CASE DIGEST: Valenzuela v. People, GR No.

160188

Title: Valenzuela v. People, GR No. 160188

Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code; Stages of theft

Facts:

While a security guard was manning his post the open parking area of a supermarket, he saw the accused, Aristotel
Valenzuela, hauling a push cart loaded with cases of detergent and unloaded them where his co-accused, Jovy
Calderon, was waiting. Valenzuela then returned inside the supermarket, and later emerged with more cartons of
detergent. Thereafter, Valenzuela hailed a taxi and started loading the boxes of detergent inside. As the taxi was
about to leave the security guard asked Valenzuela for the receipt of the merchandise. The accused reacted by
fleeing on foot, but were subsequently apprehended at the scene. The trial court convicted both Valenzuela and
Calderon of the crime of consummated theft. Valenzuela appealed before the Court of Appeals, arguing that he
should only be convicted of frustrated theft since he was not able to freely dispose of the articles stolen. The CA
affirmed the trial court’s decision, thus the Petition for Review was filed before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner Valenzuela is guilty of frustrated theft.

Held:

No. Article 6 of the RPC provides that a felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present. In the crime of theft, the following elements should be present – (1) that there be
taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain;
(4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the
use of violence against or intimidating of persons or force upon things. The court held that theft is produced when
there is deprivation of personal property by one with intent to gain. Thus, it is immaterial that the offender is able or
unable to freely dispose the property stolen since he has already committed all the acts of execution and the
deprivation from the owner has already ensued from such acts. Therefore, theft cannot have a frustrated stage, and
can only be attempted or consummated.
Crim Law 1 Case Digest: Valenzuela V. People 2007

Valenzuela v. People
G. R. No. 160188 June 21, 2007

Lessons Applicable: frustrated or consummated theft

Laws Applicable: Art. 6

FACTS:
• May 19, 1994 4:30 pm: Aristotel Valenzuela and Jovy Calderon were sighted outside the Super Sale Club, a
supermarket within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago, a security guard who was then
manning his post at the open parking area of the supermarket. Lago saw Valenzuela, who was wearing an ID with the
mark “Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU)” who hauled a push cart with cases of detergent of “Tide” brand and
unloaded them in an open parking space, where Calderon was waiting. He then returned inside the supermarket and
emerged 5 minutes after with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again unloaded these boxes to the same area in
the open parking space. Thereafter, he left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and directed it
towards the parking space where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide Ultramatic inside the
taxi, then boarded the vehicle. As Lago watched, he proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open parking
area and asked Valenzuela for a receipt of the merchandise but Valenzuela and Calderon reacted by fleeing on
foot. Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards. Valenzuela and Calderon were apprehended at
the scene and the stolen merchandise recovered worth P12,090.
• Valenzuela, Calderon and 4 other persons were first brought to the SM security office before they were
transferred to the Baler Station II of the Philippine National Police but only Valenzuela and Calderon were charged
with theft by the Assistant City Prosecutor.
• They pleaded not guilty.
• Calderon’s Alibi: On the afternoon of the incident, he was at the Super Sale Club to withdraw from his ATM
account, accompanied by his neighbor, Leoncio Rosulada. As the queue for the ATM was long, he and Rosulada
decided to buy snacks inside the supermarket. While they were eating, they heard the gunshot fired by Lago, so
they went out to check what was transpiring and when they did, they were suddenly grabbed by a security guard
• Valenzuela’s Alibi: He is employed as a “bundler” of GMS Marketing and assigned at the supermarket. He and his
cousin, a Gregorio Valenzuela, had been at the parking lot, walking beside the nearby BLISS complex and headed to
ride a tricycle going to Pag-asa, when they saw the security guard Lago fire a shot causing evryon to start
running. Then they were apprehended by Lago.
• RTC: guilty of consummated theft
• CA: Confirmed RTC and rejected his contention that it should only be frustrated theft since at the time he was
apprehended, he was never placed in a position to freely dispose of the articles stolen.

ISSUE: W/N Valenzuela should be guilty of consummated theft.

HELD: YES. petition is DENIED

• Article 6 defines those three stages, namely the consummated, frustrated and attempted felonies.
o A felony is consummated “when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present.”
o It is frustrated “when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.”
o It is attempted “when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than
his own spontaneous desistance.”
• Each felony under the Revised Penal Code has a:
o subjective phase - portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the act which begins the
commission of the crime and the last act performed by the offender which, with prior acts, should result in the
consummated crime
 if the offender never passes the subjective phase of the offense, the crime is merely attempted
o objective phase - After that point of subjective phase has been breached
 subjective phase is completely passed in case of frustrated crimes
• the determination of whether a crime is frustrated or consummated necessitates an initial concession that all of
the acts of execution have been performed by the offender
• The determination of whether the felony was “produced” after all the acts of execution had been performed
hinges on the particular statutory definition of the felony.
• “actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea” - ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a
crime or there can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting
• In crimes mala in se, mens rea has been defined before as “a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal
intent” and “essential for criminal liability.”
• Statutory definition of our mala in se crimes must be able to supply what the mens rea of the crime is and overt
acts that constitute the crime
• Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code (Elements of Theft):
1. that there be taking of personal property - only one operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft
2. property belongs to another
3. taking be done with intent to gain - descriptive circumstances
4. taking be done without the consent of the owner - descriptive circumstances
5. taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things -
descriptive circumstances
• Abandoned cases:
o U.S. v. Adiao: failed to get the merchandise out of the Custom House - consummated theft
o Diño: Military Police inspected the truck at the check point and found 3 boxes of army rifles - frustrated theft
o Flores: guards discovered that the “empty” sea van had actually contained other merchandise as well -
consummated theft
o Empelis v. IAC: Fled the scene, dropping the coconuts they had seized - frustrated qualified theft because
petitioners were not able to perform all the acts of execution which should have produced the felony as a
consequence
 cannot attribute weight because definition is attempted
• The ability of the actor “to freely dispose of the articles stolen, even if it were only momentary.”
o We are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the taking by the petitioner was completed in this case. With
intent to gain, he acquired physical possession of the stolen cases of detergent for a considerable period of time that
he was able to drop these off at a spot in the parking lot, and long enough to load these onto a taxicab.
• Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted (no
unlawful taking) or consummated (there is unlawful taking).
Crim Law 1 Case Digest: Baleros V. People 2006

