Definition

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

-the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect
to its application to a given case (Caltex v Palomar) -the art of seeking the intention of the legislature in enacting a
statute and applying it to a given state of facts (Justice Martin) –

Interpretation – the art or process of discovering or expounding on the intended signification of the language used,
that is, the meaning which the authors of the law designed it to convey to others (Black, Construction and
Interpretation of the Laws) -Any branch of the law dealing with the interpretation of law enacted by the legislature
(American Jurisprudence)

JUDICIAL FUNCTION

-required when a statute is invoked and different interpretations are in contention. -where legislature attempts to
do several things one of which in invalid, it may be discarded if the remainder of the act is workable and in no way
depends upon the invalid portion, but if that portion is an integral part of the act, and its excision changes the
manifest intent of the act by broadening its scope to include subject matter or territory which was not included
therein as enacted (Ettinger v Studevent)

CALTEX vs PALOMAR 18 SCRA 247

In 1960, Caltex (Philippines), Inc. announced its “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest”. The mechanics of the contest were
as follows:

1. Participants must estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense
during a specified period;

2. Contest is open to all car owners or licensed drivers;

3. Participants need not buy any Caltex products to be eligible. No fee is required.

4. Participants just need to fill out a form and drop their entries at the nearest Caltex station.

To publicize their contest, Caltex sought the assistance of the Philippine Postal Office. However, then acting
Postmaster Enrico Palomar denied the request of Caltex as Palomar deemed that the contest is a violation of the
Postal Law (Chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code [RAC]).

Palomar cited Section 1954 of the RAC:

SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. — No matter belonging to any of the following classes, whether
sealed as first-class matter or not, shall be imported into the Philippines through the mails, or to be deposited in or
carried by the mails of the Philippines, or be delivered to its addressee by any officer or employee of the Bureau of
Posts:

Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any manner pertaining to, or conveying or
purporting to convey any information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme depending in whole
or in part upon lot or chance, or any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining any money or property of any kind
by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.
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According to Palomar, the contest is a lottery hence, communications pertaining thereto cannot be mailed by Caltex
via Philippine Post.

Feeling aggrieved, Caltex brought the issue before the regular courts thru a petition for declaratory relief. Caltex
argued that their contest is not a lottery; that under prevailing jurisprudence, lottery consists of the following
elements:

a. consideration;

b. prize;

c. chance.

Caltex insists that their contest is not a lottery because the first element, consideration, is missing. Said element is
missing because participants are not required to pay anything – there’s no consideration on the part of the
participants.

Palomar assailed the petition as he argued that the same is not proper. He insisted that he was merely applying the
law and that there is no legal issue at all; that there is no need for the courts to call for a construction on the statute
in question. Palomar further argued that even if the said contest, assuming arguendo, is not considered a lottery, the
same is considered as a gift enterprise which is still prohibited by the Postal Law to be mailed.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Caltex’s petition for declaratory relief is proper.

2. Whether or not the Caltex contest is a lottery/gift enterprise.

HELD:

1. Yes. The petition is proper. Construction of a law is in order if what is in issue is an inquiry into the intended
meaning of the words used in a certain law. As defined in Black’s Law Dictionary: Construction is the art or process of
discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a
given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is
not explicitly provided for in the law.

2. No.

The contest is not a lottery. The contention of Caltex is well taken, i.e., the first element is lacking (no consideration).

The contest is also not a gift enterprise. The Supreme Court went on to discuss that under prevailing jurisprudence
and legal doctrines as well as definitions provided by legal luminaries, there is no explicit definition as to what a gift
enterprise is. However, under the Postal Law, the term “gift enterprise” was used in association with the term
“lottery”. As such, the principle of noscitur a sociis, a principle in statutory construction, is applicable. Under this
principle, it is only logical that the term under a construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which
is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, applying noscitur a sociis, if lottery is
prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term “gift enterprise” be so construed. Therefore,
since the contest does not include a consideration, it is neither a lottery nor a gift enterprise. Caltex should be
allowed to avail of the Philippine postal service.

Construction vs Interpretation

CONSTRUCTION -drawing of conclusions with respect to subjects that are beyond the direct expression of the text
from elements known and given in the text -the court will resort to this when it goes beyond the language of the
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statute and seeks the assistance of extrinsic aids in order to determine whether a case falls within the statute -goes
beyond the written text and may call in the aid of extrinsic considerations -drawing of conclusions, respecting
subjects that lie beyond the direct expressions of the text, from elements known from and given in the text;
conclusions which are in the spirit, though not within the letter, of the text.”

INTERPRETATION -process of discovering the true meaning of the language used -the court will resort to this when it
endeavors to ascertain the meaning of a word in a statute, which when considered with the other words in the
statute, may reveal a different meaning from that apparent when the word is considered abstractly or when given its
usual meaning -limited to exploring the written text -art of finding out the true sense of any form of words, that is,
the sense which their author intended to convey, and of enabling others to derive from them the same idea which
the author intended to convey (Dr. Leiber)

Duty of Courts

Article 8 Sec 1 of the 1987 Constitution

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.

Statute
A. PARTS OF A STATUTE
a. Title – the heading on the preliminary part, furnishing the name by which the act is
individually known. It is usually prefixed to the statute in the brief summary of its
contents.
b. Preamble – part of statute explaining the reasons for its enactment and the objects sought
to be accomplished. Usually, it starts with “whereas”.
c. Enacting clause – part of statute which declares its enactment and serves to identify it as
an act of legislation proceeding from the proper legislative authority. “Be enacted” is the
usual formula used to start this clause.
d. Body – the main and operative part of the statute containing its substantive and even
procedural provisions. Provisos and exceptions may also be found.
e. Repealing Clause - announces the prior statutes or specific provisions which have been
abrogated by reason of the enactment of the new law.
f. Saving Clause – restriction in a repealing act, which is intended to save rights, pending
proceedings, penalties, etc. from the annihilation which would result from an unrestricted
repeal.
g. Separability Clause – provides that in the event that one or more provisions or
unconstitutional, the remaining provisions shall still be in force.
h. Effectivity Clause – announces the effective date of the law.

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B. PROCEDURE IN THE ENACTMENT OF A STATUTE
1. A member of the NA shall introduce it to the Secretary of the NA who shall calendar it for the
1st Reading

2. 1 st Reading – the bill shall be read by its number and title only

3. The bill is referred to the Speaker of the appropriate Committee for the conduct of public
hearings. The committee shall decide WON to report it favorably or whether a substitute bill should
be considered If not favorable, it shall be considered dead.

4. If favorable, the bill is returned to the NA and shall be calendared for the 2nd reading.

5. 2 nd Reading – the bill shall be read in its entirety.

6. The bill is set for open debates where amendments and insertions to the bill shall be proposed

7. After approval in 2nd reading and 3 days before the final passage, it will be printed in copies in its
final form and shall be distributed to the members of the NA, unless the Pres certifies in writing the
necessity of the immediate enactment should there be public calamity of emergency

8. It shall be calendared then for the 3rd reading; no amendment shall be allowed; only the title of
the bill shall be read and the members will vote should there be a quorum If a NO vote wins, the
proposed bill is dead If YES vote wins, it will be passed to the other house and shall undergo the
same process of the three readings; if there is variance in the proposed bill, it may pass through a
Bicameral Conference Committee which can introduce amendments to suit both houses

9. After it has been finally passed, it will be submitted to the Pres for approval. He shall sign it or
veto it. If vetoed, it will be returned to NA , and if approved by 2/3s of all its members, it will become
a law.

ARTICLE VI SEC 26 AND 27, 1987 CONSTITUTION

SECTION 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.

(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate
days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days
before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment
to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall
be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays
entered in the Journal.

SECTION 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same
with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its
Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of
such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other
House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members
of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined
by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal.

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The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty
days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.

(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation,
revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.

ALALAYAN VS NAPOCOR

In 1961, Republic Act No. 3043 (An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act Numbered One
Hundred Twenty, as Amended by Republic Act Numbered Twenty Six Hundred and Forty One) was
passed. This law amended the charter of NAPOCOR (National Power Corporation). Section 3 of
RA 3043 provides that:
a. contractors being supplied by NAPOCOR shall not exceed an annual profit of 12%;
b. if they do, they shall refund such excess to their customers;
c. that NAPOCOR has the power to renew all existing contracts with franchise holders for the
supply of energy.
Santiago Alalayan and the Philippine Power and Development Company (PPDC) assailed the said
provision.They averred that Section 3 is a rider because first, it was not included in the title of the
amending law nor was it included in the amended law. Second, the main purpose of RA 3043 was
to increase the capital stock of NAPOCOR hence Alalayan et al believed that Section 3 was not
germane to RA 3043.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 3 of RA 3043 is constitutional.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court simply ruled that the Constitution does not require Congress to
employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or
catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the
purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the
subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and
its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the
same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.

TOLENTINO VS SECRETARY OF FINANCE

Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the
Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively
originate from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the
Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in
the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was
referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known
as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by
striking out its text and substituting it with the text of SB 1630 in that way “the bill remains a
House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB”. (It’s
ironic however to note that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco even signed the said Senate
Bill.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.

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HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such
consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with
amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according
to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several
instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far
as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has
always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no
showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has
been done.

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS ERMITA

Facts:

Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List challenged the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 particularly
Sections 4, 5 and 6, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC). These questioned provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing the
President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective
January 1, 2006, after any of the following conditions have been satisfied, to wit:

. . . That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective
January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following
conditions has been satisfied:

(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year
exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or

(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-
half percent (1 ½%).

Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of its
exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution. They further argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and
services and cannot be included within the purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since
this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the government and
usually imposed on imported/exported goods. They also said that the President has powers to
cause, influence or create the conditions provided by law to bring about the conditions precedent.
Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are made by law as to how the Secretary of Finance
will make the recommendation. They claim, nonetheless, that any recommendation of the Secretary
of Finance can easily be brushed aside by the President since the former is a mere alter ego of the
latter, such that, ultimately, it is the President who decides whether to impose the increased tax rate
or not.

Issues:

Whether or not R.A. No. 9337 has violated the provisions in Article VI, Section 24, and Article VI,
Section 26 (2) of the Constitution.

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Whether or not there was an undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec 28
Par 1 and 2 of the Constitution.

Whether or not there was a violation of the due process and equal protection under Article III Sec. 1
of the Constitution.

Discussions:

Basing from the ruling of Tolentino case, it is not the law, but the revenue bill which is required by
the Constitution to “originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives, but Senate has the
power not only to propose amendments, but also to propose its own version even with respect to
bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in the House. the Constitution simply means
is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public
debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the
theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be
more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at
large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are
thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.

In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to
inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the
legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the
legislature.

The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that “no person or class of persons shall
be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the
same place and in like circumstances.”

Rulings:

R.A. No. 9337 has not violated the provisions. The revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of
Representatives, the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to
the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes,
percentage, excise and franchise taxes. Verily, Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution does not
contain any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the amendments that may be introduced by
the Senate to the House revenue bill.

There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a
law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate
power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his
authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process
can go forward.

Supreme Court held no decision on this matter. The power of the State to make reasonable and
natural classifications for the purposes of taxation has long been established. Whether it relates to
the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the
methods of assessment, valuation and collection, the State’s power is entitled to presumption of
validity. As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a clear showing of
unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.

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C. VAGUE STATUTES

VAGUE – lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application Repugnant to the Consti in 2 respects:

1. Violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it,
fair notice of the conduct to avoid

2. Leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and become an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle -The language conveys a sufficiently definite
warning as to the prescribed conduct when measured by common understanding and
practice

ESTRADA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001

Facts:
Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes
to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct
line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects
of the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard
in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The
Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused.
The focal point of the case is the alleged “vagueness” of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this terms
are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the
validity of the mentioned law.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law using the
facial challenge.

Ruling:
On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. The
petitioner’s contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the law seeks to
penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under the
petitioner’s reliance since ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It
can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification
by a saving clause or construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case since the
statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.
On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be achieved
by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. Doctrine
of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal
law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the
most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists. Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial challenge of a statute in

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free speech cases. With respect to such statue, the established rule is that one to who application of a statute
is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken
as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. On its
face invalidation of statues results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied
to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It is evident that the
purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined than real.
The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the Congress’ decision to
include it among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Supreme Court holds the
plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for lacking merit.

Issues:

1. WON Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague

No. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are
subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. The
amended information itself closely tracks the language of law, indicating w/ reasonable certainty the various
elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have committed.
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense.
Petitioner however bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms
“combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. These
omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly
vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, hence violative of his fundamental right to due process.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or
because of the employment of terms without defining them.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the
statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects – it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of other
may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad
statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

2. WON the Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the predicate crimes of plunder and
therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process

No. Sec. 4 (Rule of Evidence) states that: For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall
not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the
presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating
by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.

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The “reasonable doubt” standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it
gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof of
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.
Not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is required
to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged—the element of the offense.
Relative to petitioner’s contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that
“pattern” is a “very important element of the crime of plunder;” and that Sec. 4 is “two-pronged, (as) it
contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime, “ such that without it the accused cannot
be convicted of plunder –
We do not subscribe to petitioner’s stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be
culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to sec. 1 par. (d). Sec. 4 purports to do no
more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely
procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but
only operated in furtherance of a remedy.
What is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude
exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

3. WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power
of Congress to so classify it.

No. It is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Precisely because the constitutive
crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy
that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed “willfully, unlawfully and
criminally.” It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement
of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of
Senator Tañada made during the deliberation on S.B. No.733
Senator Tañada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution
need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it
proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme
or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime
must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to
prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since
the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent.
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved
in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death.
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either
because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to
completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being.
There are crimes however in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject
criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself
to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se.
For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not
matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate
crimes are mainly mala in se.

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 Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as
amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is
DISMISSED for lack of merit

D. REPEAL OF STATUTES

ARTICLE 7, CIVIL CODE

Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance
shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be
void and the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are
not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (5a)

Express repeal – is the abrogation or annulling of a previously existing law by the enactment of a
subsequent statute which declares that the former law shall be revoked and abrogated.

Implied repeal – when a later statute contains provisions so contrary to irreconcilable with those
of the earlier law that only one of the two statutes can stand in force.
The repeal of a penal law deprives the court of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of
the old penal law prior to its repeal.

Only a law can repeal a law.

The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest, otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later
act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act.
Two (2) categories of repeal by implication:
1. Where provision in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict;
2. If the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute
– to be a complete and perfect system in itself.

