Concept of Quasi-Delict; Distinctions; Quasi-delict v.
Delict
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article
is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. (n)
Title Fourteen QUASI-OFFENSES
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless
imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would
have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have
constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum
period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act
which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of
arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have
constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only
resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be
punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said
damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than
twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed
upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause
some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light
felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound
discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than
those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the
court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should
be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile
Law, to death of a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall
be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or
falling to do an act from which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing of
failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those
cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor
the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall
be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured
parties such help as may be in this hand to give. (As amended by R.A. 1790,
approved June 21, 1957).
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Concept of Quasi-Delict; Distinctions; Quasi-delict v. Delict
Barredo vs Garcia 73 Phil 607 (1942)
Facts:
On May 3, 1936, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate taxicab driven
by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapilis. The carretela was over-
turned, and one of the passengers, Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries and died 2 days later. A
criminal action was filed against Fontanilla, and was convicted. The court in the criminal case
granted the petition to reserve the civil action. Parents of the deceased, later, filed a civil
action against Barredo, the proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Fontanilla,
making him primarily and directly responsible. It is undisputed that Fontanilla’s negligence
was the cause of the accident, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road at high speed,
and there was no showing that Barredo exercised the diligence of a good father of a family.
Main theory of the defense is that the liability of Barredo is only subsidiary under the RPC
and since no civil action was filed against fontanilla he cannot be held responsible in the
case.
Issue: W/N plaintiffs may bring separate civil action against Fausto Barredo, thus making him
primarily and directly responsible under Art. 1903 of the civil code as an employer of Pedro
Fontanilla
Ruling:
In the present case, the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal negligence, so that if he had
even sued for his civil responsibility arising from the crime, he would have been held
primarily liable for civil damages, and Barredo would have been held subsidiarily liable for
the same. But the plaintiffs are directly suing Barredo, on his primary responsibility because
of his own presumed negligence — which he did not overcome — under article 1903. Thus,
there were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the subsidiary one because of the civil liability of
the taxi driver arising from the latter's criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary
liability as an employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which course
to take, and they preferred the second remedy.
The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the owner or director of
a business or enterprise and the negligent acts are committed while the servant is engage in
his master’s employment as such owner
Padilla v CA (Torts)
PADILLA v CA G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984 ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL
GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY BEDENIA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
FACTS:
1. The information states that on February 8, 1964 at around 9AM, the accused prevented
Antonio Vergara and his family to close their stall located at the Public Market, Building No.
3, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and by subsequently forcibly opening the door of said
stall and thereafter brutally demolishing and destroying said stall and the furnitures therein
by axes and other massive instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares and
merchandise
Contentions:
Vergara Family
1. accused took advantage of their public positions: Roy Padilla, being the incumbent
municipal mayor, and the rest of the accused being policemen, except Ricardo Celestino who
is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with evident
premeditation.
Roy Padilla, et al
1. finding of grave coercion was not supported by the evidence
2. the town mayor had the power to order the clearance of market premises and the
removal of the complainants' stall because the municipality had enacted municipal
ordinances pursuant to which the market stall was a nuisance per se
3. violation of the very directive of the petitioner Mayor which gave the stall owners seventy
two (72) hours to vacate the market premise
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Trial court: conviction. Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose Parley
Bedenia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion, and hereby imposes
upon them to suffer an imprisonment of FIVE (5) months and One (1) day; to pay a fine of
P500.00 each; to pay actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P10,000.00; moral
damages in the amount of P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages,
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Concept of Quasi-Delict; Distinctions; Quasi-delict v. Delict
jointly and severally, and all the accessory penalties provided for by law; and to pay the doubt.
proportionate costs of this proceedings. Article 2177 of the Civil Code provides:
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
(2) Court of Appeals: acquittal but ordered them to pay solidarily the amount of 9,000. The distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
petitioners were acquitted because these acts were denominated coercion when they plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. That
properly constituted some petitioners were acquitted because these acts were denominated the same punishable act or omission can create two kinds of civil liabilities against the
coercion when they properly constituted some other offense such as threat or malicious accused and, where provided by law, his employer. 'There is the civil liability arising from
mischief the act as a crime and the liability arising from the same act as a quasi-delict. Either one of
these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the accused, However, the
Roy Padilla et al for petition for review on certiorari - grounds offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability.
Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier cited, that "when the accused in a criminal prosecution is
1. where the civil liability which is included in the criminal action is that arising from and as a
acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil
consequence of the criminal act, and the defendant was acquitted in the criminal case, (no
action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted."
civil liability arising from the criminal case), no civil liability arising from the criminal charge
What Article 29 merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an
could be imposed upon him
acquittal for the same criminal act or omission.
2. liability of the defendant for the return of the amount received by him may not be
enforced in the criminal case but must be raised in a separate civil action for the recovery of The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of only in a separate
the said amount civil action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no statement that such separate
filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of recovering damages. Considering
moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it would
ISSUE: whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in requiring the
be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a separate civil action to be
petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the
filed.
criminal charge.
RULING:
Cruz v. CA
No, the Court of Appeals is correct.
1. A separate civil action is not required. To require a separate civil action simply because Dr. Ninevetch Cruz v. CA and Lydia Umali
the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary
duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of 1997 / Francisco / Petition for review on certiorari of a CA decision
all concerned.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that when a Standard of conduct > Experts > Medical professionals
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged is impliedly instituted with it. The exceptions are when the offended party
expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately.
Civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability
FACTS
arising from the act as a crime.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it Medical malpractice suit – type of claim which a victim has available to him/her to redress a
includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the wrong committed by a medical professional which has caused bodily harm; most often
civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable

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Concept of Quasi-Delict; Distinctions; Quasi-delict v. Delict
brought as a civil action for damages under NCC 2176 or a criminal case under RPC 365, with  lack of provision of supplies
which a civil action for damages is impliedly instituted.
 the fact that the transfer was needed meant that there was something wrong in
Lydia Umali was examined by Dr. Cruz who found a myoma [benign tumor] in her uterus, the way Dr. Cruz conducted operation
and scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation [removal of uterus] on 23 Mar 1991.
Rowena Umali de Ocampo accompanied her mother to the hospital a day before the  no showing that pre-surgery procedure (clearance, blood typing/tests) was
operation, and they spent the night there. Rowena noticed that the clinic was untidy, so she conducted
tried to persuade her mother not to proceed with the operation. The following day, Rowena
asked Dr. Cruz if the operation could be postponed, but Lydia told her daughter that Dr. Cruz ISSUE AND HOLDING
said that the operation must go on as scheduled.
WON the circumstances are sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction against Dr. Cruz
While Lydia’s relatives were waiting, Dr. Ercillo (anesthesiologist) told them to buy tagamet for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. NO. DR. CRUZ IS ACQUITTED, BUT SHE IS
ampules, and Rowena’s sister went out to buy some. An hour later, Dr. Ercillo asked them to STILL CIVILLY LIABLE (50K civil liability; 100k moral damages, 50k exemplary damages).
buy blood for Lydia, so they did. A few hours later, the operation was finished, but later, Dr.
Cruz asked the family to buy additional blood, but there was no more type A blood available RATIO
in the blood bank. A person arrived to donate blood which was later transfused to Lydia.
Elements of reckless imprudence
Rowena noticed that her mother was gasping for breath–apparently, the oxygen supply had
run out, so the family went out to buy oxygen. Later in the evening, she went into shock and 1. Offender does / fails to do an act
her blood pressure dropped. She was then transferred to another hospital so she could be
connected to a respirator and further examined. However, this transfer was without the 2. Doing / failure to do act is voluntary
consent of the relatives, who only found out about it when an ambulance came to take
Lydia to the other hospital. 3. Without malice

