G.R. No.

214883 September 02, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRISTINA SAMSON
MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS: Appellant Cristina Samson and victim Jerry Delmar were married and begot two daughters.
Throughout their marriage, they were in constant fighting, and this was always witnessed by their
children and other nearby relatives.
On June 27, 2002, while appellant was in their house watching television with her children, her
husband came in drunk. Because appellant was not able to cook dinner, they had a fight which later
on led to the victim pointing a knife at appellant’s neck. Appellant begged her husband not to hurt her,
but the latter continued threatening her with the knife and even told her to stop talking or else he will
put a hole in her neck. He even slapped her face twice. When the fight escalated, appellant was able
to get hold of the knife and begged her husband not to come near her. However, the victim still
continued to move towards her. That was when appellant stabbed the victim, who then fell on the
ground and crawled until he reached the door. Upon hearing the commotion at their daughter’s
house, appellant’s father and brother came to help and bring the victim to the hospital. The victim
eventually died in the hospital.
Appellant was charged with Parricide. She pleaded not guilty and invoked the justifying circumstance
of self-defense. However, the RTC found that there was no more unlawful aggression against
appellant when she stabbed the victim, thereby invalidating her claim of self-defense. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Hence, this present appeal.

ISSSUE:
1. Whether or not there still exists an unlawful aggression against appellant even if the victim was
already disarmed, in order that self-defense may be properly invoked.
2. Whether or not there is a reasonable necessity of the means employed by Cristina in order for her
to be justified in killing her husband.

HELD:
1. AFFIRMATIVE. It seems that the victim’s aggression had already ceased when he was disarmed,
but the perceived peril to Cristina’s life persisted as the victim continued to move towards her. It was
only until she stabbed the victim that the danger to her life ended. Despite having been disarmed, the
victim still posed a threat and peril to the life of the appellant, leaving her with no choice but to defend
herself or else she would be the one to die.
Unlawful aggression does not strictly require that there be an actual physical force or actual use of
weapon against the offender that poses a threat and imminent danger on his life. It is sufficient that
the offender be in reasonable perception or belief that his life is still in danger. Such reasonable belief
of a perceived peril or threat to one’s life would justify the offender’s action of taking defense and
eventually killing the victim.
2. AFFIRMATIVE. There was reasonable necessity for Cristina to stab the victim in the attendant
circumstance, as her husband is much stronger than her, and there are no other available means or
any less deadly weapon to prevent or repel the threat other than the knife she holds. There is no
more time for her to think and calculate how she would save herself from the imminent danger posed
against her life, so she can only follow her instinct to use the readily available means of defense,
which, in this case, is the knife on hand.
Also, it does not mean that just because the victim was no longer armed, the means employed by
Cristina is already unreasonable. Perfect equality between the weapon used by the one defending
himself and that of the aggressor is not required. What the law requires is a rational equivalence.
There is obviously no showing that there was sufficient provocation on the part of Cristina for her
husband to hurt her. Moreover, her flight and evasion of arrest for four years does not automatically
mean guilt, but could be justified by her fear of possible retaliation from her husband’s relatives.
Therefore, herein appeal is granted and Cristina is acquitted and ordered immediately released.
SOPLENTE V. PEOPLE (G.R. NO. 152715)
FACTS: The cousins, Rogelio and Nicanor, watched the amateur singing contest being held near the
Sta. Cruz Chapel. While engrossed with the singing contest, they were approached by two persons
from the group of Leyson who then tapped Nicanor’s shoulder. They insisted on bringing Nicanor
along with them so Nicanor called for Rogelio’s help. The latter immediately intervened to stop the
two from harassing Nicanor. At about past eleven o’clock in the evening (11:00 p.m.), before the
conclusion of the amateur singing contest, Rogelio and Nicanor decided to go home. At past
midnight, Bukay (their cousin’s wife) asked Rogelio and Nicanor to accompany her in looking for her
children who had watched the singing contest. They obliged but before they had gone about three
hundred meters, Nicanor separated from them to buy cigarettes from a nearby store. Rogelio and
Bukay went onwards but at a distance of about fifty meters from the stage, Rogelio stopped and
Bukay proceeded alone to look for her children. A few minutes later, Bukay appeared with the
children and they all headed home. While on the way home, Rogelio suddenly found himself
surrounded by around ten persons led by Leyson. He shouted at Nicanor to run and the latter
immediately scampered away. Leyson drew his gun and fired at Rogelio but the latter was able to
parry it by tapping the base of Leyson’s hand holding the gun. Forthwith, Rogelio stabbed Leyson
once. He was kicked by Notarte immediately after he stabbed Leyson. Rogelio also stabbed Notarte.
Rogelio managed to escape after that and he sought refuge in the house of Susing (their cousin).
Before dawn, a policeman arrived at Susing’s house and Rogelio voluntarily gave himself up. The
knife he used was also turned over to the police. He was brought to the police substation at Lagao.
ISSUE: Whether or not our laws on self-defense are suppose to approximate the natural human
responses to danger.
DECISION: At the commencement of the attack, Rogelio could not have been obliged to view
Notarte, or any other member of the posse for that matter, as a less menacing threat than Leyson.
We have to understand that these events occurred spontaneously in a matter of seconds or even
simultaneously. Rogelio bore no superhuman power to slow down time or to prevent the events from
unfolding at virtual warp speed, to be able to assess with measured certainty the appropriate
commensurate response due to each of his aggressors. Even those schooled in the legal doctrines of
self-defense would, under those dire circumstances, be barely able to discern the legally defensible
response and immediately employ the same. Our laws on self-defense are supposed to approximate
the natural human responses to danger, and not serve as our inconvenient rulebook based on which
we should acclimatize our impulses in the face of peril. It would be wrong to compel Rogelio to have
discerned the appropriate calibrated response to Notarte’s kicking when he himself was staring at the
evil eye of danger. That would be a gargantuan demand even for the coolest under pressure.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JERRY ANTONIO Y DIOLATA, accused-
appellant.
G.R. No. 144933 | July 3, 2002 (First Division)
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Facts: Accused-appellant was convicted of murder. The facts as presented by the prosecution show
that at 1:00 in the early morning of October 11, 1998, the victim, Jomar Ephan, was engaged in a
drinking session with Reynaldo Ephan and Roselito Dacillo in front of a store in Barangay Pakna-an,
Mandaue City. Accused-appellant arrived and bought cigarettes. Then, he ordered Jomar, Reynaldo
and Roselito to count the cigarettes he bought, but the three told accused-appellant to let the
storekeeper do the counting. Rebuked, accused-appellant left the store. He returned minutes later and
suddenly stabbed the victim at the back, after which he immediately fled. The victim was rushed by his
companions to the hospital but died the following day.

