2. ID.; ID.; ID.
— A quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana" is a separate legal
Concept of Quasi-delict; Elements (full)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 48006. July 8, 1942.]
FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner, vs. SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA
ALMARIO, respondents.
Celedonio P. Gloria and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Jose G. Advincula for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. DAMAGES; QUASI-DELICT OR "CULPA AQUILIANA"; PRIMARY AND DIRECT
RESPONSIBILITY OF EMPLOYERS UNDER ARTICLES 1902-1910 OF THE CIVIL
CODE. — A head-on collision between a taxi and a carretela resulted in the
death of a 16-year-old boy, one of the passengers of the carretela. A criminal
action was filed against the taxi driver and he was convicted and sentenced
accordingly. The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the right
to bring a separate civil action be reserved. Thereafter the parents of the
deceased brought suit for damages against the proprietor of the taxi, the
employer of the taxi driver, under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Defendant
contended that his liability was governed by the Revised Penal Code,
according to which his responsibility was only secondary, but no civil action
had been brought against the taxi driver. Held: That this separate civil action
lies, the employer being primarily and directly responsible in damages under
articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code.
institution under the Civil Code, with a substantivity all its own, and
individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime.
Upon this principle, and on the wording and spirit of article 1903 of the Civil
Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be safely
anchored.
3. ID.; ID.; ID. — The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-
contractual looms clear and unmistakable. This legal institution is of ancient
lineage, one of its early ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Law. In
fact, in Spanish legal terminology, this responsibility is often referred to
as culpa aquiliana. The Partidas also contributed to the genealogy of the
present fault or negligence under the Civil Code: for instance, Law 6, Title 15,
of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es de fazer emienda, porque, como quier que el
non fizo a sabiendas el daño al otro, pero acaescio por su culpa."
4. ID.; ID.; ID. — The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil
Code. According to article 1089, one of the five sources of obligations is this
legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extra- contractual: "los actos . . . en
que intervenga cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia." Then article 1093
provides that this kind of obligation shall be governed by Chapter II of Title
XVI of Book IV, meaning articles 1902-1910. This portion of the Civil Code is
exclusively devoted to the legal institution of culpa aquiliana.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISTINCTION BETWEEN CRIMES UNDER THE PENAL CODE AND
THE "CULPA AQUILIANA" OR "CUASI-DELITO" UNDER THE CIVIL CODE. — A
distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the
responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent
act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under
article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito
or culpa extra-contractualunder articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Plaintiffs
1
were free to choose which remedy to enforce. Some of the differences
between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-
delito under the Civil Code are enumerated in the decision.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; OPINIONS OF JURISTS. — The decision sets out extracts from
opinions of jurists on the separate existence of cuasi- delicts and the
employer's primary and direct liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; SENTENCES OF THE SUPREME TRIBUNAL OF SPAIN. — The
decision cites sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain upholding the
principles above set forth: that a cuasi-delict or culpa extra- contractual is a
separate and distinct legal institution, independent from the civil
responsibility arising from criminal liability, and that an employer is, under
article 1903 of the Civil Code, primarily and directly responsible for the
negligent acts of his employee.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; DECISIONS OF THIS COURT. — Decisions of this Court are also
cited holding that, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-
delitoor culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly
recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer
could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which,
after such a conviction, he could have been sued for his civil liability arising
from his crime.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; FOUNDATIONS OF DOCTRINES ABOVE SET FORTH; LITERAL
MEANING OF THE LAW. — The Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless
but also simple negligence; if it should be held that articles 1902-1910, Civil
Code, apply only to negligence not punishable by law, culpa aquiliana would
have very little application in actual life. The literal meaning of the law will
not be used to smother a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown
development as culpa aquiliana.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DEGREE OF PROOF. — There are numerous cases of
criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but
can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, defendant can
and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910,
Civil Code. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXPEDITIOUS REMEDY. — The primary and direct
responsibility of employer under article 1903, Civil Code, is more likely to
facilitate remedy for civil wrongs. Such primary and direct responsibility of
employers is calculated to protect society.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRACTICE OF RELYING SOLELY ON CIVIL RESPONSIBILITY
FOR A CRIME. — The harm done by such practice is pointed out, and the
principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq., of
the Civil Code is restored to its full vigor.
DECISION
BOCOBO, J p:
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner
herein, Fausto Barredo, liable in damages for the death of
Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver
employed by said Fausto Barredo.
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between
Malabon and Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision
between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a
carretela guided by Pedro Dimapilis. The carretela was overturned, and one of
its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which
he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to an
2
indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision
correccional. The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the right
to bring a separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. Severino Garciaand Timotea
Almario, parents of the deceased, on March 7, 1939, brought an action in the
Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor
of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the
Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs
for P2,000 plus legal interest from the date of the complaint. This decision
was modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the damages to P1,000
with legal interest from the time the action was instituted. It is undisputed
that Fontanilla's negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he was driving on
the wrong side of the road, and at high speed. As to Barredo's responsibility,
the Court of Appeals found:
". . . It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is no proof
that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage. (See p. 22, appellant's brief.) In fact it is shown he was careless in
employing Fontanilla who had been caught several times for violation of the
Automobile Law and speeding (Exhibit A) — violations which appeared in the
records of the Bureau of Public Works available to the public and to himself.
Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of
the Civil Code."
The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is
governed by the Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and
as there has been no civil action against Pedro Fontanilla, the person
criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held responsible in this case. The
petitioner's brief states on page 10:
". . . The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his failure
to exercise all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of Pedro Fontanilla to prevent damages suffered by the
respondents. In other words, the Court of Appeals insists on applying in this
case article 1903 of the Civil Code. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is found in
Chapter II, Title 16, Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact makes said article
inapplicable to a civil liability arising from a crime as in the case at bar simply
because Chapter II of Title 16 of Book IV of the Civil Code, in the precise
words of article 1903 of the Civil Code itself, is applicable only to "those
(obligations) arising from wrongful or negligent acts or omissions not
punishable by law.'"
The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:
". . . We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability sought to be
imposed upon him in this action is not a civil obligation arising from a felony
or a misdemeanor (the crime of Pedro Fontanilla), but an obligation imposed
in article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in the selection or
supervision of his servant or employee."
The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this
separate civil action against Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and
directly responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of
Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant maintains that Fontanilla's negligence being
punishable by the Penal Code, his (defendant's) liability as an employer is only
subsidiary, according to said Penal Code, but Fontanilla has not been sued in a
civil action and his property has not been exhausted. To decide the main
issue, we must cut through the tangle that has, in the minds of many,
confused and jumbled together delitosand cuasi delitos, or crimes under the
Penal Code and fault or negligence under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
This should be done, because justice may be lost in a labyrinth, unless
3
principles and remedies are distinctly envisaged. Fortunately, we are aided in
our inquiry by the luminous presentation of this perplexing subject by renown
jurists and we are likewise guided by the decisions of this Court in previous
cases as well as by the solemn clarity of the considerations in several
sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain.
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana" is a
separate legal institution under the Civil Code, with a substantivity all its own,
and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime.
Upon this principle, and on the wording and spirit of article 1903 of the Civil
Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be safely
anchored.
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are as
follows:
CIVIL CODE
"ART. 1089. Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi- contracts,
and from acts and omissions which are unlawful or in which any kind of fault
or negligence intervenes."
xxx xxx xxx
"ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall be
governed by the provisions of the Penal Code.
"ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or
negligence, not punishable by law, intervenes shall be subject to the
provisions of Chapter II, Title XVI of this book."
xxx xxx xxx
"ART. 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another
by his fault or negligence shall be liable for the damage so done.
"ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is
enforcible, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom another is responsible.
"The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for
any damages caused by the minor children who live with them.
"Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated persons
subject to their authority and living with them.
"Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for
any damages caused by their employees while engaged in the branch of the
service in which employed, or on occasion of the performance of their duties.
"The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special agent,
but not if the damage shall have been caused by the official upon whom
properly devolved the duty of doing the act performed, in which case the
provisions of the next preceding article shall be applicable.
"Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages
caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.
"The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons
mentioned therein prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent the damage.".
"Art. 1904.Any person who pays for damage caused by his employees may
recover from the latter what he may have paid.".
REVISED PENAL CODE
4
"Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. — Every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
"Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The exemption
from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12
and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption
from civil liability, which shall be enforced subject to the following rules:
"First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability for acts
committed by any imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine
years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has
acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person
under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no
fault or negligence on their part.
"Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his
authority, legal guardianship, or control, or if such person be insolvent, said
insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting
property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law.
"Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the persons for
whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in
proportion to the benefit which they may have received.
"The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate
amount for which each one shall be liable.
"When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even
approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the Government, or to
the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the
damage has been caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents,
indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or
regulations.
"Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons
using violence or causing the fear shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or,
if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always
to the latter that part of their property exempt from execution.
"ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and
proprietors of establishment. — In default of persons criminally liable,
innkeepers, tavern keepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be
civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a
violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation
shall have been committed by them or their employees.
"Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by
robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for the
payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in
advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the
deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the
directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them
with respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall
attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons
unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.
"ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The subsidiary liability
established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers,
teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for
felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or
employees in the discharge of their duties."
5
xxx xxx xxx
"ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless
imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period; if it would
have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.
"Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act
which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty
of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have
constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
period shall be imposed."
It will thus be seen that while the terms of article 1902 of the Civil Code seem
to be broad enough to cover the driver's negligence in the instant case,
nevertheless article 1093 limits cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions "not
punishable by law." But inasmuch as article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
punishes not only reckless but even simple imprudence or negligence, the
fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently been
crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the "confusion worse
confounded." However, a closer study shows that such a concurrence of
scope in regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction between
the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-
delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing damages
may produce civil liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-
contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and
unmistakable. This legal institution is of ancient lineage, one of its early
ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Law. In fact, in Spanish legal
terminology, this responsibility is often referred to as culpa aquiliana. The
Partidas also contributed to the genealogy of the present fault or negligence
under the Civil Code, for instance, Law 6, Title 15, of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo
es de fazer emienda, porque, como quier que el non fizo a sabiendas el daño
al otro, pero acaescio por su culpa."
The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to
article 1089, one of the five sources of obligations is this legal institution
of cuasi-delito or culpa extra- contractual: "los actos . . . en que intervenga
cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia." Then article 1093 provides that this
kind of obligation shall be governed by Chapter II of Title XVI of Book IV,
meaning articles 1902-1910. This portion of the Civil Code is exclusively
devoted to the legal institution of culpa aquiliana.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:.
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private
concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act,
while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are
punished only if there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the
latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any kind of fault or negligence
intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all violations of the penal
law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of
6
ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when
nobody is hurt. (See Colin and Capitant, "Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil,"
Vol. 3, p. 728.).
Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of quasi-
delicts and the employer's primary and direct liability under article 1903 of
the Civil Code.
Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsabilidad" in the "Enciclopedia
Juridica Española" (Vol. XXVII, p. 414) says:
"El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca diversos aspectos y
comprende a diferentes personas. Asi, existe una responsabilidad civil
propiamente dicha, que en ningun caso lleva aparejada responsabilidad
criminal alguna, y otra que es consecuencia indeclinable de la penal que nace
de todo delito o falta."
"The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects and comprises
different persons. Thus, there is a civil responsibility, properly speaking, which
in no case carries with it any criminal responsibility, and another which is a
necessary consequence of the penal liability as a result of every felony or
misdemeanor."
Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following case: There
had been a collision between two trains belonging respectively to the
Ferrocarril Cantabrico and the Ferrocarril del Norte. An employee of the latter
had been prosecuted in a criminal case, in which the company had been
made a party as subsidiarily responsible in civil damages. The employee had
been acquitted in the criminal case, and the employer, the Ferrocarril del
Norte, had also been exonerated. The question asked was whether the
Ferrocarril Cantabrico could still bring a civil action for damages against the
Ferrocarril del Norte. Maura's opinion was in the affirmative, stating in part
(Maura, Dictamenes, Vol. 6, pp. 511-513):
"Quedando las cosas asi, a proposito de la realidad pura y neta de los hechos,
todavia menos parece sostenible que exista cosa juzgada acerca de la
obligacion civil de indemnizar los quebrantos y menoscabos inferidos por el
choque de los trenes. El titulo en que se funda la accion para demandar el
resarcimiento, no puede confundirse con las responsabilidades civiles nacidas
de delito, siquiera exista en este, sea el cual sea, una culpa rodeada de notas
agravatorias que motivan sanciones penales, mas o menos severas. La lesion
causada por delito o falta en los derechos civiles, requiere restituciones,
reparaciones o indemnizaciones, que cual la pena misma atañen al orden
publico; por tal motivo vienen encomendadas, de ordinario, al Ministerio
Fiscal; y claro es que si por esta via se enmiendan los quebrantos y
menoscabos, el agraviado excusa procurar el ya conseguido desagravio; pero
esta eventual coincidencia de los efectos, no borra la diversidad originaria de
las acciones civiles para pedir indemnizacion.
"Estas, para el caso actual (prescindiendo de culpas contractuales, que no
vendrian a cuento y que tienen otro regimen), dimanan, segun el articulo
1902 del Codigo Civil, de toda accion u omision, causante de daños o
perjuicios, en que intervenga culpa o negligencia. Es trivial que acciones
semejantes son ejercitadas ante los Tribunales de lo civil cotidianamente, sin
que la Justicia punitiva tenga que mezclarse en los asuntos. Los articulos 18 al
21 y 121 al 128 del Codigo Penal, atentos al espiritu y a los fines sociales y
politicos del mismo, desenvuelven y ordenan la materia de responsabilidades
civiles nacidas de delito, en terminos separados del regimen por ley comun de
la culpa que se denomina aquiliana, por alusion a precedentes legislativos
del Corpus Juris. Seria intempestivo un paralelo entre aquellas ordenaciones,
7
y la de la obligacion de indemnizar a titulo de culpa civil; pero viene al caso y
es necesaria una de las diferenciaciones que en el tal paralelo se notarian.
"Los articulos 20 y 21 del Codigo Penal, despues de distribuir a su modo las
responsabilidades civiles, entre los que sean por diversos conceptos culpables
del delito o falta, las hacen extensivas a las empresas y los establecimientos al
servicio de los cuales estan los delincuentes; pero con caracter subsidiario, o
sea, segun el texto literal, en defecto de los que sean responsables
criminalmente. No coincide en ello el Codigo Civil, cuyo articulo 1903, dice; La
obligacion que impone el articulo anterior es exigible, no solo por los actos y
omisiones propios, sino por los de aquellas personas de quienes se debe
responder; personas en la enumeracion de las cuales figuran los dependientes
y empleados de los establecimientos o empresas, sea por actos del servicio,
sea con ocasion de sus funciones. Por esto acontece, y se observa en la
jurisprudencia, que las empresas, despues de intervenir en las causas
criminales con el caracter subsidiario de su responsabilidad civil por razon del
delito, son demandadas y condenadas directa y aisladamente, cuando se
trata de la obligacion, ante los tribunales civiles.
"Siendo como se ve, diverso el titulo de esta obligacion, y formando
verdadero postulado de nuestro regimen judicial la separacion entre justicia
punitiva y tribunales de lo civil, de suerte que tienen unos y otros normas de
fondo en distintos cuerpos legales, y diferentes modos de proceder,
habiendose por añadidura, abstenido de asistir al juicio criminal la Compañia
del Ferrocarril Cantabrico, que se reservo ejercitar sus acciones, parece
innegable que la de indemnizacion por los daños y perjuicios que le irrogo el
choque, no estuvo sub judice ante el Tribunal del Jurado, ni fue sentenciada,
sino que permanecio intacta, al pronunciarse el fallo de 21 de marzo. Aun
cuando el veredicto no hubiese sido de inculpabilidad, mostrose mas arriba,
que tal accion quedaba legitimamente reservada para despues del proceso;
pero al declararse que no existio delito, ni responsabilidad dimanada de
delito, materia unica sobre que tenian jurisdiccion aquellos juzgadores, se
redobla el motivo para la obligacion civil ex lege, y se patentiza mas y mas que
la accion para pedir su cumplimiento permanece incolume, extraña a la cosa
juzgada."
"As things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of the facts, it seems
less tenable that there should be res judicata with regard to the civil
obligation for damages on account of the losses caused by the collision of the
trains. The title upon which the action for reparation is based cannot be
confused with the civil responsibilities born of a crime, because there exists in
the latter, whatever each nature, a culpa surrounded with aggravating
aspects which give rise to penal measures that are more or less severe. The
injury caused by a felony or misdemeanor upon civil rights requires
restitutions, reparations, or indemnifications which, like the penalty itself,
affect public order; for this reason, they are ordinarily entrusted to the office
of the prosecuting attorney; and it is clear that if by this means the losses and
damages are repaired, the injured party no longer desires to seek another
relief; but this coincidence of effects does not eliminate the peculiar nature of
civil actions to ask for indemnity.
"Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to contractual faults
which are not pertinent and belong to another scope) are derived, according
to article 1902 of the Civil Code, from every act or omission causing losses
and damages in which culpa or negligence intervenes. It is unimportant that
such actions are every day filed before the civil courts without the criminal
courts interfering therewith. Articles 18 to 21 and 121 to 128 of the Penal
Code, bearing in mind the spirit and the social and political purposes of that
Code, develop and regulate the matter of civil responsibilities arising from a
crime, separately from the regime under common law, of culpa which is
8
known as aquiliana, in accordance with legislative precedent of the Corpus
Juris. It would be unwarranted to make a detailed comparison between the
former provisions and that regarding the obligation to indemnify on account
of civil culpa; but it is pertinent and necessary to point out to one of such
differences.
"Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distributing in their own way the
civil responsibilities among those who, for different reasons, are guilty of
felony or misdemeanor, make such civil responsibilities applicable to
enterprises and establishments for which the guilty parties render service,
but with subsidiary character, that is to say, according to the wording of the
Penal Code, in default of those who are criminally responsible. In this regard,
the Civil Code does not coincide because article 1903 says: 'The obligation
imposed by the next preceding article is demandable, not only for personal
acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is
responsible.' Among the persons enumerated are the subordinates and
employees of establishments or enterprises, either for acts during their
service or on the occasion of their functions. It is for this reason that it
happens, and it is so observed in judicial decisions, that the companies or
enterprises, after taking part in the criminal cases because of their subsidiary
civil responsibility by reason of the crime, are sued and
sentenced directly and separately with regard to theobligation, before the
civil courts.
