Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Author(s): W. J. T. Mitchell
Source: Critical Inquiry, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Winter, 1989), pp. 348-371
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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W.J. T. Mitchell
348
with the artistic avant-garde for at least a quarter of a century, and its
central masterpieces are now firmly entrenched in the tradition of Western
painting and safely canonized in our greatest museums. That does not
mean that there will be no more abstract paintings, or that the tradition
is dead; on the contrary, the obsolescence we are contemplating is in a
very precise sense the precondition for abstraction's survival as a tradition
that resists any possible assault from an avant-garde. Indeed, the abstract
probably has more institutional and cultural power as a rearguard tradition
than it ever did as an avant-garde overturning of tradition. For that very
reason its self-representations need to be questioned more closely than
ever, especially its account of its own nature and history. This seems
important, not just to set the record straight about what abstract art was,
but to enable critical and artistic experimentation in the present, and a
more nuanced account of both pre- and postmodern art, both of which
are in danger of being swallowed up by the formulas (and reactions
against the formulas) of abstract formalism. If art and criticism are to
continue to play an oppositional and interventionist role in our time,
passive acceptance and reproduction of a powerful cultural tradition like
abstract art will simply not do.
Many stories of the emergence of abstract art have been told, and
I don't propose to tell a new version here. My aim is rather to examine
a few important variations on these narratives, which represent abstract
art as a repression of literature, verbal discourse, or language itself in
favor of "pure" visuality or painterly form, and to ask whether this re-
pression was successful, and what it meant. A capsule version of one
such narrative appears in the opening paragraph of an essay by Rosalind
Krauss entitled "Grids":
3. Clement Greenberg, The CollectedEssays and Criticism, ed. John O'Brian, 2 vols.
(Chicago, 1986), 1:23; hereafter abbreviated CEC.
4. Greenberg qualifies this by specifying "sentimental and declamatory" literature as
the offender, but then qualifies his qualification by saying that all of "Western and Graeco-
Roman art" shows that these offensive literary values go "hand in hand" with "realistic
illusion."
5. See especially Michael Fried, "Art and Objecthood," Artforum5 (Summer 1967):
12-23; reprinted in Aesthetics:A CriticalAnthology,ed. George Dickie and RichardJ. Sclafani
(New York, 1977), pp. 438-60; hereafter abbreviated "AO."Page references are to Aesthetics.
was true, that the fewer verbal promptings provided by the painter in
the form of titles, narrative clues, or subject matter, the more demand
for the spectator to fill the void with language. Not that this suggestion
is original with Borofsky (or with me).9 Early in the seventies the journalist
Tom Wolfe, in a hilariously vulgar and philistine put-down of modern
art, made his own "breakthrough" in comprehending the pure visuality
of abstraction:
9. Harold Rosenberg notes also that "the place of literature has been taken by the
rhetoric of abstract concepts," but he regards this as a mainly negative development (Ro-
senberg, The De-definitionof Art [New York, 1972], p. 56).
10. Tom Wolfe, The Painted Word(New York, 1975), pp. 6-7; hereafter abbreviated
PW.
fame from their painting, Wolfe's revelation of this paradox in the ideology
of modernism goes about as deep as the average political cartoon. Which
doesn't prevent us from learning something from this cartoon that seems
to have eluded most commentators on abstract art: namely, that the entire
antiverbal ideology of abstraction, its depiction as a rigorous "barrier"
between vision and language, is a myth that needs to be understood and
not just debunked. If abstract art actually was and is an art of "the painted
word," as Wolfe claims, what is that word, how is it made manifest in the
paintings, and why did its presence have to be denied?
I've already suggested a short answer to the first question: "theory"
is the "word" (or words) that stands in the same relation to abstract art
that traditional literary forms had to representational painting. By "theory"
I mean that curious hybrid of mainly prose discourse compounded from
aesthetics and other branches of philosophy, as well as from literary
criticism, linguistics, the natural and social sciences, psychology, history,
political thought, and religion. Sometimes this sort of writing is called
"intellectual prose" or simply "criticism,"and it is characterized, generally,
by a refusal of disciplinary identity-it is rarely just history or science or
moral philosophy, but a synthetic discourse that ranges over several
specialized idioms.