On the other hand, the defense tried to prove that deceased attempted to hit accused-appellant but
because the former was very drunk, he missed and fell on his belly. It was at this point when accused-
appellant got hold of a knife he saw under the table and stabbed the deceased at the back.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in rejecting accused-appellant’s self-defense theory

Held: No.Where an accused invokes self-defense, he thereby admits authorship of the crime. The
burden of proof is thus shifted on him to prove all the elements of self-defense, to wit: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the
aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused.

In the case at bar, even if we sustain the version of accused-appellant that the initial act of aggression
came from the group of the deceased, still we cannot uphold his plea of self-defense. As testified by
accused-appellant himself, the deceased who was at that time very drunk tried to hit him but missed
and fell on the ground. At that point, unlawful aggression ceased and it was no longer necessary for
him to stab the deceased. It was accused-appellant, therefore, who became the aggressor when he,
despite the condition of the deceased, proceeded to stab the latter at the back. His act can no longer
be interpreted as an act of self-preservation but a perverse desire to kill. Hence, he cannot successfully
claim the benefit of self-defense. Furthermore, if it were true that the companions of the deceased
ganged up on him, his attack should have been directed against them and not against the deceased
who was already defenseless and lying on the ground.
PEOPLE VS. CA & TANGAN

Doctrine:

▪ The element of unlawful aggression in self-defense must not come from the person defending
himself but from the victim. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient.

▪ Sufficient provocation as a requisite of incomplete self-defense is different from sufficient

provocation as a mitigating circumstance. As an element of self-defense, it pertains to its absence on
the part of the person defending himself; while as a mitigating circumstance, it pertains to its
presence on the part of the offended party.

Facts:
▪ Victim is Generoso Miranda, 29 yo optometrist. Accused is Navy Captain Eladio Tangan.
▪ Both were driving along Roxas Boulevard and they had several encounters on the road that caused
anger to both parties.
▪ Gereroso pulled over and got off his car, so did Tangan where they exchanged expletives: Putang
ina mo, bakit mo ginigitgit ang sasakyan ko?" Generoso and Tangan then exchanged expletives.
Tangan pointed his hand to Generoso and the latter slapped it, saying, "Huwag mo akong dinuduro!
Sino ka ba, ano ba ang pinagmamalaki mo?" Tangan countered, "Ikaw, ano ang gusto mo?" With
this, Tangan went to his car and got his .38 caliber handgun on the front seat.
▪ Prosecution claims that accused pointed the gun to Generoso and shot MIranda at a distance of
about a meter. The shot hit the stomach of Generoso Miranda causing the latter to fall and while still
conscious, Generoso Miranda told Manuel Miranda, his uncle also riding his car, to get the gun.
Manuel Miranda grappled for the possession of the gun and during their grappling, Rosalia Cruz
intervened and took hold of the gun and after Rosalia Cruz has taken hold of the gun, a man wearing
a red T-shirt took the gun from her. The man in T-shirt was chased by Manuel Miranda who was able
to get the gun where the man in red T-shirt placed it.
▪ The defense, however, claims that after the gun was taken by the accused from inside his car, the
Mirandas started to grapple for possession of the gun and during the grappling, and while the two
Mirandas were trying to wrest away the gun from the accused, they fell down at the back of the car of
the accused. According to the accused, he lost the possession of the gun after falling at the back of
his car and as soon as they hit the ground, the gun fell, and it exploded hitting Generoso Miranda. So
he now claims self defense as a justifying circumstance.
▪ Tangan was then charged with homicide with the use of a licensed firearm, and he was separately
charged with illegal possession of unlicensed firearm.
▪ LC acquitted Tangan of illegal possession of firearm, but convicted him of homicide. The privileged
mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense and the ordinary mitigating circumstances of
sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party and of passion and obfuscation were
appreciated in his favor.
▪ CA affirmed judgment of trial court.

