Persons and Family Relations

Assignment for June 19, 2018:

New Civil Code Articles 1 – 39

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 386

AN ACT TO ORDAIN AND INSTITUTE THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

PRELIMINARY TITLE

CHAPTER 1
Effect and Application of Laws

Article 1. This Act shall be known as the "Civil Code of the Philippines." (n)

Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. (1a)

Article 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. (2)

Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. (3)

Article 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the
law itself authorizes their validity. (4a)

Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good
customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. (4a)

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be
excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter
shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the
laws or the Constitution. (5a)

Article 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system of the Philippines. (n)

Article 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency
of the laws. (6)

Article 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail. (n)

Article 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced. (n)

Article 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. (n)

Article 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of three
hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours; and nights from sunset to
sunrise.

If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they respectively
have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included. (7a)

Article 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in
the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations. (8a)

Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)

Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is stipulated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property
and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (10a)

Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the
laws of the country in which they are executed.

When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the
Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their
execution.

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order,
public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. (11a)

Article 18. In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws, their deficiency shall be
supplied by the provisions of this Code. (16a)

CHAPTER 2
Human Relations (n)

Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify
the latter for the same.

Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Article 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes
into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to
him.

Article 23. Even when an act or event causing damage to another's property was not due to the fault or
negligence of the defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited.

Article 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account
of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must
be vigilant for his protection.

Article 25. Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure or display during a period of acute public want or
emergency may be stopped by order of the courts at the instance of any government or private charitable
institution.
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and
other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a
cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;

(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;

(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;

(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth,
physical defect, or other personal condition.

Article 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or
neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against
the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.

Article 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of
force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or highhanded method shall give rise to a
right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage.

Article 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted.
Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require
the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.

If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the
absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the
acquittal is due to that ground.

Article 30. When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no
criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall
likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of.

Article 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as
a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of
the latter.

Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be
liable to the latter for damages:

(1) Freedom of religion;

(2) Freedom of speech;

(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;

(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;

(5) Freedom of suffrage;

(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;

(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;

(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures;
 (10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;

(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;

(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;

(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of grievances;

(14) The right to be a free from involuntary servitude in any form;

(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;

(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and
to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;

(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to confess
guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when
the person confessing becomes a State witness;

(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or
inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and

(19) Freedom of access to the courts.

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a
criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil
action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal
prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.

The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a
violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

Article 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any
person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city
or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent
of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.

Article 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense, charges another with the same, for
which no independent civil action is granted in this Code or any special law, but the justice of the peace finds no
reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to
institute criminal proceedings, the complaint may bring a civil action for damages against the alleged offender.
Such civil action may be supported by a preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant's motion, the court
may require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the defendant in case the complaint should be found to be
malicious.

If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be presented by the prosecuting attorney, the
civil action shall be suspended until the termination of the criminal proceedings.

Article 36. Pre-judicial questions, which must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or
may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall not
be in conflict with the provisions of this Code.
 BOOK I
PERSONS

TITLE I
CIVIL PERSONALITY

CHAPTER 1
General Provisions

Article 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural
person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired
and may be lost. (n)

Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are
mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as
when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements. (32a)

Article 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to act: age, insanity, imbecility,
the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family relations, alienage, absence, insolvency and
trusteeship. The consequences of these circumstances are governed in this Code, other codes, the Rules of
Court, and in special laws. Capacity to act is not limited on account of religious belief or political opinion.

A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is qualified for all acts of civil life, except in cases specified
by law. (n)

Cases:

EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS

 Tañ ada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27

Tañada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that
laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations
and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that
petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and
enforceable.
HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the
law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general
public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia
legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette…. The
word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if
the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance
and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due
process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application
which have not been published have no force and effect.

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to
their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature
may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous
publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws
relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any
bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires
act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be
directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the
content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the
wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their
dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless
their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give
proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless
the naked blade is drawn.

 Acaac v. Azcuna, G.R. No. 187378, September 30, 2013

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 187378 September 30, 2013

RAMONITO O. ACAAC, PETALFOUNDATION, INC., APOLINARIO M. ELORDE, HECTOR ACAAC, and

ROMEO BULAWIN, Petitioners,
vs.
MELQUIADES D. AZCUNA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor, and MARIETES B. BONALOS, in her capacity
as Municipal Engineer and Building Official-Designate, both of Lopez Jaena Municipality, Misamis
Occidental,Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated September 30, 2008 and
Resolution3 dated March 9, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 00284-MIN which reversed
and set aside the Decision4 dated November 26, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Branch 2
(RTC) in Civil Case No. 4684 for injunction.

The Facts

Petitioner People’s Eco-Tourism and Livelihood Foundation, Inc.(PETAL) is a non-governmental organization,

founded by petitioner Ramonito O. Acaac, which is engaged in the protection and conservation of ecology,
tourism, and livelihood projects within Misamis Occidental.5 In line with its objectives, PETAL built some cottages
made of indigenous materials on Capayas Island (a 1,605 square meter islet) in 1995 as well as a seminar
cottage in 20016which it rented out to the public and became the source of livelihood of its beneficiaries,7 among
whom are petitioners Hector Acaac and Romeo Bulawin.

On April 11 and May 20, 2002, however, respondents Mayor Melquiades D. Azcuna, Jr. (Azcuna) and Building
Official Marietes B. Bonalos issued separate Notices of Illegal Construction against PETAL for its failure to apply
for a building permit prior to the construction of its buildings in violation of Presidential Decree No.
1096,8 otherwise known as the "National Building Code of the Philippines," ordering it to stop all illegal building
activities on Capayas Island. When PETAL failed to comply with the requirements for the issuance of a building
permit, a Third and Final Notice of Illegal Construction was issued by respondents against it on July 8, 2002,9 but
still the same remained unheeded.

It was also on July 8, 2002 that the Sangguniang Bayan of Lopez Jaena (SB) adopted Municipal Ordinance No.
02, Series of 200210 (subject ordinance) which prohibited, among others: (a) the entry of any entity, association,
corporation or organization inside the sanctuaries;11 and (b) the construction of any structures, permanent or
temporary, on the premises, except if authorized by the local government.12 On July 12, 2002, Azcuna approved
the subject ordinance; hence, the same was submitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Misamis Occidental
(SP), which in turn, conducted a joint hearing on the matter. Thereafter, notices were posted at the designated
areas, including Capayas Island, declaring the premises as government property and prohibiting ingress and
egress thereto.13

On August 23, 2002, a Notice of Voluntary Demolition was served upon PETAL directing it to remove the
structures it built on Capayas Island. Among the reasons cited was its violation of the subject ordinance. A
similar notice was also served against individual petitioners on October 25, 2002.

On October 29, 2002, petitioners filed an action praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining order,
injunction and damages15 against respondents before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 4684, alleging that
they have prior vested rights to occupy and utilize Capayas Island. PETAL claimed that its predecessors-in-
interest have been in possession thereof since 1961, with whom it entered into a Memorandum of Agreement for
the operation of the said island as a camping, tourism, and recreational resort; thus, the issuance of the subject
ordinance was prejudicial to their interest as they were deprived of their livelihood. Moreover, PETAL assailed
the validity of the subject ordinance on the following grounds: (a) it was adopted without public consultation; (b) it
was not published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province as required by Republic Act
No.7160,16 otherwise known as "The Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC);and (c) it was not approved by the
SP. Therefore, its implementation should be enjoined.17

In their Answer,18 respondents averred that petitioners have no cause of action against them since they are not
the lawful owners or lessees of Capayas Island, which was classified as timberland and property belonging to
the public domain. Further, they maintained that they have complied with all the publication and hearing
requirements for the passage of the subject ordinance, which was deemed approved by operation of law for
failure of the SP to take any positive action thereon as provided under the LGC. As such, it is valid and
enforceable.

The RTC Ruling

On November 26, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision19 declaring the subject ordinance as invalid/void based on
the following grounds: (a) PETAL’s protest has not been resolved and that the subject ordinance was not duly
approved by the SP; (b) the said ordinance was not published in a newspaper of general circulation nor was it
posted in public places; (c) Capayas Island is classified as timberland, hence, not suited to be a bird or fish
sanctuary; and (d) the authority and control over timberlands belong to the national government, through the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).20 Based on the foregoing, respondents were
ordered, among others, to desist from closing Capayas Island to the public.21 However, the petitioners were
ordered to remove the structures they built thereon without valid building permits22 since they were found to have
no title over the disputed property.23

Aggrieved, respondents appealed the foregoing pronouncement before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
00284-MIN.

The Proceedings Before the CA

On September 30, 2008, the CA rendered a Decision24 granting respondents’ appeal.

Contrary to the RTC’s ruling, it held that the subject ordinance was deemed approved upon failure of the SP to
declare the same invalid within30 days after its submission in accordance with Section 56 of the LGC.25 It also
gave credence to Azcuna’s testimony that the subject ordinance was posted and published in conspicuous
places in their municipality, and in the bulletin board.26 Moreover, public consultations were conducted with
various groups before the subject ordinance was passed.27 The CA further ruled that the Municipality of Lopez
Jaena was vested with sufficient power and authority to pass and adopt the subject ordinance under Section 447
in relation to Section 16 of the LGC.28 Therefore, it is not only the DENR that could create and administer
sanctuaries.29 Having enacted the subject ordinance within its powers as a municipality and in accordance with
the procedure prescribed by law, the CA pronounced that the subject ordinance is valid.30

On the other hand, the CA upheld the RTC’s finding that petitioner shave no proprietary rights over the Capayas
Island, thereby rendering their action for injunction improper.31

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration32 therefrom was denied by the CA in a Resolution33 dated March 9, 2009.
Hence, the instant petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not the subject ordinance is valid and enforceable against
petitioners.34

The Court’s Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Section 56 of the LGC provides:

SEC. 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or Resolutions by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. – (a) Within three (3) days after approval, the secretary to the Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan shall forward to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for review, copies of approved ordinances
and the resolutions approving the local development plans and public investment programs formulated by the
local development councils.

(b) Within thirty (30) days after receipt of copies of such ordinances and resolutions, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be
none, to the provincial prosecutor for prompt examination. The provincial attorney or provincial
prosecutor shall, within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of the documents, inform the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan in writing his comments or recommendations, which may be considered by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan in making its decision.

(c) If the Sangguniang Panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or resolution is beyond the power
conferred upon the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan concerned, it shall declare such
ordinance or resolution invalid in whole or in part. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall enter its action in
the minutes and shall advise the corresponding city or municipal authorities of the action it has taken.

(d) If no action has been taken by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan within thirty (30) days after submission
of such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be presumed consistent with law and therefore valid.

In this case, petitioners maintain that the subject ordinance cannot be deemed approved through the mere
passage of time considering that the same is still pending with the Committee on Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources of the SP.35 It, however, bears to note that more than 30 days have already elapsed from the time the
said ordinance was submitted to the latter for review by the SB;36 hence, it should be deemed approved and
valid pursuant to Section 56 (d) above. As properly observed by the CA:

Par. (d) should be read in conjunction with par. (c), in order to arrive at the meaning of the disputed word,
"action." It is clear, based on the foregoing provision, that the action that must be entered in the minutes of the
sangguniang panlalawigan is the declaration of the sangguniang panlalawigan that the ordinance is invalid in
whole or in part. x x x.

