EASTERN BROADCASTING CORP (DYRE) V. DANS JR.

[137 SCRA 628; L-59329; 19 JUL 1985]

Sunday, February 01, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: A petition was filed to reopen the Radio Station DYRE. DYRE was “summarily closed” on grounds of
national security. The radio station was allegedly used to incite people to sedition. Petitioner, DYRE contends
that they were denied due process. There was no hearing to establish factual evidence for the closure.
Furthermore, the closure of the radio station violates freedom of expression. Before the court could even
promulgate a decision upon the Issue raised, Petitioner, through its president Mr. Rene Espina, filed a motion to
withdraw the petition. The rights of the station were sold to a new owner, Manuel Pastrana; who is no longer
interested in pursuing the case. Despite the case becoming moot and academic, (because there are no longer
interested parties, thus the dismissal of the case) the Supreme Court still finds that there is need to pass a
“RESOLUTION” for the guidance of inferior courts and administrative tribunals in matters as this case.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not due process was exercised in the case of DYRE.

(2) Whether or not the closure of DYRE is a violation of the Constitutional Right of Freedom of Expression.

Held: The court finds that the closure of the Radio Station in 1980 as null and void. The absence of a hearing is
a violation of Constitutional Rights. The primary requirements in administrative proceedings are laid down in the
case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relation (69 Phil.635). The Ang Tibay Doctrine should be followed before
any broadcast station may be closed. The Ang Tibay Doctrine provides the following requirements:

(1) The right to hearing, includes the right to present one’s case and submit evidence presented.
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented
(3) The decision must have something to support itself.
(4) Evidence must be substantial (reasonable evidence that is adequate to support conclusion)
(5) Decision must be based on the evidence presented at hearing
(6) The tribunal body must act on its own independent consideration of law and facts and not simply accept
subordinate’s views
(7) Court must render decision in such a manner that the proceeding can know the various issued involved and
reasons for decisions rendered.

The court stresses that while there is no controlling and precise definition of Due Process, it gives an
unavoidable standard that government actions must conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty and property
is valid.

The closure of the radio station is like wise a violation of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and
expression. The court stresses that all forms of media, whether print or broadcast are entitled to this
constitutional right. Although the government still has the right to be protected against broadcasts which incite
the listeners to violently overthrow it. The test for the limitation of freedom of expression is the “clear and present
danger” rule. If in the circumstances that the media is used in such nature as to create this danger that will bring
in such evils, then the law has the right to prevent it. However, Radio and television may not be used to organize
a rebellion or signal a start of widespread uprising. The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the
vitality of a representative democracy. The people continues to have the right to be informed on public affairs
and broadcast media continues to have the pervasive influence to the people being the most accessible form of
media. Therefore, broadcast stations deserve the the special protection given to all forms of media by the due
process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.

AYER PRODUCTIONS VS. CAPULONG [160 SCRA 861; G.R. NO. L-82380; 29 APR 1988]
Sunday, February 08, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Ayer
Productions, envisioned, sometime in 1987, for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international
release, the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed motion picture entitled
"The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB as and other government agencies consulted.
Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production.

It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style,

creating four fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary footage
as background. David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright and Professor McCoy (University of
New South Wales) is an American historian have developed a script.

Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his
name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or
other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation. petitioners acceded to this demand and the
name of Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the projected
motion picture. However, a complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to privacy. RTC ordered for
the desistance of the movie production and making of any reference to plaintiff or his family and from
creating any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which nevertheless is based on, or bears substantial
or marked resemblance to Enrile. Hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not freedom of expression was violated.

Held: Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and produce motion
pictures and exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television. Furthermore
the circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to yield
monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression.
The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither
private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely look
like. There was, in other words, no "clear and present danger" of any violation of any right to privacy.
Subject matter is one of public interest and concern. The subject thus relates to a highly critical stage in
the history of the country.

At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public concern, that petitioners
propose to film were taking place, Enrile was a "public figure:" Such public figures were held to have
lost, to some extent at least, their right to privacy.

The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional freedom of
speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that
the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events.

G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976 PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner, vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER,
respondents. G.R. No. L-44684. October 12,1976 VICENTE M. GUZMAN, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ELECTIONS, respondent. G.R. No. L-44714. October 12,1976 RAUL M. GONZALES,
RAUL T. GONZALES, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE
COMMISSION ON SELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.
MARTIN, J,:

Facts: On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN
ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law. The
Commission on Elections, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election
Code (BP 881), said R.A. 6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to
govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. In a
petition dated November 20, 1989, herein petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be a newspaper
columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in
the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec
Resolution No. 2167, which provides: Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or
announcers. — During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite day, no
mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or
television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues It is alleged by petitioner that said
provision is void and unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of
expression and of the press enshrined in the Constitution.

Issue : WON the said Section 19 of resolution No 2167 is unconstitutional

Held: it is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the
power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued
for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or information to the
end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates
therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured Neither Article
IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the
Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners
themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their
freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In
fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No.
2167 has no statutory basis. While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner's freedom of
expression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the forum where he may express his view. No reason
was advanced by respondent to justify such abridgement. We hold that this form of regulation is
tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable reason. Plebiscite
issues are matters of public concern and importance. The people's right to be informed and to be able
to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged
discussion of the issues, including the forum. The people affected by the issues presented in a
plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression
may be exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression but
they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the public concerned because they are limited
to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or television times

United States v. O’Brien

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Citation. 130 S. Ct. 3353; 176 L. Ed. 2d 1245;2010 U.S.78 U.S.L.W. 3700

Brief Fact Summary. The Defendant, O’Brien (Defendant), was convicted for symbolically burning his
draft card under a federal statute forbidding the altering of a draft card. His conviction was upheld after
the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) found the law constitutional.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. First, a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the government. Second, if it furthers a substantial or important governmental
interest. Third, if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. Fourth, if
the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment constitutional freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Facts. The Defendant was convicted under Section:462(b)(3) of the Universal Military Training and
Service Act (UMTSA) of 1948, amended in 1965 to include the applicable provision that made it an
offense to “alter, knowingly destroy, knowingly mutilate”� a Selective Service registration certification.
Defendant knowingly burned his draft card on the front steps of the local courthouse. The Court of
Appeals held the 1965 amendment unconstitutional as a law abridging the freedom of speech.

Issue. Whether the 1965 Amendment is unconstitutional as applied to Defendant because his act of
burning the draft card was protected “symbolic speech”� within the First Amendment?
Whether the draft cards are merely pieces of paper designed only to notify registrants of their
registration or classification, to be retained or tossed into the waste basket according to the
convenience of the registrant?
Whether the 1965 Amendment is unconstitutional as enacted because it was intended to “suppress
freedom of speech?”�
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Held. No. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed. It cannot be accepted that there is an endless
and limitless variety of conduct that constitutes “speech”� whenever the person engaging in the
conduct intends to express an idea. However, even if the alleged communicative element of
Defendant’s conduct is sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution (Constitution), it does not necessarily follow that the destruction of a draft card is
constitutionally protected activity. First, a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the government. Second, if it furthers a substantial or important governmental
interest. Third, if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. Fourth, if
the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment constitutional freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest. The 1965 Amendment meets all these requirement
s. Therefore, the 1965 Amendment is constitutional as applied to Defendant.
No. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed. Although the initial purpose of the draft card is to
notify, it serves many other purposes as well. These purposes would be defeated if the card were to be
mutilated or destroyed.
No. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed. The purpose of Congress is not a basis for declaring
this legislation unconstitutional. Therefore, the 1965 Amendment is constitutional as enacted.