"Seeing that the title of this obligation is different, and the separation
between punitive justice and the civil courts being a true postulate of our
judicial system, so that they have different fundamental norms in different
codes, as well as different modes of procedure, and inasmuch as the
Compañia del Ferrocarril Cantabrico has abstained from taking part in the
criminal case and has reserved the right to exercise its actions, it seems
undeniable that the action for indemnification for the loses and damages
caused to it by the collision was not sub judice before the Tribunal del
Jurado, nor was it the subject of a sentence, but it remained intact when the
decision of March 21 was rendered. Even if the verdict had not been that of
acquittal, it has already been shown that such action had been legitimately
reserved till after the criminal prosecution; but because of the declaration of
the non-existence of the felony and the non- existence of the responsibility
arising from the crime, which was the sole subject matter upon which
the Tribunal del Jurado had jurisdiction, there is greater reason for the civil
obligation ex lege, and it becomes clearer that the action for its enforcement
remain intact and is not res judicata."
Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil
Code, on which the Spanish Civil Code is largely based and whose provisions
on cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual are similar to those of the Spanish
Civil Code, says, referring to article 1384 of the French Civil Code which
corresponds to article 1903, Spanish Civil Code:
"The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for
another), without including the author of the act. The action against the
principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial
act committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary in the sense that it
can not be instituted till after the judgment against the author of the act or at
least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; the action for responsibility
(of the employer) is in itself a principal action." (Laurent, Principles of French
Civil Law, Spanish translation, Vol. 20, pp. 734-735.)
Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp. 429,
430), declares that the responsibility of the employer is principal and not
subsidiary. He writes:
9
"Cuestion 1. La responsabilidad declarada en el articulo 1903 por las acciones
u omisiones de aquellas personas por las que se debe responder, es
subsidiaria? es principal? Para contestar a esta pregunta es necesario saber,
en primer lugar, en que se funda el precepto legal. Es que realmente se
impone una responsabilidad por una falta ajena? Asi parece a primera vista;
pero semejante afirmacion seria contraria a la justicia y a la maxima universal,
segun la que las faltas son personales, y cada uno responde de aquellas que le
son imputables. La responsabilidad de que tratamos se impone con ocasion
de un delito o culpa, pero no por causa de ellos, sino por causa del cuasi
delito, esto es, de la imprudencia o de la negligencia del padre, del tutor, del
dueño o director del establecimiento, del maestro, etc. Cuando cualquiera de
las personas que enumera el articulo citado (menores de edad, incapacitados,
dependientes, aprendices) causan un daño, la ley presume que el padre, el
tutor, el maestro, etc., han cometido una falta de negligencia para prevenir o
evitar el daño. Esta falta es la que la ley castiga. No hay, pues, responsabilidad
por un hecho ajeno, sino en la apariencia; en realidad la responsabilidad se
exige por un hecho propio. La idea de que esa responsabilidad sea subsidiaria
es, por lo tanto, completamente inadmisible."
"Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for the acts or
omissions of those persons for whom one is responsible, subsidiary or
principal? In order to answer this question it is necessary to know, in the first
place, on what the legal provision is based. Is it true that there is a
responsibility for the fault of another person? It seems so at first sight; but
such assertion would be contrary to justice and to the universal maxim that
all faults are personal, and that everyone is liable for those faults that can be
imputed to him. The responsibility in question is imposed on the occasion of a
crime or fault, but not because of the same, but because of the cuasi-
delito, that is to say, the imprudence or negligence of the father, guardian,
proprietor or manager of the establishment, of the teacher, etc. Whenever
anyone of the persons enumerated in the article referred to (minors,
incapacitated persons, employees, apprentices) causes any damage, the law
presumes that the father, guardian, teacher, etc. have committed an act of
negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. It is this fault that is
condemned by the law. It is, therefore, only apparent that there is a
responsibility for the act of another; in reality the responsibility exacted is for
one's own act. The idea that such responsibility is subsidiary is, therefore,
completely inadmissible."
Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia, Referentes al
Codigo Civil Español," says in Vol. VII, p. 743:
"Es decir, no se responde de hechos ajenos, porque se responde solo de su
propia culpa, doctrina del articulo 1902; mas por excepcion, se responde de la
ajena respecto de aquellas personas con las que media algun nexo o vinculo,
que motiva o razona la responsabilidad. Esta responsabilidad, es directa o es
subsidiaria? En el orden penal, el Codigo de esta clase distingue entre
menores e incapacitados y los demas, declarando directa la primera (articulo
19) y subsidiaria la segunda (articulos 20 y 21); pero en el orden civil, en el
caso del articulo 1903, ha de entenderse directa, por el tenor del articulo que
impone la responsabilidad precisamente por los actos de aquellas personas
de quienes se deba responder.'"
"That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is
liable only for his own faults, this being the doctrine of article 1902; but, by
exception, one is liable for the acts of those persons with whom there is a
bond or tie which gives rise to the responsibility. Is this responsibility direct or
subsidiary? In the order of the penal law, the Penal Code distinguishes
between minors and incapacitated persons on the one hand, and other
persons on the other, declaring that the responsibility for the former is direct
(article 19), and for the latter, subsidiary (articles 20 and 21); but in the
10
scheme of the civil law, in the case of article 1903, the responsibility should
be understood as direct, according to the tenor of that article, for precisely it
imposes responsibility 'for the acts of those persons for whom one should be
responsible."
Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court
has upheld the principles above set forth: that a quasi- delict or culpa extra-
contractual is a separate and distinct legal institution, independent from the
civil responsibility arising from criminal liability, and that an employer is,
under article 1903 of the Civil Code, primarily and directly responsible for the
negligent acts of his employee.
One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of October 21,
1910. In that case, Ramon Lafuente died as the result of having been run over
by a street car owned by the "Compañia Electrica Madrileña de Traccion." The
conductor was prosecuted in a criminal case but he was acquitted.
Thereupon, the widow filed a civil action against the street car company,
praying for damages in the amount of 15,000 pesetas. The lower court
awarded damages; so the company appealed to the Supreme Tribunal,
alleging violation of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code because by final
judgment the non-existence of fault or negligence had been declared. The
Supreme Court of Spain dismissed the appeal, saying:.
"Considerando que el primer motivo del recurso se funda en el equivocado
supuesto de que el Tribunal a quo, al condenar a la Compañia Electrica
Madrileña al pago del daño causado con la muerte de Ramon Lafuente
Izquierdo, desconoce el valor y efectos juridicos de la sentencia absolutoria
dictada en la causa criminal que se siguio por el mismo hecho, cuando es lo
cierto que de este han conocido las dos jurisdicciones bajo diferentes
aspectos, y como la de lo criminal declaro dentro de los limites de su
competencia que el hecho de que se trata no era constitutivo de delito por no
haber mediado descuido o negligencia graves, lo que no excluye, siendo este
el unico fundamento del fallo absolutorio, el concurso de la culpa o
negligencia no calificadas, fuente de obligaciones civiles segun el articulo
1902 del Codigo Civil, y que alcanzan, segun el 1903, entre otras personas, a
los Directores de establecimientos o empresas por los daños causados por sus
dependientes en determinadas condiciones, es manifiesto que la de lo civil, al
conocer del mismo hecho bajo este ultimo aspecto y al condenar a la
Compañia recurrente a la indemnizacion del daño causado por uno de sus
empleados, lejos de infringir los mencionados textos, en relacion con el
articulo 116 de la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal, se ha atenido estrictamente
a ellos, sin invadir atribuciones ajenas a su jurisdiccion propia, ni contrariar en
lo mas minimo el fallo recaido en la causa."
"Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on the mistaken
supposition that the trial court, in sentencing the Compañia Madrileña to the
payment of the damage caused by the death of Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo,
disregards the value and juridical effects of the sentence of acquittal
rendered in the criminal case instituted on account of the same act, when it is
a fact that the two jurisdictions had taken cognizance of the same act in its
different aspects, and as the criminal jurisdiction declared within the limits of
its authority that the act in question did not constitute a felony because there
was no grave carelessness or negligence, and this being the only basis of
acquittal, it does not exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence which is
not qualified, and is a source of civil obligations according to article 1902 of
the Civil Code, affecting, in accordance with article 1903, among other
persons, the managers of establishments or enterprises by reason of the
damages caused by employees under certain conditions, it is manifest
that the civil jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the same act in this latter
aspect and in ordering the company, appellant herein, to pay an indemnity for
the damage caused by one of its employees, far from violating said legal
11
provisions, in relation with article 116 of the Law of Criminal
Procedure, strictly followed the same, without invading attributes which are
beyond its own jurisdiction, and without in any way contradicting the decision
in that cause." (Italics supplied.).
It will be noted, as to the case just cited:
First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or with
the street car company. This is precisely what happens in the present case:
the driver, Fontanilla, has not been sued in a civil action, either alone or with
his employer.
Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal negligence,
but the Supreme Tribunal of Spain said that this did not exclude the co-
existence of fault or negligence, which is not qualified, on the part of the
conductor, under article 1902 of the Civil Code. In the present case, the taxi
driver was found guilty of criminal negligence, so that if he had even sued for
his civil responsibility arising from the crime, he would have been held
primarily liable for civil damages, andBarredo would have been held
subsidiarily liable for the same. But the plaintiffs are directly suing Barredo,
on his primary responsibility because of his own presumed negligence —
which he did not overcome — under article 1903. Thus, there were two
liabilities of Barredo: first, the subsidiary one because of the civil liability of
the taxi driver arising from the latter's criminal negligence; and,
second, Barredo's primary liability as an employer under article 1903. The
plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take, and they preferred the
second remedy. In so doing, they were acting within their rights. It might be
observed in passing, that the plaintiffs chose the more expeditious and
effective method of relief, because Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just
been released, and besides, he was probably without property which might
be seized in enforcing any judgment against him for damages.
Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the
employer was held liable civilly, notwithstanding the acquittal of the
employee (the conductor) in a previous criminal case, with greater reason
should Barredo, the employer in the case at bar, be held liable for damages in
a civil suit filed against him because his taxi driver had been convicted. The
degree of negligence of the conductor in the Spanish case cited was less than
that of the taxi driver, Fontanilla, because the former was acquitted in the
previous criminal case while the latter was found guilty of criminal negligence
and was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to
two years of prision correccional.
(See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is similar to the one above
quoted.).
In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated February 14, 1919, an
action was brought against a railroad company for damages because the
station agent, employed by the company, had unjustly and fraudulently,
refused to deliver certain articles consigned to the plaintiff. The Supreme
Court of Spain held that this action was properly under article 1902 of the
Civil Code, the court saying:
"Considerando que la sentencia discutida reconoce, en virtud de los hechos
que consigna con relacion a las pruebas del pleito: 1.°, que las expediciones
facturadas por la compañia ferroviaria a la consignacion del actor de las
vasijas vacias que en su demanda relacionan tenian como fin el que este las
devolviera a sus remitentes con vinos y alcoholes; 2.°, que llegadas a su
destino tales mercancias no se quisieron entregar a dicho consignatario por el
jefe de la estacion sin motivo justificado y con intencion dolosa, y 3.°, que la
falta de entrega de estas expediciones al tiempo de reclamarlas el
demandante le originaron daños y perjuicios en cantidad de bastante
importancia como expendedor al por mayor que era de vinos y alcoholes por
12
las ganancias que dejo de obtener al verse privado de servir los pedidos que
se le habian hecho por los remitentes en los envases:
"Considerando que sobre esta base hay necesidad de estimar los cuatro
motivos que integran este recurso, porque la demanda inicial del pleito a que
se contrae no contiene accion que nazca del incumplimiento del contrato de
transporte, toda vez que no se funda en el retraso de la llegada de las
mercancias ni de ningun otro vinculo contractual entre las partes
contendientes, careciendo, por tanto, de aplicacion el articulo 371 del Codigo
de Comercio, en que principalmente descansa el fallo recurrido, sino que se
limita a pedir la reparacion de los daños y perjuicios producidos en el
patrimonio del actor por la injustificada y dolosa negativa del porteador a la
entrega de las mercancias a su nombre consignadas, segun lo reconoce la
sentencia, y cuya responsabilidad esta claramente sancionada en el articulo
1902 del Codigo Civil, que obliga por el siguiente a la Compañia demandada
como ligada con el causante de aquellos por relaciones de caracter
economico y de jerarquia administrativa."
"Considering that the sentence in question recognizes, in virtue of the facts
which it declares, in relation to the evidence in the case: (1) that the invoice
issued by the railroad company in favor of the plaintiff contemplated that the
empty receptacles referred to in the complaint should be returned to the
consignors with wines and liquors; (2) that when the said merchandise
reached their destination, their delivery to the consignee was refused by the
station agent without justification and withfraudulent intent, and (3) that the
lack of delivery of these goods when they were demanded by the plaintiff
caused him losses and damages of considerable importance, as he was a
wholesale vendor of wines and liquors and he failed to realize the profits
when he was unable to fill the orders sent to him by the consignors of the
receptacles:
"Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding the four
assignments of error, as the original complaint did not contain any cause of
action arising from non-fulfilment of a contract of transportation, because the
action was not based on the delay of the goods nor on any contractual
relation between the parties litigant and, therefore, article 371 of the Code of
Commerce, on which the decision appealed from is based, is not applicable;
but it limits itself to asking for reparation for losses and damages produced on
the patrimony of the plaintiff on account of the unjustified and fraudulent
refusal of the carrier to deliver the goods consigned to the plaintiff as stated
by the sentence, and the carrier's responsibility is clearly laid down in article
1902 of the Civil Code which binds, in virtue of the next article, the defendant
company, because the latter is connected with the person who caused the
damage by relations of economic character and by administrative hierarchy."
(Emphasis supplied.)
The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come
under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the
agent was unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the
subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of
a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it
was the employer and not the employee who was being sued.
Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.
In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359, 362-
365 [year 1907]), the trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff, a laborer of
the defendant, because the latter had negligently failed to repair a tramway,
in consequence of which the rails slid off while iron was being transported,
and caught the plaintiff whose leg was broken. This Court held:.
13
"It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the action that the
necessary conclusion from these collated laws is that the remedy for injuries
through negligence lies only in a criminal action in which the official criminally
responsible must be made primarily liable and his employer held only
subsidiarily to him. According to this theory the plaintiff should have procured
the arrest of the representative of the company accountable for not repairing
the track, and on his prosecution a suitable fine should have been imposed,
payable primarily by him and secondarily by his employer.
"This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this subject.
Article 1093 of the Civil Code makes obligations arising from faults or
negligencenot punished by the law, subject to the provisions of Chapter II of
Title XVI. Section 1902 of that chapter reads:
" 'A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there
is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
" 'SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable,
not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for
whom they should be responsible.
" 'The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the
damages caused by the minors who live with them.
xxx xxx xxx
" 'Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for
the damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in
which the latter may be employed or in the performance of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
" 'The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons
mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to avoid the damage.'"
"As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be
sufficient to point out that nowhere in our general statutes is the employer
penalized for failure to provide or maintain safe appliances for his workmen.
His obligation therefore is one 'not punished by the laws' and falls under civil
rather than criminal jurisprudence. But the answer may be a broader one. We
should be reluctant, under any conditions, to adopt a forced construction of
these scientific codes, such as is proposed by the defendant, that would rob
some of these articles of effect, would shut out litigants against their will
from the civil courts, would make the assertion of their rights dependent
upon the selection for prosecution of the proper criminal offender, and
render recovery doubtful by reason of the strict rules of proof prevailing in
criminal actions. Even if these articles had always stood alone, such a
construction would be unnecessary, but clear light is thrown upon their
meaning by the provisions of the Law of Criminal Procedure of Spain (Ley de
Enjuiciamiento Criminal), which, though never in actual force in these Islands,
was formerly given a suppletory or explanatory effect. Under article 111 of
this law, both classes of action, civil and criminal, might be prosecuted jointly
or separately, but while the penal action was pending the civil was
suspended. According to article 112, the penal action once started, the civil
remedy should be sought therewith, unless it had been waived by the party
injured or been expressly reserved by him for civil proceedings for the future.
If the civil action alone was prosecuted, arising out of a crime that could be
enforced only on private complaint, the penal action thereunder should be
extinguished. These provisions are in harmony with those of articles 23 and
133 of our Penal Code on the same subject.
14
"An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citation
of these articles suffices to show that the civil liability was not intended to be
merged in the criminal nor even to be suspended thereby, except as expressly
provided in the law. Where an individual is civilly liable for a negligent act or
omission, it is not required that the injured party should seek out a third
person criminally liable whose prosecution must be a condition precedent to
the enforcement of the civil right.
"Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be
regarded as subsidiary in respect of criminal actions against his employees
only while they are in process of prosecution, or in so far as they determine
the existence of the criminal act from which liability arises, and his obligation
under the civil law and its enforcement in the civil courts is not barred
thereby unless by the election of the injured person. Inasmuch as no criminal
proceeding had been instituted, growing out of the accident in question, the
provisions of the Penal Code can not affect this action. This construction
renders it unnecessary to finally determine here whether this subsidiary civil
liability in penal actions has survived the laws that fully regulated it or has
been abrogated by the American civil and criminal procedure now in force in
the Philippines.
"The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case
appears from the briefs before us to have arisen from the interpretation of
the words of article 1093, 'fault or negligence not punished by law,' as applied
to the comprehensive definition of offenses in articles 568 and 590 of the
Penal Code. It has been shown that the liability of an employer arising out of
his relation to his employee who is the offender is not to be regarded as
derived from negligence punished by the law, within the meaning of articles
1902 and 1093. More than this, however, it cannot be said to fall within the
class of acts unpunished by the law, the consequences of which are regulated
by articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. The acts to which these articles
are applicable are understood to be those not growing out of pre-existing
duties of the parties to one another. But where relations already formed give
rise to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi contract, then
breaches of those duties are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the
same code. A typical application of this distinction may be found in the
consequences of a railway accident due to defective machinery supplied by
the employer. His liability to his employee would arise out of the contract of
employment, that to the passengers out of the contract for passage, while
that to the injured bystander would originate in the negligent act itself."