This construction would be more in consonance with the rule of statutory construction that the parts of a statute
must be read together in such a manner as to give effect to all of them and that such parts shall not be
construed as contradicting each other. x x x laws are given a reasonable construction such that apparently
conflicting provisions are allowed to stand and given effect by reconciling them, reference being had to the
moving spirit behind the enactment of the statute.37

Neither can the Court give credence to petitioners’ contentions that the subject ordinance was not published nor
posted in accordance with the provisions of the LGC.38 It is noteworthy that petitioners’ own evidence reveals
that a public hearing39 was conducted prior to the promulgation of the subject ordinance. Moreover, other than
their bare allegations, petitioners failed to present any evidence to show that no publication or posting of the
subject ordinance was made. In contrast, Azcuna had testified that they have complied with the publication and
posting requirements.40 While it is true that he likewise failed to submit any other evidence thereon, still, in
accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, its constitutionality or legality should be
upheld in the absence of any controverting evidence that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed in
its enactment. Likewise, petitioners had the burden of proving their own allegation, which they, however, failed to
do. In the similar case of Figuerres v. CA,41 citing United States v. Cristobal,42 the Court upheld the presumptive
validity of the ordinance therein despite the lack of controverting evidence on the part of the local government to
show that public hearings were conducted in light of: (a) the oppositor’s equal lack of controverting evidence to
demonstrate the local government’s non-compliance with the said public hearing; and (b) the fact that the local
government’s non-compliance was a negative allegation essential to the oppositor’s cause of action:

However, it is noteworthy that apart from her bare assertions, petitioner Figuerres has not presented any
evidence to show that no public hearings were conducted prior to the enactment of the ordinances in question.
On the other hand, the Municipality of Mandaluyong claims that public hearings were indeed conducted before
the subject ordinances were adopted, although it likewise failed to submit any evidence to establish this
allegation. However, in accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, their
constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of evidence showing that the procedure prescribed
by law was not observed in their enactment. In an analogous case, United States v. Cristobal, it was alleged that
the ordinance making it a crime for anyone to obstruct waterways had not been submitted by the provincial
board as required by §§2232-2233 of the Administrative Code. In rejecting this contention, the Court held:

From the judgment of the Court of First Instance the defendant appealed to this court upon the theory that the
ordinance in question was adopted without authority on the part of the municipality and was therefore
unconstitutional. The appellant argues that there was no proof adduced during the trial of the cause showing that
said ordinance had been approved by the provincial board. Considering the provisions of law that it is the duty of
the provincial board to approve or disapprove ordinances adopted by the municipal councils of the different
municipalities, we will assume, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that the law has been complied with.

We have a right to assume that officials have done that which the law requires them to do, in the absence of
positive proof to the contrary.

Furthermore, the lack of a public hearing is a negative allegation essential to petitioner's cause of action in the
present case. Hence, as petitioner is the party asserting it, she has the burden of proof. Since petitioner failed to
rebut the presumption of validity in favor of the subject ordinances and to discharge the burden of proving that
no public hearings were conducted prior to the enactment thereof, we are constrained to uphold their
constitutionality or legality.43 (Emphases supplied, citation omitted)

All told, the Court finds no reversible error committed by the CA in upholding the validity of the subject
ordinance.

In any event, petitioners have not shown any valid title44 to the property in dispute to be entitled to its possession.
Besides, the RTC’s order directing the removal of the structures built by petitioners on Capayas Island without
building permits was not appealed. As such, the same should now be deemed as final and conclusive upon
them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 30, 2008 and Resolution dated March 9,
2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00284-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Ignorance of the law

 Kasilag v. Rodriguez, 69 PHIL 217

FACTS: Marcial Kasilag and Emiliana Ambrosio entered a contract of mortgage of improvements of land
acquired as homestead to secure the payment of the indebtedness of P1,000 plus interest. The parties
stipulated that Emilina Ambrosio was to pay the debt with interest within 4 ½ years., and in such case,
mortgage would not have any effect. They also agreed that Emiliana Ambrosio would execute a deed of
sale if it would not be paid within 4 ½ years and that she would pay the tax on the land. After a year, it
turned out that she was not able to pay the tax. Hence, they entered a verbal agreement whereby she
conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on the condition that they would not collect the interest
of the loan, would attend to the payment of the land tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, & would
introduce improvement thereof.

These pacts made by the parties independently were calculated to alter the mortgage a contract clearly
entered into, converting the latter into a contract of antichresis. The contract of antichresis, being a real
encumbrance burdening the land, is illegal and void because it is legal and valid.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioner should be deemed the possessor of the land in good faith because he was
unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated

RULING: Yes. From the facts found established by the Court of Appeals we can neither deduce nor presume
that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside from the
prohibition contained in section 116. This being the case, the question is whether good faith may be
premised upon ignorance of the laws.

Gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be the basis of good faith, but possible, excusable
ignorance may be such basis. It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant with the laws because he is
not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief
that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking possession thereof
and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and
enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was
prohibited by section 116. These considerations again bring us to the conclusion that, as to the petitioner,
his ignorance of the provisions of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the basis of his good
faith.

KASILAG V. RODRIGUEZ [ 69 P 217] –

F: Responds, Rafaela Rodriguez, et al., children and heirs of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, commenced a civil
case to recover from the petitioner the possession of the land and its improvements granted by way of homestead to
Emiliana Ambrosio (EA).

The parties entered into a contract of mortgage of the improvements on the land acquired as homestead to secure the
payment of the indebtedness for P1,000 plus interest. In clause V, the parties stipulated that EA was to pay, w/in 4 1/2
yrs, the debt w/ interest thereon, in w/c event the mortgage would not have any effect; in clause VI, the parties agreed
that the tax on the land and its improvements, during the existence of the mortgage, should be paid by the owner of
the land; in clause VII, it was covenanted that w/in 30 days from the date of the contract, the owner of the land would
file a motion in the CFI of Bataan asking that cert. of title no. 325 be cancelled and that in lieu thereof another be
issued under the provisions of RA 496; in clause VIII the parties agreed that should EA fail to redeem the mortgage
w/in the stipulated period of 4 1/2 yrs, she would execute an absolute deed of sale of the land in favor of the
mortgagee, the petitioner, for the same amount of the loan including unpaid interest; and in clause IX it was stipulated
that in case the motion to be presented under clause VII should be disapproved by the CFI-Bataan, the contract of
sale of sale would automatically become void and the mortgage would subsist in all its force.

One year after the execution of the mortgage deed, it came to pass that EA was unable to pay the stipulated interest
as well as the tax on the land and its improvements. For this reason, she and the petitioner entered into another verbal
contract whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on condition that the latter would not collect
the interest on the loan, would attend to the payment of the land tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, and would
introduce improvements thereon.

HELD: The possession by the petitioner and his receipts of the fruits of the land, considered as integral elements of
the contract of antichresis, are illegal and void agreements, bec. the such contract is a lien and as such is expressly
prohibited by Sec 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended. The CA held that petitioner acted In BF in taking possession of
the land bec. he knew that the contract he made w/ EA was an absolute sale, and further, that the latter could not sell
the land bec. it is prohibited by Sec. 116 of Act 2874.
xxx [A] person is deemed a possessor in BF when he knows that there is a flaw in his title or in the manner of its
acquisition, by w/c it is invalidated.

The question to be answered is w/n the petitioner should be deemed a possessor in GF bec. he was unaware of any
flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by w/c it is invalidated. Ignorance of the flaw is the keynote of the
rule. From the facts as found by the CA, we can neither deduce nor presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in
his title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside from the prohibition contained in Sec. 116. This being the case, the
question is w/n GF may be premised upon ignorance of the laws.

Gross and inexcusable ignorance of the law may not be the basis of GF but excusable ignorance may be such basis
(if it is based upon ignorance of a fact.) It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant w/ the laws bec. he is not a
lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was not
violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking possession thereof and in consenting to receive
its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of
the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by Sec. 116. Thus, as to the petitioner, his
ignorance of the provisions of sec. 116 is excusable and may be the basis of GF.
The petitioners being in GF, the respondents may elect to have the improvements introduced by the petitioner by
paying the latter the value thereof, P3,000, or to compel the petitioner to buy and have the land where the
improvements or plants are found, by paying them its market value to be fixed by the court of origin, upon hearing the
parties.

RETROACTIVITY OF LAWS

As a general rule, laws shall have only a prospective effect and must not be applied retroactively in
such a way as to apply to pending disputes and cases. This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex
prospicit, non respicit (the law looks forward and not backward),[1] and is conformable to Article 4 of
the Civil Code. The rule is intended to the tendency of retroactive legislation to be unjust and
oppressive on account of its liability to punish individuals for violations of laws not yet enacted,
unsettle vested rights or disturb the legal effect of prior transactions[2], which is unconstitutional[3].

The principle of non-retroactivity finds application in various aspects of the legal system. Thus, the rule
is that the jurisdiction of a court depends on the law existing at the time an action is filed[4]; a statute
continues to be in force with regard to all rights that had accrued prior to its amendment[5]; a new
doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court overturning an existing doctrine is to be applied
prospectively, and not to parties relying on the old doctrine and acting on the faith thereof[6]; and
many others.

While in general, laws are prospective, they are retroactive in the following instances:

1. If the law itself provides for retroactivity (Art. 4, Civil Code), but in no case may an ex post facto law
be passed, such as one that criminalizes an act done before the passing of the law and which was
innocent when done[7]. A law is considered retroactivity if it is clearly expressed in the language of the
statute[8]. The existence of an effectivity clause defining when the law shall take effect militates
conclusively against the retroactivity of such law[9].
2. If the law is remedial in nature, since there are no vested rights in rules of procedure[10].
3. If the statute is penal in nature, provided it is favorable to the accused/convict and the latter is not a
habitual delinquent as defined under the Revised Penal Code[11].
4. If the law is of an emergency nature and are authorized by the police power of the government[12].
5. If the law is curative, provided it does not impair vested rights nor affect final judgments[13].
6. If a substantive right is to be declared for the first time, unless vested rights are impaired.

 Simon v. Chan, G.R. No. 157547, February 23, 2011

Lessons Applicable: Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage. There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure.

Laws Applicable:

FACTS:

 December 1996: Eduard Simon issued a check to Elvin Chan a Landbank Check dated December 26, 1996
worth P336,000.00
 December 26, 1996: It was dishonored due to account closed.
 After a formal demand, Simon filed for preliminary attachmen - MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of
preliminary attachment
 Simon filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia because there is already a charge of
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 - granted by the MeTC
 Chan appealed to the CA - reversed and set aside the decision of the MeTC
ISSUE: W/N the case should be dismissed due to litis pendentia because the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure pertaining to independent civil actions which became effective on December 1, 2000 are applicable to
this case renders Chan's civil action to recover as an independent civil action

HELD: YES. Reversa CA and reinstate MeTC

 Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage. There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure. xxx
 Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to leave the
offended private party defrauded and empty-handed by excluding the civil liability of the offender, giving her
only the remedy, which in many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a separate civil suit. To do
so may leave the offended party unable to recover even the face value of the check due her, thereby
unjustly enriching the errant drawer at the expense of the payee. The protection which the law seeks to
provide would, therefore, be brought to naught. However, there is no independent civil action to recover the
value of a bouncing check issued in contravention of BP 22. Applying Rule 111 of the Rules of Court,
effective December 1, 200 that the criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed
to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed
 DMPI Employees Credit Association v. Velez (different facts): issuance of a bouncing check may result in
two separate and distinct crimes of estafa and violation of BP 22, the procedures for the recovery of the civil
liabilities arising from these two distinct crimes are different and non-interchangeable
 In prosecutions of estafa, the offended party may opt to reserve his right to file a separate civil action, or may
institute an independent action based on fraud pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code
 In prosecutions of violations of BP 22, however, the Court has adopted a policy to prohibit the reservation or
institution of a separate civil action to claim the civil liability arising from the issuance of the bouncing check

 Francisco v. CA, G.R. No. 102330, November 25, 1998

Francisco vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 108747
April 6, 1995
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Facts:

Petitioner Pablo C. Francisco, upon humiliating his employees, was accused of multiple grave oral
defamation in five (5) separate Informations instituted by five of his employees, each Information charging
him with gravely maligning them on four different days, i.e., from 9 to 12 April 1980.