PALANCA VS CA
Facts:
On January 22, 1977, petitioner, as vendor, and Jose S. Sanicas, as vendee, entered into a Contract to Sell
on Installment of a parcel of land. Private respondent agreed to pay petitioner the amount of P9,851.00 as
downpayment and the balance of P88,659.00 in 120 monthly installments with 14% interest per annum on
the outstanding balance. Sanicas further agreed to pay the annual real property taxes, and that should he
fail to pay the said taxes, he would have to pay a yearly surcharge or penalty of 50% of the taxes due plus
12% compounded interest per annum.

11 | P a g e
Sanicas later assumed the account of his brother Jose and he designated the latter as his authorized
representative in dealing with petitioner.

Private respondent requested a detailed statement but petitioner failed to furnish him with the statement.
Private respondent hired an accountant to compute his obligations under the contract. Thereafter, he
tendered the amount of P44,955.87 in cash upon petitioner, which amount included interest at 12% per
annum.

Petitioner, however, refused to receive the amount tendered, prompting private respondent to make a
judicial consignment of the amount on May 29, 1987.

Applying Article 1250 of the New Civil Code, the trial court ruled that for an agreement providing for the
adjustment of the purchase price in case of a diminution of the value of the peso to come into effect, there
should be an "extraordinary inflation or deflation." It was the position of the trial court that inasmuch as
there was no extraordinary inflation or deflation, paragraph 11 of the contract should not be taken into
account in the computation of the amount payable under the contract.

Furthermore, the trial court ruled that it was unconscionable to peg the unpaid balance in the event of
monetary fluctuation at 100.398% aside from the agreed interest rate of 14%.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals wherein CA modified the judgment of the trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a proportionate increase in payment on the balance of the purchase
price for a piece of real property bought on installment, pursuant to paragraph 11 of the subject Contract
To Sell on Installment.

Held:
Petition is denied.

In the case at bench, the clear understanding of the parties is that there should be an upward adjustment
of the purchase price the moment there is a deterioration of the Philippine peso vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar.
This is the "monetary fluctuation" contemplated by them as would justify the adjustment. Under this
scenario, it is an idle task to determine whether the contract has been visited by an "extraordinary inflation"
as to trigger the operation of Article 1250.

While the contract may contain an "escalator clause" providing that in the occurrence of certain events, the
contract price shall be increased to a fixed percentage of the base price ("Escalator" price adjustment
clauses, 63 ALR 2d 1337 [1959], still the autonomy of the parties to provide such escalator clauses may be
limited by law.

The stipulation of the parties is in violation of R.A. No. 529, as amended, entitled "An Act to Assure Uniform
Value To Philippine Coin and Currency," otherwise as the Cuenco Law.

Central Bank Circular cannot repeal a law. Only a law can repeal another law. Article 7 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines provides:
Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by
disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

PEOPLE VS TAMAYO

12 | P a g e
G.R. No. L-41423 March 19, 1935

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CRISANTO TAMAYO, defendant-appellant.

Juan Amor and Simeon J. Tolentino for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

HULL, J.:

Appellant was convicted in the justice of the peace court of Magsingal, Province of Ilocos Sur, of
a violation of section 2, municipal ordinance No. 5, series of 1932, of said municipality. Upon
appeal to the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur conviction resulted and a fine was imposed.
From that decision this appeal was brought.

While this appeal was pending, the municipal council repealed section 2 in question, which
repeal was duly approved by the provincial board, and the act complained of, instead of being a
violation of the municipal ordinances, is now legal in that municipality.

Appellant has moved for a dismissal of the action against him on account of that repeal.

In the leading cases of the United States vs. Cuna (12 Phil., 241), and Wing vs. United States (218
U.S., 272), the doctrine was clearly established that in the Philippines repeal of a criminal Act by
its reenactment, even without a saving clause, would not destroy criminal liability. But not a
single sentence in either decision indicates that there was any desire to hold that a person could
be prosecuted, convicted, and punished for acts no longer criminal.

There is no question that a common law and in America a much more favorable attitude towards
the accused exists relative to statutes that have been repealed than has been adopted here. Our
rule is more in conformity with the Spanish doctrine, but even in Spain, where the offense ceases
to be criminal, prosecution cannot be had. (1 Pacheco Commentaries, 296.)

The repeal here was absolute, and not a reenactment and repeal by implication. Nor was there
any saving clause. The legislative intent as shown by the action of the municipal council is that
such conduct, formerly denounced, is no longer deemed criminal, and it would be illogical for
this court to attempt to sentence appellant for an offense that no longer exists.

We are therefore of the opinion that the proceedings against appellant must be dismissed. So
ordered. Costs de oficio.

Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Vickers, Imperial, Butte, Goddard, and Diaz, JJ.,
concur.

PEOPLE VS SINDIONG AND PASTOR

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

13 | P a g e
vs.
GERONIMA SINDIONG DE PASTOR and SANTOS T. PASTOR, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-335 February 12, 1947

Nature of the Action: An appeal from the decision of the trial court

Facts: Defendants were charged of violating Sections 1458 and 1459 of the Revised Administrative
Code, having deliberately evaded paying the percentage tax while being owners of ‘Magazine
Center’, an establishment devoted to selling newspapers from 1936 to 1938. However, defendant
Sindiong countered that the law accused of him were repealed by CA Nos. 466 and 503, which
were in force in 1939, and which excluded Sindiong’s business from the requirement of paying
taxes.

Issue: Can defendants be charged against a law that has been repealed?

Ruling: Wherefore, it is the judgment of this Court that the order appealed from be, as it is hereby,
affirmed with costs de officio.

Ratio: No. The Supreme Court held that upon the enactment of the National Internal Revenue
Code (CA 466 and 503), the defendants ceased to be bound in paying taxes. The prevailing doctrine
is that where the repealing law wholly fails to penalize the acts which constituted the offense
defined and penalized in the repealed law, the repeal carries with it the deprivation of the courts
of jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence persons charged with violations of the old law prior to
the repeal.

MECANO VS. COA

ACTS: Mecano is a Director II of the NBI. He was hospitalized and on account of which he incurred medical
and hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is claiming from the COA.

In a memorandum to the NBI Director, Director Lim requested reimbursement for his expenses on the
ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 699 of the RAC, the pertinent provisions of which
read:

Sec. 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred in performance of duty. — When a person
in the service of the national government of a province, city, municipality or municipal district is so injured
in the performance of duty as thereby to receive some actual physical hurt or wound, the proper Head of
Department may direct that absence during any period of disability thereby occasioned shall be on full
pay, though not more than six months, and in such case he may in his discretion also authorize the
payment of the medical attendance, necessary transportation, subsistence and hospital fees of the injured
person. Absence in the case contemplated shall be charged first against vacation leave, if any there be.

xxx xxx xxx

In case of sickness caused by or connected directly with the performance of some act in the line of duty,
the Department head may in his discretion authorize the payment of the necessary hospital fees.

Director Lim then forwarded petitioner’s claim, to the Secretary of Justice. Finding petitioner’s illness to
be service-connected, the Committee on Physical Examination of the Department of Justice favorably
recommended the payment of petitioner’s claim.

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However, then Undersecretary of Justice Bello III returned petitioner’s claim to Director Lim, having
considered the statements of the Chairman of the COA to the effect that the RAC being relied upon was
repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987.

Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy of Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of then
Secretary of Justice Drilon stating that “the issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal
or abregate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code, including the particular Section 699 of the
latter”.

Director Lim transmitted anew Mecano’s claim to then Undersecretary Bello for favorable consideration;
Secretary Drilon forwarded petitioner’s claim to the COA Chairman, recommending payment of the same.
COA Chairman however, denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been
repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987, solely for the reason that the same section was not restated
nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987. He commented, however, that the claim may be filed
with the Employees’ Compensation Commission, considering that the illness of Director Mecano occurred
after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987.

Eventually, petitioner’s claim was returned by Undersecretary of Justice Montenegro to Director Lim with
the advice that petitioner “elevate the matter to the Supreme Court if he so desires”.

Hence this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: 1. WON the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the RAC

HELD: The Court resolves to GRANT the petition; respondent is hereby ordered to give due course to
petitioner’s claim for benefits

NO

The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a subsequent law is a matter of
legislative intent. The lawmakers may expressly repeal a law by incorporating therein a repealing provision
which expressly and specifically cites the particular law or laws, and portions thereof, that are intended to
be repealed. A declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing clause, that a particular and specific law,
identified by its number or title, is repealed is an express repeal; all others are implied repeals

In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the ascertainment of whether or not it was the
intent of the legislature to supplant the old Code with the new Code partly depends on the scrutiny of the
repealing clause of the new Code. This provision is found in Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the
Administrative Code of 1987 which reads:

Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions thereof,
inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

The question that should be asked is: What is the nature of this repealing clause?

It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that
are intended to be repealed. Rather, it is an example of a general repealing provision. It is a clause which
predicates the intended repeal under the condition that substantial conflict must be found in existing and
prior acts. This latter situation falls under the category of an implied repeal.

There are two categories of repeal by implication.

1. Where provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the
later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one.

15 | P a g e
 2.
2. If the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute,
it will operate to repeal the earlier law.

Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover nor attempt to cover the entire
subject matter of the old Code. There are several matters treated in the old Code which are not found in
the new Code, such as the provisions on notaries public, the leave law, the public bonding law, military
reservations, claims for sickness benefits under Section 699, and still others.

According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice, what appears clear is the intent to cover
only those aspects of government that pertain to administration, organization and procedure,
understandably because of the many changes that transpired in the government structure since the
enactment of the RAC decades of years ago.

Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the two Codes on the matter of the subject
claim are in an irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can be no such conflict because the provision on
sickness benefits of the nature being claimed by petitioner has not been restated in the Administrative
Code of 1987.

Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not
favored. 20 The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to
know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.

NOTES:

1. the COA would have Us consider that the fact that Section 699 was not restated in the Administrative
Code of 1987 meant that the same section had been repealed. The COA anchored this argument on the
whereas clause of the 1987 Code, which states:

WHEREAS, the effectiveness of the Government will be enhanced by a new Administrative Code which
incorporate in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural principles and rules of
governance; and

xxx xxx xxx

It argues, in effect, that what is contemplated is only one Code — the Administrative Code of 1987. This
contention is untenable.

The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not
of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the prior act, since the new statute may merely
be cumulative or a continuation of the old one. What is necessary is a manifest indication of legislative
purpose to repeal.

2. Regarding COA contention that recovery under this subject section (699) shall bar the recovery of
benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program, the same cannot be upheld. The second sentence
of Article 173, Chapter II, Title II (dealing on Employees’ Compensation and State Insurance Fund), Book
IV of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1921, expressly provides that “the payment of compensation
under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code . . . whose benefits are administered by the system (meaning SSS or GSIS) or by other
agencies of the government.”

LEYNES VS. COA

Facts:

16 | P a g e
Petitioner Judge Tomas C. Leynes, is the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Calapan City,
Oriental Mindoro, Branch 40. His salary and representation and transportation allowance (RATA) were
drawn from the budget of the Supreme Court. Besides that, petitioner also received a monthly allowance
of P944 from the local funds of the Municipality of Naujan starting 1984.

On May 7, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan unanimously approved a resolution increasing petitioner judge’s
monthly allowance from P944 to P1,600 (an increase of P656) starting May 1993. This supplemental
budget was approved by the municipal government (the Municipal Mayor and
the Sangguniang Bayan) and was also likewise approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and the Office
of Provincial Budget and Management of Oriental Mindoro.

On February 17, 1994, Provincial Auditor Salvacion M. Dalisay sent a letter to the Municipal Mayor and
the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan directing them to stop the payment of the P1,600 monthly allowance
or RATA to petitioner judge and to require the immediate refund of the amounts previously paid to the
latter. She reasoned that the Municipality of Naujan could not grant RATA to petitioner judge in addition
to the RATA the latter was already receiving from the Supreme Court. Petitioner judge appealed the
matter to COA Regional Director Gregoria S. Ong who, however, upheld the opinion of Provincial Auditor
Dalisay.

Issue:

Whether or not the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro can validly provide RATA to its Municipal
Judge, in addition to that provided by the Supreme Court.

Held:

RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, clearly provides that provincial, city and municipal
governments may grant allowances to judges as long as their finances allow. Section 3, paragraph (e) of
LBC No. 53, by outrightly prohibiting LGUs from granting allowances to judges whenever such allowances
are (1) also granted by the national government or (2) similar to the allowances granted by the national
government, violates Section 447(a)(l)(xi) of the Local Government Code of 1991. As already stated, a
circular must conform to the law it seeks to implement and should not modify or amend it. Moreover, by
prohibiting LGUs from granting allowances similar to the allowances granted by the national government,
Section 3 (e) of LBC No. 53 practically prohibits LGUs from granting allowances to judges and, in effect,
totally nullifies their statutory power to do so. Being unduly restrictive therefore of the statutory power
of LGUs to grant allowances to judges and being violative of their autonomy guaranteed by the
Constitution, Section 3, paragraph (e) of LBC No. 53 is hereby declared null and void.

UC VS. CUNA

FACTS:

Cuna, on June 30, 1907, sold opium to Apolinanaria Gumpal, Filipina, who was not a doctor or a
registered user of the drug. He was charged in violation of Sec. 5 of Act No. 1461 of the Philippine
Commission. Cuna demurred on the ground that the said act was repealed by Act no. 1761 on October
10, 1907 and because having repealed during the pendency of the case with no exception regarding the
pendency, there was no law in force thus no jurisdiction of any courts. The trial court dismissed the case.

17 | P a g e
 The Government appealed and argued that both acts penalize the same crime and should not be
construed as having the courts deprive Cuna of trial.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cuna, who committed the crime before the repeal, should be convicted.

RULING: YES.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

The trial court cited the American and English common-law doctrine in their decision. The Supreme
Court, although they consider it right, said that those laws were not in force in the country. The SC said
that no retroactive effect of the law shall take effect except when the punishment will be more favorable
to the accused. Being that the new law penalized the same act in the repealed law, there is no
retroactivity. The old law should still be prescribed. The SC decided that the Courts have jurisdiction over
the case. The decision of the trial court was reversed.

E. ORDINANCE
Ordinance – an act passed by the local legislative body in the exercise of its law-making authority.

TEST OF VALID ORDINANCE

1. Must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

2. Must not be unfair or oppressive;
3. Must not be partial or discriminatory;
4. Must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
5. Must be general and consistent with public policy; and
6. Must not be unreasonable.

REASON WHY AN ORDINANCE SHOULD NOT CONTRAVENE A STATUTE

Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national
law making body.

The delegate cannot be superior to the principal.

ROLE OF FOREIGN JURISPRUDENCE

Philippine laws must necessarily be construed in accordance with the intention of its own law makers
and such intent may be deduced from the language of each law and the context of other local legislation
related thereof.
MAGTAJAS VS PRYCE PROPERTIES CORP

G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994

MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners,

vs.

PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION,

FACTS: There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de
Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project.The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its
tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro

18 | P a g e
City.he reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On
December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353.Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a
sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was
joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31,
1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit
their enforcement

ISSUE: WON Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid

HELD: No

Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others,
"gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance
which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.The rationale of the requirement that the
ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This
decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it
was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353
prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the
operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and
the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.

TANO VS SOCRATES

Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law; Regalian Doctrine

GR No. 110249; August 21, 1997

FACTS:

On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance banning the
shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1998.
Subsequently the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a resolution
prohibiting the catching , gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several species of live
marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters.

Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court declare the said
ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said ordinances deprived them of
the due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in
violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:

Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the challenged
ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws. There is
absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman.
Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to

19 | P a g e
 lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation’s marine wealth. The so-called “preferential
right” of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute.

In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and pursuant to the first
paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their “exploration, development and
utilization...shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.

In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in
municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of
ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters. In light of the principles
of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to LGUs which
unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned ordinances cannot be
doubted.

Basic Guidelines in Statutory Construction

A. LEGISLATIVE INTENT

The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain the

meaning and intention of the legislature, to the end that the same may be enforced.
Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.

Article 10 Civil Code

Art. 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.

Socorro Ramirez vs. CA and Garcia [G.R. No. 93833. September 28, 1995]

Facts:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC alleging that the private
respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated
her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality,”
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.”

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought damages. The
transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by
petitioner.

As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Pasay RTC for violation of
Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of
private communication, and other purposes.”

20 | P a g e
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later on granted, on the ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.

The CA declared the RTC’s decision null and void and denied the petitioner’s MR, hence the instant petition.

Issue:
W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the conversation

Held:
Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly
known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however
otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the
parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder.
The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a
party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to
penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier “any”.
Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a (person) privy to a
communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will)
qualify as a violator” under this provision of R.A. 4200.

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court’s conclusion that
in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of
private conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons.

The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need
not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing,
intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere
allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape
recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed
out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: “Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one
can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person
should be professed.”
Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include
“private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point of absurdity.
The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning “to share or to impart.” In its
ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the “process by which meanings or
thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or
gestures)”
These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of
“meanings or thoughts” which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988,
between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter’s office. Any doubts about the
legislative body’s meaning of the phrase “private communication” are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact
that the terms “conversation” and “communication” were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his
Explanatory Note to the Bill.

21 | P a g e
 Chavez vs. JBC, Escudero and Tupas, July 17, 2012
G.R. No. 202242 July 17, 2012
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS,
JR., Respondents.

Facts:
The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of Supreme Court
Chief Justice following Renato Corona’s departure.
Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a separate,
competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a
body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).

In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that “(1) A Judicial and Bar
Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice
as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the
Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.” In compliance therewith, Congress, from
the moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one representative from the Congress to sit in the
JBC to act as one of the ex officio members.

In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven
(7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from
Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate,
with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. During the existence of the case, Senator Francis Joseph G.
Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as
representatives of the legislature.

It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.

The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally envisioned a
unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating “a representative of the National Assembly” to the
JBC. The phrase, however, was not modified to aptly jive with the change to bicameralism which was
adopted by the Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. The respondents also contend that if
the Commissioners were made aware of the consequence of having a bicameral legislature instead
of a unicameral one, they would have made the corresponding adjustment in the representation of
Congress in the JBC; that if only one house of Congress gets to be a member of JBC would deprive
the other house of representation, defeating the principle of balance.

22 | P a g e
The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of Congress to be
members of the JBC does not render JBC’s purpose of providing balance nugatory; that the presence
of two (2) members from Congress will most likely provide balance as against the other six (6)
members who are undeniably presidential appointees

Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an object of concern, not
just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all the citizens who have the right to seek judicial
intervention for rectification of legal blunders.

Issue:
Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom
are members of Congress, defeats the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
No. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to perform the functions
of the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such, it is unconstitutional.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are
clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the
language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed. As such, it can be clearly and unambiguously discerned from Paragraph 1,
Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution that in the phrase, “a representative of Congress,” the
use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no
room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional
Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had
it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC,
the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.

Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in
itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and
specific by considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated.
Every meaning to be given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body
of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or
phrases and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter. Applying the foregoing principle
to this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the
Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the
Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular
representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC

Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous,
there is no need to resort extrinsic aids such as records of the Constitutional Commission.
Nevertheless, even if the Court should proceed to look into the minds of the members of the
Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable from the records thereof that it was intended that the
JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. The underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that
a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among
any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter.

With the respondents’ contention that each representative should be admitted from the Congress
and House of Representatives, the Supreme Court, after the perusal of the records of Constitutional
Commission, held that “Congress,” in the context of JBC representation, should be considered as one
body. While it is true that there are still differences between the two houses and that an inter-play
between the two houses is necessary in the realization of the legislative powers conferred to them
by the Constitution, the same cannot be applied in the case of JBC representation because no liaison
between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is required between the

23 | P a g e
 Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Hence,
the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.

The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private sector and the three branches of
government would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of the members of the
Judiciary. Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by
having more than one voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would
“negate the principle of equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the
Constitution.”

It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7)
members only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of
it, goes against that mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing Congress with
an equal voice with other members of the JBC in recommending appointees to the Judiciary is
explicit. Any circumvention of the constitutional mandate should not be countenanced for the
Constitution is the supreme law of the land. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to
which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the
land, must defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what may be the tides of
time. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the call of situations and much more
tailor itself to the whims and caprices of the government and the people who run it.

Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior
official actions are nonetheless valid. In the interest of fair play under the doctrine of operative facts,
actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not
nullified.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar
Council IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to
reconstitute itself so that only one ( 1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its
proceedings, in accordance with Section 8( 1 ), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. This disposition is
immediately executory.

Mecano vs. COA

ACTS: Mecano is a Director II of the NBI. He was hospitalized and on account of which he incurred medical
and hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is claiming from the COA.

In a memorandum to the NBI Director, Director Lim requested reimbursement for his expenses on the
ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 699 of the RAC, the pertinent provisions of which
read:

Sec. 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred in performance of duty. — When a person
in the service of the national government of a province, city, municipality or municipal district is so injured
in the performance of duty as thereby to receive some actual physical hurt or wound, the proper Head of
Department may direct that absence during any period of disability thereby occasioned shall be on full
pay, though not more than six months, and in such case he may in his discretion also authorize the
payment of the medical attendance, necessary transportation, subsistence and hospital fees of the injured
person. Absence in the case contemplated shall be charged first against vacation leave, if any there be.

xxx xxx xxx

In case of sickness caused by or connected directly with the performance of some act in the line of duty,
the Department head may in his discretion authorize the payment of the necessary hospital fees.
24 | P a g e
Director Lim then forwarded petitioner’s claim, to the Secretary of Justice. Finding petitioner’s illness to
be service-connected, the Committee on Physical Examination of the Department of Justice favorably
recommended the payment of petitioner’s claim.

However, then Undersecretary of Justice Bello III returned petitioner’s claim to Director Lim, having
considered the statements of the Chairman of the COA to the effect that the RAC being relied upon was
repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987.

Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy of Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of then
Secretary of Justice Drilon stating that “the issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal
or abregate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code, including the particular Section 699 of the
latter”.

Director Lim transmitted anew Mecano’s claim to then Undersecretary Bello for favorable consideration;
Secretary Drilon forwarded petitioner’s claim to the COA Chairman, recommending payment of the same.
COA Chairman however, denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been
repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987, solely for the reason that the same section was not restated
nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987. He commented, however, that the claim may be filed
with the Employees’ Compensation Commission, considering that the illness of Director Mecano occurred
after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987.

Eventually, petitioner’s claim was returned by Undersecretary of Justice Montenegro to Director Lim with
the advice that petitioner “elevate the matter to the Supreme Court if he so desires”.

Hence this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: 1. WON the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the RAC

HELD: The Court resolves to GRANT the petition; respondent is hereby ordered to give due course to
petitioner’s claim for benefits

NO

The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a subsequent law is a matter of
legislative intent. The lawmakers may expressly repeal a law by incorporating therein a repealing provision
which expressly and specifically cites the particular law or laws, and portions thereof, that are intended to
be repealed. A declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing clause, that a particular and specific law,
identified by its number or title, is repealed is an express repeal; all others are implied repeals

In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the ascertainment of whether or not it was the
intent of the legislature to supplant the old Code with the new Code partly depends on the scrutiny of the
repealing clause of the new Code. This provision is found in Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the
Administrative Code of 1987 which reads:

Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions thereof,
inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

The question that should be asked is: What is the nature of this repealing clause?

It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that
are intended to be repealed. Rather, it is an example of a general repealing provision. It is a clause which
predicates the intended repeal under the condition that substantial conflict must be found in existing and
prior acts. This latter situation falls under the category of an implied repeal.

25 | P a g e
There are two categories of repeal by implication.

1. Where provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the
later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one.
2.
2. If the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute,
it will operate to repeal the earlier law.

Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover nor attempt to cover the entire
subject matter of the old Code. There are several matters treated in the old Code which are not found in
the new Code, such as the provisions on notaries public, the leave law, the public bonding law, military
reservations, claims for sickness benefits under Section 699, and still others.

According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice, what appears clear is the intent to cover
only those aspects of government that pertain to administration, organization and procedure,
understandably because of the many changes that transpired in the government structure since the
enactment of the RAC decades of years ago.

Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the two Codes on the matter of the subject
claim are in an irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can be no such conflict because the provision on
sickness benefits of the nature being claimed by petitioner has not been restated in the Administrative
Code of 1987.

Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not
favored. 20 The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to
know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.

NOTES:

1. the COA would have Us consider that the fact that Section 699 was not restated in the Administrative
Code of 1987 meant that the same section had been repealed. The COA anchored this argument on the
whereas clause of the 1987 Code, which states:

WHEREAS, the effectiveness of the Government will be enhanced by a new Administrative Code which
incorporate in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural principles and rules of
governance; and

xxx xxx xxx

It argues, in effect, that what is contemplated is only one Code — the Administrative Code of 1987. This
contention is untenable.

The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not
of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the prior act, since the new statute may merely
be cumulative or a continuation of the old one. What is necessary is a manifest indication of legislative
purpose to repeal.

2. Regarding COA contention that recovery under this subject section (699) shall bar the recovery of
benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program, the same cannot be upheld. The second sentence
of Article 173, Chapter II, Title II (dealing on Employees’ Compensation and State Insurance Fund), Book
IV of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1921, expressly provides that “the payment of compensation
under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code . . . whose benefits are administered by the system (meaning SSS or GSIS) or by other
agencies of the government.”

26 | P a g e
 Airsporna vs CA
Facts

Mapalad Aisporna, the wife of one Rodolfo Aisporna, an insurance agent, solicited the application of
Eugenio Isidro in behalf of Perla Compana de Seguros without the certificate of authority to act from
the insurance commissioner. Isidro passed away while his wife was issued Php 5000 from the
insurance policy. After the death, the fiscal instigated criminal action against Mapalad for violating
sec 189 of the Insurance code for feloniously acting as agent when she solicited the application form.

In the trial court, she claimed that she helped Rodolfo as clerk and that she solicited a renewal, not a
new policy from Isidro through the phone. She did this because her husband was absent when he
called. She only left a note on top of her husband’s desk to inform him of what transpired. (She did
not accept compensation from Isidro for her services)

Aisporna was sentenced to pay Php 500 with subsidiary costs in case of insolvency in 1971 in the
Cabanatuan city court.

In the appellate court, she was found guilty of having violating par 1 of sec 189 of the insurance
code.

The OSG kept on repeating that she didn’t violate sec 189 of the insurance code.
In seeking reversal of the judgment, Aisporna assigned errors of the appellate court:
1. the receipt of compensation was not a necessary element of the crime in par 1 of sec 189 of the
insurance code
2. CA erred in giving due weight to exhibits F, F1, F17 inclusive sufficient to establish petitioner’s
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
3. The CA erred in not acquitting the petitioner

Issues:

Won a person can be convicted of having violated the 1st par of the sec 189 of the IC without
reference to the 2ndparagraph of the said section. Or
Is it necessary to determine WON the agent mentioned in the 1st paragraph of the aforesaid section
is governed by the definition of an insurance agent found on its second paragraph

Decision: Aisporna acquitted

Ruling:

Sect 189 of the I.C., par 1 states that “No insurance company doing business with the Philippine
Islands nor l any agent thereof shall pay any commission or other compensation to any person for
services in obtaining new insurance unless such person shall have first procured from the Insurance
Commissioner a certificate of authority to act as an agent of such company as herein after provided.
No person shall act as agent, sub-agent, or broker in the solicitation of procurement of applications
for insurance without obtaining a certificate from the Insurance Commissioner.

Par2 Any person who for COMPENSATION solicits or obtains insurance for any for any insurance
compna or offers or assumes to act in the negotiating of such insurance shall be an insurance agent
in the intent of this section and shall thereby become liable to all liabilities to which an insurance
agent is subject.
Par 3 500 pseo fine for person or company violating the provisions of the section.

27 | P a g e
The court held that the 1st par prohibited a person to act as agent without certificate of authority
from the commissioner

In the 2nd par, the definition of an insurance agent is stipulated

The third paragraph provided the penalty for violating the 1st 2 rules

The appellate court said that the petitioner was penalized under the1st paragraph and not the 1nd.

The fact that she didn’t receive compensation wasn’t an excuse for her acquittal because she was
actually punished separately under sec 1 because she did not have a certificate of authority as under
par 1.

The SC held that the definition of an insurance agent was made by CA to be limited to paragraph 2
and not applicable to the 1st paragraph.

The appellate court said that a person was an insurance agent under par 2 if she solicits insurance
for compensation, but in the 1st paragraph, there was no necessity that a person solicits an insurance
compensation in order to be called an agent.

The SC said that this was a reversible error.

The CA said that Aisporna didn’t receive compensation.

The SC said that the definition of an insurance agent was found in the 2nd par of Sec 189 (check the
law) The definition in the 2nd paragraph qualified the definition of an agent used in the 1st and third
paragraphs.

DOCTRINE: The court held that legislative intent must be ascertained from the consideration of the
statute as a whole. The words shouldn’t be studied in isolated explanations but the whole and every
part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to
pronounce the harmonious whole.

Noscitur a sociis provides that where a particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in
itself, the true meaning may be made clear in the company it is fixed in. In applying this, the court
held that the definition of an insurance agent in the 2ndparagraph was applicable in the
1st paragraph.

To receive compensation be the agent is an essential element for violation of the 1st paragraph.
The appellate court said that she didn’t receive compensation by the receipt of compensation wasn’t
an essential element for violation of the 1st paragraph.