A good way to see how this sort of prose comes to be focussed on
the problems of abstract painting is to ask oneself what sorts of things
did Clement Greenberg, the most important American apologist for ab-
straction, have to know in order to write the sort of criticism he wrote?
The answer: a fair amount of art history, a smattering of Kant, a sense
of Marxist historical and critical categories, mediated mainly through
Trotsky, experience as a painter and friend of painters, four languages,
some practical experience in business and government bureaucracy, an
acquaintance with European politics, and membership in the group of
intellectuals writing for Partisan Review around World War II. Other
writers on abstract art bring other areas of expertise: Rudolf Arnheim
brings a great deal of Kant, and a wealth of experimental evidence from
studies of visual perception in Gestalt psychology; Michael Fried brings
a phenomenological perspective leavened by the tradition of Anglo-
American philosophy mediated through Stanley Cavell; Rosalind Krauss
unites a first-hand acquaintance with the art world with a combination
of structuralism, deconstruction, and a Foucauldian approach to history.
The other thing all these writers share is that they write well, or persuasively,
or in a style that enables discussion of abstract paintings, often by providing
a set of formulas, a language game that can be carried on. Their effect
is to make the apparent "wall"or "grid"between abstract art and language
seem more like a screen door through which the winds of theoretical
discourse blow freely. These "winds" may include a fair amount of hot
air, as Borofsky suggests. There is no necessary connection between good
theory and good painting. (Leo Steinberg complains, for instance, that
Jasper Johns is a very good painter but a very bad theorist.)" There is,
however, a necessary connection between the meaning of abstract painting
and the theoretical discourse around it.
A predictable objection to my claim here is that this discourse arises
only after the fact of artistic creation; it may provide an explanation of
a painting or a movement, but it is not constitutive of and prior to
painting the way traditional literary and historical narratives were. Ut
picturapoesis meant an art of mutual imitation and collaboration between
two "sister arts" that both dwelt in the realm of the aesthetic; ut pictura
theoriais an unequal relationship of mere convenience between the mas-
terwork of abstract painting and the humble servant of critical prose.
There are two sorts of answers to this objection. The first is simply the
empirical fact that, for many abstract artists, theory has been a constitutive
pre-text for their work.'2 Cezanne believed that "all things, particularly
in art, are theory developed and applied in contact with nature."'3 An
even more comprehensive and ambitious claim for a tradition ofut pictura
theoria has been articulated by Robert Morris, a sculptor and painter
whose career spans the major American art movements from late mod-
ernism to the present.14 Morris argues that the evolution of modern art
may be mapped as a progression of textualizing theories: early abstraction
(Kandinsky, Malevich, Mondrian) builds principally on the theoretical
manifestos written by the artists themselves, and based on their readings
of nineteenth-century idealist philososphy; American abstract expres-
sionism tends to rely more on critics like Greenberg, a division of labor
between the silent artist and his critical spokesman; with minimalism and
postmodernism, Morris argues, the textual accompaniments to visual art
are once again being produced by the artists themselves, and the theoretical
resources of these texts are to be found in structuralismand deconstruction.
But this answer is still open to the objection that this language is
somehow all "outside" the paintings themselves, no matter who produces
it or when. It still does not seem visibleor "coded" in the works of Jackson
Pollock or Mondrian the way Biblical narratives were made visible and
immanent in the paintings of Raphael and Michelangelo. One answer
to this objection is simply that Biblical narratives are not visible to spectators
11. Leo Steinberg, Other Criteria (New York, 1972), p. 52: "I think he [Johns] fails;
not as a painter, but as a theorist." Michael Fried would perhaps express just the opposite
judgment.
12. Indeed, the notion of "painting theory" precedes modernist abstraction, as the
examples of Turner, Blake, and Hogarth show. See my essay, "Metamorphoses of the
Vortex," in ArticulateImages, ed. Richard Wendorf (Minneapolis, 1983), pp. 125-68.
13. Paul Cezanne to Charles Camoin, 22 Feb. 1903, Letters,ed. John Rewald, trans.
Marguerite Kay (London, 1941), p. 228; reprinted in Theoriesof Modern Art: A SourceBook
by Artistsand Critics, ed. Herschel B. Chipp (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968), p. 18.