Issue: WON the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense was properly granted?

Held: No. The element of unlawful aggression was not proven in this case.

▪ In order that incomplete self-defense as a mitigating circumstance may be successfully

appreciated, it is necessary that a majority of the requirements of selfdefense be present, particularly
the requisite of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Unlawful aggression by itself or in
combination with either of the other two requisite suffices to establish incomplete self-defense. Absent
the unlawful aggression, there can never be self- defense, complete or incomplete, because if there is
nothing to prevent or repel, the other two requisites of defense will have no basis.
▪ The element of unlawful aggression in self-defense must not come from the person defending
himself but from the victim. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient. Likewise, the
exchange of insulting words and invectives between Tangan and Generoso Miranda, no matter how
objectionable, could not be considered as unlawful aggression, except when coupled with physical
assault. There being no lawful aggression on the part of either antagonists, the claim of incomplete
self-defense falls. Tangan undoubtedly had possession of the gun, but the Mirandas tried to wrestle
the gun from him. It may be said that the former had no intention of killing the victim but simply to
retain possession of his gun. However, the fact that the victim subsequently died as a result of the
gunshot wound, though the shooter may not have the intention to kill, does not absolve him from
culpability. Having caused the fatal wound, Tangan is responsible for all the consequences of his
felonious act. He brought out the gun, wrestled with the Mirandas but anticipating that the gun may be
taken from him, he fired and fled.

▪ The third requisite of lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself is not
supported by evidence. By repeatedly blocking the path of the Mirandas for almost five times, Tangan
was in effect the one who provoked the former. The repeated blowing of horns, assuming it was done
by Generoso, may be irritating to an impatient driver but it certainly could not be considered as
creating so powerful an inducement as to incite provocation for the other party to act violently.

▪ Sufficient provocation as a requisite of incomplete self-defense is different from sufficient

provocation as a mitigating circumstance. As an element of self-defense, it pertains to its absence on
the part of the person defending himself; while as a mitigating circumstance, it pertains to its
presence on the part of the offended party.

Dispositive: Defendant’s petition for review is DISMISSED. The appealed decision is AFFIRMED
with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) Tangan is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with all the accessory penalties. (2) Tangan is
ordered to pay the victim's heirs P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P42,000.00 as funeral and burial
expenses, P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. MAMERTO NARVAEZ, defendant-appellant.
G.R. Nos. L-33466-67 April 20, 1983|En Banc
MAKASIAR, J.

FACTS: In the afternoon of August 22, 1968, Graciano Juan, Jesus Verano and Cesar Ibanez together
with the two deceased Davis Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia, were fencing the land of George Fleischer,
father of deceased Davis Fleischer. The place was in the boundary of the highway and the hacienda
owned by George Fleischer. This is located in the municipality of Maitum, South Cotabato. At the place
of the fencing is the house and rice drier of appellant Mamerto Narvaez.

At that time, appellant was taking his rest, but when he heard that the walls of his house were being
chiseled, he arose and there he saw the fencing going on. If the fencing would go on, appellant would
be prevented from getting into his house and the bodega of his ricemill. So he addressed the group,
saying 'Pare, if possible you stop destroying my house and if possible we will talk it over what is good,'
addressing the deceased Rubia, who is appellant's compadre. The deceased Fleischer, however,
answered: 'No, gademit, proceed, go ahead.' Appellant apparently lost his equilibrium and he got his
gun and shot Fleischer, hitting him. As Fleischer fell down, Rubia ran towards the jeep, and knowing
there is a gun on the jeep, appellant fired at Rubia, likewise hitting him. Both Fleischer and Rubia died
as a result of the shooting'

CFI convicted the accused of murder qualified by treachery with the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: W/N the defendant’s act of killing the deceased falls under the justifying circumstances of
defense of property?

HELD: NO. The act of killing of the two deceased by appellant is not disputed. Appellant admitted
having shot them from the window of his house with the shotgun which he surrendered to the police
authorities. He claims, however, that he did so in defense of his person and of his rights, and therefore
he should be exempt from criminal liability.

