ALEXANDER A. PADILLA et.

al, petitioner,
vs
CONGRESS OF PHILIPPINES, respondent

GR No. 231671, 2017-07-25

FACTS:
P.S. Resolution No. 388 was approved, after receiving seventeen (17) affirmative votes as against five (5)
negative votes, and was adopted as Senate Resolution No. 49[5] entitled "Resolution Expressing the Sense
of the Senate Not to Revoke, at this Time, Proclamation No. 216, Series of 2017, Entitled 'Declaring a State
of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of
Mindanao.'"[6]P.S. Resolution No. 390, on the other hand, garnered only nine (9) votes from the senators
who were in favor of it as opposed to twelve (12) votes from the senators who were against its approval
and adoption.[7]On May 31, 2017, the House of Representatives, having previously constituted itself as a
Committee of the Whole House,[8] was briefed by Executive Secretary Salvador C. Medialdea (Executive
Secretary Medialdea), Secretary Lorenzana, and other security officials for about six (6) hours. After the
closed-door briefing, the House of Representatives resumed its regular meeting and deliberated on House
Resolution No. 1050 entitled "Resolution Expressing the Full Support of the House of Representatives to
President Rodrigo Duterte as it Finds No Reason to Revoke Proclamation No. 216, Entitled 'Declaring a
State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of
Mindanao.'"[9] The House of Representatives proceeded to divide its members on the matter of
approving said resolution through viva voce voting. The result shows that the members who were in favor
of passing the subject resolution secured the majority vote.[10]The House of Representatives also
purportedly discussed the proposal calling for a joint session of the Congress to deliberate and vote on
President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216. After the debates, however, the proposal was
rejected.[11]These series of events led to the filing of the present consolidated petitions.
The Padilla Petition
Petitioners in G.R. No. 231671 raise the question of "[w]hether Congress is required to convene in joint
session, deliberate, and vote jointly under Article VII, [Section] 18 of the Constitution"
THE PLAIN TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION, SUPPORTED BY THE EXPRESS INTENT OF THE FRAMERS, AND
CONFIRMED BY THE SUPREME COURT, REQUIRES THAT CONGRESS CONVENE IN JOINT SESSION TO
DELIBERATE AND VOTE AS A SINGLE DELIBERATIVE BODY.
Petitioners claim that in Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo,[18] this Court described the "duty" of the Congress
to convene in joint session as "automatic." The convening of the Congress in joint session when former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Macapagal-Arroyo) declared martial law and suspended
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao was also a legislative precedent where the
Congress clearly recognized its duty to convene in joint session.[19]
The Tañada Petition
The petitioners in G.R. No. 231694 chiefly opine that: A PLAIN READING OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
LEADS TO THE INDUBITABLE CONCLUSION THAT A JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS TO REVIEW A
DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW BY THE PRESIDENT IS MANDATORY.FAILURE TO CONVENE A JOINT
SESSION DEPRIVES LAWMAKERS OF A DELIBERATIVE AND INTERROGATORY PROCESS TO REVIEW
MARTIAL LAW.FAILURE TO CONVENE A JOINT SESSION DEPRIVES THE PUBLIC OF TRANSPARENT