Discussion. This case creates a symbolic speech test that was used here to uphold the 1965
Amendment to the UMTSA.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
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Citation. 315 U.S. 568, 62 S. Ct. 766, 86 L. Ed. 1031, 1942 U.S. 851.

Brief Fact Summary. Chaplinsky was convicted under a State statute for calling a City Marshal a “God
damned racketeer”� and a “damned fascist”� in a public place.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. “Fighting words”� are not entitled to protection under the First Amendment of
the United States Constitution (Constitution)

Facts. A New Hampshire statute prohibited any person from addressing any offensive, derisive or
annoying word to any other person who is on any street or public place or calling him by any derisive
name. Chaplinsky, a Jehovah’s Witness, called a City Marshal a “God damned racketeer”� and a
“damned fascist”� in a public place and was therefore arrested and convicted under the statute.

Issue. Did the statute or the application of the statute to Chaplinsky’s comments violate his free speech
rights under the First Amendment of the Constitution?
Held. No. The lower court is affirmed.
Considering the purpose of the First Amendment of the Constitution, it is obvious that the right to free
speech is not absolute under all circumstances. There are some narrowly defined classes of speech
that have never been protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution. These include “fighting
words,”� words that inflict injury or tend to excite an immediate breach of the peace. Such words are of
such little expositional or social value that any benefit they might produce is far outweighed by their
costs on social interests in order and morality.
The statute at issue is narrowly drawn to define and punish specific conduct lying within the domain of
government power. Moreover, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, which is the ultimate arbiter of
the meanings of New Hampshire law, has defined the Statute as applying only to “fighting words”�.
Therefore, the Statute does not unconstitutionally impinge upon the right of free speech.
Discussion. By holding that “fighting words”� are not protected forms of speech the Supreme
Court of the United States (Supreme Court) announced a rare form of content based restriction on
speech that is permissible. The student should consider what characteristics distinguish a “fight word”�
from a bona fide criticism. One difference may lie in the speaker’s intent. “Fighting words”� are
intended to inflict harm, bona-fide criticisms are intended to communicate ideas. Another difference
may lie in the differing likely effects of each: “fighting words”� are likely to provoke the average person
to violence while bona fide criticisms are not.

alonzo vs. CA

FACTS:
Dr. Alonzo is the Field Operations Officer for Region XI of the Philippine Medical Care Commission
(PMCC). As a field inspector, she is assigned to inspect clinics in order to see to it that clinics are
properly following rules and regulations of the Philippine Medical Care Commission. She inspected Sto.
Niño Medical Clinic in Astorga, Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur, and Our Lady of Fatima Medical Clinic in
Guihing, Hagonoy, Davao del Sur. Both of these clinics were owned and managed by Dr. Angeles
Velasco, married to Judge Dan Velasco of the MTC-Hagonoy, Davao del Sur. After the inspection, Dr.
Alonzo submitted her report on her findings to Dr. Jesus Tamesis, PMCC Vice-Chairman.

A portion of the submitted report read:

“In all, this particular clinic should be closely monitored because, aside from the above mentioned
violations, the husband is a judge and it gives them a certain amount of "untouchability". In fact, they
make court suits their pastime.”
Finding such portion to be libelous, Dr. Velasco and her husband, Judge Dan Velasco, then filed a
complaint for libel against the petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the questioned report of Dr. Alonzo is libelous.

Held:
No.Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a libel is a public and malicious imputation of a
crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act or omission, condition, status, or
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person or to
blacken the memory of one who is dead.

For an imputation then to be libelous, the following requisites must concur:

(a) it must be defamatory;(b) it must be malicious;(c) it must be given publicity; and

(d) the victim must be identifiable.

Any of the imputations covered by Article 353 is defamatory and, under the general rule laid down in
Article 354, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true; if no good
intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, excerpt in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or
social duty; and

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks; of any judicial
legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report
or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise
of their functions.

The privileged character of these communications is not absolute, but merely qualified since they could
still be shown to be malicious by proof of actual malice or malice in fact. The burden of proof in this
regard is on the plaintiff or the prosecution.

Publication in the law of libel means the making known of the defamatory matter, after it has been
written, to some person other than the person of whom it is written. If the statement is sent straight to a
person whom it is written, there is no publication.
The Court held that the report in this case falls within the first paragraph of Article 354 of the Revised
Penal Code. Consequently, the presumption of malice or malice in law was negated by the privileged
character of the report. The privilege may only be lost by proof of malice in fact.

SC disagree with the conclusion of the trial court that malice in fact was duly proved in this case since
the petitioner “was moved by ill-will” because Dr. Velasco did not grant her “a loan of P1,500” and
refused “to bear the vacation expenses of her children.” This conclusion is purely inconclusive for, as a
matter of fact, Dr. Velasco herself was uncertain of these incidents indeed incited the petitioner.

All told then, the prosecution in this case was unable to prove malice in fact.

Finally there was, in law, no publication of the questioned report. The rule is settled that a
communication made by a public officer in the discharge of his official duties to another or to a body of
officers having a duty to perform with respect to the subject matter of the communication does not
amount to a publication within the meaning of the law on defamation.

G.R. No. 113216 September 5, 1997 RHODORA M. LEDESMA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Quezon City,
respondents

Facts : Sometime in April 1992, a complaint for libel was filed by Dr. Juan F. Torres, Jr. against Dr.
Rhodora M. Ledesma, petitioner herein, before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office, docketed as I.S.
No. 92-5433A. Petitioner filed her counter-affidavit to the complaint. Finding "sufficient legal and factual
basis," the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office filed on July 6, 1992 an Information for libel against
petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104. A petition for review of the
resolution of Assistant City Prosecutor Vestil was filed by petitioner before the Department of Justice
pursuant to P.D. No. 77 as amended by P.D. No. 911. The Department of Justice gave due course to
the petition and directed the Quezon City prosecutor to move for deferment of further proceedings and
to elevate the entire records of the case. 5 Accordingly, a "Motion to Defer, Arraignment" dated
September 7, 1992 was filed by Prosecutor Tirso M. Gavero before the court a quo. 6 On September 9,
1992, the trial court granted the motion and deferred petitioner's arraignment until the final termination
of the petition for review. 7 Without the consent or approval of the trial prosecutor, private complainant,
through counsel, filed a Motion to Lift the Order dated September 9, 1992 and to Set the Case for
Arraignment/Trial