On 2 January 1990, after nearly ten (10) years, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Br. 61, found
petitioner Pablo C. Francisco, guilty of grave oral defamation, in four (4) of the five (5) cases filed against
him, and sentenced him to a prison term of one (1) year and one (l) day to one (1) year and eight (8)
months of prision correccional "in each crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged in the
information(s)," ordered him to indemnify each of the offended parties, Victoria Gatchalian, Rowena Ruiz,
Linda Marie Ayala Pigar and Marie Solis, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P5,000.00 for attorney's
fees, plus costs of suit. However, he was acquitted in for persistent failure of the offended party, Edgar
Colindres, to appear and testify.

Issue:

(a) Whether petitioner is still qualified to avail of probation even after appealing his conviction to the RTC
which affirmed the MeTC except with regard to the duration of the penalties imposed.

Held:

Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years imprisonment for probation is based on the
assumption that those sentenced to higher penalties pose too great a risk to society, not just because of
their demonstrated capability for serious wrong doing but because of the gravity and serious
consequences of the offense they might further commit.

The Probation Law, as amended, disqualifies only those who have been convicted of grave felonies as
defined in Art. 9 in relation to Art. 25 of the Revised Penal Code, and not necessarily those who have been
convicted of multiple offenses in a single proceeding who are deemed to be less perverse.

Hence, the basis of the disqualification of the petitioner is principally on the gravity of the offense
committed and the concomitant degree of penalty imposed. Those sentenced to a maximum term not
exceeding six (6) years are not generally considered callous, hard core criminals, and thus may avail of
probation.

The Court hereby finds the accused Pablo C. Francisco GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in each of the
above entitled cases and appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance which is analogous to
passion or obfuscation, the Court hereby sentences the said accused in each case to a straight penalty of
eight months imprisonment, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law; and to pay the costs.

The argument that petitioner had to await the remand of the case to the MeTC, which necessarily must be
after the decision of the RTC had become final, for him to file the application for probation with the trial
court, is to stretch the law beyond comprehension. The law, simply, does not allow probation after an
appeal has been perfected.

Accordingly, considering that prevailing jurisprudence treats appeal and probation as mutually exclusive
remedies, and petitioner appealed from his conviction by the MeTC although the imposed penalties were
already probationable, and in his appeal, he asserted only his innocence and did not even raise the issue of
the propriety of the penalties imposed on him, and finally, he filed an application for probation outside the
period for perfecting an appeal granting he was otherwise eligible for probation, the instant petition for
review should be as it is hereby DENIED.

TERESITA C. FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, et al, respondents. G.R. No. 102330.
November 25, 1998. QUISUMBING, J

FACTS: Petitioner, the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio Francisco (Eusebio) by his second marriage
filed a suit for damages and for annulment of general power of attorney authorizing Conchita Evangelista
(Eusebio’s daughter in his first marriage) to administer the house and lot together with the apartments
allegedly acquired by petitioner and Eusebio during their conjugal partnership. The trial court rendered
judgment in favor of private respondents due to petitioner’s failure to establish proof that said properties
were acquired during the existence of the second conjugal partnership, or that they pertained exclusively
to the petitioner. As such, the CA ruled that those properties belong exclusively to Eusebio, and that he has
the capacity to administer them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court committed reversible error in affirming the trial court's ruling
that the properties, subject matter of controversy, are not conjugal but the capital properties of Eusebio
exclusively.

RULING: SC resolved the issue of the nature of the contested properties based on the provisions of the
New Civil Code. Indeed, Articles 158 and 160 of the New Civil Code have been repealed by the Family Code
of the Philippines. Nonetheless, SC cannot invoke the new law in this case without impairing prior vested
rights pursuant to Article 256 in relation to Article 105 (second paragraph) of the Family Code. Accordingly,
the repeal of Articles 158 and 160 of the New Civil Code does not operate to prejudice or otherwise affect
rights which have become vested or accrued while the said provisions were in force.

HELD: Petition is denied. The Decision of the CA is affirmed

 Pesca v. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001

LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner, vs. ZOSIMO A. PESCA, respondent.

FACTS: The petitioner and respondent were married and had four children. Lorna filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of her
husband. She alleged that he is emotionally immature and irresponsible. He was cruel and violent. He was
a habitual drinker. Whenever she tells him to stop or at least minimize his drinking, her husband would
hurt her. There was even a time when she was chased by a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the
presence of their children. The children also suffered physical violence. Petitioner and their children left
the home. Two months later, they returned upon the promise of respondent to change. But he didn’t. She
was battered again. Her husband was imprisoned for 11 days for slight physical injuries. RTC declared their
marriage null and void. CA reversed RTC’s ruling. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N the guidelines for psychological incapacity in the case of Republic vs CA & Molina should be
taken in consideration in deciding in this case.

HELD: Yes. In the Molina case, guidelines were laid down by the SC before a case would fall under the
category of psychological incapacity to declare a marriage null and void. This decision has force and effect
of a law. These guidelines are mandatory in nature. Petition denied.

The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the
settled legal maxim – “legis interpretado legis vim obtinet” – that the interpretation placed upon the
written law by a competent court has the force of law.

MANDATORY OR PROHIBITORY LAWS

 Nerwin v. PNOC, G.R. No. 167057, April 11, 2012

 FACTS: In 1999, National Electrification Administration (NEA) published an invitation to pre-qualify and to
bid for a contract known as IPB No. 80 for the supply and delivery of about 60,000 pieces of wood poles
and 20,000 of cross-arms. Nerwin was one of the bidders The contract was awarded to him being the
lowest bidder. However, NEA’s board of directors passed a resolution reducing by 50% the material
requirements for IPB 80 to which Nerwin protested. A losing bidder, Tri State and Pacific Synergy filed a
complaint alleging the documents Nerwin submitted during the pre-qualification bid were falsified. Finding
a way to nullify the bid, NEA sought the opinion of Gov’t Corporate Counsel who upheld the eligibility of
Nerwin. NEA allegedly held negotiations with other bidders for IPB 80 contract. As a result, Nerwin filed a
complaint with prayer of injunction which was grabted by RTC Manila. PNOC – Energy Dev’t Corp issued an
invitation to pre-qualify and bid for O-ILAW project. Nerwin filed a civil action in RTC alleging that it was an
attempt to subject portions of IPB 80 to another bidding. He prayed for TRO to enjoin respondents to the
proposed bidding. Respondents averred that this is in violation of a rule that government infrastructure are
not subject to TROs. RTC granted TRO nevertheless. CA ruled in favor of respondents. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N CA erred in dismissing the case pursuant to RA 8975 which prohibits issuance of TRO except SC
to gov’t projects

HELD: Decision of CA affirmed. Sec 3 of RA 8975 clearly prohibits issuance of TRO, preliminary injunctions,
and preliminary mandatory injunctions against gov’t.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

 DM Consunji v. CA, G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001

GR No. 137873 April 20, 2001

Consunji vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors
from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji,
Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State
Insurance Fund. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego.
On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.
D. M. Consunji then sought the reversal of the CA decision.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioner is held liable under the grounds of negligence.
2. Whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection or choice of action
between availing themselves of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in the regular
courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the
negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions,
RULING:
1. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or transaction speaks for itself) is peculiar to the law of negligence
which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute
for specific proof of negligence. It has the following requisites: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not
ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under
the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3)the injury suffered must not have been due to
 any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. All the requisites for the application of the
rule of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s
negligence arises. Petitioner does not cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence
arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident.
2. The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under the
Workmen´s Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. In the course of availing
the remedies provided under the Workmen’s Compensation law, the claimants are deemed to have waived
theirknown right of the remedies provided by other laws. The Court of Appeals, however, held that the case at bar
came under exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioner´s negligence when she filed her
claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Had the claimant been aware, she would’ve opted to avail
of a better remedy than that of which she already had.

 Villareal v. People, G.R.No.151258, February 01, 2012

FACTS:

In February 1991, seven freshmen law students (including Leonardo "Lenny" Villa) of the Ateneo de Manila University School of
Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity).

On the night of February 8, 1991, the neophytes were "briefed" and brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the
commencement of their initiation. The rites were scheduled to last for three days.

The neophytes were subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation rites." These rites included:

1. Indian Run – which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the
neophytes;

2. Bicol Express – which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall and their legs outstretched
while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs;

3. Rounds – in which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the "auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged with the duty
of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee
blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and

4. Auxies’ Privilege Round – in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes.

They survived their first day of initiation.

On the morning of their second day, the neophytes were made to present comic plays, play rough basketball, and recite the Aquila
Fraternity’s principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon,
the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them physically and psychologically. The neophytes
were subjected to the same manner of hazing that they endured on the first day of initiation.

After a while, accused alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites
be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal,
however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to
"paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain.

Lenny received several paddle blows. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk that he had to be
carried to the carport. The initiation for the day was officially ended. They then slept at the carport.

After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and
Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling
cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him
warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.

Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the 35 Aquilans.
The trial court rendered judgment holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide. The criminal
case against the remaining nine accused commenced anew.

The CA set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and modified the criminal liability of each of the accused according to
individual participation. One accused had by then passed away, so the following Decision applied only to the remaining 25
accused:

1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants were acquitted, as their individual guilt was not established by proof beyond reasonable
doubt.
2. Four of the accused-appellants were found guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries.
3. Two of the accused-appellants – Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal – were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when it set aside the
finding of conspiracy by the trial court and adjudicated the liability of each accused according to individual participation (NO)

2) Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it pronounced Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug guilty only
of slight physical injuries (YES)

3) Whether or not accused Dizon is guilty of homicide (NO)

HELD:

1) NO. Grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the
evidence. Mere errors of judgment are correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, and
not by an application for a writ of certiorari. Pursuant to the rule on double jeopardy, the Court is constrained to deny the Petition
contra Victorino et al. – the 19 acquitted fraternity members.

A verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a re-examination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will
put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense.

2) YES. The CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda,
and Bantug criminally liable for slight physical injuries.

Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be liable for the consequences of an act, even if its result
is different from that intended. Thus, once a person is found to have committed an initial felonious act, such as the unlawful
infliction of physical injuries that results in the death of the victim, courts are required to automatically apply the legal framework
governing the destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and not subject to discretion. The accused cannot be held criminally liable
for physical injuries when actual death occurs.

Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon – as if only their acts, in and of themselves, caused the death of Lenny
Villa – is contrary to the CA’s own findings. From proof that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple
injuries he suffered, the only logical conclusion is that criminal responsibility should redound to all those who have been proven
to have directly participated in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny.

3) NO. The Court cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code on the basis of the existence of intent to kill. Animus interficendi cannot and should not be inferred unless there is proof
beyond reasonable doubt of such intent. Instead, the Court adopts and reinstates the finding of the trial court in part, insofar as
it ruled that none of the fraternity members had the specific intent to kill Lenny Villa.

REPEAL OF LAWS

 Thornton v. Thornton, G.R. No. 154598, August 16, 2004

FACTS: Petitioner was an American, respondent was a Filipino. They were married and had one daughter.
After 3 years, the woman grew restless and bored as a plain housewife and wanted to return to her old job
as GRO in a nightclub. One day, the woman left the family home together with their daughter and told her
servants that she was going to Basilan. The husband filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated
Family Court in Makati City but was dismissed because the child was in Basilan. When he went to Basilan,
he didn’t find them and the barangay office issued a certification that respondent was no longer residing
there. Petitioner filed another petition for habeas corpus in CA which could issue a writ of habeas corpus
enforceable in the entire country. The petition was denied by CA on the ground that it did not have
jurisdiction over the case since RA 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive jurisdiction
over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of CA)
and B.P 129 (The judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.)

ISSUE: W/N CA has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in light
of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over such petitions.

HELD: Petition granted. CA should take cognizance of the case because nothing in RA 8369 revoked its
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving custody of minors. The reasoning of CA cant be
affirmed because it will result to iniquitous, leaving petitioners without legal course in obtaining custody.
The minor could be transferred from one place to another and habeas corpus case will be left without legal
remedy since family courts take cognizance only cases within their jurisdiction. Literal interpretation would
render it meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice, and contradiction. The literal interpretation of
“exclusive” will result in grave injustice and negate the policy to protect the rights and promote welfare of
children.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

 Pesca v. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001

FACTS: The petitioner and respondent were married and had four children. Lorna filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of her
husband. She alleged that he is emotionally immature and irresponsible. He was cruel and violent. He was
a habitual drinker. Whenever she tells him to stop or at least minimize his drinking, her husband would
hurt her. There was even a time when she was chased by a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the
presence of their children. The children also suffered physical violence. Petitioner and their children left
the home. Two months later, they returned upon the promise of respondent to change. But he didn’t. She
was battered again. Her husband was imprisoned for 11 days for slight physical injuries. RTC declared their
marriage null and void. CA reversed RTC’s ruling. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N the guidelines for psychological incapacity in the case of Republic vs CA & Molina should be
taken in consideration in deciding in this case.

HELD: Yes. In the Molina case, guidelines were laid down by the SC before a case would fall under the
category of psychological incapacity to declare a marriage null and void. This decision has force and effect
of a law. These guidelines are mandatory in nature. Petition denied.

The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the
settled legal maxim – “legis interpretado legis vim obtinet” – that the interpretation placed upon the
written law by a competent court has the force of law.

 De Castro v. JBC, G. R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010

Facts:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration on the March 17, 2010 decision of the Court. The said decision directs the
Judicial and Bar Council to resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy created by the
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010, and to prepare the short list of nominees
and submit it to the incumbent President. Movants argue that the disputed constitutional provision, Art. VII, Sec. 15
and Art. VIII, Sec. 4(1), clearly intended the ban on midnight appointments to cover the members of the Judiciary, and
they contended that the principle of stare decisis is controlling, and insisted that the Court erred in disobeying or
abandoning the Valenzuela ruling.

ISSUE (Section 4):

Did the Constitutional Commission extend to the Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during the period
stated in Sec. 15, Article VII?

RULING:
The Constitutional Commission did not extend to the Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during the period
stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII. The deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted from the records of the
Constitutional Commission did not concern either Sec. 15, Art. VII or Sec. 4(1), Art. VIII, but only Sec. 13, Art. VII, a
provision on nepotism.

Election ban on appointments does not extend to the Supreme Court. The Court upheld its March 17, 2010 decision
ruling that the prohibition under Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution against presidential appointments immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the term of the outgoing president does not apply to
vacancies in the Supreme Court.

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL –
ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010

FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after
the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.

These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory
retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under
Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for
every vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution
prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up
the position of Chief Justice.

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of Chief Justice
the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio;
Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero
J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their
nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.

The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the
prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the
Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its
occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the
prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the
Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not
written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample
restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its
independence from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent
qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the
President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.

A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the process, there
being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the
vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume
its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which
unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme
Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.

ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his
retirement.

HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme
Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall
not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be
composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in
division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment
of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not
done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments
within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting
President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment
of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not
done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments
within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting
President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of
the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the
Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department.
This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference
to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient
to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated
Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential
appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to
be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section
4 (1) thereof.

 Republic v. Renman Enterprises, G.R. No. 199310, February 19, 2014

CASE DIGEST: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by RONNIE P.
INOCENCIO. G.R. No. 199310; February 19, 2014.

FACTS: On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises, Inc. (respondent), filed an application with the RTC for
judicial confirmation of title over two parcels of land, Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 situated in Barangay
Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila.

On December 13, 2001, the RTC granted respondent's application for registration. Thereafter, following
the required publication and posting, a scheduled hearing was set. However, on May 30, 2002, only the
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) appeared as oppositor. Hence, the RTC issued an order of
general default except LLDA, which was given 15 days to submit its comment/opposition to the
respondent's application for registration.

On June 4, 2002, the LLDA filed its Opposition to the respondent's application for registration, asserting
that the lots are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. On the other hand,
the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), on July 16, 2002, likewise filed its Opposition,alleging that the
respondent failed to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Respondent's witnesses showed that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the said parcels of land long before June 12, 1945. The
respondent purchased Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 from Conrado Salvador (Salvador) and Bella Mijares
(Mijares), respectively, in 1989. The subject properties were originally owned and possessed by Veronica
Jaime (Jaime), who cultivated and planted different kinds of crops in the said lots, through her caretaker
and hired farmers, since 1943. Sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the said parcels of land to Salvador and
Mijares, who continued to cultivate the lots until the same were purchased by the respondent in 1989.

The respondent likewise alleged that the subject properties are within the alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain, as evidenced by the certifications issued by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR).

On the other hand, the LLDA alleged that the respondent's application for registration should be denied
since the subject parcels of land are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; it
pointed out that pursuant to Section 41(11) of Republic Act No. 4850(R.A. No. 4850), lands, surrounding
the Laguna de Bay, located at and below the reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters are public lands
which form part of the bed of the said lake. Engr. Magalonga, testifying for the oppositor LLDA, he found
out that the elevations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are below 12.50 m. That upon actual area verification of
the subject properties on September 25, 2002, Engr. Magalonga confirmed that the elevations of the
subject properties range from 11.33 m to 11.77 m.

On rebuttal, the respondent presented Engr. Flotildes, who claimed that, based on the actual topographic
survey of the subject properties he conducted upon the request of the respondent, the elevations of the
subject properties, contrary to LLDA's claim, are above 12.50 m.

The RTC granted the respondent's application for registration of title to the subject properties. The RTC
found that the respondent was able to prove that the subject properties form part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain.

The RTC opined that the elevations of the subject properties are very much higher than the reglementary
elevation of 12.50 m and, thus, not part of the bed of Laguna Lake.

The RTC likewise found that the respondent was able to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject properties as early as 1943.

The petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA likewise pointed out
that the respondent was able to present certifications issued by the DENR, attesting that the subject
properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, which was not disputed by
the petitioner. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: Did the CA err in affirming the RTC Decision which granted the application for registration filed by
the respondent?

HELD: Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to
public land acquired under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, or the Public Land Act, as
amended by P.D. No. 1073.Under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, applicants for registration of title must
sufficiently establish: first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the
public domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To prove that the subject property forms part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the respondent presented two certifications issued by
Calamno, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. However, the said certifications presented by the respondent are insufficient to prove that
the subject properties are alienable and disposable.

In Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 578 Phil. 441 (2008).The Court clarified that, in
addition to the certification issued by the proper government agency that a parcel of land is alienable and
disposable, applicants for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of public domain as alienable and disposable. They must present a copy
of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal
custodian of the records.

Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves,

prove that the land is alienable and disposable.

Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds that the respondent failed to present sufficient
evidence to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject properties since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Cerquena testified for the respondents that the subject properties were originally owned by Jaime who
supposedly possessed and cultivated the same since 1943; that sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the subject
properties to Salvador and Mijares who, in turn, sold the same to the respondent in 1989.

The foregoing are but unsubstantiated and self-serving assertions of the possession and occupation of the
subject properties by the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest; they do not constitute the well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence of possession and occupation of the subject properties required by Section 14(1)
of P.D. No. 1529.
For purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, proof of specific acts of ownership
must be presented to substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the land subject of the application. Applicants for land registration cannot just offer general
statements which are mere conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of possession. Actual
possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would
actually exercise over his own property. Valiao v. Republic, G.R. No. 170757, November 28, 2011

"A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under
claim of ownership. For him, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive
grant from the state. The possession of public land, however long the period thereof may have extended,
never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land
does not operate against the state, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same
under claim of ownership for the required number of years." Del Rosario v. Republic of the Philippines, 432
Phil. 824

Further, the Court notes that the tax declarations over the subject properties presented by the respondent
were only for 2002. The respondent failed to explain why, despite its claim that it acquired the subject
properties as early as 1989, and that its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject
property since 1943, it was only in 2002 that it started to declare the same for purposes of taxation. "While
tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of ownership."
Aide v. Bernal, G.R. No. 169336, March 18, 2010 GRANTED.

DUTY TO RENDER JUDGMENT

 People v. Ritter, 194 SCRA 690

FACTS: On or about October 10, 1986, Ritter brought Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot in a hotel room in
Olongapo. Ritter masturbated Jessie and fingered Rosario. Afterwards, he inserted a foreign object to the
vagina of Rosario. The next morning, Ritter gave Jessie 200, and Rosario 300. Rosario told Jessie that Ritter
inserted an object inside her vagina. Sometime the following day, Rosario said that the object has already
been removed from her vagina. On May 14, 1987, Alcantara saw Rosario with bloody skirt, foul smelling.
Rosario was brought and confined to Olongapo City general Hospital. An OB-Gyne tried to remove the
object inside her vagina using forceps but failed because it was deeply embedded and covered by tissues.
She was having peritonitis. She told the attending physician that a Negro inserted the object to her vagina
3 months ago. Ritter was made liable for rape with homicide. RTC found him guilty of rape with homicide.

ISSUE: W/N Ritter was liable for rape and homicide

HELD: No. The prosecution failed to prove that Rosario was only 12 years old when the incident with Ritter
happened. And that Rosario prostituted herself even at the tender age. As evidence, she received 300 from
Ritter the following morning. A doctor/specialist also testified that the inserted object in the vagina of
Rosario Baluyot by Ritter was different from that which caused her death. Rosario herself said to Jessie the
following day that the object has been removed already. She also told the doctor that a Negro inserted it
to her vagina 3 months ago. Ritter was a Caucasian.

However, it does not exempt him for the moral and exemplary damages he must award to the victim’s
heirs. It does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil liability which is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action. Ritter was deported.