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PROCEEDINGS WITHIN WHICH TO BE INFORMED OF THE FACTUAL BASES OF MARTIAL LAW AND THE
INTENDED PARAMETERS OF ITS IMPLEMENTATION.THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION INTENDED
THAT A JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS BE CONVENED IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE DECLARATION OF
MARTIAL LAW.
Consolidation of Respondents' Comments Respondents assert firmly that there is no mandatory duty on
their part to "vote jointly," except in cases of revocation or extension of the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.[29] In the absence of such duty, the non-
convening of the Congress in joint session does not pose any actual case or controversy that may be the
subject of judicial review.[30] Additionally, respondents argue that the petitions raise a political question
over which the Court has no jurisdiction.
Respondents further contend that the constitutional right to information, as enshrined under Article III,
Section 7 of the Constitution, is not absolute. Matters affecting national security are considered as a valid
exception to the right to information of the public. For this reason, the petitioners' and the public's right
to participate in the deliberations of the Congress regarding the factual basis of a martial law declaration
may be restricted in the interest of national security and public safety Respondents allege that petitioners
failed to present an appropriate case for mandamus to lie. Mandamus will only issue when the act to be
compelled is a clear legal duty or a ministerial duty imposed by law upon the defendant or respondent to
perform the act required that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station.
According to respondents, it is erroneous to assert that it is their ministerial duty to convene in joint
session whenever martial law is proclaimed or the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended in
the absence of a clear and specific constitutional or legal provision. In fact, Article VII, Section 18 does not
use the words "joint session" at all, much less impose the convening of such joint session upon the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. What the
Constitution requires is joint voting when the action of the Congress is to revoke or extend the
proclamation or suspension.
Subsequent events on July 14, 2017, petitioners in G.R. No. 231671, the Padilla Petition, filed a
Manifestation, calling the attention of the Court to the imminent expiration of the sixty (60)-day period
of validity of Proclamation No. 216 on July 22, 2017. Despite the lapse of said sixty (60)-day period,
petitioners exhort the Court to still resolve the instant cases for the guidance of the Congress, State actors,
and all Filipinos. On July 22, 2017, the Congress convened in joint session and, with two hundred sixty-
one (261) votes in favor versus eighteen (18) votes against, overwhelmingly approved the extension of
the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Mindanao until December 31, 2017.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of these consolidated petitions;
Whether or not the petitions satisfy the requisites for the Court's exercise of its power of judicial review;
Whether or not the Congress has the mandatory duty to convene jointly upon the President's
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Article
VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution; and Whether or not a writ of mandamus or certiorari may be
issued in the present cases.
RULING:
The Court's jurisdiction over these consolidated petitions

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The principle of separation of powers
Contrary to respondents' protestations, the Court's exercise of jurisdiction over these petitions cannot be
deemed as an unwarranted intrusion into the exclusive domain of the Legislature. Bearing in mind that
the principal substantive issue presented in the cases at bar is the proper interpretation of Article VII,
Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, particularly regarding the duty of the Congress to vote jointly when
the President declares martial law and/or suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, there can
be no doubt that the Court may take jurisdiction over the petitions. It is the prerogative of the Judiciary
to declare "what the law is."
Political question doctrine
Corollary to respondents' invocation of the principle of separation of powers, they argue that these
petitions involve a political question in which the Court may not interfere. It is true that the Court
continues to recognize questions of policy as a bar to its exercise of the power of judicial review.
Existence of the requisites for judicial review
Petitioners in G.R. No. 231671 allege that they are suing in the following capacities: (1) Padilla as a member
of the legal profession representing victims of human rights violations, and a taxpayer; (2) Saguisag as a
human rights lawyer, former member of the Philippine Senate, and a taxpayer; (3) Monsod as a framer of
the Philippine Constitution and member of the 1986 ConCom, and a taxpayer; (4) Rosales as a victim of
human rights violations committed under martial law declared by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
and a taxpayer; (5) Gorospe as a lawyer and a taxpayer; and (6) Senator De Lima as an incumbent Member
of the Philippine Senate, a human rights advocate, a former Secretary of Justice, Chairperson of the
Commission on Human Rights, and a taxpayer.
Petitioners satisfy these standards.
Actual case or controversy
There are two conflicting claims presented before the Court: on the one hand, the petitioners' assertion
that the Congress has the mandatory duty to convene in joint session to deliberate on Proclamation No.
216; and, on the other, the respondents' view that so convening in joint session is discretionary on the
part of the Congress.
As the present petitions allege an omission on the part of the Congress that constitutes neglect of their
constitutional duties, the petitions make a prima facie case for mandamus, and an actual case or
controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an act or omission of a branch of government is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but, in fact, the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute.
Liberality in cases of transcendental importance in any case, it is an accepted doctrine that the Court may
brush aside procedural technicalities and, nonetheless, exercise its power of judicial review in cases of
transcendental importance.
Mootness
The Court acknowledges that the main relief prayed for in the present petitions (i.e., that the Congress be
directed to convene in joint session and therein deliberate whether to affirm or revoke Proclamation No.
216) may arguably have been rendered moot by: (a) the lapse of the original sixty (60) days that the
President's martial law declaration and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus were
effective under Proclamation No. 216; (b) the subsequent extension by the Congress of the proclamation