Defense of one's person or rights is treated as a justifying circumstance under Art. 11, par. 1 of the
Revised Penal Code, but in order for it to be appreciated, the following requisites must occur:

First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself (Art. 11,
par. 1, Revised Penal Code, as amended).

The actuation of deceased Fleischer in angrily ordering the continuance of the fencing would have
resulted in the further chiselling of the walls of appellant's house as well as the closure of the access to
and from his house and rice mill-which were not only imminent but were actually in progress. There is
no question, therefore, that there was aggression on the part of the victims: Fleischer was ordering,
and Rubia was actually participating in the fencing. This was indeed aggression, not on the person of
appellant, but on his property rights.

The following provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines are in point:
Art. 536. In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as
there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or a right
 to deprive another of the holding of a thing must invoke the aid of the competent court, if
the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.
Art. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should he
be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by the means
established by the laws and the Rules of Court (Articles 536 and 539, Civil Code of the
Philippines).

Conformably to the foregoing provisions, the deceased had no right to destroy or cause damage to
appellant's house, nor to close his accessibility to the highway while he was pleading with them to stop
and talk things over with him. The assault on appellant's property, therefore, amounts to unlawful
aggression as contemplated by law.
Illegal aggression is equivalent to assault or at least threatened assault of immediate and
imminent kind (People vs. Encomiendas, 46 SCRA 522).

In the case at bar, there was an actual physical invasion of appellant's property which he had the right
to resist, pursuant to Art. 429 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:
Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person
from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may
be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical
invasion or usurpation of his property (Emphasis supplied).

The reasonableness of the resistance is also a requirement of the justifying circumstance of self-
defense or defense of one's rights under paragraph 1 of Article 11, Revised Penal Code. When the
appellant fired his shotgun from his window, killing his two victims, his resistance was disproportionate
to the attack.

WE find, however, that the third element of defense of property is present, i.e., lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of appellant who was defending his property. As a matter of fact, there was no
provocation at all on his part, since he was asleep at first and was only awakened by the noise produced
by the victims and their laborers. His plea for the deceased and their men to stop and talk things over
with him was no provocation at all.

Be that as it may, appellant's act in killing the deceased was not justifiable, since not all the elements
for justification are present. He should therefore be held responsible for the death of his victims, but he
could be credited with the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to
paragraph 6, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
Plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines

accused-appellat: Cunigunda Boholst-Caballero (Boholst here, for brevity)

Facts:

(According to Boholst)

 The couple had a rough marriage. Soon after, Caballero left, and Boholst and her daughter was left to the
support of her parents.
 One night, after carolling, Boholst met Caballero who upon seeing her, manhandled her. There were an
exchange of words and later on, Caballero was already holding her by the hair and slapping her face until
her nose bled.
 Caballero pushed her to the grounds, and to stop herself from falling, she held on to his waist. As she did so,
she grasped the knife tucked by the left side of his body.
 She fell to the ground then Caballero knelt over her and chocked her saying that he will kill her. Because she
had no other recourse, she pulled out the knife of her husband and thrust it at him, hitting the left side of his
body near the belt line.
 When she was finally free, she ran home and on the way, she threw the knife.
 In the morning, she surrendered to the police and presented the torn and blood-stained dress she wore that
night. The police officer accompanied her to look for the weapon but when it can no longer be found, she
was advised to just give any knife and she did (now marked Exhibit C).

(According to the Prosecution’s witness, Caballero’s friend)

 On the night of the incident, Boholst was already waiting for Caballero, and when he approached her, she
suddenly stabbed Francisco her with the knife marked by the prosecution as Exhibit C.
 His friends brought him to the hospital where he was later interviewed by the police officer confirming that his
wife stabbed him. But because he needs blood transfusion, he needs to be transferred to another hospital.
He died on the way.

Issue: Did Boholst act in legitimate defense of her person?

Held: Yes.

Ratio decidendi:

 The RTC held that Boholst’s evidence was not clear and convincing:
 Testimony improbable as brought out by her demonstration during the trial
 No wound or injury on her body treated by the physician
 That the knife used was a Moro knife and not exhibit C is incredible
 Contradictory statements
 Has motive: husband’s abandonment
 The court departs from the general rule that appellate court will not disturb the findings of the trial court on
facts testified by the witnesses
 The trial court judge overlooked an important piece of evidence that could confirm the narration of the
appellant: location of the wound inflicted on the victim.
 As she was flat on her back and and her husband choking her, she had no other recourse but to pull out the
knife inserted at the left side of her husband’s belt and stabbed him hitting the left back portion just below the
waist, as also described by the attending physician as the left lumbar region.
 The fact that the blow landed in the vicinity from where the knife was drawn is a strong indication of the truth
of her testimony, for as she lay on the ground with her husband bent over her it was quite natural for her right
hand to get hold of the knife tucked in the left side of the man’s belt and thrust it at that section of the body
nearest to her hand at the moment.
 This particular location of the wound negates the credibility of the prosecution witness that is if it was true,
then the wound should have been directed towards the front of the body of the victim rather than at his back.
 The Court finds the location of the wound as a valuable circumstance which confirms the plea of self-
defense.
 Appellant also lacks motive. She declared that she still loved her husband and for several months prior to the
incident, she appeared resigned to her fate.
 She also surrendered herself immediately the morning after.
 The court also believed that the knife must be a blade of six inches as stated by Boholst for it to penetrate
through the left lumbar region to the victim’s large intestine and cause the discharge of fecal matter. >.<
 All the elements of self-defense are present:
 unlawful aggression as pointed out above
 reasonable necessity for means employed: woman strangled and chocked by a furious aggressor,
rendered almost unconcious by the strong pressure on her throat. What is vital is the imminent peril to
Boholst’s life. The knife afforded appellant the only reasonable means with which she could free and
save herself. Necessity knows no law.
 Lack of sufficient provocation: Boholst did not provoke Caballero. She gave a valid excuse that she went
carolling to earn money for their child.