 Alonzo v. Padua, 150 SCRA 379

CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.
Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioners.
Luis R. Reyes for private respondent.
Ponente: CRUZ

FACTS:
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in ‘the name of
their deceased parents. One of them transferred his undivided share by way of absolute sale. A year later,
his sister sold her share in a “Con Pacto de Retro Sale”. By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners
occupied, after the said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions
sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. with their consent, their son
Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area.
One of the five coheirs sought to redeem the area sold to petitioners but was dismissed when it appeared
that he was an American citizen. Another coheir filed her own complaint invoking the same right of
redemption of her brother. Trial court dismissed the complaint, on the ground that the right had lapsed,
not having been exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales. Although there was no written
notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law.
Respondent court reversed the decision of the Trial Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not actual knowledge satisfied the requirement of Art. 1088 of the New Civil Code.

HELD:
YES. Decision of respondent court was reversed and that of trial court reinstated.

RATIO:
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given
them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years between
the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising
their right of redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.
While [courts] may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, [courts] nevertheless have the right to
read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, [courts] defer not to “the letter that killeth” but to
“the spirit that vivifieth,” to give effect to the law maker’s will.

PRESUMPTION AND APPLICABILITY OF CUSTOM

 Martinez v. Van Buskirk, 18 Phil. 79

FACTS: On Spetember 11, 1908, Martinez was riding a carromata in Ermita along the left side of the street
when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant to which a pair of horses was attached came along the
street in the opposite direction at great speed. The horses ran into the carromata and wounded Martinez
servely. The defendant presented evidence that the cochero was a good servant and a reliable and safe
cochero. And that he was delivering stuff so he tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the
delivery wagon and went inside the wagon to unload the stuff to be delivered. But while unloading,
another vehicle drove by whose driver cracked a whip and made some noises which frightened the horses
and which made it ran away. The cochero was thrown from the inside of the wagon and was unable to stop
the horses. The horses collided with the carromata.
ISSUE: W/N the employer is liable for the negligence of his cochero

HELD: No. Defendant not liable. Cochero was not negligent. What happened was an accident. It has been a
custom or a matter of common knowledge and universal practice of merchants to leave horses in the
manner which the cochero left it during the accident. This is the custom in all cities. The public, finding
itself unprejudiced by such practice has acquiesced for years.

LEGAL PERIODS

 CIR v. Primetown, G.R. 162155, August 28, 2007

FACTS: Gilbert Yap, Vice Chair of Primetown applied on March 11, 1999 for a refund or credit of income
tax which Primetown paid in 1997. He claimed that they are entitled for a refund because they suffered
losses that year due to the increase of cost of labor and materials, etc. However, despite the losses, they
still paid their quarterly income tax and remitted creditable withholding tax from real estate sales to BIR.
Hence, they were claiming for a refund. On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Santos required
Primetown to submit additional documents to which Primetown complied with. However, its claim was not
acted upon which prompted it to file a petition for review in CTA on April 14, 2000. CTA dismissed the
petition as it was filed beyonf the 2-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund
according to Sec 229 of NIRC. According to CTA, the two-year period is equivalent to 730 days pursuant to
Art 13 of NCC. Since Primetown filed its final adjustment return on April 14, 1998 and that year 2000 was a
leap year, the petition was filed 731 days after Primetown filed its final adjusted return. Hence, beyond the
reglementary period. Primetown appealed to CA. CA reversed the decision of CTA. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: W/N petition was filed within the two-year period

HELD: Pursuant to EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987, a year shall be understood to be 12 calendar
months. The SC defined a calendar month as a month designated in the calendar without regard to the
number of days it may contain. The court held that Administrative Code of 1987 impliedly repealed Art 13
of NCC as the provisions are irreconcilable. Primetown is entitled for the refund since it is filed within the
2-year reglementary period.

BINDING EFFECT

 Tenchavez v. Escaño, 15 SCRA 355

FACTS:
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got married on
Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic
chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly
registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and go-between
who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student where she and
Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as
suggested by Vicenta’s parents. However after translating the said letter to Vicenta’s dad , he disagreed
for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in
Manila.

Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left for the
United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and issued by
the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her marriage to
the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has begotten
children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her
parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.

ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines.

HELD:
Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give recognition on foreign
decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil
Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign
countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough grounds for the
legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still
married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is
the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an
invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant
Vicenta F. Escaño;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of
P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife,
the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

 ATCI Overseas Corp v. Echin, G.R. No. 178551, Oct. 11, 2010

ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL and MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH-KUWAIT Petitioners, vs. MA.
JOSEFA ECHIN, Respondent.
G.R. No. 178551
October 11, 2010

FACTS:
Respondent Echin was hired by petitioner ATCI in behalf of its principal co-petitioner, Ministry of Public
Health of Kuwait, for the position of medical technologist under a two-year contract with a monthly salary
of US$1,200.00.Within a year, Respondent was terminated for not passing the probationary period which
was under the Memorandum of Agreement.
Ministry denied respondent‘s request and she returned to the Philippines shouldering her own fair.
Respondent filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint against ATCI for illegal
dismissal. Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of respondent and ordered ATCI to pay her $3,600.00,
her salary for the three months unexpired portion of the contract.
ATCI appealed Labor Arbiter‘s decision, however, NLRC affirmed the latter‘s decision and denied petitioner
ATCI‘s motion for reconsideration. Petitioner appealed to the Court Appeals contending that their principal
being a foreign government agency is immune from suit, and as such, immunity extended to them.
Appellate Court affirmed NLRC‘s decision. It noted that under the law, a private employment agency shall
assume all responsibilities for the implementation of the contract of employment of an overseas worker;
hence, it can be sued jointly and severally with the foreign principal for any violation of the recruitment
agreement or contract of employment.
Petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this present petition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners be held liable considering that the contract specifically stipulates that
respondent ‘s employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait.
Ruling:
Court denied the petition. According to RA 8042: “The obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement
entered into by and between the local agent and its foreign principal are not coterminous with the term of
such agreement so that if either or both of the parties decide to end the agreement, the responsibilities of
such parties towards the contracted employees under the agreement do not at all end, but the same extends
up to and until the expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed
pursuant to the said recruitment agreement. In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law
applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. Where a foreign law is not pleaded
or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply
Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented before us.

 Tuna Processing Inc. v. Phil. Kingford, G.R. No. 185582, Feb. 29, 2012

Tuna Processing v. Philippine Kingford

G.R. No. 185582, February 29, 2012
FACTS:

Kanemitsu Yamaoka, co-patentee of a US Patent, Philippine Letters Patent, and an Indonesian Patent,
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with five Philippine tuna processors including Respondent
Philippine Kingford, Inc. (KINGFORD). The MOA provides for the enforcing of the abovementioned patents,
granting licenses under the same, and collecting royalties, and for the establishment of herein Petitioner Tuna
Processors, Inc. (TPI).

Due to a series of events not mentioned in the Petition, the tuna processors, including Respondent
KINGFORD, withdrew from Petitioner TPI and correspondingly reneged on their obligations. Petitioner TPI
submitted the dispute for arbitration before the International Centre for Dispute Resolution in the State of
California, United States and won the case against Respondent KINGFORD.

To enforce the award, Petitioner TPI filed a Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Award before the RTC of Makati City. Respondent KINGFORD filed a Motion to Dismiss,
which the RTC denied for lack of merit. Respondent KINGFORD then sought for the inhibition of the RTC
judge, Judge Alameda, and moved for the reconsideration of the order denying the Motion. Judge Alameda
inhibited himself notwithstanding “[t]he unfounded allegations and unsubstantiated assertions in the
motion.” Judge Ruiz, to which the case was re-raffled, in turn, granted Respondent KINGFORDS’s Motion
for Reconsideration and dismissed the Petition on the ground that Petitioner TPI lacked legal capacity to sue
in the Philippines. Petitioner TPI is a corporation established in the State of California and not licensed to do
business in the Philippines.

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines, but which collects royalties
from entities in the Philippines, sue here to enforce a foreign arbitral award?

ARGUMENT:

Petitioner TPI contends that it is entitled to seek for the recognition and enforcement of the subject foreign
arbitral award in accordance with RA No. 9285 (Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004), the Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards drafted during the United Nations Conference
on International Commercial Arbitration in 1958 (New York Convention), and the UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration (Model Law), as none of these specifically requires that the party seeking
for the enforcement should have legal capacity to sue.

RULING:

YES. Petitioner TPI, although not licensed to do business in the Philippines, may seek recognition and
enforcement of the foreign arbitral award in accordance with the provisions of the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 2004. A foreign corporation’s capacity to sue in the Philippines is not material insofar as
the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is concerned.
The Resolution of the RTC is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

Sec. 45 of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 provides that the opposing party in an application
for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award may raise only those grounds that were enumerated
under Article V of the New York Convention, to wit:
Article V
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party against whom it is
invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is
sought, proof that:

a. The parties to the agreement referred to in Article II were, under the law applicable to them, under
some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or,
failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made;
b. The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of
the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case;
c. The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the
submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to
arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not
so submitted, that part of the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be
recognized and enforced;
d. The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the
agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where
the arbitration took place; or
e. The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a
competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.

2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in the
country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:
a. The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that
country; or
b. The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.

Not one of the abovementioned exclusive grounds touched on the capacity to sue of the party seeking
the recognition and enforcement of the award.

Pertinent provisions of the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution, which was promulgated
by the Supreme Court, likewise support this position.

Rule 13.1 of the Special Rules provides that “[a]ny party to a foreign arbitration may petition the court to
recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award.” The contents of such petition are enumerated in Rule
13.5. Capacity to sue is not included. Oppositely, in the rule on local arbitral awards or arbitrations in
instances where “the place of arbitration is in the Philippines,” it is specifically required that a petition “to
determine any question concerning the existence, validity and enforceability of such arbitration agreement”
available to the parties before the commencement of arbitration and/or a petition for “judicial relief from the
ruling of the arbitral tribunal on a preliminary question upholding or declining its jurisdiction” after arbitration
has already commenced should state “[t]he facts showing that the persons named as petitioner or respondent
have legal capacity to sue or be sued.”
Indeed, it is in the best interest of justice that in the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award, the Court
deny availment by the losing party of the rule that bars foreign corporations not licensed to do business
in the Philippines from maintaining a suit in Philippine courts. When a party enters
into a contract containing a foreign arbitration clause and, as in this case, in fact submits itself to
arbitration, it becomes bound by the contract, by the arbitration and by the result of arbitration, conceding
thereby the capacity of the other party to enter into the contract, participate in the arbitration and cause the
implementation of the result. Although not on all fours with the instant case, also worthy to consider is the
wisdom of then Associate Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her Dissenting Opinion in Asset Privatization
Trust v. Court of Appeals [1998], to wit:

xxx Arbitration, as an alternative mode of settlement, is gaining adherents in legal and judicial circles
here and abroad. If its tested mechanism can simply be ignored by an aggrieved party, one who, it must be
stressed, voluntarily and actively participated in the arbitration proceedings from the very beginning, it will
destroy the very essence of mutuality inherent in consensual contracts.

Clearly, on the matter of capacity to sue, a foreign arbitral award should be respected not because it is favored
over domestic laws and procedures, but because Republic Act No. 9285 has certainly erased any conflict of
law question.