The SC said that this view wasn’t correct owing to the American insurance laws which qualified
compensation as a qualifying factor in penalizing unauthorized persons who solicited insurance
(Texas code and snyder’s law)

Chinabank vs Ortega, January 31, 1973

28 | P a g e
 Facts:

Vicente Acaban won in a civil case for sum of money against B & B Forest Development Corporation. To
satisfy the judgment, the Acaban sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of the B & B Forest
Development Corporation with the China Banking Corporation (CBC). Accordingly, a notice of
garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff of the trial court and served on said bank through its
cashier, Tan Kim Liong. Liong was ordered to inform the Court whether or not there is a deposit in the
CBC of B & B Forest Development Corporation, and if there is any deposit, to hold the same intact and
not allow any withdrawal until further order from the Court. CBC and Liong refuse to comply with a
court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor by invoking the provisions of Republic
Act No. 1405 ( Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act) which allegedly prohibits the disclosure of any
information concerning to bank deposits.

Issue:

Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court processes garnishing
the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405.

Held:

No. The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into deposit of B & B Forest
Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the
court whether or not the defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation had a deposit in the China
Banking Corporation only for the purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would
hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order. It is sufficiently clear that the
prohibition against examination of or inquiry into bank deposit under RA 1405 does not preclude its
being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed there is no real inquiry in such a case, and
the existence of the deposit is disclosed the disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process. It
is hard to conceive that it was ever within the intention of Congress to enable debtors to evade
payment of their just debts, even if ordered by the Court, through the expedient of converting their
assets into cash and depositing the same in a bank. (China Banking Corporation vs Ortega, G.R. No. L-
34964, 31 January 1973)

B. VERBA LEGIS

If the language of the statute is plain and free from ambiguity, and express a single, definite, and sensible
meaning, that meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning which the legislature intended to convey.

Padilla, et. Al vs Congress, GR No. 231671, July 25, 2017

ALEXANDER A. PADILLA v. CONGRESS OF PHILIPPINES, GR No. 231671, 2017-07-25
Facts:
P.S. Resolution No. 388 was approved, after receiving seventeen (17) affirmative votes as against
five (5) negative votes, and was adopted as Senate Resolution No. 49[5] entitled "Resolution
Expressing the Sense of the Senate Not to Revoke, at this Time, Proclamation No. 216, Series of
2017, Entitled 'Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao.'"[6]P.S. Resolution No. 390, on the other hand, garnered only
nine (9) votes from the senators who were in favor of it as opposed to twelve (12) votes from the
senators who were against its approval and adoption.[7]On May 31, 2017, the House of
29 | P a g e
Representatives, having previously constituted itself as a Committee of the Whole House,[8] was
briefed by Executive Secretary Salvador C. Medialdea (Executive Secretary Medialdea), Secretary
Lorenzana, and other security officials for about six (6) hours. After the closed-door briefing, the
House of Representatives resumed its regular meeting and deliberated on House Resolution No.
1050 entitled "Resolution Expressing the Full Support of the House of Representatives to President
Rodrigo Duterte as it Finds No Reason to Revoke Proclamation No. 216, Entitled 'Declaring a State of
Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of
Mindanao.'"[9] The House of Representatives proceeded to divide its members on the matter of
approving said resolution through viva voce voting. The result shows that the members who were in
favor of passing the subject resolution secured the majority vote.[10]The House of Representatives
also purportedly discussed the proposal calling for a joint session of the Congress to deliberate and
vote on President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216. After the debates, however, the proposal was
rejected.[11]These series of events led to the filing of the present consolidated petitions.
he Padilla PetitionPetitioners in G.R. No. 231671 raise the question of "[w]hether Congress is
required to convene in joint session, deliberate, and vote jointly under Article VII, [Section] 18 of the
Constitution"
HE PLAIN TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION, SUPPORTED BY THE EXPRESS INTENT OF THE FRAMERS, AND
CONFIRMED BY THE SUPREME COURT, REQUIRES THAT CONGRESS CONVENE IN JOINT SESSION TO
DELIBERATE AND VOTE AS A SINGLE DELIBERATIVE BODY.
Petitioners claim that in Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo,[18] this Court described the "duty" of the
Congress to convene in joint session as "automatic." The convening of the Congress in joint session
when former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Macapagal-Arroyo) declared martial law
and suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao was also a legislative
precedent where the Congress clearly recognized its duty to convene in joint session.[19]
The Tañada Petition... he petitioners in G.R. No. 231694 chiefly opine that:A PLAIN READING OF THE
1987 CONSTITUTION LEADS TO THE INDUBITABLE CONCLUSION THAT A JOINT SESSION OF
CONGRESS TO REVIEW A DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW BY THE PRESIDENT IS
MANDATORY.FAILURE TO CONVENE A JOINT SESSION DEPRIVES LAWMAKERS OF A DELIBERATIVE
AND INTERROGATORY PROCESS TO REVIEW MARTIAL LAW.FAILURE TO CONVENE A JOINT SESSION
DEPRIVES THE PUBLIC OF TRANSPARENT PROCEEDINGS WITHIN WHICH TO BE INFORMED OF THE
FACTUAL BASES OF MARTIAL LAW AND THE INTENDED PARAMETERS OF ITS IMPLEMENTATION.THE
FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION INTENDED THAT A JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS BE CONVENED
IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW.
Consolidation of Respondents' CommentsRespondents assert firmly that there is no mandatory duty
on their part to "vote jointly," except in cases of revocation or extension of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.[29] In the absence of
such duty, the non-convening of the Congress in joint session does not pose any actual case or
controversy that may be the subject of judicial review.[30] Additionally, respondents argue that the
petitions raise a political question over which the Court has no jurisdiction.
Respondents further contend that the constitutional right to information, as enshrined under Article
III, Section 7 of the Constitution, is not absolute. Matters affecting national security are considered
as a valid exception to the right to information of the public. For this reason, the petitioners' and the
public's right to participate in the deliberations of the Congress regarding the factual basis of a
martial law declaration may be restricted in the interest of national security and public safety...
espondents allege that petitioners failed to present an appropriate case for mandamus to lie.
Mandamus will only issue when the act to be compelled is a clear legal duty or a ministerial duty
imposed by law upon the defendant or respondent to perform the act required that the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station.
According to respondents, it is erroneous to assert that it is their ministerial duty to convene in joint
session whenever martial law is proclaimed or the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
30 | P a g e
suspended in the absence of a clear and specific constitutional or legal provision. In fact, Article VII,
Section 18 does not use the words "joint session" at all, much less impose the convening of such
joint session upon the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. What the Constitution requires is joint voting when the action of the Congress is to
revoke or extend the proclamation or suspension.
Subsequent EventsOn July 14, 2017, petitioners in G.R. No. 231671, the Padilla Petition, filed a
Manifestation, calling the attention of the Court to the imminent expiration of the sixty (60)-day
period of validity of Proclamation No. 216 on July 22, 2017. Despite the lapse of said sixty (60)-day
period, petitioners exhort the Court to still resolve the instant cases for the guidance of the
Congress, State actors, and all Filipinos.On July 22, 2017, the Congress convened in joint session and,
with two hundred sixty-one (261) votes in favor versus eighteen (18) votes against, overwhelmingly
approved the extension of the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao until December 31, 2017.
Issues:
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of these consolidated
petitions;Whether or not the petitions satisfy the requisites for the Court's exercise of its power of
judicial review;Whether or not the Congress has the mandatory duty to convene jointly upon the
President's proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus under Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution; andWhether or not a writ of
mandamus or certiorari may be issued in the present cases.
Ruling:
The Court's jurisdiction over these consolidated petitions
The principle of separation of powers
Contrary to respondents' protestations, the Court's exercise of jurisdiction over these petitions
cannot be deemed as an unwarranted intrusion into the exclusive domain of the Legislature. Bearing
in mind that the principal substantive issue presented in the cases at bar is the proper interpretation
of Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, particularly regarding the duty of the Congress to
vote jointly when the President declares martial law and/or suspends the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, there can be no doubt that the Court may take jurisdiction over the petitions. It is the
prerogative of the Judiciary to declare "what the law is."
Political question doctrine
Corollary to respondents' invocation of the principle of separation of powers, they argue that these
petitions involve a political question in which the Court may not interfere. It is true that the Court
continues to recognize questions of policy as a bar to its exercise of the power of judicial review.
Existence of the requisites for judicial review
Petitioners in G.R. No. 231671 allege that they are suing in the following capacities: (1) Padilla as a
member of the legal profession representing victims of human rights violations, and a taxpayer; (2)
Saguisag as a human rights lawyer, former member of the Philippine Senate, and a taxpayer; (3)
Monsod as a framer of the Philippine Constitution and member of the 1986 ConCom, and a
taxpayer; (4) Rosales as a victim of human rights violations committed under martial law declared by
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, and a taxpayer; (5) Gorospe as a lawyer and a taxpayer; and (6)
Senator De Lima as an incumbent Member of the Philippine Senate, a human rights advocate, a
former Secretary of Justice, Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights, and a taxpayer.
Petitioners satisfy these standards.
Actual case or controversy

31 | P a g e
There are two conflicting claims presented before the Court: on the one hand, the petitioners'
assertion that the Congress has the mandatory duty to convene in joint session to deliberate on
Proclamation No. 216; and, on the other, the respondents' view that so convening in joint session is
discretionary on the part of the Congress.
As the present petitions allege an omission on the part of the Congress that constitutes neglect of
their constitutional duties, the petitions make a prima facie case for mandamus, and an actual case
or controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an act or omission of a branch of government is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but, in fact, the
duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.
Liberality in cases of transcendental importanceIn any case, it is an accepted doctrine that the Court
may brush aside procedural technicalities and, nonetheless, exercise its power of judicial review in
cases of transcendental importance.
MootnessThe Court acknowledges that the main relief prayed for in the present petitions (i.e., that
the Congress be directed to convene in joint session and therein deliberate whether to affirm or
revoke Proclamation No. 216) may arguably have been rendered moot by: (a) the lapse of the
original sixty (60) days that the President's martial law declaration and suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus were effective under Proclamation No. 216; (b) the subsequent extension
by the Congress of the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus over the whole of Mindanao after convening in joint session on July 22, 2017; and (c)
the Court's own decision in Lagman v. Medialdea,[64] wherein we ruled on the sufficiency of the
factual bases for Proclamation No. 216 under the original period stated therein.
It cannot be gainsaid that there are compelling and weighty reasons for the Court to proceed with
the resolution of these consolidated petitions on the merits. As explained in the preceding
discussion, these cases involve a constitutional issue of transcendental significance and novelty. A
definitive ruling from this Court is imperative not only to guide the Bench, the Bar, and the public
but, more importantly, to clarify the parameters of congressional conduct required by the 1987
Constitution, in the event of a repetition of the factual precedents that gave rise to these cases.
The duty of the Congress to vote jointly under Article VII, Section 18
The Congress is not constitutionally mandated to convene in joint session except to vote jointly to
revoke the President's declaration or suspension.By the language of Article VII, Section 18 of the
1987 Constitution, the Congress. is only required to vote jointly to revoke the President's
proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress.
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special
session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.The Congress, if not in session, shall, within
twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules
without need of a call.
The provision in question is clear, plain, and unambiguous. In its literal and ordinary meaning, the
provision grants the Congress the power to revoke the President's proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and prescribes how the Congress may
exercise such power, i.e., by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members, voting jointly, in a
regular or special session. The use of the word "may" in the provision - such that "[t]he Congress x x
x may revoke such proclamation or suspension x x x" - is to be construed as permissive and operating
to confer discretion on the Congress on whether or not to revoke,[71] but in order to revoke, the

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same provision sets the requirement that at least a majority of the Members of the Congress, voting
jointly, favor revocation.
I
It is worthy to stress that the provision does not actually refer to a "joint session." While it may be
conceded, subject to the discussions below, that the phrase "voting jointly" shall already be
understood to mean that the joint voting will be done "in joint session," notwithstanding the
absence of clear language in the Constitution,[72] still, the requirement that "[t]he Congress, voting
jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, x x x" explicitly
applies only to the situation when the Congress revokes the President's proclamation of martial law
and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Simply put, the provision only
requires Congress to vote jointly on the revocation of the President's proclamation and/or
suspension.
Hence, the plain language of the subject constitutional provision does not support the petitioners'
argument that it is obligatory for the Congress to convene in joint session following the President's
proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, under
all circumstances
The deliberations of the 1986 ConCom reveal the framers' specific intentions to (a) remove the
requirement of prior concurrence of the Congress for the effectivity of the President's proclamation
of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (b) grant to the
Congress the discretionary power to revoke the President's proclamation and/or suspension by a
vote of at least a majority of its Members, voting jointly.
As the Court established in its preceding discussion, the clear meaning of the relevant provision in
Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution is that the Congress is only required to vote jointly on
the revocation of the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus. Based on the Civil Liberties Union case, there is already no need to look
beyond the plain language of the provision and decipher the intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution.
That the Congress will vote on the revocation of the President's proclamation and/or suspension in a
joint session can only be inferred from the arguments of the Commissioners who pushed for the
"voting jointly" amendment that the Members of the House of Representatives will benefit from the
advice, opinion, and/or wisdom of the Senators, which will be presumably shared during a joint
session of both Houses. Such inference is far from a clear mandate for the Congress to automatically
convene in joint session, under all circumstances, when the President proclaims martial law and/or
suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, even when Congress does not intend to revoke
the President's proclamation and/or suspension.
There was no obligation on the part of the Congress herein to convene in joint session as the
provision on revocation under Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution did not even come into
operation in light of the resolutions, separately adopted by the two Houses of the Congress in
accordance with their respective rules of procedure, expressing support for President Duterte's
Proclamation No. 216.
The provision in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution requiring the Congress to vote jointly
in a joint session is specifically for the purpose of revocation of the President's proclamation of
martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In the petitions at bar,
the Senate and House of Representatives already separately adopted resolutions expressing support
for President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216. Given the express support of both Houses of the
Congress for Proclamation No. 216, and their already evident lack of intent to revoke the same, the
provision in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution on revocation did not even come into
operation and, therefore, there is no obligation on the part of the Congress to convene in joint
session.
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It cannot be disputed then that the Senate and House of Representatives placed President Duterte's
Proclamation No. 216 under serious review and consideration, pursuant to their power to revoke
such a proclamation vested by the Constitution on the Congress.
The Court highlights the particular circumstance herein that both Houses of Congress already
separately expressed support for President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216, so revocation was not
even a possibility and the provision on revocation under Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution requiring the Congress to vote jointly in a joint session never came into operation. It will
be a completely different scenario if either of the Senate or the House of Representatives, or if both
Houses of the Congress, resolve/s to revoke the President's proclamation of martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, in which case, Article VII, Section 18 of the
1987 Constitution shall apply and the Congress must convene in joint session to vote jointly on the
revocation of the proclamation and/or suspension.
Petitioners invoke the following provision also in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution:
"The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or
suspension convene in accordance with its rules without call." Petitioners reason that if the Congress
is not in session, it is constitutionally mandated to convene within twenty-four (24) hours from the
President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, then it is with all the more reason required to convene immediately if in session.
The Court is not persuaded.
First, the provision specially addresses the situation when the President proclaims martial law
and/or suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus while the Congress is in recess. To ensure
that the Congress will be able to act swiftly on the proclamation and/or suspension, the 1987
Constitution provides that it should convene within twenty-four (24) hours without need for call. It is
a whole different situation when the Congress is still in session as it can readily take up the
proclamation and/or suspension in the course of its regular sessions, as what happened in these
cases.
Second, the provision only requires that the Congress convene without call, but it does not explicitly
state that the Congress shall already convene in joint session. In fact, the provision actually states
that the Congress "convene in accordance with its rules," which can only mean the respective rules
of each House as there are no standing rules for joint sessions. And third, it cannot be said herein
that the Congress failed to convene immediately to act on Proclamation No. 216. Both Houses of the
Congress promptly took action on Proclamation No. 216, with the Senate already issuing invitations
to executive officials even prior to receiving President Duterte's Report, except that the two Houses
of the Congress acted separately.
There is likewise no basis for petitioners' assertion that without a joint session, the public cannot
hold the Senators and Representatives accountable for their respective positions on President
Duterte's Proclamation No. 216. Senate records completely chronicled the deliberations and the
voting by the Senators on Senate Resolution No. 49 (formerly P.S. Resolution No. 388) and P.S.
Resolution No. 390. While it is true that the House of Representatives voted on House Resolution
No. 1050 viva voce, this is only in accordance with its rules. Per the Rules of the House of
Representatives... ince no one moved for nominal voting on House Resolution No. 1050, then the
votes of the individual Representatives cannot be determined. It does not render though the
proceedings unconstitutional or invalid.
The Congress did not violate the right of the public to information when it did not convene in joint
session.
e
Petitioners contend that the Constitution requires a public deliberation process on the proclamation
of martial law: one that is conducted via a joint session and by a single body. They insist that the