Issue : WON the letter is libelous

Held : In every case for libel, the following requisites must concur: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must
be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable Petitioner's letter was
written to seek redress of proper grievance against the inaccurate distribution and payment of
professional fees and against unfair treatment in the Nuclear Medicine Department of the Philippine
Heart Center Petitioner's letter was written to seek redress of proper grievance against the inaccurate
distribution and payment of professional fees and against unfair treatment in the Nuclear Medicine
Department of the Philippine Heart Center. It is a qualified privileged communication under Article
354(1) of the Revised Penal Code Petitioner's letter was a private communication made in the
performance of a moral duty on her part. Her intention was not to inflict an unjustifiable harm on the
private complainant, but to present her grievance to her superior. The privileged nature of her letter
overcomes the presumption of malice. There is no malice when justifiable motive exists; and in the
absence of malice, there is no libel. We note that the information itself failed to allege the existence of
malice Further, we note that the information against petitioner was filed only on July 27, 1992 or one
year after June 27, 1991, the date the letter was sent. It is obviously nothing more than a
countercharge to give Complainant Torres a leverage against petitioner's administrative action against
him

In Alonzo, the settled rule is that, when a public officer, in the discharge of his or her official duties,
sends a communication to another officer or to a body of officers, who have a duty to perform with
respect to the subject matter of the communication, such communication does not amount to
publication within the meaning of the law on defamation.[35] Publication in libel means making the
defamatory matter, after it has been written, known to someone other than the person to whom it has
been written.[36] The reason for such rule is that a communication of the defamatory matter to the
person defamed cannot injure his reputation though it may wound his self-esteem. A mans reputation is
not the good opinion he has of himself, but the estimation in which others hold him.[37] In this case,
petitioner submitted the letter to the director of said hospital; she did not disseminate the letter and its
contents to third persons. Hence, there was no publicity and the matter is clearly covered by paragraph
1 of Article 354 of the Penal Code.

Further, we note that the information against petitioner was filed only on July 27, 1992 or one year after
June 27, 1991, the date the letter was sent. It is obviously nothing more than a countercharge to give
Complainant Torres a leverage against petitioners administrative action against him.

Ineluctably, Judge Asuncions denial of the motion to withdraw the information and the reconsideration
thereof was not only precipitate but manifestly erroneous. This is further compounded by the fact that
he did not explain his grounds for his denial inasmuch as he did not make an independent assessment
of the motion or the arguments in the resolution of the secretary of justice. All in all, such rash action
did not do justice to the sound ruling in Crespo vs. Mogul upon which, ironically, he supposedly rested
his action, or to the directive in Marcelo and Martinez where this Court required trial courts to make an
independent assessment of the merits of the motion.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Motion to Withdraw
the Information dated February 17, 1993 filed before the trial court is GRANTED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Borjal v Court of Appeals 301 SCRA 1 January 14, 1999

Facts: A civil action for damages based on libel was filed before the court against Borjal and Soliven for
writing and publishing articles that are allegedly derogatory and offensive against Francisco
Wenceslao, attacking among others the solicitation letters he send to support a conference to be
launch concerning resolving matters on transportation crisis that is tainted with anomalous activities.
Wenceslao however was never named in any of the articles nor was the conference he was organizing.
The lower court ordered petitioners to indemnify the private respondent for damages which was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. A petition for review was filed before the SC contending that private
respondent was not sufficiently identified to be the subject of the published articles.

Issue: Whether or not there are sufficient grounds to constitute guilt of petitioners for libel.

Held: In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable although it is not
necessary that he be named. It is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the
person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person could identify him as the
object of the libelous publication. These requisites have not been complied with in the case at bar. The
element of identifiability was not met since it was Wenceslaso who revealed he was the organizer of
said conference and had he not done so the public would not have known.

The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the press and that privileged
communications must be protective of public opinion. Fair commentaries on matters of public interest
are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair
comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false,
because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation
is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public
person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation
to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on
a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is
immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the
facts.

The questioned article dealt with matters of public interest as the declared objective of the conference,
the composition of its members and participants, and the manner by which it was intended to be funded
no doubt lend to its activities as being genuinely imbued with public interest. Respondent is also
deemed to be a public figure and even otherwise is involved in a public issue. The court held that
freedom of expression is constitutionally guaranteed and protected with the reminder among media
members to practice highest ethical standards in the exercise thereof.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A privileged communication may be either:

1. Absolutely privileged communication à those which are not actionable even if the author has acted
in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art.VI, of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a member
of Congress from liability for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any Committee thereof.

2. Qualifiedly privileged communications à those containing defamatory imputations are not actionable
unless found to have been made without good intention justifiable motive. To this genre belong "private
communications" and "fair and true report without any comments or remarks."

SALVADOR D. FLOR VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 139987. March 31, 2005

Facts: Information for libel was filed before the RTC, Branch 20, Naga City, against the petitioner and
Ramos who were then the managing editor and correspondent, respectively, of the Bicol Forum, a local
weekly newspaper circulated in the Bicol Region. It states: On or about the 18th day up to the 24th day
of August, 1986, in the Bicol Region comprised by the Provinces of Albay, Catanduanes, Sorsogon,
Masbate, Camarines Sur, and Camarines Norte, and the Cities of Iriga and Naga, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court under R.A. No. 4363, and B.P. Blg. 129, the above-
named accused who are the news correspondent and the managing editor, respectively, of the local
weekly newspaper Bicol Forum, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without
justifiable motive and with malicious intent of impeaching, discrediting and destroying the honor,
integrity, good name and reputation of the complainant as Minister of the Presidential Commission on
Government Reorganization and concurrently Governor of the Province of Camarines Sur, and to
expose him to public hatred, ridicule and contempt, write, edit, publish and circulate an issue of the
local weekly newspaper BICOL FORUM throughout the Bicol Region, with banner headline and front
page news item read by the public throughout the Bicol Region “VILLAFUERTE’S DENIAL
CONVINCES NO ONE”. The trial court found the petitioner guilty. The Court of Appeals likewise upheld
the decision of the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not the questioned news item is libelous.

Held: No. Libel is defined as “a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of a natural person or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is
dead.” The law recognizes two kinds of privileged matters. First are those which are classified as
absolutely privileged which enjoy immunity from libel suits regardless of the existence of malice in fact.
The other kind of privileged matters are the qualifiedly or conditionally privileged communications
which, unlike the first classification, may be susceptible to a finding of libel provided the prosecution
establishes the presence of malice in fact. The exceptions provided for in Article 354 of the Revised
Penal Code fall into this category. The interest of society and the maintenance of good government
demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is
a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of
officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be
assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. Rising superior to any official, or set of officials, to the
Chief Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary – to any or all the agencies of Government – public
opinion should be the constant source of liberty and democracy.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-39258 November 15, 1982
RAYMUNDO A. ARMOVIT, ROBERTO L. BAUTISTA, OSCAR S. ATENCIO, and POLICARPIO
MAPUA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, Presiding Judge, Branch VII, Court of First Instance of
Manila, ADEZ REALTY, INC., PILAR I. VDA. DE ZUZUARREGUI, PACITA JAVIER, ANTONIO DE
ZUZUARREGUI, JR., ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI, and VICTORINO GASKELL, respondents.