14. See Robert Morris' essay, "Words and Images in Modernism and Postmodernism,"
pp. 337-47 of this issue.
who don't already know the stories from other sources; traditional painting
is not so different from modern in that respect.'5 But more fundamentally
we have to understand the way abstract art sees itself as having changed
the rules of the game. It is one of the principal doctrines of abstract art
that although iconography and represented objects may disappear, content
and subject matter do not. These paintings, no matter how abstract, are
never merely formal or decorative; the "greatest fear" of the abstract
artist, as Krauss says, "is that he may be making mereabstraction, abstraction
uninformed by a subject, contentless abstraction"(0, p. 237). The question
is how can a painting without represented objects have a subject? How
can pure forms of paint on canvas say anything, much less articulate
complex theoretical concepts?
The remarkable thing is that once this question is raised about an
abstract painting, there are so many answers. Take, for instance, Malevich's
SuprematistComposition:Red Square and Black Square, arguably the most
famous and familiar abstract painting ever made (fig. 3). The problem
with this picture is not that we have nothing to say about it, or that it
says nothing to us, but rather that we feel overwhelmed and embarrassed
by the number of things it can be made to say. I recently stood in front
of this painting with my thirteen-year-old son at the Museum of Modern
Art. His innocent eyes took in the situation at once. "I suppose you're
going to tell me how great and full of significance this one is, too," he
said. Several replies crossed my mind. I thought about explaining to him
Malevich's wish "to free art from the ballast of the objective world."'16 I
thought of Krauss' claim (again, quite orthodox) that Malevich is painting
the "operations of the [Hegelian] dialectic" (0, p. 237). I sorted through
my stock of iconographic conventions for the meaning of the colors red
and black, the numerological significance of the square as an emblem of
earthly foundations, the square as an "expression" (in Malevich's terms)
"of binary thought" (quoted in O, p. 238). I recalled a few basic principles
from Arnheim on the psychology of visual perception that might explain
the effects of the whole composition, effects of size, placement, relation
to frame, and so on. Fortunately (I think), I kept all these thoughts to
myself, and said simply: "Well, believe it or not, I know someone who
has written seventy-five pages just trying to explain this one
painting.'"17
My son looked at me in disbelief: "Well I could say everything there is
15. One of the principal objectives of early modernist formalism, in fact, was the
attempt to suspend or erase awareness of literary, narrative elements in traditional painting
to allow concentration on things like "significant form."
16. Quoted in Alfred H. Barr, Cubismand AbstractArt (1936; Cambridge, Mass., 1986),
p. 122; hereafter abbreviated C.
17. I am thinking of Charles Altieri's painstaking efforts to rescue the notion of
"representation" (or, more precisely, "representativeness") in abstract painting. See Altieri,
"Representation, Representativeness, and Non-Representational Art,"Journal of Comparative
Literatureand Aesthetics5 (1982): 1-23.
to say abolut it in one sentence." "Oh?" I said. "And what is that one
sentence?" He scarcely hesitated: "There is a small tilted red square below
a larger black square."
It didn't take too much prodding on my part to get my son to admit
that he hadn't quite said everythingthere is to say about the painting in
this one sentence. (He said nothing about the white background, for
instance, or the fact that "below" is not quite exact enough.) But this
answer stuck with me for several reasons. First, it does seem to me that
there is a real truth in thinking of this as a "one-sentence" painting, in
the way a geometrical figure may illustrate a single algebraic proposition,
or a haiku may attempt to capture a scenic image. Second, I was glad to
see that my son seemed intuitively to grasp a crucial feature of the
language game of abstract art: he didn't say it was a "picture of a red
and black square," or a representation of these figures. He saw it as a
direct presentation of the figures: "there is a small tilted red square below
a larger black square." Third, I felt gratified that he shared my sense
that the "hero"of this painting, the protagonist of its one-sentence narrative,
is the tilted red square. I'm not sure I'd want to claim that this is an
objective "fact" about the painting's meaning, a message that is unequiv-
ocally coded in its composition; there must be viewers who identify with
the black square. But I can at least testify that it is a social fact about the
perception of the painting, verified in numerous other conversations.