Baleros v. People

G.R. No. 138033 February 22, 2006

Lessons Applicable: Attempted Rape

Laws Applicable: Art. 6

FACTS:
• Martina Lourdes Albano (Malou), a medical student of the University of Sto. Tomas, stayed at Room 307 with her
maid Marvilou.
• December 12 10:30 pm: Malou slept. Her maid Marvilou slept on a folding bed right in front of her bedroom
door.
• December 13, 1991 1:00 am: Chito left the fraternity party with Robert Chan and Alberto wearing a barong
tagalog, with t-shirt inside, with short pants with stripes lent by Perla Duran and leather shoes.
• December 13, 1991 1:30 am: Chito arrived at the Building wearing a white t-shirt with fraternity symbols and
black shorts with the brand name “Adidas” from a party. He requested permission from S/G Ferolin to go up to
Room 306 leased by Ansbert Co but at that time only Joseph Bernard Africa was there. Although Chito could not
produce the required written authorization, he let him in because he will be a tenant in the coming summer
break. Joseph was awaken by Chito’s knock so he glanced the alarm clock and let him. He saw him wearing dark-
colored shorts and white T-shirt.
• December 13, 1991 1:50 am: Renato Baleros, Jr. y David (Chito) forcefully covered the face of Martina Lourdes T.
Albano with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical with dizzying effects. This awakened Malou. She struggled but could
not move because she was tightly held and pinned down on the bed. She kicked him and got her right hand free to
squeeze his sex organ causing him to let her go. She went for the bedroom door and woke up Marvilou. She also
intercommed S/G Ferolin saying: "may pumasok sa kuarto ko pinagtangkaan ako". Malou proceed to Room 310
where her classmates Christian Alcala, Bernard Baptista, Lutgardo Acosta and Rommel Montes were staying and
seeked help. She saw her bed in a mess and noticed that her nightdress was stained with blue. Aside from the
window with grills which she had originally left opened, another window inside her bedroom which leads to Room
306 was now open.
• December 13, 1991 3:30 pm: Christian and his roommates, Bernard and Lutgardo were asked by the CIS people
to look for anything not belonging to them in their Unit when Rommel Montes went inside and found a grey bag.
o Christian knew right away that it belonged to Chito. It contained white t-shirt with fraternity symbol, a Black
Adidas short pants, a handkerchief , 3 white T-shirts, an underwear and socks.
• Chito pleaded NOT Guilty
• 13 witnesses including Malou and her classmates, Joseph Bernard Africa, Rommel Montes, Renato Alagadan and
Christian Alcala
o Malou: Chito was her classmate whom he rejected a week before
o Chito: He only slept and at about 6 to 6:30, Joseph told him that something had happened and asked him to
follow him to Room 310 carrying his gray bag and since no one was there they went to Room 401 where Renato
Alagadan was. He left his grey bag at Room 306 the day before.
• handkerchief and Malou’s night dress both contained chloroform, a volatile poison which causes first degree
burn exactly like what Malou sustained on that part of her face where the chemical-soaked cloth had been pressed
• RTC: guilty of attempted rape
• CA: Affirmed

ISSUE: W/N Chito is guilty of attempted rape

HELD: NO. REVERSED and SET ASIDE. ACQUITTING Renato D. Baleros, Jr. of the charge for attempted rape. GUILTY of
light coercion and is accordingly sentenced to 30 days of arresto menor and to pay a fine of P200.00, with the
accessory penalties thereof and to pay the costs.

• Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a man who has carnal knowledge or
intercourse with a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) By using force or intimidation; (2) When the
woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is
demented.
• Under Article 6, in relation to the aforementioned article of the same code, rape is attempted when the offender
commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
o whether or not the act of the petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while on top of Malou,
constitutes an overt act of rape.
o Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a
particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination
following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense
• Chito was fully clothed and that there was no attempt on his part to undress Malou, let alone touch her private
part
• Verily, while the series of acts committed by the petitioner do not determine attempted rape, they constitute
unjust vexation punishable as light coercion under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code.
o As it were, unjust vexation exists even without the element of restraint or compulsion for the reason that this
term is broad enough to include any human conduct which, although not productive of some physical or material
harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person
o That Malou, after the incident in question, cried while relating to her classmates what she perceived to be a
sexual attack and the fact that she filed a case for attempted rape proved beyond cavil that she was disturbed, if not
distressed
People vs. Almazan

G.R. Nos. 138943-44

September 17, 2001

Facts:

-On September 28, 1996, at about 4:00pm, accused-appellant Henry Almazan went home accompanied by his friend
Johnald Molina. His wife informed him upon his return that his twelve fighting cocks had been stolen. He then
proceeded to search for them and ended up in Vicente Madriaga’s house where the latter was playing chess with a
certain Allan. The spectators were Vicente’s son Noli carrying his 2-year old daughter, his grandson Noel, and
neighbor Angel Soliva.