Finally, even assuming, only for the sake of argument, that the RTC correctly observed that the Model Law,
not the New York Convention, governs the subject arbitral award, Petitioner TPI may still seek recognition
and enforcement of the award in Philippine court, since the Model Law prescribes substantially identical
exclusive grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement.

ARTICLE16

Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is stipulated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property
and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (10a)

 Testate Estate of Amos Bellis, 20 SCRA 358

Testate of Amos Bellis vs. Edward A. Bellis, et al

FACTS:

Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had five legitimate children with
his first wife (whom he divorced), three legitimate children with his second wife (who survived him) and, finally,
three illegitimate children.

6 years prior Amos Bellis’ death, he executed two(2) wills, apportioning the remainder of his estate and properties
to his seven surviving children. The appellants filed their oppositions to the project of partition claiming that they
have been deprived of their legitimes to which they were entitled according to the Philippine law. Appellants argued
that the deceased wanted his Philippine estate to be governed by the Philippine law, thus the creation of two
separate wills.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of the illegitimate children’s
successional rights

RULING:
Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance
with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in view
of those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.

Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should be governed
by his national law. Since Texas law does not require legitimes, then his will, which deprived his illegitimate children
of the legitimes, is valid.

The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the legitimes under the texas law, which
is the national law of the deceased.

ARTICLE 17

Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the
laws of the country in which they are executed.

 Raytheon v. Rouzie, G.R. No. 162894, February 26, 2008

FACTS:
Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc., a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
State of Connecticut, United States of America, and respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered
into a contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in several
government projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts. On 11 March 1992,
respondent secured a service contract with the Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers
affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows.

On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission, a
suit against BMSI and Rust International, Inc., Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G. Browning for alleged nonpayment of
commissions, illegal termination and breach of employment contract.
On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action for damages before the Regional
Trial Court of Bauang, La Union. The Complaint named as defendants herein petitioner Raytheon International, Inc. as
well as BMSI and RUST, the two corporations impleaded in the earlier labor case.
Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which disclosed that per the written agreement between respondent
and BMSI and RUST, denominated as “Special Sales Representative Agreement,” the rights and obligations of the
parties shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint on
grounds of failure to state a cause of action and forum non conveniens and prayed for damages by way of compulsory
counterclaim.
Petitioner asserts that the written contract between respondent and BMSI included a valid choice of law clause,
that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of
foreign elements in the dispute – namely, the parties and witnesses involved are American corporations and citizens
and the evidence to be presented is located outside the Philippines – that renders our local courts inconvenient forums.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS?

RULING:
On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a Philippine court and
where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and the res, it may or can proceed to try the case
even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of
sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is filed.

As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over herein respondent (as party
plaintiff) upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner (as party defendant)
was acquired by its voluntary appearance in court.
That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by the lawsof the State of
Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded from
hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair
to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a
substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties.The choice of law stipulation will become
relevant only when the substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds
before the trial court.
 Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions on its
jurisdiction where it is not the most “convenient” or available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking
remedies elsewhere. Petitioner’s averments of the foreign elements in the instant case are not sufficient to oust the trial
court of its jurisdiction over Civil Case No. No. 1192-BG and the parties involved.

Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual
determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a matter of defense. While it is within the discretion of the trial
court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to
determine whether special circumstances require the court’s desistance.

ARTICLE 18

Article 18. In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws, their deficiency shall be
supplied by the provisions of this Code. (16a)

 Tamano v. Judge Ortiz, G.R. No. 126603, June 29, 1998

FACTS: Sen. Tamano and Zorayda Tamano married in civil rites. Before Sen. Tamano died, he married
Estrellita in civil rites too. A year after Sen. Tamano’s death, Zorayda and her son filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage of her husband and Estrellita on the ground that it was bigamous.
Zorayda further claimed that her husband claimed to be divorces and Estrellita as single, hence, their
marriage was fraudulent. Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that QC RTC has no jurisdiction
because only a party to a marriage could file an action for annulment against the other spouse. Estrellita
also contended that since Tamano and Zorayda were both Muslims and married in Muslim rites, the
jurisdiction to hear and try the case is vested in Sharia courts pursuant to Art 155 of Code of Muslim. RTC
denied the petition and ruled it has jurisdiction since Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance
with the Civil Code. Motion for reconsideration was also denied. Petitioner referred to SC which ruled that
it should be referred to CA first. The CA ruled that the case would fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of
sharia courts only when filed in places where there are sharia courts. But in places where there are no
sharia courts, the instant petition could be at RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N Sharia courts and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject case and the nature of action.

HELD: SC held that RTC has jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital
relations. In this case, both petitioner and the deceased were married through a civil wedding. And
whether or not they were likewise married in a Muslim wedding, sharia courts are still not vested with
original jurisdiction over marriages married under civil and Muslim law.

 Llave v. Republic, G.R. No. 169766, March 30, 2011

In May 1993, Mamintal A.J. Tamano (a former senator) married Estrellita Juliano-Llave under a civil ceremony. In June
1993, both got married again to each other but this time under Muslim rites. Unfortunately, in less than a year, Tamano
died.
In November 1994, mother and son Haja Putri Zorayda Tamano and Adib Ahmad Tamano filed a complaint for the
declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Tamano for being bigamous. It appears that Zorayda and
Tamano were already married in 1958 under civil rites and Muslim rites.
In her defense, Estrellita averred that Tamano was already divorced when he married Estrellita in 1993. This was
evidenced by Tamano’s declared status of “divorced” at the time of their marriage in 1993.
After a long and tedious process, the marriage between Estrellita and Tamano was finally declared void for being
bigamous by the RTC and later the Court of Appeals.
Estrellita now questions the said ruling on the ground that:
a. Zorayda and Adib have no legal standing to question the marriage between Estrellita and Tamano because they
were not parties to the marriage contract; that under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, an action to file the declaration of nullity of marriage
is only limited to the husband or the wife;
b. The proceedings in the RTC and the CA are void because under Article 48 of the Family Code as well as A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC, the Solicitor General or the public prosecutor are required to appear or participate in the proceedings in
order to determine collusion between the parties – this was not the case here, according to Estrellita;
c. The Muslim Code or PD 1083 was enacted in 1977 and that the marriage between Zorayda and Tamano happened
in 1958; that Muslim Code provides for Muslim Divorce; that under said law, if Muslim divorce need not be registered.
ISSUE: Whether or not Estrellita’s arguments are correct.
HELD: No.
1. Zorayda and Adib have the legal personality to question the marriage between Estrellita and Tamano. A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC, which limits to only the husband or the wife the filing of a petition for nullity is prospective in application
and does not shut out the prior spouse from filing suit if the ground is a bigamous subsequent marriage.
2. The participation of the Sol-Gen or the public prosecutor can be dispensed with. First of, the public prosecutor was
actually ordered by the RTC at the onset of the case to make a report on whether or not there was a collusion between
the parties. And as the records of the case would show, the prosecutor did submit a report finding no collusion. Second,
the rationale behind the requirement for the Sol-Gen or public prosecutor to participate is to make sure that there’s
no collusion between the parties. In this case, the lack of collusion between the parties (between Estrellita and
Zorayda) is apparent because of the vehement opposition of Estrellita to the petition filed by Zorayda.
3. The Muslim Code did not automatically cover all Muslim marriages already existing at the time of its enactment.
Further, the Muslim Code finds no application to marriages celebrated under both civil and Muslim rites. Further still,
the Muslim Code did not provide for retroactive application. It cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which
already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Tamano and Zorayda.
Thus, the law applicable on the marriage between Tamano and Zorayda is the Civil Code and nowhere in the Civil Code
is divorce allowed. The declaration of Tamano that he was divorced is therefore without effect as to the validity of his
earlier marriage with Zorayda. Hence, the ruling of the RTC and the CA is correct – the marriage between Tamano and
Estrellita in 1993 is void for being bigamous.

 Zamoranos v. People, G.R. No. 193902, June 1, 2011

CASE DIGEST: ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SAMSON R.
PACASUM, SR., Respondents.

FACTS: Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic rites. Prior thereto, Zamoranos was a Roman
Catholic who had converted to Islam. Subsequently, the two wed again, this time, in civil rites before Judge Perfecto
Laguio (Laguio) of the RTC, Quezon City.

A little after a year, Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained a divorce by talaq. The dissolution of their marriage was
confirmedy theShari'aCircuitDistrictCourt,which issued a Decree of Divorce.

Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married anew. As she had previously done in her first nuptial to De Guzman,
Zamoranos wed Samson Pacasum, Sr. (Pacasum), her subordinate at the Bureau of Customs where she worked,
under Islamic rites in Balo-i, Lanao del Norte. Thereafter, in order to strengthen the ties of their marriage,
Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed their marriage vows in a civil ceremony before Judge Valerio Salazar of the RTC,
Iligan City. However, unlike in Zamoranos' first marriage to De Guzman, the union between her and Pacasum was
blessed with progeny, namely: Samson, Sr., Sam Jean, and Sam Joon.

Despite their three children, the relationship between Zamoranos and Pacasum turned sour and the two were de
facto separated. The volatile relationship of Zamoranos and Pacasum escalated into a bitter battle for custody of
their minor children. Eventually, Zamoranos and Pacasum arrived at a compromise agreement which vested primary
custody of the children in the former, with the latter retaining visitorial rights thereto.
As it turned out, the agreement rankled on Pacasum. He filed a flurry of cases against Zamoranos including a petition
for annulment, a criminal complaint for bigamy and dismissal and disbarment from the civil service.

Meanwhile, on the criminal litigation front, the Office of the City Prosecutor, through Prosecutor Leonor Quiones,
issued a resolution, finding prima facie evidence to hold Zamoranos liable for Bigamy. Consequently, an Information
for Bigamy was filed against Zamoranos before the RTC.

On the other civil litigation front on the Declaration of a Void Marriage, the RTC, rendered a decision in favor of
Zamoranos, dismissing the petition of Pacasum for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, found that
Zamoranos and De Guzman are Muslims, and were such at the time of their marriage, whose marital relationship
was governed by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines.

ISSUE:

Was the marriage of Zamoranos to Pacasum bigamous?

HELD: First, we dispose of the peripheral issue raised by Zamoranos on the conclusiveness of judgment made by the
RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, which heard the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by Pacasum on the
ground that his marriage to Zamoranos was a bigamous marriage. In that case, the decision of which is already final
and executory, the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter by the regular civil courts. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, declared that it was the
Shari'a Circuit Court which had jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof.
Nonetheless, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, which heard the case for Bigamy, should have taken cognizance of the
categorical declaration of the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, that Zamoranos is a Muslim, whose first marriage to another
Muslim, De Guzman, was valid and recognized under Islamic law. In fact, the same court further declared that
Zamoranos' divorce from De Guzman validly severed their marriage ties.

From the foregoing declarations of all three persons in authority, two of whom are officers of the court, it is evident
that Zamoranos is a Muslim who married another Muslim, De Guzman, under Islamic rites. Accordingly, the nature,
consequences, and incidents of such marriage are governed by P.D. No. 1083.

Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in criminal cases, the trial court must have jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the offense. In this case, the charge of Bigamy hinges on Pacasum's claim that Zamoranos is not a
Muslim, and her marriage to De Guzman was governed by civil law. This is obviously far from the truth, and the fact
of Zamoranos' Muslim status should have been apparent to both lower courts, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, and the
CA.