Even more interesting, I would suggest, are the little scenes like this one
that are played out repeatedly in front of abstract paintings, in which a
believer or connoisseur (or somebody who has taken Art 101) tries to
explain one of these objects to a nonbeliever.
This sort of social fact is, I would suggest, a primary piece of data
that tends to be repressed by abstract art's ideology of silent meditation,
its tendency to project a solitary, sensitive spectator vibrating to the
ineffable tunes of the Hegelian dialectic or the Kantian categories. Perhaps
the most important thing this little conversation with my son reminded
me of was the fact that Hegel's dialectic is at bottom a social relationship,
an image of the mutual dependence of master and slave. Malevich's
image is surely dialectical and abstract, but language, narrative, and
discourse can never-should never-be excluded from it. The relation
of black square to red square is not just the relation between abstract
opposites like stability and tilt, large and small, but of more potent,
ideologically charged associations like deadly black and vivid, revolutionary
red, domination and resistance, or of even more personal and emotional
relationships like father and son. I take it that there's no need for me to
specify which square is the father, which the son.
These sorts of sentimental, bourgeois associations are, of course,
exactly what abstract art tried to deny as "kitsch" in the name of high
artistic "purity." But this denial, despite Krauss' claims, was never entirely
successful; it was continually contradicted, in social fact, by the elaboration
"Towards a Newer Laocoon" (1940): "When the purist insists upon ex-
cluding 'literature' and subject matter from plastic art, now and in the
future, the most we can charge him with off-hand is an unhistorical
attitude" (CEC, 1:23). Greenberg puts himself in the position of the
friendly advocate who helps out his client by minimizing the charge (the
avant-garde is merely unhistorical) and offering to pay the fine by supplying
that missing history. This history is, as it turns out, precisely that narrative
of failed revolution and political marginalization of the avant-garde that,
as we have seen, contradicts its idealized self-image. Even more disquieting,
Greenberg makes it clear that the avant-garde, far from occupying a
revolutionary posture, is actually a bourgeois movement that depends
on the patronage of the capitalist ruling classes for its sustenance; its
"purity," from either a political or religious point of view, is continually
in danger of being compromised by the vulgarity and materialism around
it. In another sense, however, this very vulgarity, the popular productions
of mass culture that Greenberg labels "kitsch," is what he offers to avant-
garde culture as something to oppose, a common enemy that may distract
it from its own impurities and contradictions. Kitsch, you will recall, is
art that has not renounced its reliance on literature, that is filled with
representations of familiar, formulaic, and sentimental stories: magazine
covers (most notably the Saturday Evening Post), calendar art, Socialist
Realism, and Hollywood movies (recently-in the forties-corrupted
even further by learning to talk) are the principal visual examples. Kitsch
is mass-produced, notes Greenberg, for the "urban masses," who have
recently been transformed by "universal literacy" into proper consumers
for pseudoart. Abstract art, then, is (like all high "formal"culture) actually
an aristocratic form, made by and for a tiny elite in the cosmopolitan
centers of advanced capitalist countries; in preindustrial societies, Green-
berg even suggests that formal culture is "generally much superior" in
"slave-owning tribes" (CEC, 1:19 n.6). All the pretensions to purity, im-
mediacy, and "innocent eyes" are belied by the reliance of high formalist
art on a very impure socioeconomic base, and its appeal to a sophisticated,
cultivated spectator whose eyes are far from innocent. The only thing
that prevents this art from being, in Greenberg's words, a decadent
"Alexandrianism" is the fact that it is not "motionless" but dynamic and
changing (CEC, 1:6).
Greenberg's account of the materialist underside of abstract art is
too vulgar for some consumers, not vulgar enough for others. (He doesn't
contemplate the possibility, for instance, that the "dynamic movement"
in avant-garde art may be something like the dynamic movement in
automobile styles and dress fashions.)18 But it did have the salutary effect
of exposing the contradictions of the avant-garde while at the same time
holding it together in a precarious unity, at least for a few years. T. J.