Boholst acted in the legitimate defense of her person. Judgment of conviction set aside. Acquitted.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. LUIS B. TORING DIOSDADO BERDON and CARMELO B. BERDON, accused-appellants.
G.R. No. L-56358 October 26, 1990|Third Division
FERNAN, C.J.

FACTS: In the evening of May 25, 1980, a benefit dance was held for the last canvassing of votes for
the candidates for princesses who would reign at the sitio fiesta. Members of the kwaknit gang, headed
by the accused Luis Toring, were present.

At around 10:45 PM, Samuel Augusto stepped out of the dancing area to answer the call of nature. At
the same time, Luis Toring and his group proceeded to the dark area while whispering to each other.
The accused then stabbed with the knife the right side of Samuel’s abdomen. Upon being seen by a
witness, the group then fled towards the dark.

in his defense, Toring stated that it was Samuel who approached them and held one of their members.
Then Samuel thrust the butt of his shotgun on the chin of another member, proceeded to another group
who were also gangmates of Toring. Toring then reacted to what he saw and got his kitchen knife,
approached Samuel and stabbed him twice.

RTC discredited the claim of Toring and found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder by direct participation as principal; Diosdado Berdon as accomplice thereto and
Carmelo Berdin as accessory after the fact.

Toring seeks his exoneration by contending that the assault was justified because he acted in defense
of his first cousin.

ISSUE: W/N the assault of the accused is justified since it was made in defense of his relative.

HELD: NO. The appreciation of the justifying circumstance of defense of a relative, however, hinges in
this case on the presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Corollarily, the claim of
Toring that Samuel was, at the time of the assault, carrying a shotgun to intimidate Toring's group must
be proven.

The presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and the lack of proof of provocation on
the part of Toring notwithstanding, full credence cannot be given, to Toring's claim of defense of a
relative. Toring himself admitted in court as well as in his sworn statement that in 1979, he was shot
with a .22 caliber revolver by Edgar Augusto, Samuel's brother. It cannot be said, therefore, that in
attacking Samuel, Toring was impelled by pure compassion or beneficence or the lawful desire to
avenge the immediate wrong inflicted on his cousin. Rather, he was motivated by revenge, resentment
or evil motive because of a "running feud" between the Augusto and the Toring brothers. As the defense
itself claims, after the incident subject of the instant case occurred, Toring's brother, Arsenio, was shot
on the leg by Edgar Augusto. Indeed, vendetta appears to have driven both camps to commit unlawful
acts against each other. Hence, under the circumstances, to justify Toring's act of assaulting Samuel
Augusto would give free rein to lawlessness.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court insofar as it convicts Luis Toring as principal
in the murder of Samuel Agusto and Diosdado Berdon as an accomplice thereto.
 (STATE OF NECESSITY)

VICKY C. TY, petitioner,

vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 149275 |September 27, 2004|Second Division
TINGA, J.

FACTS: Petitioner’s mother Chua Lao So Un was confined at the Manila Doctors’ Hospital (hospital)
from 30 October 1990 until 4 June 1992. Being the patient’s daughter, petitioner signed the
"Acknowledgment of Responsibility for Payment" in the Contract of Admission dated 30 October 1990.
As of 4 June 1992, the Statement of Account shows the total liability of the mother in the amount of
P657,182.40. Petitioner’s sister, Judy Chua, was also confined at the hospital from 13 May 1991 until
2 May 1992, incurring hospital bills in the amount of P418,410.55. The total hospital bills of the two
patients amounted to P1,075,592.95.

On 5 June 1992, petitioner executed a promissory note wherein she assumed payment of the obligation
in installments. To assure payment of the obligation, she drew several postdated checks against
Metrobank payable to the hospital. The seven (7) checks, each covering the amount of P30,000.00,
were all deposited on their due dates. But they were all dishonored by the drawee bank and returned
unpaid to the hospital due to insufficiency of funds, with the "Account Closed" advice. Soon thereafter,
the complainant hospital sent demand letters to Ty by registered mail. As the demand letters were not
heeded, complainant filed the seven (7) Informations subject of the instant case.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court finding the accused guilty of
seven counts of violation of B.P. 22.