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Congress must be transparent, such that there is an "open and robust debate," where the evaluation
of the proclamation's factual bases and subsequent implementation shall be openly discussed and
where each member's position on the issue is heard and made known to the public.
However, based on their internal rules, each House has the discretion over the manner by which
Congressional proceedings are to be conducted. Verily, sessions are generally open to the public,[84]
but each House may decide to hold an executive session due to the confidential nature of the
subject matter to be discussed and deliberated upon.
t is clear that matters affecting the security of the state are considered confidential and must be
discussed and deliberated upon in an executive session, excluding the public therefrom.
That these matters are considered confidential is in accordance with settled jurisprudence that, in
the exercise of their right to information, the government may withhold certain types of information
from the public such as state secrets regarding military, diplomatic, and other national security
matters.
Thus, to demand Congress to hold a public session during which the legislators shall openly discuss
these matters, all the while under public scrutiny, is to effectively compel them to make sensitive
information available to everyone, without exception, and to breach the recognized policy of
preserving these matters' confidentiality, at the risk of being sanctioned, penalized, or expelled from
Congress altogether.
Propriety of the issuance of a writ of mandamus or certiorari... t
It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that petitioner should have a clear legal right to
the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act
required. Mandamus never issues in doubtful cases.
Although there are jurisprudential examples of the Court issuing a writ of mandamus to compel the
fulfillment of legislative duty,[94] we must distinguish the present controversy with those previous
cases. In this particular instance, the Court has no authority to compel the Senate and the House of
Representatives to convene in joint session absent a clear ministerial duty on its part to do so under
the Constitution and in complete disregard of the separate actions already undertaken by both
Houses on Proclamation No. 216, including their respective decisions to no longer hold a joint
session, considering their respective resolutions not to revoke said Proclamation.
In the same vein, there is no cause for the Court to grant a writ of certiorari.
To reiterate, the two Houses of the Congress decided to no longer hold a joint session only after
deliberations among their Members and putting the same to vote, in accordance with their
respective rules of procedure. Premises considered, the Congress did not gravely abuse its discretion
when it did not jointly convene upon the President's issuance of Proclamation No. 216 prior to
expressing its concurrence thereto.

Saguisag et al vs Ochoa, January 12, 2016

Facts:
petitioners respectfully pray that the Honorable Court RECONSIDER, REVERSE, AND SET - ASIDE
its Decision dated January 12, 2016, and issue a new Decision GRANTING the instant
consolidated petitions by declaring the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)
entered into by the respondents for the Philippine government, with the United States of
America, UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID and to permanently enjoin its implementation.
petitioners claim this Court erred when it ruled that EDCA was not a treaty.[5] In connection to
this, petitioners move that EDCA must be in the form of a treaty in order to comply with the

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constitutional restriction under Section 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution on foreign
military bases, troops, and facilities.[6] Additionally, they reiterate their arguments on the issues
of telecommunications, taxation, and nuclear weapons.[7]
Petitioners assert that this Court contradicted itself when it interpreted the word "allowed in" to
refer to the initial entry of foreign bases, troops, and facilities, based on the fact that the plain
meaning of the provision in question referred to prohibiting the return of foreign bases, troops,
and facilities except under a treaty concurred in by the Senate
Secondly, by interpreting "allowed in" as referring to an initial entry, the Court has simply
applied the plain meaning of the words in the particular provision.[10] Necessarily, once entry
has been established by a subsisting treaty, latter instances of entry need not be embodied by a
separate treaty. After all, the Constitution did not state that foreign military bases, troops, and
facilities shall not subsist or exist in the Philippines.
Issues:
constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the
Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America (U.S.)
Ruling:
we find that EDCA did not go beyond the framework. The entry of US troops has long been
authorized under a valid and subsisting treaty, which is the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).[14]
Reading the VFA along with the longstanding Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT)[15] led this Court to
the conclusion that an executive agreement such as the EDCA was well within the bounds of the
obligations imposed by both treaties.
Thus, we find no reason for EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. It fully conforms to the
Philippines' legal regime through the MDT and VFA. It also fully conforms to the government's
continued policy to enhance our military capability in the face of various military and
humanitarian issues that may arise. This Motion for Reconsideration has not raised any
additional legal arguments that warrant revisiting the Decision.
Principles:
The settled rule is that the plain, clear and unambiguous language of the Constitution should be
construed as such and should not be given a construction that changes its meaning
With due respect, the Honorable Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno's theory of "initial
entry" mentioned above ventured into a construction of the provisions of Section 25, Article
XVIII of the Constitution which is patently contrary to the plain language and meaning of the
said constitutional provision.
On verba legis interpretation... verba legis
Petitioners' own interpretation and application of the verba legis rule will in fact result in an
absurdity, which legal construction strictly abhors.

Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Communications

vs NLRC, March 3, 1992

Facts: Wage Order No. 6 increased the cost-of-living allowance (COLA) of non-agricultural workers in
the private sector.
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Petitioner Corporation complied with said Order by paying its monthly-paid employees the
mandated P3.00 per day COLA. In its computation, Petitioner Corporation multiplied the P3.00 daily
COLA by 22 days, which is the number of working days in the company.

Respondent Union disagreed with the computation alleging that prior to the effectivity of the Wage
Order, Petitioner Corporation had been computing and paying the COLA on the basis of 30 days per
month and that this constituted an employer practice, which should not be unilaterally withdrawn.

The Labor Arbiter sustained the position of Petitioner Corporation by holding that the monthly COLA
should be computed on the basis of 22 days, since the evidence showed that there are only 22 days
in a month for monthly-paid employees in the company.

The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter on appeal, holding that Petitioner Corporation was guilty of
illegal deductions considering that COLA should be paid and computed on the basis of 30 days since
workers paid on a monthly basis are entitled to COLA on days “unworked”; and the full allowance
enjoyed by Petitioner Corporation’s monthly-paid employees before the CBA executed between the
parties constituted voluntary employer practice, which cannot be unilaterally withdrawn.

Issue: WON the computation and payment of COLA on the basis of 30 days per month constitute
an employer practice which should not be unilaterally withdrawn.

Held: No. Section 5 of the Rules Implementing Wage Orders Nos. 2, 3, 5 and 6 provides that “all
covered employees shall be entitled to their daily living allowance during the days that they are paid
their basic wage, even if unworked.” The primordial consideration for entitlement of COLA is that
basic wage is being paid. The payment of COLA is mandated only for the days that the employees are
paid their basic wage, even if said days are unworked. On the days that employees are not paid their
basic wage, the payment of COLA is not mandated.

Moreover, Petitioner Corporation cannot be faulted for erroneous application of a doubtful or

difficult question of law. Since it is a past error that is being corrected, no vested right may be said to
have arisen nor any diminution of benefit under Article 100 of the Labor Code may be said to have
resulted by virtue of the correction.

Basbacio vs Secretary of Justice November 7, 1994

FACTS:

Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were convicted of frustrated
murder and of two counts of frustrated murder. Petitioner and his son-in-law were sentenced to
imprisonment and ordered immediately detained after their bonds had been cancelled. Petitioner
and his son-in-law appealed. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting petitioner on the
ground that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy between him and his son-in-law. Based on his
acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under Rep. Act No. 7309, Sec. 3(a), which provides for the payment
of compensation to “any person who was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently
released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal.” The claim was filed with the Board of Claims of the
Department of Justice, but the claim was denied on the ground that while petitioner’s presence at
the scene of the killing was not sufficient to find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, yet,
considering that there was bad blood between him and the deceased as a result of a land dispute
and the fact that the convicted murderer is his son-in-law, there was basis for finding that he was
“probably guilty.” Petitioner brought this petition for review on certiorari as a special civil action
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
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ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled of the claim under R.A. No. 7309.

HELD:

NO. Petitioner’s contention has no merit.

RATIO:

Verba legis non est recedendum – from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

To say then that an accused has been “unjustly convicted” has to do with the manner of his
conviction rather than with his innocence. An accused may on appeal be acquitted because he did
not commit the crime, but that does not necessarily mean that he is entitled to compensation for
having been the victim of an “unjust conviction.” If his conviction was due to an error in the
appreciation of the evidence the conviction while erroneous is not unjust. That is why it is not, on
the other hand, correct to say as does respondent, that under the law liability for compensation
depends entirely on the innocence of the accused.

Bolos vs. Bolos, October 2010

634 SCRA 429, [October 20, 2010]

DOCTRINE:

Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which the Court promulgated
on 15 March 2003, extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family
Code which took effect on 3 August 1988.

FACTS:

Petitioner Cynthia Bolos(Cynthia)filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code. After trial on the merits, the
RTC granted the petition for annulment. A copy of said decision was received by respondent Danilo
and he thereafter timely filed the Notice of Appeal.

The RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure to file the required motion for
reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Thereafter, the RTC issued the order
declaring its decision declaring the marriage null and void as final and executory and granting the
Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia. Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition
forcertiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. Danilo also prayed that he be
declared psychologically capacitated to render the essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should
be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family home and their children.

The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC declaring the
nullity of marriage as final and executory. The appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion
for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case
as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family
Code took effect.
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 Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized before the
effectivity of the Family Code. According to petitioner, the phrase “under the Family Code” in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word “petitions” rather than to the word “marriages.” Such that
petitions filed after the effectivity of the Family Code are governed by the A.M. No. even if the
marriage was solemnized before the same. Danilo, in his Comment, counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC is not applicable because his marriage with Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980, years
before its effectivity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled “Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,” is applicable to the case at bench.

HELD:

No, it does not.

RATIO:

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in
its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:

“Section 1. Scope.—This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.”

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends
only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on
August 3, 1988.7 The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and
those solemnized under the Civil Code.8 The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s
interpretation that the phrase “under the Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word
“petitions” rather than to the word “marriages.”

In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision which denied due course
to respondent’s appeal and denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration.

C. STATUTE AS A WHOLE

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that legislative intent must be

ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not merely of a
particular provision. A word or phrase might easily convey a meaning which is
different from the one actually intended.

A statute should be construed as a whole because it is not to be presumed that the

legislature has used any useless words, and because it is dangerous practice to base

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the construction upon only a part of it, since one portion may be qualified by other
portions.

Commisioner on Customs vs. Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. Aug 1975

ESSO STANDARD EASTERN, INC. vs. ACTING COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS

18 SCRA 488
GR No. L-21841, October 28, 1966

"Exemptions from taxation are construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor
of the taxing authority."

FACTS: Petitioner, engaged in the industry of processing gasoline, oils etc., claims for the refund of
special import taxes paid pursuant to the provision of RA 1394 which imposed a special import tax "on
all goods, articles or products imported or brought into the Philippines." Exempt from this tax, by
express mandate of Section 6 of the same law are "machinery, equipment, accessories, and spare
parts, for the use of industries, miners, mining enterprises, planters and farmers". Petitioner argued
that the importation it made of gas pumps used by their gasoline station operators should fall under
such exemptions, being directly used in its industry. The Collector of Customs of Manila rejected the
claim, and so as the Court on Tax Appeals. The CTA noted that the pumps imported were not used in
the processing of gasoline and other oil products but by the gasoline stations, owned by the petitioner,
for pumping out, from underground barrels, gasoline sold on retail to customers.

ISSUE: Is the contention of the petitioner tenable? Does the subject imports fall into the exemptions?

HELD: No. The contention runs smack against the familiar rules that exemption from taxation is not
favored, and that exemptions in tax statutes are never presumed. Which are but statements in
adherence to the ancient rule that exemptions from taxation are construed in strictissimi juris against
the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. Tested by this precept, we cannot indulge
in expansive construction and write into the law an exemption not therein set forth. Rather, we go by
the reasonable assumption that where the State has granted in express terms certain exemptions,
those are the exemptions to be considered, and no more. Since the law states that, to be tax-exempt,
equipment and spare parts should be "for the use of industries", the coverage herein should not be
enlarged to include equipment and spare parts for use in dispensing gasoline at retail.

JMM Promotions Vs NLRC, 1993

JMM Promotions & Management, Inc., petitioner, vs. National Labor Relations
Commission and Ulpiano L. De Los Santos, respondents.

Ponente: Cruz, J.

Facts:

1. Following Secs. 4 and 17, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules, the petitioner, a recruiting agency,
made the following:

a. Paid the license fee (Sec. 4)

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b. Posted a cash bond of 100k and surety bond of 50k(Sec. 4)

c. Placed money in escrow worth 200k (Sec. 17)

2. The petitioner wanted to appeal a decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) to the respondent NLRC, but the latter dismissed the appeal because of failure of the
petitioner to post an appeal bond required by Sec. 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules. The
decision being appealed involved a monetary award.

3. The petitioner contended that its payment of a license fee, posting of cash bond and surety bond,
and placement of money in escrow are enough; posting an appeal bond is unnecessary. According
to Sec. 4, the bonds are posted to answer for all valid and legal claims arising from violations of the
conditions for the grant and use of the license, and/or accreditation and contracts of
employment. On the other hand, according to Sec. 17, the escrow shall answer for valid and legal
claims of recruited workers as a result of recruitment violations or money claims.