Raymundo Armovit, Roberto L. Bautista and Oscar S. Atencio for petitioners.

Senen S. Ceneza for respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:

The invocation of the constitutional right to freedom of expression 1 in a motion to dismiss an action for
damages flied by petitioners as defendants failed to obtain an affirmative response from respondent
Judge Amante P. Purisima. Hence this certiorari, prohibition and mandamus proceeding, assailing on
jurisdictional grounds the order denying such motion. The alleged grievance of private respondents 2
as plaintiffs in a case then pending before respondent Judge 3 arose from the first two paragraphs of
the answer of petitioners 4 as defendants, worded as follows: "[Defendant], through counsel, by way of
answer to the complaint, respectfully, represents: 1. The averments of plaintiff's alleged due
organization and existence (par. 1, Complaint) is denied — it falsifies the fact of its creation and
operation as an instrument and front for illegal and oppressive usurious loan transactions; the
averments on defendant's personal circumstances (supra) are admitted, with the qualification that his
dealings with plaintiff were based on good faith and reliance on his part, but taken advantage of by
scheming plaintiff. 2. That averments on the alleged loan secured on 3 December 1971 in the sum of
P7,270.00 and accessory sums thereon, the supposed demands for payment and requests for
extensions, the alleged failure of defendant to pay (pars. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, supra) are specifically denied
as fraudulent distortions of the facts and apparent disguises to confuse and conceal the true
agreements between the parties," 5 after which came the affirmative defenses. The privileged
character of such words employed in a pleading on a matter impressed with relevance, usury being the
defense, is not difficult to discern, if, as should be the case, there be recognition of the basic
constitutional right of free expression. So it would be in accordance with an unbroken line of decisions
of this Tribunal. It does appear, therefore, that petitioners are entitled to the remedies prayed for.

The facts are undisputed. This litigation had its origin in a suit for collection filed by plaintiff Adez
Realty, Inc., now one of the private respondents, seeking the payment of P7,270.00 with 12% interest
and 25% of such amount as liquidated damages. 6 The principal allegation was that plaintiff, now
respondent, Adez Realty, Inc. agreed to extend to the defendant, now petitioner, Policarpio Mapua and
did deliver to him a loam in the amount of P7,270.00 on the condition that failure to liquidate such loan
on the date due would result in paying not only the principal with interest but the equivalent to 25% as
liquidated damages. 7 It was then stated that defendant Mapua had not paid such overdue debt, hence
the filing of this case for collection. 8 The answer was filed with the alleged offending paragraphs
thereof as duly noted at the outset of this opinion. 9 Moreover, the affirmative defenses contained the
following allegations: "3. The transactions between plaintiff and defendant are in reality a loan of
P5,000.00 secured way back in 1969 earning usurious interest at the rate of 5% monthly, or 60% per
annum to the extent that defendant was unable to pay said usurious interest and at the same time
liquidate the principal amount of P5,000.00 by December 3, 1971, such that 4. On 3 October 1971,
plaintiff's jargon and double-talk caused defendant to sign the alleged promissory note — Annex A,
Complaint, which plaintiff managed to facelift and veneer as a lawful deed and agreement, but stripped
of its gloss, it is null and void, for being contrary to the laws policy against usury. 5. Considering the
payments by defendant of 5% interest monthly on the principal since 1969, or P250.00 monthly, until 3
December 1971, defendant had fully paid the principal indebtedness. 10 The language employed in
such answer resulted, as had been stated, in a complaint for damages filed with the Court of First
Instance of Manila before respondent Judge. 11 Then came the motion to dismiss, which as set forth,
was predicated on the matter complained of being absolutely privileged. 12 When after an opposition to
such motion 13 and a reply to such opposition 14 were submitted, the lower court issued the order
denying the motion to dismiss, 15 this petition was filed with this Court, a motion for reconsideration
having proved futile. 16

To repeat, the petition is impressed with merit.

1. "The prevailing rule," according to Justice Malcolm in the leading case of Santiago v. Calvo," 17
is that parties, counsel and witnesses are exempted from liability in libel or slander for words otherwise
defamatory published in the course of judicial proceedings, provided the statements are pertinent or
relevant to the case." 18 Such doctrine was foreshadowed in the earlier case of Zurbito v. Bayot, 19
decided in 1911. In the language of Justice Johnson: "If the persons presenting the claim are, in the
opinion of those opposing it, attempting to have a claim allowed which should not be snowed, they
have a right to state their reasons therefor, even though such opposition may incidentally reflect upon
the honor and credit of the person presenting the claim." 20 A year after the Santiago ruling, a similar
pronouncement came from the pen of another eminent jurist, Justice Street in Baron v. David. 21 Thus:
"It is clear that with respect to these damages the cross-action cannot be maintained, for the reason
that the affidavit in question was used in course of a legal proceeding for the purpose of obtaining a
legal remedy, and it is, therefore, privileged." 22 The then Justice, now retired Chief Justice
Concepcion in the leading case of Sison v. David 23 restated the principle: "It is, thus, clear that
utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and
motions, belong to the class of communications that are already absolutely privileged." 24 As so
emphatically stressed by the late Chief Justice Castro in Deles v. Aragona:" 25 The doctrine of
privileged communication is not an Idle and empty principle. It has been distilled from wisdom and
experience." 26

2. It is undoubted likewise, as held in Tolentino v. Baylosis, Justice J.B.L. Reyes being the
ponente, 27 that as to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary for the invocation of this
absolute privilege, "the courts favor a liberal rule." 28 He added: "The matter to which the privilege
does not extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no
reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy and impropriety. In order that matter alleged in a pleading
may be privileged, it need not be in every case material to the issues presented by the pleadings. It
must, however, be legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to the subject of the controversy that it
may become the subject of inquiry in the course of the trial." 29 He likewise quoted from the aforesaid
Santiago v. Calvo decision: "For, as aptly observed in one case, 'while the doctrine of privileged
communications is liable to be abused, and its abuse may lead to great hardships, yet to give legal
sanction to such suits as the present would, we think, give rise to far greater hardships.'" 30 The
language of the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Bengzon in Dorado v. Pilar 31 is apropos:
"Undoubtedly, lawyers should be allowed some latitude of remark or comment in the furtherance of
causes they uphold. For the felicity of their clients they may be pardoned some infelicities of phrase."
32 It bears mentioning that in Deles, 33 such sentiment was pharaphrased by Chief Justice Castro in
this wise: "Lawyers, most especially, should be allowed a great latitude of pertinent comment in the
furtherance of the causes they uphold, and for felicity of their clients, they may be pardoned some
infelicities of language." 34

3. The language of this Court on the question of what pleadings enjoy absolute immunity is not
swathed in obscurity. Nor has there been only change of mind - far from it. This Court has consistently
adhered to what it had stated with clarity as far as 1911. If at all, the later decisions had been even
more emphatic to dissipate any lurking doubt that the rule of liberality so unequivocally set forth must
be upheld. The principle that calls for application is crystal-clear. The immunity parties and counsel
enjoy is absolute — as long as the test of relevance is met. There is need, it would seem, to keep in
mind that as Hokfeld pointed out, the correlative of immunity is disability. Respondent Judge failed to
heed such an imperative. It ought to have granted the motion to dismiss. Petitioners, to repeat, are
entitled to the remedies sought. So this Court has ruled in the aforecited cases of Zurbito and Baylosis
as wen as People v. Andres. 35

WHEREFORE, certiorari is granted and the assailed order denying the motion to dismiss is annulled.
Respondent Judge or whoever may be acting in his stead is prohibited from taking any further action in
Civil Case No. 94551 except to dismiss the same. To that extent, mandamus lies. No costs.

Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Guerrero, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. L-45031 October 21, 1991

NANERICO D. SANTOS, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako Law Offices for petitioner.

FERNAN, C.J.:

Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeal promulgated on August 25, 1976 which
affirmed the judgment of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VIII (Pasig) convicting
Nanerico D. Santos of the crime of libel and sentencing him to pay a fine of P6,000.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, to indemnify the private offended parties Carlos Moran Sison and
Luis F. Sison in the amount of P50,000.00 by way of actual, consequential and exemplary damages
and costs. 1

The instant petition raises the ultimate issue of whether or not the publication of a complaint filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission before any judicial action is taken thereon is privileged as a
report of a judicial proceeding.

On February 23, 1970, petitioner Nanerico D. Santos as a columnist of the then Manila Daily Bulletin
wrote and published in his weekly column an article entitled "Charges Against CMS Stock Brokerage,
Inc." which article was quoted verbatim from an unverified complaint filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on February 13,1970 by Rosario Sison Sandejas and her daughters charging
CMS Stock Brokerage Inc., particularly its board chairman and controlling stockholder Carlos Moran
Sison and its president-general manager Luis F. Sison, of engaging in fraudulent practices in the stock
market.

On the very day that the news item appeared, Carlos Moran Sison sought a meeting with petitioner
Santos so that he could submit to the columnist his reply which he wanted published "the very next
day" and in the same column. They met at about 6:15 in the evening at the Andres-Soriano Executive
Center in Makati, Rizal where petitioner promised Sison that he would have the reply published, not on
the next day, but in the February 25, 1970 issue of the Manila Daily Bulletin because " it was already
past the deadline for the next day's issue."

The reply was not published on February 25, 1970 as petitioner had promised and so Carlos Moran
Sison called petitioner by phone to tell him not to publish the reply anymore as it would only rekindle
the talks. Sison also informed petitioner that he would be sued for libel, to which statement petitioner
retorted: "Well, sue me for libel." 2

About a week later when Carlos Moran Sison chanced upon petitioner at the Hotel Intercontinental
lobby, the latter asked Sison: "When will you sue me?" Petitioner received his answer on March 4,1970
when the appropriate complaint for libel was lodged against him by Carlos Moran Sison and Luis F.
Sison before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. Charge together with petitioner were Mariano
B. Quimson, Jr., Hans M. Menzi, M.M. de los Reyes, Felix G. Gonzales and Ben Rodriguez, also of the
Manila Daily Bulletin. Subsequently, the corresponding information was filed before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Pasig) on November 16, 1970. 3 It is interesting to note that a few weeks following
the publication of the complaint, Santos' weekly column was stopped, ostensibly to cut down on
overhead expenses brought about by the adoption of the floating rate in foreign exchange . 4

On January 26, 1971, upon motion of the trial fiscal and with the conformity of the offended parties, the
lower court dismissed the case against all the accused, with the exception of petitioner Nanerico D.
Santos.

In due time, the trial court rendered its judgment of conviction. In affirming the decision, respondent
Appellate Court declared:

The article in question is not a privileged communication. At the time the complaint filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission was published in the column of the accused there was as yet no
proceeding at which both parties had an opportunity to be present and to be heard. (Barreto vs.
Philippine Publishing Co., 30 Phil. 88). Publishing an article based upon a complaint filed in a Court of
First Instance before any judicial action is taken thereon is not privileged as a report of a judicial
proceeding. (Choa Tek Hee vs. Philippine Publishing Co., 34 Phil, 447).

The article in question is libelous. It imputes a crime to the private offended parties, that of 'willful
violation of the provisions of the Securities Act and the implementing Rules and Regulations issued by
the commission'which is penalized by imprisonment or fine or both and said published article of the
accused imputes to the private offended parties, as stockbrokers, fraudulent acts and illegal
purchases/sales and manipulations of securities to the prejudice of their customers and the general
investing public, which acts actually caused the dishonor, discredit or contempt of the private offended
parties. (Annex "D", Rollo, pp. 6-7).

The case is now before us for resolution.

The applicable provision of law is Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code which states as follows:

Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. — Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious,
even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the
following cases:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral
or social duty; and

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative or other official proceedings which are of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or
speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of
their functions.

Generally, malice is presumed (malice in law) in every defamatory imputation. This presumption,
however, does not arise if the communication is privileged under Article 354.

Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 354 refer to qualifiedly privileged communications. 5 The character of the
privilege is a matter of defense which may be lost by positive proof of express malice. In other words,
the onus of proving actual malice is placed on the plaintiff who must then convince the court that the
offender was prompted by malice or ill will. Once this is accomplished, the defense of privilege is
unavailing. Thus, under Article 362 of the Revised Penal Code, it is provided that:

Art. 362. Libelous remarks. — Libelous remarks or comments connected with the matter privileged
under the provisions of article 354, if made with malice, shall not exempt the author nor the editor or
managing editor of a newspaper from criminal liability. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner now insists that the published article is privileged, being a fair and true report of a judicial
proceeding, without comments or remarks, and therefore not punishable. He maintains that the alleged
libelous news report which came out in the Manila Daily Bulletin was merely lifted from a complaint
word for word, except for the last innocuous paragraph which he added to the effect that "(i)nvestors
and Sison's fellow brokers are eagerly awaiting developments on these charges". Moreover, he
contends that the cited rulings in the cases of Barreto vs. Philippine Publishing Co., 30 Phil. 88 and
Choa Tek Hee vs. Philippine Publishing Co., 34 Phil. 447, are no longer valid. Petitioner's arguments
are well-taken.

It must be recalled that in holding petitioner liable for libel, both the trial court and the Appellate Court
applied the doctrine established in the aforementioned 1915-1916 cases. Briefly:

An answer to a complaint filed in court, containing libelous matter, is not privileged so as to exempt a
newspaper from prosecution under the Libel Act for a publication thereof, no action having been taken
by the court thereon. (Barretto vs. Philippine Publishing Co., supra).
Publishing an article based upon a complaint filed in a Court of First Instance before any judicial action.
is taken thereon is not privileged as a report of a judicial proceeding. (Choa Tek Hee vs. Philippine
Publishing Co., supra).

