ATTY.

ROMULO MACALINTAL vs PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL

TRIBUNAL (2010)

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Confronting us is an undesignated petition1 filed by Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal (Atty. Macalintal), that
questions the constitution of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized
progeny of Section 4,2Article VII of the Constitution:

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose.

FACTS:

Petition filed by Atty. Macalintal that questions the constitution of the PET as an
illegal and unauthorized progeny of SECTION 4(7), ARTICLE VII of the
Constitution, to wit:

“The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualification of the President or Vice-President, and
may promulgate its rules for the purpose”

Petitioner concedes that the Supreme Court is “authorized to promulgate its rules
for the purpose, “he chafes at the creation of a purportedly “separate tribunal”
complemented by a budget allocation, a seal, a set of personnel and confidential
employees, to effect the constitutional mandate.

Further, petitioner highlights the SC decision in Buac v, COMELEC which

peripherally declared that “contests involving the President and the Vice-President
fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the PET, in the exercise of quasi-
judicial power.”

Petitioner reiterates that the Constitution, which prohibits the designation of

Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law to any
agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

Petitioner is adamant on his contention that the provision, as worded, does not
authorize the constitution of the PET. And although he concedes that the Supreme
Court may promulgate its rules for this purpose, petitioner is insistent that the
constitution of the PET is unconstitutional.

However, petitioner avers that it allows the Court to appoint additional personnel
for the purpose, notwithstanding the silence of the constitutional provision.

ISSUE/S:

I. Whether petitioner has locus standi to file the instant petition.

II. Whether the creation of the PET is unconstitutional for being a violation
of par. 7, section 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

III. Whether the designation of members of the Supreme Court as members

of the PET is unconstitutional for being a violation of Section 12, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING:

Petition is dismissed.

1. The issue of locus standi is derived from the following requisites of a

judicial inquiry:
 a. There must be an actual case or controversy;
b. The question of constitutionality must raised by the proper party;
c. The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and
d. The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself.

This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In people v. Vera, it
held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a “personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct
injury as a result”

However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi

may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion. This was done in the
1949 Emergency Power Cases, Araneta v. Dinglasan, where the “transcendental
importance” of the case prompted the Court to act liberally.

By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the case decided by
this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded
standing to sue, provided that the following are met:

1. Cases involve constitutional issues;

2. For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds
or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
3. For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the
election law in question’
4. For concerned citizens, there must be showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
5. For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of
infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.
Since the creation and continued operation of the PET involves the use of public
funds and the issue raised herein is of transcendental importance, it is petitioner’s
humble submission that, as a citizen, a taxpayer and a member of the BAR, he has
the legal standing to file this petition.

But even if his submission is valid, petitioner’s standing is still imperilled by the
white elephant in the petition, i.e., his appearance as counsel for former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the election protest filed by 2004 presidential
candidate Fernando Poe Jr before PET, because judicial inquiry, as mentioned
above, requires that constitutional question be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity. Such appearance as counsel before the Tribunal, to our mind have
been the first opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of the Tribunal’s
constitution.

2. The Supreme Court as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), the Senate

Electoral Tribunal (SET) and House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) are electoral tribunals, each specifically and exclusively clothed
with jurisdiction by the Constitution to act respectively as:

“Sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President and Vice-President, Senators, and Representatives.”

In a litany of cases, this Court has long recognized that these electoral tribunals
exercise jurisdiction over election contests only after a candidate has already been
proclaimed winner in an election.

Petitioner, prominent election lawyer who has filed several cases before this Court
involving constitutional and election law issues, cannot claim ignorance of :
a. The invocation of our jurisdiction under Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution; and
b. The unanimous holding thereon.
Unquestionably, the overarching framework affirmed in Tecson V COMELEC is
that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to decide presidential and vice-
presidential election protests while concurrently acting as an independent Electoral
Tribunal.

It is well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the

Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that
all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject should be considered and
interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one
section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the
two can be made to stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in
favour of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one
which may make the words idle and nugatory.

On its face, the contentious constitutional provision does not specify the
establishment of the PET. But neither does it preclude, much less prohibit,
otherwise. It entertains divergent interpretations which, though unacceptable to
petitioner, do not include his restrictive view, one which really does not offer a
solution.

Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, the provision under scrutiny, should be
read with other related provisions of the Constitution such as the parallel
provisions on the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House of
Representatives.

The 1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers of the three great
branches of the government. To recall the words of Justice Laurel in Angara v
Electoral Commission, “the Constitution has blocked but with deft strokes and
bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial
departments of the government.”
Thus, the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that the legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines, the executive power shall be vested in
the President of the Philippines, and the judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. These
provisions not only establish a separation of powers by actual division but also
confer plenary legislative, executive and judicial powers subject only to limitations
provided in the Constitution.

The Court could not have been more explicit then on the plenary grant and exercise
of judicial power. Plainly, the abstraction of the Supreme Court acting as a
Presidential Electoral Tribunal from the unequivocal grant of jurisdiction in the last
paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution is sound and tenable.

3. The issue raised by petitioner is more imagined than real. Section 12, Article
VIII of the Constitution reads:

“The members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall
not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions.”

The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution which provides that the power “shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.” Consistent with our
presidential system of government, the function of “dealing with the settlement of
disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are
legally demandable and enforceable”.

With the advent of the 1987 Constitution judicial power was expanded to include
“the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”

The power was expounded, but it remained absolute.