4. Sec. 6 reads:

“In case the decision of the Administration involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer
shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond…”

The bonds required here are different from the bonds required in Sec. 4.

Issue: Was the petitioner still required to post an appeal bond despite the fact that it has posted
bonds of 150k and placed 200k in escrow before?

Held:

Yes. It is possible for the monetary reward in favor of the employee to exceed the amount of
350,000 because of the stringent requirements posed upon recruiters. The reason for such is that
overseas employees are subjected to greater risks and hence, the money will be used to insure more
care on the part of the local recruiter in its choice of foreign principal to whom the worker will be
sent.

Doctrine: Construction:

It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this case),
care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an
integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam
pereat. “That the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed.”

The rule is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead,
apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated
and harmonious whole. With regard to the present case, the doctrine can be applied when the Court
found that Sec. 6 complements Sec. 4 and Sec. 17.

In the POEA Rules, the bonds required in Sec. 4 Rule 2, Book 2 and the escrow required in Sec. 17
Rule 2, Book 2 have different purposes from the appeal bond required in Sec. 6, Rule 5 Book 7.

The bonds in Sec. 4 are made to answer for all claims against the employer, which is not limited to
monetary awards to employees whose contracts of employment have been violated.

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The escrow agreement in Sec. 17 is used only as a last resort in claiming against the employer.

On the other hand, Sec. 6 requires an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary
award. Indeed, this appeal bond is intended to further insure the payment of the monetary
award. Also, it is possible that the monetary award may exceed the bonds posted previously and the
money placed in escrow. If such a case happens, where will the excess be sourced? To solve such a
dilemma, an appeal bond equivalent to the amount of the monetary award is required by Sec. 6.

Leynes vs COA, December 11, 2003

Facts:

Petitioner Judge Tomas C. Leynes, is the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Calapan City,
Oriental Mindoro, Branch 40. His salary and representation and transportation allowance (RATA) were
drawn from the budget of the Supreme Court. Besides that, petitioner also received a monthly
allowance of P944 from the local funds of the Municipality of Naujan starting 1984.

On May 7, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan unanimously approved a resolution increasing petitioner
judge’s monthly allowance from P944 to P1,600 (an increase of P656) starting May 1993. This
supplemental budget was approved by the municipal government (the Municipal Mayor and
the Sangguniang Bayan) and was also likewise approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and the
Office of Provincial Budget and Management of Oriental Mindoro.

On February 17, 1994, Provincial Auditor Salvacion M. Dalisay sent a letter to the Municipal Mayor
and the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan directing them to stop the payment of the P1,600 monthly
allowance or RATA to petitioner judge and to require the immediate refund of the amounts previously
paid to the latter. She reasoned that the Municipality of Naujan could not grant RATA to petitioner
judge in addition to the RATA the latter was already receiving from the Supreme Court. Petitioner
judge appealed the matter to COA Regional Director Gregoria S. Ong who, however, upheld the
opinion of Provincial Auditor Dalisay.

Issue:

Whether or not the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro can validly provide RATA to its Municipal
Judge, in addition to that provided by the Supreme Court.

Held:

RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, clearly provides that provincial, city and municipal
governments may grant allowances to judges as long as their finances allow. Section 3, paragraph (e)
of LBC No. 53, by outrightly prohibiting LGUs from granting allowances to judges whenever such
allowances are (1) also granted by the national government or (2) similar to the allowances granted
by the national government, violates Section 447(a)(l)(xi) of the Local Government Code of 1991. As
already stated, a circular must conform to the law it seeks to implement and should not modify or
amend it. Moreover, by prohibiting LGUs from granting allowances similar to the allowances granted
by the national government, Section 3 (e) of LBC No. 53 practically prohibits LGUs from granting
allowances to judges and, in effect, totally nullifies their statutory power to do so. Being unduly
restrictive therefore of the statutory power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges and being violative

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of their autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution, Section 3, paragraph (e) of LBC No. 53 is hereby
declared null and void.

Radiola Toshiba vs IAC, July 18 1991

Facts:

The petitioner obtained a levy on the attachment against the properties of Carlos Gatmaytan
and Teresita Gatmaytan un Civil case o. 35946 for collection of sum of money before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Metro Manila. A few months later three creditors filed another
petition against Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan for involuntary insolvency, docketed as special
proceedings No. 1548 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga and Angeles city.

A favorable judgment was obtained of by the petitioner in Civil case No. 35946. The court
ordered for the consolidation of ownership of petitioner over said property but respondent sheriff of
Angeles City refused to issue a final ceritificate of sale because of the pending insolvency proceedings.

Court of First Instance of Angeles City and Intermediate Appellate Court rules against petitioner

Issue:

Whether or not the levy on attachment in favor of petitioner in dissolved by the insolvency
proceedings against respondents commenced for months after the said attachment.

Held:

Section 32 (of the Insolvency Law). As soon as an assignee is elected or appointed and qualified,
the clerk of court shall, by an instrument under his hand and seal of the court, assign and convey to
the assignee all the real and personal property, estate and effects of the debtor with all his deeds,
books and papers relating thereto, and such assignment shall relate back to the commencement of
the proceedings in insolvency, and shall relate back to the acts upon the adjudication was founded,
and by operation of law shall vest the title to all such property, estate and effects in the assignee,
although the same is then attached in mesne process, as the property of debtor. Such assignment shall
operate to vest in the assignee all of the estate of the insolvent debtor not exempt by law from
execution. It shall dissolved any attachment levied within one month next preceding the
commencement of the insolvency proceedings and vacate and set aside any judgment entered in any
action commenced within thirty days immediately prior to the commencement of insolvency
proceedings and shall set aside any judgment entered by default or consent of the debtor within thirty
days immediately prior to the commencement of insolvency proceedings.

Section 79. When an attachment has been made and is not dissolved before the
commencement of proceedings in insolvency, or is dissolved by an undertaking given by the
defendant, if the claim upon which attachment suit was commenced is proved against the estate of
the debtor, the plaintiff may prove the legal costs and disbursements of the suit, and in keeping of the
property, and the amount thereof shall be a preferred debt.

There is no conflicts between the two provisions.

Statutory Construction; where a statute is susceptible of more than one interpretation, court should
adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction as will render the provision thereof operative and
effective and harmonious with each other. – but even granting that such conflicts exists, it may be

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 stated that in construing a statute, courts should adopt a construction that will give effect to every
part of the statute, if at all possible. This rule is expressed in the maxim, ut magis valeat quam pereat
or that construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute – its every word,
hence when a statute is susceptible of more than one interpretation, the court should adopt such
reasonable and beneficial construction as will render the provision thereof operative and effective
and harmonious with each other.

D. SPIRIT AND PURPOSE OF LAW

When the interpretation of a statute according to the exact and literal import of its words
would lead to absurd or mischievous consequences, or would thwart or contravene the
manifest purpose of the legislature in its enactment, it should be construed according to its
spirit and reason, disregarding or modifying, so far as may be necessary, the strict letter of
the law.

 When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases.
 Doctrine of necessary implications. What is implied in a statute is as much a part
thereof as that which is expressed.

MANUEL DE GUIA VS. COMELEC [G.R. NO. 104712. MAY 06, 1992]
Ponente: BELLOSILLO J.

FACTS:

[C]ongress passed R.A. 7166, signed into law by the President on November 26, 1991. It is “An Act
Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing
Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
issued Resolution No. 2313, adopting rules and guidelines in the apportionment, by district, of the
number of elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in provinces with only one (1)
legislative district and the Sangguniang Bayan of municipalities in the Metro Manila Area for the
preparation of the Project of District Apportionment by the Provincial Election Supervisors and
Election Registrars, Resolution No. 2379, approving the Project of District Apportionment submitted
pursuant to Resolution No. 2313, and Resolution UND. 92-010 holding that pars. (a), (b) and (c), and
the first sentence of par. (d), all of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, apply to the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner
imputes grave abuse of discretion to COMELEC in promulgating the aforementioned resolutions, and
maintained that election of Sanggunian members be “at large” instead of “by district”.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner’s interpretation of Sec.3 of R.A. 7166 is correct in assailing the
aforementioned COMELEC Resolutions.

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HELD:

NO. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit

RATIO:

Spirit and purpose of the law – The reason for the promulgation of R.A. 7166 is shown in the
explanatory note of Senate Bill No. 1861, and that respondent COMELEC is cognizant of its legislative
intent.

No law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless, much less inutile. We must therefore, as
far as we can, divine its meaning, its significance, its reason for being. As it has oft been held, the key
to open the door to what the legislature intended which is vaguely expressed in the language of a
statute is its purpose or the reason which induced it to enact the statute.

The true import of Par. (d) is that Sangguniang Panlungsod of the single-district cities and the
Sangguniang Bayan of the municipalities outside Metro Manila, which remained single-districts not
having been ordered apportioned under Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166 will have to continue to be elected at
large in the May 11, 1992, elections, although starting 1995 they shall all be elected by district to
effect the full implementation of the letter and spirit of R.A. 7166.

SALENILLAS VS. CA, JANUARY 31, 1989

FACTS:

The petitioner Elena Salenillas acquired properties after purchasing them from her parents, the Enciso
spouses. The petitioners mortgaged the property twice, the latest done on December4, 1975 in favor
of the Philippine National Bank Branch, Daet, Camarines Norte as security for a loan of P2,500.00.
Petitioners failed to pay and so the property was extrajudicially foreclosed and was then sold in the
public auction on February 27, 1981. A “Sheriff’s Final Deed” was issued on July 12, 1983.

RTC of Camarines Norte issued motions for writ of possession, which the petitioners opposed.

Petitioners sought for reconsideration, which was later on denied. The Court of appeals made a similar
decision.

On November 17, 1983 and on on August 31, 1984,Petitioners wished to repurchase the property and
maintained that they had the right to do so as provided for under Section 119 of the Public Land Act,
as amended, which states that,

Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when
proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs within a period of five
years from the date of the conveyance.

The Respondent state argued that the Petitioners were disqualified from being legal heirs of the
subject property since petitioners acquired the said property through inheritance but by sale.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners had the right to repurchase the contested property under Section 119 of
the Public Land Act.

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HELD:

Petitioner Elena Salenillas, being a child of the Encisos, is a "legal heir" of the latter. As such, and even
on this score alone, she may therefore validly repurchase. This must be so because Section 119 of the
Public Land Act, in speaking of "legal heirs," makes no distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos.

Invoking the provision made under Section 119 of the Public Land Act, the petitioners, being legal
heirs, had the right to repurchase the said property as long as the 5-year period had not yet proscribed.
The Court held that when the petitioners expressed their desire to repurchase the property in 1984,
it was evident that the 5-year period had not yet proscribed, the public auction having been in 1981
and the issuance of the Final deed in 1983.
COMMENDADOR VS. DE VILLA, AUGUST 2, 1991
Facts:

These four cases have been consolidated because they involve practically the same parties and
related issues arising from the same incident.
1. The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 and
97454 are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged
participation in the failed coup d’ etat that took place on December 1 to 9, 1989.
2. The charges against them are violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code (Murder).
3. Pre-Investigation Panel and a Court Martial were formed. During their trial, petitioners invoked
their right to peremptory Challenge. The same was denied by the Court Martial on the ground that
the right was discontinued when martial law was declared under a Presidential Decree. The Court
realizes that the recognition of the right to peremptory challenge may be exploited by a respondent
in a court-martial trial to delay the proceedings and defer his deserved Punishment.

Issue:
1. Whether petitioners were denied of their right of due process due to the investigation was
resolved against them in failure to submit a counter affidavit?
2. Whether GCM No. 14 has a legal ground denying the petitioners their right of peremptory
challenge?
3. Whether denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection?

Held:
1. They had been expressly warned in the subpoena sent them that “failure to submit the
aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of (their)
right to submit controverting evidence.” They chose not to heed the warning. As their motions
appeared to be dilatory, the PTI Panel was justified in referring the charges to GCM No. 14 without
waiting for the petitioners to submit their defense. Due process is satisfied as long as the party is
accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without
violation of the Bill of Rights.
2. It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself
ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. This principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio legis
est anima: the reason of law is its soul. Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right
to peremptory challenge in L P.D. No. 39 became ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was
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dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation No. 2045, As a result, the old rule embodied in Article
18 of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now again allows the right to peremptory
challenge.
3. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly situated and do not
apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others. The accused officers
can complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military are not. But they cannot say
they have been discriminated against because they are not allowed the same right that is extended
to civilians.

RUFINO LOPEZ & SONS, INC., v. THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS

G.R. No. L-9274 February 1, 1957

Facts:
1. Lopez & Sons imported hexagonal wire netting from Hamburg, Germany. The Manila Collector of
Customs assessed the corresponding customs duties on the importation on the basis of consular and
supplies invoices. Said customs duties were paid and the shipments were released. Subsequently,
however, and freight of said wire netting and as a result of the reassessment, additional customs
duties were levied and imposed upon petitioner.
2. On May 23, 1955, a motion to dismiss was filed at the Court of Tax Appeal but was dismissed on
the ground that it had no jurisdiction to review decisions of the Collector of Customs of Manila,
citing section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, creating said tax court

Issue:
Whether Section 11 of RA 1125 allows the respondent court to review decisions of the Collector of
Customs?

Held:
The court holds that under the law, particularly, the Customs Law and Republic Act No. 1125, the
Court of Tax Appeals has no jurisdiction to review by appeal, decisions of the Collector of Customs.
The Commissioner of Customs is purely administrative, whereas, appeal to the Court of Tax Appeal is
manifestly judicial. And it is a sound rule that before one resorts to the Courts, the administrative
remedy provided by law should first be exhausted. In the second place, the two remedies suggested
by the petitioner would result in confusion because a person adversely affected by a decision of a
Collector of Customs could not be sure where to seek the remedy, whether with the Commissioner
of Customs or with the Court of Tax Appeals, and it might even be difficult for him to decide
because, if he took the appeal directly to the Tax Court, that would ordinarily cut off his remedy
before the Commissioner of Customs for the reason that, should the Court of Tax Appeals decide
against him, he may not appeal said decision to the Commissioner of Customs because the
Commissioner as an administrative officer may not review the decision of the Court. On the other
hand, if the person affected by a decision of a Collector of Customs took his appeal to the
Commissioner of Customs, and there receives an adverse decision, he may yet appeal wherefrom to
the Court of Tax Appeals. In the third place, even if the person affected by an adverse ruling of the
Collector of Customs took his appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals, as advocated by counsel for the
petitioner, under the literal meaning of section 11, the Tax Court may refuse to entertain said
appeal, as was done in the present case, on the ground that under section 7 of Republic Act No.
1125, it had no jurisdiction to review a decision of the Collector of Customs, section 7 clearly limiting
its appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commissioner of Customs.