-Henry Almazan brandished a .38 caliber revolver in front of the group since he suspected Angel to be the culprit
behind the theft of his fighting cocks. He aimed at Angel and fired twice but to no avail. Vicente tried to calm Henry
down while Angel ran away but the accused-appellant aimed instead at Noli, fired his gun, and killed him. He then
turned to Noel and shot him on the thigh. Both Noli and Noel were rushed to the hospital; the former dying along
the way and latter surviving from a mere minor injury from the gunshot.

-Henry contested that his acts were in self-defense. According to him, upon arrival at Vicente’s house, the group was
drinking liquor, mocking him, and threatening him of physical violence. He claims that Angel was the one that pulled
out a .38 caliber revolver and aimed at him but misfired twice that ensued in a struggle for the weapon between the
two men. During the struggle, accused-appellant claims that Noli was accidentally shot. After successfully wrestling
the weapon away from Angel, Henry claims to have received a blow from behind which caused him to fall and see
Noel poised to attack him with a broken bottle so he fired at the latter’s lower part of the body. His friend Johnald
Molina corroborated his story.

-Accused-appellant was charged with murder qualified by treachery for the death of Noli and frustrated murder for
shooting Noel based on a statement of Noel’s attending physician, Dr. Misael Jonathan Ticman, who said that if not
medically treated, the wound might get infected or lead to the victim’s death. He did send the victim home after
undergoing treatment.

-Accused-appellant went into hiding after the shooting incident and was caught eight months later.

Crime Commited:

Murder and Frustrated Murder aggravated by treachery and evident premeditation.

Contention of the Accused:

-Prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

-The testimony of Shirley Abordo, common-law wife of Nilo, is merely hearsay.

-The testimony of Vicente has alleged inconsistencies in various vital points.

-Evidence of the prosecution is impugned for its failure to present Angel who was primarily involved in the incident
and whom the defense claims to be the real transgressor.
-For frustrated murder, accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in holding him guilty, as the wound
sustained by Noel was not fatal and could not have caused his death. He also claims that his act was in self-defense.

-The evidence sufficient to establish the absolute and moral certainty of the accused-appellant’s guilt is absent and
he should be acquitted.

Contention of the State:

-Theft of Henry’s fighting cocks constituted sufficient motive for the killing and that as a cockfight aficionado he must
have found it imperative to exact vengeance on his suspected culprits.

-Testimony of Johnald failed to create reasonable doubt on the guilt of Henry since he is a friend [and is] expected to
extend relief to a friend, especially one in need.

-The qualifying circumstance of treachery was appreciated on the ground that the victims were completely
defenseless when attacked and did not commit the slightest provocation.

-Frustrated murder charge is based on Dr. Ticman’s statement where he says “Noel could catch infection[from the
gunshot wound].”

-The witnesses for the prosecution were consistent in their narration of the manner by which the events transpired,
and they remained steadfast in the identification of the perpetrator.

Held:

-No justification for evident premeditation as there was no proof as to the manner and time during which the plan to
kill was hatched.

-Testimonial evidence to be credible should not only come from the mouth of a credible witness but should also be
credible, reasonable and in accord with human experience, failing which, it should be rejected.

-For the claim of self-defense to the charge of murder aggravated by treachery, the accused-appellant failed to
discharge the burden of proof that rests upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence the elements thereof:
(a) that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) that there was reasonable necessity for the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) that there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
defendant.

-Accused-appellant should be held liable for attempted murder, not frustrated murder since the victim did not
sustain a fatal wound that could have caused his death were it not for timely medical assistance. Dr. Ticman’s
statements are pure speculation and the nature of the wound was that of a mere minor injury.

-The Joint Decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant Henry Almazan guilty of Murder is affirmed. However,
his conviction for Frustrated Murder is modified by lowering the crime to Attempted Murder.
Crim Law 1 Case Digest: People V. Listerio 2000

People v. Listerio

G.R.No. 122099 July 5, 2000

Lessons Applicable: Conspiracy, Attempted or Frustrated Stage

Laws Applicable:

FACTS:
• Criminal Case No. 91-5842 and Criminal Case No. 91-5843 were filed against Agapito Listerio y Prado and Samson
dela Torre y Esquela
• Upon arraignment, accused Agapito Listerio y Prado and Samson dela Torre y Esquela pleaded not guilty to the
crimes charged. Their other co-accused have remained at large.
• May 14, 1991:
o Marlon Araque’s Version: Marlon and his brother Jeonito were in Purok 4, Alabang, Muntinlupa to collect a sum
of money from Tino. Having failed they turned backAs they were passing Tramo near Tino’s place, a group composed
of Agapito Listerio, Samson dela Torre, George dela Torre, Marlon dela Torre and Bonifacio Bancaya blocked their
path and attacked them with lead pipes and bladed weapons. Jeonito Araque from behind with 3 stab wounds: 1.
upper right portion of his back, 2. lower right portion and 3. middle portion of the left side of his back causing him to
fall down. Marlon was hit on the head by Samson dela Torre and Bonifacio Bancaya with lead pipes and
momentarily lost consciousness. When he regained consciousness 3 minutes later, Jeonito was already dead and the
group fled. He was brought to the hospital for treatment of his forearm and the shoulder
o Agapito Listerio’s Version: Agapito Listerio is a 39 years old, married, side walk vegetable vendor and a resident
of Purok 4.
 1:00 pm: He was in store of Nimfa Agustin drinking beer with Edgar Demolador and Andres Gininao
 2:00 pm: He went to his house and slept
 5:00 pm: Remolador and Gininao woke him up and told him there was a quarrel near the railroad track
 6:00 pm: 2 policemen passed by going to the house of Samson de la Torre while he was chatting with Remolador
and Gininao and invited them for questioning. But, the two were sent home. He was handed a Sinumpaang
Salaysay executed by Marlon Araque, implicating him for the death of Jeonito Araque and the frustrated murder of
Marlon Araque. When he confronted Marlon as to why he was being included in the case, the latter replied
“because you ejected us from your house”
• Dr. Manimtim’s Autopsy Reports:
o Marlon Araque: 2 wounds on the forearm and the shoulder were caused by a sharp object like a knife while the
other 2 were caused by a blunt instrument such as a lead pipe
o Jeonito Araque: 3 stab wounds were inflicted from behind by a sharp, pointed and single-bladed instrument like
a kitchen knife, balisong or any similar instrument. Considering the involvement of a vital organ and a major blood
vessel, the first wound was considered fatal. Unlike the first, the second and third wounds were non-fatal. The first
and second wounds were inflicted by knife thrusts delivered starting below going upward by assailants who were
standing behind the victim
• RTC: Attempted Homicide only on the basis of Dr. Manimtim’s testimony that none of the wounds sustained by
Marlon Araque were fatal