In the new hospital, she was re-operated upon by Dr. Cruz and Dr. Ercillo because blood was
oozing out from her incision. They summoned Dr. Angeles, Ob-Gyne head of the new
hospital, but when he arrived, Lydia was already in shock and possibly dead (BP: 0/0). Dr.
Angeles told Drs. Cruz and Ercillo that there was nothing he could do. Lydia died while Dr.
Cruz was closing her abdominal wall. Immediate cause of death is shock; disseminated
intravascular coagulation (DIC) as antecedent cause.
Dr. Cruz and Dr. Ercillo were charged with reckless imprudence and negligence resulting in
homicide of Lydia Umali. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) found Dr. Ercillo not
guilty for insufficiency of evidence against her, but held Dr. Cruz responsible for Umali’s
death. RTC and CA affirmed MTCC.
Manifestation of negligence
 untidiness of clinic
4. Material damage results from reckless imprudence
5. There is inexcusable lack of precaution, taking into consideration offender’s
employment, degree of intelligence, physical condition, other circumstances re: persons,
time, place
Standard of care
Standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under
similar circumstances, bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of
treatment or the present state of medical science
When the physician’s qualifications are admitted, there is an
inevitable presumption that in proper cases, he takes the necessary precaution and employs
the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his clients, unless the contrary is
sufficiently established by expert testimony.

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Concept of Quasi-Delict; Distinctions; Quasi-delict v. Delict
Expert testimony
Expert testimony is essential to establish standard of care of the profession, as well as that
the physician’s conduct in the treatment and care falls below such standard. It is also usually
necessary to support the conclusion as to causation. There is an absence of any expert
testimony re: standard of care in the case records. NBI doctors presented by the
prosecution only testified as to the possible cause of death.
While it may be true that the circumstances pointed out by the lower courts constitute
reckless imprudence, this conclusion is still best arrived not through the educated surmises
nor conjectures of laymen, including judges, but by the unquestionable knowledge of
expert witnesses. The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified
physicians stems from the realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which
laymen are incapable of intelligently evaluating.
Burden of establishing medical negligence on plaintiff
Plaintiff has the burden to establish this, and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence,
there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon, as well as a causal
connection of such breach and the resulting death of patient. Negligence cannot create a
right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of (Chan Lugay v. St.
Luke’s Hospital, Inc.). In this case, no cogent proof exists that the circumstances caused
Lydia’s death, so the 4th element of reckless imprudence is missing.
The testimonies of the doctors presented by the prosecution establish hemorrhage /
hemorrhagic shock as the cause of death, which may be caused by several different
factors. Autopsy did not reveal any untied cut blood vessel, nor was there a tie of a cut
blood vessel that became loose. The findings of the doctors do not preclude the probability
that a clotting defect (DIC) caused the hemorrhage and consequently, Lydia’s death.
The Court has no recourse but to rely on the expert testimonies that substantiate Dr. Cruz’
allegation that the cause of Lydia’s death was DIC, which cannot be attributed to Dr. Cruz’
fault or negligence. This probability was unrebutted during trial.
Philippine Rabbit vs. People of the Philippines
Philippine Rabbit vs. People
G.R. No. 147703 April 14, 2004
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Facts: Napoleon Roman was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to pay damages. The court further ruled that in the
event of the insolvency of accused, petitioner shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the
accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final and executory.
Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. The CA ruled that the
institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action arising from the
offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against the accused-employee, the
employer’s subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
becomes conclusive and enforceable.
Issue: Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-
employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.
Held: No. It is well-established in our jurisdiction that the appellate court may, upon motion
or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail. This rule is
based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court when they abscond.
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a
criminal prosecution. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly
instituted in a criminal action; that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action. Hence,
the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may
be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the
employee.
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the
crime or delict per se, but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-
contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the
criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the control of the
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Concept of Quasi-Delict; Distinctions; Quasi-delict v. Delict
prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil
interest therein.

The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly
speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees.
Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed
in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of
supplying the latter’s lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act independently
on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.

As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Under Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of
their employees in the event of the latter’s insolvency. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its
decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the
employer. In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the offended
party, the judgment of conviction should bind the person who is subsidiarily liable. In effect
and implication, the stigma of a criminal conviction surpass

To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to
amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court. By the same
token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees without the
latter’s consent would also result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the
judgment. The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive
upon the employer not only with regard to the former’s civil liability, but also with regard to
its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee.

The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil
liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and
enforceable by reason of his flight, then the former’s subsidiary civil liability has also become
immediately enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary
liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.