The Court, through Justice Moreland, gave the rationale:

The foundation of the right of the public to know what is going on in the courts is not the fact that the
public, or a portion of it, is curious, or that what goes on in the court is news, or would be interesting, or
would furnish topics of conversation; but is simply that it has a right to know whether a public officer is
properly performing his duty. In other words, the right of the public to be informed of the proceedings in
court is not founded in the desire or necessity of people to know about the doings of others, but in the
necessity of knowing whether its servant, the judge, is properly performing his duty. Only clear
provisions of law can justify a newspaper, or an individual, in spreading baseless charges of fraud or
corruption made by one man against another, wherever such charges may be found. The fact that such
charges are contained in a paper filed in court gives no inherent right to an individual to peddle its
contents from door to door or spread them broadcast; and a newspaper has no more privileges than an
individual. Between the newspaper and the individual there is no difference of right. The real difference
between them lies in the ability of the one to spread the publication more quickly, more extensively, and
more thoroughly than the other. Unless, therefore, the statute plainly confers that right, the publication
of such charges is actionable unless justified. . . .

It is generally agreed that the privilege, the right to publish without liability for damages, does not
extend to mere pleadings filed in court, as, for example, bills in equity, upon which there has been no
action. (Cited cases). The reason for this rule is thus stated in Park v Detroit Free Press Co.: There is
no rule of law which authorizes any but the parties interested to handle the files or publish the contents
of their matters in litigation. The parties, and none but the parties, control them. One of the reasons why
parties are privileged from suit for accusations made in their pleadings is that the pleadings are
addressed to courts where the facts can be fairly tried, and to no other readers. If pleadings and the
documents can be published to the world by any one who gets access to them, no more effectual way
of doing malicious mischief with impunity could be devised than filling papers containing false and
scurrilous charges, and getting these printed news. . . . (Barreto vs. Philippine Publishing Co., supra,
pp. 92-93, 105-106).

However, it would seem that the passage of time has worked to petitioner's great advantage. In 1976,
the doctrine so fervently and eloquently espoused by Justice Moreland in the Barreto case was
overturned by this Court through Justice Esguerra in Cuenco vs, Cuenco, No. L-29560, March 31, 1976
70 SCRA 212, 234-235. Thus:

The reason for the rule that pleadings in judicial proceedings are considered privileged is not only
because said pleadings have become part of public record open to the public to scrutinize, but also due
to the undeniable fact that said pleadings are presumed to contain allegations and assertions lawful
and legal in nature, appropriate to the disposition of issues ventilated before the courts for the proper
administration of justice and, therefore, of general public concern. Moreover, pleadings are presumed
to contain allegations substantially true because they can be supported by evidence presented in good
faith, the contents of which would be under the scrutiny of courts, and therefore, subject to be purged of
all improprieties and illegal statements contained therein.

We are firmly convinced that the correct rule on the matter should be that a fair and true report of a
complaint filed in court without remarks nor comments even before an answer is filed or a decision
promulgated should be covered by the privilege.

In Manuel vs. Pano, supra, the Court, speaking through Justice Cruz, categorically stated that the
publication of a complaint, being a true and fair report of a judicial proceeding, made in good faith and
without comments or remarks, is privileged and comes under Item 2 of Article 354. It is no longer
correct to state that Article 354 is not applicable because the published complaint as filed would not by
itself constitute a judicial proceeding, as the issues have not as yet been joined. That doctrine
established in the Barretto and Choa Tek Hee cases is no longer controlling and has been superseded
by the Cuenco case. Moreover, it could also be argued that the complaint, by itself, is a public record
and may be published as such under Rule 135, Section 2 of the Rules of Court unless the court directs
otherwise in the interest of morality or decency.

We now come to the all-important consideration of whether the prosecution, in an effort to remove the
protection of privilege, was able to establish that the columnist charged with libel was in fact motivated
by malice.

It is plainly evident from a reading of the published article itself that it is but a faithful reproduction of a
pleading filed before a quasi-judicial body. There are no embellishments, wild imputations, distortions
or defamatory comments calculated to damage the reputation of the offended parties and expose them
to public contempt. What petitioner has done was to simply furnish the readers with the information that
a complaint has been filed against a brokerage firm. Then he proceeded to reproduce that pleading
verbatim in his column. Now this is decidely part and parcel of petitioner's job as a columnist whose
"beat" happens to be the stock market. He is obligated to keep the public abreast of the current news in
that particular field. On this crucial point, the Court is inclined to resolve all doubts in favor of petitioner
and declare that there is no libel. It may be well for us to keep in mind that the rule on privileged
communications in defamation cases developed because "public policy, the welfare of society and the
orderly administration of justice" have demanded protection for public opinion. Therefore, they should
not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice and falsehood. Such
excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged communications. 6

The controversial publication being a fair and true report of a judicial proceeding and made without
malice, we find the author entitled to the protection and immunity of the rule on privileged matters under
Article 354 (2). It follows that he cannot be held criminally liable for libel.

WHEREFORE, the conviction of petitioner Nanerico D. Santos is SET ASIDE and he is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime of libel. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Policarpio vs. Manila Times

GR no. L-16027, May 30, 1962

Conception, J.:

FACTS: Plaintiff Lumen Policarpio seeks to recover damages from Manila Times by reason of the
publication in the Saturday Mirror and the Daily Mirror of two articles which are claimed to be per se
defamatory, libelous and false and jeopardize her integrity and good name. These articles were about
the charges against her which caused her to be separated from her service as a executive secretary of
the local UNESCO National Commission. Plaintiff maintains that the effect of these false statements
was to give the general impression that she was guilty or at least probably guilty of the crimes of
malversation of public funds and estafa. Likewise, she asserted that there are other inaccuracies in the
news item.

ISSUE: W/N Manila Times had acted maliciously in publishing the aforementioned articles.

RULING: Affirmative. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no

good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or
social duty; and

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report
or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise
of other functions.

In the case at bar, aside from containing information derogatory to the plaintiff, the article
presented her in a worse predicament than that in which she, in fact, was. In other words, said article
was not a fair and true report of the proceedings there in alluded to. What is more, its sub-title —
"PCAC RAPS L. POLICARPIO ON FRAUD" — is a comment or remark, besides being false.
Accordingly, the defamatory imputations contained in said article are "presumed to be malicious".

Lopez vs. CA (1970)

Lopez publisher and owner of Manila Chronicle and Gatbonton (Editor) v. Court of Appeals and Cruz
(1970)
Ponente: Fernando, J.