ISSUE: W/N there is a conspiracy for frustrated homicide

HELD: YES. appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

1.] the award of P5,000.00 to Marlon Araque by way of moral damages in Criminal Case No. 91-5843 is DELETED;

2.] Accused-Appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 91-5843 of Frustrated
Homicide and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of Six (6) Years of Prision Correccional, as minimum to
Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor, as maximum.

After finality of this Decision, the records shall be remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, which is
directed to render judgment based on the evidence against Samson dela Torre y Esquela.

• Direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found for criminals do not write down their lawless plans and plots.
Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime which
indubitably point to and are indicative of a joint purpose, concert of action and community of interest
• conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence of acts charged, but may and generally
must be proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances, which vary according to the purpose
accomplished. Previous agreement to commit a crime is not essential to establish a conspiracy, it being sufficient
that the condition attending to its commission and the acts executed may be indicative of a common design to
accomplish a criminal purpose and objective
• It is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt acts as a direct or indirect contribution in
the execution of the crime planned to be committed. The overt act may consist of active participation in the actual
commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his con-conspirators by being present at the
commission of the crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators
• Conspiracy transcends mere companionship, it denotes an intentional participation in the transaction with a view
to the furtherance of the common design and purpose
o all of them armed with deadly weapons at the locus criminis, indubitably shows their criminal design to kill the
victims
• conspirator is equally liable for the crime as it is unnecessary to determine who inflicted the fatal wound because
in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all
• Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing means, methods
or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make. That circumstance qualifies the crime into murder.
o all of them armed with bladed weapons and lead pipes, blocked (hinarang) the path of the victims effectively
cutting off their escape
• The commission of the crime was also attended by abuse of superior strength on account of the fact that
accused-appellant and his companions were not only numerically superior to the victims but also because all of
them, armed with bladed weapons and lead pipes, purposely used force out of proportion to the means of defense
available to the persons attacked. However, this aggravating circumstance is already absorbed in treachery. In the
light of the finding of conspiracy, evident premeditation need not be further appreciated, absent concrete proof as
to how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time had elapsed before it was carried out.
• What determines whether a felony is attempted or frustrated is whether or not the subjective phase in the
commission of an offense has been passed (NOT gravity of the wound)
• Subjective phase
o portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the act which begins the commission of the crime
and the last act performed by the offender which, with the prior acts, should result in the consummated crime.
• Objective phase
o Forward the subjective phase
o period occupied by the acts of the offender over which he has control – that period between the point where he
begins and the point where he voluntarily desists.
• If between these two points the offender is stopped by reason of any cause outside of his own voluntary
desistance, the subjective phase has not been passed and it is an attempt.
• If he is not so stopped but continues until he performs the last act, it is frustrated
• frustrated when: (subjective phase is completely passed. Subjectively the crime is complete)
o the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony
o the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator’s will
• attempted felony: (offender never passes the subjective phase of the offense)
o the offender commits overt acts to commence the perpetration of the crime
o he is not able to perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony; and
o his failure to perform all the acts of execution was due to some cause or accident other than his spontaneous
desistance
• intent to kill determines whether the infliction of injuries should be punished as attempted or frustrated murder,
homicide, parricide or consummated physical injuries
o intent to kill of the malefactors herein who were armed with bladed weapons and lead pipes can hardly be
doubted given the prevailing facts of the case
o can not be denied that the crime is a frustrated felony not an attempted offense considering that after being
stabbed and clubbed twice in the head as a result of which he lost consciousness and fell, Marlon’s attackers
apparently thought he was already dead and fled

Crim Law 1 Case Digest: People V. Campuhan 2000

People v. Campuhan
G.R. No. 129433 March 30, 2000
Lessons Applicable: Attempted rape
Laws Applicable:

FACTS:
• April 25, 1996 4 pm: Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of 4-year old Crysthel Pamintuan, went to the ground
floor of their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for her 2 children. There she met Primo Campuhan, helper of
Conrado Plata Jr., brother of Corazon, who was then busy filling small plastic bags with water to be frozen into ice in
the freezer located at the second floor.
• Then she heard Crysthel cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" so she went upstairs and saw Primo Campuhan inside her
children's room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already removed, while
his short pants were down to his knees and his hands holding his penis with his right hand
• Horrified, she cursed "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him several times. He evaded her blows and
pulled up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside who she tried to block his path. Corazon then ran out and shouted for
help thus prompting Vicente, her brother, a cousin and an uncle who were living within their compound, to chase
the Campuhan who was apprehended. They called the barangay officials who detained.
• Physical examination yielded negative results as Crysthel ‘s hymen was intact
• Campuhan: Crysthel was in a playing mood and wanted to ride on his back when she suddenly pulled him down
causing both of them to fall down on the floor.
• RTC: guilty of statutory rape, sentenced him to the extreme penalty of death
• Thus, subject to automatic review

ISSUE: W/N it was a consummated statutory rape

HELD: NO. MODIFIED. guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years
four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor medium as minimum, to fourteen (14) years ten (10) months and
twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. Costs de oficio.