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of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus over the whole of Mindanao
after convening in joint session on July 22, 2017; and (c) the Court's own decision in Lagman v.
Medialdea,[64] wherein we ruled on the sufficiency of the factual bases for Proclamation No. 216 under
the original period stated therein.
It cannot be gainsaid that there are compelling and weighty reasons for the Court to proceed with the
resolution of these consolidated petitions on the merits. As explained in the preceding discussion, these
cases involve a constitutional issue of transcendental significance and novelty. A definitive ruling from this
Court is imperative not only to guide the Bench, the Bar, and the public but, more importantly, to clarify
the parameters of congressional conduct required by the 1987 Constitution, in the event of a repetition
of the factual precedents that gave rise to these cases.
The duty of the Congress to vote jointly under Article VII, Section 18
The Congress is not constitutionally mandated to convene in joint session except to vote jointly to revoke
the President's declaration or suspension.By the language of Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution, the Congress. is only required to vote jointly to revoke the President's proclamation of
martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The
Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session,
may revoke such proclamation or suspension which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and
public safety requires it.The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The provision in question is clear, plain, and unambiguous. In its literal and ordinary meaning, the
provision grants the Congress the power to revoke the President's proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and prescribes how the Congress may exercise
such power, i.e., by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members, voting jointly, in a regular or special
session. The use of the word "may" in the provision - such that "[t]he Congress x x x may revoke such
proclamation or suspension x x x" - is to be construed as permissive and operating to confer discretion on
the Congress on whether or not to revoke,[71] but in order to revoke, the same provision sets the
requirement that at least a majority of the Members of the Congress, voting jointly, favor revocation.
I
It is worthy to stress that the provision does not actually refer to a "joint session." While it may be
conceded, subject to the discussions below, that the phrase "voting jointly" shall already be understood
to mean that the joint voting will be done "in joint session," notwithstanding the absence of clear language
in the Constitution,[72] still, the requirement that "[t]he Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special session, x x x" explicitly applies only to the situation when
the Congress revokes the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus. Simply put, the provision only requires Congress to vote jointly on the
revocation of the President's proclamation and/or suspension.
Hence, the plain language of the subject constitutional provision does not support the petitioners'
argument that it is obligatory for the Congress to convene in joint session following the President's

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proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, under all
circumstances
The deliberations of the 1986 ConCom reveal the framers' specific intentions to (a) remove the
requirement of prior concurrence of the Congress for the effectivity of the President's proclamation of
martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (b) grant to the Congress
the discretionary power to revoke the President's proclamation and/or suspension by a vote of at least a
majority of its Members, voting jointly.
As the Court established in its preceding discussion, the clear meaning of the relevant provision in Article
VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution is that the Congress is only required to vote jointly on the
revocation of the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. Based on the Civil Liberties Union case, there is already no need to look beyond the plain
language of the provision and decipher the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution.
That the Congress will vote on the revocation of the President's proclamation and/or suspension in a joint
session can only be inferred from the arguments of the Commissioners who pushed for the "voting jointly"
amendment that the Members of the House of Representatives will benefit from the advice, opinion,
and/or wisdom of the Senators, which will be presumably shared during a joint session of both Houses.
Such inference is far from a clear mandate for the Congress to automatically convene in joint session,
under all circumstances, when the President proclaims martial law and/or suspends the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, even when Congress does not intend to revoke the President's proclamation and/or
suspension.
There was no obligation on the part of the Congress herein to convene in joint session as the provision on
revocation under Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution did not even come into operation in light
of the resolutions, separately adopted by the two Houses of the Congress in accordance with their
respective rules of procedure, expressing support for President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216.
The provision in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution requiring the Congress to vote jointly in a
joint session is specifically for the purpose of revocation of the President's proclamation of martial law
and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In the petitions at bar, the Senate and
House of Representatives already separately adopted resolutions expressing support for President
Duterte's Proclamation No. 216. Given the express support of both Houses of the Congress for
Proclamation No. 216, and their already evident lack of intent to revoke the same, the provision in Article
VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution on revocation did not even come into operation and, therefore,
there is no obligation on the part of the Congress to convene in joint session.
It cannot be disputed then that the Senate and House of Representatives placed President Duterte's
Proclamation No. 216 under serious review and consideration, pursuant to their power to revoke such a
proclamation vested by the Constitution on the Congress.
The Court highlights the particular circumstance herein that both Houses of Congress already separately
expressed support for President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216, so revocation was not even a possibility
and the provision on revocation under Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution requiring the
Congress to vote jointly in a joint session never came into operation. It will be a completely different
scenario if either of the Senate or the House of Representatives, or if both Houses of the Congress,
resolve/s to revoke the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, in which case, Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution shall apply and the
Congress must convene in joint session to vote jointly on the revocation of the proclamation and/or
suspension.

