recording of his attorney’s lien on a quantum meruit basis and the motion filed by
Atty. Carlos M. Ortega for a recording of his attorneys lien on a contingent fee
basis. In view, however, of the conflict presented by the FEU-ELU Resolution dated
July 3,1983, the Court deems it necessary to remand the settlement of this matter
to the National Labor Relations Commission. [Cebu Institute of Technology (CIT)
vs. Ople, 160 SCRA 503(1988)]

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS) vs. HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA et al.
G.R. No. 166715. August 14, 2008. Judicial Review; A constitutional question is ripe
for adjudication when the governmental act being challenged has a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it.—An actual case or controversy
involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible
of judicial adjudication. A closely related requirement is ripeness, that is, the
question must be ripe for adjudication. And a constitutional question is ripe for
adjudication when the governmental act being challenged has a direct adverse
effect on the individual challenging it. Thus, to be ripe for judicial adjudication,
the petitioner must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury
to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision of the Court.

Where an action of the legislative branch is alleged to have infringed the

Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to
settle the dispute.—This notwithstanding, public interest requires the resolution of
the constitutional issues raised by petitioners. The grave nature of their allegations
tends to cast a cloud on the presumption of constitutionality in favor of the law.
And where an action of the legislative branch is alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to
settle the dispute.

Public Officers; Public Accountability; Public office is a public trust—it must be

discharged by its holder not for his own personal gain but for the benefit of the
public for whom he holds it in trust.—Public office is a public trust. It must be
discharged by its holder not for his own personal gain but for the benefit of the
public for whom he holds it in trust. By demanding accountability and service with
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency, patriotism and justice, all government
officials and employees have the duty to be responsive to the needs of the
people they are called upon to serve.

Presumption of Regularity; The presumption of regularity enjoyed by public officers

in the performance of their duties necessarily obtains in favor of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) and Bureau of Customs (BOC) officials and employees.—
Public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their
duties. This presumption necessarily obtains in favor of BIR and BOC officials and
employees. RA 9335 operates on the basis thereof and reinforces it by providing
a system of rewards and sanctions for the purpose of encouraging the officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC to exceed their revenue targets and
optimize their revenue-generation capability and collection. The presumption is
disputable but proof to the contrary is required to rebut it. It cannot be overturned
by mere conjecture or denied in advance (as petitioners would have the Court
do) specially in this case where it is an underlying principle to advance a declared
public policy.

Attrition Act of 2005 (R.A. No. 9335); Judicial Review; To invalidate RA 9335 based
on baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that
passed it but also of the executive which approved it.—A law enacted by
Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality. To justify its
nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,
not a doubtful and equivocal one. To invalidate RA 9335 based on petitioners’
baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that
passed it but also of the executive which approved it.

A system of incentives for exceeding the set expectations of a public office is not
anathema to the concept of public account-ability.—Public service is its own
reward. Nevertheless, public officers may by law be rewarded for exemplary and
exceptional performance. A system of incentives for exceeding the set
expectations of a public office is not anathema to the concept of public
accountability. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces dedication to duty, industry,
efficiency and loyalty to public service of deserving government personnel.

Equal Protection; Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is

equality under the same conditions and among persons similarly situated—it is
equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are classified
based on substantial differences in relation to the object to be accomplished.—
Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is equality under the
same conditions and among persons similarly situated; it is equality among
equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are classified based on
substantial differences in relation to the object to be accomplished. When things
or persons are different in fact or circumstance, they may be treated in law
differently. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, 59 SCRA 54 (1974), this
Court declared: The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of
equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the [S]tate. It is not,
therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against
inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a
statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation
on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution
does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though
they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination
as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either
in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.

The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a

classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary;
Since the subject of the law is the revenue-generation capability and collection
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC), the
incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said
agencies.—The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is,
a classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not
arbitrary. With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of
the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. Since
the subject of the law is the revenue-generation capability and collection of the
BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should
logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR
and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of
generating revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes,
customs duties, fees and charges.

Delegation of Powers; Test; A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy
to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and lays down a
sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law
to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot.—Two tests determine the validity of delegation of
legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A
law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out
or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it
provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries
of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be
sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority,
announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented.

Civil Service; Security of Tenure; Inefficiency; Incompetence; The guarantee of

security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the
service for causes other than those provided by law and only after due process is
accorded the employee; RA 9335 lays down a reasonable yardstick for removal
(when the revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due
consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection, a standard
analogous to inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official
duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil service laws.—RA 9335 in no way
violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC.
The guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be
dismissed from the service for causes other than those provided by law and only
after due process is accorded the employee. In the case of RA 9335, it lays down
a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the revenue collection falls short of the
target by at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the
level of collection. This standard is analogous to inefficiency and incompetence
in the performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil
service laws. The action for removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules and
regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due process. At any
rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: “public
interest,” “justice and equity,” “public convenience and welfare” and “simplicity,
economy and welfare.” In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused
with public interest.

Separation of Powers; Legislative Veto; Congressional oversight is not

unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an
encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the
constitutional separation of powers, but to forestall the danger of congressional
encroachment “beyond the legislative sphere,” the Constitution imposes two
basic and related constraints on Congress—it may not vest itself, any of its
committees or its members with either executive or judicial power, and, when it
exercises its legislative power, it must follow the “single, finely wrought and
exhaustively considered, procedures” specified under the Constitution, including
the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment; Any post-enactment
congressional measure should be limited to scrutiny and investigation—any
action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed
by the Constitution.—It is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional
per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the
executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation
of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a
democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation
of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment “beyond the
legislative sphere,” the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on
Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either
executive or judicial power. And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must
follow the “single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures”
specified under the Constitution, including the procedure for enactment of laws
and presentment. Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this
should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional
oversight must be confined to the following: (1) scrutiny based primarily on
Congress’ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in
connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and
be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments
and its power of confirmation and (2) investigation and monitoring of the
implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation
of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.