• People v. De la Peña: labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated

• Primo's kneeling position rendered an unbridled observation impossible
• Crysthel made a categorical statement denying penetration but her vocabulary is yet as underdeveloped
• Corazon narrated that Primo had to hold his penis with his right hand, thus showing that he had yet to attain an
erection to be able to penetrate his victim
• the possibility of Primo's penis having breached Crysthel's vagina is belied by the child's own assertion that she
resisted Primo's advances by putting her legs close together and that she did not feel any intense pain but just felt
"not happy" about what Primo did to her. Thus, she only shouted "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" not "Aray ko, aray ko!
• no medical basis to hold that there was sexual contact between the accused and the victim

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO E. DELA CRUZ, accused-appellant.

G.R. No. 128359, 6 December 2000

Facts:

dela Cruz and San Antonio were currently living together when Macapagal (victim, San Antonio’s ex-live-in partner)
went to their apartment, holding a gun (9mm caliber pistol) and banged the door of the bedroom ahere dela Cruz
was demanding him to go out

Dela Cruz opened the door, and upon seeing that Macapagal was pointing the gun at him, he immediately went back
to the room and closed the door.

The next time he went out, he, too, was already holding a gun (.35 caliber revolver).

The two immediately grappled each other and not long after, shots were heard and Macapagal fell dead on the floor.

Appellant told San Antonio to call the police and when they arrive, he surrendered the gun he used and told the
police that he shot Macapagal in self defense.

According to the autopsy, Macapagal sustained 4 wounds. 3 of which were non-penetrating (upper jaw, below the
left shoulder, right side of the waist). The shot that took his life was on the left side of the chest penetrating the
heart.

Dela Cruz had no license to carry the firearm.

Issue: W/N the accused is able to prove to the court the elements of self-defense in order to extenuate him from the
crime.

Held: No.

Ratio:

Three conditions must concur to extenuate him:

Unlawful aggression by the person injured or killed

presuppose an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person – not a
mere threatening or intimidating attitude – but most importantly at the time the defensive action was taken against
the aggressor.
In this case, the victim banged at the bedroom door with his gun but the appellant, upon seeing the victim pointing a
gun at him was able to prevent at this stage harm to himself by promptly closing the door. He could have stopped
there. Instead, he confronted the victim.

Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel that unlawful aggression

The number of wounds sustained by the victim would negate this component of self defense. The four gunshot
wounds indicate a determined effort to kill.

Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself

When the appellant confronted the victim, instead of taking precautionary measures, appellant could no longer
argue that there was no provocation on his part

Claim of self defense rejected

Crim Law 1 Case Digest: People V. Orita 1990

People v. Orita
G.R. No. 88724 April 3, 1990
Lessons Applicable: No frustrated rape
Laws Applicable: Art. 6

FACTS:
• March 20, 1983 Early Morning: Cristina S. Abayan, 19-year old freshman student at the St. Joseph's College,
arrived at her boarding house after her classmates brought her home from a party. She knocked at the door of her
boarding house when a frequent visitor of another boarder held her and poked a knife to her neck. Despite pleading
for her release, he ordered her to go upstairs with him. Since the door which led to the 1st floor was locked from
the inside, they used the back door to the second floor. With his left arm wrapped around her neck and his right
hand poking a "balisong" to her neck, he dragged her up the stairs. When they reached the second floor, he
commanded herwith the knife poked at her neck, to look for a room. They entered Abayan's room. He then pushed
her hitting her head on the wall. With one hand holding the knife, he undressed himself. He then ordered her to
take off her clothes. Scared, she took off her T-shirt, bra, pants and panty. He ordered her to lie down on the floor
and then mounted her. He made her hold his penis and insert it in her vagina. Still poked with a knife, she did as told
but since she kept moving, only a portion of his penis entered her. He then laid down on his back and commanded
her to mount him. Still only a small part of his penis was inserted into her vagina. When he had both his hands flat on
the floor. She dashed out to the next room and locked herself in. When he pursued her and climbed the partition,
she ran to another room then another then she jumped out through a window.
• Still naked, she darted to the municipal building, 18 meters in front of the boarding house and knocked on the
door. When there was no answer, she ran around the building and knocked on the back door. When the policemen
who were inside the building opened the door, they found her naked sitting on the stairs crying. Pat. Donceras, took
off his jacket and wrapped it around her. Pat. Donceras and two other policemen rushed to the boarding
house where they heard and saw somebody running away but failed to apprehend him due to darkness. She was
taken to Eastern Samar Provincial Hospital where she was physically examined.
• Her vulva had no abrasions or discharges.
• RTC: frustrated rape

ISSUE: W/N there is frustrated rape.

HELD: NO. RTC MODIFIED. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua
as well as to indemnify the victim in the amount of P30,000
• Correlating Art. 335 and Art. 6, there is no debate that the attempted and consummated stages apply to the
crime of rape.
• Requisites of a frustrated felony are:
o (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony
o (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator's will
• attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or agency which intervenes
and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has performed all of the acts which should produce the crime
as a consequence, which acts it is his intention to perform
o If he has performed all of the acts which should result in the consummation of the crime and voluntarily desists
from proceeding further, it can not be an attempt.
• in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim he actually attains his
purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished. Any
penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ,
without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is
attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ
• The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted even on the sole basis of the victim's
testimony if credible. Dr. Zamora did not rule out penetration of the genital organ of the victim.