The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the accused contracting a second marriage while a prior valid
one still subsists and has yet to be dissolved. At the very least, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, should
haveuspendedtheproceedings until Pacasum had litigated the validity of Zamoranos and De Guzman's marriage
before the Shari'a Circuit Court and had successfully shown that it had not been dissolved despite the divorce by
talaq entered into by Zamoranos and De Guzman.

In a pluralist society such as that which exists in the Philippines, P.D. No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws,
was enacted to "promote the advancement and effective participation of the National Cultural Communities x x x,
[and] the State shall consider their customs, traditions, beliefs and interests in the formulation and implementation
of its policies."

Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the regular criminal courts have jurisdiction over the offense defeats
the purpose for the enactment of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws and the equal recognition bestowed by the
State on Muslim Filipinos.

Moreover, the two experts, in the same book, unequivocally state that one of the effects of irrevocable talaq, as well
as other kinds of divorce, refers to severance of matrimonial bond, entitling one to remarry.
It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos' divorce from De Guzman, as confirmed by an Ustadz and Judge Jainul
of the Shari'a Circuit Court, and attested to by Judge Usman, was valid, and, thus, entitled her to remarry Pacasum in
1989. Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is without jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy.

 Villagarcia v. Sharia, G.R. No. 188832, April 23, 2014

Roldan purchased a 300-square-meter parcel of land located in Shariff Kabunsuan, from one Ceres.
Transfer Certificate of Title covering the parcel of land was issued in Roldan’s name. Roldan had the
parcel of land surveyed. In a report, the Geodetic Engineer f ound that Vivencio occupied the parcel
of land covered by Roldan’s certificate of title.
Failing to settle with Vivencio at the barangay level, Roldan filed an action to recover the possession
of the parcel of land with respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court alleging among others that he is a
Filipino Muslim
Respondent court took cognizance of the case and caused service of summons on Vivencio. However,
despite service of summons, Vivencio failed to file his answer. Thus, Roldan moved that he b e allowed
to present evidence ex parte, which motion respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court granted. In its
decision, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court ruled that Roldan, as registered owner, had the better
right to possess the parcel of land. There after, it issued the notice of writ of execution to Vivencio.
Vivencio filed a petition for relief from judgment with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction. He argued that Shari’a District Courts may only hear civil actions and proceedings if both
parties are Muslims. Considering that he is a Christian, Vivencio argued that respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of Roldan’s action for recovery of possession of
a parcel of land. However, respondent cour t denied the petition.

ISSUE:
Does the Shari’a District Court has jusrisdiction over real action where one of the parties is not a
muslim even if it decides the action applying the provisions of the Civil Code?

RULING:
The Shari’a District Court has NO j urisdiction over real action where one of the parties is not a Muslim.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is "the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to
which the proceedings in question belong." This power is conferred by law, which m ay either be the
Constitution or a statute. Since subject matter jurisdiction is a matter of law, parties cannot choose,
consent to, or agree as to what court or tribunal should decide their disputes. If a court hears, tries,
and decides an action in which it has no jurisdiction, all its proceedings, including the judgment
rendered, are void.
The law conferring the jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts is the Code of the Muslim Personal Laws
of the Philippines. Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code, Shari’ a District Courts have concurrent
original jurisdiction with "existing civil courts" over real actions not arising from customary contracts
wherein the parties involved are Muslims. However, this concurrent jurisdiction over real actions "is
applicable solely when both parties are Muslims". When one of the parties is not a Muslim, the action
must be filed before the regular courts.
Considering that Vivencio is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction
over Roldan’s action for recovery of possession of real property. The proceedings before it are void,
regardless of the fact that it applied the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines in resolving
the action.
The application of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Phi lippines by respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court does not validate the proceedings before the court. Under Article 175 of the Muslim
Code, customary contracts are construed in accordance with Muslim law. Hence, Shari’a District
Courts apply Muslim law when resolving real actions arising from customary contracts.
In real actions not arising from contracts customary to Muslims, there is no reason for Shari’a District
Courts to apply Muslim law. In such real actions, Shari’a District Courts will necessarily apply the laws
of general application, which in this case is the Civil Code of the Philippines, regardless of the court
taking cognizance of the action.
 COMMENCEMENT AND TERMINATION OF PERSONALITY
BIRTH

 Geluz v. CA, 2 SCRA 801

FACTS:

Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar lazo, respondent, came to know Antonio Geluz, the petitioner and
physician, through her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became pregnant some time in 1950 before she and Oscar
were legally married. As advised by her aunt and to conceal it from her parents, she decided to have it
aborted by Geluz. She had her pregnancy aborted again on October 1953 since she found it inconvenient
as she was employed at COMELEC. After two years, on February 21, 1955, she again became pregnant and
was accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter’s daughter Lucida at Geluz’ clinic at Carriedo and
P. Gomez Street. Oscar at this time was in the province of Cagayan campaigning for his election to the
provincial board. He doesn’t have any idea nor given his consent on the abortion.

ISSUE: Whether husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from
the physician who caused the same.

HELD:

The Supreme Court believed that the minimum award fixed at P3,000 for the death of a person does not
cover cases of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality which trial court and Court of Appeals
predicated.

Both trial court and CA wasn’t able to find any basis for an award of moral damages evidently because
Oscar’s indifference to the previous abortions of Nita clearly indicates he was unconcerned with the
frustration of his parental affections. Instead of filing an administrative or criminal case against Geluz, he
turned his wife’s indiscretion to personal profit and filed a civil action for damages of which not only he
but, including his wife would be the beneficiaries. It shows that he’s after obtaining a large money
payment since he sued Geluz for P50,000 damages and P3,000 attorney’s fees that serves as indemnity
claim, which under the circumstances was clearly exaggerated.

 Quimiging v. Icao, 34 SCRA 134

Facts:
Carmen Quimiguing, suing through her parents, Antonio and Jacoba Cabilin, sought an appeal from the orders of
Zamboanga CFI, which dismissed her complaint for support and damages and request for amendment of complaint.

Quimiguing averred that the then already married Felix Icao succeeded in having sexual relations with her through
force and intimidation. As a result, she became pregnant despite efforts and drugs supplied by Icao and had to stop
studying. She then claimed for monthly support, damages and attorney’s fees.

The defendant-appellee, however, moved to dismiss in light of Quimiguing’s failure to allege the fact that a child had
been born in her complaint. The lower court dismissed the case and subsequently denied further amendment to the
complaint, ruling that no amendment was allowed for failure of the original complaint to state a cause of action.

Issue:
W/N the plaintiff-appellants can ask for support and damages from defendant despite failure to allege fact of birth in
complaint
Ruling:
Yes. The Court ruled that plaintiff-appellant had right to support of the child she was carrying and an independent
cause of action for damages.
This is because the Civil Code (Art. 40) recognizes the provisional personality of the unborn child, which includes its
right to support from its progenitors, even it is only “en ventre de sa mere.” Article 742 of the same Code holds that,
just as a conceived child, it may receive donations through persons that legally represent it. Readings of Articles 40,
854 of the Civil Code and Article 29 of the Spanish Code also further strengthen the case for reversal of order.

Additionally, “for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust xxx constitutes a clear violation of
the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for damage caused” per Article 21 of the Civil Code, a
provision supported by Article 2219, which provides moral damages for victims of seduction, abduction, rape or
other lascivious acts.

Judgment reversed, set aside and remanded for proceedings conformable to the decision; with costs against Icao.

 De Jesus v. Syquia, 58 Phil 866

FACTS:

Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a cashier in a barber shop owned by the
defendant’s brother in law Vicente Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the defendant, 23 years of age and an
unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila was accustomed to have his haircut in the said barber
shop. He got acquainted with Antonio and had an amorous relationship. As a consequence, Antonia got
pregnant and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931.

In the early months of Antonia’s pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor. On February 1931, he even
wrote a letter to a rev father confirming that the child is his and he wanted his name to be given to the
child. Though he was out of the country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia reminding her to eat on
time for her and “junior’s” sake. The defendant ask his friend Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth and
hospital arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital in Manila.

After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines Street Manila where they
lived together for about a year. When Antonia showed signs of second pregnancy, defendant suddenly
departed and he was married with another woman at this time.

It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in charge of the
arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. that
was first planned.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written by defendant to Antonia
during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity.

2. Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession of the
status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that as a consequence, the
defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco.

HELD:
The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of paternity and the other letters are
sufficient to connect the admission with the child carried by Antonia. The mere requirement is that the
writing shall be indubitable.

“The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a
natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal the father's resolution to admit the
status”.

Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in refusing to provide damages to Antonia Loanco
for supposed breach of promise to marry since action on this has no standing in civil law. Furthermore,
there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second
baby, Pacita Loanco. Finally, SC found no necessity to modify the judgment as to the amount of
maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco in the amount of P50 pesos per month. They likewise pointed out
that it is only the trial court who has jurisdiction to modify the order as to the amount of pension.

 Continental Steel v. Montano, G.R. No. 182836, October 13, 2009

FACTS: Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel, filed a claim for Paternity Leave,
Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the CBA. The claim was
for Hortillano’s unborn child who died. Hortillano’s wife had a premature delivery while she was on her
38th week of pregnancy. The female fetus died during the labor. The company granted Hortillano’s claim
for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and death benefits. Hortillano claimed that
the provision in CBS did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must
have acquired juridical personality. Petitioner argued that the said provision of CBA did not contemplate
death of an unborn child or a fetus without legal personality. They also claimed that there are two
elements for the entitlement of the benefit: 1) death; and 2) status of legitimate dependent. None which
existed in Hortillano’s case. They further contend that the only one with civil personality could die, based
on Art 40-42 of Civil Code. Hence, according to petitioner, the unborn child never died. Labor Arbiter
Montana argued that the fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she
was conceived. Petitioner appealed to CA but CA affirmed Labor Arbiter’s decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N only one with juridical personality can die.

HELD: No. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal
definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when
it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil
personality is extinguished by death. The issue of civil personality is irrelevant in this case. Arts 40-42 do
not provide at all definition of death. Life is not synonymous to civil personality. One need not acquire civil
personality first before s/he could die. The Constitution in fact recognizes the life of the unborn from
conception.

ISSUE: W/N a fetus can be considered as a dependent.

HELD: Yes. Even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. The fetus would have not reached 38-39
weeks without depending upon its mother.

DEATH

Limjoco v. Intestate Estate of Pio Fragante, 80 Phil 776

FACTS: Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of public
convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal. His intestate estate is financially capable
of maintaining the proposed service. The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public
convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased through its special or judicial administrator appointed by
the proper court of competent jurisdiction to maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims that
the granting of certificate applied to the estate is a contravention of law.

ISSUE: W/N the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial personality

HELD: Yes, because under the Civil Code, “estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial juridical
person for the purpose of settlement and distribution of his properties.” Fragante has rights and fulfillment
of obligation which survived after his death. One of those rights involved the pending application for public
convenience before the PSC. The state or the mass of property, rights left by the decedent, instead of heirs
directly, become vested and charged with his rights and obligations. Under the present legal system, rights
and obligations which survived after death have to be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the
deceased.

Valino v. Adriano, G.R. No. 182894, April 22, 2014

DOCTRINE:
The law confines the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to the members of the family to the exclusion of
one’s common law partner.
Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for
many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed
to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally married in common law
jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.