Facts:
o January 1956 – Front-page story on the Manila Chronicle à Fidel Cruz, sanitary inspector assigned
to the Babuyan Islands, sent distress signals to US Airforce planes which forwarded such message to
Manila
o An American Army plane dropped emergency sustenance kits on the beach of the island which
contained, among other things, a two way radio set. Using the radio set Cruz reported to the authorities
in Manila that the locals were living in terror due to a series of killings committed on the island since
Christmas of 1955.
o Philippine defense forces (scout rangers) were immediately deployed to the babuyan claro. They
were led by Major Wilfredo Encarnacion who discovered that Cruz only fabricated the story about the
killings to get attention. Cruz merely wanted transportation home to Manila.
o Major Encarnacion branded the fiasco as a “hoax” à the same word to be used by the newspapers
who covered the same
o January 13, 1956 - This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle, edited by Gatbonton devoted a
pictorial article to it. It claimed that despite the story of Cruz being a hoax it brought to light the misery
of the people living in that place, with almost everybody sick, only 2 individuals able to read and write
and food and clothing being scarce
o January 29, 1956 - This Week Magazineà in the "January News Quiz" made reference to Cruz as “a
health inspector who suddenly felt "lonely" in his isolated post, cooked up a story about a murderer
running loose on the island of Calayan so that he could be ferried back to civilization.” à Called it “Hoax
of the year”
o In both issues photos of a Fidel Cruz were published but both photos were of a different person of
the same name à Fidel G. Cruz former mayor, business man, contractor from Santa Maria, Bulacan
o January 27, 1957 à published statements correcting their misprint and explained that confusion and
error happened due to the rush to meet the Jan 13th issue’s deadline
o Cruz sued herein petitioners for libel in CFI Manila. Cruz won and was awarded P11,000 in damages
(5k actual, 5k moral, 1k attorney’s fees)
o CA affirmed CFI decision hence this case

Issue:
o WON petitioners should be held liable for their error in printing the wrong Fidel Cruz’s photo in
relation to the “hoax of the year”?
o WON such error is sufficient ground for an action for libel to prosper?

Held:
Yes they are liable but damages awarded to Cruz is reduced to P1,000.00

Ratio:
1. Mistake is no excuse to absolve publishers because libel is harmful on its face by the fact that it
exposes the injured party to more than trivial ridicule, whether it is fact or opinion is irrelevant.
o Citing Lu Chu Sing v. Lu Tiong Gui à libel is "malicious defamation, expressed either in writing,
printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, ..., tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead or to
impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish the alleged or natural defects of one who is alive,
and thereby "pose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule,"
o Citing standard treatise of Newell on Slander and Libel à "Publication of a person's photograph in
connection with an article libelous of a third person, is a libel on the person whose picture is published,
where the acts set out in the article are imputed to such person."
o In this case à 3rd person was Cruz à his picture being published beside the article imputes him as
the purveyor of the hoax of the year

2. Libel cannot be used to curtail press freedom however it also can not claim any talismanic
immunity form constitutional limitations
o State interest in press freedom à citing Justice Malcolm: Full discussion of public affairs is necessary
for the maintenance of good governance… “Public officials must not be too thin-skinned with reference
to comments on official acts”…”of course criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as an
individual is less than the state, so must expected criticism be born for the common good.”
o So long as it was done in good faith, the press should have the legal right to have and express their
opinions on legal questions. To deny them that right would be to infringe upon freedom of the press.
o “Last word on the subject” à Citing Quisumbing v. Lopez: Press should be given leeway and
tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our
democracy
o Freedom of the press ranks high in the hierarchy of legal values
o TEST of LIABLITY à must prove there was actual malice in publishing the story/photo! (Note: but this
was not done in this case)

4. Citing Concepcion, CJ. à Correction of error in publishing does not wipe out the responsibility
arising from the publication of the original article
o Correction = Mitigating circumstance not a justifying circumstance!

. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1964 U.S. LEXIS 1500, 376 U.S. 967, 84 S. Ct. 1130, 12 L. Ed. 2d
83 (U.S. 1964)

Brief Fact Summary. The Plaintiff, Sullivan (Plaintiff) sued the Defendant, the New York Times Co.
(Defendant), for printing an advertisement about the civil rights movement in the south that defamed
the Plaintiff.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The constitutional guarantees require a federal rule that prohibits a public
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he
proves that the statement was made with actual malice — that is, with knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.

Facts. The Plaintiff was one of three Commissioners of Montgomery, Alabama, who claimed that he
was defamed in a full-page ad taken out in the New York Times. The advertisement was entitled, “Heed
Their Rising Voices”� and it charged in part that an unprecedented wave of terror had been directed
against those who participated in the civil rights movement in the South. Some of the particulars of the
advertisement were false. Although the advertisement did not mention the Plaintiff by name, he claimed
that it referred to him indirectly because he had oversight responsibility of the police. The Defendant
claimed that it authorized publication of the advertisement because it did not have any reason to
believe that its contents were false. There was no independent effort to check its accuracy. The Plaintiff
demanded that the Defendant retract the advertisement. The Defendant was puzzled as to why the
Plaintiff thought the advertisement reflected adversely on him. The jury found the ad libe
lous per se and actionable without proof of malice. The jury awarded the Plaintiff $500,000 in damages.
The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. The Defendant appealed.

Issue. Is the Defendant liable for defamation for printing an advertisement, which criticized a public
official’s official conduct?
Held. No. Reversed and remanded.
* Safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press are required by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution (Constitution) in a libel action brought by a public official
against critics of his official conduct.
* Under Alabama law, a publication is libelous per se if the words tend to injure a person in his
reputation or to bring him into public contempt. The jury must find that the words were published of and
concerning the plaintiff. Once libel per se has been established, the defendant has no defense as to
stated facts unless he can persuade the jury that they were true in all their particulars.
* Erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate and it must be protected if the freedoms of
expression are to have the breathing space that the need to survive.
* The constitutional guarantees require a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement
was made with actual malice — that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.
* The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) holds that the Constitution delimits a
State’s power to award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials against critics of their
official conduct. In this case, the rule requiring proof of actual malice is applicable.
* The Defendant’s failure to retract the advertisement upon the Plaintiff’s demand is not adequate
evidence of malice for constitutional purposes. Likewise, it is not adequate evidence of malice that the
Defendant failed to check the advertisements accuracy against the news stories in the Defendant’s own
files. Also, the evidence was constitutionally defective in another respect: it was incapable of supporting
the jury’s finding that the allegedly libelous statements were made of and concerning the Plaintiff.
Concurrence. Justice Hugo Black (J. Black) argued that the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Constitution do not merely “delimit”� a State’s power to award damages, but completely prohibit a
State from exercising such a power. The Defendant had an absolute, unconditional right to publish
criticisms of the Montgomery agencies and officials.

Discussion. In order for a public official to recover in a defamation action involving his official conduct,
malice must be proved. Without the showing of malice, the Supreme Court felt that a defamation action
in this case would severely cripple the safeguards of freedom speech and expression that are
guaranteed in the First Amendment of the Constitution and applicable to the States via the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution.

Black Letter Law: to view the black letter law, scroll down to the LexisNexis Headnotes of this case.
What’s a headnote?

Jalandoni v. Drilon
327 SCRA 107
FACTS: Private respondents published a full-page advertisement in five major daily newspapers.
These ads contained allegations naming petitioner who was then a PCGG Commissioner of having
committed illegal and unauthorized acts. Petitioner filed a complaint for the crime of libel.