CASE DIGEST: Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo vs.People of the Philippines and the Sandiganbayan, G. R. No. 220598, 19 July
2016

Bersamin, J:
FACTS:

The Court resolves the consolidated petitions for certiorariseparately filed by former President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo and Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) Budget and Accounts Manager Benigno B. Aguas.

On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA)
and PCSO Budget and Accounts Manager Aguas (and some other officials of PCSO and Commission on Audit whose
charges were later dismissed by the Sandiganbayan after their respective demurrers to evidence were granted,
except for Uriarte and Valdes who were at large) for conspiracy to commit plunder, as defined by, and penalized
under Section 2 (b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.

The information reads: That during the period from January 2008 to June 2010 or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto xxx accused Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the then President of the Philippines xxx Benigno Aguas, then PCSO
Budget and Accounts Manager, all public officers committing the offense in relation to their respective offices and
taking undue advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships, connections or
influence, conniving, conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally amass, accumulate and/or acquire, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or
total value of PHP365,997,915.00, more or less, [by raiding the public treasury].

Thereafter, accused GMA and Aguas separately filed their respective petitions for bail which were denied by the
Sandiganbayan on the ground that the evidence of guilt against them was strong.

After the Prosecution rested its case, accused GMA and Aguas then separately filed their demurrers to evidence
asserting that the Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against them. The same were denied by the
Sandiganbayan, holding that there was sufficient evidence to show that they had conspired to commit plunder. After
the respective motions for reconsideration filed by GMA and Aguas were likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan, they
filed their respective petitions for certiorari.

ISSUES:

Procedural:

Whether or not the special civil action for certiorari is proper to assail the denial of the demurrers to evidence.

Substantive:

Whether or not the State sufficiently established the existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte ;

Whether or not the State sufficiently established all the elements of the crime of plunder: (a) Was there evidence of
amassing, accumulating or acquiring ill-gotten wealth in the total amount of not less than P50,000,000.00? (b) Was
the predicate act of raiding the public treasury alleged in the information proved by the Prosecution?

RULING:

Re procedural issue:

The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an interlocutory order issued by the trial
court because of the availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of
the Rules of Court expressly provides that “the order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to
evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.” It is not an
insuperable obstacle to this action, however, that the denial of the demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an
interlocutory order that did not terminate the proceedings, and the proper recourse of the demurring accused was
to go to trial, and that in case of their conviction they may then appeal the conviction, and assign the denial as
among the errors to be reviewed. Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in which the writ of certiorari may issue
should not be limited, because to do so “x x x would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is
the discretion of the court that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either
prohibition or mandamus. In the exercise of our superintending control over other courts, we are to be guided by all
the circumstances of each particular case ‘as the ends of justice may require.’ So it is that the writ will be granted
where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.”
The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure to the contrary
or for the sake of the convenience of one side. This is because the Court has the bounden constitutional duty to
strike down grave abuse of discretion whenever and wherever it is committed. Thus, notwithstanding the
interlocutory character and effect of the denial of the demurrers to evidence, the petitioners as the accused could
avail themselves of the remedy of certiorari when the denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Re first substantive issue: The Prosecution did not properly allege and prove the existence of conspiracy among
GMA, Aguas and Uriarte.

A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show was an implied conspiracy to
commit plunder among all of the accused on the basis of their collective actions prior to, during and after the implied
agreement. It is notable that the Prosecution did not allege that the conspiracy among all of the accused was by
express agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a chain conspiracy.

We are not unmindful of the holding in Estrada v. Sandiganabayan [G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002, 377 SCRA
538, 556] to the effect that an information alleging conspiracy is sufficient if the information alleges conspiracy
either: (1) with the use of the word conspire, or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude,
etc; or (2) by allegations of the basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common
understanding would know what is being conveyed, and with such precision as would enable the accused to
competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. We are not talking about the
sufficiency of the information as to the allegation of conspiracy, however, but rather the identification of the main
plunderer sought to be prosecuted under R.A. No. 7080 as an element of the crime of plunder. Such identification of
the main plunderer was not only necessary because the law required such identification, but also because it was
essential in safeguarding the rights of all of the accused to be properly informed of the charges they were being
made answerable for. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of the crime charged to be set out in the
information is to enable all the accused to suitably prepare their defense because they are presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the facts that constituted the offense charged.

Despite the silence of the information on who the main plunderer or the mastermind was, the Sandiganbayan
readily condemned GMA in its resolution dated September 10, 2015 as the mastermind despite the absence of the
specific allegation in the information to that effect. Even worse, there was no evidence that substantiated such
sweeping generalization.

In fine, the Prosecution’s failure to properly allege the main plunderer should be fatal to the cause of the State
against the petitioners for violating the rights of each accused to be informed of the charges against each of them.

Re second substantive issues:

(a) No proof of amassing, or accumulating, or acquiring ill-gotten wealth of at least Php50 Million was adduced
against GMA and Aguas.

The corpus delicti of plunder is the amassment, accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth valued at not less
than Php50,000,000.00. The failure to establish the corpus delicti should lead to the dismissal of the criminal
prosecution.

As regards the element that the public officer must have amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth worth
at least P50,000,000.00, the Prosecution adduced no evidence showing that either GMA or Aguas or even Uriarte,
for that matter, had amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth of any amount. There was also no evidence,
testimonial or otherwise, presented by the Prosecution showing even the remotest possibility that the CIFs
[Confidential/Intelligence Funds] of the PCSO had been diverted to either GMA or Aguas, or Uriarte.