In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother of the 8 or 9-
year-old child Salvador Bona brought a civil action against Moreta to recover
damages resulting from the death of the child, who had been run over by an
automobile driven and managed by the defendant. The trial court rendered
judgment requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,000 as
indemnity: This Court in affirming the judgment, said in part:
"If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of
Solana Street, had to stop his auto before crossing Real Street, because he
had met vehicles which were going along the latter street or were coming
from the opposite direction along Solana Street, it is to be believed that,
when he again started to run his auto across said Real Street and to continue
its way along Solana Street northward, he should have adjusted the speed of
the auto which he was operating until he had fully crossed Real Street and
had completely reached a clear way on Solana Street. But, as the child was
run over by the auto precisely at the entrance of Solana Street, this accident
could not have occurred if the auto had been running at a slow speed, aside
from the fact that the defendant, at the moment of crossing Real Street and
entering Solana Street, in a northward direction, could have seen the child in
15
the act of crossing the latter street from the sidewalk on the right to that on
the left, and if the accident had occurred in such a way that after the
automobile had run over the body of the child, and the child's body had
already been stretched out on the ground, the automobile still moved along a
distance of about 2 meters, this circumstance shows the fact that the
automobile entered Solana Street from Real Street, at a high speed without
the defendant having blown the horn. If these precautions had been taken by
the defendant, the deplorable accident which caused the death of the child
would not have occurred."
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been
prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the
child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of
the same act of negligence being a proper subject-matter either of a criminal
action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely
separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article
1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a
cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly
recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer
could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which,
after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising
from his crime.
Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the same
doctrine. In Bernal and Enverso vs. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant,
Ltd., 54 Phil., 327, the parents of the five- year-old child, Purificacion Bernal,
brought a civil action to recover damages for the child's death as a result of
burns caused by the fault and negligence of the defendants. On the evening
of April 10, 1925, the Good Friday procession was held in Tacloban, Leyte.
Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal had come from
another municipality to attend the same. After the procession the mother
and the daughter with two others were passing along Gran Capitan Street in
front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., owned by
defendant J. V. House, when an automobile appeared from the opposite
direction. The little girl, who was slightly ahead of the rest, was so frightened
by the automobile that she turned to run, but unfortunately she fell into the
street gutter where hot water from the electric plant was flowing. The child
died that same night from the burns. The trial court dismissed the action
because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. But this Court held,
on appeal, that there was no contributory negligence, and allowed the
parents P1,000 in damages from J. V. House who at the time of the tragic
occurrence was the holder of the franchise for the electric plant. This Court
said in part:
"Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined, he
nevertheless was led to order the dismissal of the action because of the
contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. It is from this point that a majority of
the court depart from the stand taken by the trial judge. The mother and her
child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on
the evening when the religious procession was held. There was nothing
abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the
mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing
and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water.
The doctrine announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf
and Pacific Co. ([1907], 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil Code
must again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the child and her
mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense
could only result in reduction of the damages."
16
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied
article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have
been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only
punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence,
nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil action for
fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year 1915]), the action was for
damages for the death of the plaintiff's daughter alleged to have been caused
by the negligence of the servant in driving an automobile over the child. It
appeared that the cause of the mishap was a defect in the steering gear. The
defendant Leynes had rented the automobile from the International Garage
of Manila, to be used by him in carrying passengers during the fiesta of Tuy,
Batangas. Leynes was ordered by the lower court to pay P1,000 as damages
to the plaintiff. On appeal this Court reversed the judgment as to Leynes on
the ground that he had shown that he exercised the care of a good father of a
family, thus overcoming the presumption of negligence under article 1903.
This Court said:
"As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised the care
and diligence of a good father of a family. He obtained the machine from a
reputable garage and it was, so far as appeared, in good condition. The
workmen were likewise selected from a standard garage, were duly licensed
by the Government in their particular calling, and apparently thoroughly
competent. The machine had been used but a few hours when the accident
occurred and it is clear from the evidence that the defendant had no notice,
either actual or constructive, of the defective condition of the steering gear."
The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus:.
"Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of
negligence, but also provides when the liability shall cease. It says:
" 'The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons
mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to avoid the damage.'"
"From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused
by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision
over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that that presumption is juris
tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows
necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in
selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good
father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from
liability.
"This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on
his own negligence and not on that of his servant."
The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court in Cerf vs.
Medel (33 Phil., 37 [year 1915]). In the latter case, the complaint alleged that
the defendant's servant had so negligently driven an automobile, which was
operated by defendant as a public vehicle, that said automobile struck and
damaged the plaintiff's motorcycle. This Court, applying article 1903 and
following the rule in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, said in part (p. 41) that:
"The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the
owner or director of a business or enterprise and the negligent acts are
17
committed while the servant is engaged in his master's employment as such
owner"
Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes
was Cuison vs. Norton & Harrison Co., 55 Phil., 18 (year 1930). The latter case
was an action for damages brought by Cuison for the death of his seven-year-
old son Moises. The little boy was on his way to school with his sister
Marciana. Some large pieces of lumber fell from a truck and pinned the boy
underneath, instantly killing him. Two youths, Telesforo Binoya and Francisco
Bautista, who were working for Ora, an employee of defendant Norton &
Harrison Co., pleaded guilty to the crime of homicide through reckless
negligence and were sentenced accordingly. This Court, applying articles 1902
and 1903, held:
"The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship
of pater familias. This theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his
own negligence and not on that of his servant." (Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes
[1915], 30 Phil., 624; Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. [1918], 38 Phil., 768.)
In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517
(year 1930) the plaintiff brought an action for damages for the demolition of
its wharf, which had been struck by the steamer Helen C belonging to the
defendant. This Court held (p. 526):
"The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's wharf
collapsed was a duly licensed captain, authorized to navigate and direct a
vessel of any tonnage, and that the appellee contracted his services because
of his reputation as a captain, according to F. C. Cadwallader. This being so,
we are of the opinion that the presumption of liability against the defendant
has been overcome by the exercise of the care and diligence of a good father
of a family in selecting Captain Lasa, in accordance with the doctrines laid
down by this court in the cases cited above, and the defendant is therefore
absolved from all liability."
It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary liability
is negatived by the six cases above set forth. He is, on the authority of these
cases, primarily and directly responsible in damages under article 1903, in
relation to article 1902, of the Civil Code.
Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant. We
study first, City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586 (year 1928). A
collision between a truck of the City of Manila and a street car of the Manila
Electric Co. took place on June 8, 1925. The truck was damaged in the amount
of P1,788.27. Sixto Eustaquio, the motorman, was prosecuted for the crime of
damage to property and slight injuries through reckless imprudence. He was
found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of P900, to indemnify the City of
Manila for P1,788.27, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Unable to collect the indemnity from Eustaquio, the City of Manila filed an
action against the Manila Electric Company to obtain payment, claiming that
the defendant was subsidiarily liable. The main defense was that the
defendant had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
the damage. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. This
Court held, in part, that this case was governed by the Penal Code, saying:
"With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the
conclusion that the provisions of the Penal Code govern. The Penal Code in
easily understandable language authorizes the determination of subsidiary
liability. The Civil Code negatives its application by providing that civil
obligations arising from crimes or misdemeanors shall be governed by the
provisions of the Penal Code. The conviction of the motorman was a
misdemeanor falling under article 604 of the Penal Code. The act of the
motorman was not a wrongful or negligent act or omission not punishable by
18
law. Accordingly, the civil obligation connected up with the Penal Code and
not with article 1903 of the Civil Code. In other words, the Penal Code affirms
its jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its jurisdiction. This is a case of
criminal negligence out of which civil liability arises and not a case of civil
negligence."
xxx xxx xxx
"Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal Code and not
to the Civil Code. Indeed, as pointed out by the trial judge, any different ruling
would permit the master to escape scot- free by simply alleging and proving
that the master had exercised all diligence in the selection and training of its
servants to prevent the damage. That would be a good defense to a strictly
civil action, but might or might not be to a civil action either as a part of or
predicated on conviction for a crime or misdemeanor. (By way of parenthesis,
it may be said further that the statements here made are offered to meet the
argument advanced during our deliberations to the effect that article 1902 of
the Civil Code should be disregarded and codal articles 1093 and 1903
applied.)"
It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's proposition,
because the Court of Appeals based its decision in the present case on the
defendant's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code and
not on his subsidiary liability arising from Fontanilla's criminal negligence. In
other words, the case of City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., supra, is
predicated on an entirely different theory, which is the subsidiary liability of
an employer arising from a criminal act of his employee, whereas the
foundation of the decision of the Court of Appeals in the present case is the
employer's primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code. We have
already seen that this is a proper and independent remedy.
Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is another case invoked by the
defendant. A motorman in the employ of the Manila Electric Company had
been convicted of homicide by simple negligence and sentenced, among
other things, to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of P1,000. An action
was then brought to enforce the subsidiary liability of the defendant as
employer under the Penal Code. The defendant attempted to show that it
had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting the
motorman, and therefore claimed exemption from civil liability. But this Court
held:
"In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold, (1)
that the exemption from civil liability established in article 1903 of the Civil
Code for all who have acted with the diligence of a good father of a family, is
not applicable to the subsidiary civil liability provided in article 20 of the Penal
Code."
The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in the
instant case, because the action there had for its purpose the enforcement of
the defendant's subsidiary liability under the Penal Code, while in the case at
bar, the plaintiff's cause of action is based on the defendant's primary and
direct responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code. In fact, the above
case destroys the defendant's contention because that decision illustrates the
principle that the employer's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the
Civil Code is different in character from his subsidiary liability under the Penal
Code.
In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the defendant has
failed to recognize the distinction between civil liability arising from a crime,
which is governed by the Penal Code, and the responsibility for cuasi-
delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code, and has likewise failed to give
due importance to the latter type of civil action.
19
The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. Onrubia (46 Phil., 327). That
case need not be set forth. Suffice it to say that the question involved was
also civil liability arising from a crime. Hence, it is as inapplicable as the two
cases above discussed.
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality
of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show
that there is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal
negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same
negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the
Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under articles
1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above
cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer — in this case the
defendant-petitioner — is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of
the Civil Code.
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be
sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing
doctrines that have been little understood in the past, it might not be
inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but
also simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to
the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa
aquilianawould have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or
injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence
— even the slightest — would have to be indemnified only through the
principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what
sphere would remain for cuasi-delitoor culpa aquiliana? We are loath to
impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd
and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to
uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not
use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a
principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles
1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence
is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous
cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable
doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the
defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles
1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of
unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability
effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property
first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and
cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under
our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the
primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the
Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil
wrongs, because the procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful and
productive of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that
professional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyances usually do not
have sufficient means with which to pay damages. Why then, should the
plaintiff be required in all cases to go through this roundabout, unnecessary,
20
and probably useless procedure? In construing the laws, courts have
endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of
employers and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect
society. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised
in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who
principally reap the profits resulting from the services of these servants and
employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful
conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has
said, "they should reproach themselves, at least, some for their weakness,
others for their poor selection and all for their negligence." And according to
Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just that such responsibility should
fall upon the principal or director who could have chosen a careful and
prudent employee, and not upon the injured person who could not exercise
such selection and who used such employee because of his confidence in the
principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this
primary responsibility of the employer on the principle of representation of
the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited (Vol.
7, p. 747) that before third persons the employer and employee "vienen a ser
como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la de
quien le emplea y utiliza." ("become as one personality by the merging of the
person of the employee in that of him who employs and utilizes him.") All
these observations acquire a peculiar force and significance when it comes to
motor accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating the
responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal
Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the
overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of
understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana,
there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the
civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another
remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although
this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has nevertheless rendered
practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy
based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we
are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time
we pointed out to the harm done by such practice and to restore the principle
of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil
Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or
culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no
longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is
believed, make for the better safeguarding of private rights because it re-
establishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that
an independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and
results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged
or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and
is hereby affirmed, with costs against the defendant- petitioner.
Yulo, C.J., Moran, Ozaeta and Paras, JJ., concur.
||| (Barredo v. Garcia, G.R. No. 48006, [July 8, 1942], 73 PHIL 607-621)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-24803. May 26, 1977.]
21
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of
Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. REGINALD HILL, minor,
and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-
appellees.
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.
DECISION
BARREDO, J p:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated
January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs.
Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the
complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill,
a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant
Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing
by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when
criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground that his
act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
"1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule
107, which is now Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court;
"2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-
adjudicata;
"3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill,
because he was relieved as guardian of the other defendant through
emancipation by marriage." (P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for
reconsideration of the defendants of such denial, reiterating the above
grounds that the following order was issued:
"Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on
January 14, 1965 and after thoroughly examining the arguments therein
contained, the Court finds the same to be meritorious and well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby
reconsidered by ordering the dismissal of the above entitled case.
"SO ORDERED.
"Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965." (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on
Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are
presenting for Our resolution the following assignment of errors:
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING THE
CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT —
I
"THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF
SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT,
AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT IS INAPPLICABLE;
II
22
"THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR
RES-ADJUDICATA;
III
"THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL
CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and
IV
"THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT
MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER
DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE." (page 4, Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants,
defendant-appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case
No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was
acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of
intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has
favored Us with a copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably because
appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the basis stated in the court's
decision. And so, when appellants filed their complaint against appellees
Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their
son, the appellees filed the motion to dismiss above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues
presented for Our resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in
the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code be applied
against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the
occurrence complained of, Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting
subsistence from his father, was already legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and
further clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or
negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly established in this
jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court
postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the
nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and
mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court
of Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our
own, that the same given act can result in civil liability not only under the
Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion holds:
"The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come
under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the
agent was unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the
subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of
a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it
was the employer and not the employee who was being sued." (pp. 615-616,
73 Phil.) 1
"It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been
prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the
child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of
the same act of negligence being a proper subject matter either of a criminal
action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely
separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article
1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of
23
a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully and
clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the
wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and
for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil
liability arising from his crime." (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2
"It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied
article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have
been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only
punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence,
nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil action for
fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code." (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3
"The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be
sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing
doctrines that have been little understood, in the past, it might not be
inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
"Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but
also simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, accordingly to
the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa
aquilina would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or
injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence
— even the slightest — would have to be indemnified only through the
principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what
sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to
impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation to absurd
and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to
uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not
use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a
principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles
1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
"Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence
is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous
cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable
doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the
defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles
1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of
unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium." (p. 620, 73 Phil.)
"Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal
Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the
overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of
understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa
aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by
virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is
another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has nevertheless
rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective
remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present
case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is
high time we pointed out to the harms done by such practice and to restore
the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et
seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream
of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that
its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal
Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding or private
24
rights because it re-establishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for the
further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues,
limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the
party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and
efficacious redress." (p. 621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the
foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia - that the concurrence of the
Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only acts of
negligence and not intentional voluntary acts — deeper reflection would
reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but
that in fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the
reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of
February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a
negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at
the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations "which are derived
from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law,
intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers
to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline qualification, "not
punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an
undesirable construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that
"killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth life" hence, the ruling that "(W)e will
not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a
principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development asculpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles
1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And so, because Justice Bacobo was
Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original text of the new
Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the
Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, "not punishable by law," thereby
making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are
criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or
negligent. Thus, the corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new
code, which is Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations derived from quasi-
delicts shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this
Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision,
Article 2177 of the new code provides:
"ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article
is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant."
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177)
through at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we
consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a
violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a 'culpa aquilian' or quasi-
delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and
individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between
criminal negligence and 'culpa extra-contractual' or 'cuasi-delito' has been
sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear,
sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist.
Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of
criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to
a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence,
but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article
forestalls a double recovery." (Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of
negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that
25
upholds "the spirit that giveth life" rather than that which is literal that killeth
the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And
considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil
Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability in a
civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the
civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111,
contemplate also the same separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit
of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress", to
borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific
Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to
"fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also
acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal
act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in
the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to
in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same
act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished
even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has
not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We
here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and
negligent acts which may be punishable by law. 4
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has
not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar
to the instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation
by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our
considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already
free from responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of
the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes
place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that
pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really
full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession
shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the
minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot
borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of
his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with
the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company." In the instant case, it is not controverted
that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting
subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually,
therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a
situation which is not unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the
joint and solidary liability of parents with their offending child under Article
2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in
order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons. 5 On the other
26
hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor
emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the
assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it
freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial
litigation. (See Manresa, id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing
someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a
minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child,
while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and
alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their
minor married child without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to
Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald.
However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of
equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become merely subsidiary to that of his
son.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is
ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against
appellees.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio and Martin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion Jr., J., is on leave.
Martin, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.
||| (Elcano v. Hill, G.R. No. L-24803, [May 26, 1977], 167 PHIL 462-475)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-33171. May 31, 1979]
PORFIRIO P. CINCO, petitioner-appellant, vs. HON. MATEO CANONOY,
Presiding Judge of the Third Branch of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
HON. LORENZO B. BARRIA, City Judge of Mandaue City, Second Branch,
ROMEO HILOT, VALERIANA PEPITO and CARLOS PEPITO, respondents-
appellees.
Eriberto Seno for appellant.
Jose M. Mesina for appellees.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner filed a complaint in the City Court for recovery of damages on
account of a vehicular accident involving his car and a jeepney driven by
respondent Romeo Hilot and operated by respondents Valeriana Pepito and
Carlos Pepito. Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against the driver. At
the pre-trial of the civil case counsel for the respondents moved for the
suspension of the civil action pending determination of the criminal case
invoking Section 3(b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The City Court granted
the motion and ordered the suspension of the civil case. Petitioner elevated
the matter on certiorari to the Court of First Instance, alleging that the City
Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in suspending the civil action for
being contrary to law and jurisprudence. The Court of First Instance dismissed
the petition; hence, this petition to review on certiorari.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not there can be an independent civil
action for damages to property during the pendency of the criminal action.
The Supreme Court held that an action for damages based on Articles 2176
and 2180 of the New Civil Code is quasi-delictual in character which can be
prosecuted independently of the criminal action.
27
Petition granted.