HELD: In libel cases against public officials, for liability to arise, the alleged defamatory statement must
relate to official conduct, even if the defamatory statement is false, unless the public official concerned
proves that the statement was made with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that it was false or not.
Here, petitioner failed to prove actual malice on the part of the private respondents. The statements
embodied in the advertisement are covered by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech. This
carries the right to criticize the action and conduct of a public official.
JALANDONI V DRilon
Private respondent Ledesma filed an administrative complaint for violation of the RPC and the Anti-
Graft andCorrupt Practices Act against the petitioner with the PCGG. Exactly a year thereafter,
petitioner Jalandoni filed acomplaint for the crime of libel against officials/directors of OPMC. Herein is
a petition for certiorari seeking tonullify and set aside the orders of the Honorable Secretary of Justice
withdrawing the information in I.S. Nos. 93-6228 and 93-6422 and denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by herein petitioner Jalandoni.Issue:Can malice be presumed from defamatory
words? Who has the burden of proving malice?

Held:No. Under Article 361 of the Revised Penal Code, in libel cases against public officials, for liability
to arise, thealleged defamatory statement must relate to official conduct, even if the defamatory
statement is false, unless thepublic official concerned proves that the statement was made with actual
malice, that is, with knowledge that it wasfalse or not. The subject of the defamatory statement has the
burden of proving malice on the part of the author ofsuch statement. The same was not written to cast
aspersion on the good name of the petitioner. The paidadvertisement merely served as a vehicle to
inform the stockholders of the going-ons in the business world and onlyexposed the irregularities
surrounding the PCGG and RCBC deal and the parties involved.R. Reyes Trucking V. People, 329
SCRA 600Imprudence and Negligence – Art. 365
Facts:

Fermin versus Court of Appeals GR 157643

Here is the digest I made of the recent libel conviction handed down by the Supreme Court in Fermin
versus Court of Appeals (March 28, 2008):
If the utterances are false, malicious or unrelated to a public officer's performance of his duties or
irrelevant to matters of public interest involving public figures, the same may give rise to criminal and
civil liability
Fermin versus CA
Facts:
On complaint of spouses Annabelle Rama Gutierrez and Eduardo (Eddie) Gutierrez, two (2) criminal
informations for libel were filed against Cristinelli Salazar Fermin and Bogs C. Tugas before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. Fermin was charged being the publisher of “Gossip
Tabloid” while Tugas was editor-in-chief.
The Informations quoted the portion of the article complained against which was published on June 14,
1995, which read:
"MAS MALAKING HALAGA ANG NADISPALKO NILA SA STATES, MAY MGA NAIWAN DING
ASUNTO DOON SI ANNABELLE"
"IMPOSIBLENG NASA AMERIKA NGAYON SI ANNABELLE DAHIL SA KALAT DIN ANG ASUNTO
NILA DU'N, BUKOD PA SA NAPAKARAMING PINOY NA HUMAHANTING SA KANILA MAS
MALAKING PROBLEMA ANG KAILANGAN NIYANG HARAPIN SA STATES DAHIL SA PERANG
NADISPALKO NILA, NAGHAHANAP LANG NG SAKIT NG KATAWAN SI ANNABELLE KUNG SA
STATES NGA NIYA MAIISIPANG PUMUNTA NGAYON PARA LANG TAKASAN NIYA SI LIGAYA
SANTOS AT ANG SINTENSIYA SA KANYA"
Fermin raised the defense of press freedom. She admitted to having a close association with
congressman Roilo Golez and Paranaque Mayor Joey Marquez, and that she used her skills as writer
to campaign for them during the 1995 elections where Eddie Gutierrez, was also a candidate for
congress running against Golez.
Fermin also argued that to sustain a conviction for libel it is mandatory that the publisher knowingly
participated in or consented to the preparation and publication of the libelous article.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Fermin can validly raise trhe defense of press freedom.
2. Whether or not as publisher she is liable for libel.
Held:
1. Fermin cannot validly raise the defense of press freedom.
If the utterances are false, malicious or unrelated to a public officer's performance of his duties or
irrelevant to matters of public interest involving public figures, the same may give rise to criminal and
civil liability. While complainants are considered public figures for being personalities in the
entertainment business, media people, including gossip and intrigue writers and commentators such as
Fermin, do not have the unbridled license to malign their honor and dignity by indiscriminately airing
fabricated and malicious comments, whether in broadcast media or in print, about their personal lives.
Neither can petitioner take refuge in the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and of the
press. Although a wide latitude is given to critical utterances made against public officials in the
performance of their official duties, or against public figures on matters of public interest, such criticism
does not automatically fall within the ambit of constitutionally protected speech.
2. Fermin, as publisher is guilty of libel, whether or not she had actual knowledge and participation,
having furnished the means of carrying on the publication of the article purportedly prepared by the
members of the Gossip Reportorial Team, who were employees under her control and supervision. It is
worthy to note that Fermin was not only the "publisher", as shown by the editorial box of Gossip
Tabloid, but also its "president" and "chairperson" as she herself admitted on the witness stand. She
also testified that she handled the business aspect of the publication, and assigns editors to take
charge of everything. Obviously, Fermin had full control over the publication of articles in the said
tabloid. Her excuse of lack of knowledge, consent, or participation in the release of the libelous article
fails to persuade TEAcCD
Note:
Instead of the penalty of imprisonment of 3 months 11 days to one year 8 months and 21 days, the
Supreme removed the penalty of imprisonment (pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 08-2008) and
imposed a fine of P6,000 each. But the Supreme Court slapped Fermin with moral damages of
P500,000 each private complainant.
GONZALEZ VS KALAW KATIGBAK

FACTS: Petitioner was the producer of the movie Kapit sa Patalim which the Board of Review for
Motion Pictures and Televisions allowed on condition that certain deletions were made and that it was
shown on adults only. The petitioner brought an action, claiming violation of their freedom of
expression.

HELD: Motion pictures are important both as a method for the communication of ideas and the
expression of the artistic impulse. The power of the Board is limited to the classification of films. For
freedom of expression is the rule and restrictions the exception. The power to impose prior restraint is
not to be presumed, rather the presumption is against its validity. Censorship is allowable only under
the clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to public safety, public morals,
public health or any other legitimate public interest. The Board committed an abuse of discretion in
subjecting petitioner to difficulty and travail before the movie was classified as "For adults only" without
deletion. However there is not enough votes to consider the abuse of discretion grave as it explained
that there were reasons for its action because of the scenes showing women erotically dancing naked
and kissing and caressing each other like lesbians. VV.

Notes: The movie involved in this case was "Kapit sa Patalim" which the censors wanted to cut in
some part and to label "For Adults". The SC rules that movies are within the constitutional protection of
freedom of expression, so that censorship is presumed to be valid as constituting prior restraint. The
only case whe the Board of Censors can order a deletion is when there is a clear and present danger of
a substantive evil against national security or public morals or other public interest. In all other cases,
the Board can only classify.

But a different standard must be followed in television because of the pervasive and intrusive influence
of the medium on people who watch its programs without having to pay anything.

On the issue of obscenity, the SC held that sex along is not necessarily obscenity, the test being
whether, using contemporary community standards, the dominant appeal us to the prurient interest.
(Miller v. California). Thus on this score, it found abuse of discretion of the part of the Board for
subjecting the producer to difficulty and for entertaining a narrow view of obscenity, but it lacked the
votes to rules that the abuse was grave.