(b) The Prosecution failed to prove the predicate act of raiding the public treasury (under Section 2 (b) of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended)

To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury, the key is to look at the accompanying
words: misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds [See Sec. 1(d) of RA 7080]. This process
is conformable with the maxim of statutory construction noscitur a sociis, by which the correct construction of a
particular word or phrase that is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings may be made by
considering the company of the words in which the word or phrase is found or with which it is associated. Verily, a
word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases, and its meaning may,
therefore, be modified or restricted by the latter. To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another’s
property as if it were one’s own; to misappropriate means to own, to take something for one’s own
benefit; misuse means “a good, substance, privilege, or right used improperly, unforeseeably, or not as intended;”
and malversationoccurs when “any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public
funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through
abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or
partially.” The common thread that binds all the four terms together is that the public officer used the property
taken. Considering that raids on the public treasury is in the company of the four other terms that require the use of
the property taken, the phrase raids on the public treasurysimilarly requires such use of the property taken.
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in contending that the mere accumulation and gathering constituted
the forbidden act of raids on the public treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a sociis, raids on the public
treasury requires the raider to use the property taken impliedly for his personal benefit.

As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money went but, more importantly, that GMA and
Aguas had personally benefited from the same. Hence, the Prosecution did not prove the predicate act of raids on
the public treasury beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the resolutions issued in
Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 by the Sandiganbayan on April 6, 2015 and September 10, 2015; GRANTS the
petitioners’ respective demurrers to evidence; DISMISSES Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 as to the petitioners
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO and BENIGNO AGUAS for insufficiency of evidence; ORDERS the immediate release
from detention of said petitioners; and MAKES no pronouncements on costs of suit.

People vs. Comadre 431 SCRA 366 (2004) (Digest)

Complex Crime

26. People vs. Comadre 431 SCRA 366 (2004)

 Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry Bullanday, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio (drinking grioup) were
having a drinking spree on the terrace of the house of Robert’s father (Jaime). As the drinking session went on,
Robert and the others noticed appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano (appellants)
walking. The three stopped in front of the house. While his companions looked on, Antonio suddenly throw a
hand grenade, ripping a hole in the roof of the house. Drinking group were hit by shrapnel (fragments of the
grenade) and slumped unconscious on the floor. They were all rushed to the Hospital. However, Robert died before
reaching the hospital. TC: appellants guilty of complex crime of murder with multiple attempted murder.

ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in convicting the appellants?

Held: Only Antonio is liable for the crime.

RULING:

It was established that prior to the grenade explosion, Rey Camat, Jaime Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe and Gerry
Bullanday were able to identify the culprits, namely, appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo

Lozano because there was a lamppost in front of the house and the moon was bright. No conspiracy. Only Antonio is
liable for the crime. When Antonio Comadre was in the act of throwing the hand grenade, George Comadre and
Danilo Lozano merely looked on without uttering a single word of encouragement or performed any act to assist
him.

ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001

Facts:

Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon
the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the
valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers
from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it
abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates
the fundamental rights of the accused.
The focal point of the case is the alleged “vagueness” of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this terms are:
combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the
mentioned law.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law using the facial challenge.

Ruling:

On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. The petitioner’s contention
that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the law seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly
argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under the petitioner’s reliance since ordinary
intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of
legislation that is utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot be invoked.
Said doctrine may not invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine
merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude.

On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds
that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible
chilling effect upon protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the
area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully since
the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists. Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed
for facial challenge of a statute in free speech cases. With respect to such statue, the established rule is that one to
who application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it
might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be
unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of statues results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they
might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It is evident that the
purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined than real.

The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the Congress’ decision to include it among
the heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional
and petition is dismissed for lacking merit.

Issues:

1. WON Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague

No. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it
what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. The amended information itself
closely tracks the language of law, indicating w/ reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the
petitioner is alleged to have committed.

We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense.

Petitioner however bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms “combination”
and “series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. These omissions, according to the
petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental right
to due process.

A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or because of the
employment of terms without defining them.

A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the
Constitution in two (2) respects – it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted
by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible “chilling
effect” upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go
unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of other may be deterred and perceived
grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law
cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

2. WON the Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore
violates the rights of the accused to due process

No. Sec. 4 (Rule of Evidence) states that: For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary
to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt
or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.

In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of
innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond
reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.

The “reasonable doubt” standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life
to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof of reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.

Not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged—the element of the offense.

Relative to petitioner’s contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that “pattern” is a “very
important element of the crime of plunder;” and that Sec. 4 is “two-pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a
substantive element of the crime, “ such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder –

We do not subscribe to petitioner’s stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and
understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to sec. 1 par. (d). Sec. 4 purports to do no more than prescribe a
rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does
not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operated in furtherance of a remedy.

What is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the
fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

3. WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of
Congress to so classify it.
No. It is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se
the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended
information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed “willfully, unlawfully and criminally.” It thus alleges
guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.

In support of his contention In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea
and that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Tañada made
during the deliberation on S.B. No.733

Senator Tañada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not
prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as
the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the
requisite mens rea must be shown.

The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the
Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of
the offender is determined by his criminal intent.

Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the
affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death.

The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either
because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely
disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being.

There are crimes however in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal
acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to
develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses.

The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when
the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that such
acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se.

Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA
7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of
merit
People vs manero error 404

Criminal Law- People of the R.P. vs. Pugay

THIS CASE IS WITH REGARD TO ART. 3(2) & 8(2) OF THE R.P.C.

"A Conspiracy exists when two or more people come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it."

"A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious, careful and
prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment."