SYLLABUS
1. ACTIONS; DAMAGES; ACTION FOR DAMAGES BASED ON QUASI DELICT MAY
PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY. — Where the plaintiff made essential averments
in the complaint that it was the driver's fault or negligence in the operation of
the jeepney which caused the collision between his automobile and said
jeepney; that plaintiff sustained damages because of the collision; that a
direct causal connection exists between the damage he suffered and the fault
or negligence of the defendant-driver and where the defendant-operator in
their answer, contended, among others, that they observed due diligence in
the selection and supervision of their employees, a defense peculiar to
actions based on quasi-delict, such action is principally predicated on Articles
32176 and 2180 of the New Civil Code which is quasi-delictual in nature and
character. Liability being predicated on quasi-delict, the civil case may
proceed as a separate and independent court action as specifically provided
for in Article 2177.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 3(b), RULE 111 OF THE RULES OF COURT GOVERNS
CIVIL ACTIONS WHICH MUST BE SUSPENDED AFTER THE COMMENCEMENT
OF THE CRIMINAL. — Section 3 (b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court refers to
"other civil actions arising from cases not included in Section 2 of the same
rule" in which, "once the criminal action has been commenced, no civil action
arising from the same offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be
suspended in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the
criminal proceeding has been rendered". The civil action referred to in
Section 2(a) and 3(b), Rule 11 of the Rules of Court which should be
suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that arising from
the criminal offense and not the civil action based on quasi delict.
3. ID.; ID.; JURAL CONCEPT OF QUASI-DELICT. — The jural concept of a quasi-
delict is that of an independent source of obligation "not arising from the act
or omission complained, as a felony."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; QAUSI-DELICT INCLUDES DAMAGE TO PROPERTY. — The
concept of quasi-delict enunciated in Article 2176 of the New Civil Code is so
broad that it includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to
property. It makes no distinction between "damage to persons" on the one
hand and "damage to property" on the other. The word "damage" is used in
two concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for the harm done. And with
respect to "harm" it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and
property since "harm" is not limited to personal but also to property injuries.
An example of quasi-delict in the law itself which includes damage to property
in Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code which holds proprietors responsible for
damages caused by excessive smoke which may be harmful "to person or
property".
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO SUSPEND ACTION BASED
ON QUASI-DELICTA AFTER THE CRIMINAL HAS BEEN COMMENCED. —
Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in upholding the decision of
the city court suspending the civil action based on quasi-delict until after the
criminal action is finally terminated.
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J p:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu rendered on November 5, 1970.
The background facts to the controversy may be set forth as follows:
28
Petitioner herein filed, on February 25, 1970, a Complaint in the City Court of
Mandaue City, Cebu, Branch II, for the recovery of damages on account of a
vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney driven by Romeo
Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito, the last three being
the private respondents in this suit. Subsequent thereto, a criminal case was
filed against the driver, Romeo Hilot, arising from the same accident. At the
pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend
the civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit, invoking
Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, which provides: llcd
"(b) After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from
the same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in
whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal
proceeding has been rendered;"
The City Court of Mandaue City in an Order dated August 11, 1970, ordered
the suspension of the civil case. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
thereof, having been denied on August 25, 1970, 1 petitioner elevated the
matter on Certiorari to the Court of First Instance of Cebu, respondent Judge
presiding, on September 11, 1970, alleging that the City Judge had acted with
grave abuse of discretion in suspending the civil action for being contrary to
law and jurisprudence. 2
On November 5, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the Petition for Certiorari
on the ground that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
City Court in suspending the civil action inasmuch as damage to property is
not one of the instances when an independent civil action is proper; that
petitioner has another plain, speedy, and adequate remedy under the law,
which is to submit his claim for damages in the criminal case; that the
resolution of the City Court is interlocutory and, therefore, Certiorari is
improper; and that the Petition is defective inasmuch as what petitioner
actually desires is a Writ of Mandamus (Annex "R"). Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by respondent Judge in an Order dated
November 14, 1970 (Annex "S" and Annex "U").
Hence, this Petition for Review before this Tribunal, to which we gave due
course on February 25, 1971. 3
Petitioner makes these:
"ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
"1. THE TRIAL COURT, RESPONDENT JUDGE MATEO CANONOY, ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL OF THE CIVIL CASE NO. 189 FILED IN THE CITY
COURT OF MANDAUE SHOULD BE SUSPENDED UNTIL AFTER A FINAL
JUDGMENT IS RENDERED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
"2. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IN ORDER TO AVOID DELAY
THE OFFENDED PARTY MAY SUBMIT HIS CLAIM FOR DAMAGES IN THE
CRIMINAL CASE.
"3. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI IS NOT PROPER, BECAUSE THE RESOLUTION IN QUESTION IS
INTERLOCUTORY.
"4. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION IS
DEFECTIVE." 4
all of which can be synthesized into one decisive issue: whether or not there
can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the
pendency of the criminal action.
From the Complaint filed by petitioner before the City Court of Mandaue City,
Cebu, it is evident that the nature and character of his action was quasi-
29
delictual, predicated principally on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code,
which provide:
"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter. (1902a)"
"Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
"Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
"The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)"
Thus, plaintiff made the essential averments that it was the fault or
negligence of the driver, Romeo Hilot, in the operation of the jeepney owned
by the Pepitos which caused the collision between his automobile and said
jeepney; that damages were sustained by petitioner because of the collision;
that there was a direct causal connection between the damages he suffered
and the fault and negligence of private respondents.
Similarly, in the Answer, private respondents contended, among others, that
defendant, Valeriana Pepito, observed due diligence in the selection and
supervision of her employees, particularly of her co-defendant Romeo Hilot, a
defense peculiar to actions based on quasi-delict. 5
Liability being predicated on quasi-delict, the civil case may proceed as a
separate and independent civil action, as specifically provided for in Article
2177 of the Civil Code. prcd
"Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant. (n)"
The crucial distinction between criminal negligence and quasi-delict, which is
readily discernible from the foregoing codal provision, has been expounded in
Barredo vs. Garcia, et al., 73 Phil. 607, 620-621, 6 thus:
"Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but
also simple imprudence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to
the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa
aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or
injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence
— even the slightest would have to be indemnified only through the principle
of civil liability arising from crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere
would remain for quasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to
the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and
anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold
30
the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the
literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of
such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa
aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles
1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
"Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence
is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous
cases of criminal negligence which cannot be shown beyond reasonable
doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the
defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles
1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, otherwise, there would be many instances of
unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
"Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendants liability
effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property
first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and
cumbersome method of obtaining a relief. True, there is such a remedy under
our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the
primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the
Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil
wrongs because the procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful and
productive of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that
professional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyances usually do not
have sufficient means with which to pay damages. Why, then, should the
plaintiff be required in all cases to go through this roundabout, unnecessary,
and probably useless procedure? In construing the laws, courts have
endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice.
"At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of
employers and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect
society. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised
in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who
principally reap the profits resulting from the services of these servants and
employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful
conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has
said, 'they should reproach themselves, at least, some for their weakness,
others for their poor selection and all for their negligence.' And according to
Manresa, 'It is much more equitable and just that such responsibility should
fail upon the principal or director who could have chosen a careful and
prudent employee, and not upon the such employee because of his
confidence in the principal or director.' (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists
also base this primary responsibility of the employer on the principle of
representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work
already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third persons the employer and
employee 'vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del
dependiente en la de quien la emplea y utiliza' (become as one personality by
the merging of the person of the employee in that of him who employs and
utilizes him.) All these observations acquire a peculiar force and significance
when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of stressing and
accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.
"Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal
Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to overlapping or
concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of
the character and efficacy of the action for culpa-aquiliana, there has grown
up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the Civil
responsibility arising from crime, forgetting that there is another remedy,
which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this
31
habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has nevertheless rendered
practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy
based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we
are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we behave it is high time
we pointed out to the harm done by such practice and to restore the principle
of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil
Code to its full rigor. It is high time we cause the stream of quasi-delict or
culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no
longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is
believed, make for the better safeguarding of private rights because it
reestablishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason
that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and
results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged
or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress."
(Garcia vs. Florido, 52 SCRA 420, 424-425, Aug. 31, 1973). (Emphasis supplied)
The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly
recognized in section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, reading:
"Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32,
33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil
action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought
by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the
right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence."
Significant to note is the fact that the foregoing section categorically lists
cases provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, supra, as allowing of an
"independent civil action."
Tested by the hereinabove-quoted legal tenets, it has to be held that the City
Court, in suspending the civil action, erred in placing reliance on section 3 (b)
of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, supra, which refers to "other civil actions
arising from cases not included in the section just cited" (i.e., Section 2, Rule
111 above quoted), in which case "once the criminal action has being
commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted
and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found, until
final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered." Stated
otherwise, the civil action referred to in Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court, which should be suspended after the criminal action has been
instituted is that arising from the criminal offense not the civil action based
onquasi-delict. cdphil
Article 31 of the Civil Code then clearly assumes relevance when it provides:
"Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the
act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter."
For obviously, the jural concept of a quasi-delict is that of an independent
source of obligation "not arising from the act or omission complained of as a
felony." Article 1157 of the Civil Code bolsters this conclusion when it
specifically recognizes that:
"Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:
(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
32
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a)"
(Emphasis supplied)
It bears emphasizing that petitioner's cause of action is based on quasi-delict.
The concept of quasi-delict, as enunciated in Article 2176 of the Civil Code
(supra), is so broad that it includes not only injuries to persons but also
damage to property. 7 It makes no distinction between "damage to persons"
on the one hand and "damage to property" on the other. Indeed, the word
"damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for the
harm done. And with respect to "harm" it is plain that it includes both injuries
to person and property since "harm" is not limited to personal but also to
property injuries. In fact, examples of quasi-delict in the law itself include
damage to property. An instance is Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code which
holds proprietors responsible for damages caused by excessive smoke which
may be harmful "to persons or property."
In the light of the foregoing disquisition, we are constrained to hold that
respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in upholding the Decision of
the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, suspending the civil action based on
a quasi-delict until after the criminal case is finally terminated. Having arrived
at this conclusion, a discussion of the other errors assigned becomes
unnecessary. cdphil
WHEREFORE, granting the Writ of Certiorari prayed for, the Decision of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside, and
the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, Branch II, is hereby ordered to proceed
with the hearing of Civil Case No. 189 of that Court.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Cinco v. Canonoy, G.R. No. L-33171, [May 31, 1979], 179 PHIL 297-306)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 97336. February 19, 1993.]
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; FINDINGS OF THE
TRIAL COURT; RULE AND EXCEPTIONS. — It is the rule in this jurisdiction that
appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility
of witnesses, the latter court having heard the witnesses and having had the
opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner of testifying,
unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value
which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. (People vs. Garcia, 89
SCRA 440 [1979]; People vs. Bautista, 92 SCRA 465 [1979]; People vs.
Abejuela, 92 SCRA 503 [1979]; People vs. Arciaga, 98 SCRA 1 [1980]; People
vs. Marzan, 128 SCRA 203 [1984]; People vs., Alcid, 135 SCRA 280 [1985];
People vs. Sanchez, 199 SCRA 414 [1991]; People vs. Atilano, 204 SCRA 278
[1991]). Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not
the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence
33
introduced by the parties before the lower court. There are, however,
recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina vs. Asistio, Jr., this Court
took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions: "(1) When the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil.
15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95
Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts (Cruz v. Sosing, L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are
conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee
(Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]); (7) The
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia
v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA
593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth
in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court
of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is
contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242
[1970])." Petitioner has not endeavored to point out to Us the existence of
any of the above quoted exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual
findings of the trial and appellate courts must be respected.
2. CIVIL LAW; QUASI-DELICT; TORTS; ART. 21 OF THE CIVIL CODE;
CONSTRUED. — Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict is
limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness
or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a
civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law
concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not
only negligence, but intentional criminal acts as well such as assault and
battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the
Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting
the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts. with certain exceptions,
are to. be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or
omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In between
these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of Article
21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is
even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article
21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become
much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts.
(TOLENTINO, A.M. Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed., 72).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY; RULE; RATIONALE. — The
existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, 109 Phil. 629 [1960]; Estopa vs.
Piansay, 109 Phil. 640 [1960]) Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft
of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason
therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committee on the Proposed
Civil Code, from which We quote: "The elimination of this chapter is
proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been
definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil. 866 [1933]). The
history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in England has
shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing
women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the
abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the
American states . . ." This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision,
Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in
34
this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of
moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically
enumerate and punish in the statute books (Philippine National Bank vs.
Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 237 [1978]).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AWARD OF DAMAGES, JUSTIFIED BECAUSE OF FRAUD
AND DECEIT BEHIND IT; CASE AT BAR. — In the light of the above laudable
purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's
promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love
by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes
the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress,
proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the
promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle
her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify
the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to
marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to
her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however,
that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy. In the instant case, respondent Court found
that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for
and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that
he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on
appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-
in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." In short, the private
respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every
single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction — the kind
illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The
petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under
either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the
private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
seduction. Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be
applied-in a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral
seduction.
5. ID.; PARI DELICTO RULE; DEFINED; NOT APPRECIATED IN CASE AT BAR. —
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private
respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she
eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but
because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of
conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the
petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not,
therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal
fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." (Black's
Laws Dictionary, Fifth ed., 1004). At most, it could be conceded that she is
merely in delicto. "Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the
parties, where his transgression has been brought about by the imposition or
undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong
principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself procured
by fraud." (37 AM Jur 2d. 401). In Mangayao vs. Lasud, (11 SCRA 158 [1964])
We declared: "Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault,
there should be no action by one against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil
Code). This rule, however, has been interpreted as applicable only where the
fault on both sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where one
party is literate or intelligent and the other one is not (c.f. Bough vs.
Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209)."
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
35
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
review and set aside the Decision 1 of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 October 1989 Decision or
Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil
Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or not damages may be
recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. cdphil
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel,
filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint 2 for damages against the
petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She
alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino
and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in
her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at
the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student
taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan
City; before 20 August 1987; the latter courted and proposed to marry her;
she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married; they
therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school semester, which
was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's
parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the
marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with
him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with
him; a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards
her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of
such maltreatment, she sustained injuries, during a confrontation with a
representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the
complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not
to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone
living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering
the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00,
reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees
and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and
equitable. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No 16503.
In his Answer with Counterclaim, 3 petitioner admitted only the personal
circumstances of the parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest
of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those
alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he never
proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent;
he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to
live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop
coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived him by
stealing his money and passport; and finally, no confrontation took place with
a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that
the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was
unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has
suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award
of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-
Trial Order 4 embodying the stipulated facts which the parties had agreed
upon, to wit:
"1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan, while the defendant is single, Iranian, citizen and resident (sic) of
36
Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1, 1987 up to the
present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum-Northwestern,
Dagupan City, College of Medicine, second year medicine proper.
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette, Fernandez
Avenue, Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic) high
school graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the Manager of the
Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johnny Rabino introduced the defendant to the
plaintiff on August 3, 1986." cdll
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code,
rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision 5 favoring the private respondent.
The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's
fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
"IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty
thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of three
thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00)
pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs.
3. All other claims are denied." 6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a)
petitioner and private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a
woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual
advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses,
promised to marry private respondent, (d) because of his persuasive promise
to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of
that deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents — in accordance
with Filipino customs and traditions — made some preparations for the
wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs
and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f)
petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the
petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality, have
offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The
trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony
because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity and courage to come
to court and expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if
her claim was false. 7
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of
the evidence for the private respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by
the respondent Court as follows:
"According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that
she never had a boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just a few
days after they first met. He later proposed marriage to her several times and
she accepted his love as well as his proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987,
on which same day he went with her to her hometown of Banaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and inform them of their
relationship and their intention to get married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to
"E" (and their submarkings) of defendant with members of plaintiff's family or
with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that occasion, defendant told
plaintiff's parents and brothers and sisters that he intended to marry her
37
during the semestral break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents
thought he was good and trusted him, they agreed to his proposal for him to
marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to stay in their house
and sleep with plaintiff during the few days that they were in Bugallon. When
plaintiff and defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live
together in defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October,
1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to school,
and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her
sleep the whole day and night until the following day. As a result of this live-in
relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave her some
medicine to abort the foetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with defendant
and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told her that he
could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. That
was the time plaintiff left defendant, went home to her parents, and
thereafter consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain
in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and a
barangay tanod send by the barangay captain went to talk to defendant to
still convince him to marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could not
do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City, although the
truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant is still
single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had
informed them of his desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors
for the wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and
chickens, and even already invited many relatives and friends to the
forthcoming wedding." 8
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of
Appeals which docketed the case as CA-G R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief, 9 he
contended that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of
factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs. Cdpr
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged
decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In
sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the
following analysis:
"First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was
already 23 years old at the time, does not appear to be a girl of loose morals.
It is uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her unfortunate experience
with defendant and never had a boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower
court, a barrio lass 'not used and accustomed to the trend of modern urban
life', and certainly would (sic) not have allowed 'herself to be deflowered by
the defendant if there was no persuasive promise made by the defendant to
marry her.' In fact, we agree with the lower court that plaintiff and defendant
must have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have thought because of
the deception of defendant, for otherwise, she would not have allowed
herself to be photographed with defendant in public in so (sic) loving and
tender poses as those depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot
believe, therefore, defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him
except a waitress at the restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact
admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown of Banaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p.
54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a beach party together with the manager and
employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.),
and on April 1, 1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told
him to marry her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsnid.). Would defendant have left
Dagupan City where he was involved in the serious study of medicine to go to
38
plaintiff's hometown in Banaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of
special relationship between them? And this special relationship must indeed
have led to defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff,
communicated not only to her but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites
Rabino, the owner of the restaurant where plaintiff was working and where
defendant first proposed marriage to her, also knew of this love affair and
defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the
reason why plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant after she had
accepted defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral
character and must think so low and have so little respect and regard for
Filipino women that he openly admitted that when he studied in Bacolod City
for several years where he finished his B.S. Biology before he came to
Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City.
In other words, he also lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did not
marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising, then,
that he felt so little compunction or remorse in pretending to love and
promising to marry plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order
to satisfy his lust on her." 11
and then concluded:
"In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-
appellant's fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to
marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him
and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's
part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as these acts of appellant are
palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good customs, and public policy,
and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to our women,
coming as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of
our people and taking advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our
institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be made, under
Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the moral
damages and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered
him to do in its decision in this case." 12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26
March 1991; he raises therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of
the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had
not committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or
public policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private
respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for
liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the
fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino
customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with
Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a promise
to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable
because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which
purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the
basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not possess good
moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law wife" is now his
legal wife as their marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the
Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent,
petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the
39
live-in relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted for
consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even
if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private
respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts would not be
actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere breach
of promise is not actionable. 14
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to
the petition and the petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due
course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with. prLL
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's
arguments in support of his thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which boil
down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule
in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's
findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having heard the
witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their
deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial court had plainly
overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered, might affect the
result of the case. 15
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and
trial courts had overlooked any fact of substance or value which could alter
the result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not
the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence
introduced by the parties before the lower court. There are, however,
recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, inMedina vs. Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court
took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
"(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible (Luna v.
Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion
(Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing, L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When
the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957;
unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond
the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil.
401 [1958]); (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of
the trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v.
Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based
(Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,);
and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record
(Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970])."
Petitioner has not endeavored to point out to Us the existence of any of the
above quoted exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual findings of
the trial and appellate courts must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
40
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an
actionable wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the
New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason
therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committee on the Proposed
Civil Code, from which We quote:
"The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry
is not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs.
Syquia. 18 The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in
England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by
designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led
to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of
the American states .." 19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is
designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs
which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish
in the statute books. 20
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
"'But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs
defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless
gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless,
even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the
Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate
in the proposed Civil Code the following rule: LLpr
'ARTICLE 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.'
'An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: 'A' seduces the
nineteen-year old daughter of 'X.' A promise of marriage either has not been
made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present
laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above eighteen years of age. Neither can
any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though
the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and her
family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot
bring any action for damages. But under the proposed article, she and her
parents would have such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the foregoing rule is approved, would
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs
which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the
statutes." 21
Article 2176, of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
"Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter."
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness
or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a
civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law
concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not
41
only negligence, but intentional criminal acts as well such as assault and
battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the
Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting
the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts. with certain exceptions,
are to. be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or
omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In between
these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of Article
21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is
even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article
21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become
much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the
opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the
proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause
of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in
reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle
scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to
obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages
pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of
the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and
reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury
should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's
"fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry
plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to
live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part
that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent
surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina,
not because of lust but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by
the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could
not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or
Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was
above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied-in a
breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction.
Thus, inHermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court denied recovery of
damages to the woman because: LibLex
" . . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of
seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than
the complainant — who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly
enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are
supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere
apprentice pilot, but, also, because the court of first instance found that,
complainant 'surrendered herself' to petitioner because, 'overwhelmed by
her love' for him, she 'wanted to bind' him 'by having a fruit of their
engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.'"
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at
possible recovery if there had been moral seduction, recovery was eventually
denied because We were not convinced that such seduction existed. The
following enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said
case:
42
"The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in
the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had
beenseduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than
mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes
essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of
confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S.
vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —
'To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or
inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other
inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is
from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent Dig. tit. Seduction, par.
56). She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of
some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and
do have that effect, and which result in her ultimately submitting her person
to the sexual embraces of her seducer' (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
'On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or
deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is
insufficient to warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out sexual desire
or curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed
opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to
allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the
female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by; which a class of
adventuresses would be swift to profit.' (47 Am. Jur. 662).
xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one
whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age,
maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of
intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly
there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been
deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful
persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to
his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the
alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual relations
upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we
conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other
cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First
Instance in dismissing the complaint." 27
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras,
who recently retired from this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to
marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be
recovered:
" . . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was
due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, L-14628, Sept. 30,
1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7
Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29,
1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT
be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there was criminal or moral
seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it be the other
way around, there can be no recovery of moral damages, because here
mutual lust has intervened). . . . ."
43
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses
for the wedding preparations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471)." LLpr
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:
"It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos 30 still subsists,
notwithstanding the incorporation of the present article 31 in the Code. The
example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there was seduction, not
necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. But when
the sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or qualifying circumstance
of abuse of authority or influence, but the woman, already of age, has
knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an injury
which can be the basis for indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by wilfullness (sic), the
action lies. The court, however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is
sufficient to deceive the woman under the circumstances, because an act
which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit as
to an experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a
wrongful act and a resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the
act is not punishable under the criminal law and there should have been an
acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that reason."
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the
effect that granting, for argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the
private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him,
both parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil
Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the private
respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes
as far as stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or
damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her own doing," 33 for:
" . . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor
sooner or later. Take notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a
mere employee . . (Annex C ) or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a
luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who can give her
economic security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance (TSN, pp.
51-53, May 18, 1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept a
proposition that may have been offered by the petitioner." 34
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is
clear that he harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private
respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational
background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment.
Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved by good
faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstanced could
not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and
promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice,
beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her
and would want her to be his life partner. His was nothing but pure lust which
he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his
proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of
ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality
and so brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women.
It can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in
blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to
act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and
traditions.
44
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private
respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she
eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but
because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of
conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the
petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not,
therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal
fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35 At most,
it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto. cdphil
"Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where
his transgression has been brought about by the imposition or undue
influence of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally
rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by
fraud." 36
In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:
"Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no
action by one against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule,
however, has been interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both
sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is literate
or intelligent and the other one is not (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil.
209)."
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let
it not be said that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents
in letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same room in their house
after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to
protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the higher values
of morality and dignity.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the
instant petition is hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. cdll
SO ORDERED.
||| (Gashem Shookat Baksh v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97336, [February 19,
1993])
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 108017. April 3, 1995.]
MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, in her, own behalf and in behalf of the minor
children KRIZTEEN ELIZABETH, BEVERLY MARIE and NAPOLEON II, all
surnamed DULAY, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Eighth
Division, HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Quezon City, Br. 84,
SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC., and SUPERGUARD
SECURITY CORPORATION, respondents.
Yolanda Quisumbing-Javellana & Associates for petitioners.
Ambrosio Padilla Mempin Reyes & Calsan Law Offices for respondent
SUPERGUARD Security Corporation.
Padilla Jimenez Kintanar & Asuncion Law Firm for respondent SAFEGUARD
Investigation & Security Co.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION;
RULE. — It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before
the prosecution in the criminal action presents evidence is even far better
45
than a compliance with the requirement of an express reservation (Yakult
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 357 [1990]).
2. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; CAUSE OF ACTION; ELEMENTS FOR EXISTENCE
THEREOF. — A cause of action exists if the following elements are present,
namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission
on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for
which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. (Del Bros
Hotel Corporation v. CA, 210 SCRA 33 [1992]); Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Pundogar, 218 SCRA 118 [1993]).
3. ID.; ID.; ID; DETERMINED BY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINTS; CASE
AT BAR. — The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged
in the complaint as constituting the cause of action (Republic v. Estenzo, 158
SCRA 282 [1988]). The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is
to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his
argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and
prayer for relief (De Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, 112 SCRA 243
[1982]). An examination of the complaint in the present case would show that
the plaintiffs, petitioners herein, are invoking their right to recover damages
against the private respondents for their vicarious responsibility for the injury
caused by Benigno Torzuela's act of shooting and killing Napoleon Dulay, as
stated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the complaint. The general rule is that the
allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against
the defendants if, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid
judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROOF OF ALLEGATIONS; WHEN NECESSARY. — In
determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a
cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to
establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the
outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case. If the
allegations in a complaint can furnish a sufficient basis by which the
complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of
the defenses that may be assessed by the defendants (Rava Dev't. Corp. v. CA,
211 SCRA 152 [1992] citing Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 [1991]). To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of
cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not
exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous,
indefinite or uncertain (Azur v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]). Since the
petitioners clearly sustained an injury to their rights under the law, it would
be more just to allow them to present evidence of such injury. cdrep
4. CIVIL LAW; TORTS AND DAMAGES; QUASI-DELICT; CONSTRUED. — Well-
entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not only acts committed
with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. As far back
as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already
held that: ". . .Article 2176, where it refers to 'fault or negligence,' covers not
only acts 'not punishable by law' but also acts criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action
lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is
not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on
both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other
words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule
111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised
46
Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as quasi-
delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of
Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may
be punishable by law." The same doctrine was echoed in the case of Andamo
v. Intermediate Appellate Court (191 SCRA 195 [1990]), wherein the Court
held: "Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only
acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a civil action lies against
the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is prosecuted or found guilty
or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the
tortfeasor is actually also charged criminally), to recover damages on both
scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of
the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary." [Citing Virata v.
Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472]
5. ID.; ID.; RULE WHEN AN INJURY IS CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE
EMPLOYEE. — Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as aforequoted,
when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly
arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the
master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in
supervision over him after selection or both (Layugan v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363 [1988]). The liability of the employer under
Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse
against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such
employee (Kapalaran Bus Lines v. Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989]).
Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employee.
DECISION
BIDIN, J p:
This petition for certiorari prays for the reversal of the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated October 29, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 24646 which affirmed the
order of the Regional Trial Court dismissing Civil Case No. Q-89-1751, and its
resolution dated November 17, 1991 denying herein petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. cdll
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty.
Napoleon Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang sa Alabang," Alabang Village,
Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty
at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.
Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased
Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed
on February 8, 1989 an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela and
herein private respondents Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc.,
("SAFEGUARD") and/or Superguard Security Corp. ("SUPERGUARD"), alleged
employers of defendant Torzuela. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-89-1751 among others alleges the following:
1. . . .
"Defendants SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC,
(Defendant Safeguard) and SUPERGUARD SECURITY CORPORATION
(Defendant Superguard) are corporations duly organized and existing in
accordance with Philippine laws, with offices at 10th Floor, Manufacturers
Building, Inc., Plaza Santa Cruz, Manila. They are impleaded as alternative
47
defendants for, while the former appears to be the employer of defendant
BENIGNO TORZUELA (defendant TORZUELA), the latter impliedly
acknowledged responsibility for the acts of defendant TORZUELA by
extending its sympathies to plaintiffs.
"Defendant BENIGNO TORZUELA is of legal age, an employee of defendant
SAFEGUARD and/or defendant SUPERGUARD and, at the time of the incident
complained of, was under their control and supervision. . . .
"3. On December 7, 1988 at around 8:00 a.m., defendant TORZUEIA, while he
was on duty as security guard at the "Big Bang sa Alabang," Alabang Village,
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila shot and killed NAPOLEON V. DULAY with a .38
caliber revolver belonging to defendant SAFEGUARD, and/or SUPERGUARD
(per police Report dated January 7, 1989, copy attached as Annex A);
"4. The incident resulting in the death of NAPOLEON V. DULAY was due to the
concurring negligence of the defendants. Defendant TORZUELA'S wanton and
reckless discharge of the firearm issued to him by defendant SAFEGUARD
and/or SUPERGUARD was the immediate and proximate cause of the injury,
while the negligence of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD consists
in its having failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the
supervision and control of its employee to avoid the injury.
xxx xxx xxx"
(Rollo, pp. 117-118)
Petitioners prayed for actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages,
and attorney's fees. The said Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 was raffled to Branch
84 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided by respondent Judge
Teodoro Regino. cdphil
On March 2, 1989, private respondent SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground that the complaint does not state a valid cause of action.
SUPERGUARD claimed that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the
scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed
with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed by Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
"ARTICLE 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. — Every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."
Respondent SUPERGUARD further alleged that a complaint for damages
based on negligence under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the
one filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article 2176
applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In
addition, the private respondent argued that petitioners' filing of the
complaint is premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a
criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability
(Rollo, p. 55-59).
Respondent SAFEGUARD also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as
defendant on the ground that defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees
(Rollo, p. 96). LibLex
Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their cause of action against
the private respondents is based on their liability under Article 2180 of the
New Civil Code, which provides:
48
"ARTICLE 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though
the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx"
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners contended that a suit against alternative defendants is allowed
under Rule 3, Section 13 of the Rules of Court. Therefore, the inclusion of
private respondents as alternative defendants in the complaint is justified by
the following: the Initial Investigation Report prepared by Pat. Mario Tubon
showing that Torzuela is an employee of SAFEGUARD; and through overt acts,
SUPERGUARD extended its sympathies to petitioners (Rollo, pp. 64 and 98).
Meanwhile, an Information dated March 21, 1989 charging Benigno Torzuela
with homicide was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati and was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 89-1896.
On April 13, 1989, respondent Judge Regino issued an order granting
SUPERGUARD'S motion to dismiss and SAFEGUARD'S motion for exclusion as
defendant. The respondent judge held that the complaint did not state facts
necessary or sufficient to constitute a quasi-delict since it does not mention
any negligence on the part of Torzuela in shooting Napoleon Dulay or that the
same was done in the performance of his duties. Respondent judge ruled that
mere allegations of the concurring negligence of the defendants (private
respondents herein) without stating the facts showing such negligence are
mere conclusions of law (Rollo, p. 106). Respondent judge also declared that
the complaint was one for damages founded on crimes punishable under
Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code as distinguished from those
arising from quasi-delict. The dispositive portion of the order dated April 13,
1989 states:
"WHEREFORE, this Court holds that in view of the material and ultimate facts
alleged in the verified complaint and in accordance with the applicable law on
the matter as well as precedents laid down by the Supreme Court, the
complaint against the alternative defendants Superguard Security
Corporation and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., must be and
(sic) it is hereby dismissed." (Rollo, p. 110).
The above order was affirmed by the respondent court and petitioners'
motion for reconsideration thereof was denied. cdphil
Petitioners take exception to the assailed decision and insist that quasi-
delicts are not limited to acts of negligence but also cover acts that are
intentional and voluntary, citing Andamo v. IAC (191 SCRA 195 [1990]). Thus,
petitioners insist that Torzuela's act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes
a quasi-delict actionable under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code.
Petitioners further contend that under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code,
private respondents are primarily liable for their negligence either in the
selection or supervision of their employees. This liability is independent of the
employee's own liability for fault or negligence and is distinct from the
subsidiary civil liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The civil
action against the employer may therefore proceed independently of the
criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, Section 3 of the Rules of Court.
49
Petitioners submit that the question of whether Torzuela is an employee of
respondent SUPERGUARD or SAFEGUARD would be better resolved after trial.
Moreover, petitioners argue that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay is also
actionable under Article 33 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
"ARTICLE 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action
for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence." (Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, petitioners cite Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
which provides:
"Rule 111. . . .
SECTION 3. When civil action may proceed independently. — In the cases
provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the independent civil-action which has been reserved may be
brought by the offended party, shall proceed independently of the criminal
action, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." (Emphasis
supplied)
The term "physical injuries" under Article 33 has been held to include
consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide. Thus, petitioners
maintain that Torzuela's prior conviction is unnecessary since the civil action
can proceed independently of the criminal action. On the other hand, it is the
private respondents' argument that since the act was not committed with
negligence, the petitioners have no cause of action under Articles 2176 and
2177 of the New Civil Code. The civil action contemplated in Article 2177 is
not applicable to acts committed with deliberate intent, but only applies to
quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. Torzuela's act of
shooting Atty. Dulay to death, aside from being purely personal, was done
with deliberate intent and could not have been part of his duties as security
guard. And since Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers only acts done
within the scope of the employee's assigned tasks, the private respondents
cannot be held liable for damages. LexLib
We find for petitioners.
It is undisputed that Benigno Torzuela is being prosecuted for homicide for
the fatal shooting of Napoleon Dulay. Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides:
"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — When a criminal action
is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal
Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused."
(Emphasis supplied)
It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the
prosecution in the criminal action presents evidence is even far better than a
compliance with the requirement of an express reservation (Yakult Philippines
v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 357 [1990]). This is precisely what the
petitioners opted to do in this case. However, the private respondents
opposed the civil action on the ground that the same is founded on a delict
50
and not on a quasi-delict as the shooting was not attended by negligence.
What is in dispute therefore is the nature of the petitioner's cause of action.
The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the
complaint as constituting the cause of action (Republic v. Estenzo, 158 SCRA
282 [1988]). The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be
determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his
argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and
prayer for relief (De Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, 112 SCRA 243
[1982]). An examination of the complaint in the present case would show that
the plaintiffs, petitioners herein, are invoking their right to recover damages
against the private respondents for their vicarious responsibility for the injury
caused by Benigno Torzuela's act of shooting and killing Napoleon Dulay, as
stated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the complaint. prLL
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
"ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties
is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter."
Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for
limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions
resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176
covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are
voluntary and intentional. As far back as the definitive case of Elcano v.
Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held that:
". . . Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts
"not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action
lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is
not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on
both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other
words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule
111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as quasi-
delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of
Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may
be punishable by law." (Emphasis supplied)
The same doctrine was echoed in the case of Andamo v. Intermediate
Appellate Court (191 SCRA 195 [1990]), wherein the Court held:
"Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts
"not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a civil action lies against
the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is prosecuted or found guilty
or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the
tortfeasor is actually also charged criminally), to recover damages on both
scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of
the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary." [Citing Virata v.
Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472] (Emphasis supplied)
51
Private respondents submit that the word "intentional" in the Andamo case is
inaccurate obiter, and should be read as "voluntary" since intent cannot be
coupled with negligence as defined by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the absence of more substantial reasons, this Court will not disturb the
above doctrine on the coverage of Article 2176.
Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies
only to injuries intentionally committed pursuant to the ruling in Marcia v.
CA (120 SCRA 193 [1983]), and that the actions for damages allowed
thereunder are ex-delicto. However, the term "physical injuries" in Article 33
has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing death (Capuno
v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines 121 Phil. 638 [1965]; Carandang v.
Santiago 97 Phil. 94 [1955]). It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in
the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also
consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro 126 SCRA
293 [1983]). Although in the Marcia case (supra), it was held that no
independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the
result of criminal negligence, it must be noted however, that Torzuela, the
accused in the case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with reckless
imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless
imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33
lies. Cdpr
Private respondents also contend that their liability is subsidiary under the
Revised Penal Code; and that they are not liable for Torzuela's act which is
beyond the scope of his duties as a security guard. It having been established
that the instant action is not ex-delicto, petitioners may proceed directly
against Torzuela and the private respondents. Under Article 2180 of the New
Civil Code as aforequoted, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the
employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of
the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both
(Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court 167 SCRA 363 [1988]). The liability
of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior
showing of the insolvency of such employee (Kapalaran Bus Lines v.
Coronado 176 SCRA 792 [1989]). Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private
respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but also acts which are
intentional and voluntary, it was therefore erroneous on the part of the trial
court to dismiss petitioner's complaint simply because it failed to make
allegations of attendant negligence attributable to private respondents.