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Petitioners invoke the following provision also in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution: "The
Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension
convene in accordance with its rules without call." Petitioners reason that if the Congress is not in session,
it is constitutionally mandated to convene within twenty-four (24) hours from the President's
proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then it is with
all the more reason required to convene immediately if in session.
The Court is not persuaded.
First, the provision specially addresses the situation when the President proclaims martial law and/or
suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus while the Congress is in recess. To ensure that the
Congress will be able to act swiftly on the proclamation and/or suspension, the 1987 Constitution provides
that it should convene within twenty-four (24) hours without need for call. It is a whole different situation
when the Congress is still in session as it can readily take up the proclamation and/or suspension in the
course of its regular sessions, as what happened in these cases.
Second, the provision only requires that the Congress convene without call, but it does not explicitly state
that the Congress shall already convene in joint session. In fact, the provision actually states that the
Congress "convene in accordance with its rules," which can only mean the respective rules of each House
as there are no standing rules for joint sessions. And third, it cannot be said herein that the Congress failed
to convene immediately to act on Proclamation No. 216. Both Houses of the Congress promptly took
action on Proclamation No. 216, with the Senate already issuing invitations to executive officials even
prior to receiving President Duterte's Report, except that the two Houses of the Congress acted
separately.
There is likewise no basis for petitioners' assertion that without a joint session, the public cannot hold the
Senators and Representatives accountable for their respective positions on President Duterte's
Proclamation No. 216. Senate records completely chronicled the deliberations and the voting by the
Senators on Senate Resolution No. 49 (formerly P.S. Resolution No. 388) and P.S. Resolution No. 390.
While it is true that the House of Representatives voted on House Resolution No. 1050 viva voce, this is
only in accordance with its rules. Per the Rules of the House of Representatives... ince no one moved for
nominal voting on House Resolution No. 1050, then the votes of the individual Representatives cannot be
determined. It does not render though the proceedings unconstitutional or invalid.
The Congress did not violate the right of the public to information when it did not convene in joint session.
Petitioners contend that the Constitution requires a public deliberation process on the proclamation of
martial law: one that is conducted via a joint session and by a single body. They insist that the Congress
must be transparent, such that there is an "open and robust debate," where the evaluation of the
proclamation's factual bases and subsequent implementation shall be openly discussed and where each
member's position on the issue is heard and made known to the public.
However, based on their internal rules, each House has the discretion over the manner by which
Congressional proceedings are to be conducted. Verily, sessions are generally open to the public, but each
House may decide to hold an executive session due to the confidential nature of the subject matter to be
discussed and deliberated upon.
It is clear that matters affecting the security of the state are considered confidential and must be discussed
and deliberated upon in an executive session, excluding the public therefrom.

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That these matters are considered confidential is in accordance with settled jurisprudence that, in the
exercise of their right to information, the government may withhold certain types of information from the
public such as state secrets regarding military, diplomatic, and other national security matters.
Thus, to demand Congress to hold a public session during which the legislators shall openly discuss these
matters, all the while under public scrutiny, is to effectively compel them to make sensitive information
available to everyone, without exception, and to breach the recognized policy of preserving these matters'
confidentiality, at the risk of being sanctioned, penalized, or expelled from Congress altogether.
Propriety of the issuance of a writ of mandamus or certiorari...
It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that petitioner should have a clear legal right to the
thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required.
Mandamus never issues in doubtful cases.
Although there are jurisprudential examples of the Court issuing a writ of mandamus to compel the
fulfillment of legislative duty, we must distinguish the present controversy with those previous cases. In
this particular instance, the Court has no authority to compel the Senate and the House of Representatives
to convene in joint session absent a clear ministerial duty on its part to do so under the Constitution and
in complete disregard of the separate actions already undertaken by both Houses on Proclamation No.
216, including their respective decisions to no longer hold a joint session, considering their respective
resolutions not to revoke said Proclamation.
In the same vein, there is no cause for the Court to grant a writ of certiorari.
To reiterate, the two Houses of the Congress decided to no longer hold a joint session only after
deliberations among their Members and putting the same to vote, in accordance with their respective
rules of procedure. Premises considered, the Congress did not gravely abuse its discretion when it did not
jointly convene upon the President's issuance of Proclamation No. 216 prior to expressing its concurrence
thereto.