Case of People of the R.P. vs. Pugay

No. L-74324 17November1988

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The accused are pronounced by the RTC of Cavite guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of murder of Bayani
Miranda and sentencing them to a prison term ranging from 12 years (prison mayor) as mimimum to 20 years
(prison temporal) as maximum and for samson to be sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

Miranda and the accused Pugay are friends. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and they used to sleep together.
On the evening of May 19, 1982 a town fiesta was held in the public plaza of Rosario Cavite. Sometime after
midnight accused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived (they were drunk), and they started making
fun of Bayani Miranda. Pugay after making fun of the Bayani, took a can of gasoline and poured its contents on the
latter, Gabion (principal witness) told Pugay not to do the deed. Then Samson set Miranda on fire making a human
torch out of him. They were arrested the same night and barely a few hours after the incident gave their written
statements.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Is conspiracy present in this case to ensure that murder can be the crime? If not what are the criminal
responsibilities of the accused?

There is no:
CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.
Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to the existence of a previous agreement to
commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose and
were united in its executed.
Since there was no animosity between miranda and the accused, and add to the that that the meeting at the scene
of the incident was purely coincidental, and the main intent of the accused is to make fun of miranda.
Since there is no conspiracy that was proven, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from
different acts directed against miranda is individual NOT collective and each of them is liable only for the act that
was committed by him.

**Conspiracy may be implied from concerted action of the assailants in confronting the victim.

Criminal Responsibilities:
PUGAY: Having failed to exercise diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act
committed by his companions who at the same time were making fun of the deceased. - GUILTY OF RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE

SAMSON:Since there are NO sufficient evidence that appears in the record establishing qualifying circumstances
(treachery, conspiracy). And granted the mitigating circumstance that he never INTENDED to commit so grave a
wrong. - GUILTY OF HOMICIDE

HELD:
JUDGEMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WAS AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. JUDGEMENT FOR GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT FOR MURDER WAS LOWERED TO THE ABOVE JUDGEMENTS.

I hope this helps.

Ladonga vs. People

FACTS:

Evangelina and Adronico Ladonga and spouse, conspiring and knowing fully well that they did not have sufficient
funds deposited with the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), drew and issue UCPB Check No. 284743 postdated
July 7, 1990 in the amount of P9,075.55), payable to Alfredo Oculam, and thereafter, without informing the latter
that they did not have sufficient funds deposited with the bank to cover up the amount of the check, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously pass on, indorse, give and deliver the said check to Alfredo by way of
rediscounting of the aforementioned checks; however, upon presentation of the check to the drawee bank for
encashment, the same was dishonored for the reason that the account of the accused had already been closed, to
the damage and prejudice of Alfredo.

The RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg.
22. Adronico applied for probation which was granted. On the other hand, petitioner brought the case to the Court
of Appeals, arguing that the RTC erred in finding her criminally liable for conspiring with her husband as the principle
of conspiracy is inapplicable to B.P. Blg. 22 which is a special law; moreover, she is not a signatory of the checks and
had no participation in the issuance thereof.

ISSUE:

a.) Whether conspiracy is applicable in violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, by invoking art. 10 of RPC?

b.) Whether or not the cases cited by the CA in affirming in toto the conviction of petitioner as conspirator applying
the suppletory character of the RPC tos special laws like BP 22 is applicable?

RULING:

A.) YES. Some provisions of the Revised Penal Code, especially with the addition of the second sentence in Article
10, are applicable to special laws. It submits that B.P. Blg. 22 does not provide any prohibition regarding the
applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code to it.

Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows: ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which
are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code
shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.

The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides that offenses which in the future are made punishable
under special laws are not subject to the provisions of the RPC, while the second makes the RPC supplementary to
such laws

B.) B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the
absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily
applicable, may be applied suppletorily. Indeed, in the recent case of Yu vs. People the Court applied suppletorily
the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22.

The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is analogous to the application of the provision
on principals under Article 17 in U.S. vs. Ponte. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design
is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each
of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals. BUT In the present case, the prosecution failed
to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. Conspiracy must be
established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. Thus, Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga is
ACQUITTED of the charges against her under B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.

People v. Bustinera Case Digest

People v. Luisito Bustinera

G. R. No. 148233. June 8, 2004

FACTS:

ESC Transport hired Luisito Bustinera as a taxi driver. It was agreed that appellant would drive the taxi from 6:00 a.m.
to 11:00 p.m., after which he would return it to ESC Transport's garage and remit the boundary fee in the amount of
P780.00 per day. On December 25,1996, appellant admittedly reported for work and drove the taxi, but he did not
return it on the same day as he was supposed to. The owner of ESC reported the taxi stolen. On January 9, 1997,
Bustinera's wife went to ESC Transport and revealed that the taxi had been abandoned. ESC was able to recovered.
The trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft.

HELD:

Bustinera was convicted of qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended for the unlawful
taking of a motor vehicle. However, Article 310 has been modified, with respect to certain vehicles, by Republic Act
No. 6539, as amended, otherwise known as "AN ACT PREVENTING AND PENALIZING CARNAPPING. "When statutes
are in pari materia or when they relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or things, or
cover the same specific or particular subject matter, or have the same purpose or object, the rule dictates that they
should be construed together. The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking
be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be
accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. Theft is qualified
when any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the theft is committed by a domestic servant; (2) the theft is
committed with grave abuse of confidence; (3) the property stolen is either a motor vehicle, mail matter or large
cattle; (4) the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation; (5) the property stolen is
fish taken from a fish pond or fishery; and (6) the property was taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon,
volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. On the other hand, Section 2 of
Republic Act No.6539, as amended defines "car napping" as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle
belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by
using force upon things." The elements of car napping are thus: (1) the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to
another; (2) the taking is without the consent of the owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons or by using force upon things; and (3) the taking is done with intent to gain. Car napping is essentially the
robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle, the concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and car napping being the
same. From the foregoing, since appellant is being accused of the unlawful taking of a Daewoo sedan, it is the anti-
car napping law and not the provisions of qualified theft which would apply