Petitioner interposed the defense that she issued the checks "under the impulse of an uncontrollable
fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or injury."

ISSUE: W/N the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant exemption from criminal liability.

HELD: NO. For this exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the following requisites must
concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear
of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed.

It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and imminence that
the ordinary man would have succumbed to it. It should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable
fear for one’s life or limb. A mere threat of a future injury is not enough. It should not be speculative,
fanciful, or remote. A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion was
such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well. It
must be of such character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape.

In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. Ty claims that she
was compelled to issue the checks--a condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her before her
mother could be discharged--for fear that her mother’s health might deteriorate further due to the
inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse, her mother might commit suicide. This is speculative fear;
it is not the uncontrollable fear contemplated by law.

To begin with, there was no showing that the mother’s illness was so life-threatening such that her
continued stay in the hospital suffering all its alleged unethical treatment would induce a well-grounded
apprehension of her death. Secondly, it is not the law’s intent to say that any fear exempts one from
criminal liability much less petitioner’s flimsy fear that her mother might commit suicide. In other words,
the fear she invokes was not impending or insuperable as to deprive her of all volition and to make her
a mere instrument without will, moved exclusively by the hospital’s threats or demands.

Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with no choice but to commit a crime. She did
not take advantage of the many opportunities available to her to avoid committing one. By her very own
words, she admitted that the collateral or security the hospital required prior to the discharge of her
mother may be in the form of postdated checks or jewelry. And if indeed she was coerced to open an
account with the bank and issue the checks, she had all the opportunity to leave the scene to avoid
involvement.

Moreover, petitioner had sufficient knowledge that the issuance of checks without funds may result in
a violation of B.P. 22. She even testified that her counsel advised her not to open a current account nor
issue postdated checks "because the moment I will not have funds it will be a big problem." Besides,
apart from petitioner’s bare assertion, the record is bereft of any evidence to corroborate and bolster
her claim that she was compelled or coerced to cooperate with and give in to the hospital’s demands.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.

(FULFULLMENT OF DUTY/LAWFUL EXERCISE OF RIGHT)

YAPYUCO vs SANDIGANBAYAN
EDUARDO L. BAXINELA, Petitioner-Appellant, vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent-Appellee.
G.R. No. 149652 l March 24, 2006 Second Division
AZCUNA, J

FACTS: In the evening of October 18, 1996, a minor altercation ensued between the deceased Sgt.
Lajo and another costumer at the pub where the two eventually able to patch things up. Lajo was on
his way out when petitioner Baxinela, a police officer, followed the latter with his gun already drawn out.
Then, from behind, Baxinela held Lajo’s left arm and asked the latter if he was carrying a gun, to which
Lajo responded that he was an MIG. After that, an explosion was heard coming from Baxinela’s gun.
Baxinela then got a gun from Lajo’s waist and handed it to Regimen. Afterwards Baxinela held both of
Lajo’s arms, who was still standing, and pushed him against the wall and repeated his question. Lajo
answered "Why did you shoot me? I am also a military." At this point Lajo got out his wallet and gave it
to Baxinela. Baxinela opened the wallet and looked at an ID. Afterwards Baxinela and Regimen just left
and did nothing to aid Lajo. Alvarez and his fellow security guard, Rolando Gabriel, then picked up Lajo
and boarded him on a tricycle. RTC found petitioner Baxinela guilty of the crime of homicide.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner is entitled to the justifying circumstance of fulfilment of a duty or the lawful
exercise of a right or office.

HELD: NO. In order to avail of this justifying circumstance it must be shown that: 1) the accused acted
in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and 2) the injury caused or the
offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise
of a right or office. While the first condition is present, the second is clearly lacking. Baxinela’s duty was
to investigate the reason why Lajo had a gun tucked behind his waist in a public place. This was what
Baxinela was doing when he confronted Lajo at the entrance, but perhaps through anxiety, edginess
or the desire to take no chances, Baxinela exceeded his duty by firing upon Lajo who was not at all
resisting. The shooting of Lajo cannot be considered due performance of a duty if at that time Lajo
posed no serious threat or harm to Baxinela or to the civilians in the pub.