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 RENE A.V. SAGUISAG et. al, petitioners,
vs
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, respondents

GR No. 231671, July 07, 2017

FACTS:
Petitioners respectfully pray that the Honorable Court RECONSIDER, REVERSE, AND SET - ASIDE its
Decision dated January 12, 2016, and issue a new Decision GRANTING the instant consolidated
petitions by declaring the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) entered into by the
respondents for the Philippine government, with the United States of America, UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AND INVALID and to permanently enjoin its implementation.
petitioners claim this Court erred when it ruled that EDCA was not a treaty.[5] In connection to this,
petitioners move that EDCA must be in the form of a treaty in order to comply with the constitutional
restriction under Section 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution on foreign military bases, troops,
and facilities.[6] Additionally, they reiterate their arguments on the issues of telecommunications,
taxation, and nuclear weapons.[7]
Petitioners assert that this Court contradicted itself when it interpreted the word "allowed in" to refer
to the initial entry of foreign bases, troops, and facilities, based on the fact that the plain meaning of
the provision in question referred to prohibiting the return of foreign bases, troops, and facilities
except under a treaty concurred in by the Senate
Secondly, by interpreting "allowed in" as referring to an initial entry, the Court has simply applied the
plain meaning of the words in the particular provision.[10] Necessarily, once entry has been
established by a subsisting treaty, latter instances of entry need not be embodied by a separate
treaty. After all, the Constitution did not state that foreign military bases, troops, and facilities shall
not subsist or exist in the Philippines.
ISSUES:
Constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Republic of
the Philippines and the United States of America (U.S.)
RULING:
we find that EDCA did not go beyond the framework. The entry of US troops has long been authorized
under a valid and subsisting treaty, which is the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).[14] Reading the
VFA along with the longstanding Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT)[15] led this Court to the conclusion
that an executive agreement such as the EDCA was well within the bounds of the obligations imposed
by both treaties.
Thus, we find no reason for EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. It fully conforms to the Philippines'
legal regime through the MDT and VFA. It also fully conforms to the government's continued policy
to enhance our military capability in the face of various military and humanitarian issues that may
arise. This Motion for Reconsideration has not raised any additional legal arguments that warrant
revisiting the Decision.

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The settled rule is that the plain, clear and unambiguous language of the Constitution should be
construed as such and should not be given a construction that changes its meaning. Petitioners' own
interpretation and application of the verba legis rule will in fact result in an absurdity, which legal
construction strictly abhors.

GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and IMELDA SALAZAR, respondents

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 G.R. No. 82511 March 3, 1992

Facts:

Private Respondent, Imelda Salazar a systems analyst of GMCRC (petitioner) was suspended for her
failure to disclose and notify the company of the allegations against her roommate, Delfin Salvidar
(Manager for Technical Operations).

Petitioner GMCR, prompted by reports that company equipment and spare parts worth thousands of
dollars under the custody of Saldivar were missing, caused the investigation of the latter's activities. The
report dated September 25, 1984 prepared by the company's internal auditor, Mr. Agustin Maramara,
indicated that Saldivar had entered into a partnership styled Concave Commercial and Industrial Company
with Richard A. Yambao, owner and manager of Elecon Engineering Services (Elecon), a supplier of
petitioner often recommended by Saldivar. The report also disclosed that Saldivar had taken petitioner's
missing Fedders airconditioning unit for his own personal use without authorization and also connived
with Yambao to defraud petitioner of its property. The airconditioner was recovered only after petitioner
GMCR filed an action for replevin against Saldivar.

The company placed Salazar under preventive suspension for one month giving her 30 days within which
to, explain her side. But instead of submitting an explanation, she filed a complaint against petitioner for
illegal suspension, which she subsequently amended to include illegal dismissal, vacation and sick leave
benefits, 13th month pay and damages, after petitioner notified her in writing that she was considered
dismissed "in view of inability to refute and disprove the findings.”

The Labor Arbiter ordered GMCR to reinstate Salazar to her former or equivalent position and to pay her
full backwages and other benefits she would have received were it not for the illegal dismissal including
payment of moral damages. On appeal, NLRC affirmed the aforesaid decision with respect to the
reinstatement but limited the backwages to a period of two (2) years and deleted the award for moral
damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Labor Tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the suspension
and subsequent dismissal of private respondent was illegal and in ordering her reinstatement with two
(2) years' back wages?