With respect to the issue of whether the complaint at hand states a sufficient
cause of action, the general rule is that the allegations in a complaint are
sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants if, admitting
the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in
accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exists if the following
elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever
means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the
part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3)
an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the
plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the
plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.
(Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, 210 SCRA 33 [1992]); Development Bank of
the Philippines v. Pundogar 218 SCRA 118 [1993]).
This Court finds, under the foregoing premises, that the complaint sufficiently
alleged an actionable breach on the part of the defendant Torzuela and
52
respondents SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD. It is enough that the
complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay resulting in the
latter's death; that the shooting occurred while Torzuela was on duty; and
that either SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer and
responsible for his acts. This does not operate however, to establish that the
defendants below are liable. Whether or not the shooting was actually
reckless and wanton or attended by negligence and whether it was actually
done within the scope of Torzuela's duties; whether the private respondents
SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD failed to exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family; and whether the defendants are actually liable, are
questions which can be better resolved after trial on the merits where each
party can present evidence to prove their respective allegations and defenses.
In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to
support a cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does
not have to establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of
action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the
case (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, supra). If the allegations in a complaint
can furnish a sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the
same should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be
assessed by the defendants (Rava Dev't. Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA 152 [1992]
citing Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA
663 [1991]). To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the
complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a
claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain
(Azur v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]). Since the petitioners clearly
sustained an injury to their rights under the law, it would be more just to
allow them to present evidence of such injury. cdrep
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby
GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals as well as the Order of the
Regional Trial Court dated April 13, 1989 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 is remanded to the Regional Trial Court for
trial on the merits. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Dulay v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108017, [April 3, 1995], 313 PHIL 8-
25)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-35095. August 31, 1973.]
GERMAN C. GARCIA, LUMINOSA L. GARCIA, and ESTER
FRANCISCO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE MARIANO M. FLORIDO OF THE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL, MARCELINO INESIN,
RICARDO VAYSON, MACTAN TRANSIT CO., INC., and PEDRO TUMALA Y
DIGAL,respondents.
Paulino A. Conol for petitioners.
Dominador M. Canastra and Wilfredo C . Martinez for private respondents.
Hon. Mariano M. Florido for and in his own behalf.
DECISION
ANTONIO, J p:
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Misamis Occidental, Branch III, in Civil Case No. 2850 (German C. Garcia, et al.
53
vs. Marcelino Inesin, et al.) dated October 21, 1971, dismissing petitioners'
action for damages against respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro
Tumala, "without prejudice to refiling the said civil action after conviction of
the defendants in the criminal case filed by the Chief of Police of Sindangan,
Zamboanga del Norte", and from the order of said Court dated January 21,
1972, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis
Occidental Hospital, together with his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester
Francisco, bookkeeper of said hospital, hired and boarded a PU car with plate
No. 241-8 G Ozamis 71 owned and operated by respondent, Marcelino Inesin,
and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a roundtrip from Oroquieta
City to Zamboanga City, for the purpose of attending a conference of chiefs of
government hospitals, hospital administrative officers, and bookkeepers of
Regional Health Office No. 7 at Zamboanga City. At about 9:30 a.m., while the
PU car was negotiating a slight curve on the national highway at kilometer 21
in Barrio Guisukan, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, said car collided with an
oncoming passenger bus (No. 25) with plate No. 77-4 W Z.N. 71 owned and
operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by defendant, Pedro
Tumala. As a result of the aforesaid collision, petitioners sustained various
physical injuries which necessitated their medical treatment and
hospitalization.
Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus were at the
time of the accident driving their respective vehicles at a fast clip, in a
reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross violation of traffic
rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU
car, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco,
filed on September 1, 1971 with respondent Court of First Instance of
Misamis Occidental an action for damages (Civil Case No. 2850) against the
private respondents, owners and drivers, respectively, of the PU car and the
passenger bus that figured in the collision, with prayer for preliminary
attachment.
On September 16, 1971, Marcelino Inesin and Ricardo Vayson filed their
answer in the aforementioned Civil Case No. 2850 admitting the contract of
carriage with petitioners but alleged, by way of defense, that the accident
was due to the negligence and reckless imprudence of the bus driver, as when
Ricardo Vayson, driver of the PU car, saw the oncoming passenger bus No. 25
coming from the opposite direction ascending the incline at an excessive
speed, chasing another passenger bus, he had to stop the PU car in order to
give way to the passenger bus, but, in spite of such precaution, the passenger
bus bumped the PU car, thus causing the accident in question, and, therefore,
said private respondents could not be held liable for the damages caused on
petitioners.
On September 29, 1971, respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro
Tumala, filed a motion to dismiss on three (3) grounds, namely: 1) that the
plaintiffs (petitioners) had no cause of action; 2) that the complaint carries
with it a prayer for attachment but without the requisite verification, hence
defective under the provision of Sec. 3, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court; and 3)
that the defendants (respondents), Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and its driver,
accused Pedro Tumala, had operated said passenger bus with maximum care
and prudence.
The principal argument advanced in said motion to dismiss was that the
petitioners had no cause of action for on August 11, 1971, or 20 days before
the filing of the present action for damages, respondent Pedro Tumala was
charged in Criminal Case No. 4960 of the Municipal Court of Sindangan,
Zamboanga del Norte, in a complaint filed by the Chief of Police for "double
serious and less serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence", and
54
that, with the filing of the aforesaid criminal case, no civil action could be filed
subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has been finally adjudicated,
pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, and, therefore, the filing
of the instant civil action is premature, because the liability of the employer is
merely subsidiary and does not arise until after final judgment has been
rendered finding the driver, Pedro Tumala, guilty of negligence; that Art. 33 of
the New Civil Code, is not applicable because Art 33 applied only to the
crimes of physical injuries or homicide, not to the negligent act or
imprudence of the driver.
On October 14, 1971, petitioners filed an opposition to said motion to dismiss
alleging that the aforesaid action for damages was instituted not to enforce
the civil liability of the respondents under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code
but for their civil liability on quasi-delicts pursuant to Articles 2176-2194, as
the same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising
from a crime under the Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-
delict or culpa extracontractual under the Civil Code, and the party seeking
recovery is free to choose which remedy to enforce.
In dismissing the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 2850, the lower
court sustained the arguments of respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and
Pedro Tumala, and declared that whether or not "the action for damages is
based on criminal negligence or civil negligence known as culpa aquiliana in
the Civil Code or tort under American law" there "should be a showing that
the offended party expressly waived the civil action or reserved his right to
institute it separately" and that "the allegations of the complaint in culpa
aquiliana must not be tainted by any assertion of violation of law or traffic
rules or regulations" and because of the prayer in the complaint asking the
Court to declare the defendants jointly and severally liable for moral,
compensatory and exemplary damages, the Court is of the opinion that the
action was not based on "culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict."
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on
January 21, 1972, hence this appeal on certiorari.
There is no question that from a careful consideration of the allegations
contained in the complaint in Civil Case No. 2850, the essential averments for
a quasi-delictual action under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are
present, namely: a) act or omission of the private respondents; b) presence of
fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the passenger
bus No. 25 by respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus
with the passenger car; c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by
petitioners as a result of the collision; d) existence of direct causal connection
between the damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of private
respondents; and e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations
between the parties. The circumstance that the complaint alleged that
respondents violated traffic rules in that the driver drove the vehicle "at a fast
clip in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in violation of
traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard
the PU car" does not detract from the nature and character of the action, as
one based on culpa aquiliana. The violation of traffic rules is merely
descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe for the protection of the
interests of others, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, which failure resulted in the injury on
petitioners. Certainly excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear
indication of negligence. Since the same negligent act resulted in the filing of
the criminal action by the Chief of Police with the Municipal Court (Criminal
Case No. 4960) and the civil action by petitioners, it is inevitable that the
averments on the drivers' negligence in both complaints would substantially
55
be the same. It should be emphasized that the same negligent act causing
damages may produce a civil liability arising from a crime under Art. 100 of
the Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-
contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code. This distinction has
been amply explained in Barredo vs. Garcia, et all (73 Phil. 607, 620-621). 1
It is true that under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the Revised
Rules of Court which became effective on January 1, 1964, in the cases
provided for by Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177 of the Civil Code, an independent
civil action entirely separate and distinct from the civil action, may be
instituted by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case,
provided said party has reserved his right to institute it separately, but it
should be noted, however, that neither Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule 111
fixes a time limit when such reservation shall be made. In Tactaquin v.
Palileo, 2 where the reservation was made after the tort-feasor had already
pleaded guilty and after the private prosecutor had entered his appearance
jointly with the prosecuting attorney in the course of the criminal
proceedings, and the tort-feasor was convicted and sentenced to pay
damages to the offended party by final judgment in said criminal case, We
ruled that such reservation is legally ineffective because the offended party
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or ommission of the
defendant. We explained in Meneses v. Luat 3 that when the criminal action
for physical injuries against the defendant did not proceed to trial as he
pleaded guilty upon arraignment and the Court made no pronouncement on
the matter or damages suffered by the injured party, the mere appearance of
private counsel in representation of the offended party in said criminal case
does not constitute such active intervention as could impart an intention to
press a claim for damages in the same action, and, therefore, cannot bar a
separate civil action for damages subsequently instituted on the same Found
under Article 33 of the New Civil Code.
In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners never intervened in
the criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro
Tumala, much less has the said criminal action been terminated either by
conviction or acquittal of said accused.
It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for
damages, petitioners have in effect abandoned their right to press recovery
for damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to recover them in
the present civil case.
As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private respondents
to the former has ceased to be involved in the criminal action. Undoubtedly
an offended party loses his right to intervene in the prosecution of a criminal
case, not only when he has waived the civil action or expressly reserved his
right to institute, but also when he has actually instituted the civil action. For
by either of such actions his interest in the criminal case has disappeared.
As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may
produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict
or culpa extracontractual. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while
the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, having always had its own
foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in
accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may
proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and
regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, "the proviso in Section 2 of Rule
111 with reference to . . . Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to
the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted . . . and
are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is
now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which is procedural, may also be
56
regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33
and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in
the proviso." 4 But in whatever way We view the institution of the civil action
for recovery of damages under quasi-delict by petitioners, whether as one
that should be governed by the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111 of the
Rules which require reservation by the injured party considering that by the
institution of the civil action even before the commencement of the trial of
the criminal case, petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene
therein, or one where reservation to file the civil action need not be made,
for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes
the reservation and the failure of the offended party to do so does not bar
him from bringing the action, under the peculiar circumstances of the case,
We find no legal justification for respondent court's order of dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the decision and order appealed from are hereby reversed and
set aside, and the court a quo is directed to proceed with the trial of the case.
Costs against private respondents.
||| (Garcia v. Florido, G.R. No. L-35095, [August 31, 1973], 152 PHIL 353-366)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 74761. November 6, 1990.]
NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL
R. ANDAMO, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil
Cases Division) and MISSIONARIES OF OUR LADY OF LA SALETTE,
INC., respondents.
Lope E. Adriano for petitioners.
Padilla Law Office for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; NATURE AND PURPOSE THEREOF DETERMINED
BY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT. — It is axiomatic that the nature of
an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as
constituting the cause of action. The purpose of an action or suit and the law
to govern it, including the period of prescription, is to be determined not by
the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but
rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. (De Tavera
vs. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc., G.R. No. L-48928, February 25, 1982,
112 SCRA 243.) The nature of an action is not necessarily determined or
controlled by its title or heading but by the body of the pleading or complaint
itself. To avoid possible denial of substantial justice due to legal technicalities,
pleadings as well as remedial laws should be liberally construed so that the
litigants may have ample opportunity to prove their respective claims.
(Dominguez vs. Lee, G.R. No. 74960-61, November 27, 1987, 155 SCRA 703)
2. CIVIL LAW; QUASI-DELICTS; ELEMENTS THEREOF. — A careful examination
of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles
2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-
delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must
respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
(Taylor vs. Manila Electric Company, 16 Phil. 8; Vergara vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 77679, September 30, 1987, 154 SCRA 564)
3. ID; ID; "FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE," CONSTRUED. — Article 2176 of the Civil
Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act or
omission constituting fault or negligence, and whenever Article 2176 refers to
"fault or negligence", it covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also
57
acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal
act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually
charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary. (Virata vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. L-46179,
January 31, 1978, 81 SCRA 472)
4. ID; ID; DISTINGUISHED FROM CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE. — According to the
Report of the Code Commission, Article 2177 of the Civil Code though at first
sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact
nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the
criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, which
is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its
own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such
distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or
"cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decisions of the SupremeCourt of Spain .
..
5. ID; ID; CIVIL ACTION, ENTIRELY INDEPENDENT OF THE CRIMINAL CASE. —
In Azucena vs. Potenciano, (5 SCRA 468, 470-471), the Court declared that in
quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is entirely independent of the criminal case
according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no logical
conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the
said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution — whether it be
conviction or acquittal — would render meaningless the independent
character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his
action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless
of the result of the latter."
6. ID; ID; EFFECT OF ACQUITTAL OR CONVICTION IN THE CRIMINAL CASE. — In
the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals (176 SCRA 591), this Court held that a
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil
Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart
and independent from a delict or crime — a distinction exists between the
civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or
culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce
civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for
quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the
acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil
case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal where thecourt has
declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which
case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of
the civil liability.
7. ID; PROPERTY; USE THEREOF, NOT WITHOUT LIMITATIONS; RECIPROCAL
DUTIES OF ADJOINING LANDOWNERS. — It must be stressed that the use of
one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code
provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a
manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM
NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal
duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner
so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we
recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such
structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care
so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand
the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or
damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim
indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
58
DECISION
FERNAN, J p:
The pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is
whether a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water
conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and
damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages under
Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the
resulting civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a
parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that
of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious
corporation. LexLib
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances,
including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and
eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners'
crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of
petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed
plants and other improvements to destruction.
In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action, docketed as Criminal
Case No. TG 907-82, before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 4
(Tagaytay City), against Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin,
officers and directors of herein respondent corporation, for destruction by
means of injunction under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed another action against
respondent corporation, this time a civil case, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-
748, for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction before the same court. 1
On March 11, 1983, respondent corporation filed its answer to the complaint
and opposition to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Hearings
were conducted including ocular inspections on the land. However, on April
26, 1984, the trial court, acting on respondent corporation's motion to
dismiss or suspend the civil action, issued an order suspending further
hearings in Civil Case No. TG-748 until after judgment in the related Criminal
Case No. TG-907-82.
Resolving respondent corporation's motion to dismiss filed on June 22, 1984,
the trial court issued on August 27,1984 the disputed order dismissing Civil
Case No. TG-748 for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was
instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. Said order was
anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the same
offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been
commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been
rendered in the criminal action." 2
Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court. 3
On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court, First Civil Cases Division,
promulgated a decision, 4 affirming the questioned order of the
trial court. 5 A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by
the Appellate Court in its resolution dated May 19, 1986. 6
59
Directly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case: No. TG-748 in
accordance with Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Pules of Court. Petitioners
contend that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil
Case No. TG-748 since it is predicated on a quasi-delict. Petitioners have
raised a valid point.
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the
facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action. 7 The
purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it, including the period of
prescription, is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the
action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its
allegations and prayer for relief. 8 The nature of an action is not necessarily
determined or controlled by its title or heading but by the body of the
pleading or complaint itself. To avoid possible denial of substantial justice due
to legal technicalities, pleadings as well as remedial laws should be liberally
construed so that the litigants may have ample opportunity to prove their
respective claims. 9
Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of petitioners' complaint in Civil
Case No. TG-748:LibLex
4) That within defendant's land, likewise located at Biga (Biluso), Silang,
Cavite, adjacent on the right side of the aforesaid land of plaintiffs, defendant
constructed waterpaths starting from the middle-right portion thereof
leading to a big hole or opening, also constructed by defendant, thru the
lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks fence situated on the right side of
its cemented gate fronting the provincial highway, and connected by
defendant to a man-height inter-connected cement culverts which were also
constructed and lain by defendant cross-wise beneath the tip of the said
cemented gate, the left-end of the said inter-connected culverts again
connected by defendant to a big hole or opening thru the lower portion of
the same concrete hollow-blocks fence on the left side of the said cemented
gate, which hole or opening is likewise connected by defendant to the
cemented mouth of a big canal, also constructed by defendant, which runs
northward towards a big hole or opening which was also built by defendant
thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks fence which separates
the land of plaintiffs from that of defendant (and which serves as the exit-
point of the floodwater coming from the land of defendant, and at the same
time, the entrance-point of the same floodwater to the land of plaintiffs, year
after year, during rainy or stormy seasons.
"5) That moreover, on the middle-left portion of its land just beside the land
of plaintiffs, defendant also constructed an artificial lake, the base of which is
soil, which utilizes the water being channeled thereto from its water system
thru inter-connected galvanized iron pipes (No. 2) and complimented by rain
water during rainy or stormy seasons, so much so that the water below it
seeps into, and the excess water above it inundates, portions of the adjoining
land of plaintiffs.
"6) That as a result of the inundation brought about by defendant's
aforementioned water conductors, contrivances and manipulators, a young
man was drowned to death, while herein plaintiffs suffered and will continue
to suffer, as follows:
"a) Portions of the land of plaintiffs were eroded and converted to deep, wide
and long canals, such that the same can no longer be planted to any crop or
plant.
"b) Costly fences constructed by plaintiffs were, on several occasions, washed
away.
60
"c) during rainy and stormy seasons the lives of plaintiffs and their laborers
are always in danger.
"d) Plants and other improvements on other portions of the land of plaintiffs
are exposed to destruction. . . ." 10
A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil
action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.
All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by
the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person
for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred
by the plaintiff. 11
Clearly, from petitioners' complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by
respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners.
There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of
building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such
action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the
recovery of damages.
In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, 12 the Court applied Article 1902, now
Article 2176 of the Civil Code and held that "any person who without due
authority constructs a bank or dike, stopping the flow or communication
between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby causing loss and damages to a
third party who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use and
enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the payment of an
indemnity for loss and damages to the injured party."
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain
and the property subject of the instant case is privately owned, the fact
remains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have
sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and
contrivances built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the
complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or
omission of respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or
negligence, and the causal connection between the act and the damage, with
no pre-existing contractual obligation between the parties make a clear case
of a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. llcd
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without
limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing
cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third
person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining
landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must
use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights
and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build
structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and
maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to
adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of
nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or
a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage
suffered.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage
caused by his act or omission constituting fault or negligence, thus:
"Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict is governed by the provisions of this chapter."