It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is outside the commerce of man. However, the law
recognizes that a certain right of possession over the corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent burial, and for the
exclusion of the intrusion by third persons who have no legitimate interest in it. This quasi-property right, arising out
of the duty of those obligated by law to bury their dead, also authorizes them to take possession of the dead body
for purposes of burial to have it remain in its final resting place, or to even transfer it to a proper place where the
memory of the dead may receive the respect of the living. This is a family right. There can be no doubt that persons
having this right may recover the corpse from third persons.

FACTS:
Atty. Adriano Adriano (Atty. Adriano) married respondent Rosario Adriano in 1955. The couple had 5 children and 1
adopted child, also impleaded herein as respondents. The marriage did turn sour and the couple separated in fact,
though Adriano continued to support his wife and children.

Atty. Adriano then started living with Valino, whom he courted. Atty. Adriano died and since his immediate family,
including respondent were in the United States, Valino took it upon herself to bury Atty. Adriano at her family's
mausoleum. In the meantime, Respondents heard about the death and requested Valino to delay the burial so they
can pay their final respects, but Valino still buried the body.

Respondents commenced suit against Valino praying that they be indemnified for actual, moral and exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees and that the remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed and transferred to the family plot.

Valino claimed that it was Atty. Adriano's last wish to be buried at Valino's family's mausoleum and that the
respondent's knew that Atty. Adriano was already in a coma yet they still proceeded to the US on vacation. And that
as far as the public was concerned, Valino had been introducing her as his wife for the past 20 years.

The RTC dismissed the complaint of respondents for lack of merit as well as the counterclaim of Valino after it found
them to have not been sufficiently proven.

CA reversed [explained that Rosario, being the legal wife, was entitled to the custody of the remains of her deceased
husband. Citing Article 305 of the New Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code, it was the considered
view of the appellate court that the law gave the surviving spouse not only the duty but also the right to make
arrangements for the funeral of her husband. For the CA, Rosario was still entitled to such right on the ground of her
subsisting marriage with Atty. Adriano at the time of the latter’s death, notwithstanding their 30-year separation in
fact.]

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents (wife and children of deceased Atty. Adriano) are entitled to the remains of Atty.
Adriano.

HELD:
YES. The weight of legal provisions puts the responsibility of the burial with the respondents, to wit:

The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in accordance with the order
established for support, under Article 294. In case of descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the
oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right. (New Civil Code Art. 305)

Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in
the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (Family Code, Art. 199)

No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed without the consent of the persons
mentioned in Articles [199 of the Family Code] and 305. (New Civil Code, Art. 308)

As applied to this case, it is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she
being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living separately from her husband and was in
the United States when he died has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or
renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband
is baseless.

It is also recognized that a corpse is outside the commerce of man. However, the law recognizes that a certain right
of possession over the corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent burial, and for the exclusion of the intrusion by
third persons who have no legitimate interest in it. This quasi-property right, arising out of the duty of those
obligated by law to bury their dead, also authorizes them to take possession of the dead body for purposes of burial
to have it remain in its final resting place, or to even transfer it to a proper place where the memory of the dead may
receive the respect of the living. This is a family right. There can be no doubt that persons having this right may
recover the corpse from third persons.

RESTRICTIONS ON CIVIL CAPACITY

PRESUMPTION OF CAPACITY

Catalan v. Basa, G.R. No. 159567, July 31, 2007

Facts:
On October 20, 1948, Feliciano Catalan was discharged from active military service. The Board of Medical
Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs found that he was unfit to render military service due to his
mental disorder (schizophrenia). On September 28, 1949, Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo. On June 16,
1951, Feliciano allegedly donated to his sister Mercedes one-half of the real property through the
execution of a document, titled, “Absolute deed of Donation”. On December 11,
1953, People’s Bank and Trust Company filed Special Proceedings to declare Feliciano incompetent.
On December 22, 1953, the trial court issued its Order of Adjudication of Incompetency for Appointing
Guardian for the Estate and Fixing Allowance of Feliciano. Thus, Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), which
is formerly the People’s Bank and Trust Company, was appointed to be his guardian by the trial court. On
March 26, 1979, Mercedes sold the property donated by Feliciano to her in issue in her children Delia and
Jesus Basa. On April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as Feliciano’s guardian filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of
Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, as well as damages against herein respondents. BPI
alleged that the Deed of Absolute Donation of Mercedes was void ab initio, as Feliciano never donated the
property to Mercedes. In addition, BPI averred that even if Feliciano had truly intended to give the
property to her, the donation would still be void, as he was not of sound mind and was therefore incapable
of giving valid consent. On August 14, 1997, Feliciano passed away. Both the lower court and Court of
Appeals dismissed the case because of insufficient evidence presented by the complainants to overcome
the presumption that Feliciano was sane and competent at the time he executed the deed of donation in
favor of Mercedes Catalan.

Issue:
Whether or not Feliciano has the capacity to execute the donation
Whether or not the property donated to Mercedes and later on sold to her children is legally in possession
of the latter
Are laches and prescription should be considered in the case?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower court and the Court of Appeals and denied the
petition. A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a thing or right in favor of
another, who accepts it. Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential. Consent in
contracts presupposes the following requisites: (1) it should be intelligent or with an exact notion of the
matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free; and (3) it should be spontaneous. The parties’ intention
must be clear and the attendance of a vice of consent, like any contract, renders the donation voidable. A
person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his
property. By merely alleging the existing of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show substantial proof that
at the date of the donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his mental facilities.
Thus, the lower court correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind at that time and this condition
continued to exist until proof to the contrary was adduced. Since the donation was valid. Mercedes has the
right to sell the property to whomever she chose. Not a shred of evidence has been presented to prove the
claim that Mercedes’ sale of property to her children was tainted with fraud or falsehood. Thus, the
property in question belongs to Delia and Jesus Basa. The Supreme Court notes the issue of prescription
and laches for the first time on appeal before the court. It is sufficient for the Supreme Court to note that
even if it prospered, the deed of donation was still a voidable, not a void, contract. As such, it remained
binding as it was not annulled in a proper action in court within four years.

CONTRACTS

Mercado v. Espiritu, 37 Phil 215

FACTS:
The case was about the contract made by Luis Espiritu (father of Jose Espiritu, the defendant) and the heirs of his
sister Margarita Mercado; Domingo and Josepha Mercado, who pretended to be of legal age to give their consent
into the contract of sale of the land they inherited from their deceased mother Margarita Mercado (sister of Luis
Mercado). The siblings Domingo et. al., sought for the annulment of contract asserting that Domingo and Josepha
were minors during the perfection of contract.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of sale is valid when the minors presented themselves that they were of legal age.
HELD:
The court declared that the contract of sale was VALID, even if it were made and entered into by minors, who
pretended to be of legal age. The court stated that they will not be permitted to excuse themselves from the
fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them, or to have them annulled.
The ruling was in accordance with the provisions on law on estoppel and Rule 123, Section 6 paragraph A which
states that “whenever a party has, by its own declaration, act or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another
party to believe a particular thing to be true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of
such declaration, cannot be permitted to falsify it.

Bambalan v. Maramba, 51 Phil 417

FACTS: Bambalan’s parents received a loan from marimba. When the father died, Bambalan was left as the sole heir
of his father’s estate. Maramba forced Bambalan, who was at that time a minor, to sell their land as payment for the
loan. Bambalan signed because he was forced to do so because they were threatening his mother with
imprisonment. Muerang and Maramba bought Bambalan’s 1st cedula to acknowledge the document

ISSUE: W/N the sale of land to Maramba was valid

HELD: The sale was void because he was a minor at the time of the execution. Doctrine of Mercado vs Espiritu is not
applicable because the plaintiff did not pretend to be of age, and the defendant knew him as a minor.

Sia Suan & Chiao v. Alcantara, 85 Phil 669 Braganza v. Villa-Abrille, 105 Phil 456

Ponente: J. Paras

FACTS
A deed of sale was executed by Rufino Alcantara ang his sons, one of them is a minor, conveying to Sia
Suan five parcels of land. Thereafter, the attorney of Alcantara informed the husband of Sia that Ramon
Alcantara is a minor and accordingly disavowed the contract. Ramon, however, executed an affidavit in the
office of the attorney of the husband of Sia, ratifying the sale and receiving P500 as payment. In the
meantime, Sia sold one of the lots to Azorez.
Ramon instituted an action for the annulment of the deed of sale at the CFI of Laguna, to which the court
granted, and thereby required Sia to pay Ramon the sum of P1,750 with legal interest and the
reconveyance of the property. Sia appealed by certiorari.

ISSUE
Whether or not the deed of sale is valid.

HELD
Yes. Under the doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado vs Espiritu (37 Phil 215) to bind a minor who
represents himself to be of legal age, it is not necessary for his vendee to actually part with a cash, as long
as the contract is supported by a valid consideration. Preexisting indebtedness is a valid consideration
which produces its full force and effect, in the absence of any other vice that may legally invalidate the
sale.
The circumstance that, about one month after the date of the conveyance, Ramon informed Sia and her
husband of his minority, is of no moment, because Ramon’s previous misrepresentation had already
estopped him from disavowing the contract.

CRIMINAL LIABILITY

Atizado v. People, G.R. No. 173822, October 13, 2010

SALVADOR ATIZADO and SALVADORMONREAL, Petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS: Petitioners Atixado and Monreal areaccused of killing and murdering one Rogelio Llonaon April
1994. It was said that both petitionersbarged in on the house of one Desder, where thevictim was a guest
and suddenly shot at Llona with their guns. After the shooting, they fled.For their defense, the petitioners
interposed that they were at their family residence and drinking gin.The RTC convicted Atizado and
Monreal for the crime of murder and sentenced them with reclusion perpetua. On appeal to the CA, the
court affirmed the conviction in 2005.It is important to note that Salvador Monreal was a minor at the time
of the commission of the crime.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower courts erred in finding the petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
murder. What is the penalty to be imposed on Monreal, aminor during the time of the commission?

HELD/RATIO: Yes, conviction affirmed. However, the penalty imposed on Monreal is suspended. The
witness positive identification of the petitioners as the killers, and her declarations on what each of the
petitioners did when they mounted their sudden deadly assault against Llona left no doubt whatsoever
that they had conspired to kill and had done so with treachery. Under Article 248 of the RPC, the penalty
for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no modifying circumstances, the CA correctly
imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua on Atizado. But reclusion per petua was not the correct
penalty for Monreal due to his being a minor over15 but under 18 years of age. The RTC and the CA did not
appreciate Monreal sminority at the time of the commission of the murder probably because his birth
certificate was not presented at the trial. Yet, it cannot be doubted that Monreal was a minor below 18
years of age when the crime was committed on April 18, 1994.His counter-affidavit, the police blotter and
trialrecords show that Monreal was a minor at the time of the commission. Monreal s minority was legally
sufficient, for it conformed with the normssubsequently set under Section 7 of Republic Act No.
9344:Section 7.

Determination of Age. - The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She
shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years
old or older. In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and other government
officials concerned shall exert all efforts at determining the age of the child in conflict with the law.
Monreal has been detained for over 16 years, that is, from the time of his arrest on May 18, 1994 until the
present. Given that the entire period of Monreal s detention should be credited in the service of his
sentence, pursuant to Section 41 of Republic Act No. 9344, the revision of the penalty warranted his
immediate release from the penitentiary