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 ALONZO VS. PADUA
G.R. No. L-9274 February 1, 1957

CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners,

vs.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.

Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioners.

Luis R. Reyes for private respondent.

Ponente: CRUZ

FACTS:

Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in ‘the
name of their deceased parents. One of them transferred his undivided share by way of absolute
sale. A year later, his sister sold her share in a “Con Pacto de Retro Sale”. By virtue of such
agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the
said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a
fence. with their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a
part of the enclosed area.

One of the five coheirs sought to redeem the area sold to petitioners but was dismissed when it
appeared that he was an American citizen. Another coheir filed her own complaint invoking the
same right of redemption of her brother. Trial court dismissed the complaint, on the ground that
the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales. Although
there was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied
the requirement of the law. Respondent court reversed the decision of the Trial Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not actual knowledge satisfied the requirement of Art. 1088 of the New Civil Code.

HELD:

YES. Decision of respondent court was reversed and that of trial court reinstated.

RATIO:

The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was
given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14
years between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without
the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.

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 While [courts] may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, [courts] nevertheless have the
right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, [courts] defer not to “the letter that
killeth” but to “the spirit that vivifieth,” to give effect to the law maker’s will.

E. DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATION

The doctrine which states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that
which is expressed.

CHUA VS CSC
FACTS:

Republic Act No. 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the
government service as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Deemed qualified to
avail of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act. Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she
is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application with respondent National
Irrigation Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the same; instead, she was offered separation
benefits equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service commencing from 1980,
or almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects. A recourse by petitioner to
the Civil Service Commission yielded negative results, citing that her position is co-terminous with the
NIA project which is contractual in nature and thus excluded by the enumerations under Sec.3.1 of
Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1, i.e. casual, emergency, temporary or regular
employment. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act No. 6683.

HELD:

YES. Petition was granted.

RATIO:

Petitioner was established to be a co-terminous employee, a non-career civil servant,

like casual and emergency employees. The Supreme Court sees no solid reason why the latter are
extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the former are not. It will be noted that Rep.
Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early retirement to regular, temporary,
casual and emergency employees. But specifically excluded from the benefits are uniformed
personnel of the AFP including those of the PC-INP. It can be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio
alterius but the applicable maxim in this case is the doctrine of necessary implication which holds
that “what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed”.

[T]he Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioner’s
application for early retirement benefits under R.A. No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and
oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period
and she is entitled to the benefits of said law. In the interest of substantial justice, her application
must be granted; after all she served the government not only for two (2) years — the minimum

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requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental
projects.

CITY OF MANILA VS GOMEZ, AUG 31, 1981

City of Manila and Treasurer vs. Judge Gomez [G.R. No. L-37251. August 31, 1981]

Ponente: AQUINO, J.

FACTS:

Section 64 of the Revised Charter of Manila, Republic Act No. 409, which took effect on June 18, 1949,
fixed the annual realty tax at one and one-half percent. On the other hand, Section 4 of the Special
Education Fund Law, Republic Act No. 5447, which took effect on January 1, 1969, imposed “an annual
additional tax of one per centum on the assessed value of real property in addition to the real property
tax regularly levied thereon under existing laws” but “the total real property tax shall not exceed a
maximum of three per centrum. That maximum limit gave the municipal board of Manila the Idea of
fixing the realty tax at three percent. [B]y means of Ordinance No. 7125, approved by the city mayor
on December 26, 1971 and effective beginning the third quarter of 1972, the board imposed
an additional one-half percent realty tax.

Esso Philippines, Inc. paid under protest and later filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Manila for the recovery of it. It contended that the additional one-half percent tax is void because it
is not authorized by the city charter nor by any law (Civil Case No. 88827). After hearing, the trial court
declared the tax ordinance void and ordered the city treasurer of Manila to refund to Esso the said
tax. The City of Manila and its treasurer appealed under Republic Act No. 5440 (which superseded
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court) with the ruling of Judge Gomez brought about the jurisdiction to the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the additional one-half percent realty tax is legal and valid.

HELD:

YES. By necessary implication.

RATIO:

The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of implications in statutory construction and sustained the
City of Manila’s contention that the additional one-half percent realty tax was sanctioned by the
provision in Section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law. The doctrine of implications means that “that
which is plainly implied in the language of a statute is as much a part of it as that which is
expressed”. The obvious implication is that an additional one-half percent tax could be imposed by
municipal corporations. Inferentially, that law (the ordinance) fixed at two percent the realty tax that
would accrue to a city or municipality. Section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law, as confirmed by
the Real Property Tax Code (later), in prescribing a total realty tax of three percent impliedly
authorized the augmentation by one-half percent of the pre-existing one and one- half percent realty
tax.

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 F. CASUS OMISSUS

When a statute makes specific provisions in regard to several enumerated cases or objects,
but omits to make any provision for a case or object which is analogous to those
enumerated, or which stands upon the same reason, and is therefore within the general
scope of the statute, and it appears that such case or object was omitted by inadvertence
or because it was overlooked or unforeseen, it is called a “casus omissus”. Such
omissions or defects cannot be supplied by the courts.
The rule of “casus omissus pro omisso habendus est” can operate and apply only if and
when the omission has been clearly established.

Chavez vs. JBC, Escudero and Tupas, July 17, 2012

G.R. No. 202242 July 17, 2012
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS,
JR., Respondents.

Facts:
The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of Supreme Court
Chief Justice following Renato Corona’s departure.
Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a separate,
competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a
body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).

In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that “(1) A Judicial and Bar
Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice
as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the
Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.” In compliance therewith, Congress, from
the moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one representative from the Congress to sit in the
JBC to act as one of the ex officio members.

In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven
(7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from
Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate,
with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. During the existence of the case, Senator Francis Joseph G.
Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as
representatives of the legislature.

It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.

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The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally envisioned a
unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating “a representative of the National Assembly” to the
JBC. The phrase, however, was not modified to aptly jive with the change to bicameralism which was
adopted by the Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. The respondents also contend that if
the Commissioners were made aware of the consequence of having a bicameral legislature instead
of a unicameral one, they would have made the corresponding adjustment in the representation of
Congress in the JBC; that if only one house of Congress gets to be a member of JBC would deprive
the other house of representation, defeating the principle of balance.

The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of Congress to be
members of the JBC does not render JBC’s purpose of providing balance nugatory; that the presence
of two (2) members from Congress will most likely provide balance as against the other six (6)
members who are undeniably presidential appointees

Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an object of concern, not
just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all the citizens who have the right to seek judicial
intervention for rectification of legal blunders.

Issue:
Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom
are members of Congress, defeats the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
No. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to perform the functions
of the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such, it is unconstitutional.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are
clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the
language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed. As such, it can be clearly and unambiguously discerned from Paragraph 1,
Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution that in the phrase, “a representative of Congress,” the
use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no
room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional
Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had
it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC,
the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.

Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in
itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and
specific by considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated.
Every meaning to be given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body
of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or
phrases and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter. Applying the foregoing principle
to this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the
Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the
Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular
representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC

Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous,
there is no need to resort extrinsic aids such as records of the Constitutional Commission.
Nevertheless, even if the Court should proceed to look into the minds of the members of the
Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable from the records thereof that it was intended that the
JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. The underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that
a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among
any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter.
52 | P a g e
With the respondents’ contention that each representative should be admitted from the Congress
and House of Representatives, the Supreme Court, after the perusal of the records of Constitutional
Commission, held that “Congress,” in the context of JBC representation, should be considered as one
body. While it is true that there are still differences between the two houses and that an inter-play
between the two houses is necessary in the realization of the legislative powers conferred to them
by the Constitution, the same cannot be applied in the case of JBC representation because no liaison
between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is required between the
Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Hence,
the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.

The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private sector and the three branches of
government would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of the members of the
Judiciary. Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by
having more than one voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would
“negate the principle of equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the
Constitution.”

It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7)
members only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of
it, goes against that mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing Congress with
an equal voice with other members of the JBC in recommending appointees to the Judiciary is
explicit. Any circumvention of the constitutional mandate should not be countenanced for the
Constitution is the supreme law of the land. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to
which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the
land, must defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what may be the tides of
time. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the call of situations and much more
tailor itself to the whims and caprices of the government and the people who run it.

Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior
official actions are nonetheless valid. In the interest of fair play under the doctrine of operative facts,
actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not
nullified.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar
Council IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to
reconstitute itself so that only one ( 1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its
proceedings, in accordance with Section 8( 1 ), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. This disposition is
immediately executory.

SPOUSES DELFINO VS ST. JAMES HOSPITAL

Petitioner: SPS. NEREO & NIEVA DELFINO

Respondent: ST. JAMES HOSPITAL, INC., and THE HONORABLE RONALDO ZAMORA, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT.

Facts:

Respondent assails the Decision on the ground that the Court had erroneously interpreted the 1991
Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP) or the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of the Municipality of
Santa Rosa, Laguna, in ruling that the St. James Hospital is a non-conforming structure under the 1991
Zoning Ordinance and that the expansion of the St. James Hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed
capacity medical institution within the Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision is prohibited under the provisions

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 of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance. Respondent contends that the case must now be decided in accordance
with the latest Zoning Ordinance passed in 1999 or the Santa Rosa Zoning Ordinance

Respondent claims that the legislative history of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance shows that commercial
and institutional uses were expressly allowed in Sec. 2, par. 1 of said Ordinance as it retained uses that
are commercial and institutional as well as recreational in character and those for the maintenance of
ecological balance. Respondent explains that what appears is the fact that parks, playgrounds, and
recreation centers are deemed to have been covered by Sec. 2, par. 1 of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance.
Respondent contends that St. James Hospital and its expansion are consistent with the uses allowed
under the zoning ordinance.

Issue: WON the (1)St. James Hospital is a non-conforming structure and the (2)expansion into a four-
storey, forty-bed capacity medical institution within the Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision is prohibited
under the provisions of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance

Ruling: (1) Yes. Under the legal maxim expression unius est exclusion alterius, the express mention of
one thing in a law, means the exclusion of others not expressly mentioned. Interpreting the whole of
Section 2, Article VI, it expressly enumerated the allowable uses within a residential zone, those not
included in the enumeration are deemed excluded. Hence, since hospitals, among other things, are
not among those enumerated as allowable uses within the residential zone, thus hospitals have been
deliberately eliminated from those structures permitted to be constructed within a residential area in
Santa Rosa, Laguna.

(2) Yes. Section 1. EXISTING NON-CONFORMING USES AND BUILDINGS. The lawful uses of any building,
structure or land at the point of adoption or amendment of this Ordinance may be continued, although
such does not conform with the provisions of this Ordinance.

1. That no non-conforming use shall be enlarged or increased or extended to occupy a greater area
or land that has already been occupied by such use at the time of the adoption of this Ordinance, or
moved in whole or in part to any other portion of the lot parcel of land where such non-conforming
use exist at the time of the adoption of this Ordinance.4 (Emphasis ours.)

It is clear from the above quoted provision of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance that the expansion of a non-
conforming building is prohibited. Hence, we accordingly resolve that the expansion of the St. James
Hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed capacity medical institution within the Mariquita Pueblo
Subdivision as prohibited under the provisions of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance.

BASIC STATCON RULE: According to the rule of casus omissus in statutory construction, a thing
omitted must be considered to have been omitted intentionally. Therefore, with the omission of the
phrase "hospital with not more than ten capacity" in the new Zoning Ordinance, and the
corresponding transfer of said allowable usage to another zone classification, the only logical
conclusion is that the legislative body had intended that said use be removed from those allowed
within a residential zone. Thus, the construction of medical institutions, such as St. James Hospital,
within a residential zone is now prohibited under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance.

PEOPLE VS. GUILLERMO MANANTAN [G.R. NO L-14129. JULY 31, 1962]

Ponente: REGALA, J.

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FACTS:

[D]efendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section 54 of the Revised Election Code in the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as
justice of the peace the defendant is one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code. The lower court denied the said motion. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in
support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Macaraeg applying the rule of “expressio
unius, est exclusion alterius”. The lower court dismissed the information against the accused upon the
authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense. The issue was raised to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a justice of the peace was included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code.

HELD:

YES. The order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and this case was remanded for trial
on the merits.

RATIO:

The application of the rule of casus omissus does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in
nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from
a legislative enumeration. In the present case, and for reasons already mentioned, there has been no such
omission. There has only been a substitution of terms. On law reason and public policy, defendant-appellee’s
contention that justices of the peace are not covered by the injunction of Section 54 must be rejected. To
accept it is to render ineffective a policy so clearly and emphatically laid down by the legislature.

Although it was observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the rule of “expressio
unius, est exclusion alterius” in arriving at the conclusion that justices of the peace are not covered by Section
54, the rule has no application. If the legislature had intended to exclude a justice of the peace from the
purview of Section 54, neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals has given the reason for the exclusion.
Indeed, there appears no reason for the alleged change. Hence, the rule of expressio unius est exclusion
alterius has been erroneously applied.

G. STARE DECISIS

Article 8 Civil Code

Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system of the Philippines. (n)

It is the doctrine that, when court has once laid down a principle, and apply it to all
future cases, where facts are substantially the same, regardless of whether the
parties and properties are the same.

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Stare Decisis. Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled.
Matters already decided on the merits cannot be relitigated again and again.
“Stare decisis et non quieta movere” (follow past precedents and do not disturb what
has been settled.

Lazatin vs Ombudsman, June 5 2009

FACTS:

The Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a Complaint-Affidavit
charging petitioners (Lazatin) with Illegal Use of Public Funds.

A preliminary investigation was conducted and it was recommened that 14 counts each of
Malversation of Public Funds and violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 should be filed against
the petitioners. Resolution was approved by the Ombudsman; hence, 28 Informations were filed
before the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner Lazatin and his co-petitioners then filed their respective Motions for
Reconsideration/Reinvestigation, which motions were granted by the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan also ordered the prosecution to re-evaluate the cases against petitioners.

The Office of the Special Prosecutor(OSP) submitted to the Ombudsman its Resolution which
recommended the dismissal of the cases against petitioners for lack or insufficiency of evidence.

The Ombudsman ordered the Office of the Legal Affairs (OLA) to review the OSP Resolution. In a
Memorandum, the OLA recommended that the OSP Resolution be disapproved and the OSP be
directed to proceed with the trial of the cases against petitioners. The Ombudsman adopted
the OLA Memorandum, thereby disapproving the OSP Resolution and ordering the prosecution of
the subject cases. The cases were then returned to the Sandiganbayan for continuation of criminal
proceedings.

Petitioners filed the instant petition.