61
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts
"not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action
lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is
not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to
the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases
vary. 13
The distinctness of quasi-delicts is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code,
which states:
"Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding
article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant."
According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision
though at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we
consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a
violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent
negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin,
having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from
criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa
extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain . . ." 14
In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court held that a quasi-
delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code
with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and
independent from a delict or crime — a distinction exists between the civil
liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa
extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil
liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for
quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the
acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil
case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal where the court has
declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which
case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of
the civil liability. prLL
In Azucena vs. Potenciano, 16 the Court declared that in quasi-delicts, "(t)he
civil action is entirely independent of the criminal case according to Articles
33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no logical conclusion than this, for
to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result
of the criminal prosecution — whether it be conviction or acquittal — would
render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the
clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the
then Intermediate Appellate Court affirming the order of dismissal of the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18 (Tagaytay City) dated August 17,
1984 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to
reinstate Civil Case No. TG-748 entitled "Natividad V. Andamo and Emmanuel
R. Andamo vs. Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc." and to proceed
with the hearing of the case with dispatch. This decision is immediately
executory. Costs against respondent corporation.
62
||| (Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74761, [November 6,
1990], 269 PHIL 200-210)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 4977. March 22, 1910.]
DAVID TAYLOR, plaintiff-appellee, vs. THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND
LIGHT COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
W.H. Lawrence, for appellant.
W.L. Wright, for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES; CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. — When the
immediate cause of an accident resulting in an injury is the plaintiff's own act,
which contributed to the principal occurrence as one of its determining
factors, he can not recover damages for the injury.
DECISION
CARSON, J p:
An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries,
instituted by David Taylor, a minor, by his father, his nearest relative.
The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street
railway and an electric light system in the city of Manila. Its power plant is
situated at the eastern end of a small island in the Pasig River within the city
of Manila, known as the Isla del Provisor. The power plant may be reached by
boat or by crossing a footbridge, impassable for vehicles, at the westerly end
of the island.
The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the same time when he received the
injuries complained of, 15 years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer,
more mature than the average boy of his age, and having considerable
aptitude and training in mechanics.
On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel
Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge of the Isla del
Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the
defendant, who had promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature
engine. Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys,
impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest
which both seem to have taken in machinery, spent some time in wandering
about the company's premises. The visit made on a Sunday afternoon, and it
does not appear that they saw or spoke to anyone after leaving the power
house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy.
After watching the operation of the traveling crane used in handling the
defendant's coal, they walked across the open space in the neighborhood of
the place where the company dumped the cinders and ashes from its
furnaces. Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps
scattered on the ground. These caps are approximately of the size and
appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it two long
thin wires by means of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity.
They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite,
and have in themselves considerable explosive power. After some discussion
as to the ownership of caps, and their right to take them, the boys picked up
all they could find, hung them of a stick, of which each took one end, and
carried them home. After crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl named
63
Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and all three went to the home of the boy
Manuel. The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps. They
thrust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket and obtained no
result. They next tried to break the cap with a stone and failed. Manuel
looked for a hammer, but could not find one. They then opened one of the
caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they
got matches, and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to
the contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to
all three. Jessie, who, when the boys proposed purring a match to the
contents of the cap, became frightened and started to run away, received a
slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded, and David
was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which
injured his right eye to such an extent as to necessitate its removal by the
surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds.
The evidence does not definitely and conclusively disclose how the caps came
to be on the defendant's premises, not how long they had been there when
the boys found them. It appeared, however, that some months before the
accident, during the construction of the defendant's plant, detonating caps of
the same kind as those found by the boys were used in sinking a well at the
power plant near the place where the caps were found; and it also appears
that at or about the time when these caps were found, similar caps were in
use in the construction of an extension of defendant's street car line to Fort
William McKinley. The caps when found appeared to the boys who picked
them up to have been lying there for a considerable time, and from the place
where they were found would seem to have been discarded as defective or
worthless and fir only to be thrown upon the rubbish heap.
No measures seem to have been adapted by the defendant company to
prohibit or prevent visitors from entering and walking about its premises
unattended, when they felt disposed as to do. As admitted in defendant
counsel's brief, "it is undoubtedly true that children in their play sometimes
crossed the footbridge to the island;" and, we may add, roamed about at will
on the unenclosed premises of the defendant, in the neighborhood of the
place where the caps were found. There is no evidence that any effort ever
was made to forbid these children from visiting the defendant company's
premises, although it must be assumed that the company or its employees
were aware of the fact that they not infrequently did so.
Two years before the accident, plaintiff spent four months at sea, as a cabin
boy on one of the interisland transports. later he took upon work in his
father's office learning mechanical drawing and mechanical engineering.
About a month after his accident he obtained employment as a mechanical
draftsman and continued in the employment for six months at a salary of
P2.50 a day; and it appears that he was a boy of more than average
intelligence, taller and more mature both mentally and physically than most
boys of fifteen.
The facts set our in the foregoing statement are to our mind fully and
conclusively established by the evidence of record, and are substantially
admitted by counsel. The only questions of fact which are seriously disputed
are plaintiff's allegations that the caps which were found by plaintiff on
defendant company's premises were the property of the defendant, or that
they had come from its possession and control, and that the company or
some of its employees left them exposed on its premises at the point where
they were found.
The evidence in support of these allegations is meager, and the defendant
company, apparently relying on the rule of law which places the burden of
proof of such allegations upon the plaintiff, offered no evidence in rebuttal,
and insists that plaintiff failed in his proof. We think, however, the plaintiff's
64
evidence is sufficient to sustain a findings in accord with his allegations in this
regard.
It was proven that caps, similar to those found by the plaintiff, were used,
more or less extensively, on the McKinley extension of the defendant
company's track; that some of these caps were used in blasting a well on the
company's premises a few months before the accident; that not far from the
place where the caps were found the company has a storehouse for the
materials, supplies, and so forth, used by it in its operations as a street
railway and a a purveyor of electric light; and that the place, in the
neighborhood of which the caps were found, was being used by the company
as a short of dumping ground for ashes and cinders. Fulminating caps or
detonators for the discharge by electricity of blasting charges by dynamite are
not articles in common use by the average citizen, and under all the
circumstances, and in the absence of all evidence to the contrary, we thing
that the discovery of twenty or thirty of these caps at the place where they
were found by the plaintiff on defendant's premises fairly justifies the
inference that the defendant company was either the owner of the caps in
question or had these caps under its possession and control. We think also
that the evidence tends to disclose that these caps or detonators were
willfully and knowingly thrown by the company or its employees at the spot
where they were found, with the expectations that they would be buried out
of sight by the ashes which it was engaged in dumping in that neighborhood,
they being old and perhaps defective; and, however this may be, we are
satisfied that the evidence is sufficient to sustained a finding that the
company or some of employees either willfully or through an oversight left
them exposed at a point on its premises which the general public including
children at play, were not prohibited from visiting, and over which the
company knew or ought to have known that young boys were likely to roam
abound in pastime or in play.
Counsel for appellant endeavors to weaken or destroy the probative value of
the facts on which these conclusions are based by intimating or rather
assuming that the blasting worked on the company's well and on its McKinley
extension was done by contractors. It was conclusively proven, however, that
while the workman employed in blasting the well was regularly employed by
J.G. White & Co., a firm of contractors, he did the work on the well directly
and immediately under the supervision and control of one of defendant
company's foremen, and there is no proof whatever in the record that the
blasting on the McKinley extension was done by independent contractors.
Only one witness testified upon this point, and while he stated that he
understood that a part of this work was done by contract, he could not say so
of his own knowledge, and knew nothing of the terms and conditions of the
alleged contract, or of the relations of the alleged contractor to the defendant
company. The fact having been proven that detonating caps were more or
less extensively employed on work done by the defendant company's
directions and on its behalf, we think that the company should have
introduced the necessary evidence to support its contention if it wished to
avoid the not unreasonable inference that it was the owner of the material
used in these operations and that it was responsible for tortious of negligent
acts of the agents employed therein, on the ground that this work had been
intrusted to independent contractors as to whose acts the maxim respondent
superior should not be applied. If the company did not in fact own or make
use of caps such as those found on its premises, as intimated by counsel, it
was a very simple matter for it to prove that fact, and in the absence of such
proof we think that the other evidence in the record sufficiently establishes
the contrary, and justifies the court in drawing the reasonable inference that
the caps found on its premises were its property, and were left where they
were found by the company or some of its employees.
65
Plaintiff appears to have rested his case, as did the trial judge his decision in
plaintiff's favor, upon the provisions of article 1089 of the Civil Code read
together with articles 1902, 1903, and 1908 of that Code.
"ART. 1089. Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi—contracts,
and by illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or
negligence occurs."
"ART. 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another
when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so
done.
"ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable,
not only for personal acts and omission, but also for those of the persons for
whom they should be responsible.
"The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the
damages caused by the minors who alive with them.
xxx xxx xxx
"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprises are equally liable for
the damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in
which the latter may be employed or on account of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons
mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to avoid the damage."
"ART. 1908. The owners shall be also be liable for the damages caused —
"1. By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due
diligence, and for kindling of explosive substance which may not have been
placed in a safe and proper place."
Counsel for defendant and appellant rests his appeal strictly upon his
contention that the facts proven at the trial do not establish the liability of
the defendant company under the provisions of these articles, and since we
agree with this view of the case, it is not necessary for us to consider the
various questions as to the form and the right of action (analogous to those
raised in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359),
which would perhaps, be involved in a decision affirming the judgment of the
court below.
We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code, as under the
generally accepted doctrine in the United States, the plaintiff in an action
such as that under consideration, in order to establish his right to a recovery,
must establish by competent evidence:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some
person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the
damage.
The propositions are, or course, elementary, and do not admit of discussion,
the real difficulty arising in the application of these principles to the particular
facts developed in the case under consideration.
It is clear that the accident could not have happened had not the fulminating
caps been left exposed at the point where they were found, or if their owner
66
had exercised due care in keeping them in a appropriate place; but it is
equally clear that plaintiff would not have been injured had he not, for his
own pleasure and convenience, entered upon defendant's premised, and
strolled around thereon without the express permission of the defendant,
and had he not picked up and carried away the property of the defendant
which he found on its premises, and had he not thereafter deliberately cut
open one of the caps and applied a match to its contents.
But counsel for plaintiff contends that because of plaintiff's youth and
inexperience, his entry upon defendant company's premises, and the
intervention of his action between the negligent act of defendant in leaving
the caps exposed on its premises and the accident which resulted in his injury
should not be held to have contributed in any wise accident, which should be
deemed to be the direct result of defendant's negligence in leaving the caps
exposed at the pace where they were found by the plaintiff, and this latter
the proximate cause of the accident which occasioned the injuries sustained
by him.
In support of his contention, counsel for plaintiff relied on the doctrine laid
down in many of the courts of last result in the United States in the cases
known as the "Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases, and the cases based thereon.
In the typical cases, the question involved has been whether a railroad
company is liable for an injury received by an infant of tender years, who
from mere idle curiosity, or for purposes of amusement, enters upon the
railroad company's premises, at a place where the railroad company's
premises, at a place where the railroad company knew, or had a good reason
to suppose, children who would likely to come, and there found explosive
signal torpedoes left exposed by the railroad company's employees, one of
which when carried away by the visitor, exploded and injured him; or where
such infant found upon the premises a dangerous machine, such as a
turntable left in such condition as to make it probable that children in playing
with it would be exposed to accident or injury therefrom and where the
infant did in fact suffer injury in playing with such machine.
In these, and in a great variety of similar cases, the great weight of authority
holds the owner of the premises liable.
As laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout ( 17 Wall. (84 U.S.), 657), (wherein the
principal question was whether a railroad company was liable for an injury
received by an infant while upon its premises, from idle curiosity, or for
purposed of amusement, if such injury was, under the circumstances,
attributable to the negligence of the company), the principles on which these
cases turn are that "while railroad company is not bound to the same degree
of care in regard to mere strangers who are unlawfully upon its premises that
it owes to passengers conveyed by it, it is not exempt from responsibility to
such strangers for injuries arising from its negligence or from its tortious
acts;" and that "the conduct of an infant of tender years is not to be judged
by the same rule which governs that of an adult. While it is the general rule in
regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury
resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been
free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The
care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity
only, and this is to be determined in such case by the circumstances of the
case."
The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout was vigorously
controverted and sharply criticized in severally state courts, and the supreme
court of Michigan in the case of Ryan vs. Towar (128 Mich., 463) formally
repudiated and disapproved the doctrine of the Turntable cased, especially
that laid down in Railroad Company vs. Stout, in a very able decision wherein
it held, in the language of the syllabus: (1) That the owner of land is not liable
67
to trespassers thereon for injuries sustained by them, not due to his wanton
or willful acts; (2) that no exception to this rule exists in favor of children who
are injured by dangerous machinery naturally calculated to attract them to
the premises; (3) that an invitation of license to cross the premises of another
can not be predicated on the mere fact that no steps have been taken to
interfere with such practice; (4) that there is no difference between children
and adults of an invitation or a license to enter upon another's premises.
Similar criticisms of the opinion in the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout
were indulged in by the courts in Connecticut and Massachusetts. (Nolan vs.
Railroad Co., 53 Conn., 461; 154 Mass., 349). And the doctrine has been
questioned in Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, and perhaps in other
States.
On the other hand, many if not most of the courts of last resort in the United
States, citing and approving the doctrine laid down in England in the leading
case of Lynch vs. Nurding (1 Q.B., 29, 35, 36), lay down the rule in these cases
in accord with that announced in Railroad Company vs. Stout (supra), and the
Supreme Court of the United States, in a unanimous opinion delivered by
Justice Harlan in the case of Union Pacific Railway Co. vs. McDonald (152 U.S,
262) on the 5th of March, 1894, reexamined and reconsidered the doctrine
laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout, and after an exhaustive and critical
analysis and review of may of the adjudged cases, both English and America,
formally declared that it adhered "to the principles announced in the case of
Railroad Co. vs. Stout."
In the case of Union Pacific Railway Co. vs. McDonald (supra) the facts were
as follows: The plaintiff, a boy 12 years of age, our of curiosity and for his own
pleasure, entered upon and visited the defendant's premises, without
defendant's express permission or invitation, and, while there, was by an
accident injured by failing into a burning slack pile of whose existence he had
knowledge, but which had been left by defendant on its premises without any
fence around it or anything to give warning of its dangerous condition,
although defendant knew or had reason to believe that it was in a place
where it would attract the interest or curiosity of passers-by. On these facts
the court held that the plaintiff could not be regarded as a mere trespasser,
for whose safety and protection while on the premises in question, against
the unseen danger referred to, the defendant was under no obligation to
make provision.
We quote at length from the discussion by the court of the application of the
principles involved to the facts in that case, because what is said there is
strikingly applicable in the case at bar, and would seem to dispose of
defendant's contention that, the plaintiff in this case being a trespasser, the
defendant's company owed him no duty, and in no case could be held liable
for injuries which would not have resulted but for the entry of plaintiff on
defendant's premises.
"We adhere to the principle announced in Railroad Co., vs. Stout (supra).
Applied to the case now before us, they require us to hold that the defendant
was guilty of negligence in leaving unguarded the slack pile, made by it in the
vicinity of its depot building. It could have forbidden all the persons from
coming to its coal mine for purposes merely of curiosity and pleasure. But it
did not do so. On the contrary, it permitted all, without regard to age, to visit
its mine, and witness its operation. It knew that the usual approach to the
mine was by a narrow path skirting its slack pit, close to its depot building, at
which the people of the village, old and young, would often assemble. It knew
that children were in the habit of frequenting that locality and playing around
the shaft house in the immediate vicinity of the slack pit. The slightest regard
for the safety of these children would have suggested that they were in
danger from being so near a pit, beneath the surface of which was concealed
68
(except when snow, wind, or rain prevailed) a mass of burning coals into
which a child might accidentally fall and be burned to death. Under all the
circumstances, the railroad company ought not to be heard to say that the
plaintiff, a mere lad, moved by curiosity to see the mine, in the vicinity of the
slack pit, was a trespasser, to whom it owed no duty, or for whose protection
it was under no obligation to make provisions.
"In Townsend vs. Wathen (9 East., 277, 281) it was held that if a man place
dangerous traps, baited with flesh, in his own ground, so near to a highway,
or to the premises of another, that dogs passing along the highway, or kept in
his neighbors premises, would probably be attracted by their instinct into the
traps, and in consequence of such act his neighbor's dog be so attracted and
thereby injured, an action on the case would lie. 'What difference,' said Lord
Ellenborough, C.J., 'is there a reason between drawing the animal into the
trap by means of his instinct which he can not resist, and putting him there by
manual force?' What difference, in reason we may observe in this case, is
there between an express license to the children of this village to visit the
defendant's coal mine, in the vicinity of its slack pile, and an implied license,
resulting from the habit of the defendant to permit them, without objection
or warning, to do so at will, for purposes of curiosity or pleasure? Referring to
the case of Townsend vs. Wathen, Judge Thompson, in his work on the Law of
negligence, volume 1, page 305, note, well ways: "It would be a barbarous
rule of law that would make the owner of land liable for setting a trap
thereon, baited with stinking meat, so that his neighbor's dog attracted by his
natural instincts, might run into it and be killed, and which would exempt him
from liability for the consequences of leaving exposed and unguarded on his
land a dangerous machine, so that his neighbor's child attracted to it and
tempted to intermeddle with it by instincts equally strong, might thereby be
killed of maimed for life."
Chief Justice Cooley, voicing the opinion of the supreme court of Michigan, in
the case of Powers vs. Marlow (53 Mich., 507), said that (p. 515):
"Children, wherever they go, must be expected to act upon childlike instincts
and impulses; and others who are chargeable with a duty of care and caution
toward them must calculate upon this, and take precautions accordingly. If
they leave exposed to the observation of children anything which would be
tempting to them, and which they in their immature judgment might
naturally suppose they were at liberty to handle or play with, they should
expect that liberty to be taken."