Essentially, Baxinela is trying to convince the Court that he should be absolved of criminal liability by
reason of a mistake of fact, a doctrine first enunciated in United States v. Ah Chong. It was held in that
case that a mistake of fact will exempt a person from criminal liability so long as the alleged ignorance
or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith. In examining the circumstances attendant in
the present case, the Court finds that there was negligence on the part of Baxinela. Lajo, when he was
shot, was simply turning around to see who was accosting him. Moreover, he identified himself saying
"I am MIG." These circumstances alone would not lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe
that Baxinela’s life was in peril. Thus, his act of shooting Lajo, to the mind of this Court, constitutes
clear negligence. But even if the Court assumes that Lajo’s actions were aggressive enough to appear
that he was going for his gun, there were a number of procedures that could have been followed in
order to avoid a confrontation and take control of the situation. Baxinela, whom the Court assumes not
to be a rookie policeman, could have taken precautionary measures by simply maintaining his hold on
to Lajo’s shoulders, keeping Lajo facing away from him, forcing Lajo to raise his hands and then take
Lajo’s weapon. There was also Regimen who should have assisted Baxinela in disabling and disarming
Lajo. The events inside the disco pub that unnecessarily cost the life of Lajo did not have to happen
had Baxinela not been negligent in performing his duty as a police officer.

The Court will, however, attribute to Baxinela the incomplete defense of fulfillment of a duty as a
privileged mitigating circumstance. In Lacanilao v. Court of Appeals, it was held that if the first condition
is fulfilled but the second is wanting, Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code is applicable so that the
penalty lower than one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed. Accordingly, the
Court grants in favor of Baxinela a privileged mitigating circumstance and lower his penalty by one
degree. His entitlement to the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is also
recognized, thereby further reducing his penalty to its minimum.

The Court commiserates with our policemen who regularly thrust their lives in zones of danger in order
to maintain peace and order and acknowledges the apprehensions faced by their families whenever
they go on duty. But the use of unnecessary force or wanton violence is not justified when the fulfillment
of their duty as law enforcers can be effected otherwise. A "shoot first, think later" attitude can never
be countenanced in a civilized society.
 ROWENO POMOY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
[G.R. No. 150647. September 29, 2004] |Third Division
PANGANIBAN, J

FACTS: On January 4, 1990, petitioner, a police officer, and Tomas Balboa, a suspect in a robbery
case, went to the investigation room for tactical interrogation. It was alleged that when they reached
the main building, Balboa attempted to grab the gun of petitioner, two gun shots were heard. It was
verified that petitioner was seen still holding a .45 caliber pistol facing Balboa, who was lying in a pool
of blood, about two feet away.

RTC found petitioner guilty of the crime of homicide. In his defense, petitioner contends that the death
of Balboa resulted from an accident.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner is entitled to the justifying circumstance of fulfilment of a duty or the lawful
exercise of a right or office.

HELD: YES. The elements of accident are as follows: 1) the accused was at the time performing a
lawful act with due care; 2) the resulting injury was caused by mere accident; and 3) on the part of the
accused, there was no fault or no intent to cause the injury.1 From the facts, it is clear that all these
elements were present. At the time of the incident, petitioner was a member -- specifically, one of the
investigators -- of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed at the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force
Company. Thus, it was in the lawful performance of his duties as investigating officer that, under the
instructions of his superior, he fetched the victim from the latter’s cell for a routine interrogation.

Again, it was in the lawful performance of his duty as a law enforcer that petitioner tried to defend his
possession of the weapon when the victim suddenly tried to remove it from his holster. As an enforcer
of the law, petitioner was duty-bound to prevent the snatching of his service weapon by anyone,
especially by a detained person in his custody. Such weapon was likely to be used to facilitate escape
and to kill or maim persons in the vicinity, including petitioner himself.

Petitioner cannot be faulted for negligence. He exercised all the necessary precautions to prevent his
service weapon from causing accidental harm to others. As he so assiduously maintained, he had kept
his service gun locked when he left his house; he kept it inside its holster at all times, especially within
the premises of his working area.
At no instance during his testimony did the accused admit to any intent to cause injury to the deceased,
much less kill him. Furthermore, Nicostrato Estepar, the guard in charge of the detention of Balboa,
did not testify to any behavior on the part of petitioner that would indicate the intent to harm the victim
while being fetched from the detention cell.

The participation of petitioner, if any, in the victim’s death was limited only to acts committed in the
course of the lawful performance of his duties as an enforcer of the law. The removal of the gun from
its holster, the release of the safety lock, and the firing of the two successive shots -- all of which led to
the death of the victim -- were sufficiently demonstrated to have been consequences of circumstances
beyond the control of petitioner. At the very least, these factual circumstances create serious doubt on
the latter’s culpability.
 JOHN ANGCACO, petitioner,
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 146664 l February 28, 2002|Second Division
MENDOZA, J

FACTS: On September 25, 1980, petitioner and his co-accused were serving a warrant of arrest on
Restituto Bergante who was wanted in connection with a robbery case. It was alleged that petitioner
and his co-accused fired their guns and called out Restituto, however Noe and his brother Noel
Bergante answered that their father was not around. When they went outside, Noe and his cousin,
Freddie Ganancial were flanked by petitioner. Then, shots rang out from the armalite of accused, as a
result of which Freddie turned around and dropped to the ground face down.