Petitioners argue that the Ombudsman had no authority to overturn the OSP's Resolution
dismissing the cases against petitioners because, under Section 13, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, the Ombudsman is clothed only with the power to watch, investigate and
recommend the filing of proper cases against erring officials, but it was not granted the power
to prosecute. They point out that under the Constitution, the power to prosecute belongs to the
OSP, which was intended by the framers to be a separate and distinct entity from the Office of the
Ombudsman. Petitioners conclude that, as provided by the Constitution, the OSP being a separate
and distinct entity, the Ombudsman should have no power and authority over the OSP. Thus,
petitioners maintain that R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), which made the OSP an
organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman, should be struck down for being
unconstitutional.

The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.

Petitioners' attack against the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6770 is stale. It has long been
settled that the provisions of R.A. No. 6770 granting the Office of the Ombudsman prosecutorial
powers and placing the OSP under said office have no constitutional infirmity. The issue of whether
said provisions of R.A. No. 6770 violated the Constitution had been fully dissected as far
back as 1995 in Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman : The Court held that giving prosecutorial

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powers to the Ombudsman is in accordance with the Constitution as paragraph 8, Section 13, Article
XI provides that the Ombudsman shall “exercise such other functions or duties as may be provided
by law.”

The constitutionality of Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770, which subsumed the OSP under the Office
of the Ombudsman, was likewise upheld by the Court in Acop. It was explained, thus:

x x x Section 7 of Article XI expressly provides that the then existing

Tanodbayan, to be henceforth known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
“shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be
provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created
under this Constitution.” The underscored phrase evidently refers to the
Tanodbayan's powers under P.D. No. 1630 or subsequent amendatory
legislation. It follows then that Congress may remove any of the
Tanodbayan's/Special Prosecutor's powers under P.D. No. 1630 or grant it
other powers, except those powers conferred by the Constitution on the
Office of the Ombudsman.

Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when one considers that by

express mandate of paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, the
Ombudsman may “exercise such other powers or perform functions or duties as
may be provided by law,” it is indubitable then that Congress has the power to
place the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the
Ombudsman. In the same vein, Congress may remove some of the powers
granted to the Tanodbayan by P.D. No. 1630 and transfer them to the
Ombudsman; or grant the Office of the Special Prosecutor such other powers
and functions and duties as Congress may deem fit and wise. This Congress
did through the passage of R.A. No. 6770.

The foregoing ruling of the Court has been reiterated in Camanag v. Guerrero. More recently,
in Office of the Ombudsman v. Valera, the Court, basing its ratio decidendi on its ruling in Acop and
Camanag, declared that the OSP is “merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and
may only act under the supervision and control, and upon authority of the Ombudsman” and
ruled that under R.A. No. 6770, the power to preventively suspend is lodged only with the
Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman. The Court's ruling in Acop that the authority of the
Ombudsman to prosecute based on R.A. No. 6770 was authorized by the Constitution was also
made the foundation for the decision in Perez v. Sandiganbayan, where it was held that the power
to prosecute carries with it the power to authorize the filing of informations, which power had not
been delegated to the OSP. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that under the Constitution, Congress was
not proscribed from legislating the grant of additional powers to the Ombudsman or placing the OSP
under the Office of the Ombudsman.

ISSUE:

W/n the Court's ruling on the constitutionality of the provisions of R.A. No. 6770 should
be revisited and the principle of stare decisis be set aside.

RULING:

The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to
unsettle things which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines which provides, thus:

ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the

Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.

It was further explained in Fermin v. People as follows:

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 The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires
courts in a country to follow the rule established in a decision of the Supreme Court
thereof. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases
by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once
a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed
to further argument.

In Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel Corporation,
the Court expounded on the importance of the foregoing doctrine, stating that:
The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy grounded on the necessity
for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus:
Time and again, the court has held that it is a very
desirable and necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid
down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will
adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts
are substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand
by the decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply
means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one
case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are
substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It
proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided
alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have
been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case
litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is
a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.
The doctrine has assumed such value in our judicial system that the Court has ruled that
“[a]bandonment thereof must be based only on strong and compelling reasons, otherwise, the
becoming virtue of predictability which is expected from this Court would be immeasurably affected and
the public's confidence in the stability of the solemn pronouncements diminished.” Verily, only upon
showing that circumstances attendant in a particular case override the great benefits derived by our
judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, can the courts be justified in setting aside the same.
In this case, petitioners have not shown any strong, compelling reason to convince the
Court that the doctrine of stare decisis should not be applied to this case. They have not
successfully demonstrated how or why it would be grave abuse of discretion for the
Ombudsman, who has been validly conferred by law with the power of control and supervision
over the OSP, to disapprove or overturn any resolution issued by the latter.
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Phil Carpet MCorp. vs Tagmayon, December 2013

FACTS:

Petitioner Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation (PCMC) is a corporation registered in the

Philippines engaged in the business of manufacturing wool and yarn carpets and rugs. 4 Respondents
were its regular and permanent employees, but were affected by petitioner’s retrenchment and
voluntary retirement programs. The alleged reason of PCMC for such action was because of less
demand in the market of their products due to the un-competitiveness of their price

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On March 15, 2004, Tagyamon,5 Luna,6 Badayos,7 Dela Cruz,8 and Comandao9 received a uniformly
worded Memorandum of dismissal stating that they are going to be retrenched because of the slump
in market demand. As to Marcos, Ilao, and Nemis, they claimed that they were dismissed effective
March 31, 2004, together with fifteen (15) other employees on the ground of lack of market/slump in
demand. PCMC, however, claimed that they availed of the company’s voluntary retirement program
and, in fact, voluntarily executed their respective Deeds of Release, Waiver, and Quitclaim. Thus,
they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PCMC, Mr. Patricio Lim and Mr. David Lim. These
cases were later consolidated.

Respondents: Relied on the ruling in Philippine Carpet Employees Association (PHILCEA) v. Hon.
Sto. Tomas as to the validity of the company’s retrenchment program. They further explained that
PCMC did not, in fact, suffer losses shown by its acts prior to and subsequent to their termination.
They also insisted that their acceptance of separation pay and signing of quitclaim is not a bar to the
pursuit of illegal dismissal case.

PCMC: Retrenchment was a necessary management prerogative. Petitioners also stressed that
respondents belatedly filed their complaint as they allowed almost three years to pass making
the principle of laches applicable. Considering that respondents accepted their separation pay and
voluntarily executed deeds of release, waiver and quitclaim, PCMC invoked the principle of estoppel
on the part of respondents to question their separation from the service. Finally, as to Marcos, Ilao
and Nemis, PCMC emphasized that they were not dismissed from employment, but in fact they
voluntarily retired from employment to take advantage of the company’s program

LA: DISMISSED. Respondents voluntarily opted to retire, were subsequently hired on a contractual
basis, terminated, and were paid separation benefits. The filing of the illegal dismissal case was a
mere afterthought designed primarily for respondents to collect more money, taking advantage
of the 2006 Supreme Court decision. NLRC: AFFIRMED LA. It emphasized the application of the
principle of laches for respondents’ inaction for an unreasonable period. CA: REVERSED. The
case was instituted prior to the expiration of the prescriptive period set by law which is four
years. It stressed that said principle cannot be invoked earlier than the expiration of the
prescriptive period. Citing the Court’s decision in the Philcea case, the CA applied the doctrine
of stare decisis, in view of the similar factual circumstances of the cases. As to Ilao, Nemis and
Marcos, while acknowledging their voluntary resignation, the CA found the same not a bar to the
illegal dismissal case because they did so on the mistaken belief that PCMC was losing money

ISSUE: WON laches has barred the action?

HELD: NO.

1. “Laches”:the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which
by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, thus, giving rise to a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.

SC: Laches is a doctrine in equity while prescription is based on law. Our courts are basically
courts of law not courts of equity. Thus, laches cannot be invoked to resist the enforcement of an
existing legal right. x x x Courts exercising equity jurisdiction are bound by rules of law and have no
arbitrary discretion to disregard them. In Zabat Jr. v. Court of Appeals x x x, this Court was more
emphatic in upholding the rules of procedure. We said therein:

As for equity which has been aptly described as a "justice outside legality," this is applied only in the
absence of, and never against, statutory law or, as in this case, judicial rules of procedure. Aequetas
nunguam contravenit legis. The pertinent positive rules being present here, they should preempt and
prevail over all abstract arguments based only on equity.

Thus, where the claim was filed within the [four-year] statutory period, recovery therefore cannot be
barred by laches. Courts should never apply the doctrine of laches earlier than the expiration of time
limited for the commencement of actions at law."

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An action for reinstatement by reason of illegal dismissal is one based on an injury to the
complainants’ rights which should be brought within four years from the time of their
dismissal pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code. Respondents’ complaint filed almost 3
years after their alleged illegal dismissal was still well within the prescriptive period. Laches
cannot, therefore, be invoked yet. To be sure, laches may be applied only upon the most
convincing evidence of deliberate inaction, for the rights of laborers are protected under the social
justice provisions of the Constitution and under the Civil Code.

***NOTE: NCC says within 4 years but according to the LC prescription is 3 years (so I guess the
court interprets 3 years as x<4.

2. With regard to the illegal dismissal case, the court ruled in favour of the respondents saying that the
petitioner did not execute a valid retrenchment scheme. Their reason of a slump in the market is
incongruent with their actions of buying expensive new machinery worth P20M and hiring more than
100 employees. Also, the court noted that PCMC acted in bad faith in announcing its cost-reduction
program after receiving a letter from the Union President which included a proposal for additional
benefits and wage increases to be incorporated in their CBA the following year.

Cabaobas vs Pepsi Cola, March 2015

FACTS:

Respondent Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. (PCPPI) is a domestic corporation engaged

in the manufacturing, bottling and distribution of soft drink products, which operates plants all over
the country, one of which is the Tanauan Plant in Tanauan, Leyte.

In 1999, PCPPI’s Tanauan Plant allegedly incurred business losses in the total amount of
Twenty-Nine Million One Hundred Sixty-Seven Thousand and Three Hundred Ninety (P29, 167,
390.00) Pesos. To avert further losses, PCPPI implemented a company-wide retrenchment program
(Corporate-wide Rightsizing Program or CRP) from 1999 to 2000, and retrenched forty-seven (47)
employees of its Tanauan Plant on July 31, 1999.

On January 15, 2000, petitioners, who are permanent and regular employees of the Tanauan
Plant, received their respective letters, informing them of the cessation of their employment on
February 15, 2000, pursuant to PCPPI's CRP. Petitioners then filed their respective complaints for
illegal dismissal before the National Labor Relations Commission Regional Arbitration Branch No. VIII
in Tacloban City.

Petitioners alleged that PCPPI was not facing serious financial losses because after their
termination, it regularized four (4) employees and hired replacements for the forty-seven (47)
previously dismissed employees. They also alleged that PCPPI's CRP was just designed to prevent their
union, Leyte Pepsi-Cola Employees Union-Associated Labor Union (LEPCEU-ALU), from becoming the
certified bargaining agent of PCPPI's rank-and-file employees.

PCPPI countered that petitioners were dismissed pursuant to its CRP to save the company
from total bankruptcy and collapse; thus, it sent notices of termination to them and to the Department
of Labor and Employment.

Labor Arbiter Vito C. Bose rendered a Decision finding the dismissal of petitioners as illegal.
PCPPI appealed from the Decision of the Labor Arbiter to the Fourth Division of the NLRC of Tacloban
City. The NLRC dismissed the complaints for illegal dismissal, and declared the retrenchment program
is a valid exercise of management prerogatives. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
The appellate court affirmed the decision of the NLRC. Aggrieved, petitioners come before the Court
in this petition for review on certiorari.

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ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners’ dismissal pursuant to respondent’s retrenchment program is

legal?

HELD:

Yes, as all the requisites for a valid retrenchment are present, the Court finds Pepsi’s
rightsizing program and the consequent dismissal of petitioners in accord with law.

Essentially, the prerogative of an employer to retrench its employees must be exercised only
as a last resort, considering that it will lead to the loss of the employees' livelihood. It is justified only
when all other less drastic means have been tried and found insufficient or inadequate. Corollary
thereto, the employer must prove the requirements for a valid retrenchment by clear and convincing
evidence; otherwise, said ground for termination would be susceptible to abuse by scheming
employers who might be merely feigning losses or reverses in their business ventures in order to ease
out employees. These requirements are:
(1) That retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to prevent business losses which, if already
incurred, are not merely de minimis, but substantial, serious, actual and real, or if only expected, are
reasonably imminent as perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer;

(2) That the employer served written notice both to the employees and to the Department of Labor
and Employment at least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment;

(3) That the employer pays the retrenched employees separation pay equivalent to one (1) month
pay or at least one-half (½) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher;

(4) That the employer exercises its prerogative to retrench employees in good faith for the
advancement of its interest and not to defeat or circumvent the employees’ right to security of
tenure; and

(5) That the employer used fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be dismissed and
who would be retained among the employees, such as status, efficiency, seniority, physical fitness,
age, and financial hardship for certain workers.

The issues, subject matters and causes of action between the parties in Pepsi-Cola Products
Philippines, Inc. v. Molon and the present case are identical, namely, the validity of PCPPI's
retrenchment program, and the legality of its employees' termination. This impels the Court to accord
a similar disposition and uphold the legality of same program.

Moreover, in due regard of the abovementioned requisites, the Court observes that Pepsi had
validly implemented its retrenchment program:

 Pepsi complied with the requirements of substantial loss (PEPSI-COLA’s financial

statements are substantial evidence which carry great credibility and reliability viewed in light
of the financial crisis that hit the country which saw multinational corporations closing shops
and walking away, or adapting [sic] their own corporate rightsizing program).

 Pepsi complied with the requirements of due notice to both the DOLE and the workers to be
retrenched at least one (1) month prior to the date of retrenchment.

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  Respondents had already been paid the requisite separation pay as evidenced by the
September 1999 quitclaims signed by them.

 Pepsi’s Corporate Rightsizing Program was a company-wide program which had already been
implemented in its other plants in Bacolod, Iloilo, Davao, General Santos and Zamboanga.
Consequently, given the general applicability of its retrenchment program, Pepsi could not
have intended to decimate LEPCEU-ALU’s membership, much less impinge upon its right to
self-organization, when it employed the same.

 Pepsi’s management exerted conscious efforts to incorporate employee participation during

the implementation of its retrenchment program. Records indicate that Pepsi had initiated
sit-downs with its employees to review the criteria on which the selection of who to be
retrenched would be based.

 On the final requirement of fair and reasonable criteria for determining who would or would
not be dismissed, records indicate that Pepsi did proceed to implement its rightsizing program
based on fair and reasonable criteria recommended by the company supervisors.

Verily, the foregoing incidents clearly negate the claim that the retrenchment was undertaken by
Pepsi in bad faith.

Final Disposition: The petition is denied. The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are
affirmed.

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