HELD:

NO. The assailed resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated
December 29, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner GMCR is ordered to REINSTATE private
respondent Imelda Salazar and to pay her backwages equivalent to her salary for a period of two
(2) years only

RATIO:

It was held by the court that the preventive suspension was lawful. It does not signify that the company
has adjudged the employee guilty of the charges she was asked to answer and explain. Such disciplinary
measure is resorted to for the protection of the company's property pending investigation any alleged

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malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee. GMCR had not violated Salazar's right to due
process when she was promptly suspended. If at all, the fault, lay with private respondent when she
ignored petitioner's "giving her ample opportunity to present (her) side to the Management." Instead, she
went directly to the Labor Department and filed her complaint for illegal suspension without giving her
employer a chance to evaluate her side of the controversy.

While loss of confidence or breach of trust is a valid ground for terminations it must rest on some basis
which must be convincingly established. An employee should not be dismissed on mere presumptions and
suppositions. GMCR "presumed reasonably that complainant's sympathy would be with Saldivar" and its
averment that Saldivar's investigation although unverified, was probably true, do not pass this Court's
test. While we should not condone the acts of disloyalty of an employee, neither should we dismiss him
on the basis of suspicion derived from speculative inferences. The report merely insinuated that in view
of Salazar's special relationship with Saldivar, she might have had direct knowledge of Saldivar's
questionable activities. Direct evidence implicating private respondent is wanting from the records.

Also, the report is one–sided since it came out after Saldivar had already resigned and he does not have
the opportunity to refute management's findings. Since the main evidence dealt principally on the
alleged culpability of Saldivar and without having had a chance to voice his, stringent examination
should have been carried out to ascertain if there existed independent legal grounds to hold Salazar
answerable as well and, thereby, justify her dismissal.

But while the court agrees with the propriety of Salazar's preventive suspension, it held that her
eventual separation from employment was not for cause.

Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:

Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of
an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their
monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the
time of his actual reinstatement.
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code:

Sec. 2. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employments, the employer shall not terminate the
services of an employee except for a just cause as provided in the Labor Code or when authorized
by existing laws.
Sec. 3. Reinstatement. — An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall by entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to backwages."

There being no evidence to show an authorized, much less a legal, cause for the dismissal of private
respondent, she had every right, not only to be entitled to reinstatement, but as well, to full backwages”.
The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement and payment of backwages
is, in the former, to restore the dismissed employee to her status before she lost her job, for the dictionary
meaning of the word "reinstate" is "to restore to a state, condition, positions etc. from which one had
been removed" and in the latter, to give her back the income lost during the period of unemployment.
Both remedies, looking to the past, would perforce make her "whole."

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 Reasons advanced by the Court for denying reinstatement under the facts of the case and the law
applicable thereto; that reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the long passage of time or
because of the realities of the situation; or that it would be "inimical to the employer's interest; " or that
reinstatement may no longer be feasible; or, that it will not serve the best interests of the parties
involved; or that the company would be prejudiced by the workers' continued employment; or that it
will not serve any prudent purpose as when supervening facts have transpired which make execution on
that score unjust or inequitable or, to an increasing extent, due to the resultant atmosphere of "antipathy
and antagonism" or "strained relations" or "irretrievable estrangement" between the employer and the
employee.

The principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied indiscriminately. Otherwise, reinstatement can
never be possible simply because some hostility is invariably engendered between the parties as a result
of litigation. That is human nature.

No strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of asserting one's right; otherwise an
employee who shall assert his right could be easily separated from the service, by merely paying his
separation pay on the pretext that his relationship with his employer had already become strained.

It should be proved that the employee concerned occupies a position where he enjoys the trust and
confidence of his employer; and that it is likely that if reinstated, an atmosphere of antipathy and
antagonism may be generated as to adversely affect the efficiency and productivity of the employee
concerned.

It has not been proved that the position of private respondent is one that may be characterized as a
position of trust and confidence. As a systems analyst, Salazar was very far removed from operations
involving the procurement of supplies. Salazar's duties revolved around the development of systems and
analysis of designs on a continuing basis. In other words, Salazar did not occupy a position of trust relative
to the approval and purchase of supplies and company assets.

FELICITO BASBACIO, petitioner

vs.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FRANKLIN DRILON in his capacity as Secretary of
Justice, respondent.

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 G.R. No. 109445 November 7, 1994

FACTS:

Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were convicted of frustrated
murder and of two counts of frustrated murder for a land dispute. Both were sentenced to
imprisonment and ordered immediately detained after their bonds had been cancelled.

Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. However, only Basbacio’s appeal proceeded to judgment, as the
appeal of the other accused was dismissed for failure to file his brief

The Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting petitioner on the ground that the prosecution failed
to prove conspiracy between him and his son-in-law. Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under
RA No. 7309, Sec. 3(a), which provides for the payment of compensation to “any person who was unjustly
accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal.” The claim
was filed with the Board of Claims of the Department of Justice, but the claim was denied on the ground
that while petitioner’s presence at the scene of the killing was not sufficient to find him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, yet, considering that there was bad blood between him and the deceased as a result
of a land dispute and the fact that the convicted murderer is his son-in-law, there was basis for finding
that he was “probably guilty.” Petitioner brought this petition for review on certiorari as a special civil
action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled of the claim payment of compensation under R.A. No. 7309

HELD:

NO. the petition is DISMISSED.

RATIO:

The court held that Petitioner's contention has no merit as it would require that every time an accused is
acquitted on appeal he must be given compensation on the theory that he was "unjustly convicted" by
the trial court. Such a reading of sec. 3(a) is contrary to petitioner's professed canon of construction that
when the language of the statute is clear it should be given its natural meaning. It leaves out of the
provision in question the qualifying word "unjustly" so that the provision would simply read: "The
following may file claims for compensation before the Board: (a) any person who was accused, convicted,
imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal."

RA No. 7309, Sec. 3(a), which provides for the payment of compensation to “any person who was unjustly
accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal” does not
refer solely to an unjust conviction as a result of which the accused is unjustly imprisoned, but, in addition,
to an unjust accusation. The accused must have been "unjustly accused, in consequence of which he is
unjustly convicted and then imprisoned. It is important to note this because if from its inception the
prosecution of the accused has been wrongful, his conviction by the court is, in all probability, also
wrongful. Conversely, if the prosecution is not malicious any conviction even though based on less than
the required quantum of proof in criminal cases may be erroneous but not necessarily unjust.

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To say then that an accused has been "unjustly convicted" has to do with the manner of his conviction
rather than with his innocence. An accused may on appeal be acquitted because he did not commit the
crime, but that does not necessarily mean that he is entitled to compensation for having been the victim
of an "unjust conviction." If his conviction was due to an error in the appreciation of the evidence the
conviction while erroneous is not unjust. That is why it is not, on the other hand, correct to say as does
respondent, that under the law liability for compensation depends entirely on the innocence of the
accused.

CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, Petitioner

vs.

DANILO T. BOLOS, Respondent

G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010

FACTS:

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On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as JDRC No.
6211. After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment. A copy of said decision was
received by respondent Danilo and he thereafter timely filed the Notice of Appeal.

The RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure to file the required motion for reconsideration
or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages. After such, the RTC issued the order declaring its decision declaring the
marriage null and void as final and executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by
Cynthia.

Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the
orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction, to wit: 1) the September 19, 2006 Order which denied due course to Danilo’s appeal; 2) the
November 23, 2006 Order which denied the motion to reconsider the September 19, 2006 Order; and 3)
the January 16, 2007 Order which declared the August 2, 2006 decision as final and executory. Danilo also
prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to render the essential marital obligations to
Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family home and their children.

The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC declaring the nullity
of marriage as final and executory. The appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion for
reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the
marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took
effect.

Petitioner sought that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized before the
effectivity of the Family Code. According to petitioner, the phrase “under the Family Code” in A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC refers to the word “petitions” rather than to the word “marriages.” Such that petitions filed
after the effectivity of the Family Code are governed by the A.M. No. even if the marriage was solemnized
before the same. Danilo, in his Comment, counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable because
his marriage with Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980, years before its effectivity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled “Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,” is applicable to the case.

HELD:

No. Court finds the petition is devoid of merit.

RATIO:

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The petitioner’s stance is unavailing. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on
March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:

“Section 1. Scope.—This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages
and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.”

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only
to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3,
1988.7 The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those
solemnized under the Civil Code.8 The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation
that the phrase “under the Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word “petitions” rather
than to the word “marriages.”

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity,
there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application. As the statute is
clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the
maxim, index animi sermo, or "speech is the index of intention." Furthermore, there is the maxim verba
legis non est recedendum, or "from the words of a statute there should be no departure."

In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision which denied due course
to respondent’s appeal and denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration.

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