RTC found the petitioner guilty of the crime of murder. In his defense, petitioner claims that the killing
was done in fulfilment of a lawful duty.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner is entitled to the justifying circumstance of fulfilment of a duty or the lawful
exercise of a right or office.

HELD: NO. For this justifying circumstance to be appreciated, the following must be established: (1)
that the offender acted in the lawful exercise of a right or a duty; and (b) that the injury or offense
committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such right or office.

In this case, the mission of petitioner and his colleagues was to effect the arrest of Restituto Bergante.
As Edep himself explained, the standard procedure in making an arrest was, first, to identify themselves
as police officers and to show the warrant to the arrestee and to inform him of the charge against him,
and, second, to take the arrestee under custody. But, it was not shown here that the killing of Ganancial
was in furtherance of such duty. No evidence was presented by the defense to prove that Ganancial
attempted to prevent petitioner and his fellow officers from arresting Restituto Bergante. There was in
fact no clear evidence as to how Freddie Ganancial was shot. Indeed, as already stated, any attempt
by the victim to arrest the wanted person was pointless as Restituto Bergante was not in his house. As
regards the second requisite, there can be no question that the killing of Freddie Ganancial was not a
necessary consequence of the arrest to be made on Restituto Bergante.

Reliance by the Court of Appeals on the case of People v. Oanis is misplaced. In Oanis, the accused,
who were police officers, shot and killed the victim under the erroneous notion that the latter was the
person they were charged to arrest. The Court held that the first requisite - that the offenders acted in
performance of a lawful duty - was present because the offenders, though overzealous in the
performance of their duty, thought that they were in fact killing the man they have been ordered to take
into custody dead or alive. In this case, petitioner did not present evidence that he mistook Freddie
Ganancial for Restituto Bergante and, therefore, killed him (Ganancial) perhaps because he placed the
lives of the arresting officers in danger.
 (OBEDIENCE TO AN ORDER)

LUIS A. TABUENA, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 103501-03. February 17, 1997] En Banc
FRANCISCO, J

ADOLFO M. PERALTA, petitioner, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 103507. February 17, 1997]

FACTS: Then President Marcos instructed petitioner Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the
president’s office and in cash what the MIAA owes the Philippine National Construction Corporation
(PNCC), to which Tabuena replied, “Yes, sir, will do it.” About a week later, Tabuena received from the
private secretary of Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum dated January 8, 1986, directing Tabuena to
pay immediately the PNCC the sum of P55 Million in cash as partial payment of MIAA’s account, signed
by then president Marcos.

In a memo dated January 7, 1986 from Minister Ongpin for the President, the former requested for the
partial deferment of PNCC’s advances for the MIA Development Project. At the same time, PNCC has
potential escalation claims amounting to P99 Million, however there has been no funding allocation for
any of the escalation claims due to budgetary constraints.
The MIA Project has been completed and operational as far back as 1982 and yet the residual amounts
due to PNCC have not yet been paid, resulting in undue burden to PNCC due to additional cost of
money to service of its obligations for this contract.

In obedience to President Marcos’ verbal instruction and memo, Tabuena, with the help of Dabao and
Peralta, caused the release of P55 Million of MIAA funds by means of three withdrawals.

The disbursement of the P55 Million was, as described by Tabuena and Peralta themselves, “out of
the ordinary” and “not based on the normal procedure”. Not only were there no vouchers prepared to
support the disbursement, the P55 Million was paid in cold cash. Also, no PNCC receipt for the P55
Million was presented.

The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner of the crime of malversation under Article 17 of the Revised
Penal Code. The defense of Tabuena was that they acted in good faith. Tabuena claimed that he was
merely complying with the MARCOS Memorandum which ordered him to forward immediately to the
Office ofthe President P55 million in cash as partial payment of MIAA’s obligations to PNCC, and that
he was of the belief that MIAA indeed had liabilities to PNCC.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner is entitled to the justifying circumstance of obedience to an order issued for
some lawful purpose.

HELD: YES. First. Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for that was what the
MARCOS Memorandum required him to do. He could not be faulted if he had to obey and strictly
comply with the presidential directive, and to argue otherwise is something easier said than done.
Marcos was undeniably Tabuena’s superior – the former being then the President of the Republic who
unquestionably exercised control over government agencies such as the MIAA and PNCC. In other
words, Marcos had a say in matters involving inter-government agency affairs and transactions, such
as for instance, directing payment of liability of one entity to another and the manner in which it should
be carried out. And as a recipient of such kind of a directive coming from the highest official of the land
no less, good faith should be read on Tabuena’s compliance, without hesitation nor any question, with
the MARCOS Memorandum. Tabuena therefore is entitled to the justifying circumstance of “Any
person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose.” The
subordinate-superior relationship between Tabuena and Marcos is clear. And so too, is the lawfulness
of the order contained in the MARCOS Memorandum, as it has for its purpose partial payment of the
liability of one government agency (MIAA) to another (PNCC).