And the same eminent jurist in his treaties on torts, alluding to the doctrines
of implied invitations to visit the premises of another, says:
"In the case of young children, and other persons not fully sui juris, an implied
license might sometimes arise when it would not on behalf of others. Thus
leaving a tempting thing for children to play with exposed, where they would
be likely to gather for that purpose, may be equivalent to an invitation to
them to make use of it; and, perhaps if one were to throw away upon his
premises, near the common way, things tempting to children, the same
implication should arise." (Chap. 10, p. 303.)
The reasoning which led the Supreme Court of the United States to its
conclusions in the cases of Railroad Co., vs. Stout (supra) and Union Pacific
Railroad Co. vs. McDonald (supra) is not less cogent and convincing in this
jurisdiction than in that than in that wherein those cases originated. Children
here are actuated by similar childish instincts and impulses. Drawn by
curiosity and impelled by the restless spirit of youth, boys here as well as
there will usually be found wherever the public permitted to congregate. The
movement of machinery, and indeed anything which arouses the attention of
the young and inquiring mind, will draw them to the neighborhood as
69
inevitably as does the magnet draw the iron which comes within the range of
its magnetic influence. The owners of premises, therefore, whereon things
attractive to children are exposed, or upon which the public are expressively
or impliedly permitted to enter to or upon which the owner knows or ought
to know children are likely to roam about for pastime and in play, "must
calculate upon this, and take precautions accordingly." In such cases the
owner of the premises can not be heard to say that because the child has
entered upon his premises without his express permission he is a trespasser
to whom the owner owes no duty or obligation whatever. The owner's failure
to take reasonable precautions to prevent the child form entering premises at
a place where he knows or ought to know that children are accustomed to
roam about or to which their childish instincts and impulses are likely to
attract them is at least equivalent to an implied license to enter, and where
the child does not enter under such conditions the owner's failure to make
reasonable precaution to guard the child against the injury from unknown or
unseen dangers, placed upon such premises by the owner, is clearly a breach
of duty, a negligent omission, for which he may and should be held
responsible, if the child is actually injured, without other fault on its part than
that it had entered on the premises of a stranger without his express
invitation or permission. To hold otherwise would be expose to all the
children in the community to unknown perils and unnecessary danger at the
whim of the owners or occupants of land upon which they might naturally
and reasonably be expected to enter.
This conclusion is founded on reason, justice, and necessary, and neither the
contention that a man has a right to do what he will with his own property of
that children should be kept under the care of the parents or guardian, so as
to prevent their entering on the premises of others is of sufficient weight to
put it in doubt. In this jurisdiction as well as in the United States all private
property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so
used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights
and interests of the community (see U.S. vs. Toribio, 1 No. 5060, decided
January 26, 1910), and except as to infants of very tender years it would be
absurd and unreasonable in community organized as is that in which we live
to hold that parents or guardians are guilty of negligence or imprudence in
every case wherein they permit growing boys and girls to leave the parental
roof unattended, even if in the event of accident to the child the negligence
of the parents could in any event be imputed to the child so as to deprive it of
a right to recover in such cases — a point which we neither discuss not
decide.
But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property
without defendant's express invitation or permission would not have relieved
defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there by the plaintiff,
without other fault on his part, if such injury were attributable to the
negligence of the defendant, we are of opinion that under all the
circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps
exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received
by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to
the negligence of the defendant," and, on the other hand, we are satisfied
that plaintiff's action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting a match
to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant
injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore, is not
civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred.
Plaintiff contends, upon the authority of the Turntable and Torpedo cases,
that because of plaintiff's youth the intervention of his action between the
negligent act of the defendant leaving the caps exposed on its premises and
the explosion which resulted in his injury should not be held to have
contributed in any wise to the accident; and it is because we can not agree
70
with this proposition, although we accept the doctrine on the Turntable and
Torpedo cases, that we have thought of proper to discuss and to consider
that doctrine at length in this decision. As was said in case of Railroad Co. vs.
Stout (supra), "While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that entitle
him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of
another he must himself have been free from fault, such is not the rule in
regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution required of a child is
according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in
each case by the circumstance of the case." As we think we have shown,
under the reasoning on which rests the doctrine of the Turntable and
Torpedo cases, no fault which would relieve defendant of responsibility for
injuries resulting from negligence can be attributed to the plaintiff, a well-
grown boy of 15 years of age, because of his entry upon defendant's
uninclosed premises without express permission or invitation; but it is a
wholly different question whether such a youth can be said to have been free
from fault when he willfully and deliberately cut upon the detonating cap,
and placed a match to the contents, knowing, as he undoubtedly did, that his
action would result in an explosion. On this point, which must be determined
by "the particular circumstances of this case," the doctrine laid down in the
Turntable and Torpedo cases lends us no direct aid, although it is worthy of
observation that in all of the "Torpedo" and analogous cases to which our
attention has been directed, the record discloses that the plaintiffs, is whose
favor judgments have been affirmed, were of such tender years that they
were held not to have the capacity to understand the nature or character of
the explosive instruments which fell into their hands.
In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was well—grown youth
of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his
age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a
mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the
record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take
care. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, despite his
denials on the witness stands, he well knew the explosive character of the cap
with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him
in his attempt to produce an explosion, as described by the little girl who was
present, admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by
the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a
hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the
applications of a match to the contents of the cap, show clearly that he knew
what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had
reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous, in view of the
fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was with him at the time when he
put the match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and ran away.
True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature
of the explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of
the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he
incurred; but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be
expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly
produced the explosion. It would be going far to say that "according to his
maturity and capacity" he exercised such "care and caution" as might
reasonably be required of him, or that the defendant or anyone else should
be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under such
circumstances.
The law fixed no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the
necessary capacity to understand and appreciate the nature and
consequences of his own acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to
exercise with due care an precaution in the commission of such acts; and
indeed it would be impracticable and perhaps impossible so to do, for in the
71
very nature of things the question of negligence necessarily depends on the
ability of the minor to understand the character of his own acts and their
consequences; and the age at which a minor can be said to have such ability
will necessarily vary in accordance with the varying nature of the infinite
variety of acts which may be done by him. But some idea of the presumed
capacity of infants under the laws in force in these Islands may be gathered
from an examination of the varying ages fixed by our laws at which minors
are conclusively presumed to be capable to exercising certain rights and
incurring certain responsibilities, through it can not be said that these
provisions of law are of much practical assistance in cases such as that at bar,
except so far as they illustrate the rule that the capacity of a minor to become
responsible for his own acts varies with the varying circumstances of each
case. Under the provisions of the Penal code a minor over fifteen years of age
is presumed to be capable of committing a crime and is to be held criminally
responsible therefore, although the fact that he is less than eighteen years of
age will be taken into consideration as an extenuating circumstance (Penal
code, arts, 8 and 9). At 10 years of age a child may, under certain
circumstances, choose which parent it prefers to live with (Code of Civil
Procedure, sec. 771). At 14 it may petition for the appointment of a guardian
(Id., sec. 551), and may consent or refuse to be adopted (Id., sec. 765). And
males of 14 and females of 12 are capable of contracting of legal marriage
(Civil Code, art. 83; G.O., No., 68, sec. 1).
We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and
understanding to be sensible to the danger to which he exposed himself
when he put the match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the
sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and
appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which
would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act;
and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and
immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be
true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligent
act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless
plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident
which inflicted the injury.
The rule of the Roman law was: Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentit, non
intelligitur damnum sentire. (Digest, book 50, tit. 17, rule 203.)
The partidas contain the following provisions:
"The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him
through his own fault, and that he can not demand reparation therefore from
another." (Law 25, tit. 5 Partida 3.)
"And they even said that when a man received an injury through his own
negligence he should blame himself for it." (Rule 22, tit. 34 Partida 7.)
"According to ancient sages, when a man received an injury through his own
acts the grievance should be against himself and not against another." (Law 2,
tit. 7Partida 2.)
And while there does not appear to be anything in the Civil Code which
expressly lays down the law touching contributory negligence in this
jurisdiction, nevertheless, the interpretation placed upon its provisions by the
supreme court of Spain, and by this court in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf
and Pacific Co., (7 Phil. Rep., 359), clearly deny to the plaintiff in the case at
bar the right to recover damages from the defendant, in whole or in part, for
the injuries sustained by him.
The judgment of the supreme court of Spain of the 7th of March, 1902
(93 Jurispredencia Civil, 391), is directly in point. In that case the court said:
72
"According to the doctrine expressed in article 1902 of the Civil Code, fault or
negligence is a source of obligation when between such negligence and the
injury there exists, the relation of cause and effect: but if the injury produced
should not be the result of acts or omissions of a third party, the latter has no
obligation to repair the same, although such acts or omissions were
imprudent or unlawful, and much less when it is shown that the immediate
cause of the injury was the negligence of the injured party himself."
The same court, in its decision of June 12, 1900, said that "the existence of
the alleged fault or negligence is not sufficient without proof that it, and no
other cause, gave rise to the damage."
See also judgment of October 21, 1903.
To similar effect Scaevola, the learned Spanish writer, writing under that title
in his Jurisprudencia del Codigo Civil (1902 Anuario, p. 455), commenting on
the decision of March 7, 1902, says that "in accordance with the doctrine
expressed by article 1902 of the Civil Code, fault or negligence gives rise to an
obligation when between it and the damage there exists the relation of cause
and effect' but if the damage caused does not arise from acts or omissions of
a third person, there is no obligation to make good upon the latter, even
though such acts or omissions be imprudent or illegal, and much less so when
it is shown that the immediate cause of the damage has been the
recklessness the injured party himself."
And again —
"In accordance with the fundamental principle of proof, that the burden
thereof is upon the plaintiff, it is apparent that it is the duty of him who shall
claim damages to establish their existence. The decisions of April 9, 1896, and
March 18, July 6, and September 27, 1898, have especially supported the
principle, the first setting forth in detail the necessary points of the proof,
which are two: An act or omission on the part of the person who is to be
charged with the liability, and the production of the damage by said act or
omission.
"This includes, by inference, the establishment of a relation of cause or effect
between the act or the omission and the damage; the latter must be direct
result of one of the first two. As the decision of March 22, 1881, said, it is
necessary that damages result immediately and directly from an act
performed culpably and wrongfully' 'necessarily presupposing a legal ground
for imputability.'" (Decision of October 29, 1877.)
"Negligence is not presumed, but be proven by him who alleges it." (Scaevola,
Jurisprudencia del Codigo Civil, vol. 6, pp. 551, 552.)
(Cf. decisions of supreme court of Spain of June 12, 1900. and June 23, 1900.)
Finally, we think the doctrine is in this jurisdiction applicable to the case at
bar was definitely settled in this court in the maturely considered case of
Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (supra), wherein we held that while
"There are many cases (personal injury cases) in the supreme court of Spain
in which the defendant was exonerated." on the ground that "the negligence
of the plaintiff was immediate cause of the casualty" (decisions of the 15th of
January, the 19th of February, and the 7th of March, 1902, stated in
Alcubilla's Index of that year); none of the cases decided by the supreme
court of Spain "define the effect to be given the negligence of a plaintiff
which contributed to his injury as one of its causes, though not the principal
one, and we left to seek the theory of the civil law in the law in the practice of
another countries;" and in such cases we declared the law in this jurisdiction
to require the application of 'the principle of proportional damages," but
73
expressly and definitely denied the right of recovery when the acts of the
injured party were the immediate causes of the accident.
The doctrine as laid down in that case as follows:
"Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured
party shall be considered immediate causes of the accident. The test is
simple. Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury,
between the event itself, without which there could have been no accident,
and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independence of it, but
contributing to his own proper hurt. For instance, the cause of the accident
under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace
it. This produced the event giving occasion for damages — that is, sinking of
the track and the sliding of the iron rails. To this event, the act of the plaintiff
in walking by the side of the car did not contribute, although it was an
element of the damage which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been out
of place wholly or partly through this act or omission of duty, that would have
been one of the determining causes of the event or accident, for which he
would have been responsible. Where he contributes to the principal
occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover. Where, in
conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he
may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should
pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own
imprudence."
We think it is quite clear that under the doctrine thus stated, the immediate
cause of the explosion , the accident which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was
his own act of putting a match to the contents of the cap, and that having
"contributed to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he
can not recover."
We have not deemed it necessary to examine the effect of plaintiff's action in
picking up upon defendant's premises the detonating caps, the property of
the defendant, and carrying them sway to the home of his friend, as
interrupting the relation of cause and effect between the negligent act or
omission of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and
the injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff by the explosion of one of these caps.
Under the doctrine of the Torpedo cases, such action on the part of an infant
of very tender years would have no effect in relieving defendant of
responsibility, but whether in view of the well known facts admitted in
defendant's brief that "boys are snappers-up of unconsidered trifles," a youth
of the age and maturity of plaintiff should be deemed without fault in picking
up the caps in question under all the circumstances of this case, we neither
discuss not decide.
Twenty days after the date of this decision let judgment be entered reversing
the judgment of the court below, without costs to either party in this
instance, and ten days thereafter let the record be returned to the court
wherein it originated, where judgment will be entered in favor of the
defendant for the costs in first instance and the complaint dismissed without
day. So ordered.
||| (Taylor v. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co., G.R. No. 4977, [March 22,
1910], 16 PHIL 8-30)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 50959. July 23, 1980.]
HEIRS OF PEDRO TAYAG, SR., petitioners, vs. HONORABLE FERNANDO
S. ALCANTARA, PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. and ROMEO VILLA Y
CUNANAN, respondents.
74
DECISION
CONCEPCION, JR., J p:
This is a petition for certiorari, premised upon the following facts:
On September 25, 1974, the petitioners, heirs of Pedro Tayag, Sr., namely:
Crisanta Salazar, Pedro Tayag, Jr., Renato Tayag, Gabriel Tayag,
Corazon Tayag and RodolfoTayag, filed with the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac, Branch I, presided over by the respondent Judge, a complaint 1 for
damages against the private respondents Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and
Romeo Villa y Cunanan — docketed therein as Civil Case No. 5114 — alleging
among others that in the afternoon of September 2, 1974, while
Pedro Tayag Sr. was riding on a bicycle along MacArthur Highway at Bo. San
Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac on his way home, he was bumped and hit by a Philippine
Rabbit Bus bearing Body No. 1107 and Plate No. YL 604 PUB '74, driven by
Romeo Villa, as a result of which he sustained injuries which caused his
instantaneous death. In due time, the private respondents filed their
answer, 2 admitting some allegations and denying the other allegations of the
complaint. cdasia
Thereafter, the private respondents filed a motion to suspend the
trial 3 dated April 30, 1975, on the ground that the criminal case 4 against the
driver of the bus Romeo Villa was still pending in said court, and that Section
3, Rule III of the Revised Rules of Court enjoins the suspension of the civil
action until the criminal action is terminated. The respondent Judge granted
the motion, and consequently, suspended the hearing of Civil Case No.
5114. 5
On October 25, 1977, the respondent Judge rendered a decision 6 in Criminal
Case No. 836, acquitting the accused Romeo Villa of the crime of homicide on
the ground of reasonable doubt.
Thereafter, the private respondents filed a motion to dismiss 7 Civil Case No.
5114 on the ground that the petitioners have no cause of action against
them, the driver of the bus having been acquitted in the criminal action. The
petitioners opposed the motion 8 alleging that their cause of action is not
based on crime but on quasi-delict.
Acting upon the said motion as well as the opposition thereto, the
respondent Judge issued an order 9 dated April 13, 1978, dismissing the
complaint in Civil Case No. 5114.
The petitioners moved to reconsider; 10 however, the same was denied by
respondent Judge in his order 11 dated May 30, 1979.
Hence, the petitioners interposed the present petition for certiorari, to annul
and set aside the order of respondent Judge dated April 13, 1977, claiming
that the respondent Judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction
and/or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the disputed order, and that
there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
except thru the present petition.
After the private respondents had filed their comment, 12 this Court Resolved
to consider the said comment as answer to the petition, and the case was
deemed submitted for decision on September 3, 1979.
The only issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not the
respondent Judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction and/or with
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Civil Case No. 5114.
75
The petition is meritorious. Article 31 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the
act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter."
Evidently, the above quoted provision of the Civil Code refers to a civil action
based, not on the act or omission charged as a felony in a criminal case, but
one based on an obligation arising from other sources, 13 like quasi delict. 14
In the case at bar, the allegations of the complaint clearly show that
petitioners' cause of action was based upon a quasi delict. 15 Thus, the
complaint alleged among others:
xxx xxx xxx
"4. That on September 2, 1974, at about 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon at Sitio
Pagasa, Bo. San Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac, along MacArthur Highway and while
riding on a bicycle on his way home to Bo. San Sebastian, Tarlac, Tarlac,
Pedro Tayag, Sr. was bumped and hit by a Philippine Rabbit Bus bearing Body
No. 1107 and Plate No. YL 604 PUB '74 and as result of which he sustained
physical injuries which cause his instantaneous death and the bicycle he was
riding on was damaged and destroyed;"
5. That the Philippine Rabbit Bus . . . was at the time of the accident being
driven by defendant Romeo Villa y Cunanan in a faster and greater speed
than what was reasonable and proper and in a grossly negligent, careless,
reckless and imprudent manner, without due regards to injuries to persons
and damage to properties and in violation of traffic rules and regulations;
"6. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. has failed to exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees, particularly defendant Romeo Villa y Cunanan, otherwise the
accident in question which resulted in the death of Pedro Tayag, Sr. and
damage to his property would not have occurred;"
xxx xxx xxx
All the essential averments for a quasi delictual action are present, namely:
(1) an act or omission constituting fault or negligence on the part of private
respondent; (2) damage caused by the said act or omission; (3) direct causal
relation between the damage and the act or omission; and (4) no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties. In the case of Elcano vs. Hill, 16 this
Court held that:
". . ., a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether
or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that
the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to
recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality
only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par.
(e), Section 3, Rule III, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act
considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even
by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here
hold, in reiteration of Garcia that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and
negligent acts which may be punishable by law."
The petitioners' cause of action being based on a quasi-delict, the acquittal of
the driver, private respondent Romeo Villa, of the crime charged in Criminal
76
Case No. 836 is not a bar to the prosecution of Civil Case No. 5114 for
damages based on quasi-delict. 17

In the light of the foregoing, We hold that respondent Judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing Civil Case
No. 5114.

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal should be, as it is hereby set aside, and
the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, with costs
against the private respondents.

||| (Heirs of Tayag, Sr. v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 50959, [July 23, 1980], 187 PHIL
456-462)

77