Words and Phrases; Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President
or an administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and
regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed
by it, retains a “right” or “power” to approve or disapprove such regulations
before they take effect; Congress has two options when enacting legislation to
define national policy within the broad horizons of its legislative competence—it
can itself formulate the details or it can assign to the executive branch the
responsibility for making necessary managerial decisions in conformity with those
standards.—Legis-lative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an
administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and
regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed
by it, retains a “right” or “power” to approve or disapprove such regulations
before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional
oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation designed to
attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an
agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It
radically changes the design or structure of the Constitution’s diagram of power
as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its
own laws. Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national
policy within the broad horizons of its legislative competence. It can itself
formulate the details or it can assign to the executive branch the responsibility for
making necessary managerial decisions in conformity with those standards. In the
latter case, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when
it leaves the hands of the legislature. Thus, what is left for the executive branch or
the concerned administrative agency when it formulates rules and regulations
implementing the law is to fill up details (supplementary rule-making) or ascertain
facts necessary to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).
Congress; Statutes; Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may
not pass upon their legality by subjecting them to its stamp of approval without
disturbing the calculated balance of powers established by the Constitution—in
exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the Implementing Rules and
Regulations based on a determination of whether or not they conformed with the
provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power
exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.—Administrative regulations
enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law which
they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect.
Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statute and are just as
binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. As such, they have the
force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality
until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court.
Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon
their legality by subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing the
calculated balance of powers established by the Constitution. In exercising
discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether
or not they conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial
power unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.

Principle of Bicameralism; Presentment Clause; The requirement that the

implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by Congress as a condition
for their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism
and the rule on presentment; A valid exercise of legislative power requires the act
of both chambers—it can be exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers
nor by a committee of either or both chambers.—The requirement that the
implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by Congress as a condition
for their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism
and the rule on presentment. x x x Legislative power (or the power to propose,
enact, amend and repeal laws) is vested in Congress which consists of two
chambers, the Senate and the House of Representatives. A valid exercise of
legislative power requires the act of both chambers. Corrollarily, it can be
exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers nor by a committee of either
or both chambers. Thus, assuming the validity of a legislative veto, both a single-
chamber legislative veto and a congressional committee legislative veto are
invalid.

Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for approval or
veto and in the absence of presentment to the President, no bill passed by
Congress can become a law.—Every bill passed by Congress must be presented
to the President for approval or veto. In the absence of presentment to the
President, no bill passed by Congress can become a law. In this sense, law-making
under the Constitution is a joint act of the Legislature and of the Executive.
Assuming that legislative veto is a valid legislative act with the force of law, it
cannot take effect without such presentment even if approved by both
chambers of Congress.

Publication; Subject to the indispensable requisite of publication under the due

process clause, the determination as to when a law takes effect is wholly the
prerogative of Congress—as such, it is only upon its effectivity that a law may be
executed and the executive branch acquires the duties and powers to execute
the said law.—Where Congress delegates the formulation of rules to implement
the law it has enacted pursuant to sufficient standards established in the said law,
the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves
the hands of the legislature. And it may be deemed to have left the hands of the
legislature when it becomes effective because it is only upon effectivity of the
statute that legal rights and obligations become available to those entitled by
the language of the statute. Subject to the indispensable requisite of publication
under the due process clause, the determination as to when a law takes effect is
wholly the prerogative of Congress. As such, it is only upon its effectivity that a law
may be executed and the executive branch acquires the duties and powers to
execute the said law. Before that point, the role of the executive branch,
particularly of the President, is limited to approving or vetoing the law.

From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers
Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional.—From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of
law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of
powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires
Congress or its members to approve the implementing rules of a law after it has
already taken effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows
Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling made by the members
of the executive branch charged with the implementation of the law.

Statutes; Partial Unconstitutionality; Separability Clause; The general rule is that

where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part
is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be
enforced; The presence of a separability clause in a statute creates the
presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather than complete
nullity of the statute.—In Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 282
SCRA 361 (1997), the Court laid down the following rules: The general rule is that
where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part
is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be
enforced. The presence of a separability clause in a statute creates the
presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather than complete
nullity of the statute. To justify this result, the valid portion must be so far
independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the legislature
would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it could not constitutionally
enact the other. Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible and valid
statute, which carries out the legislative intent. x x x The exception to the general
rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and
connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for
each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole,
the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In making the parts of the statute
dependent, conditional, or connected with one another, the legislature intended
the statute to be carried out as a whole and would not have enacted it if one
part is void, in which case if some parts are unconstitutional, all the other provisions
thus dependent, conditional, or connected must fall with them.

Administrative Law; To be effective, administrative rules and regulations must be

published in full if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to
a valid delegation.—To be effective, administrative rules and regulations must be
published in full if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to
a valid delegation. The IRR of RA 9335 were published on May 30, 2006 in two
newspapers of general circulation and became effective 15 days thereafter. Until
and unless the contrary is shown, the IRR are presumed valid and effective even
without the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. [Abakada
Guro Party List vs. Purisima, 562 SCRA 251(2008)]