18. See Steinberg, Other Criteria, pp. 77-82, for a consideration of this possibility.
The pictorial conquest of the external visual world had been com-
pleted and refined many times and in different ways during the
previous half millennium. The more adventurous and original
artists had grown bored with painting facts. By a common and
powerful impulse they were driven to abandon the imitation of
natural appearance. [C, p. 11]
As for this diagram, I still recall vividly its heraldic power; for it
proclaimed, with a schema more familiar to the sciences, an evo-
lutionary pedigree for abstract art that seemed as immutable as a
chart tracing the House of Windsor or the Bourbon Dynasty. Dar-
winian assumptions merged with the pursuit of genealogical blue
blood in pronouncing, for instance, that a coupling of van Gogh
and Gauguin created Fauvism, just as sodium and chlorine would
make salt; and that Cubism, that most fertile of monarchs, had an
amazing variety of princely offspring, from Orphism to Purism.
At the bottom of the chart, which was marked off, in graph-paper
fashion, by five-year periods, starting in 1890 at the top and ending
with what was then the present, 1935, this multiplicity had been
distilled into two parallel but polarized currents, nongeometrical
and geometrical abstract art. The skeletal clarity and purity of this
diagram were fleshed out in the text itself, which ... outlined in
the most pithy and impersonal way the visual mutations and the
historical fact that accounted for the thrilling invention of a totally
unfamiliar art belonging to our century and to no other. [C, pp.
1-2]
Cizonne
1890 JAPANESE PRINTS Gauguin d. 1903 Pro
Seurat d.1891 1890
1895
Rousseau1895
1916
d.
Redon
1900 1 1900
I
ART
NEAR-EASTERN
1905 FAUVISM NEGROSCULPTURE 1905
i O1905 Poris
I\ CUBISM
I 1906-08 Paris
MACHINE ESTHETIC
1910 1 (ABSTRACT) FUTURISM 1910
EXPRESSIONISM
, 1910 Milon ORPHSM SUPRE
1912 Poris
1911 Munich
Broncusi CONSTRUCTIVISM
P 19
1915 Moscow1915
(ABSTRACT
DADAISM DE STIJLand
ZurichPoris PURISM NEOPLASTICISM
NEOPLASTICISM
1916 Colog e
1920 Bi por
Leyden Berlin 920
1920
,1918
Poris
1920,1916
Weimor Dessoau
1925
S•BSTRACT)
SURREALISM MODERN ,BAUHAUS 1925
ARCHITECTURE
1930 1930
NON-GEOMETRICAL
ABSTRACTART GEOMETRICAL
ABSTRACTART 193S
193S
1935 1935
FIG.4.-Chart by Alfred H. Barr, Jr., for dust jacket of book published to accompany
the exhibition Cubismand AbstractArt, 2 March-19 April 1936, The Museum of Modern
Art, New York.
22. See my essay, "The Rhetoric of Iconoclasm: Marxism, Ideology, and Fetishism,"
Iconology:Image, Text, Ideology (Chicago, 1986), pp. 160-208.
24. These associations were clear to Barr, who refused to buy "Flag" for the Museum
of Modern Art, "fearing patriotic repercussions" (Michael Crichton,JasperJohns [New York,
1977], p. 73).
FIG. 6.--Jasper
Johns, Target with Four
Faces.1955. Collection,
The Museum of
Modern Art, New York.
Gift of Mr. and Mrs.
RobertScull.
other (fig. 7), we find fragments of the human form, once again, I suspect,
displayed as a kind of consequence of or comment on the proposition
articulated by the target. It's hard to imagine a more vulgar and direct
set of statements combined with a more subtle commentary on the tradition
that Johns grows out of and deconstructs. The amazing thing is how
deaf even our best critics have been to these vulgarities, dismissing them
as "gimmicks," or neutralizing them as abstract types of "ordinari-
ness"-as if this were the way the concrete always had to end up, by just
being another mode of the abstract. But Johns is a great artist, not just
because he shows us a new way to make pictures, and thus a new way
to see, but because he gives voice to all that had been repressed in the
tradition he tries to overcome. A voice, that is, if we are willing to listen,
and not simply to reproduce the silences or the high-toned chatter of
"the Abstract" with a capital A.